Canadian Next Generation First Responder Initiative ...For the purposes of CNG-1R, a capability gap is defined as the difference between the capability (e.g., skills, equipment, processes,

Canadian Next Generation First Responder Initiative: Preliminary Capability Assessment

Michelle Royal CAE Inc. Prepared By: CAE Inc. 135 Innovation Drive Ottawa, Ont., K2K 3G7 Senior Test and Evaluation Subject Matter Expert Contractor's Document Number: 114117-003 Version 01 Contract Project Manager: Damon Gamble PWGSC Contract Number: W7714-135838/B/001/SV Technical Authority: Gerry Doucette, Portfolio Manager, Policing and law Enforcement Disclaimer: The scientific or technical validity of this Contract Report is entirely the responsibility of the Contractor and the contents do not necessarily have the approval or endorsement of the Department of National Defence of Canada.

Contract Report DRDC-RDDC-2017-C127 March 2017

IMPORTANT INFORMATIVE STATEMENTS The Canadian Next Generation First Responder Initiative: Preliminary Capability Assessment report was prepared in support of Canadian Safety and Security Program project CSSP-2016-TI-2226. The program is led by Defence Research and Development Canada’s Centre for Security Science, in partnership with Public Safety Canada. The objective of this study was to begin an analysis of science and technology (S&T) capabilities associated with selected major Canadian public safety events where police, fire fighters, paramedics and emergency management personnel serve together. The Assessment builds on the results of a CSSP-sponsored Canadian Next Generation First Responder (CNG-1R) initiative workshop held in Ottawa on December 5-6, 2016. This work is intended to: gather first responder technology requirements; enlist support for S&T innovation for the next generation of responders; identify specific opportunities to improve operator capabilities; and begin to unpack challenges associated with implementing new technologies. The ‘incident flowcharts’ depicted in the Assessment are intended to highlight fifty-four capabilities which correspond to the salient points of the critical events under consideration. It is anticipated that the clusters of capabilities depicted in the flowcharts will provide the analytical and conceptual footing for more detailed conversations between responders and S&T solution providers to help address remaining capability gaps. The Canadian Safety and Security Program is a federally-funded program to strengthen Canada’s ability to anticipate, prevent/mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from natural disasters, serious accidents, crime and terrorism through the convergence of science and technology with policy, operations and intelligence.

CAE Inc.1135 Innovation Drive

Ottawa, Ont., K2K 3G7 CanadaTel: 613-247-0342Fax: 613-271-0963

CSSP TASK 39CANADIAN NEXT-GENERATION FIRST RESPONDER

PRELIMINARY CAPABILITY ASSESSMENTFINAL REPORT

FOR

DEFENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CANADA –CENTRE FOR SECURITY SCIENCE

222 Nepean Street, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0K2

3 1 M a r c h 2 0 1 7

Document No. 114117-003 Version 01

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2017

© Sa Majesté la Reine (en droit du Canada), telle que représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2017

CSSP Task 39CNG-1R Preliminary Capability Assessment

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© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2017© Sa Majesté la Reine (en droit du Canada), telle que représentée par le ministre de la

Défense nationale, 2017

R E V I S I O N H I S T O R Y

Revision Reason for Change Origin Date

Version 01 Initial document issued 31 March 2017


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T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Background .......................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Objective .............................................................................................................. 2 1.3 This Document ..................................................................................................... 2

2 METHODOLOGY.................................................................................................... 4 2.1 Identification of Capability Gaps ........................................................................... 4 2.2 Development and Prioritization of Preliminary Capability Needs.......................... 6

3 CNG-1R PRELIMINARY CAPABILITY NEEDS ..................................................... 7 3.1 Situational Awareness (SA).................................................................................. 7 3.2 Communications and Information Sharing (CIS) .................................................. 8 3.3 Command, Control, and Coordination (CCC) ..................................................... 10 3.4 Responder Health and Safety (RHS).................................................................. 11 3.5 Logistics and Resource Management (LRM) ..................................................... 11 3.6 Casualty Management (CM)............................................................................... 12 3.7 Training and Exercise (TE)................................................................................. 13 3.8 Risk Assessment and Planning (RAP) ............................................................... 14 3.9 Intelligence and Investigation (II) ........................................................................ 15 3.10 Capability Needs According to Incident .............................................................. 16 3.11 Incident Flowcharts............................................................................................. 27

4 CNG-1R PRIORITIES ........................................................................................... 35 4.1 Survey Results ................................................................................................... 35

5 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 38 5.1 CNG-1R Future Path .......................................................................................... 38

6 REFERENCES...................................................................................................... 41

APPENDIX A WORKSHOP SUMMARY ................................................................ A-1 A.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................A-1 A.2 CONDUCT OF THE WORKSHOP..................................................................A-2 A.3 EMERGENCY SCENARIOS...........................................................................A-4

APPENDIX B INCIDENT SUMMARIES.................................................................. B-1 B.1 Fort McMurray Fire (2016) ..............................................................................B-1 B.2 Parliament Hill Shooting (2014) ......................................................................B-1 B.3 Moncton Shooting (2014)................................................................................B-2 B.4 Southern Alberta Flooding (2013)...................................................................B-2 B.5 Lac Mégantic Québec Train Derailment and Fire (2013) ................................B-3 B.6 Elliot Lake Mall Collapse (2012) .....................................................................B-3


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B.7 Manitoba Flood (2011)....................................................................................B-4 B.8 Toronto G20 Public Order Incidents (2010) ....................................................B-4

APPENDIX C INTERVIEW PROTOCOL ................................................................ C-1 C.1 Project Goal and Rationale ............................................................................ C-1 C.2 Interview Design ............................................................................................ C-1 C.3 Interview Questions ....................................................................................... C-1

APPENDIX D PRIORITIZATION PROTOCOL ....................................................... D-1

APPENDIX E PRIORITIZATION DATA...................................................................E-1

L I S T O F F I G U R E S

Figure 4-1: CNG-1R Priorities by Capability Domain..................................................... 36

L I S T O F T A B L E S

Table 2-1: CNG-1R Selected Incidents ........................................................................... 4 Table 3-1: Capability Needs According to Incident........................................................ 16


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L I S T O F A C R O N Y M S A N D D E F I N I T I O N S

CCC COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COORDINATIONCIS COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SHARINGCM CASUALTY MANAGEMENTCNG-1R CANADIAN NEXT GENERATION FIRST RESPONDERCSS CENTRE FOR SECURITY SCIENCECSSP CANADIAN SAFETY AND SECURITY PROGRAM

DHS DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITYDRDC DEFENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CANADA

FD FIRE DEPARTMENTFRRG FIRST RESPONDERS RESOURCE GROUP

HUSAR HEAVY URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE

II INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION

LRM LOGISTICS AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

MMA MONTREAL, MAINE, AND ATLANTIC (RAILWAY)

NFPA NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION

OPP ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE

PPE PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

R&D RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENTRAP RISK ASSESSMENT AND PLANNINGRCMP ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICERHS RESPONDER HEALTH AND SAFETY

S&T SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGYSA SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

TE TRAINING AND EXERCISETF TASK FORCE

U.S. UNITED STATES


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E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y

The Canadian Next Generation First Responder (CNG-1R) initiative is managed by the Centre for Security Science, Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC CSS). The intent of the CNG-1R program is inform the development of science and technology requirements and investment planning for the Canadian Safety and Security Program (CSSP).

This document describes an initial CNG-1R study intended to develop a baseline of capability needs. The results described in this document are not intended to represent a complete assessment of capability needs, but instead to offer a preliminary assessment from which future efforts can be based.

The initial CNG-1R study had three primary objectives:

1. Identify capability needs for near-term CSSP investments;

2. Identify processes and mechanisms to guide future technology development efforts; and

3. Develop a framework for periodic re-assessment of capability needs.

This document describes 54 capability needs identified by law enforcement officers, firefighters, emergency medical personnel, and emergency managers that participated in the response to major incidents across Canada.

The initial component of the CNG-1R process was a workshop sponsored by DRDC CSS to establish a foundation for ongoing consultation with the public safety community. The workshop occurred December 5-6, 2016 in Ottawa, Ontario. Following the workshop, the study team completed the CNG-1R Preliminary Capability Assessment. This included reviewing after action reports and other documentation associated with major incidents across Canada, and, conducting interviews and surveys with responders. These activities allowed the study team to identify capability gaps, and develop and prioritize preliminary capability needs.

At the conclusion of all activities, 12 needs were identified as the highest priority. Those include:

1. The ability to identify and provide appropriate personal protective equipment (i.e., garments, gear, and breathing apparatus) for incident type (e.g. weather, comfort, protection).

2. The ability to train leaders and supervisors to manage major incidents.

3. The ability to convey up-to-date information on threats and hazards to responders in real time.

4. The ability to obtain critical information about the extent/perimeter of the incident.

5. The ability to understand incident characteristics as they evolve.


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6. The ability to maintain resilient communications systems in urban and rural areas.

7. The ability to manage an incident using a joint command system.

8. The ability to understand the characteristics and location of threats and hazards on the incident scene.

9. The ability to deliver urgent trauma care on-scene during tactical incidents.

10. The ability to disseminate clear direction and tasking to responders on the incident scene, regardless of agency or service.

11. The ability to provide mental health support before, during, and after response operations.

12. The ability to share information in real time among services and agencies.

Three final recommendations for future activities are made based on the outcomes of this initial CNG-1R initiative.

1. The development of a standardized process to guide Canadian Safety and Security Program technology development activities.

2. The creation of a standing body of emergency responders that provide input to DRDC CSS on matters pertinent to technology development and acquisition issues.

3. The identification of collaboration opportunities that align with the baseline capability needs identified in this document. A suggested first step is a scan of ongoing efforts being undertaken by DRDC CSS domestic and international partners that are related to the highest priority CNG-1R capability needs.


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1 INTRODUCTION

This document contains the results of an initiative to identify the capability needs of Canada’s first responder community. The Canadian Next Generation First Responder (CNG-1R) initiative is managed by the Centre for Security Science, Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC CSS). The intent of the CNG-1R program is inform the development of science and technology requirements and investment planning for the Canadian Safety and Security Program (CSSP). The CSSP mission is to strengthen Canada’s ability to anticipate, prevent, mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from natural disasters, serious accidents, crime, and terrorism through the convergence of science and technology (S&T) with policy, operations, and intelligence.1

The CNG-1R initiative is a capabilities-based assessment in which the operators, the men and women responsible for emergency response operations, identified and prioritized capability gaps and needs. This methodology will allow technology planners in federal agencies, academia, and private industry to develop solutions based on the validated needs of the end-users. The CNG-1R results described in this document represent an initial effort to describe the capabilities that responders believe are necessary to more efficiently, effectively, and safely respond to major incidents in Canada.

This document describes 54 capability needs identified by law enforcement officers, firefighters, emergency medical personnel, and emergency managers who participated in the response to major incidents across Canada. Not all of the capability needs described in this document can be solved, in full or in part, by the development of new technology solutions. In addition, research efforts in the United States and abroad are already addressing some needs. However, the CNG-1R results highlight a number of opportunities for CSSP to develop new technology solutions to improve the ability of Canada’s responders for response to future incidents. The results also identify opportunities for collaboration which will allow CSSP to participate in ongoing efforts, thereby allowing Canadian responders to take advantage of innovation elsewhere.

1.1 Background

The CNG-1R effort parallels Project Responder, a similar series of studies conducted in the United States that identifies capability needs for major incident response. While many of the capability needs identified in the U.S. study are similar to those identified in this document, there are some key distinctions between the two countries that preclude DRDC from developing technology programs for Canadian responders based on the American results. First, the results of the American study assume nation-wide doctrine, funding mechanisms, and federal agencies’ roles and responsibilities that do not exist in Canada. Second, the response environment in Canada is different than in the United States. Differences include frequency of incidents,

1 “Canadian Safety and Security Program,” Defence Research and Development Canada, last modified December 10, 2014, http://www.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/en/dynamic-article.page?doc=canadian-safety-and-security-program/hzvlql9b


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prevalence of incident types, dual language requirements, and climate differences, The CNG-1R initiative represents an opportunity to collaborate with international partners in areas where capability needs are similar and develop distinct science and technology solutions for Canadian responders where they are not.

The initial component of the CNG-1R process was a workshop sponsored by DRDC CSS to establish a foundation for ongoing consultation with the public safety community. The workshop occurred December 5-6, 2016 in Ottawa, Ontario. First responders from across Canada gathered by invitation to share their knowledge to strengthen the CSSP knowledge of S&T requirements from tri-service operators (fire, police and paramedics) and help to shape CSSP priorities to respond to those requirements. The workshop reinforced the notion that the concepts of operator capability and community resilience must be based on strong partnerships to provide the depth for multi-agency response to major emergencies. At the same time, it was acknowledged that catastrophic events demand far more of the tri-services than can be achieved with normally available resources. Thus, the intervention of CSSP S&T solutions must be managed within practical and fiscal constraints that underscore the requirement for clear priority-setting in a Canadian context.2

Following the workshop, the study team completed the CNG-1R Preliminary Capability Assessment. As part of the assessment, the study team reviewed after action reports and other documentation associated with major incidents across Canada, and, conducted interviews and surveys with responders. A detailed methodology is described in the following section.

This document describes a preliminary set of capability needs that, if addressed, can provide significant increases in the ability of the public safety community to respond to diverse threats and hazards. The focus of this effort is on capabilities needed for major incident response, with the acknowledgement that any new solution must have utility for daily operations or it will not be used during the confusion of a major incident.

1.2 Objective

The initial CNG-1R study had three primary objectives:

1. Identify capability needs for near-term CSSP investments;

2. Identify processes and mechanisms to guide future technology assessment and development efforts; and

3. Develop a framework for periodic re-assessment of capability needs.

1.3 This Document

The intent of this initial CNG-1R study was to develop a baseline of capability needs. The results described in this document are not intended to represent a complete assessment of

2 A summary of the workshop can be found in appendix A.


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capability needs, but instead to offer a preliminary assessment from which future efforts can be based.


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2 METHODOLOGY

This section describes the methodology used to complete the CNG-1R Preliminary Capability Assessment. As noted above, this CNG-1R study was limited in terms of schedule and budget, with the intent to capture a baseline set of capability needs. As such, each phase of the methodology was abbreviated to align with the available schedule. There were two primary phases in the CNG-1R study: 1) identification of capability gaps, and 2) development and prioritization of preliminary capability needs.

2.1 Identification of Capability Gaps

For the purposes of CNG-1R, a capability gap is defined as the difference between the capability (e.g., skills, equipment, processes, procedures) that responders currently have, and that which they believe is necessary to safely, effectively, and efficiently carry out response operations. The study team sought to review capability gaps that have been consistently identified across major incidents in Canada. The team identified eight major incidents that reflect response operations for diverse threats and hazards.3. Table 2-1 lists the incidents used in this study:

Table 2-1: CNG-1R Selected Incidents

Incident Type

Fort McMurray Fire Natural Disaster

Parliament Hill Shooting Criminal Act

Moncton Shooting Criminal Act

Southern Alberta Flooding Natural Disaster

Lac Mégantic Train Derailment and Fire Transport Accident

Elliot Lake Mall Collapse Structural Collapse

Manitoba Flood Natural Disaster

G20 Riots Public Order Emergency

The first step in the identification of capability gaps was for the study team to review documentation on these incidents, including after action reports, media accounts, and other available reports. An official after action report was not available for each incident, but other documentation provided information on response operations and issues. The team capturedgaps that were explicitly identified in the documents and identified potential gaps indicated by the reports.

3 A description of each of the incidents selected as part of the CNG-1R study can be found in appendix B.


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The study team used a structure for organizing the capability gaps that was developed as part of the Project Responder series of capability assessments for emergency response. That structure uses nine capability domains to group similar needs. Each domain addresses capabilities that are needed across services and agencies regardless of incident type. Those domains include:

Situational Awareness: the capability to provide and distill specific knowledge concerning emerging threats, hazards, and conditions in a timely fashion to support incident management decisions across all phases of major incident response.

Communications and Information Sharing: the capability to seamlessly and dynamically connect multiple persons/entities and convey meaningful and actionable information to all relevant parties.

Command, Control, and Coordination: the ability to identify incident priorities, allocate scarce resources and exchange relevant information to make effective decisions in an emergency.

Responder Health and Safety: the ability to identify hazards to public safety personnel and develop appropriate mitigations to reduce morbidity and mortality associated with response activities.

Logistics and Resource Management: the capability to identify, acquire, track and distribute available equipment, supplies and personnel in support of incident response.

Casualty Management: the capability to provide rapid and effective search and rescue, medical response, prophylaxis and decontamination for large numbers of incident casualties and identify appropriate sheltering and transportation options.

Training and Exercise: the ability to provide instruction on necessary skills for major incident response and coordinate and practice implementation of plans and potential response prior to an incident.

Risk Assessment and Planning: the capability to identify and manage likely vulnerabilities and threats and develop appropriate responses to potential major incidents based on identified risk.

Intelligence and Investigation: the ability to collect, integrate, and assess information to develop conclusions or courses of action prior to a criminal incident or to identify the cause or responsible persons following an event.

The study team categorized each capability gap from the document review into one of these capability domains.

The second step in the identification of capability gaps included interviews with responders who participated in many of the selected incidents. The study team conducted telephonic interviews


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with personnel from the fire service, law enforcement, emergency management, search and rescue units, and federal agency investigators. When possible, the study team interviewed multiple responders from the same incident, or personnel from more than one service for the same incident. The study team used an interview protocol designed to capture capability gaps in each of the above-listed capability domains.4 The interviewer asked participants to describe their experiences with regard to each domain, gaps that they experienced, and the impact of those gaps. The interviewer also asked participants to describe potential solutions that might address those gaps. A study team member took detailed notes during each interview. At the conclusion of the interview process, the team compiled an integrated list of capability gaps identified during the document review and interview processes.

2.2 Development and Prioritization of Preliminary Capability Needs

For the purposes of this study, a capability need is defined as a succinct statement that describes a discrete task or function needed to conduct response operations. The study team translated the capability gaps captured in the first phase of this effort into statements of capability need. For example, one capability gap identified during the CNG-1R effort describes the difficulty that responders face in transmitting information about threats and hazards to responders on scene in a timely manner. The corresponding capability need is “the ability to convey up-to-date information on threats and hazards to responders in real time.” The study team developed 54 capability needs based on the information gathered from the document review and interview process. A list of the CNG-1R capability needs can be found in the following section of this document.

It is important for a wider group of responders to review the list of capability needs. The study team developed an online survey, asking participants to assess their level of priority for each of the capability needs. The survey was distributed through service associations to obtain input from across the nation. Nearly 100 participants provided input to the survey, including respondents from 10 of the 13 provinces and territories, and all levels of government (including First Nations). The results of the prioritization can be found in the CNG-1R Priorities section of this document.

To further validate the capability needs, the study team developed a series of flow diagrams that illustrate high-level response operations for each of the selected incidents. The flow diagrams also depict where individual capability needs would improve operations. The flow diagrams follow the list of capability needs in the following section.

4 The CNG-1R interview protocol can be found in appendix C.


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3 CNG-1R PRELIMINARY CAPABILITY NEEDS

This section provides a list of the 54 capability needs identified during this effort. The needs are categorized according to capability domain and not listed in priority order. Each capability needis followed by a short description, in some cases supplemented by examples from the incidents studied, to provide some additional context on the need. The purpose of the CNG-1R study is to identify capability needs that might be addressed by DRDC CSS investments. Not all of the needs listed below, however, can be solved with the application of new technology. The list below is intended to be a preliminary, but comprehensive, list of capability needs as identified through interviews with responders that participated in response activities or through review of after-action documents.

3.1 Situational Awareness (SA)

Color code in Table 3-1:

SA1. The ability to obtain critical information about the extent/perimeter of the incident.This capability need addresses the difficulty that responders face in determining the edge of the affected area(s) and identifying the critical or vulnerable infrastructure within the perimeter. In the Ft. McMurray wildfire, for example, conditions on the ground and in the air hindered the ability of responders to determine the location of the fire line and its proximity to homes and infrastructure.

SA2. The ability to understand incident characteristics as they evolve. This capability need addresses challenges that responders face to recognize how an incident is changing and distinguish how response strategies and tactics need to adapt as a result.

SA3. The ability to model and/or predict future characteristics of the incident. This capability need addresses the gap that responders face in incorporating incident-specific data into models to obtain projections in real time. Currently, the use of models is often restricted to experts who are not quickly available on the incident scene or models that produce generic estimates that do not integrate incident-specific information. Flood projection models currently exist, for example, but cannot predict where an ice jam, and subsequent flooding, will occur in any given year.

SA4. The ability to superimpose incident details on a geographic map of the area. This capability need addresses the difficulty that responders face in understanding the geographic location of resources, incident artifacts, critical and vulnerable infrastructure (e.g., public utilities, hospitals, schools) within the incident perimeter. This capability is particularly critical when personnel are arriving from other jurisdictions to support response operations and are unfamiliar with the area or when incidents destroy or cover existing landmarks (e.g., flood events, tornadoes).

SA5. The ability to access up-to-date floor plans and building/infrastructure data. This capability need addresses the difficulty that responders face when entering a building with limited information on the floor or building layout. The location of stairwells, fire hose


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standpipes, exits, etc. can prove critical to response operations, but this information is not often available when needed. In the Parliament Hill shooting response, for example, responders had limited access to building layout data, complicating efforts to clear the buildings.

SA6. The ability to geolocate responders on the incident scene (indoors and outdoors, above and below ground, in three dimensions). This capability addresses the need to understand the precise location of individual responders on the incident scene, and to subsequently assess their proximity to threats and hazards.

SA7. The ability to understand the characteristics and location of threats and hazards on the incident scene. This capability need addresses the difficulty that responders currently face in identifying and locating dangers they are exposed to during response operations. During the Lac Megantic response operations, for example, responders were unaware of the volatility of the crude oil being transported in the tank cars because the documentation was not correct. The actual volatility of the crude oil posed a greater threat to responders attempting to extinguish the fires that resulted from the crash.

SA8. The ability to convey up-to-date information on threats and hazards to responders in real time. This capability need addresses the gap in transmitting information about threats and hazards in a timely manner that would allow responders to take protective or tactical actions based on that information.

SA9. The ability to access images and video pertinent to the incident scene. This capability need addresses the gap that responders currently face in accessing available images or video from all available sources (e.g., traffic cameras, closed-circuit television systems, social media feeds) in sufficient time to impact response operations.

3.2 Communications and Information Sharing (CIS)


CIS1. The ability to monitor social media during an incident to inform operations and investigations. This capability need addresses the gap that responders face in accessing social media posts generated by individuals involved in an incident or bystanders to an incident, in a timely manner, to impact response operations. During the response to the Fort McMurray wildfire, for example, local residents posted images online showing the movement of the fire line, however, this information was not available to public safety personnel during the response.

CIS2. The ability to maintain interoperable (and bilingual) communications between agencies and services. This capability need addresses the difficulty that responders face in establishing and maintaining interoperable communications on the incident scene. Conflicts between systems, frequencies, channels, and language frequently


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prevent responders from transmitting and receiving critical and operations-specific information.

CIS3. The ability to use common terminology among agencies and services. This capability need addresses the difficulty caused when response agencies use different terms to refer to similar items or when not using plain language in communications. This issue can be further exacerbated because of the dual-language nature of Canada and in Canada-U.S. cross-border response operations.

CIS4. The ability to maintain standardized radio protocols between agencies and services. This capability need addresses the difficulty that exists when agencies are unable or unwilling to establish shared response channels and to use common practices for communicating on those channels.

CIS5. The ability to maintain resilient communications systems in urban and rural areas.This capability need addresses the difficulty that responders face when communications infrastructure is non-existent in remote locations or destroyed by the incident, leading to communications challenges. Responders need the ability to quickly establish or reconstitute communications infrastructure where it is lacking.

CIS6. The ability to communicate clear direction and messaging to the public before, during, and after incidents. This capability need addresses the difficulties that responders face while trying to communicate information such as evacuation guidance to the general public. For example, during the response to the Elliot Lake mall collapse, responders experienced issues in providing the public with consistent messaging on the status of the search and rescue operations.

CIS7. The ability to communicate with affected civilians and casualties on the incident scene. This capability addresses the need to provide information and instruction such as crowd control directions and protective action instructions to those impacted by the incident.

CIS8. The ability to share information in real time among services and agencies. This capability need addresses the difficulty that response agencies face in exchanging information (e.g., incident data, resource and task status) in sufficient time to impact response operations. This capability is complicated by the diverse file formats and communications systems used by different services and agencies.

CIS9. The ability to ingest, assess, and manage data from multiple sources. This capability need addresses the issue that responders face in accessing the growing amount of information available to them in sufficient time to impact response operations. Data useful to incident operations exists in numerous databases, images, video, model projections, etc., and is structured using diverse architectures and file formats. Responders currently lack a system that is able to ingest, assess, and manageinformation in multiple formats.

CIS10. The ability to disseminate clear direction and tasking to responders on the incident scene, regardless of agency or service. This capability need addresses the gap in conveying specific information to responders engaged in response operations who are using different radio systems. In some cases, response agencies are able to


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bridge radio systems, but more often dispatchers are needed to convey information to a liaison from each agency.

CIS11. The ability to access data and information (e.g. voice, text, images, video) on the incident scene. The push-to-talk radio systems used by public safety agencies provide only voice communications. This capability need addresses the gap that responders cannot access text or other forms of data while engaged in incident operations.

CIS12. The ability to communicate in the presence of loud ambient noise. Response operations frequently occur in the midst of loud noises (e.g., fire alarms, shouting from protestors, power tools), making it extremely difficult for responders to hear radio transmissions. This capability need addresses the difficulty that responders face in transmitting and receiving information in these conditions.

3.3 Command, Control, and Coordination (CCC)


CCC1. The ability to manage an incident using a joint command system. This capability need addresses the issues that occur when command and management decisions are made without including all key stakeholders in the decision-making process.

CCC2. The ability to maintain clear understanding of the roles, responsibilities, and legal authorities of agencies and services at federal, provincial, and municipal levels during response operations. Response to a large-scale incident can involve dozens of response, medical, utility, and regulatory agencies at multiple levels of government. This capability need addresses the issue that occur when the roles and responsibilities of each entity are not well understood, leading to conflicts and delays.

CCC3. The ability to develop a unified incident plan. Different services have different priorities during the response to a large-scale incident. The need to treat casualties has to be measured against the need to preserve evidence, for example. This capability need addresses the difficulties in developing strategic and tactical plans that incorporate multiple public safety concerns.

CCC4. The ability to train leaders and supervisors to manage major incidents. This capability need addresses the issue that not all responders in command positions are qualified to manage large-scale incidents. Responders believe that additional and standardized training is necessary to ensure that all command staff will be prepared to manage a major incident when necessary.

CCC5. The ability to document plans, decisions, and tasking during response operations. Incident and tactical commanders make numerous decisions that need to be recorded to support future tasking and operational plans. For example, being able to reference the decision to dispatch a team to fight one line of a fire should prevent another team from being tasked with the same objective. This same information is later used to support after action analysis. This capability need addresses the difficulty that responders


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currently face in being able to document key information during the turmoil of the incident.

3.4 Responder Health and Safety (RHS)


RHS1. The ability to provide mental health support before, during, and after response operations. This capability need addresses the issues that responders often face as a result of their participation in response operations. Often exacerbated when there are fatalities as a result of the incident, many responders experience symptoms of post-traumatic stress and may be reluctant to seek support for these symptoms.

RHS2. The ability to identify and provide appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) (i.e., garments, gear, and breathing apparatus) for incident type (e.g. weather, comfort, protection). This capability need addresses the nature of duty uniforms, specialized garments (e.g., turnout and specialized tactical gear), and other protective equipment. Responders believe that enhancements are necessary to improve the level of protection against common threats and enhance comfort.

RHS3. The ability to decontaminate large amounts of personal protective equipment during response operations. PPE can be exposed to toxins and other contaminants during response operations. Removing these toxins requires garments and equipment to be laundered in the station or sent out for specialized cleaning. This capability need addresses the difficulty that response agencies face when extended response operations require frequent decontamination of many garments.

3.5 Logistics and Resource Management (LRM)


LRM1. The ability to coordinate resources across agencies and services. This capability need addresses the difficulty in integrating resource data from multiple agencies to obtain a common and combined list of resources available for response operations.

LRM2. The ability to manage mutual aid resources on the incident scene. This capability need addresses the ability to organize, store, distribute, and track resources (e.g., personnel, equipment, vehicles) from agencies that participate in response operations.

LRM3. The ability to identify, acquire, and track resources sufficient for the size and scope of response activities. This capability need addresses the difficult task of understanding which resources are necessary, determining availability, ordering,


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monitoring transport and storage, managing use, and demobilizing resources for large-scale incidents.

LRM4. The ability to standardize type and kind of incident resources. This capability need addresses the issue that the composition and skills of response units are not consistent across Canada. The resources and skills of a search and rescue team or specialized tactical unit, including the equipment that they deploy with, may vary. This leads to problems when a municipality requests these teams through mutual aid.

LRM5. The ability to maintain up-to-date resource lists. Changes in resource availability may occur as items are purchased, put into service, or decommissioned. Contact data changes frequently and may be outdated. This capability need addresses the issue that it is difficult to frequently update resource data and know the accurate status of resources when necessary.

LRM6. The ability to confirm credentials and training certifications for responders arriving on scene. Responders, including mutual aid units and those who self-deploy,describe their skills and certifications when they arrive. It is difficult, however, to verify that responders have the training or level of skill claimed. Tasking someone who is unqualified can prove dangerous to the individual responders and those around them.This capability need addresses the difficulty in ascertaining that responders have the qualifications they describe.

LRM7. The ability to provide food and shelter for responders arriving on scene. In several incidents studied as part of the CNG-1R effort, researchers found that responders engaged in extended operations often lacked appropriate shelter and sustenance. This capability need addresses the issue that the health of responders and efficiency of operations are impacted when responders do not have adequate shelter and sustenance.

3.6 Casualty Management (CM)


CM1. The ability to deliver urgent trauma care on-scene during tactical incidents. Not all responders are trained to deliver medical care on scene, but a paramedic may not be immediately available. This capability gap addresses the need to be able to deliver basic medical support to sustain a patient until advanced care arrives. Due to delays in arriving ambulances, law enforcement officers and firefighters provided medical care to injured Royal Canadian Mounted Police personnel during the Moncton, New Brunswick shootings, for example.

CM2. The ability to standardize protocols for urgent trauma care on scene in hazardous incidents. This capability gap addresses the need to develop and use common practices and procedures designed to increase the likelihood that a patient will reach a medical centre alive.


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CM3. The ability to identify and geolocate signs of life and decomposition on the incident scene. Earlier detection and rescue improves outcomes for the injured and reduces trauma to the family members of the deceased. While this is often difficult when a trapped person can alert searchers to his or her location, it is more challenging when a person is unresponsive. This capability need addresses the difficulty in locating living and deceased victims on the incident scene.

CM4. The ability to plan for mass casualty incidents. Mass casualty incidents can involve tens, hundreds, or thousands of injuries and fatalities. Effective response to this type of incident requires the development of plans, creation of stockpiles, training of trauma and medical care staff, and the development of protocols to surge medical treatment or process remains. This capability need addresses the preparedness for incidents of this type.

CM5. The ability to conduct mass casualty and mass fatality operations. Several responders interviewed as part of the CNG-1R study expressed doubt about the ability to respond to mass casualty or mass fatality incidents in all but the largest cities in Canada. The responder felt that some communities may not be equipped to incidents that involve significant injuries or loss of life. This capability need addresses the gap in skills and capacity required to respond to mass casualty and/or mass fatality incidents.

CM6. The ability to estimate the number of casualties on the incident scene. This capability addresses the ability to calculate the number of potential casualties based on incident perimeter, time of day, capacity of building(s), planned events. This calculation informs key decisions such as the extent of search and rescue operations, resource requests, and hospital activations.

CM7. The ability to track the status of casualties from incident scene through reunification. Responders would like to be able to integrate casualty tracking data,including rescue location, triage site, transport vehicle, medical centre, reunification, and relocation destination. This capability need addresses the issue that similar information is collected at multiple locations, with limited ability to locate casualties after leaving the incident scene.

3.7 Training and Exercise (TE)


TE1. The ability to develop and provide joint training curriculum among agencies and services. Currently, responders receive much of their training in station with personnel from their agency. This limits the ability for personnel that may need to respond in joint operations to train together. This capability need addresses the lack of training available that integrates personnel from multiple agencies and services.

TE2. The ability to develop and conduct joint exercises among agencies and services. Responders believe that they need additional joint exercises to improve their ability to respond to large-scale incidents. While these exercises currently exist,


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responders state that they are limited in scale and scope. This capability need addresses the gap in the ability of agencies and services to develop joint exercises.

TE3. The ability to provide appropriate bilingual French and English training to responders throughout Canada. The United States provides many training opportunities unavailable in Canada, requiring responders to travel to the United States to obtain specializes skills. All of this instruction is provided in English, inhibiting the ability of Canadian responders to return home and disseminate training in areas where the French language is prevalent. This capability need addresses the gap that responders face in obtaining training and skills in their primary language.

TE4. The ability to provide training curriculum via virtual, simulation-based platforms.Responders believe that access to virtual platforms will allow widespread dissemination of training curriculum and exercise opportunities. This capability is especially pertinent for responders in remote areas that have limited access to training. This capability need addresses the difficulty that responders face in testing skills in training and exercise environments.

TE5. The ability to access a repository of best practice exercise scenarios and templates. This capability need addresses a gap that responders have in developing realistic scenarios for a diverse set of threats.

3.8 Risk Assessment and Planning (RAP)


RAP1. The ability to conduct standardized assessments of threats, hazards, and risks. This capability addresses the issue that many jurisdictions use different criteria to assess potential dangers to their community or do not have the tools to conduct those assessments. When an incident occurs, there is often limited ability to integrate these assessments to obtain a common picture of potential threats and hazards.

RAP2. The ability to develop plans based on threat, hazard, and risk assessments. Once jurisdictions develop a clear picture of potential dangers, they must develop a plan to mitigate threats and hazards, and respond should the threat materialize. This capability need addresses the ability to develop and obtain consensus on plans based on a standardized assessment of threats, hazards, and risks.

RAP3. The ability for key personnel (responders and municipal/provincial/federal employees) to understand roles and responsibilities in advance of incident response. This capability need addresses the issue that some stakeholders have not been trained for their position and function which can unnecessarily hinder response operations.

RAP4. The ability to access a repository of planning templates, including incident-specific plans. This capability need addresses the guidance and support available to municipalities in developing plans for preparing, mitigating, and responding to potential


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incidents. In some cases, materials are available, but communities may lack the expertise in translating these templates into incident-specific or actionable plans.

3.9 Intelligence and Investigation (II)


II1. The ability to provide investigative information to decision makers. This capability need addresses the difficulty that responders face in conveying information to incident and emergency managers in sufficient time to impact operational decisions. This capability need describes the upward flow of information from the field to command and management staff.

II2. The ability to access pertinent data and information in real time to support analysis and investigation. This capability need addresses the gap that responders face in acquiring information in time to advance an investigation. For example, an image of the shooter taken by a bystander was not available to investigators for hours after the Parliament Hill shooting.


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© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2017© Sa Majesté la Reine (en droit du Canada), telle que représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2017

3.10 Capability Needs According to Incident

Table 3-1 shows the capability needs according to the incidents where the need was observed (identified via interviews or review of documentation).

NOTE: Three capability needs were identified during interviews, but were not specifically associated with any of the selected incidents. These are marked with a “*” in the table.

Table 3-1: Capability Needs According to Incident

# Capability Need Fort

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G20

Situational Awareness

SA1 The ability to obtain critical information about the extent/perimeter of the incident

SA2 The ability to understand incident characteristics as they evolve

SA3 The ability to model and/or predict future characteristics of the incident

SA4 The ability to superimpose incident details on a geographic map of the area


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M

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G20

SA5 The ability to access up-to-date floor plans and building/infrastructure data

SA6The ability to geolocate responders on the incident scene (indoors and outdoors, above and below ground, in three dimensions)

SA7The ability to understand the characteristics and location of threats and hazards on the incident scene

SA8 The ability to convey up-to-date information on threats and hazards to responders in real time

SA9 The ability to access images and video pertinent to the incident scene


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M

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all

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G20

Communications and Information Sharing

CIS1 The ability to monitor social media during an incident to inform operations and investigations

CIS2 The ability to maintain interoperable (and bilingual) communications between agencies and services

CIS3 The ability to use common terminology among agencies and services

CIS4 The ability to maintain standardized radio protocols between agencies and services

CIS5 The ability to maintain resilient communications systems in urban and rural areas

CIS6The ability to communicate clear direction and messaging to the public before, during, and after incidents

CIS7 The ability to communicate with affected civilians and casualties on the incident scene

CIS8 The ability to share information in real time among services and agencies


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G20

CIS9 The ability to ingest, assess, and manage data from multiple sources

CIS10The ability to disseminate clear direction and tasking to responders on the incident scene, regardless of agency or service

CIS11 The ability to access data and information (e.g. voice, text, images, video) on the incident scene

CIS12 The ability to communicate in the presence of loud ambient noise


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M

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G20

Command, Control, and Coordination

CCC1 The ability to manage an incident using a joint command system

CCC2

The ability to maintain clear understanding of the roles, responsibilities, and legal authorities of agencies and services at federal, provincial, and municipal levels during response operations

CCC3 The ability to develop a unified incident plan

CCC4 The ability to train leaders and supervisors to manage major incidents

CCC5 The ability to document plans, decisions, and tasking during response operations


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M

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Responder Health and Safety

RHS1 The ability to provide mental health support before, during, and after response operations

RHS2

The ability to identify and provide appropriate personal protective equipment (i.e., garments, gear, and breathing apparatus) for incident type (e.g. weather, comfort, protection)

RHS3The ability to decontaminate large amounts of personal protective equipment during response operations


M

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G20

Logistics and Resource Management

LRM1 The ability to coordinate resources across agencies and services


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M

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G20

LRM2 The ability to manage mutual aid resources on the incident scene

LRM3The ability to identify, acquire, and track resources sufficient for the size and scope of response activities

LRM4 The ability to standardize type and kind of incident resources

LRM5 The ability to maintain up-to-date resource lists*

LRM6 The ability to confirm credentials and training certifications for responders arriving on scene

LRM7 The ability to provide food and shelter for responders arriving on scene


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M

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Casualty Management

CM1 The ability to deliver urgent trauma care on-scene during tactical incidents

CM2 The ability to standardize protocols for urgent trauma care on scene in hazardous incidents

CM3 The ability to identify and geolocate signs of life and decomposition on the incident scene

CM4 The ability to plan for mass casualty incidents*

CM5 The ability to conduct mass casualty and mass fatality operations*

CM6 The ability to estimate the number of casualties on the incident scene

CM7 The ability to track the status of casualties from incident scene through reunification


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Training and Exercise

TE1 The ability to develop and provide joint training curriculum among agencies and services

TE2 The ability to develop and conduct joint exercises among agencies and services

TE3The ability to provide appropriate bilingual French and English training to responders throughout Canada

TE4 The ability to provide training curriculum via virtual, simulation-based platforms

TE5 The ability to access a repository of best practice exercise scenarios and templates


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M

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G20

Risk Assessment and Planning

RAP1 The ability to conduct standardized assessments of threats, hazards, and risks

RAP2 The ability to develop plans based on threat, hazard, and risk assessments

RAP3

The ability for key personnel (responders and municipal/provincial/federal employees) to understand roles and responsibilities in advance of incident response

RAP4 The ability to access a repository of planning templates, including incident-specific plans


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Intelligence and Investigation

II1 The ability to provide investigative information to decision makers

II2 The ability to access pertinent data and information in real time to support analysis and investigation


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3.11 Incident Flowcharts

The following flowcharts were developed based on data derived from available documentation and from the responder interviews. They represent an intial effort to illustrate capability gaps and additional detail may be available to expand on these flowcharts.


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4 CNG-1R PRIORITIES

This section describes the results of the CNG-1R prioritization survey. As described in the Methodology section above, nearly 100 responders from across the country provided input to the survey. Participants were requested to review each capability need and assign a priority rating using a scale from one (very low priority) to five (very high priority). The results were weighted, and a final score calculated for each capability need.5

Each of the 54 needs can, in a sense, be considered to be high priority needs because the associated gaps were identified across multiple incidents. The intent of the survey, however, was to determine which of the needs are considered as the highest priority by responders across Canada. It is not possible for any federal agency, academic institution, or corporation to address all of the CNG-1R capability needs. Asking responders, who may be tasked with response operations for large-scale incidents in the future, to prioritize among the capability needs provides DRDC CSS and other stakeholders with an indication about which needs to address first.

4.1 Survey Results

One capability need was rated by the participants consistently higher than any other need. More than two-thirds of survey respondents rated the ability to identify and provide appropriate personal protective equipment for incident type as a very high priority. Capability gaps associated with this need were identified in half of the selected incidents and reflects responders’ belief that PPE can be significantly enhanced to improve responder safety.

Including the capability need listed above, 12 needs were consistently rated among the highest priorities. Those include:

1. The ability to identify and provide appropriate personal protective equipment (i.e., garments, gear, and breathing apparatus) for incident type (e.g. weather, comfort, protection).


3. The ability to convey up-to-date information on threats and hazards to responders in real time.

4. The ability to obtain critical information about the extent/perimeter of the incident.

5. The ability to understand incident characteristics as they evolve.

6. The ability to maintain resilient communications systems in urban and rural areas.


5 Data from the prioritization process can be found in appendix D.


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8. The ability to understand the characteristics and location of threats and hazards on the incident scene.

9. The ability to deliver urgent trauma care on-scene during tactical incidents.

10. The ability to disseminate clear direction and tasking to responders on the incident scene, regardless of agency or service.


12. The ability to share information in real time among services and agencies.

When viewed in terms of capability domains, four of the top 12 needs are related to situational awareness. This is not surprising as improvements in situational awareness lead to enhanced responder safety and better informed response operations. The allocation of the other priorities is illustrated in Figure 4-1.

Figure 4-1: CNG-1R Priorities by Capability Domain

The list of CNG-1R capability needs contains three needs in the Responder Health and Safety domain. Two of those three needs are included among the highest priorities.

In reviewing the above-listed capability needs, not all can be addressed through the application of technology solutions. Three of the 12 will require changes to doctrine and policy, or a renewed commitment to improvement:



CNG-1R Priorities by Capability Domain

SA CIS CCC RHS CM


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Many of the needs identified among the highest priorities are consistent with findings in the United States and elsewhere. Often, these needs are consistently identified because they would provide significant improvement to response operations. However, many have not been addressed to date despite significant technology efforts. Considerable money and effort have been spent in the United States to achieve interoperable communications, but the solution is not yet in the hands of the public safety community. High priority needs that are consistent with those elsewhere provide an opportunity for collaboration or technology transition.


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5 CONCLUSION

This document contains a list of 54 capability needs identified by responders throughout Canada. Addressing these needs would provide significant enhancements to responder safety and the efficiency and effectiveness of response operations. The list of CNG-1R capability needs describes a diverse set of skills and resources across many areas. The study team solicited input from responders to prioritize among these diverse needs in order to obtain greater understanding of which capabilities are most critical for major incident response. This document highlights the 12 highest priority capability needs as identified by firefighters, law enforcement officers, paramedics, and emergency managers throughout Canada. The results of this initial CNG-1R effort can inform the development of technology programs to improve the capabilities of emergency responders. Additional work needs to be done to identify technical requirements associated with these needs in order to plan and execute CSSP science and technology investments. The section below provides recommendations on processes intended to provide DRDC CSS and its stakeholders with the information necessary to identify potential technology solutions for emergency responders.

Not all the capabilities described in this document can be addressed with the application of technology solutions. Three of the 12 highest priority capability needs will require changes in doctrine, processes, or commitment. Development of a nation-wide consensus may be necessary to address these needs.

The scale and tempo of technology development for emergency responders in Canada is dependent, in part, on the division of responsibilities between federal, provincial, municipal, and Aboriginal governments. Individual communities or agencies determine requirements, secure funding, and roll out new equipment and solutions from their respective budgets. Many of the smaller or rural communities have finite resources and limited ability to adopt the most advanced technology solutions. This analysis underscores some of the vulnerabilities that communities may face when responding to a major incident in their jurisdiction.

5.1 CNG-1R Future Path

This section contains three recommendations for future activities based on the outcomes of this CNG-1R preliminary capability assessment.

The first recommendation is the development of a standardized process to guide technology development, including those efforts supported by the CSSP. A component of the DRDC CSS mission is to strengthen Canada’s ability to anticipate, prevent, mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from large-scale public safety incidents. To do this effectively, DRDC CSS must understand the capability needs of the emergency response community. This capability assessment process began by asking the end-user, the men and women who fulfill the public safety mission, to describe what they need to do that they cannot do today. This document provides a preliminary list of those capability needs. Additional work needs to be done, however, to transform those needs into requirements that are necessary to support science and technology procurement. The CNG-1R study team recommends a standardized three-year


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cycle to assess capability needs and develop technology investment programs based on thoseneeds.

In the first year of the cycle, DRDC CSS would assess capability needs for response to natural disasters and man-made incidents. This assessment could produce a prioritized set of capability needs, including a high-level set of user requirements for selected needs. This strategy would complement other DRDC CSS stakeholder engagement activities. In the second and third years of the cycle, DRDC CSS would map user requirements to CSSP investment planning programs to address the highest priority capability needs. A three-year cycle will position DRDC CSS and other federal initiatives, such as the Industrial Research Assistance Program, to identify and address capability needs as the response environment evolves.

The second recommendation is the creation of a standing body of emergency responders that provide input to DRDC CSS on matters pertinent to technology development and acquisition issues. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) maintains a First Responders Resource Group (FRRG), comprised of a diverse group of emergency responders from multiple services, from agencies across the United States. The FRRG meets once per year in person and virtually on a quarterly basis. The members of the FRRG review the capabilities identified in the most recent iteration of the Project Responder study, and provide detailed input, resulting in the creation of acquisition documents. These documents are distributed to industry as an initial step in the development of new solutions for the response community. The members of the FRRG are not paid for their participation in the FRRG, although travel expenses are paid by DHS. A similar group would provide DRDC CSS with continual access to its end-user community. At the conclusion of the CNG-1R prioritization survey, respondents were asked to provide contact information if they were interested in participating in future efforts. Seventy-three participants offered that information, providing DRDC CSS with a ready group of responders from across Canada.

The third recommendation is for DRDC CSS to build on existing collaboration opportunities with international partners that have identified similar responder capability needs. The DHS Apex programs – including Next Generation First Responder – are tackling similar challenges in capability areas such as situational awareness, interoperable communications, and responder safety. In addition, DHS collaboration with the U.S. Army resulted in the development of the Enhanced Dynamic Geo-Social Environment – a virtual training environment based on a gaming engine that allows law enforcement, fire service, and emergency medical services personnel to respond to active shooter scenarios.6 The CNG-1R approach lends itself to identifying identifying more collaborative and complementary reseach and development activities and solutions. Involvement in activities such as the DHS-led International Forum to Advance First Responder Innovation may also provide a conduit for collaboration efforts.7 In this regards, a

6 See the following links for more information about these programs: Next Generation First Responder (https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/ngfr); Enhanced Dynamic Geo-Social Environment (https://www.dhs.gov/publication/enhanced-dynamic-geo-social-environment-edge-evaluation-and-transition-report)7 Additional information about the International Forum can be found here: https://www.dhs.gov/publication/international-forum-advance-first-responder-innovation


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suggested first step is to inventory ongoing efforts related to the highest priority CNG-1R capability needs and strengthen engagement in programs that are addressing shared capability gaps.


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6 REFERENCES

Friscolanti, M. (2013, August 14). New security footage, 911 call, reveal the chaos of the Elliot Lake mall collapse. Retrieved from Macleans Website: http://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/videos-at-argo-mall-inquiry-show-images-from-horrific-day/

Glassford, S., Hurren, T. and Allan, T. (2015). Independent investigation into the death of Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, October 22, 2014, Centre Block, Parliament Hill, Ottawa, Canada.Retrieved from RCMP Website: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/independent-investigation-death-michael-zehaf-bibeau

Government of Alberta News Release. (2016, September 23). Province to review emergency response. Retrieved from https://www.alberta.ca/release.cfm?xID=43506A43B390C-DFC1-3220-98E154914097185B

Government of Manitoba (2013, April) 2011 Flood Review Task Force Report. Retrieved from https://www.gov.mb.ca/asset_library/en/2011flood/flood_review_task_force_report.pdf

Government of Ontario (2014). Report of the Elliot Lake Commission of Inquiry. Retrieved from Ontario Attorney General Website: http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/elliotlake/report/ES/ELI_ES_E.pdf

Hamilton, G. (2013, July 9). Police launch ‘unprecedented criminal investigation’ into Lac-Mégantic train disaster. Retrieved from National Post Website:http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/police-launch-unprecedented-criminal-investigation-into-lac-megantic-train-disaster

Ivison, J. (2016, October 21). Canada’s loneliest hero: Why you’ve never heard of this RCMP officer who shot the Parliament Hill gunman. Retrieved from National Post Website:http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadas-loneliest-hero-why-youve-never-heard-of-this-rcmp-officer-who-shot-the-parliament-hill-gunman

MNP LLP. (July 2015). Review and Analysis of the Government of Alberta’s Response to and Recovery from 2013 Floods. Retrieved from Government of Alberta Website:http://www.aema.alberta.ca/documents/2013-flood-response-report.pdf

Montreal Gazette. (2013, July 20). Lac Mégantic Timeline. Retrieved from http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/m%C3%A9gantic+timeline/8626739/story.html

Office of the Independent Police Review Director, Province of Ontario. (2012, May). Policing the right to protest – G20 Systemic Review Report. Retrieved from http://www.oiprd.on.ca/EN/PDFs/G20-Systemic-Review-2012_E.pdf


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Public Safety Canada. (2016, December 9). Canadian Disaster Database, Event Categories.Retrieved from http://cdd.publicsafety.gc.ca/srchpg-eng.aspx?dynamic=false

Royal Canadian Mounted Police. (2014, June). Independent Review of the Moncton Shooting.Retrieved from http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/independent-review-moncton-shooting-june-4-2014#desc

Royal Canadian Mounted Police. (2015, April 29). External engagement and coordination: Parliament Hill incident on October 22nd, 2014 – After Action Review. Retrieved from http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/external-engagement-and-coordination-parliament-hill-incident-october-22nd-2014-after-action-review

Royal, M. and Jennings, D. (2014, July). Project Responder 4: 2014 National Technology Plan for Emergency Response to Catastrophic Incidents. Retrieved from Department of Homeland Security Website: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Project%20Responder%204_1.pdf

The Canadian Red Cross. (2013). First Nations Recovery Needs Assessment. Retrieved from https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1387391495840/1387392049811

Topping, S. (2012). Manitoba’s Flood of 2011. Retrieved from Brandon University Website: https://www.brandonu.ca/rdi/files/2012/03/ToppingSteve-Manitobas-Flood-of-2011.pdf

Town of High River. (2014, July 28). After Action Report: June 2013 Flood. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=

0ahUKEwiv1PfXhu7SAhWLD8AKHTwuBdoQFggcMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fcommunity.swana.org%2FHigherLogic%2FSystem%2FDownloadDocumentFile.ashx%3FDocumentFileKey%3D4e743e77-d8ea-2b50-36c9-fd0c18326ec0%26forceDialog%3D1&usg=AFQjCNE_NVrk4S4NK834UjNGcArsH825Ow&sig2=vyFYmqmcQdgijlvHm_c_tA

Transportation Safety Board. (2014). Lac Mégantic runaway train and derailment investigation summary. Retrieved from http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2013/r13d0054/r13d0054-r-es.pdf

Warnica, M. (2016, July 27). Battling the beast: The untold story of the fight save Fort McMurray. Retrieved from CBC Website:http://www.cbc.ca/interactives/longform/news/battling-the-beast-fort-mcmurray-wildfire

Woods, A. (2013, July 7). Lac Mégantic: Hospital Eerily Quiet After Quebec Explosion.Retrieved from The Toronto Star Website: https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/07/07/lac_megantic_hospital_eerily_quiet_after_quebec_explosion.html


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[CBC News]. (2015, June 2). Exclusive: Parliament Hill gunman shot 31 times. [Video File]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cev1D4c1tqU

[National Fire Protection Association]. (2015, June 30). Lessons learned in Lac-Mégantic railway disaster – Featured Presentation NFPA C&E 2015. [Video File] Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=larpYRCvZoU

[TSB Canada]. (2014, August 19). Lac-Mégantic MMA Train Accident- 6 July 2013. [Video File]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wVMNspPc8Zc


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APPENDIX A WORKSHOP SUMMARY

This Appendix presents a summary of the CNG-1R workshop; the complete workshop report will be available later in 2017.

A.1 INTRODUCTION

The inaugural Workshop for the Canadian Next Generation First Responder (CNG-1R) Initiative was convened by Defence Research and Development Canada’s Centre for Security Science in Ottawa on December 6-7, 2016. First responders from across Canada gathered by invitation to share their knowledge to strengthen the Canadian Safety and Security Program’s (CSSP) knowledge of S&T requirements from tri-service operators (fire, police and paramedics) and help to shape CSSP priorities to respond to those requirements.

The workshop reinforced the notion that the concepts of operator capability and community resilience must be based on strong partnerships to provide the depth for multi-agency response to major emergencies. At the same time, it was acknowledged that catastrophic events demand far more of the tri-services than can be achieved with normally available resources. Thus, the intervention of CSSP S&T solutions must be managed within practical and fiscal constraints that underscore the requirement for clear priority-setting in a Canadian context.

Participants took stock of operator capability S&T requirements along three main lines of analysis. These were:

1. Tri-services operator capability domains, including situational awareness, coordination, health and safety, logistics, casualty management and training and exercises;

2. Existing technology gaps and constraints that inhibit effective emergency response; and,

3. Key technology development priorities with potential to enhance operator capabilities.

The conversations that took place at this workshop were acknowledged as a starting point. In next steps, DRDC CSS committed to expand information sharing and consultation tools as important steps toward development of a CSSP CNG-1R Research Strategy. As an outcome of workshop discussions, DRDC CSS also undertook to develop a list of emergency scenarios that provide a measurable starting point or use cases for development of technologies to safeguard responders, save lives and protect property and the environment.

This workshop was delivered in the context of U.S.–led efforts to define key priorities for first responders through the International Forum to Advance First Responder Innovation8.Participants were very fortunate to have Casey Grant of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) to inform us on research agenda for Smart Firefighting and Michelle Royal to describe

8 See http://www.internationalresponderforum.org/what-we-do.html


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the Project Responder body of work which provided a conceptual map to begin the development of the CNG-1R Research Strategy.

A.2 CONDUCT OF THE WORKSHOP

DRDC CSS provided a read-in package to participants consisting of:

An orientation to the operator capability domain to situate the workshop in the context of the CSSP and how DRDC CSS is organized to respond to public safety and security priorities; and,

A set of slides that presented planning assumptions about CNG-1R priorities based on the U.S. Project Responder work9 and other studies10 11into first responder capability requirements.

Each workshop day was organized to balance information exchange between seeking feedback and input on ways and means for S&T innovation to advance first responder capabilities and feedback on the CSSP and other broad initiatives to provide opportunities for participants to gain insight into the CNG-1R research and development context.

Day One of the workshop focused on assessment and analysis of the construct that DRDC CSS adapted from Project Responder and feedback on the definitions of First Responder capability domains.

Day Two of the workshop focused on the technology solutions that are currently in development of have potential to achieve technological readiness in the near future across the capability domains discussed on Day One.

DRDC intends to use the insights and assessment gathered in the course of the workshop to inform further consultation and assessment across the tri-services. It is intended as this work develops to establish a model of this process as an annual validation exercise as a strategic input to inform the selection of S&T priorities for the CSSP.

A.2.1 PART I: First Responder Capability Domains

A main goal of the workshop was to develop a process to evaluate and select research and development priorities for the CSSP. It was felt that a standardized set of defined, capability

9 https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Project%20Responder%204_1.pdf

10 www.firstnet.gov/sites/default/files/PSAC%20Use%20Cases%20Report.pdf

11https://partners1.drdcrddc.gc.ca/css/DKTCS/CPRC%20Documents/NG%20First%20Responder%20Initiative/Document%20Library/NIST.SP.1191.pd.pdf


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domains would assist in this process. The capability domain definitions selected by DRDC CSS were intended to correspond to capabilities required of all tri-services.

The first day of the workshop focused on assessing the responder capability definitions andtheir corresponding technology requirements that were distributed to participants in advance of the workshop. The responder capabilities explored at the workshop were:

Situational Awareness;

Communications;

Command, Control and Coordination;

Responder Health, Safety and Performance;

Logistics and Resource Management;

Casualty Management; and

Training and Exercises.

Two other capability domains complete the global framework for first responder capability domains but not explored at the workshop due to time constraints. These are:

Risk Assessment and Planning; and

Intelligence and Investigation

DRDC CSS will address these capability domains in next steps for the Initiative.

With some adjustments for clarity and precision, the definitions proposed by DRDC CSS were acceptable to workshop participants for classification purposes. One major precision put forward by participants was that that the definitions should apply to all response scenarios rather than the proposed restriction to catastrophic incidents. DRDC CSS had proposed this restriction in aneffort to focus its research and development efforts to highest risk scenarios.

The graphics for each capability area reflect the understanding that First Responder Capability domains should use major incidents for a planning baseline rather that catastrophic events. While catastrophic events reflect a worst-case planning scenario, they do not necessarily represent the desired planning relationships among the tri-services. They also require resource intensity beyond reasonable capability planning. This understanding is reflected in the proposed definitions that follow.

The second task associated with Capability Domain definition was to assess the technologies that may contribute to the capability domains. The candidate technologies presented by DRDC CSS were at a fairly high level of abstraction for discussion purposes. For example, the ability to


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precisely geo-locate or track a responder in latitude, longitude and altitude in any environment requires technology development in a host of areas. Further analysis will be required to assess the convergence of technologies and their corresponding timelines to feasible integration.

Each of the capability domains and their corresponding technology objectives follow with a summary of the main discussion points on each.

A.2.2 PART II: S&T RESEARCH PRIORITIES

The second main task of the workshop was to begin the process of validating existing and future use cases in cross-cutting domain areas. The areas of promising application selected in advance by DRDC CSS for evaluation were:

Location—Based Services;

Wearable Technologies;

Video Applications and Services;

Mobile Computing;

Computer-Aided Dispatch; and

Training and Exercises.

This analysis of these technology applications was approached by selecting existing capabilities which, when enhanced will improve tri-services responder capabilities. Participants were invited to assess the examples or use cases for utility and feasibility in development. The second task for participants was to identify known constraints and challenges associated with deploying technology advancement.

The distribution of these technology applications as well as the requirements and uptake of each service for technology enhancement vary significantly. In addition, technology development often represents a bundle of development tasks in hardware, software and often, policy and regulatory work. For example, the deployment of body-worn video reveals several issues that require further work such as: integration of cameras with duty gear for weight, utility and service factors, the evaluation of appropriate data collection from privacy, evidentiary and retention criteria and the burden of large-volume data storage.

A.3 EMERGENCY SCENARIOS

Setting priorities that balance potential with constraints on development is a main task of the CSSP. DRDC CSS has benefited in this work from the analysis contained in Project Responder 1-4 as well as the use cases developed for the U.S. First Net. It is clear from work to date that the backbone of future capabilities will be the enhanced data transmission capacity broadband networks. In order that the potential remain grounded in operator requirements, DRDC CSS has


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developed a group of major Canadian emergency scenarios in public safety and public order emergencies, natural disasters and transportation and industrial accidents. It is intended that these incidents provide a template for the assessment of needed capabilities.


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APPENDIX B INCIDENT SUMMARIES

This Appendix provides brief summaries of each of the selected incidents reviewed during this study.

B.1 Fort McMurray Fire (2016)

On May 1, 2016, a wildfire began southwest of Fort McMurray, Alberta, Canada. On 3 May, it swept through the community, destroying approximately 2400 homes and buildings and forcing the largest wildfire evacuation in Alberta history of nearly 90,000 people in a few hours.

An extended response from fire, law enforcement and emergency personnel was required. By the week of June 13, 2016, most government services, the Fort McMurray International Airport and other critical community resources had resumed operations. A Local State of Emergency for the Rural Municipality of Wood Buffalo was in effect from 1 May, to 10 November, 2016 to provide emergency powers need to deal with this event.

The Fort McMurray Wildfire is estimated to be the costliest Canadian disaster for insurers. Losses are estimated by the Insurance Bureau of Canada at $3.6 billion. Provincial response costs are estimated at $647 million.12

B.2 Parliament Hill Shooting (2014)

In Ottawa at 9:50 am, EST October 22, 2014, a gunman fatally shot Corporal Nathan Cirillo, a Canadian soldier on ceremonial sentry duty at the Canadian National War Memorial. He then moved to the nearby Centre Block Building of the Parliament of Canada, where members of the Parliament of Canada were attending caucus meetings. After wrestling with a constable at the entrance, the gunman ran inside and had a shootout with parliament security personnel. He was shot 31 times by six officers and died at the scene. Following the shootings, the downtown core of Ottawa was placed on lockdown while police searched for any potential additional threats.The law enforcement response involved the Ottawa Police Department, Royal Canadian Mounted Police and House of Commons security personnel. Paramedic response was also required at the War Memorial. The National Capital Region Command Centre (NCRCC) was activated after the shootout in the Centre Block.13

12 Government of Alberta News Release. “Province to review emergency response.” September 23, 2016. https://www.alberta.ca/release.cfm?xID=43506A43B390C-DFC1-3220-98E154914097185B

13 Ivison, J. “Canada’s loneliest hero: Why you’ve never heard of this RCMP officer who shot the Parliament Hill gunman” Published October 21, 2016. http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadas-loneliest-hero-why-youve-never-heard-of-this-rcmp-officer-who-shot-the-parliament-hill-gunman


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B.3 Moncton Shooting (2014)

Beginning in the early evening of June 4, 2014, a gunman killed three and wounded two Royal Canadian Mounted Police Officers in a series of shootings taking place in the Pinehurst subdivision in the northwest are of Moncton, New Brunswick.

Ambulances were dispatched to attend to injured officers, but because shootings took place at multiple locations, there was confusion over where ambulances were needed. Additionally, ambulances are not permitted to enter the scene of an active shooting, thus some injured officers were transported to hospital by their colleagues.

Overall the area was locked down for 29 hours while up 300 officer conducted a search for the heavily armed assailant. Three of the four RCMP Atlantic Region Emergency Response Teams, as well as those from "C" and National Divisions, were deployed. The municipal police forces of Bathurst, Miramichi, Fredericton and Saint John also contributed their tactical teams.

While many sightings were reported over the span of the incident, only two reported sightings were accurate. The assailant eventually surrendered and was arrested after the second verified sighting.14

B.4 Southern Alberta Flooding (2013)

The 2013 Southern Alberta floods were the worst flooding event in the province’s history, and one of the largest natural disasters in Canadian history. The speed of onset, sheer scope andmagnitude of the flood, and the tremendous resulting damage tested Alberta’s emergency management system to a degree never encountered in the province, and rarely seen globally. In addition to the significant emotional stress and trauma to those impacted, an abbreviated summary of impact is as follows:

Over 30 communities were impacted and declared Local States of Emergency;

More than 125,000 persons evacuated - largest evacuation in Canada in more than 60 years;

Approximately 14,500 homes impacted;

1600 small businesses impacted;

Almost 2700 Albertans were displaced and required accommodations assistance -temporary neighborhoods, hotels and with friends and family;

14 Royal Canadian Mounted Police. (2014, June) Independent Review of the Moncton Shooting.Retrieved from http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/independent-review-moncton-shooting-june-4-2014#desc


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Over 985 kilometers of provincial roads affected by flooding;

Damage to approximately 300 bridges and other critical infrastructure; and

Estimated total cost of the recovery, when combining provincial Disaster Recovery Program (DRP) funding, additional provincial funding and insurable losses is over $5 billion. Included in these costs were over $200 million in DRP payments to municipalities and First Nations.15

B.5 Lac Mégantic Québec Train Derailment and Fire (2013)

On the evening of July 5, 2013, at about 10:50 p.m., a Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway (MMA) train arrived at Nantes, Québec, carrying 7.7 million liters of petroleum crude oil in 72 Class 111 tank cars.

Shortly after the engineer set air brakes and hand brakes on the train and left, the Nantes Fire Department responded to a 911 call reporting a fire on the train. After shutting off thelocomotive’s fuel supply, the fire fighters moved the electrical breakers inside the cab to the off position, in keeping with MMA Railway instructions.

With power off, compressors were no longer maintaining air brake pressure. Just before 1 a.m., the air pressure had dropped to a point at which the combination of locomotive air brakes and hand brakes could no longer hold the train, and it began to roll downhill toward Lac-Mégantic, just over 11 kilometers away.

Almost all the 63 derailed tank cars were damaged, and many had large breaches. About six million liters of petroleum crude oil was quickly released. The fire began almost immediately, and the ensuing blaze and explosions left 47 people dead. Another 2000 people were forced from their homes, and much of the downtown core was destroyed. It took responders until July 19, 2013 to locate and remove bodies from the scene, and five bodies were never located. 16

B.6 Elliot Lake Mall Collapse (2012)

At 2:18 p.m. on June 23, 2012, a portion of the rooftop parking deck of the Algo Mall in the northern Ontario community of Elliot Lake collapsed onto the two floors below, sending tons of concrete, mangled steel, drywall, glass, and one vehicle crashing down. There were two fatalities and nineteen other people injured in the Mall collapse.

Local authorities acted promptly in the immediate aftermath of the collapse. They evacuated the Mall, helped the injured, and secured the site by shutting off utilities and establishing site control. Provincial authorities were rapidly informed, and assistance was summoned after the

15 MNP LLP. (July 2015) Review and Analysis of the Government of Alberta’s Response to and Recovery from 2013 Floods. Retrieved from http://www.aema.alberta.ca/documents/2013-flood-response-report.pdf

16 Montreal Gazette (2013, July 20) Lac Mégantic Timeline. Retrieved from http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/m%C3%A9gantic+timeline/8626739/story.html


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declaration of a municipal emergency. Local fire fighters, along with the Toronto Heavy Urban Search and Rescue - Task Force 3 (HUSAR/TF3) and the Ontario Provincial Police Urban Search and Rescue, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive Emergency Response Team, searched the rubble pile for survivors. Rescue and then recovery efforts continued to June 27 when the bodies of the two women were recovered.17

B.7 Manitoba Flood (2011)

The 2011 Manitoba Flood was of a scope and severity never recorded in the history of this province. In early May, 13 rivers or creeks across the province were at flood stage including the Red, Assiniboine, Souris, Whitemud, Saskatchewan and Pembina rivers. Record flood peaks were experienced on locations on the Assiniboine River, on the Souris River and smaller waterways. Extremely high lake levels on Lake Manitoba combined with severe winds on May 31 devastated lakeshore communities around the south basin of that lake.

At the height of the flood there were more than 7100 evacuees, primarily from First Nations communities. These are highly vulnerable and isolated communities that present unique circumstances for disaster resilience response and recovery.

Three million acres of cultivated farmland went unseeded in 2011. Tens of thousands of cattle had to be relocated. More than 650 provincial and municipal roads were damaged, and nearly 600 bridges, disrupting transportation networks throughout the province. Government of Manitoba costs associated with flood preparation, flood fighting, repair to infrastructure and disaster payments has reached at least $1.2 billion.18

B.8 Toronto G20 Public Order Incidents (2010)

The 2010 G20 Toronto summit was the fourth meeting of the G20 heads of state/government, held to discuss the global financial system and the world economy. It took place at the Metro Toronto Convention Centre between June 26 to 27. The G20 summit meeting was immediately preceded by a meeting of the G8 in Huntsville, Ontario on June 25 to 26. Security planning and operations for both the G8 and the G20 summits was coordinated by the Integrated Security Unit (ISU), led by the RCMP in partnership with the Toronto Police Service, the Ontario Provincial Police, the Peel Regional Police, and the Canadian Forces.

The G8 and the G20 summits were the largest domestic security operations in Canadian history. Almost 21,000 security personnel were deployed. The close timing between the two summits, and the location of the G20 in a large city, created a distinct set of circumstances and challenges for security operations. Never had one nation hosted both the G8 and the G20

17 Government of Ontario (2014). Report of the Elliot Lake Commission of Inquiry. Retrieved from http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/elliotlake/report/ES/ELI_ES_E.pdf

18 Government of Manitoba (2013, April) 2011 Flood Review Task Force Report. Retrieved from https://www.gov.mb.ca/asset_library/en/2011flood/flood_review_task_force_report.pdf


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summits back to back and in two different locations, so planning for these two summits in Ontario in 2010 surpassed many previous summits in scope, scale, and complexity.

Although the summit itself was not disturbed, the G20 weekend saw protests, vandalism and rioting in downtown Toronto and resulted in the largest mass arrests in Canadian history. Peaceful protests were followed by ‘black bloc’ tactics, where individuals dressed in black damaged businesses and set two police cruisers on fire in downtown Toronto. Overall, more than 1,100 people were arrested and hundreds of protesters were contained.19

19 Office of the Independent Police Review Director, Province of Ontario. (2012, May) Policing the right to protest – G20 Systemic Review Report. Retrieved from http://www.oiprd.on.ca/EN/PDFs/G20-Systemic-Review-2012_E.pdf


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APPENDIX C INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

This Appendix presents the interview protocol that was used during interviews with responders for the selected incidents.

C.1 Project Goal and Rationale

The purpose of the Canadian First Responder (CNG-1R) effort is to identify the next generation of Canadian Safety and Security Program (CSSP) contributions to research and development (R&D) for tri-services (fire, police and emergency medical services) technology solutions. This effort builds on work undertaken in the United States and elsewhere with a view to focusing on potential investments and projects where the CSSP is well-positioned to enhance the readiness of Canadian front line responders. This interview protocol is intended to frame and guide the interviews with responders that participated in large-scale incidents throughout the country to provide data on existing gaps in capability.

C.2 Interview Design

The project research objectives will be met in part through a series of semi-structured interviews with federal, provincial and local emergency responders who participated in response operations for incidents across Canada. The incidents include: natural disasters, criminal acts, transportation accidents, a structural collapse, and a public order emergency.

The research team will review available after-action and lessons-learned reports to become familiar with the related incidents prior to each interview. Interviews will take place via teleconference or video teleconference. Each is expected to last approximately one hour. The interviews approach will be flexible to allow the research team to address insights from responders on areas which are most salient to the particular incident that they were involved in, but they will be guided by the questions below to assure thorough coverage of the topics related to capability need.

C.3 Interview Questions

These questions are organized according to major functional requirements typical of any major incident. They will be used to identify gaps in capability, when those gaps occurred during the timetable of the incident, and how they affected response operations.

Introductory Questions (these questions are intended to get a brief overview of the responder’s role in the incident):

1. We’ve requested to speak with you in particular because of your participation in the response to <<incident>>. Can you describe your role in the response?

2. Follow on questions (as necessary):

a. What was the timeline of your involvement?


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b. Where were you physically located during the response?

c. Who were you primarily working with or interacting with during the response?

Situational awareness (defined as the capability to provide and distill specific knowledge concerning emerging threats, hazards, and conditions in a timely fashion to support incident management decisions across all phases of catastrophic incident response.)

1. Tell us about the extent of your situational awareness on the incident scene.

2. What gaps did you experience with regard to situational awareness?

3. When during the incident timetable did you experience gaps in situational awareness?

4. What was the impact of those gaps?

5. Follow-on questions (as necessary):

a. What were the specific threats and hazards facing responders on-scene?

b. What information did you need to understand those threats and hazards?

c. Did you have access to all the information that you needed to understand those threats and hazards and their impact on responder safety?

d. Did you know the location of responders on the incident scene?

e. Did you use any decision-support tools during the response? Do you consider the tools you used effective?

6. Can you envision a technology solution to address your situational awareness gaps that could make future operations more safe, effective, or efficient?

Communications and information sharing (defined as the capability to seamlessly and dynamically connect multiple persons/entities and convey meaningful and actionable information to all relevant parties.)

1. Please tell us about your on-scene communications.

2. What communications tools and equipment did you use (or have available) during the incident?

3. What gaps did you experience with regard to communications?

4. When during the incident timetable did you experience gaps in communications capability?



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6. Can you envision a technology solution to address your communications gaps that could make future operations more safe, effective, or efficient?

Command, control, & coordination (defined as the ability to identify incident priorities, allocate scarce resources and exchange relevant information to make effective decisions in an emergency.)

1. Please tell us about your command and control experiences during the incident.

2. What gaps did you experience with regard to command and control?

3. When during the incident timetable did you experience gaps in command and control capability?


5. Did Incident Command have access to all the information they needed to make incident action plans?

6. Can you envision a technology solution to address your command and control gaps that could make future operations more safe, effective, or efficient?

Responder health, & safety (defined as the ability to identify hazards to public safety personnel and develop appropriate mitigations to reduce morbidity and mortality associated with response activities.)

1. Please tell us about any issues or shortfalls with Personal Protective Equipment during the incident.

2. What gaps did you experience with regard to responder safety?

3. When during the incident timetable did you experience gaps in responder safety capability?


5. Did responders experience physical or mental health issues following the incident?

6. Can you envision a technology solution to address your responder safety gaps that could make future operations more safe, effective, or efficient?

Logistics and resource management (defined as the capability to identify, acquire, track and distribute available equipment, supplies and personnel in support of incident response.)

1. Please tell us about your experiences with logistics and resource management during the incident.

2. What gaps did you experience with regard to logistics and resource management?


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3. When during the incident timetable did you experience gaps in logistics and resource management capability?



a. Was IC able to identify all resources needed for the response in a timely manner?

b. Was IC able to request all resources needed for the response?

c. Was IC able to obtain all resources needed for the response?

d. What methods were used to track resources on scene?

6. Can you envision a technology solution to address your logistics and resource management gaps that could make future operations more safe, effective, or efficient?

Casualty management (defined as the capability to provide rapid and effective search and rescue, medical response, prophylaxis and decontamination for large numbers of incident casualties and identify appropriate sheltering and transportation options.)

1. Please tell us about your experiences managing casualties (living and deceased) during the incident.

2. What gaps did you experience with regard to casualty management?

3. When during the incident timetable did you experience gaps in casualty management capability?



a. Were you able to locate all casualties?

b. What methods did you use to locate casualties?

c. Were you able to retrieve all casualties?

d. Were you able to convey pertinent information to casualties, families and the public?

e. Can you tell us about any issues relating to registration and enquiry for casualties, families and the public?

6. Can you envision a technology solution to address your casualty management gaps that could make future operations more safe, effective, or efficient?


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Training and exercise (defined as the ability to provide instruction on necessary skills for catastrophic incident response and coordinate and practice implementation of plans and potential response prior to an incident.)

1. Do you feel that you had sufficient or specific training prior to the incident to prepare you for the response?

2. Has your jurisdiction planned or held exercises focused on response to a similar incident?

3. What gaps did you have in training or exercises pertinent to this incident?


5. Can you envision a technology solution to address your training and exercise gaps that could make future operations more safe, effective, or efficient?

Risk assessment and planning (defined as the capability to identify and manage likely vulnerabilities and threats and develop appropriate responses to potential catastrophic incidents based on identified risk.)

1. Please tell us about any related risk assessment or planning activities conducted prior to this incident.

2. What gaps did you have in risk assessment and planning pertinent to this incident?


4. Can you envision a technology solution to address your risk assessment and planning gaps that could make future operations more safe, effective, or efficient?

Intelligence and investigation (defined as the ability to collect, integrate, and assess information to develop conclusions or courses of action prior to a criminal incident or to identify the cause or responsible persons following an event.)

1. Please tell us about information sharing during this incident.

2. What gaps did you experience with regard to intelligence and investigation?

3. When did you experience gaps in intelligence and investigation capability?



a. Did you have access to the information needed for investigation or causation purposes?

b. Were you able to integrate information from multiple sources to support investigation or causation activities?


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6. Can you envision a technology solution to address your risk assessment and planning gapsthat could make future operations more safe, effective, or efficient?


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APPENDIX D PRIORITIZATION PROTOCOL

This survey is part of the Canadian Next Generation First Responder (CNG-1R) initiative. The CNG-1R initiative is managed by the Centre for Security Science, Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC CSS) to focus science and technology innovation to improve emergency response, protect lives, and reduce risk. The purpose of this enquiry is to inform the Canadian Safety and Security Program, managed by DRDC CSS, about the views of public safety services (e.g., fire, law enforcement, paramedics, emergency management) on capability gaps affecting emergency response.

As part of the CNG-1R effort, the research team reviewed major incidents and emergencies that have occurred across Canada. These incidents include natural disasters, criminal acts, infrastructure and transportation disasters, and public order emergencies. The research team conducted a series of interviews with emergency responders from multiple disciplines and jurisdictions to understand their response capability needs associated with these incidents. In this survey, we ask you to review and assess the capabilities that you believe will affect your service over the next 2-5 years. Note that the focus of this survey is on capabilities needed for response to large-scale incidents.

TAKING THE SURVEY:Please take a few minutes to provide input to this survey. You should be able to scroll through all questions. It should take you approximately fifteen minutes to complete the survey. Your input to this process is very important and will help develop CSSP science and technology objectives for first responder research investments. The survey software will save your responses should you need to close and continue the survey at a later time.

The distribution of survey results will be anonymous. You may also forward the survey link to other responders within Canada.

If you have any questions about CNG-1R or this survey, please contact Gerry Doucette ([email protected]) or Don Campbell ([email protected]).

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN TO TAKE THE SURVEY NOW.

In the area of Command, Control, and Coordination, please indicate your assessment of priority for each of the following capability needs:

The ability to manage an incident using a joint command system:

Very LOW PriorityLOW PriorityMedium PriorityHIGH PriorityVery HIGH Priority


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The ability to maintain clear understanding of the roles, responsibilities, and legal authorities of agencies and services at federal, provincial, and municipal levels during response operations:


The ability to develop a unified incident plan:


The ability to train leaders and supervisors to manage major incidents:


The ability to document plans, decisions, and tasking during response operations:



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31 March 2017 – D-3 – 114117-003 Version 01



In the area of Logistics and Resource Management, please indicate your assessment of priority for each of the following capability needs:

The ability to coordinate resources across agencies and services:


The ability to manage mutual aid resources on the incident scene:


The ability to identify, acquire, and track resources sufficient for the size and scope of response activities:


The ability to standardize type and kind of incident resources (Note: "kind" denotes a broad class of characterization, such as teams, equipment, etc. "Type" provides a minimum measure of capabilities to perform a function. For example, Type 1 HUSAR team: HUSAR is the kind and type 1 is the type. Standardizing type and kind allows for greater interoperability when ordering and integrating resources for incident response.):



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The ability to maintain up-to-date resource lists:


The ability to confirm credentials and training certifications for responders arriving on scene:


The ability to provide food and shelter for responders arriving on scene:


In the area of Situational Awareness, please indicate your assessment of priority for each of the following capability needs:

The ability to obtain critical information about the extent/perimeter of the incident:



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The ability to understand incident characteristics as the evolve:


The ability to model and/or predict future characteristics of the incident:


The ability to superimpose incident details on a geographic map of the area:


The ability to access up-to-date floor plans and building/infrastructure data:


The ability to geolocate responders on the incident scene (indoors and outdoors, above and below ground, in three dimensions):



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The ability to understand the characteristics and location of threats and hazards on the incident scene:


The ability to convey up-to-date information on threats and hazards to responders in real time:


The ability to access images and video pertinent to the incident scene:


In the area of Risk Assessment and Planning, please indicate your assessment of priority for each of the following capability needs:

The ability to conduct standardized assessments of threats, hazards, and risks:



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The ability to develop plans based on threat, hazard, and risk assessments:


The ability for key personnel (responders and municipal/provincial/federal employees) to understand roles and responsibilities in advance of incident response:


The ability to access a repository of planning templates, including incident-specific plans:


In the area of Communications and Information Sharing, please indicate your assessment of priority for each of the following capability needs:

The ability to monitor social media during an incident to inform operations and investigations:



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The ability to maintain interoperable (and bilingual) communications between agencies and services:


The ability to use common terminology among agencies and services:


The ability to maintain standardized radio protocols between agencies and services:


The ability to maintain resilient communications systems in urban and rural areas:


The ability to communicate clear direction and messaging to the public before, during, and after incidents:



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31 March 2017 – D-9 – 114117-003 Version 01



The ability to communicate with affected civilians and casualties on the incident scene:


The ability to share information in real time among services and agencies:


The ability to ingest, assess, and manage data from multiple sources:


The ability to disseminate clear direction and tasking to responders on the incident scene, regardless of agency or service:


The ability to access data and information (e.g. voice, text, images, video) on the incident scene:



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The ability to communicate in the presence of loud ambient noise:


In the area of Intelligence and Investigation, please indicate your assessment of priority for each of the following capability needs:

The ability to provide investigative information to decision makers:


The ability to access pertinent data and information in real time to support analysis and investigation:


In the area of Responder Health and Safety, please indicate your assessment of priority for each of the following capability needs:

The ability to provide mental health support before, during, and after response operations:



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31 March 2017 – D-11 – 114117-003 Version 01



The ability to identify and provide appropriate personal protective equipment (i.e., garments, gear, and breathing apparatus) for incident type (e.g. weather, comfort, protection):


The ability to decontaminate large amounts of personal protective equipment during response operations:


In the area of Casualty Management, please indicate your assessment of priority for each of the following capability needs:

The ability to deliver urgent trauma care on-scene during tactical incidents:


The ability to standardize protocols for urgent trauma care on scene in hazardous incidents:



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The ability to identify and geolocate signs of life and decomposition on the incident scene:


The ability to plan for mass casualty incidents:


The ability to conduct mass casualty and mass fatality operations:


The ability to estimate the number of casualties on the incident scene:


The ability to track the status of casualties from incident scene through reunification:



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In the area of Training and Exercise, please indicate your assessment of priority for each of the following capability needs:

The ability to develop and provide joint training curriculum among agencies and services:


The ability to develop and conduct joint exercises among agencies and services:


The ability to provide appropriate bilingual French and English training to responders throughout Canada:


The ability to provide training curriculum via virtual, simulation-based platforms:



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The ability to access a repository of best practice exercise scenarios and templates:


Are there any other capability needs that were not addressed in this survey that you consider to be a very high priority?

Thank you for your participation! For coding purposes and so we can better understand how needs vary across the country, please give us some information about your agency and role. (This information will not be shared without your permission.)

Name:

Agency:

Province/Territory:AlbertaBritish ColumbiaManitobaNew BrunswickNewfoundland and LabradorNorthwest TerritoriesNova ScotiaNunavutOntarioPrince Edward IslandQuebecSaskatchewanYukon


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Primary Discipline:Law EnforcementFire ServiceParamedic ServiceEmergency ManagementOther (e.g., Public Health, Public Works, Transportation, HUSAR)

Agency Level:FederalProvince/TerritoryLocalFirst Nation

Please provide your email address if you are willing to participate in future CNG-1R efforts (e.g., interviews, workshops).


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APPENDIX E PRIORITIZATION DATA

This appendix contains the results from the CNG-1R prioritization survey. The capability needs are listed in priority order, calculated using mean score.

RHS2. The ability to identify and provide appropriate personal protective equipment (i.e.,garments, gear, and breathing apparatus) for incident type (e.g. weather, comfort, protection)


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31 March 2017 – E-2 – 114117-003 Version 01



CCC4. The ability to train leaders and supervisors to manage major incidents

SA8. The ability to convey up-to-date information on threats and hazards to responders in real time


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-3 – 114117-003 Version 01



SA1. The ability to obtain critical information about the extent/perimeter of the incident

SA2. The ability to understand incident characteristics as they evolve


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-4 – 114117-003 Version 01



CIS5. The ability to maintain resilient communications systems in urban and rural areas

CCC1. The ability to manage an incident using a joint command system


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-5 – 114117-003 Version 01



SA7. The ability to understand the characteristics and location of threats and hazards on the incident scene

CM1. The ability to deliver urgent trauma care on-scene during tactical incidents


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-6 – 114117-003 Version 01



CIS10. The ability to disseminate clear direction and tasking to responders on the incident scene, regardless of agency or service

RHS1. The ability to provide mental health support before, during, and after response operations


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-7 – 114117-003 Version 01



CIS8. The ability to share information in real time among services and agencies

CCC3. The ability to develop a unified incident plan


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-8 – 114117-003 Version 01



CIS6. The ability to communicate clear direction and messaging to the public before, during, and after incidents


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-9 – 114117-003 Version 01



CCC2. The ability to maintain clear understanding of the roles, responsibilities, and legal authorities of agencies and services at federal, provincial, and municipal levels during response operations


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-10 – 114117-003 Version 01



LRM2. The ability to manage mutual aid resources on the incident scene

CIS3. The ability to use common terminology among agencies and services


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-11 – 114117-003 Version 01



CIS7. The ability to communicate with affected civilians and casualties on the incident scene

LRM1. The ability to coordinate resources across agencies and services


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-12 – 114117-003 Version 01



TE1. The ability to develop and provide joint training curriculum among agencies and services

TE2. The ability to develop and conduct joint exercises among agencies and services


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-13 – 114117-003 Version 01



LRM5. The ability to maintain up-to-date resource lists

CIS4. The ability to maintain standardized radio protocols between agencies and services


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-14 – 114117-003 Version 01



RAP3. The ability for key personnel (responders and municipal/provincial/federal employees) to understand roles and responsibilities in advance of incident response


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-15 – 114117-003 Version 01



RHS3. The ability to decontaminate large amounts of personal protective equipment during response operations

CCC5. The ability to document plans, decisions, and tasking during response operations


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-16 – 114117-003 Version 01



CIS12. The ability to communicate in the presence of loud ambient noise

SA3. The ability to model and/or predict future characteristics of the incident


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-17 – 114117-003 Version 01



CM2. The ability to standardize protocols for urgent trauma care on scene in hazardous incidents


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-18 – 114117-003 Version 01



LRM3. The ability to identify, acquire, and track resources sufficient for the size and scope of response activities


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-19 – 114117-003 Version 01



CIS11. The ability to access data and information (e.g. voice, text, images, video) on the incident scene

CM4. The ability to plan for mass casualty incidents


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-20 – 114117-003 Version 01



CM5. The ability to conduct mass casualty and mass fatality operations

RAP2. The ability to develop plans based on threat, hazard, and risk assessments


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-21 – 114117-003 Version 01



CIS2. The ability to maintain interoperable (and bilingual) communications between agencies and services

CIS9. The ability to ingest, assess, and manage data from multiple sources


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-22 – 114117-003 Version 01



SA5. The ability to access up-to-date floor plans and building/infrastructure data

SA4. The ability to superimpose incident details on a geographic map of the area


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-23 – 114117-003 Version 01



II1. The ability to provide investigative information to decision makers

LRM7. The ability to provide food and shelter for responders arriving on scene


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31 March 2017 – E-24 – 114117-003 Version 01



II2. The ability to access pertinent data and information in real time to support analysis andinvestigation


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31 March 2017 – E-25 – 114117-003 Version 01



SA6. The ability to geolocate responders on the incident scene (indoors and outdoors, above and below ground, in three dimensions)

RAP1. The ability to conduct standardized assessments of threats, hazards, and risks


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-26 – 114117-003 Version 01



CM3. The ability to identify and geolocate signs of life and decomposition on the incident scene

CM6. The ability to estimate the number of casualties on the incident scene


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-27 – 114117-003 Version 01



LRM4. The ability to standardize type and kind of incident resources

TE5. The ability to access a repository of best practice exercise scenarios and templates


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-28 – 114117-003 Version 01



SA9. The ability to access images and video pertinent to the incident scene

CM7. The ability to track the status of casualties from incident scene through reunification


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-29 – 114117-003 Version 01



RAP4. The ability to access a repository of planning templates, including incident-specific plans

SA9. The ability to monitor social media during an incident to inform operations and investigations


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-30 – 114117-003 Version 01



TE4. The ability to provide training curriculum via virtual, simulation-based platforms

LRM6. The ability to confirm credentials and training certifications for responders arriving on scene


Final Report

31 March 2017 – E-31 – 114117-003 Version 01



TE3. The ability to provide appropriate bilingual French and English training to responders throughout Canada