THIRD DIVISIONJUDGE DIVINA LUZP. AQUINO-SIMBULAN,Complainant,-versus-PRESIDING JUDGE NICASIO BARTOLOME (retired),ACTING CLERK OF COURT ROMANA C. PASCUAL,CLERK OF COURTMILAGROS P. LEREY (retired),and DOCKET CLERKAMOR DELA CRUZ,all of the Municipal Trial Court, Sta. Maria, Bulacan,Respondents.A.M. No. MTJ-05-1588(Formerly No. 04-9-511-RTC)Present:YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.,Chairperson,CARPIO,*CORONA,**NACHURA, andPERALTA,JJ.Promulgated:June 5, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xDECISIONPERALTA,J.:Before this Court is a letter-complaint[1]dated April 27, 2004 filed by complainant Judge Divina Luz P. Aquino-Simbulan with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), alleging that respondents Judge Nicasio V. Bartolome, together with Romana Pascual, Milagros Lerey, and Amor dela Cruz, Acting Clerk of Court, retired Clerk of Court and Docket Clerk, respectively, all of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, committed grave errors and discrepancies in processing the surety bond for the accused Rosalina Mercado in Criminal Case No. 13360, entitledPeopleof the Philippines v. Rosalina Mercado, et al.In her complaint, Judge Simbulan alleged the following:Criminal Case No. 13360 was originally raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41,San Fernando, Pampanga, where complainant Judge presides. On September 18, 2003, said branch of the RTC received an Indorsement from Warrant/Subpoena Officer PO3 Edwin Villacentino of the Sasmuan Municipal Police Station stating that the accused Mercado voluntarily surrendered before the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan and posted her bail bond through Summit Guaranty & Insurance Co., Inc., which was duly approved by respondent Judge Bartolome on August 21, 2003. This prompted complainant to issue an Order[2]datedOctober 29, 2003, directing respondent Lerey, then Clerk of Court of the MTC, to transmit to the RTC within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of said Order, the bond which the former court approved.When the Clerk of Court failed to comply, complainant Judge issued an Order[3]datedJanuary 12, 2004directing the former to explain in writing within three (3) days from receipt thereof why she should not be cited in contempt for delaying the administration of justice.OnJanuary 29, 2004, the RTC received a letter[4]from respondent Romana Pascual, then Acting Clerk of Court of the MTC, explaining that the bail bond in Criminal Case No. 13360 was approved by respondent Judge during the tenure of Lerey, and that the latter had retired onAugust 26, 2003.OnFebruary 12, 2004, the RTC received a written explanation[5]from Lerey stating that she had misplaced and overlooked the subject surety bond, which resulted in the delay of its transmission to the RTC. Attached to Lereys letter were the following documents: (1) the Court Order dated August 21, 2003 signed by respondent Judge; (2) Bond No. 46485 dated August 21, 2003 with attachments; (3) Undertaking dated November 22, 2003; (4) Certification from the Office of the Court Administrator, dated October 29, 2003; and (5) Certification from Summit Guaranty and Insurance Company, Inc., dated November 22, 2003.Upon perusal of the documents, complainant Judge discovered that the subject surety bond bore some erasures, and its attachments were highly anomalous. In view of these findings, the RTC issued asubpoenato respondents Pascual and Lerey directing them to appear before it to explain the aforementioned errors.During the hearing held onApril 26, 2004, respondents Pascual and Lerey appeared before the RTC, Branch 41,San Fernando, Pampanga, and the following facts were established therein:1.That respondent Judge issued an Order of Release datedAugust 21, 2003without a Certificate of Detention and Warrant of Arrest attached to the documents presented to him;2.That while the Order of Release was datedAugust 21, 2003, the Undertaking and Certification from the bonding company were datedNovember 22, 2003andOctober 29, 2003, respectively;3.That it was Lerey who reviewed the documents before the surety bond was referred to respondent Judge for the latters approval; and4.That the delay in the transmission of the bond and its supporting documents was attributed to Amor dela Cruz, Docket Clerk of the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.[6]After the hearing, Public Prosecutor Otto Macabulos stated that he found the explanation too shallow and self-serving, and that he would file an indirect contempt case under Rule 71, Section 3 (d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure against Lerey and Dela Cruz. He filed said complaint[7]onJune 21, 2004.The RTC, Branch 41,San Fernando, Pampanga then directed Lerey and Dela Cruz to explain in writing within fifteen (15) days why they should not be cited in indirect contempt of court or improper conduct in the processing of the bail bond of accused Mercado.[8]In her Manifestation/Compliance[9]datedOctober 25, 2004, Lerey admitted lapses and negligence in processing the subject bail bond and was remorseful for what happened. On the other hand, Dela Cruz stated that there was no wrongdoing on her part in the processing of the subject bail bond and that she merely followed instructions in mailing the said bail bond to the RTC.[10]In an Order[11]datedDecember 14, 2004, the RTC found Lerey guilty of indirect contempt and sentenced her to pay a fine ofP10,000.00, which she duly paid.However, it absolved Dela Cruz from any liability as it found her explanation meritorious.In the meantime, in his 1stIndorsement[12]dated February 26, 2004, Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Jose P. Perez referred to the Clerk of Court of the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan the Orders issued by complainant Judge relative to the surety bond for comment.However, there was nothing on record to show that said Clerk of Court complied with the directive.DCA Perez also issued a 1stIndorsement[13]dated June 22, 2004 to respondent Judge referring to the letter dated April 27, 2004 of complainant Judge, which discussed the errors and discrepancies regarding the approval of the bail bond of the accused in Criminal Case No. 13360, with the instruction to the former to submit his comment thereto.In compliance, respondent Judge submitted his 2ndIndorsement[14]datedJuly 13, 2004, wherein he denied any liability concerning his approval of the subject surety bond.According to him, Lerey had expressly admitted her negligence and lapses which caused the delay in transmitting the bond to the RTC.He stressed that just like any other judge, his Clerk of Court (Lerey) enjoys his trust and confidence on matters pertaining to the affairs of the court, including the review and approval of bail bonds.He added that he had no reason to doubt the official actions of Lerey as the latter had been serving the court for around 37 years.In a Memorandum[15]dated March 1, 2005, then Court Administrator, now Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., recommended that the letter dated April 27, 2004 (and the Orders attached thereto) of complainant Judge be treated as a formal administrative complaint and redocketed as such against respondents Judge Bartolome, Pascual, Lerey, and Dela Cruz, with the directive that the named respondents submit their respective Comments within ten (10) days uponreceipt of the Order from the Court.Said Order[16]was issued by the Court onApril 13, 2005, and all the respondents submitted their Comments onMay 13, 2005.Respondent Judge and Pascual both averred that in the case for indirect contempt, only Lerey was found guilty of negligence in the performance of her duties, and no other indictment was made against them.[17]On the other hand, Lerey stated in her Comment[18]that she has already been found guilty of indirect contempt for failure to transmit the bail bond within the period directed by the court, and paid the fine therefor, while Dela Cruz clarified that she has already been exonerated from any liability or participation in said incident.In a Resolution[19]datedJune 22, 2005, the Court referred the administrative matter to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Malolos City, Bulacan for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt of the record.OnApril 7, 2006, 2ndVice-Executive Judge Candido Belmonte submitted his Report,[20]which contained the following findings:TheInvestigating Courttakes judicial notice that certain functions of court which are not directly related to decision-making are delegated or reposed to court personnel. Under this category falls the preparation and evaluation of documents for bail, for the final approval of the judge. However, to rely solely on the representation made by the Clerk of Court without making even a perfunctory perusal of the records is also a mark of neglect. As such, this court finds the explanation of the respondent judge to be inadequate to exculpate him for the oversight he committed.x x x xWith respect to court personnel Romana Pascual, it was established that, at the time of the commission of the subject administrative offense, she was not yet discharging the functions of an Officer-in-Charge. She had no hand in the approval of the bail. As a matter of fact, she immediately informed respondent Milagros Lerey, the former Clerk of Court, of the Order coming from Judge Simbulan of RTC-Branch 41, Pampanga requiring them to transmit the supporting documents for bail. However, it was the inaction of Milagros Lerey on the matter which caused the delay in the transmission. The Court notes that the Order of Judge Simbulan was received at the MTC-Sta. Maria, Bulacan at a time when there was a transition between Milagros Lerey and the present Clerk of Court. During that interregnum, it was Romana Pascual who was the OIC. As such, the letter-explanation of Romana Pascual, datedFebruary 11, 2004, addressed to Judge Simbulan is deemed sufficient explanation by thisInvestigating Court. Hence, she is exonerated of the charges against her.Regarding the charge against court personnel Amor dela Cruz, it appears to this Court that although she was the one who finally delivered the supporting bail documents to RTC-Branch 41, Pamapanga, she has nothing to do with the act of delay. This seems to be the implication of the admission of Milagros Lerey that at the time of the approval of the bail bond the supporting documents were incomplete. She only put the documents in order after there was an Order from RTC-Branch 41, Pampanga to transmit the same. The delay took place during this period. Once Milagros Lerey handed the documents to Ms. Dela Cruz, she immediately transmitted them to RTC-Branch 41, Pampanga. These facts borne out by her Comment submitted in the Indirect Contempt Case before RTC-Branch 41, Pampanga datedJuly 19, 2004, which thisInvestigating Courtfinds sufficient.[21]Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Judge submitted the following recommendations:1)For respondent Judge Nicasio Bartolome, he be found to be negligent of his duty to supervise his court employees in the discharge of their respective functions. It is further recommended that a fine ofP5,000.00 be imposed on him.2)For respondent Milagros Lerey, she be found to be grossly negligent of the discharge of her functions as a Clerk of Court. It is further recommended that a fine ofP5,000.00 be imposed on her over and above the fine ofP10,000.00 imposed on her in the Indirect Contempt Case.3)For respondents Romana Pascual and Amor dela Cruz, there was no direct documentary or testimonial evidence that shows they have handled the bail bonds. Furthermore, they are not responsible for the delay in the transmission of the pertinent documents. As such, it is recommended that they be exonerated of the charges against them.City ofMalolos, Bulacan,April 7, 2006.[22]In a Resolution[23]datedOctober 11, 2006, the Court referred the Report of the Investigating Judge to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from receipt of records.In his Memorandum[24]datedNovember 20, 2007, DCA Jose P. Perez observed that:1.In approving the surety bond of the accused, respondent Judge violated Section 17, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.[25]In the instant case, the accused Rosalina Mercado was not arrested. That being the case, she should have filed her bail bond with the court where her case was pending, i.e., the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41,San FernandoCity, Pampanga. In the absence of the judge thereof, it could be done at another branch of the same court within theprovinceofPampangaor City ofSan Fernando. Instead, accused Mercado filed her bond in the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, where respondent Judge presides, who approved the same and ordered her release from custody.2.Respondent Judge did not require the accused to submit the supporting documents pertinent to the application for a bond. It appears that there was no Certificate of Detention presented to him; hence, there was no legal justification for him to issue the Order of Release and process the bond since the accused was not detained within his jurisdiction. Also, there was no Warrant of Arrest attached to the documents presented to him. Moreover, all the supporting papers were belatedly filed: (a) Undertaking was dated22 November 2003; (b) Certification from the Office of the Court Administrator was dated29 October 2003; and (c) the Certification from Summit Guaranty & Insurance Co., Inc. was dated22 November 2003.3.Respondent Judge failed to live up to the standards of a good magistrate. Not only did he approve the bail bond of the accused without the requisite authority to do so, his manner of doing so showed a flagrant disregard for the applicable procedural law he had sworn to uphold and serve. He committed gross misconduct by blatantly disregarding the Rules and settled jurisprudence.These findings led DCA Perez to recommend the following:Considering that Judge Bartolome has compulsorily retired from the service effective on11 October 2006, we recommend that a fine in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) be deducted from his retirement benefits.With respect to Clerk of Court Milagros Lerey, who already retired from the service on26 August 2003, we also find her guilty of gross misconduct. As can be gleaned from the records, she admitted her wrongdoing. Had she not retired, we could have meted her the extreme penalty of dismissal. We, therefore, recommend that she be fined in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00).With respect to respondents Romana Pascual and Amor dela Cruz, there being no evidence linking them to the processing of the questioned bond, it is recommended that the charges against them be dismissed.[26]In a Resolution[27]datedApril 2, 2008, the Court required the parties to manifest within ten (10) days from notice whether they were willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted.All respondents manifested their willingness to submit the case for decision: respondents Lerey, Pascual and Dela Cruz having complied onMay 13, 2008, and Judge Bartolome onMay 23, 2008. The Court submitted the administrative case for resolution onJuly 25, 2008.After a careful evaluation of the records and the Reports of the Investigating Judge and the OCA, the Court holds that there were indeed grave errors and discrepancies committed by respondents Judge Bartolome and Lerey in processing the surety bond for the accused in Criminal Case No. 13360.The following provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure apply before an accused can be released on bail:Sec. 14.Bail, where filed.(a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch of the same court within the province or city. If the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may be filed also with any regional trial court of said place, or, if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein. x x xSec. 16.Release on bail. The accused must be discharged upon approval of the bail by the judge with whom it was filed in accordance with Section 14 hereof.Whenever bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge accepting the bail shall forward the bail, the order of release and other supporting papers to the court where the case is pending, which may, for good reason, require a different one to be filed.The OCAs Report revealed that the accused Rosalina Mercado was not arrested. The proper procedure, according to the above-cited rules, would have been to file her bail bond with the RTC Branch 41,San Fernando, Pampanga where her case was pending.Had complainant Judge been absent or was unavailable at that time, the accused could file for bail with another branch of the RTC in Pampanga or inSan FernandoCity. However, the accused filed her surety bond with the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, where it was approved by respondent Judge.Not only did respondent Judge erroneously order the release of the accused, but he also failed to require submission of the supporting documents needed in the application for a bond. There was no Certificate of Detention or Warrant of Arrest attached to the bond transmitted by the MTC to the complainant Judge.Moreover, the other supporting documents were belatedly filed.Records show that respondent Judge approved the bail bond onAugust 21, 2003, but the Undertaking was datedNovember 22, 2003, the Certification from the OCA was datedOctober 29, 2003, and the Certification from Summit Guaranty and Insurance Co., Inc. was datedNovember 22, 2003.Respondent Judge contends that Lerey, who has been Clerk of Court for 37 years, was given the simple matter of examining the documents attached to the application for a bail bond.For her part, Lerey admitted her negligence when she misplaced and overlooked the surety bond policy, resulting in the delay in the transmission of said documents to the RTC. Notably, she also failed to give an explanation for the erasures which complainant discovered on the surety bond.By such acts, it is evident that Lerey did not measure up to the standards required by Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel[28]as quoted:Section 1.Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with diligence. They shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their office during working hours.In addition, a clerk of court has a vital functionin the prompt and sound administration of justice since his or her office is the hub of adjudicative and administrative orders, processes, and concerns.[29]He or she also has the dutyto ensure an orderly and efficient record management system in the court and to supervise the personnel under her office to function effectively.[30]However, Lereys admission of negligence cannot excuse respondent Judge from liability in the irregular processing of the bail bond.Pertinent provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct[31]state that:Rule 3.08. A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.Rule 3.09. A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and finality.InBellena v. Judge Perello,[32]wherein respondent Judge attributed the delay in transmittal of records to her clerk of court, the former was still found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine. The Court held that, although the clerk of court is primarily responsible for the implementation of respondent judges orders, the fact remains that respondent judge is tasked with administrative supervision over his or her personnel. It is the responsibility of the judge to always see to it that his/her orders are properly and promptly enforced, and that case records are properly stored and kept. Thus, in the present case, respondent Judge himself should have verified that the documents for bail were complete and correct instead of relying on the representations of his clerk of court.With regard to respondents Pascual and Dela Cruz, the Court observes that there is no evidence to show that they have contributed to the irregularities or delay in transmittal of the bail bond.At the time of the commission of the administrative offense, Pascual was not yet discharging the functions of an Acting Clerk of Court.Dela Cruz, on the other hand, merely delivered the supporting documents to the RTC.Having thus established the respondents liabilities, what remains for the Courts contention are their penalties.Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[33]the acts of respondent Judge and Lerey may be classified as gross neglect of duty, which is punishable by dismissal under Rule IV, Section 52 A(2) thereof.Neglect of duty denotes the failure of an employee to give ones attention to a task expected of him. Gross neglect is such neglect which, from the gravity of the case or the frequency of instances, becomes so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten the public welfare.[34]InUlat-Marrero v. Torio, Jr.,[35]the Court has categorized as a grave offense of gross neglect of duty, the failure of a court process server to serve summons which resulted in the delayed resolution of a case.As corollarily applied to the present case, where respondents released the accused on temporary liberty despite the absence of the required supporting documents for bail, the former are likewise liable for gross neglect of duty.Were it not for the fact that both respondents, Judge Bartolome and Lerey, have retired onOctober 11, 2006andAugust 26, 2003, respectively, the Court would have dismissed them from the service.Instead, it orders respondents to pay a fine to be deducted from their retirement benefits, in accordance with its rulings inMoncada v. Cervantes,[36]Office of the Court Administrator v. Paredes,[37]andSoria v. Oliveros.[38]WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds:1.Presiding Judge Nicasio Bartolome (retired)GUILTYofGROSS NEGLECT OF DUTYfor which he is meted a fine in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00), to be deducted from his retirement benefits; and2.Clerk of Court Milagros Lerey (retired)GUILTYofGROSS NEGLECT OF DUTYfor which she is meted a fine in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00), to be deducted from her retirement benefits.SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISIONRE: ORDER DATED 21 DECEMBER 2006ISSUED BY JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LAS PIAS CITY, BRANCH 275, SUSPENDING LOIDA M. GENABE, LEGAL RESEARCHER, SAME COURT.x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xJUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LAS PIAS CITY, BRANCH 275,Complainant,- versus-LOIDA M. GENABE, LEGAL RESEARCHER, SAME COURT.Respondent.A.M. No. 07-2-93-RTCA.M. No. P-07-2320Present:CARPIO,J.,Chairperson,QUISUMBING,*CHICO-NAZARIO,PERALTA,andABAD,**JJ.Promulgated:October 29, 2009

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xDECISIONCARPIO,J.:This administrative matter against Loida M. Genabe (Genabe), Legal Researcher II of the Regional Trial Court (trial court), Branch 275, Las Pias City, stemmed from a Letter dated 22 December 2006 addressed to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) filed by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda (Judge Maceda) of the same trial court.Judge Maceda attached his Order dated 21 December 2006 suspending Genabe for 30 days by reason of neglect of duty for attending a two-day seminar despite a pending assignment.In the letter, Judge Maceda requested that the salary of Genabe be withheld for the period 21 December 2006 to 20 January 2007 since the suspension was immediately executory.The FactsOn 20 November 2006, Atty. Jonna M. Escabarte (Atty. Escabarte), Branch Clerk of Court of the same trial court, issued an Inter-Office Memorandum to Genabe referring to her neglect, in leaving for Baguio City on 16 to17 November 2006 to attend a seminar for legal researchers, without finishing her assigned task.The assigned task required Genabe to summarize the statement of facts in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0059 to 03-0063 entitled People of the Philippines v. Marvilla, et al., set for promulgation on 21 November 2006.Atty. Escabarte reminded Genabe that such act could not be tolerated and that similar acts in the future would be meted an appropriate sanction.On 22 November 2006, Genabe submitted her explanation regarding the unfinished assigned case.She stated that she was not able to complete the summary due to lack of transcript of stenographic notes (TSN).Genabe added that she be absolved for humane considerations.On 29 November 2006, Judge Maceda called a staff meeting to discuss several matters in the agenda, including the inter-office memorandum.Allegedly, even before the staff meeting, Genabe resented the issuance of the memorandum and became disrespectful to the court staff, including the clerk of court.At the meeting, Genabe allegedly continued her combative behavior in total disregard of the presence of Judge Maceda.On 30 November 2006, Judge Maceda ordered Genabe to show cause why she should not be cited in contempt by the court and why she should not be administratively sanctioned for conduct unbecoming, neglect of duty and misconduct.In her Answer dated 11 December 2006, Genabe denied that she neglected her duty and explained with counter-charges.Genabe stated thatAtty. Escabarte did not give her the opportunity to be heard and that she was not given sufficient lead time to finish the five consolidated informations of the criminal case assigned to her. Genabe attributed the lack of stenographers, which was beyond her control, as the cause of the delay in the transcriptions of the minutes of the meeting.As a counter-charge, Genabe claimed that Judge Maceda disciplines his staff on a selective basis.On the same day, Judge Maceda conducted a fact-finding investigation inside his chambers.The agenda of the investigation focused on the charges of contempt, conduct unbecoming, neglect of duty, and misconduct against Genabe.Judge Maceda directed all members of the staff, including Genabe, to attend.However, Genabe did not appear despite notice.Later, she appeared to say that she was waiving her right to be present in the investigation.On 21 December 2006, Judge Maceda issued the Suspension Order against Genabe for neglect of duty.In a Letter dated 22 December 2006, Judge Maceda furnished the Office of the Court of Administrator (OCA) with a copy of the Order dated 21 December 2006.Judge Maceda suspended Genabe for a period of 30 days, using as authority the power given to appropriate supervisory officials in disciplining personnel of their respective courts as provided in Article II, Section A(2)(a) of Circular No. 30-91 dated 30 September 1991.Judge Maceda declared that the suspension was to take effect immediately and would not be stayed even if appealed to the Supreme Court.Judge Maceda then requested that following the suspension order, Genabes salary be withheld for the period 21 December 2006 to 20 January 2007.The OCA received a letter dated 12 January 2007 sent by Atty. Zandro T. Bato, Clerk of Court VI of the same trial court, returning the salary check of Genabe following the suspension order issued against her.On 22 January 2007, Genabe reported back to work after serving the 30-day suspension order of Judge Maceda.On 18 January 2007, Judge Maceda endorsed his Investigation Report and Recommendation to the OCA, even without any directive from the latter.The report mainly focused on the alleged unruly conduct of Genabe during the staff meeting of Branch 275 on 29 November 2006.Judge Maceda submitted the following recommendations:1.Pending determination of the instant matter by the Honorable Supreme Court, Ms. Loida M. Genabe, Legal Researcher, RTC, Branch 275, Las Pias City, be immediately placed under preventive suspension, and thereafter dismiss her from the service; and2.Allow the undersigned to recommend a replacement to enable RTC Branch 275 to function normally soonest.[1]In a Letter dated 18 April 2007, several staff members of the same trial court, headed by the Branch Clerk of Court, assailed the alleged inaction of the OCA on the Investigation Report and Recommendation dated 18 January 2007 submitted by Judge Maceda as well as the request for the detail of Genabe to another post.In a Resolution dated 23 May 2007, this Court resolved to:1.NOTE the letter dated 22 December 2006 of Presiding Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda x x x x;2.TREAT the Order dated 21 December 2006 issued by Judge Bonifacio [Sanz] Maceda as an administrative complaint against Loida M. Genabe under a separate docket number, A.M. No. P-07-2320 x x x x;3.DIRECT Ms. Loida M. Genabe to REPORT BACK TO WORK pending resolution of the administrative complaint against her, unless another administrative case directs otherwise; and4.REQUIRE Judge Bonifacio [Sanz] Maceda to EXPLAIN, within ten (10) days from notice, why no disciplinary sanction should be imposed against him for having violated A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties approved on 27 January 2004 and became effective on 15 February 2004.[2]Judge Maceda submitted his Explanation dated 29 June 2007, in compliance with the Courts Resolution dated 23 May 2007.Judge Maceda reasoned that there were other charges against Genabe, such as conduct unbecoming and grave misconduct, which called for the imposition of a higher penalty.Thus, he endorsed the determination of such other charges to the OCA, including whether the heavier penalty of dismissal or replacement might be warranted.Judge Maceda prayed that his explanation be considered as sufficient compliance and that he be absolved of any disciplinary sanction.On 22 August 2007, the Court resolved to refer to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation the (1) Order dated 21 December 2006 and (2) Explanation dated 29 June 2007, both made by Judge Maceda.On 29 August 2007,the Court resolved to inform the staff members of the same trial court, in consideration of the Letter dated 18 April 2007, that until Genabe has been formally charged with contempt, conduct unbecoming and misconduct, which are not light offenses, the propriety of suspending Genabe pending investigation of the charges against her cannot be properly evaluated, and to await the outcome of A.M. No. P-07-2320.On 19 November 2007, the staff members of the same trial court, headed by the Branch Clerk of Court, filed their Manifestation dated 15 October 2007, that Genabe had been formally charged with contempt, conduct unbecoming and misconduct as contained in the Investigation Report and Recommendation dated 18 January 2007 submitted by Judge Maceda to this Court.In a Resolution dated 16 January 2008, the Court resolved to require the parties to manifest their willingness to submit the matter for decision on the basis of the pleadings filed.Judge Maceda and Genabe respectively filed their compliance on separate dates.In a Resolution dated 4 June 2008, the Court resolved to:1.APPROVE the previous recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, as contained in its Agenda Report dated 24 January 2007 particularly items no. 5 and 6.Accordingly, (a) the Financial Management Office is DIRECTED to pay the salary of Ms. Loida M. Genabe pending resolution of the administrative case against her by the Court; and (b) the Office of the Administrative Services-Leave Division is DIRECTED not to deduct the number of absences incurred by Ms. Genabe from her leave credits since the order of suspension is unauthorized; and2.GRANT the application of Ms. Loida M. Genabe for leave for a period of five (5) months starting 1 May to 30 September 2008 for purposes of taking the bar examination, this, however, is without prejudice to the action that the Committee of the Education Support Program may take on her application.[3]The OCAs Report and RecommendationIn its Report dated 23 October 2007, the OCA found Judge Macedas explanation unsatisfactory.The OCA stated that Circular No. 30-91 had been impliedly amended by the Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties as contained in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which became effective on 15 February 2004.The OCA added that it was clear from the Guidelines that Judge Maceda had no authority to directly penalize a court employee. As an Executive Judge, he only had the right to act upon and investigate administrative complaints involving light offenses.The power to decide and impose a penalty, even for light offenses, rests with the Supreme Court. Thus, the OCA recommended that Judge Maceda be finedP12,000 payable immediately and be sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future would merit a severe penalty.The Courts RulingAfter a careful review of the records of the case, we find reasonable grounds to hold both Genabe and Judge Maceda administratively liable.In A.M. No. P-07-2320, we find Genabe guilty for simple neglect of duty.Simple neglect of duty has been defined as the failure of an employee to give attention to a task expected of him and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.[4]Genabe had been permitted to attend a two-day seminar in Baguio City on the premise that no work would be left pending.She was assigned to summarize the testimonies of three defense witnesses for a criminal case set for promulgation.The records reveal that Genabe was only able to summarize the TSN of one witness consisting of 46 pages and failed to finish the TSN of the other two witnesses consisting of 67 pages.Before leaving for Baguio, Genabe had three working days to complete the task.However, the assignment remained unfinished.When such task was assigned to another court employee, it only took the other employee two and a half hours to complete the TSN of the two witnesses.Further, Judge Maceda stated that this was not the only time Genabe had been remiss in her duties.In Criminal Case No. 98-926 entitled People of the Philippines v. Russel Javier, et al., Genabe failed to include in the statement of facts the detail on the prosecutors waiver of the cross examination and more importantly, neglected to include the testimony of the accused Russel Javier upon completing his testimony.Also, in Criminal Case Nos. 02-0713 and 02-0714, entitled People of the Philippines v. Alberto Ylanan, Genabe included the testimony of an alleged poseur when his testimony, upon motion, had been stricken off the record per Order dated 29 July 2003.From these instances, we find that Genabes actuations constitute simple neglect of duty.As a first offense under civil service law, we impose the penalty of suspension without pay for a period of one month and one day.[5]The suspension imposed upon Genabe under the Order dated 21 December 2006 shall be considered as the penalty imposed.The remaining balance of one day suspension must be served upon finality of this decision.With regard to the other charges of contempt, conduct unbecoming and misconduct, we find no sufficient basis to hold Genabe accountable for these offenses based on her alleged unruly conduct at the staff meeting held on 29 November 2006.In administrative proceedings, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in hiscomplaint.[6]Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.The standard was not met in this case.The Order dated 21 December 2006 and Investigation Report dated 18 January 2007 submitted by Judge Maceda centered mainly on Genabes neglect of duty in not completing her assigned task on time.The other charges had been touched on in a sporadic manner.While the law does not tolerate misconduct by a civil servant, suspension, replacement or dismissal must not be resorted to unless there is substantial evidence to merit such penalties.In the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, Genabe cannot be held accountable for the other charges against her.In A.M. No. 07-2-93-RTC, we find that Judge Maceda failed to observe due process in ordering the suspension of Genabe and withholding her salary from 21 December 2006 to 20 January 2007.Judge Maceda suspended a court personnel directly under his supervision by relying on the authority laid down in Article II, Section A(2)(a) of Circular No. 30-91 which provides:2. Lower Court Personnela. Light Offenses (1) Disciplinary matters involving light offenses as defined under the Civil Service law (Administrative Code of 1987 and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Rep. Act. 6713) where the penalty is reprimand, suspension for not more than thirty days, or a fine not exceeding thirty days' salary, and as classified in Civil Service Resolution No. 30, Series of 1989, shall be acted upon by the appropriate supervisory official of the lower court concerned.(2) The appropriate supervisory officials are the Presiding Justices/Presiding Judge of the lower collegiate courts and the Executive Judges of the trial courts with respect to the personnel of their respective courts, except those directly under the individual Justices and Judges, in which case, the latter shall be their appropriate supervisory officials.(3) The complaint for light offenses whether filed with the Court, the Office of the Court Administrator, or the lower court shall be heard and decided by the appropriate supervisory official concerned. x x xThe reliance of Judge Maceda on the provisions of this circular is misplaced.Judge Maceda found Genabe to have neglected her duty in November 2006.The guidelines in effect at that time were already those found inA.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which took effect in 2004 or two years before the administrative charge of neglect of duty was made against Genabe.Judge Maceda should have applied these new guidelines and not Circular No. 30-91.Section 1, Chapter VIII of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which provides the guidelines for administrative discipline of court employees over light offenses, states:SECTION. 1.Disciplinary jurisdiction over light offenses. The Executive Judge shall have authority to act upon and investigate administrative complaints involving light offenses as defined under the Civil Service Law and Rules (Administrative Code of 1987), and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Republic Act No. 6713), where the penalty is reprimand, suspension for not more than thirty (30) days, or a fine not exceeding thirty (30) days salary, and as classified in pertinent Civil Service resolutions or issuances, filed by (a) a judge against a court employee, except lawyers, who both work in the same station within the Executive Judges area of administrative supervision; or (b) a court employee against another court employee, except lawyers, who both work in the same station within the Executive Judges area of administrative supervision.In the preceding instances, the Executive Judge shall conduct the necessary inquiry and submit to the Office of the Court Administrator the results thereof with a recommendation as to the action to be taken thereon, including the penalty to be imposed, if any, within thirty (30) days from termination of said inquiry.At his/her discretion, the Executive Judge may delegate the investigation of complaints involving light offenses to any of the Presiding Judges or court officials within his/her area of administrative supervision.In the case of a complaint (a) filed against court employees who are lawyers, or (b) filed by private complainants against court employees, lawyers and non-lawyers alike, the same shall be forwarded by the Executive Judge to the Office of the Court Administrator for appropriate action and disposition. x x x(Emphasis supplied)The guidelines clearly provide that the authority of judges to discipline erring court personnel, under their supervision and charged with light offenses, is limited to conducting an inquiry only.After such inquiry, the executive judge is required to submit to the OCA the results of the investigation and give a recommendation as to what action should be taken. An executive judge does not have the authority to act upon the results of the inquiry and thereafter, if the court employee is found guilty, unilaterally impose a penalty, as in this case.It is only the Supreme Court which has the power to find the court personnel guilty or not for the offense charged and then impose a penalty.In the present case, Judge Maceda suspended Genabe for the offense of neglect of duty.Under Section 52(B), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[7]simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense which carries a penalty of one month and one day to six months suspension for the first offense.[8]Under A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, an executive judge may only conduct an investigation for all offenses.After the investigation, the executive judge is mandated to refer the necessary disciplinary action to this Court for appropriate action.[9]Even under Circular No. 30-91, Judge Maceda should have referred to Section A(2)(b) of Circular No. 30-91 which provides:b. Grave or Less Grave OffensesAll administrative complaints for grave or less grave offenses as defined in the Codes hereinbefore referred to shall be immediately referred to the CourtEn Bancfor appropriate action within 15 days from receipt by the Court Administrator if filed directly with him, otherwise, within 15 days likewise from receipt by him from the appropriate supervisory officials concerned.Thus, under Circular No. 30-91, a court employee charged with a less grave offense could not be directly penalized by an executive judge.Judge Maceda had no authority to suspend Genabe outright for a less grave offense of simple neglect of duty even under Circular No. 30-91. Clearly, Judge Maceda exceeded his authority when he issued the 21 December 2006 suspension order against Genabe.Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that a violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars constitutes a less serious charge in the discipline of judges of regular courts:Sec. 9. Less Serious Charges. x x x x4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars;x x x xAccordingly, Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides the sanctions to be imposed if one is found to be guilty of a less serious charge:Sec. 11. Sanctions. x x x xB. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:1.Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or2.A fine of more thanP10,000.00 but not exceedingP20,000.00.x x x xWe hold that the penalty of fine in the amount ofP12,000 is commensurate to Judge Macedas violation of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC.We sternly warn him that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.WHEREFORE, in A.M. No. P-07-2320, we find Loida M. Genabe, Legal Researcher II of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 275,GUILTYof simple neglect of duty.WeSUSPENDher for one month and one day without pay.The 30-day suspension imposed upon Loida M. Genabe under the Order dated 21 December 2006 issued by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda shall be considered as a partial service of the penalty imposed.The remaining balance of the penalty of one day suspension shall be immediately served upon finality of this decision.Respondent Loida M. Genabe is sternly warned that commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.In A.M No. 07-2-93-RTC, we find Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 275,GUILTYof violation of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC.Accordingly, weFINEhimP12,000, with a stern warning that commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

GENARO SANTIAGO III v. JUSTICE JUAN Q. ENRIQUEZ, JR.579 SCRA 1 (2009)Under the principle of judicial immunity, judges cannot be held criminally, civilly or administratively liable for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith.The complainant Genaro Santiago III filed a Petition forReconstitutionof Lost/ Destroyed OriginalCertificate of TitleNo. 56, registered in the name of Pantaleona Santiago and Blas Fajardo.The RegionalTrial Court of Quezon City granted the petition. TheRepublicof the Philippines, through the Office of the SolicitorGeneral, appealed to the Supreme Court asking for its reversal.The case was raffled to Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, Justice Vicente Veloso and herein respondent Justice Juan Enriquez. Justice Gonzales-Sison was the one who made theReportas the basis for the Divisions consultation and deliberation which upholds the decision made by the RTC of Quezon City. Justice Veloso concurred in theReportmade. On the other hand, Justice Enriquez dissented to theReportand made his own Dissenting Opinion. Justice Enriquez requested for another two (2) Justices to form a Special Division, Justice Edgardo Cruz and Justice Lucas Bersamin were then included. After the deliberations, the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Enriquez became the majority opinion. The decision of the RTC of Quezon City was reversed by the decision made by the Special Division.Complainant Santiago then filed anadministrativecomplaint against Justice Enriquez on the ground of gross ignorance of the law, and gross incompetence in connection with his rendering of alleged unjust judgment in the case of Santiago. Justice Enriquez contends that it was a mere nuisance and that it was filed prematurely.ISSUE:Whether or not there is a valid ground forthe filingof anadministrativecase against Justice EnriquezHELD:The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of the arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. Thus,unlesshe is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice, not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable.The principle of judicial immunity insulates judges, and even Justices of superior courts, from being held to account criminally, civilly or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith. To hold otherwise would render judicial office untenable. No one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in theprocessof administering justice could be infallible in his judgment.It bears particular stress in the present case thatthe filingof charges against asinglemember of a division of the appellate court is inappropriate. The Decision was not rendered by respondent in hisindividualcapacity. It was a product of the consultations and deliberations by the Special Division of five.

Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme CourtManilaEN BANC3-D INDUSTRIES, INC.andSMARTNET PHILIPPINES, INC.Complainants,- versus -JUSTICES VICENTE Q. ROXASandJUAN Q. ENRIQUEZ, JR.,Respondents.A.M. No. CA-10-50-J[formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-152-CA-J]Present:CORONA,C.J.,CARPIO,CARPIO MORALES,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,BRION,*PERALTA,BERSAMIN,DELCASTILLO,ABAD,VILLARAMA, JR.,PEREZ,MENDOZA, andSERENO,JJ.Promulgated:October 5, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xD E C I S I O NCARPIO MORALES,J.:Referred for appropriate action by the Office of the Ombudsman to this Courts Office of the Court Administrator is the verified May 13, 2005 Complaint[1]with enclosures of 3-D Industries, Inc. (3-D), and Smartnet Philippines, Inc. (Smartnet) represented by Gilbert Guy (Gilbert), against Court of Appeals (CA or appellate court) Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Vicente Q. Roxas,for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act[2](R.A. 3019, as amended)relative to the admission, by the Eighth Division of the CA, of which said Justices were members, of a Supplemental Petition forCertiorariand Second Supplemental Petition forCertiorariinCA-G.R. SP No. 87014, Northern Islands Co., Inc., et al. v. Hon. Artemio S. Tipon, et al.Culled fromGuy v. Court of Appeals,[3]decided by this Court on December 10, 2007, are the following antecedent facts:Herein complainant Smartnets representative Gilbert is the son of the spouses Francisco and Simny Guy.The spouses organized Northern Islands Co., Inc. (NICI) which is engaged in the manufacture, distribution, and sale of various home appliances bearing the 3-D trademark.The spouses also organized Lincoln Continental Development Corporation, Inc. (Lincoln Continental) as a holding company of 50% of the 20,160 shares of stock of NICI in trust for their three daughters Geraldine, Gladys and Grace-sisters of Gilbert.Finding that their son Gilbert had been dissipating the assets of Lincoln Continental, the spouses Guy caused the registration of 50% of the 20,160 shares of stock of NICI in the names of their three daughters, thus enabling the latter to assume an active role in the management of NICI.On March 18, 2004, Lincoln Continental filed a complaint at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila against NICI and Gilberts parents-the spouses Guy and three sisters (hereafter the Guy family), forannulment of the transfer of the 50% NICI sharesof stock to Gilberts sisters.The complaint, docketed] as Civil Case No. 04-109444, prayed for, among other things, the restoration of the management of NICI to Gilbert, and the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to prohibit Gilberts sisters from exercising any right of ownership over the questioned shares.Lincoln Continental later filed a Motion to Inhibit the Presiding Judge of Branch 24 of RTC Manila to which its complaint was raffled on the ground of partiality. The Motion was granted and the case was re-raffled to Branch 46 of the same court.NICI and the Guy family challenged the inhibition of the Presiding Judge of Branch 24 viaCertiorariandMandamusbefore the CA in which they prayed for, among other things, the issuance of an order restraining the Presiding Judge of Branch 46 from further hearing Civil Case No. 04-109444.In the meantime, Branch 46, acting on the prayer of Lincoln Continental,issuedon June 15, 2004 a TROrestoring the management of NICI to Gilbert.Branch 46 subsequentlyissuedonOctober 13, 2004 writ of preliminary mandatory injunctionas prayed for by Lincoln Continental.On account of the issuance by the Manila RTC Branch 46 of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in favor of Lincoln Continental, the CA-Tenth Division, by Resolution of October 20, 2004, denied NICIs and the Guy familys petition forCertiorariandMandamus.NICI and the Guy family thereafter filed anewpetition forCertiorariwithapplication for TRO/preliminary injunction,docketed asCA-G.R. SP No. 87104, praying for the nullification of the above-mentioned RTC Manila Branch 46s TRO dated June 15, 2004 and Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction dated October 13, 2004 and the restoration of thestatus quo ante.This new petition was raffled to the appellate courts Eighth Division.Acting on NICI and the Guy familysnewpetition, the CA-Eighth Division issued on October 28, 2004 a TRO enjoining the implementation of the October 13, 2004 Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued by the Manila RTC Branch 46.On November 2, 2004, NICI and the Guy family filed with the CA-Eighth Division an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the issuance of a Break-Open Order[4]to implement the appellate courts October 28, 2004 TRO.The motion was granted by Resolution of November 4, 2004 pursuant to which the Guy family entered the NICI premises at No. 3 Mercury Avenue, Libis,Quezon City.Herein Smartnet, one of the occupants of the NICI premises, filed on December 16, 2004 with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City acomplaint for forcible entryagainst NICI and the Guy family, docketed as Civil Case No. 35-33937.In the meantime, the CA-Eighth Division directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by NICI and the Guy family in theirnewpetition,CA-G.R. SP No. 87104, and a writ was accordingly issued on December 22, 2004.Gilbert later filed acomplaint for replevinon behalf of 3-D, docketed as Civil Case No. 70220, before the RTC of Pasig City.The complaint was given due course by Branch 71 of the RTC Pasig which issued on January 18, 2005 a writ of replevin in favor of 3-D, prompting the NICI and the Guy family to file on January 20, 2005 before the CA-Eighth Division aSupplemental Petitionfor Certiorariwith Urgent Motion for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to Include Supervening Events. The Supplemental Petition[5]impleaded as additional respondents herein complainant 3-D, Judges Celso D. Lavia, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 71,PasigCityand Sheriff Cresencio Rabello, Jr.,alleging that Gilbert, in an attempt to circumvent the TROs and injunctive writ issued by the CA-Eighth Division, allowed himself to be used by 3-D by filing, onits behalf, a complaint for replevin.ByResolution of January 24, 2005, the appellate courts Eighth Division issued the questioned ResolutionadmittingtheSupplemental Petition for Certiorari.Still later, NICI and the Guy family filed on April 15, 2005, before the CA-Eighth Division aSecondSupplemental Petition forCertiorariandProhibitionwith Urgent Motion for the Issuance of anExpandedWrit of Preliminary Injunction,[6]impleading as additional respondent herein complainant Smartnet, among others.In theSecond Supplemental Petition, NICI and the Guy family raised, in the main, the allegedly continuing forum shopping of Gilbert by continuing to use Smartnet,inter alia,as alter ego and dummy to institute various cases in court to gain control of the properties of NICI.[7]ByResolution of April 26, 2005, the members of the appellate courts Eighth Division, which had segued to the Seventh Division including respondents,admittedtheSecond Supplemental Petition forCertiorariandrestrained the additionally impleaded respondents including Smartnet from disturbing the December 22, 2004 writ of preliminary injunction[8]issued by the Eighth Division of which respondents were members.In the present administrative complaint, complainants allege that in issuing the assailedResolutions dated January 24, 2005andApril 26, 2005, respondents caused undue injury to them by, among other things, giving the petitioners (NICI and the Guy Family) in the new petition forCertiorariunwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence in the discharge of their judicial functions in violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.[9]Complainants likewise allege that respondents, in issuing the questioned Resolutions, had maneuvered the assignment to the Eighth Division of the supplemental petitions of NICI and the Guy family, which were, however, completelydifferentfrom the new petition forCertiorari, for the purpose of assuring that those supplemental petitions would not be raffled or assigned to other possibly unsympathetic divisions of the appellate court.[10]Furthermore, complainants allege that the conclusory ruling in the questioned Resolutions was a lame pretext since the properties involved therein are not incustodia legis,and there was no factual basis that 3-D is a mere alter ego or dummy of Gilbert.[11]Finally, complainants allege that the Divisions in which respondents were sitting had mutated into a judicial vending machine, regularly dispensing TROs and injunctions at an impressive maximum of five days from the filing of the pleadings by the petitioners.[12]By Resolution of July 28, 2009, the Court required respondent Justice Enriquez to comment on the complaint and to show cause why he should not be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned;and to refer the complaint against Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, who was already out of the service, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.Respondent Justice Enriquez filed his Comment dated September 16, 2009, emphasizing that the questionedResolution of April 26, 2007was upheld by this Court in its Decision in G.R. No. 165849,Guy v. Courts of Appeals,[13]hence, complainants allegation of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, gross negligence, and derogation of established procedure is totally devoid of factual and legal basis.He informs that he was neither theponenteof this assailed Resolution nor the Senior Member of the now Seventh Division of the appellate court.In compliance with this Courts Resolution of October 6, 2009, complainants filed a Reply dated December 4, 2009, laying emphasis on the fact that this Courts decision inGuy v. Courts of Appealswas completely silent on the issue of whether the CA-Eighth Division could expand the coverage of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction of December 22, 2004 restraining Manila RTC Branch 46 from implementing the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction which restored the management of NICI to Gilbert.Complainants add that the appellate courts Eighth Division acted with undue haste in precipitately admitting the two Supplemental Petitions forCertiorarion the basis of the bare and unsubstantiated allegation that Gilbert was using herein complainants as his alter egos to wrest control and possession of the assets and properties of NICI.Meanwhile, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline endorsed back to the Office of the Bar Confidant on September 23, 2009 the complaint respecting Justice Roxas, in compliance with the September 5, 2006 Resolution of this Court in Bar Matter 1645.[14]The present complaint in so far as it involves complainant 3-D raises issues not passed upon by this CourtinGuy v. Courts of Appeals.It bears noting that the complaintwas indorsed by the Office of the Ombudsman to this Court specifically for a determination of whether respondents acted within their duties, pursuant toFuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao[15]which ruled:. . . [I]t is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the Judges and Court personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land.The present complaint thus stemmed from the participation of respondents in theissuance of the two assailed Resolutions dated January 24, 2005 and April 26, 2005, which admitted the Supplemental and Second Supplemental Petitions, respectively, of NICI and the Guy family impleading herein complainants, among others, as additional respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 87104,thereby including them in the coverage of the injunctive writ issued thereinon December 22, 2004 enjoining the implementation of the Manila RTC Branch 46 Order which restored the management of NICI to Gilbert.Recall that complainants charge that by their questioned Resolutions, respondents violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for allegedly giving unwarranted benefits to NICI and the Guy family.There are two ways by which Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 may be violated,[16]viz: 1)by giving undue injury to any party, including the Government, 2)by causing any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.[17]These acts must be committed with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross and inexcusable negligence.Manifest partiality has been defined as a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side rather than the other.[18]Bad faith connotes not only bad judgment or negligence, but also a dishonest purpose, a conscious wrongdoing, or a breach of duty amounting to fraud.[19]Gross negligence is the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences as far as other persons are concerned.[20]That the assailed Resolutions issued by respondents favored NICI and the Guy family does not necessarily render respondents guilty of violation ofSection 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, absent proven particular acts of manifest, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, good faith and regularity being generally presumed in the performance of official duties by public officers.[21]That is why administrative complaints against judges must always be examined with a discriminating eye for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that they stand to face the sanction of dismissal and/or disbarment.[22]In order for this administrative offense to prosper, the subject order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, more importantly, must be attended by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.[23]Since the impleading of additional parties, on motion of any party ormotu proprioat any stage of the action and/or such times as are just is allowed,[24]the Court finds that respondents participation in the admission of the supplemental petitions impleading herein complainants as respondents in CA-G.R.SP No. 87104 does not render them administratively liable.While respondents may have based the assailed Resolutions on mere allegations, thus disregarding what has been established in jurisprudence that mere allegation that a corporation is the alter ego of the individual stockholders is insufficient,[25]this does not render them administratively liable because not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice,[26]which is not the case here.WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint isDISMISSED.

Republic of thePhilippinesSupreme CourtBaguioCityEN BANCFRANCISCO P. OCAMPO,Complainant,-versus-JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144,MakatiCity,Respondent.x-----------------------------------------xOFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,Complainant,-versus-JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144,MakatiCity,Respondent.x-----------------------------------------xOFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,Complainant,-versus-JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, MakatiCity,and COURT STENOGRAPHER VICTORIA C. JAMORA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City,Respondents.x-----------------------------------------xSYLVIASANTOS,Complainant,-versus-JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144,MakatiCity,Respondent.A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJA.M. No. RTJ-07-2049A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141(Formerly A.M. No. 07-5-263- RTC/Re:Initial Report on the Judicial AuditConducted at the Regional Trial Court,Branch 144,MakatiCity)A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093PUNO,C.J.,CARPIO,CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,BRION,PERALTA,BERSAMIN,DELCASTILLO,ABAD,VILLARAMA, JR.,PEREZ, andMENDOZA,JJ.Promulgated:April 23, 2010

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xD E C I S I O NPER CURIAM:These consolidated cases[1]stemmed from the administrative complaints filed against respondent Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua.A decision has been rendered in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093, entitledSylvia Santos v. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua, from which the respondent sought reconsideration.The immediately preceding case was consolidated with the subsequent administrative complaints filed against respondent Judge in a Resolution datedApril 14, 2009of the Courten banc.A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJInA.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ(the Ocampo Case),Francisco P. Ocampochargedrespondent Judge Arcaya-Chua with harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, manifest partiality and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.In his letter-complaint dated April 24, 2007 to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Francisco Ocampo stated that he was the respondent in Special Proceedings (SP) No. M-6375, entitledMilan Arceo Ocampo v. Francisco P. Ocampo, which was pending before the sala of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.OnNovember 27, 2006, Francisco Ocampo's wife, Milan Arceo Ocampo, filed a petition claiming the sole custody of their minor daughters, namely, Ma. Francesca P. Ocampo (Francesca), born on June 1, 1994, and Ma. Fatima Patricia A. Ocampo (Fatima), born on October 13, 1995. Summons was served upon Francisco Ocampo onDecember 12, 2006and the case was set for hearing the following day,December 13, 2006.During the hearing, upon agreement of the parties, respondent Judgeissued an Order enjoining Francisco Ocampo from taking their minor daughters out of the country without the court's permission and directing him to allow his wife, Milan, visitation rights over their minor daughters in their residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Since then,Milanexercised visitation rights over the minors and communicated with them through their cellular phones.Francisco Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, alleging that he andMilanwere residents and registered voters of Meycauayan, Bulacan. He then served written interrogatories to his wife, and presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove that his wife was not really a resident ofMakatiCity.In an Order datedMarch 22, 2007, respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss.Francisco Ocampo questioned the dismissal of his motion sinceMilannever presented any evidence to controvert the evidence which he submitted in support of his motion to dismiss.FranciscoOcampo, thereafter, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was likewise denied by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in an Order dated April 3, 2007. On even date, respondent Judge issued aTemporary Protection Order (TPO),requiring complainant Ocampo to turn over the custody of their minor daughters to his wife, to stay away from his wife's residence at 1211 West Ayala Condominium, 252 Gil Puyat Ave., Makati City, to refrain from committing acts that would harass, intimidate or threaten and create an unreasonable risk to the health, safety or welfare of their minor daughters and his wife, and to provide monthly support ofP50,000.00 to their minor daughters and his wife, exclusive of expenses for medication and education.Francisco Ocampo faulted respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua for issuing theTPOas the period to file his answer had not yet expired when respondent Judge issued the said Order. Moreover, he was directed to give monthly support ofP50,000.00 to his wife and minor daughters, even if his wife alleged that he is not the father of the said minors and in the absence of any factual finding as to the resources of the giver and the necessities of the recipient.In directing the payment of support to his wife, respondent Judgealso ignored the factual circumstances relating to the adulterous relations of his wife and the pendency of the legal separation case based on his wife's sexual infidelity and abandonment.Francisco Ocampo further alleged that respondent Judgecaused the implementation of the TPO as if it was a matter of life and death. When her branch sheriff was not available, respondent Judgedispatched another sheriff to implement the Order.Around 6:00 a.m. on April 5, 2007, a Maundy Thursday, the sheriff dispatched by respondent Judgebarged into the home of Francisco Ocampos parents inBaguioCityand woke up all the occupants therein.At that time, Francisco Ocampo,his minor daughters and family were having their Holy Week vacation. The sheriff went inside the house and opened the rooms against the will of the occupants and without regard to their privacy.When the sheriff learned that Francesca and Fatima were still sleeping, he demanded that they be roused from their sleep, even as Ocampo assured him that he will peacefully bring his minor daughters to his wife.The sheriff also insisted that Francisco Ocampo pay the support ofP50,000.00 right there and then, although he was told by Francisco thathe did not have such amount of money. Francesca and Fatima refused to go with the sheriff, but because of the court order, Francisco Ocampo told them to go with him.Francisco Ocampo then filed a motion for inhibition, as well as an urgentex partemotion to recall or rectify the Order dated April 3, 2007, but both motions were denied by respondent Judgein an Order dated April 13, 2007.The irregular acts attributed to respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua are as follows: (1) she denied the motion to dismiss filed by Francisco Ocampo, respondent therein, despite overwhelming evidence submitted that therein petitioner was not a resident of Makati City; (2) she scheduled the hearing of the case immediately a day after the summons was served on therein respondent; (3) she issued a TPO despite the fact that therein respondent's period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed; (4) she ordered the payment of support without sufficient basis; and (5) she caused the implementation of the TPO over-zealously, even designating a special sheriff to serve it in Baguio City on a Maundy Thursday. These, coupled with complainant Ocampo's account that respondent Judge demanded money from his wife, constitute the first set of charges filed against her.In her Comment,[2]respondent Judgeexplained that the order setting SP No. M-6375 for hearing on the petitioner's application for a TPO and Hold Departure Order was issued onDecember 8, 2006, a Friday, and was received for service by the Process Server on the same day. Based on the officer's return, the Order was attempted to be served twice by the Process Server onDecember 11, 2006, a Monday, at complainant Francisco Ocampo's house, but nobody was there. OnDecember 12, 2006, substituted service was resorted to by the Process Server.Respondent Judge stated that the hearing could not have been set earlier since the court calendar was full, nor later, because December 13, 2006 was the last hearing date, before the court went on Christmas recess, for cases requiring the presence of the public prosecutor. While Francisco Ocampo may have felt harassed by the suddenness of the court hearing, respondent Judgeprofessed that she did not have such intention. The nature of therein petitioner's prayers required immediate action by the court and the December 8, 2006 Order could have been served on him on December 11, 2006, but, as previously mentioned, was unsuccessful.Respondent Judgepointed out that had complainant Ocampo really felt harassed by the suddenness of the hearing, he could have complained during the hearing of December 13, 2006.Nonetheless, he never brought such issue to the attention of the court, until the filing of the administrative complaint, or four (4) months after the fact.At any rate, the scheduled hearing onDecember 13, 2006did not push through because FranciscoOcampo filed a motion to dismiss on the same day.Francisco Ocampo himself set the hearing of his motion for reconsideration of the Order datedMarch 22, 2007Order (which denied the Motion to Dismiss) onApril 3, 2007, a Holy Tuesday. For utter lack of merit, reconsideration was denied and the TPO was issued on the same day.Respondent Judgestated that the issuance of the TPO was anchored on the provision of Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262.The Court also took into account the provisions of Articles 176 and 220 of the Family Code, which deal with the right of the mother to exercise parental authority over illegitimate children and her right to keep them in her company. Moreover,Francisco Ocampos contention in his Answer that he was not contesting his wifes claim that the subject minors were not his children bolstered the propriety of the award of custody over the subject minors to his wife, Milan.Respondent Judgeasserted that she was not over-zealous in causing the implementation of theTPO,as the law itself mandates that the court order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent. The Order that directed the implementation of the TPO was datedApril 4, 2007, and it was received byMilan's counsel on the same day. Sheriff Manuel Q. Tangangco was deputized to serve it since the Branch Sheriff was not available. Milan Ocampo herself and her counsel coordinated with the sheriff regarding its service, also on the same day. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua explained that had she opted to defer action on Milan's prayer for the issuance of aTPOas well as its implementation, it would have been Milan who would have charged her administratively, considering that thePetitionwas filed as early as November 23, 2006, but the proceedings on the merits were delayed due to the filing by Francisco Ocampo of aMotion to Dismiss.In fact, therein petitioner, Milan Ocampo, filed on February 1, 2007 anOmnibus Motion (To Resolve Petitioner's Application for a Permanent Protection Order, etc.),claiming that Francisco Ocampo'smotion to dismisswas purely dilatory.As regards the date, time and manner the TPO was served by the sheriff, respondent Judgemaintained that she was not privy to it, since the said TPO would have been served on April 4, 2007, pursuant to the Order bearing the same date. The sheriff's arrogance, if any, was his personal accountability.Respondent Judgenoted that theSheriffs Reportand handwritten notation on the lower portion of the Order dated April 3, 2007, which was also signed by Kagawad Artemio S. Zaparita ofBaguioCityand SP04 Arthur A. Curno of the Baguio City Police, stated that respondent Francisco Ocampo voluntarily turned over the custody of subject minors to the petitioner.During the hearing onMay 10, 2007, the subject minors themselves belied the claims of Francisco Ocampo regarding the alleged arbitrary manner theTPOwas served by the sheriff.Respondent Judge also pointed out that the court did not receive any complaint from Francisco Ocampo or anyone concerned about the manner the TPO was served. It was only in the present administrative complaint that the same was raised, leading to the inference that Francisco Ocampos claims were concocted.Respondent Judgemaintained that it was irrelevant that the subject minors may not have been in danger, but were safe in the custody of complainant Francisco Ocampo.The court arrived at a preliminary determination thatMilan, being the biological mother and the subject minors being her illegitimate children, was entitled to custody over them.Moreover,Milanmay have been granted and was exercising visitation rights over subject minors, yet the duration thereof, as stated in the Order datedDecember 13, 2006, was only until the court resolved complainant Ocampo's Motion to Dismiss, which was resolved with finality onApril 3, 2007.Further, there is a whale of a difference between exercise of visitation rights and custody. During the hearing onMay 10, 2007, subject minors, who were over seven years old, declared that they preferred to stay with their mother, Milan Ocampo, and likewise confirmed the physical violence committed by complainant Francisco Ocampo against Milan Ocampo.According to respondent Judge,Milan Ocamposprayer for the issuance of a TPO and a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) was anchored mainly on R.A. No. 9262.Section15 ofR.A. No. 9262 is explicit that the TPO should be issued by the court on the date of the filing of the application afterex partedetermination that such order should be issued.Milan's prayer for the issuance of a TPO and a PPO, based on R.A. No. 9262, was incorporated in thePetitionthat was filed as early asNovember 23, 2006. Thus, it was not necessary for the court to await the filing of complainant Ocampo's Answer or the expiry of the period within which to file it before issuing the TPO.Respondent Judgeexplained that the award of support was in favor ofMilanalone as the legal wife of complainant Ocampo. This was clarified in an Order datedApril 16, 2007. Among Milan's prayers in herPetitionwas for an award of monthly support of not less thanP150,000.00, but the court awarded onlyP50,000.00, as that was the amount found reasonable by it.At any rate, the support granted by the court was only temporary. Likewise, although complainant Francisco Ocampo had not yet complied with the directive to give support as alleged byMilan, the court did not impose a sanction against him precisely because the court was then completing the hearing for the issuance of a TPO.Moreover, Francisco Ocampo had really no reason to complain about the award of support, because the directive to provide monthly support was already held in abeyance in the Order dated May 2, 2007.Respondent Judge stated that Francisco Ocampo's allegations regardingMilan's adulterous relationships and the legal separation case do not have any bearing on SP No.M-6375.She further asserted that, as can be gleaned from the records, the courses of action taken by the counsel of complainant Francisco Ocampo did not conform to normal rules of procedure.One,on April 10, 2007, he filed a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition, but two days later, or on April 12, 2007, he still filed an UrgentEx ParteMotion to Recall or Rectify Order dated April 3, 2007.Two,on April 24, 2007, he filed the instant administrative complaint, but two days later, or on April 26, 2007, he still filed an Opposition to Petitioner's Motion dated April 23, 2007 withEx ParteMotion for Examination of the Minors, and a day later, on April 24, 2007, filed a Second Motion to Inhibit. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua asseverated that from all appearances, the administrative complaint was filed for the sole objective of compelling her to inhibit herself from handling SP No.M-6375. Three,on May 11, 2007, he filed a Motion to Terminate Proceedings, which was an indication that complainant Ocampo did not really have any genuine administrative cause of action against her. As things turned out, all that complainant Ocampo wanted to hear from the subject minors was their declaration that they preferred to stay with their mother.A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049InA.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (theChang Tan/RCBC Case),the OCA, through then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, informed the Office of the Chief Justice in a Memorandum dated May 11, 2007 of the reports about the rampant selling of TPOs and PPOs in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144, which was the sala presided by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.The said reports were thereafter confirmed by Judges Winlove M. Dumayas, Marissa Macaraig-Guillen, Tranquil P. Salvador and Jenny Lind Aldecoa-Delorino, particularly with respect to SP Case No. M-6373, entitledAlbert K. S. Chang Tan II v. Stephanie Estrella Pulliam, a child custody case.In a Resolution[3]dated June 5, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the Memorandum of Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock as a complaint for gross ignorance and gross misconduct against Judge Arcaya-Chua, directed respondent Judge to file a Comment on the complaint within 10 days from receipt of notice, and suspended respondent Judge pending resolution of the administrative case.It appears that on May 7, 2007, respondent Judge issued a TPO in the said case, granting, among others, the custody of the subject minor, Rafi Pulliam, to therein petitioner, Albert Chang Tan, and directing therein respondent, Stephanie Pulliam, to stay away from the home and office ofChang Tan as well as from the school of the subject minor. Per the sheriff's return datedMay 8, 2007, the Order was not fully implemented insofar as the custody of the subject minor was directed to be turned over to Chang Tan. This development irked Chang Tan, resulting in a heated argument between Chang Tan and the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Branch 144. Chang Tan insisted that a break open order be issued or that the sheriff be permitted to enter the premises of Pulliam's house to search for the child and then bring her to court. On the same day, May 8, 2007, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua issued an order authorizing the sherifftoentertheopenpremiseswheresubjectminormaybefound for the purpose of turning over custody to petitioner, but is admonished to maintain peace and order in the conduct thereof.According to OCA, although it was not shown that Judge Arcaya-Chua received money from Chang Tan in exchange for the issuance of the TPO, the facts clearly indicate that she was remiss in issuing theTPO.Her speedy issuance ofthe Orders dated May 7, 2007 and May 8, 2007 not only showed her unusual interest in the case, but italso appeared that the Order dated May 8, 2007 was tailor-fitted to suit the wishes of Chang Tan, as expressed in the latter's heated argument with the OIC of Branch 144.OCA also pointed out that it was not the only case wherein respondent Judge displayed unusual interest. On April 17, 2007, Judge Zenaida Galapate-Laguilles of RTC, Branch 143,MakatiCityissued an order in Civil Case No. 07-352, entitledRizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) v. Moreno, setting the application for a writ of preliminary attachment for hearing onMay 9, 2007.In view of the leave of absence of Judge Galapate-Laguilles, respondent Judge was later designated as the pairing judge. OnApril 20, 2007, respondent, as pairing judge, cancelled the previously scheduledMay 9, 2007hearing and re-scheduled the hearing toApril23,2007,where she ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in favor of RCBC. According to OCA, what was highly suspicious in respondents actuation was that there was really no urgency in the application for a writ of preliminary attachment.In her Comment[4]dated June 9, 2007,respondent Judgeexplained that SP No. M-6373, entitledAlbert K. S. Chang Tan II v. Stephanie Estrella Pulliam, was originally raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 60under Judge Marissa Macaraig-Guillen. After Judge Macaraig-Guillen recused from the case, it was re-raffled to her branch onApril 30, 2007, and the records of the case were transmitted to her on the same day.Respondent Judge explained that the May 7, 2007 Order is justified under Sections 8 and 15 of R.A. No. 9262, as well as under Circular No. 03-04-04-SC, which specifically applies to a petition for custody of minors.Contrary to OCAs finding that the application filed by petitioner Chang Tan in SP No. M-6373 did not contain the requisite allegation of violence committed by therein respondent Stephanie Pulliam on her minor child, Rafi, paragraph 17 of the Application was explicit that a complaint for child abuse was filed against Stephanie Pulliam, based on, among other evidence, a handwritten letter of Rafi wherein she enumerated the many abuses that her mother had committed upon her. The complaint for child abuse was attached as an annex to the Application as well as to the Petition. Other annexes attached to the Application, mentioning in detail the acts of violence committed by Stephanie Pulliam against Rafi, consisted of the statements ofyayaJosie Leynes and Rafi herself, as well as the Psychiatric Evaluation Report of Dr. Sonia Rodriguez.Respondent Judge stated that although Article 176 of the Family Codeprovides that an illegitimate child shall be under the parental authority of the mother, an exception is when the court orders otherwise. The mother may be divested of her parental authority over her illegitimate child when the court finds compelling reasons to doso.In all cases involving a child, his best interest is of paramount consideration. The court awarded provisional custody over the subject minor and a TPO in favor of therein petitioner Chang Tan, but effective for a period of 30 days only, after a careful consideration of the allegations in the pleadings and the supporting documentary evidence. Rafi was already more than seven years old at the time the Order datedMay 7, 2007was issued, as evidenced by her Certificate of Live Birth.Respondent Judgecountered that the Order datedMay 7, 2007was not speedily issued. As was her standard operating procedure with respect to newly raffled and re-raffled cases, she immediately studied the records of SP No. M-6373.Even before Chang Tan's Application was filed on May 4, 2007, she had already arrived at a preliminary determination that the issuance of a Provisional Order and aTPOwas warranted.She also studied Chang Tan's Application on the same day it was filed, a Friday. Her study thereof continued the following day, a Saturday, also in her office.She was then planning to avail of her forfeitable leave of absence of 30 days in June 2007, inasmuch as she did not avail of the same the previous year.To expedite the resolution of motions and preparation of decisions, and to avoid being saddled with much work on her return from her leave, she had been reporting to her office on alternate Saturdays beginning April 2007.SP No. M-6373 was not the only case that she studied on that Saturday, but other cases as well. Her study of SP No. M-6373 resumed onMonday, May 7, 2007, which culminated in the issuance of an Order at almost lunchtime of the same day. Granting that the one week period in which she issued theMay 7, 2007Order may be considered speedy, such circumstance should not be taken against her as she was really a fastworker. She was accustomed to speedy preparation of orders and decisions as a result of her training in the Supreme Court as a Court Attorney for 13 years.Respondent Judgemaintained that it was necessary to implementtheOrderdatedMay 7, 2007 at once, because the courts are so mandated to cause the immediate implementation of the TPO under Section 15, R.A. No. 9262.As regards the alleged heated argument between Chang Tan and the OIC of Branch 144, respondent Judge surmised that the same could be merely concocted, as it was neither reported to her nor brought to her attention. Moreover, the doors of her chambers were always wide open and she could have clearly heard it if it really transpired.Respondent Judgeaverredthat during the hearing dated May 11, 2007, shegave a directive holding in abeyance further implementation of the May 7, 2007 Order. Thus, she asserted that if she really received money or anything from Chang Tan or from anybody in his behalf, she would have ensured complete implementation of the Order datedMay 7, 2007, instead of holding it in abeyance. Moreover, she should have declared Pulliam and her counsel guilty of the indirect contempt charge against them if it were really true that she received money from Chang Tan.Respondent Judge stated that if it were true that she had been engaged in rampant selling of TPO/PPO or any order in her branch, she and her family would not have found themselves in such state of financial drain after she had been preventively suspended.As regards her participation in Civil Case No. 07-352, entitledRizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Moreno, respondent Judgenarrated that anEx ParteMotion for Immediate Resolution of Prayer for the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Attachment was forwarded to her sala being the Pairing Judge of Branch 143. Immediately after reading the motion, she inquired from the Clerk of Court of Branch 143 about the alleged leave of absence of therein Presiding Judge Zenaida Galapate Laguilles. She learned that Judge Galapate-Laguilles indeed left for theUnited Stateson April 19, 2007 to attend a convention on Intellectual Property and would be back on May 7, 2007. She likewise gathered information from the same Branch Clerk of Court that Judge Galapate-Laguilles's trip abroad was the reason behind the Application's setting onMay 9, 2007, not because the Presiding Judge did not see any urgency in the Application. The Presiding Judge also lacked ample time to act thereon since she had a previously scheduled leave of absence. Thus, she determined from the allegations in theex parteMotion and the Complaint the urgency to act on the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. She also took into account the following: (1) the circumstance of prolonged absence of the Presiding Judge of Branch 143; (2) the reason for the setting on May 9, 2007; and (3) the mandatory wordings of Supreme Court Circular No. 19-98, i.e., the judge of the paired court shall take cognizance of all cases thereat as acting judge therein.Respondent Judgeexplained that she granted the Application because the allegations in the complaint were adequately supported by documentary and testimonial evidence. She received the records of theRCBC CaseonApril 20, 2007, a Friday, and as was her standard practice, immediately studied them.She continued her study of the records, and the records of other cases, onApril 21, 2007, a Saturday, and onApril 23, 2007, a Monday, which culminated in the preparation of the Order on the same day.In her Supplemental Comment[5]dated June 22, 2007, respondent Judgeadded that the manner by which the incidents in the Chang Tan and RCBC cases were resolved must not be taken in isolation, but in relation to the manner all incidents were resolved and all decisions and orders were rendered in her sala, such that she resolved all incidents and rendered all her rulings immediately.A.M. No.