Capital Punishment

Saints Clare & Francis Salon June 10, 2016

Table of Contents

History of the Death Penalty

CATHOLICISM & CAPITAL PUNISHMENT by Avery Cardinal Dulles April 2001

Catholic Church and Capital Punishment, Wikipedia

The Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 2267

Can you be pro-life and pro-death penalty? CNN

Twenty-Five Years Later: Cardinal Bernardin's Consistent Ethic of Life, November-December 2008 BY RON HAMEL, Ph.D. Dr. Hamel is senior director, ethics, Catholic Health Association, St. Louis.

Collection of Statements on the Death Penalty by Supreme Court Justices

'Dead Man Walking' nun: My argument with Scalia, By Helen Prejean, Updated 4:29 PM ET, Mon February 22, 2016

Deterrence

List of 156 exonerations of Prisoners on Death Row in US since 1973

Facts about the Death Penalty Infographic

Introduction

The following materials are provided as a resource for the Capital Punishment Salon on June 10th. The perspectives are historical, legal, ethical, and religious. The positions are varied and an attempt was made to make the content factual rather than editorial, though it must be noted that the opinions of members of the legal, social, and religious systems are part of the facts about Capital Punishment.

The presenter will provide a very brief overview of this document at the beginning of the salon.

There will be one copy for reference at the Salon. If you wish to have a hardcopy please print it prior to the meeting.

As far back as the Ancient Laws of China, the death

penalty has been established as a punishment for crimes. In the 18th Century BC, the Code of King Hammurabi of Babylon codified the death penalty for twenty five different crimes, although murder was not one of them. The first death sentence historically recorded occurred in 16th Century BC Egypt where the wrongdoer, a member of nobility, was accused of magic, and ordered to take his own life. During this period non-nobility was usually killed with an ax.

In the 14th Century BC, the Hittite Code also prescribed the death penalty. The 7th Century BC Draconian Code of Athens made death the penalty for every crime committed. In the 5th Century BC, the Roman Law of the Twelve Tablets codified the death penalty. Again, the death penalty was different for nobility, freemen and slaves and was punishment for crimes such as the publication of libels and insulting songs, the cutting or grazing of crops planted by a farmer, the burning [of] a house or a stack of corn near a house, cheating by a patron of his client, perjury, making disturbances at night in the city, willful murder of a freeman or a parent, or theft by a slave. Death was often cruel and included crucifixion, drowning at sea, burial alive, beating to death, and impalement (often used by Nero). The Romans had a curious punishment for parricides (murder of a parent): the condemned was submersed in water in a sack, which also contained a dog, a rooster, a viper and an ape.[1] The most notorious death execution in BC was about 399 BC when the Greek philosopher Socrates was required to drink poison for heresy and corruption of youth.[2]

Mosaic Law codified many capital crimes. In fact, there is evidence that Jews used many different techniques including stoning, hanging, beheading, crucifixion (copied from the Romans), throwing the criminal from a rock, and sawing asunder. The most infamous execution of history occurred approximately 29 AD with the crucifixion of Jesus Christ outside Jerusalem. About 300 years later, the Emperor Constantine, after converting to Christianity, abolished crucifixion and other cruel death penalties in the Roman Empire. In 438, the Code of Theodosius made more than 80 crimes punishable by death.[3]

Britain influenced the colonies more than any other country and has a long history of punishment by death. About 450 BC, the death penalty was often enforced by throwing the condemned into a quagmire. By the 10th Century, hanging from gallows was the most frequent execution method. William the Conqueror opposed taking life except in war, and ordered no person to be hanged or executed for any offense. However, he allowed criminals to be mutilated for their crimes. During the middle ages, capital punishment was accompanied by torture. Most barons had a drowning pit as well as gallows and they were used for major as well as minor crimes. For example, in 1279, two hundred and eighty nine Jews were hanged for clipping coin. Under Edward I, two gatekeepers were killed because the city gate had not been closed in time

to prevent the escape of an accused murderer. Burning was the punishment for women's high treason and men were hanged, drawn and quartered. Beheading was generally accepted for the upper classes. One could be burned for marrying a Jew. Pressing became the penalty for those who would not confess to their crimes. The executioner placed heavy weights on the victim's chest. On the first day he gave the victim a small quantity of bread, on the second day a small drink of bad water, and so on until he confessed or died. Under the reign of Henry VIII, the numbers of those put to death are estimated as high as 72,000. Boiling to death was another penalty approved in 1531, and there are records to show some people boiled for up to two hours before death took them. When a woman was burned, the executioner tied a rope around her neck when she was tied to the stake. When the flames reached her she could be strangled from outside the ring of fire. However, this often failed and many were literally burnt alive.[4]

In Britain, the number of capital offenses continually increased until the 1700's when two hundred and twenty-two crimes were punishable by death. These included stealing from a house in the amount of forty shillings, stealing from a shop the value of five shillings, robbing a rabbit warren, cutting down a tree, and counterfeiting tax stamps. However, juries tended not to convict when the penalty was great and the crime was not. Reforms began to take place. In 1823, five laws passed, exempting about a hundred crimes from the death [penalty]. Between 1832 and 1837, many capital offenses were swept away. In 1840, there was a failed attempt to abolish all capital punishment. Through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, more and more capital punishments were abolished, not only in Britain, but also all across Europe, until today only a few European countries retain the death penalty.[5]

The first recorded execution in the English American colonies was in 1608 when officials executed George Kendall of Virginia for supposedly plotting to betray the British to the Spanish. In 1612, Virginia's governor, Sir Thomas Dale, implemented the Divine, Moral, and Martial Laws that made death the penalty for even minor offenses such as stealing grapes, killing chickens, killing dogs or horses without permission, or trading with Indians. Seven years later these laws were softened because Virginia feared that no one would settle there.[6]

In 1622, the first legal execution of a criminal, Daniel Frank, occurred in Virginia for the crime of theft.[7] Some colonies were very strict in their use of the death penalty, while others were less so. In Massachusetts Bay Colony the first execution was in 1630, but the earliest capital statutes do not occur until later. Under the Capital Laws of New-England that went into effect between 1636-1647 the death penalty was meted out for pre-meditated murder, sodomy, witchcraft, adultery, idolatry, blasphemy, assault in anger, rape, statutory rape, manstealing, perjury in a capital trial, rebellion, manslaughter, poisoning and bestiality. Early laws were accompanied by a scripture from the Old Testament. By 1780, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts only recognized seven capital crimes: murder, sodomy, burglary, buggery, arson, rape, and treason.[8]

The New York colony instituted the so-called Duke's Laws of 1665. This directed the death penalty for denial of the true God, pre-meditated murder, killing someone who had no weapon of defense, killing by lying in wait or by poisoning, sodomy, buggery, kidnapping, perjury in a

capital trial, traitorous denial of the king's rights or raising arms to resist his authority, conspiracy to invade towns or forts in the colony and striking one's mother or father (upon complaint of both). The two colonies that were more lenient concerning capital punishment were South Jersey and Pennsylvania. In South Jersey there was no death penalty for any crime and there were only two crimes, murder and treason, punishable by death.[9]

However under the direction of the Crown, harsher penal codes were execution there until 1691 [sic]. In Pennsylvania, William Penn's Great Act (1682) made passed in the colonies [sic]. By 1776, most of the colonies had roughly comparable death statutes which covered arson, piracy, treason, murder, sodomy, burglary, robbery, rape, horse-stealing, slave rebellion, and often counterfeiting. Hanging was the usual sentence. Rhode Island was probably the only colony which decreased the number of capital crimes in the late 1700's.

Some states were more severe. For example, by 1837, North Carolina required death for the crimes of murder, rape, statutory rape, slave-stealing, stealing bank notes, highway robbery, burglary, arson, castration, buggery, sodomy, bestiality, dueling where death occurs, hiding a slave with intent to free him, taking a free Negro out of state to sell him, bigamy, inciting slaves to rebel, circulating seditious literature among slaves, accessory to murder, robbery, burglary, arson, or mayhem and others. However, North Carolina did not have a state penitentiary and, many said, no suitable alternative to capital punishment.[10]

The first reforms of the death penalty occurred between 1776-1800. Thomas Jefferson and four others, authorized to undertake a complete revision of Virginia's laws, proposed a law that recommended the death penalty for only treason and murder. After a stormy debate the legislature defeated the bill by one vote. The writing of European theorists such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Bentham had a great effect on American intellectuals, as did English Quaker prison reformers John Bellers and John Howard.[11]

On Crimes and Punishment, published in English in 1767 by the Italian jurist Cesare Beccaria, whose exposition on abolishing capital punishment was the most influential of the time, had an especially strong impact. He theorized that there was no justification for the taking of life by the state. He said that the death penalty was "a war of a whole nation against a citizen, whose destruction they consider as necessary, or useful to the general good." He asked the question what if it can be shown not to be necessary or useful? His essay conceded that the only time a death was necessary was when only one's death could insure the security of a nation -- which would be rare and only in cases of absolute anarchy or when a nation was on the verge of losing its liberty. He said that the history of using punishment by death (e.g., the Romans, 20 years of Czaress Elizabeth) had not prevented determined men from injuring society and that death was only a "momentary spectacle, and therefore a less efficacious method of deterring others, than the continued example of a man deprived of his liberty...."[12]

Organizations were formed in different colonies for the abolition of the death penalty and to relieve poor prison conditions. Dr. Benjamin Rush, a renowned Philadelphia citizen, proposed

the complete abolition of capital punishment. William Bradford, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, was ordered to investigate capital punishment. In 1793 he published An Enquiry How Far the Punishment of Death is Necessary in Pennsylvania. He strongly insisted that the death penalty be retained, but admitted it was useless in preventing certain crimes. In fact, he said the death penalty made convictions harder to obtain, because in Pennsylvania, and indeed in all states, the death penalty was mandatory and juries would often not return a guilty verdict because of this fact. In response, in 1794, the Pennsylvania legislature abolished capital punishment for all crimes except murder "in the first degree," the first time murder had been broken down into "degrees." In New York, in 1796, the legislature authorized construction of the state's first penitentiary, abolished whipping, and reduced the number of capital offenses from thirteen to two. Virginia and Kentucky passed similar reform bills. Four more states reduced its capital crimes: Vermont in 1797, to three; Maryland in 1810, to four; New Hampshire in 1812, to two and Ohio in 1815, to two. Each of these states built state penitentiaries. A few states went the opposite direction. Rhode Island restored the death penalty for rape and arson; Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Connecticut raised death crimes from six to ten, including sodomy, maiming, robbery, and forgery. Many southern states made more crimes capital, especially for slaves.[13]

The first great reform era occurred between 1833-1853. Public executions were attacked as cruel. Sometimes tens of thousands of eager viewers would show up to view hangings; local merchants would sell souvenirs and alcohol. Fighting and pushing would often break out as people jockeyed for the best view of the hanging or the corpse! Onlookers often cursed the widow or the victim and would try to tear down the scaffold or the rope for keepsakes. Violence and drunkenness often ruled towns far into the night after "justice had been served." Many states enacted laws providing private hangings. Rhode Island (1833), Pennsylvania (1834), New York (1835), Massachusetts (1835), and New Jersey (1835) all abolished public hangings. By 1849, fifteen states were holding private hangings. This move was opposed by many death penalty abolitionists who thought public executions would eventually cause people to cry out against execution itself. For example, in 1835, Maine enacted what was in effect a moratorium on capital punishment after over ten thousand people who watched a hanging had to be restrained by police after they became unruly and began fighting. All felons sentenced to death would have to remain in prison at hard labor and could not be executed until one year had elapsed and then only on the governor's order. No governor ordered an execution under the "Maine Law" for twenty-seven years. Though many states argued the merits of the death penalty, no state went as far as Maine. The most influential reformers were the clergy. Ironically, the small but powerful group which opposed the abolitionists were also clergy. They were, almost to a person, members of the Calvinist clergy, especially the Congregationalists and Presbyterians who could be called the religious establishment of the time. They were led by George Cheever.[14]

Finally, in 1846, Michigan became the first state to abolish the death penalty (except for treason against the state), mostly because it had no long tradition of capital punishment (there had been no hanging since 1830, before statehood) and because frontier Michigan had few established religious groups to oppose it as was the case in the east. In 1852, Rhode Island abolished the

death penalty led by Unitarians, Universalists, and especially Quakers. In the same year, Massachusetts limited its death penalty to first-degree murder. In 1853, Wisconsin abolished the death penalty after a gruesome execution in which the victim struggled for five minutes at the end of the rope, and a full eighteen minutes passed before his heart finally quit.[15]

During the last half of the century the death penalty abolition movement ground to a half, with many members moving into the slavery abolition movement. At the same time, states began to pass laws against mandatory death sentences. Legislators in eighteen states shifted from mandatory to discretionary capital punishment by 1895, not to save lives, but to try to increase convictions and executions of murderers. Still, abolitionists gained a few victories. Maine abolished the death penalty, restored it, and then abolished it again between 1876-1887. Iowa abolished the death penalty for six years. Kansas passed a "Maine Law" in 1872 which operated as de facto abolition.[16]

Electrocution as a method of execution came onto the scene in an unlikely manner. Edison Company with its DC (direct current) electrical systems began attacking Westinghouse Company and its AC (alternating current) electrical systems as they were pressing for nationwide electrification with alternating current. To show how dangerous AC could be, Edison Company began public demonstrations by electrocuting animals. People reasoned that if electricity could kill animals, it could kill people. In 1888, New York approved the dismantling of its gallows and the building of the nation's first electric chair. It held its first victim, William Kemmler, in 1890, and even though the first electrocution was clumsy at best, other states soon followed the lead.[17]

The Second Great Reform era was 1895-1917. In 1897, U.S. Congress passed a bill reducing the number of federal death crimes. In 1907, Kansas took the "Maine Law" a step further and abolished all death penalties. Between 1911 and 1917, eight more states abolished capital punishment (Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Oregon, Arizona, Missouri and Tennessee -- the latter in all cases but rape). Votes in other states came close to ending the death penalty.

However, between 1917 and 1955, the death penalty abolition movement again slowed. Washington, Arizona, and Oregon in 1919-20 reinstated the death penalty. In 1924, the first execution by cyanide gas took place in Nevada, when Tong war gang murderer Gee Jon became its first victim. The state wanted to secretly pump cyanide gas into Jon's cell at night while he was asleep as a more humanitarian way of carrying out the penalty, but, technical difficulties prohibited this and a special "gas chamber" was hastily built. Other concerns developed when less "civilized" methods of execution failed. In 1930, Mrs. Eva Dugan became the first female to be executed by Arizona. The execution was botched when the hangman misjudged the drop and Mrs. Dugan's head was ripped from her body. More states converted to electric chairs and gas chambers. During this period of time, abolitionist organizations sprang up all across the country, but they had little effect. There were a number of stormy protests against the execution of certain convicted felons (e.g., Julius and Ethel Rosenberg), but little opposition against the death penalty itself. In fact, during the anti-Communist period with all its fears and hysteria, Texas

Governor Allan Shivers seriously suggested that capital punishment be the penalty for membership in the Communist Party.[18]

The movement against capital punishment revived again between 1955 and 1972.

England and Canada completed exhaustive studies which were largely critical of the death penalty and these were widely circulated in the U.S. Death row criminals gave their own moving accounts of capital punishment in books and film. Convicted kidnapper Caryl Chessman published Cell 2455 Death Row and Trial by Ordeal. Barbara Graham's story was utilized in book and film with I Want to Live! after her execution. Television shows were broadcast on the death penalty. Hawaii and Alaska ended capital punishment in 1957, and Delaware did so the next year. Controversy over the death penalty gripped the nation, forcing politicians to take sides. Delaware restored the death penalty in 1961. Michigan abolished capital punishment for treason in 1963. Voters in 1964 abolished the death penalty in Oregon. In 1965 Iowa, New York, West Virginia, and Vermont ended the death penalty. New Mexico abolished the death penalty in 1969.[19]

Trying to end capital punishment state-by-state was difficult at best, so death penalty abolitionists turned much of their efforts to the courts. They finally succeeded on June 29, 1972 in the case Furman v. Georgia. In nine separate opinions, but with a majority of 5-4, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the way capital punishment laws were written, including discriminatory sentencing guidelines, capital punishment was cruel and unusual and violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. This effectively ended capital punishment in the United States. Advocates of capital punishment began proposing new capital statutes which they

believed would end discrimination in capital sentencing, therefore satisfying a majority of the Court. By early 1975, thirty states had again passed death penalty laws and nearly two hundred prisoners were on death row. In Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's newly passed death penalty and said that the death penalty was not always cruel and unusual punishment. Death row executions could again begin. Another form of execution was soon found. Oklahoma passed the first death by lethal injection law, based on economics as much as humanitarian reasons. The old electric

chair that had not been used in eleven years would require expensive repairs. Estimates of over $200,000 were given to build a gas chamber, while lethal injection would cost no more than ten to fifteen dollars "per event."[20]

The controversy over the death penalty continues today. There is a strong movement against lawlessness propelled by citizens' fears for their security. Politicians at the national and state levels are taking the floor of legislatures and calling for more frequent death penalties, death penalties penalty [sic] for more crimes, and longer prison sentences. Those opposing these moves counter by arguing that tougher sentences do not slow crime and that crime is little or no worse than in the past. In fact, FBI statistics show murders are now up. (For example 9.3 persons per 100,000 population were murdered in 1973 and 9.4 persons per 100,000 were murdered in 1992). The battle lines are still drawn and the combat will probably always be fought.[21]

A number of important capital punishment decisions have been made by the Supreme Court. The following is a list of the more important ones along with their legal citations:

Wilkerson v. Utah 99 U.S. 130 (1878) -- Court upheld execution by firing squad, but said that other types of torture such as "drawing and quartering, embowelling alive, beheading, public dissection, and burring alive and all other in the same line of...cruelty, are forbidden."

Weems v. U.S. 217 U.S. 349 (1910) -- Court held that what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment had not been decided, but that it should not be confined to the "forms of evil" that framers of the Bill of Rights had experienced. Therefore, "cruel and unusual" definitions are subject to changing interpretations.

Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber 329 U.S. 459 (1947) -- On May 3, 1946, convicted seventeen year old felon Willie Francis was placed in the electric chair and the switch was thrown. Due to faulty equipment, he survived (even though he was severely shocked), was removed from the chair and returned to his cell. A new death warrant was issued six days later. The Court ruled 5-4 that it was not "cruel and unusual" to finish carrying out the sentence since the state acted in good faith in the first attempt. "The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment," said the Court, "not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely." He was

then executed.

Tropp v. Dulles 356 U.S. 86 (1958) -- The Court Ruled that punishment would be considered "cruel and unusual" if it was one of "tormenting severity," cruel in its excessiveness or unusual in punishment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."

Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238 (1972) -- The Court looking at three cases struck down the death penalty in many states and set up the standard that punishment would be considered "cruel and unusual" if any of the following were present: 1) it was too severe for the crime; 2) it was arbitrary (some get the punishment and others do not, without guidelines); 3) it offends society's sense of justice; 4) it was not more effective than a less severe penalty.

Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153 (1976) -- [The] Court upheld Georgia's newly passed death penalty and said that the death penalty was not always cruel and unusual punishment.

Tison v. Arizona 481 U.S. 137 (1987) -- [The] Court upheld Arizona's death penalty for major participation in a felony with "reckless indifference to human life."

Thompson v. Oklahoma 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1987) -- The Court considered the question of execution of minors under the age of 16 at the time of the murder. The victim was the brother-in-law, who he accused of beating his sister. He and three others beat the victim, shot him twice, cut his throat, chest, and abdomen, chained him to a concrete block and threw the body into a river where it remained for four weeks. Each of the four participants were tried separately and all were sentenced to death. In a 5-3 decision, four Justices ruled that Thompson's death sentence was cruel and unusual. The fifth, O'Connor, concurred but noted that a state must set a minimum age and held out the possibility that if a state lowers, by statute, the minimum death penalty age below sixteen, she might support it. She stated, "Although, I believe that a national consensus forbidding the execution of any person for a crime committed before the age of 16 very likely does exist, I am reluctant to adopt this conclusion as a matter of constitutional law without better evidence that [sic] we now possess." States with no minimum age have rushed to specify a statute age.

Penry v. Lynaugh 492 U.S. [sic] (1989) -- [The] Court held that persons considered retarded, but legally sane, could receive the death penalty. It was not cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment if jurors were given the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances. In this case, the defendant had the mental age of approximately a six-year old child.

ENDNOTES

[1] John Laurence, A History of Capital Punishment (N.Y.: The Citadel Press, 1960), 1-3.

[2] Michael Kronenwetter, Capital Punishment: AReference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA:

ABC-CLIO, Inc., 1993), 71.

[3] Ibid., p.72.

[4] Ibid., p.72; Laurence, op.cit., 4-9.

[5] Laurence, 9-14.

[6] Kronenwetter, 72-73.

[7] Hugo Adam Bedau, The Death Penalty in America (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1982).

[8] Ibid., 7

[9] Phillip English Mackey, Voices Against Death: American Opposition to Capital Punishment, 1787-1975 (N.Y.: Burt Franklin & Co., Inc., 1976), xi-xii.

[10] Bedau, op.cit., 7.

[11] Mackey, 7-8.

[12] Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishment, trans. Henry Paolucci (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963).

[13] Mackey, op. cit., xvi-xvii.

[14] Ibid., xix-xxv.

[15] Ibid., xvii-xviii.

[16] Ibid., xxx-xxxi.

[17] Ibid., 15.

[18) Ibid., xxxii-xxxiv, xli.

[19] Ibid., xlvii-xlix.

[20] Bedau, 17.

[21] FBI Uniform Crime Report 1992; The Sentencing Project.

CATHOLICISM & CAPITAL PUNISHMENT by Avery Cardinal Dulles

April 2001

Among the major nations of the Western world, the United States is

singular in still having the death penalty. After a five-year moratorium, from

1972 to 1977, capital punishment was reinstated in the United States courts.

Objections to the practice have come from many quarters, including the

American Catholic bishops, who have rather consistently opposed the death

penalty. The National Conference of Catholic Bishops in 1980 published a

predominantly negative statement on capital punishment, approved by a

majority vote of those present though not by the required two-thirds

majority of the entire conference. Pope John Paul II has at various times

expressed his opposition to the practice, as have other Catholic leaders in

Europe.

Some Catholics, going beyond the bishops and the Pope, maintain that the

death penalty, like abortion and euthanasia, is a violation of the right to life

and an unauthorized usurpation by human beings of God’s sole lordship

over life and death. Did not the Declaration of Independence, they ask,

describe the right to life as “unalienable”?

While sociological and legal questions inevitably impinge upon any such

reflection, I am here addressing the subject as a theologian. At this level the

question has to be answered primarily in terms of revelation, as it comes to

us through Scripture and tradition, interpreted with the guidance of the

ecclesiastical magisterium.

In the Old Testament the Mosaic Law specifies no less than thirty-six capital

offenses calling for execution by stoning, burning, decapitation, or

strangulation. Included in the list are idolatry, magic, blasphemy, violation

of the sabbath, murder, adultery, bestiality, pederasty, and incest. The death

penalty was considered especially fitting as a punishment for murder since

in his covenant with Noah God had laid down the principle, “Whoever sheds

the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed, for God made man in His

own image” (Genesis 9:6). In many cases God is portrayed as deservedly

punishing culprits with death, as happened to Korah, Dathan, and Abiram

(Numbers 16). In other cases individuals such as Daniel and Mordecai are

God’s agents in bringing a just death upon guilty persons.

In the New Testament the right of the State to put criminals to death seems

to be taken for granted. Jesus himself refrains from using violence. He

rebukes his disciples for wishing to call down fire from heaven to punish the

Samaritans for their lack of hospitality (Luke 9:55). Later he admonishes

Peter to put his sword in the scabbard rather than resist arrest (Matthew

26:52). At no point, however, does Jesus deny that the State has authority to

exact capital punishment. In his debates with the Pharisees, Jesus cites with

approval the apparently harsh commandment, “He who speaks evil of father

or mother, let him surely die” (Matthew 15:4; Mark 7:10, referring to Exodus

2l:17; cf. Leviticus 20:9). When Pilate calls attention to his authority to

crucify him, Jesus points out that Pilate’s power comes to him from above-

that is to say, from God (John 19:11). Jesus commends the good thief on the

cross next to him, who has admitted that he and his fellow thief are receiving

the due reward of their deeds (Luke 23:41).

The early Christians evidently had nothing against the death penalty.

They approve of the divine punishment meted out to Ananias and Sapphira

when they are rebuked by Peter for their fraudulent action (Acts 5:1-11). The

Letter to the Hebrews makes an argument from the fact that “a man who has

violated the law of Moses dies without mercy at the testimony of two or

three witnesses” (10:28). Paul repeatedly refers to the connection between

sin and death. He writes to the Romans, with an apparent reference to the

death penalty, that the magistrate who holds authority “does not bear the

sword in vain; for he is the servant of God to execute His wrath on the

wrongdoer” (Romans 13:4). No passage in the New Testament disapproves

of the death penalty.

Turning to Christian tradition, we may note that the Fathers and Doctors of

the Church are virtually unanimous in their support for capital punishment,

even though some of them such as St. Ambrose exhort members of the clergy

not to pronounce capital sentences or serve as executioners. To answer the

objection that the first commandment forbids killing, St. Augustine writes

in The City of God:

The same divine law which forbids the killing of a human being allows

certain exceptions, as when God authorizes killing by a general law or

when He gives an explicit commission to an individual for a limited time.

Since the agent of authority is but a sword in the hand, and is not

responsible for the killing, it is in no way contrary to the commandment,

“Thou shalt not kill” to wage war at God’s bidding, or for the

representatives of the State’s authority to put criminals to death,

according to law or the rule of rational justice.

In the Middle Ages a number of canonists teach that ecclesiastical courts

should refrain from the death penalty and that civil courts should impose it

only for major crimes. But leading canonists and theologians assert the right

of civil courts to pronounce the death penalty for very grave offenses such as

murder and treason. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus invoke the authority

of Scripture and patristic tradition, and give arguments from reason.

Giving magisterial authority to the death penalty, Pope Innocent III

required disciples of Peter Waldo seeking reconciliation with the Church to

accept the proposition: “The secular power can, without mortal sin, exercise

judgment of blood, provided that it punishes with justice, not out of hatred,

with prudence, not precipitation.” In the high Middle Ages and early modern

times the Holy See authorized the Inquisition to turn over heretics to the

secular arm for execution. In the Papal States the death penalty was imposed

for a variety of offenses. The Roman Catechism, issued in 1566, three years

after the end of the Council of Trent, taught that the power of life and death

had been entrusted by God to civil authorities and that the use of this power,

far from involving the crime of murder, is an act of paramount obedience to

the fifth commandment.

In modern times Doctors of the Church such as Robert Bellarmine and

Alphonsus Liguori held that certain criminals should be punished by death.

Venerable authorities such as Francisco de Vitoria, Thomas More, and

Francisco Suárez agreed. John Henry Newman, in a letter to a friend,

maintained that the magistrate had the right to bear the sword, and that the

Church should sanction its use, in the sense that Moses, Joshua, and Samuel

used it against abominable crimes.

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century the consensus of Catholic

theologians in favor of capital punishment in extreme cases remained solid,

as may be seen from approved textbooks and encyclopedia articles of the

day. The Vatican City State from 1929 until 1969 had a penal code that

included the death penalty for anyone who might attempt to assassinate the

pope. Pope Pius XII, in an important allocution to medical experts, declared

that it was reserved to the public power to deprive the condemned of the

benefit of life in expiation of their crimes.

Summarizing the verdict of Scripture and tradition, we can glean some

settled points of doctrine. It is agreed that crime deserves punishment in

this life and not only in the next. In addition, it is agreed that the State has

authority to administer appropriate punishment to those judged guilty of

crimes and that this punishment may, in serious cases, include the sentence

of death.

Yet, as we have seen, a rising chorus of voices in the Catholic community

has raised objections to capital punishment. Some take the absolutist

position that because the right to life is sacred and inviolable, the death

penalty is always wrong. The respected Italian Franciscan Gino Concetti,

writing in L’Osservatore Romano in 1977, made the following powerful

statement:

In light of the word of God, and thus of faith, life-all human life-is sacred

and untouchable. No matter how heinous the crimes . . . [the criminal]

does not lose his fundamental right to life, for it is primordial, inviolable,

and inalienable, and thus comes under the power of no one whatsoever.

If this right and its attributes are so absolute, it is because of the image

which, at creation, God impressed on human nature itself. No force, no

violence, no passion can erase or destroy it. By virtue of this divine image,

man is a person endowed with dignity and rights.

To warrant this radical revision—one might almost say reversal—of the

Catholic tradition, Father Concetti and others explain that the Church from

biblical times until our own day has failed to perceive the true significance of

the image of God in man, which implies that even the terrestrial life of each

individual person is sacred and inviolable. In past centuries, it is alleged,

Jews and Christians failed to think through the consequences of this

revealed doctrine. They were caught up in a barbaric culture of violence and

in an absolutist theory of political power, both handed down from the

ancient world. But in our day, a new recognition of the dignity and

inalienable rights of the human person has dawned. Those who recognize

the signs of the times will move beyond the outmoded doctrines that the

State has a divinely delegated power to kill and that criminals forfeit their

fundamental human rights. The teaching on capital punishment must today

undergo a dramatic development corresponding to these new insights.

This abolitionist position has a tempting simplicity. But it is not really new.

It has been held by sectarian Christians at least since the Middle Ages. Many

pacifist groups, such as the Waldensians, the Quakers, the Hutterites, and

the Mennonites, have shared this point of view. But, like pacifism itself, this

absolutist interpretation of the right to life found no echo at the time among

Catholic theologians, who accepted the death penalty as consonant with

Scripture, tradition, and the natural law.

The mounting opposition to the death penalty in Europe since the

Enlightenment has gone hand in hand with a decline of faith in eternal life.

In the nineteenth century the most consistent supporters of capital

punishment were the Christian churches, and its most consistent opponents

were groups hostile to the churches. When death came to be understood as

the ultimate evil rather than as a stage on the way to eternal life, utilitarian

philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham found it easy to dismiss capital

punishment as “useless annihilation.”

Many governments in Europe and elsewhere have eliminated the death

penalty in the twentieth century, often against the protests of religious

believers. While this change may be viewed as moral progress, it is probably

due, in part, to the evaporation of the sense of sin, guilt, and retributive

justice, all of which are essential to biblical religion and Catholic faith. The

abolition of the death penalty in formerly Christian countries may owe more

to secular humanism than to deeper penetration into the gospel.

Arguments from the progress of ethical consciousness have been used to

promote a number of alleged human rights that the Catholic Church

consistently rejects in the name of Scripture and tradition. The magisterium

appeals to these authorities as grounds for repudiating divorce, abortion,

homosexual relations, and the ordination of women to the priesthood. If the

Church feels herself bound by Scripture and tradition in these other areas, it

seems inconsistent for Catholics to proclaim a “moral revolution” on the

issue of capital punishment.

The Catholic magisterium does not, and never has, advocated

unqualified abolition of the death penalty. I know of no official statement

from popes or bishops, whether in the past or in the present, that denies the

right of the State to execute offenders at least in certain extreme cases. The

United States bishops, in their majority statement on capital punishment,

conceded that “Catholic teaching has accepted the principle that the State

has the right to take the life of a person guilty of an extremely serious

crime.” Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, in his famous speech on the “Consistent

Ethic of Life” at Fordham in 1983, stated his concurrence with the “classical

position” that the State has the right to inflict capital punishment.

Although Cardinal Bernardin advocated what he called a “consistent ethic of

life,” he made it clear that capital punishment should not be equated with

the crimes of abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. Pope John Paul II spoke for

the whole Catholic tradition when he proclaimed in Evangelium Vitae(1995)

that “the direct and voluntary killing of an innocent human being is always

gravely immoral.” But he wisely included in that statement the word

“innocent.” He has never said that every criminal has a right to live nor has

he denied that the State has the right in some cases to execute the guilty.

Catholic authorities justify the right of the State to inflict capital punishment

on the ground that the State does not act on its own authority but as the

agent of God, who is supreme lord of life and death. In so holding they can

properly appeal to Scripture. Paul holds that the ruler is God’s minister in

executing God’s wrath against the evildoer (Romans 13:4). Peter admonishes

Christians to be subject to emperors and governors, who have been sent by

God to punish those who do wrong (1 Peter 2:13). Jesus, as already noted,

apparently recognized that Pilate’s authority over his life came from God

(John 19:11).

Pius XII, in a further clarification of the standard argument, holds that when

the State, acting by its ministerial power, uses the death penalty, it does not

exercise dominion over human life but only recognizes that the criminal, by

a kind of moral suicide, has deprived himself of the right to life. In the

Pope’s words,

Even when there is question of the execution of a condemned man, the

State does not dispose of the individual’s right to life. In this case it is

reserved to the public power to deprive the condemned person of the

enjoyment of life in expiation of his crime when, by his crime, he has

already dispossessed himself of his right to life.

In light of all this it seems safe to conclude that the death penalty is not in

itself a violation of the right to life. The real issue for Catholics is to

determine the circumstances under which that penalty ought to be applied.

It is appropriate, I contend, when it is necessary to achieve the purposes of

punishment and when it does not have disproportionate evil effects. I say

“necessary” because I am of the opinion that killing should be avoided if the

purposes of punishment can be obtained by bloodless means.

The purposes of criminal punishment are rather unanimously delineated in

the Catholic tradition. Punishment is held to have a variety of ends that may

conveniently be reduced to the following four: rehabilitation, defense

against the criminal, deterrence, and retribution.

Granted that punishment has these four aims, we may now inquire whether

the death penalty is the apt or necessary means to attain them.

Rehabilitation. Capital punishment does not reintegrate the criminal into

society; rather, it cuts off any possible rehabilitation. The sentence of death,

however, can and sometimes does move the condemned person to

repentance and conversion. There is a large body of Christian literature on

the value of prayers and pastoral ministry for convicts on death row or on

the scaffold. In cases where the criminal seems incapable of being

reintegrated into human society, the death penalty may be a way of

achieving the criminal’s reconciliation with God.

Defense against the criminal. Capital punishment is obviously an effective

way of preventing the wrongdoer from committing future crimes and

protecting society from him. Whether execution is necessary is another

question. One could no doubt imagine an extreme case in which the very fact

that a criminal is alive constituted a threat that he might be released or

escape and do further harm. But, as John Paul II remarks in Evangelium

Vitae , modern improvements in the penal system have made it extremely

rare for execution to be the only effective means of defending society against

the criminal.

Deterrence. Executions, especially where they are painful, humiliating, and

public, may create a sense of horror that would prevent others from being

tempted to commit similar crimes. But the Fathers of the Church censured

spectacles of violence such as those conducted at the Roman Colosseum.

Vatican II’s Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World

explicitly disapproved of mutilation and torture as offensive to human

dignity. In our day death is usually administered in private by relatively

painless means, such as injections of drugs, and to that extent it may be less

effective as a deterrent. Sociological evidence on the deterrent effect of the

death penalty as currently practiced is ambiguous, conflicting, and far from

probative.

Retribution. In principle, guilt calls for punishment. The graver the offense,

the more severe the punishment ought to be. In Holy Scripture, as we have

seen, death is regarded as the appropriate punishment for serious

transgressions. Thomas Aquinas held that sin calls for the deprivation of

some good, such as, in serious cases, the good of temporal or even eternal

life. By consenting to the punishment of death, the wrongdoer is placed in a

position to expiate his evil deeds and escape punishment in the next life.

After noting this, St. Thomas adds that even if the malefactor is not

repentant, he is benefited by being prevented from committing more sins.

Retribution by the State has its limits because the State, unlike God, enjoys

neither omniscience nor omnipotence. According to Christian faith, God

“will render to every man according to his works” at the final judgment

(Romans 2:6; cf. Matthew 16:27). Retribution by the State can only be a

symbolic anticipation of God’s perfect justice.

For the symbolism to be authentic, the society must believe in the existence

of a transcendent order of justice, which the State has an obligation to

protect. This has been true in the past, but in our day the State is generally

viewed simply as an instrument of the will of the governed. In this modern

perspective, the death penalty expresses not the divine judgment on

objective evil but rather the collective anger of the group. The retributive

goal of punishment is misconstrued as a self-assertive act of vengeance.

The death penalty, we may conclude, has different values in relation to each

of the four ends of punishment. It does not rehabilitate the criminal but may

be an occasion for bringing about salutary repentance. It is an effective but

rarely, if ever, a necessary means of defending society against the criminal.

Whether it serves to deter others from similar crimes is a disputed question,

difficult to settle. Its retributive value is impaired by lack of clarity about the

role of the State. In general, then, capital punishment has some limited

value but its necessity is open to doubt.

There is more to be said. Thoughtful writers have contended that the

death penalty, besides being unnecessary and often futile, can also be

positively harmful. Four serious objections are commonly mentioned in the

literature.

There is, first of all, a possibility that the convict may be innocent. John

Stuart Mill, in his well-known defense of capital punishment, considers this

to be the most serious objection. In responding, he cautions that the death

penalty should not be imposed except in cases where the accused is tried by

a trustworthy court and found guilty beyond all shadow of doubt.

It is common knowledge that even when trials are conducted, biased or

kangaroo courts can often render unjust convictions. Even in the United

States, where serious efforts are made to achieve just verdicts, errors occur,

although many of them are corrected by appellate courts. Poorly educated

and penniless defendants often lack the means to procure competent legal

counsel; witnesses can be suborned or can make honest mistakes about the

facts of the case or the identities of persons; evidence can be fabricated or

suppressed; and juries can be prejudiced or incompetent. Some “death row”

convicts have been exonerated by newly available DNA evidence. Columbia

Law School has recently published a powerful report on the percentage of

reversible errors in capital sentences from 1973 to 1995. Since it is altogether

likely that some innocent persons have been executed, this first objection is

a serious one.

Another objection observes that the death penalty often has the effect of

whetting an inordinate appetite for revenge rather than satisfying an

authentic zeal for justice. By giving in to a perverse spirit of vindictiveness or

a morbid attraction to the gruesome, the courts contribute to the

degradation of the culture, replicating the worst features of the Roman

Empire in its period of decline.

Furthermore, critics say, capital punishment cheapens the value of life. By

giving the impression that human beings sometimes have the right to kill, it

fosters a casual attitude toward evils such as abortion, suicide, and

euthanasia. This was a major point in Cardinal Bernardin’s speeches and

articles on what he called a “consistent ethic of life.” Although this argument

may have some validity, its force should not be exaggerated. Many people

who are strongly pro-life on issues such as abortion support the death

penalty, insisting that there is no inconsistency, since the innocent and the

guilty do not have the same rights.

Finally, some hold that the death penalty is incompatible with the teaching

of Jesus on forgiveness. This argument is complex at best, since the quoted

sayings of Jesus have reference to forgiveness on the part of individual

persons who have suffered injury. It is indeed praiseworthy for victims of

crime to forgive their debtors, but such personal pardon does not absolve

offenders from their obligations in justice. John Paul II points out that

“reparation for evil and scandal, compensation for injury, and satisfaction

for insult are conditions for forgiveness.”

The relationship of the State to the criminal is not the same as that of a

victim to an assailant. Governors and judges are responsible for maintaining

a just public order. Their primary obligation is toward justice, but under

certain conditions they may exercise clemency. In a careful discussion of this

matter Pius XII concluded that the State ought not to issue pardons except

when it is morally certain that the ends of punishment have been achieved.

Under these conditions, requirements of public policy may warrant a partial

or full remission of punishment. If clemency were granted to all convicts, the

nation’s prisons would be instantly emptied, but society would not be well

served.

In practice, then, a delicate balance between justice and mercy must be

maintained. The State’s primary responsibility is for justice, although it may

at times temper justice with mercy. The Church rather represents the mercy

of God. Showing forth the divine forgiveness that comes from Jesus Christ,

the Church is deliberately indulgent toward offenders, but it too must on

occasion impose penalties. The Code of Canon Law contains an entire book

devoted to crime and punishment. It would be clearly inappropriate for the

Church, as a spiritual society, to execute criminals, but the State is a

different type of society. It cannot be expected to act as a Church. In a

predominantly Christian society, however, the State should be encouraged to

lean toward mercy provided that it does not thereby violate the demands of

justice.

It is sometimes asked whether a judge or executioner can impose or carry

out the death penalty with love. It seems to me quite obvious that such

officeholders can carry out their duty without hatred for the criminal, but

rather with love, respect, and compassion. In enforcing the law, they may

take comfort in believing that death is not the final evil; they may pray and

hope that the convict will attain eternal life with God.

The four objections are therefore of different weight. The first of them,

dealing with miscarriages of justice, is relatively strong; the second and

third, dealing with vindictiveness and with the consistent ethic of life, have

some probable force. The fourth objection, dealing with forgiveness, is

relatively weak. But taken together, the four may suffice to tip the scale

against the use of the death penalty.

The Catholic magisterium in recent years has become increasingly vocal in

opposing the practice of capital punishment. Pope John Paul II

in Evangelium Vitae declared that “as a result of steady improvements in

the organization of the penal system,” cases in which the execution of the

offender would be absolutely necessary “are very rare, if not practically

nonexistent.” Again at St. Louis in January 1999 the Pope appealed for a

consensus to end the death penalty on the ground that it was “both cruel and

unnecessary.” The bishops of many countries have spoken to the same effect.

The United States bishops, for their part, had already declared in their

majority statement of 1980 that “in the conditions of contemporary

American society, the legitimate purposes of punishment do not justify the

imposition of the death penalty.” Since that time they have repeatedly

intervened to ask for clemency in particular cases. Like the Pope, the

bishops do not rule out capital punishment altogether, but they say that it is

not justifiable as practiced in the United States today.

In coming to this prudential conclusion, the magisterium is not changing

the doctrine of the Church. The doctrine remains what it has been: that the

State, in principle, has the right to impose the death penalty on persons

convicted of very serious crimes. But the classical tradition held that the

State should not exercise this right when the evil effects outweigh the good

effects. Thus the principle still leaves open the question whether and when

the death penalty ought to be applied. The Pope and the bishops, using their

prudential judgment, have concluded that in contemporary society, at least

in countries like our own, the death penalty ought not to be invoked,

because, on balance, it does more harm than good. I personally support this

position.

In a brief compass I have touched on numerous and complex problems. To

indicate what I have tried to establish, I should like to propose, as a final

summary, ten theses that encapsulate the Church’s doctrine, as I understand

it.

1) The purpose of punishment in secular courts is fourfold: the rehabilitation

of the criminal, the protection of society from the criminal, the deterrence of

other potential criminals, and retributive justice.

2) Just retribution, which seeks to establish the right order of things, should

not be confused with vindictiveness, which is reprehensible.

3) Punishment may and should be administered with respect and love for

the person punished.

4) The person who does evil may deserve death. According to the biblical

accounts, God sometimes administers the penalty himself and sometimes

directs others to do so.

5) Individuals and private groups may not take it upon themselves to inflict

death as a penalty.

6) The State has the right, in principle, to inflict capital punishment in cases

where there is no doubt about the gravity of the offense and the guilt of the

accused.

7) The death penalty should not be imposed if the purposes of punishment

can be equally well or better achieved by bloodless means, such as

imprisonment.

8) The sentence of death may be improper if it has serious negative effects

on society, such as miscarriages of justice, the increase of vindictiveness, or

disrespect for the value of innocent human life.

9) Persons who specially represent the Church, such as clergy and religious,

in view of their specific vocation, should abstain from pronouncing or

executing the sentence of death.

10) Catholics, in seeking to form their judgment as to whether the death

penalty is to be supported as a general policy, or in a given situation, should

be attentive to the guidance of the pope and the bishops. Current Catholic

teaching should be understood, as I have sought to understand it, in

continuity with Scripture and tradition.

AVERY CARDINAL DULLES, S.J. holds the Laurence J. McGinley Chair in

Religion and Society at Fordham University. This essay is adapted from a

McGinley Lecture delivered by Cardinal Dulles in New York City.

Catholic Church and capital punishment From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The teaching of the Catholic Church categorizes capital punishment as a form of "lawful slaying", a view defended by theological authorities such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas.[1] Augustine felt that the death penalty was a means of deterring the wicked and protecting the innocent.[2] In the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas reaffirmed this position. (See also Aquinas on the death penalty).

More recently, Pope John Paul II appealed for a consensus to end the death penalty on the ground that it was "both cruel and unnecessary."[3][4]

Contents [hide]

• 1Augustine • 2Aquinas • 3Church teaching • 4References

Augustine[edit] According to St. Augustine:

The same divine authority that forbids the killing of a human being establishes certain exceptions, as when God authorizes killing by a general law or when He gives an explicit commission to an individual for a limited time.

The agent who executes the killing does not commit homicide; he is an instrument as is the sword with which he cuts. Therefore, it is in no way contrary to the commandment, 'Thou shalt not kill' to wage war at God's bidding, or for the representatives of public authority to put criminals to death, according to the law, that is, the will of the most just reason (from The City of God, Book 1, Chapter 21)

Aquinas[edit] The following is a summary of Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 3, Chapter 146 which was written by Aquinas prior to writing the Summa Theologica. St. Thomas was a vocal supporter of the death penalty. This was based on the theory (found in natural moral law), that the state has not only the right, but the duty to protect its citizens from enemies, both from within, and without.

For those who have been appropriately appointed, there is no sin in administering punishment. For those who refuse to obey God's laws, it is correct for society to rebuke them with civil and criminal sanctions. No one sins working for justice, within the law. Actions that are necessary to preserve the good of society are not inherently evil. The common good of the whole society is greater and better than the good of any particular person. "The life of certain pestiferous men is an impediment to the common good which is the concord of human society. Therefore, certain men must be removed by death from the society of men." This is likened to the physician who must amputate a diseased limb, or a cancer, for the good of the whole person. He based this on I Corinthians 5, 6: "You know that a little leaven corrupts the whole lump of dough?" and I Corinthians 5, 13: "Put away the evil one from among yourselves"; Romans 13,4: "[it is said of earthly power that] he bears not the sword in vain: for he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that does evil"; I Peter 2, 13-14: "Be subjected therefore to every human creature for God's sake: whether to be on the king as excelling, or to governors as sent by him for the punishment of evildoers and for the praise of good." He

believed these passages superseded the text of Exodus 20,13: "Thou shall not kill." This is mentioned again in Matthew 5,21. Also, it is argued that Matthew 13, 30: "Suffer both the weeds and the wheat to grow until the harvest." The harvest was interpreted as meaning the end of the world. This is explained by Matthew 13,38-40. [5]

Aquinas acknowledged these passages could also be interpreted as meaning there should be no use of the death penalty if there was a chance of injuring the innocent. The prohibition "Thou shall not kill", was superseded by Exodus 22,18: "Wrongdoers you shall not suffer to live." The argument that evildoers should be allowed to live in the hope that they might be redeemed was rejected by Aquinas as frivolous. If they would not repent in the face of death, it was unreasonable to assume they would ever repent. "How many people are we to allow to be murdered while waiting for the repentance of the wrongdoer?", he asked, rhetorically. Using the death penalty for revenge, or retribution is a violation of natural moral law.

The Church teaches that the commandment is "Thou shalt not murder", which permits the death penalty by the civil authority as the administrator of justice in a human society in accordance with the Natural Law.

Pope John Paul II advocated incarceration in lieu of the death penalty whenever possible.

Pope Francis has stated that he is against the death penalty.[6]

Church teaching[edit] The Church’s teaching is that punishments, including the death penalty, may be levied for four reasons:[2]

1. Rehabilitation - The sentence of death can and sometimes does move the condemned person to repentance and conversion.The death penalty may be a way of achieving the criminal’s reconciliation with God.

2. Defense against the criminal - Capital punishment is an effective way of preventing the wrongdoer from committing future crimes and protecting society from him.

3. Deterrence - Executions may create a sense of horror that would prevent others from being tempted to commit similar crimes.

4. Retribution - Guilt calls for punishment. The graver the offense, the more severe the punishment ought to be. In Holy Scripture death is regarded as the appropriate punishment for serious transgressions. Thomas Aquinas held that sin calls for the deprivation of some good, such as, in serious cases, the good of temporal or even eternal life. The wrongdoer is placed in a position to expiate his evil deeds and escape punishment in the next life.

The Catechism of the Catholic Church states that the death penalty is permissible in certain cases if the "guilty party's identity and responsibility have been fully determined". As to defense against the criminal, the Church teaches that if there are other means available to defend people from the "unjust aggressor", these means are preferred to the death penalty because they are considered to be more respectful of the dignity of the person and in keeping with the common good.[7](2267) Because today's society makes possible effective means for preventing crime without execution, the Catechism - quoting Pope John Paul II wrote that "the cases in which execution of the offender is an absolute necessity 'are very rare, if not practically nonexistent.'"[7]

On March 25, 1995, Pope John Paul II affirmed the church's stance towards capital punishment in his 1995 encyclical titled Evangelium Vitae (The Gospel of Life).[8]

In January 1999, Pope John Paul II, without changing Catholic teaching, appealed for a consensus to end the death penalty on the ground that it was "both cruel and unnecessary."[3][9] He said that criminal offenders should be offered "an incentive and help to change his or her behaviour and be

rehabilitated"[10] Pope Francis advocated that "capital sentences be commuted to a lesser punishment that allows for time and incentives for the reform of the offender."[11]

The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops states that "Our fundamental respect for every human life and for God, who created each person in his image, requires that we choose not to end a human life in response to violent crimes if non-lethal options are available."[12]

References[edit]

1. Jump up^ "CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Capital Punishment (Death Penalty)". Newadvent.org. 1 June 1911. Retrieved 23 August2010.

2. ^ Jump up to:a b Dulles, Avery Cardinal. "Catholicism & Capital Punishment". Retrieved 2014-06-27. 3. ^ Jump up to:a b Suris, Paul J. "Church Teaching and the Death Penalty". Retrieved 2009-05-05. 4. Jump up^ "Catholicism & Capital Punishment". Catholic Education Resource Center. 5. Jump up^ Latin source [1] 6. Jump up^ Bordoni, Linda (2014-10-23). "Pope: no to death penalty and to inhuman prison

conditions". radiovaticana.va. Radio Vatican. Retrieved 2015-02-12. 7. ^ Jump up to:a b Paragraph number 2258–2330 (1994). "Catechism of the Catholic Church". Libreria

Editrice Vaticana. Retrieved27 December 2008. 8. Jump up^ http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/death-penalty-capital-

punishment/catholic-campaign-to-end-the-use-of-the-death-penalty.cfm 9. Jump up^ "Catholicism & Capital Punishment". Catholic Education Resource Center. 10. Jump up^ "The Death Penalty Pro and Con - The Pope's Statement". PBS. Public authority must

redress the violation of personal and social rights by imposing on the offender an adequate punishment for the crime, as a condition for the offender to regain the exercise of his or her freedom. In this way authority also fulfills the purpose of defending public order and ensuring people's safety, while at the same time offering the offender an incentive and help to change his or her behaviour and be rehabilitated.

11. Jump up^ "Papal Message Reaffirms Call to Abolish Death Penalty".National Catholic Register. 19 June 2013.

12. Jump up^ "CATHOLIC CAMPAIGN TO END THE USE OF THE DEATH PENALTY" (PDF). United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.

The Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 2267. 2267 Assuming that the guilty party's identity and responsibility have been fully determined, the traditional teaching of the Church does not exclude recourse to the death penalty, if this is the only possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust aggressor.

If, however, non-lethal means are sufficient to defend and protect people's safety from the aggressor, authority will limit itself to such means, as these are more in keeping with the concrete conditions of the common good and more in conformity to the dignity of the human person.

Today, in fact, as a consequence of the possibilities which the state has for effectively preventing crime, by rendering one who has committed an offense incapable of doing harm - without definitely taking away from him the possibility of redeeming himself - the cases in which the execution of the offender is an absolute necessity "are very rare, if not practically nonexistent."68

Can you be pro-life and pro-death penalty? Story highlights

• Carol Costello: Can you be pro-life and pro-death penalty at the same time? • She says one Oklahoma state representative is OK with executions but strongly pro-life • Catholic Church has "consistent ethic of life," opposing abortion and the death penalty • Costello: Only a small minority of Americans are consistent on the two issues

Can you be pro-life and pro-death penalty? It's a question more than one person I know is asking after Oklahoma's botched execution of Clayton Lockett. Not necessarily because of the way Oklahoma tortuously executed the convicted killer, but because of the hard-core way some reacted to Lockett's execution.

Like Mike Christian. The pro-life Oklahoma state representative told The Associated Press, "I realize this may sound harsh, but as a father and former lawman, I really don't care if it's by lethal injection, by the electric chair, firing squad, hanging, the guillotine or being fed to the lions."

He also threatened to impeach judges who dared delay executions for any reason.

This is from a man who is so strongly pro-life he voted for eight bills in four years to prevent women in Oklahoma from terminating their pregnancies, or, as many who oppose abortion say, "killing babies."

Color me confused. So, Rep. Christian says it's OK to kill, unless you're a woman who wants to end her pregnancy?

As I told my friends during a heated debate last weekend, that smacks of hypocrisy.

The only nonhypocritical viewpoint, I argued, exists in the Catholic Church.

Catholics believe in the "Consistent Ethic of Life." As Georgetown's Father Thomas Reese puts it, "we are concerned about a person from womb to tomb."

"Life is something that comes from God and shouldn't be taken away by man," Reese told me.

Put simply, the Catholic Church opposes abortion and the death penalty. Period. Except nothing in life is that simple. Especially our collective views on the death penalty and abortion.

If you ask a Southern Baptist, he or she will likely tell you the Catholic Church is wrong.

"There is no contradiction here," R. Albert Mohler, president of The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, told me, referring to Rep. Christian's underlying position.

Christian's words were "careless," and don't "reflect any Biblical ... defense of the death penalty," he says, but it does not defy logic if Christian is pro-life and pro-death penalty.

"It's not an eye-for-an-eye kind of thing," explained Mohler. "Retribution is not the same as a demand for justice. In Genesis 9, God speaks to Noah after the flood. When someone takes human life, they forfeit their own life."

So, I asked, "Should a woman who's had an abortion forfeit her own life?"

Mohler emphatically answered, "no."

Lockett deserved to die, he said, because the act of murder "was taken in wanton disregard of the life taken and given the nature of the crime, this individual has forfeited his right to live." (Lockett not only raped and shot his victim, but ordered his accomplice to bury her alive.)

Don't get me wrong; pro-lifers could argue that pro-choice, anti-death penalty believers are inconsistent, too. How can you choose to end life, but adamantly oppose the death penalty?

Apparently, consistency is not America's strong suit. According to a 2010 study, only about 8% of Americans oppose abortion and the death penalty under all circumstances.

James Unnever, professor of criminology at the University of South Florida Sarasota-Manatee, co-authored the study. He expected his test results to show a consistent belief system in all kinds of premeditated death. In other words, if you believe in the sanctity of life, you would be opposed to euthanasia, the death penalty and abortion.

Turned out, that was not remotely true.

"From a religious position, the Catholic faith is the most consistent life ethic," Unnever says. "Religion is only one factor that affects using the death penalty." The other factor, he says, is politics. "When you get people who are against abortion and for the death penalty, that's not as much a religious effect as a politics effect. Politics trumps any religion."

Jacinta Gau, professor of criminal justice at the University of Central Florida, co-authored two studies on attitudes about abortion and capital punishment. She was also surprised by the inconsistency many showed toward life issues.

Of those who strongly oppose abortion, yet strongly approve of the death penalty, Gau says: "What seems to link those two attitudes together is related to fundamentalism, a literal interpretation of the Bible, and an inflexible way of viewing society in general," Gau says. "I'm not sure they really view it as a contradiction. There's a punitive attitude toward this -- kind of like if you don't want a child, don't engage in risky sexual behavior; if you kill someone, you deserve death."

And Gau says pro-choice, anti-death penalty believers also don't see a contradiction. Those who are pro-choice don't "see abortion as ending a life," she says. "The death penalty becomes completely separate for the pro-choice people, because it's about a woman's right to choose."

Truth told, the "Consistent Ethic of Life," is relatively new to the Catholic Church. For centuries, the church supported capital punishment.

But passionate pro-life and death penalty foes, such as Sister Helen Prejean, convinced the church that "helping to kill a defenseless person" in any circumstance is wrong.

"What's more innocent than an unborn baby?" Prejean told me. "It's easy to be against that." Then Prejean went for the jugular. The people who commit terrible crimes, "Could you kill them? If there's a part of you who can't say yes to that, then you can't say yes to the death penalty."

I must admit I was humbled by Prejean's question. Couple that with the fact we can now lock up violent criminals for life and I, again, find myself arguing for the "Consistent Ethic of Life."

As for Mohler, the Southern Baptist leader, he offered me this final thought: "If I had the opportunity to trade the death penalty for the affirmation of protection of the life of the unborn, I'd take it in a second."

Let the debate rage on.

Twenty-Five Years Later: Cardinal Bernardin's Consistent Ethic of Life November-December 2008

BY RON HAMEL, Ph.D. Dr. Hamel is senior director, ethics, Catholic Health Association, St. Louis.

On Dec. 6, 1983, Cardinal Joseph Bernardin, in a lecture at Fordham University, first articulated what he referred to as the "consistent ethic of life."1 This approach to life issues would shape his thinking, lecturing, preaching and advocacy on many subjects for almost two decades until his death in 1996. One of the subjects that Bernardin particularly devoted energy and attention to was health care. As he himself said: "Because of its central importance to human dignity … I have felt a special responsibility to devote a considerable amount of attention to health care at both the local and national levels."2

During his tenure as Archbishop of Chicago, Bernardin delivered numerous addresses on the consistent ethic of life itself, which has direct relevance to health care, and more than two dozen addresses specifically on health care-related topics. In some of these latter presentations, Bernardin's appeal to the consistent ethic of life is explicit; in others, it is implicit. In most, it is the consistent ethic of life that shaped his approach to and development of the health care topic at hand.

On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the consistent ethic, it seems appropriate to ask what the consistent ethic of life contributed to Bernardin's approach to health care as well as what value it might have for health care today, especially Catholic health care.3 In order to do this, however, it is first necessary to understand something of what the consistent ethic of life entails. Some Elements of the Consistent Ethic of Life Although much could be written about the various aspects of the consistent ethic of life, it is sufficient for our purposes to highlight just a few. First, the consistent ethic is grounded in the conviction that all human life is sacred, a sacredness rooted in the belief that human beings are created in the image of God. Although Bernardin most often spoke of the sacredness of human life, he also, quite often, used the language of human dignity — the inviolable dignity of the human person and the need to respect persons. For example, he said in one of his lectures that theologically the consistent ethic "is grounded in the respect we owe the human person. To defend human life is to protect the human person … the core reality in Catholic moral thought."4 Elsewhere, he spoke of "a singleminded commitment to the dignity and worth of human persons."5 Second, in light of the sacredness of human life and human dignity, Bernardin believed profoundly that life issues, broadly understood, are of one piece (a "seamless garment"). They are interrelated. In other words, if one is committed to "preserving life" (opposing abortion, euthanasia, and the like), one should also be committed to "enhancing life." Or, as Bernardin said: "Those who defend the right to life of the weakest among us must be equally visible in support of the quality of life of the powerless among us: the old and the young, the hungry and the homeless, the undocumented immigrant and the unemployed worker."6 Respect for human life and dignity require a concern for and commitment to both, while recognizing that the issues under each category are different and require separate analysis. Abortion or war are not the same as capital punishment or providing health insurance to the uninsured, or caring for the elderly or the dying, even though each of these has to do with the sacredness of human life and human dignity. Third, Bernardin held that a pre-condition for sustaining a consistent ethic of life in society is "attitude," an attitude of respect for all human life. "Attitude," he said, "is the place to root an ethic of life."7 Such an attitude undergirds a concern for and activity on behalf of a host of life issues and must be cultivated in society if there is going to be any hope that public actions will respect human life and dignity in concrete cases.

Finally, Bernardin maintained that a consistent ethic of life has direct implications for public policy. A commitment to the right to life and to quality of life should translate into specific political and economic positions and should influence assessments of policies, party platforms and political candidates.

How does this approach to life issues manifest itself in Bernardin's dealing with health care?

The Consistent Ethic of Life and Health Care Bernardin's approach to issues in the health care arena through the prism of the consistent ethic was essentially twofold. On the one hand, he addressed what he termed "classical" medical ethics questions, that is, issues that we would typically define as more "clinical" — abortion, euthanasia and the like. And here, Bernardin cautions: "Consistency means we cannot have it both ways. We cannot urge a compassionate society and vigorous public policy to protect the rights of the unborn and then argue that compassion and significant public programs on behalf of the needy undermine the moral fiber of the society or are beyond the proper scope of governmental responsibility."8

Although he applied traditional moral principles to these and other issues, his approach to them differed in that he discussed factors that contributed to these actions and the need to address contextual factors as well. For example, while opposing physician-assisted-suicide and euthanasia, the cardinal insisted that it is critical to enhance care of the dying and to address the various factors driving these two practices.

On the other hand, Bernardin focused a great deal of attention on what he called "contemporary" social justice issues, and he dealt with various aspects of the health care system such as managed care, the not-for-profit status of health care, and health care reform. These issues were for Bernardin the "life-enhancing" issues. Again, he stressed the importance of human dignity and the sacredness of human life. It was through this prism that he viewed and analyzed these various aspects of health care.

Though Bernardin tackled a wide range of health-care-related issues, his treatment of these issues, while important, is not where the contribution of his consistent ethic lies. Nor does it lie in providing tools for the moral analysis of these issues. These are not his legacy to the church and society. The contribution of the consistent ethic of life to health care lies elsewhere.

A Moral Vision for Health Care Cardinal Bernardin's consistent ethic of life functioned primarily as a "moral vision" guiding his approach to health care issues, and it is precisely this moral vision that is the legacy of the consistent ethic for health care today. The consistent ethic of life did not, as one might expect, reside primarily in a set of principles or norms to be applied to specific issues or in an array of moral analyses of a host of ethical issues in health care, whether of a clinical or a more social justice-related nature. Rather, the consistent ethic of life for Bernardin was a way of seeing reality. It was characterized by a particular set of beliefs and values and affected what he saw, how he saw it, and how he interpreted what was seen. The consistent ethic of life was essentially an interpretive lens. How, more specifically, did and does Cardinal Bernardin's consistent ethic of life function as a moral vision? First, Bernardin's moral vision illuminates and brings into focus what is most important. It directs attention to the sacredness of human life and inherent human dignity as the primary moral consideration in all moral analyses in the area of health care (and elsewhere) and as the fundamental value for guiding moral deliberation and judgment. It places human life and human dignity at the center of all of these issues, so that they do not get lost in other kinds of considerations. The dignity and worth of human persons, said Bernardin, is the "one stable element in terms of which all other judgments are made. The dignity and value of human persons is a basic value …. [L]et it be said that the energizing vision of healthcare must be this commitment to the dignity

of human persons…."9 This vision and commitment in turn lead to a special concern for the most vulnerable - the unborn, children, the sick and the elderly, the uninsured and underinsured among them. Second, within the arena of health care, a moral vision constituted by the consistent ethic of life sensitizes one to procedures, technological developments, and aspects of the health care system that fail to promote or do not adequately promote human dignity and do not sufficiently enhance human life. The consistent ethic provides insight into these realities and the need for their cessation in some cases (e.g., abortion, euthanasia, etc.) or, in other cases, their need for reform (such as the health care system). Third, as a lens or moral vision, the consistent ethic fosters a broader view of ethical issues in health care, drawing attention both to direct threats to human life itself (e.g., abortion, euthanasia) and threats to human dignity and the enhancement of human life (e.g., lack of health care coverage) as well as the connections between the two. In this way, the consistent ethic fosters breadth and depth in moral analyses. In other words, it is not sufficient to only oppose euthanasia, but one must also be concerned about and address those factors that give rise to euthanasia and find ever better ways to care for the dying and ensure the dying the opportunity to forgo treatment and to live their lives fully while dying. Fourth, the consistent ethic of life is corrective in that it brings to light problematic personal and social attitudes — individualism, a utilitarian assessment of persons, privatization of moral choices, excess autonomy, the commodification and commercialization of health care, the technological imperative, and the like — often associated with various technologies and aspects of the health care system. These attitudes are threats to human life and dignity and are, therefore, unacceptable. In their place, as an alternative, the consistent ethic offers a view of the individual as possessing inherent dignity and as inherently social with responsibilities to other individuals and to society. Fifth, the consistent ethic is not only corrective, it is also transformational. It is inherently oriented toward deep change, change in personal attitudes and behaviors, change in social and institutional attitudes, policies, and practices as well as change of and within the health care system itself and the use of particular procedures and technologies. As such, it serves as both a foundation and an incentive for advocacy efforts.10

In sum, Bernardin's consistent ethic of life as a moral vision underscores the fundamental importance of human dignity and human life, sensitizes to threats to human life and well-being, brings these threats to the foreground, inspires alternative attitudes, approaches and practices, and motivates for profound change.

The Consistent Ethic and Catholic Health Care Is any of this new to Catholic health care? In many ways, it is not. Catholic health care is profoundly committed to respecting human life and dignity. These are among its fundamental values. They are at the core of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, which help shape the identity and practice of Catholic health care and they appear frequently in organizational mission statements and values. Catholic health care is clearly opposed to life-threatening procedures such as abortion and euthanasia, but its very mission is with promoting life-enhancing practices — care of the sick, the dying, the elderly, the vulnerable and the poor. Its approach to life is comprehensive and consistent. And Catholic health care is profoundly committed to transformation — to changing social structures, policies, practices, and attitudes that harm human life and dignity, and human well-being. In so many ways then, Catholic health care seems to embody what Cardinal Bernardin means by the consistent ethic of life.

Catholic health care, however, often falls short of the ideal and sometimes loses its way, buffeted as it is by numerous social forces, market pressures, and technological developments. In this context, Bernardin's moral vision, his "singleminded commitment" to care for human life and dignity in all their breadth and depth, can assist Catholic health care to keep focused on its true mission, to be shaped by beliefs and values that promote and enhance human life and dignity, to maintain a balance between life-preserving and life-enhancing efforts. It can also urge Catholic health care toward continuous self-transformation and increased efforts at

transforming social polices and practices as they affect human life and dignity, especially in the realm of health care. While not new to Catholic health care, Bernardin's consistent ethic of life is a critical reminder of and a continuous challenge to what it should always be about.

NOTES 1. Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, Consistent Ethic of Life (Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1988), 1-11. 2. Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, Celebrating the Ministry of Healing: Joseph Cardinal Bernardin's

Reflections on Healthcare (St. Louis: The Catholic Health Association, 1999), 83.

3. A more extensive discussion of this subject will appear in a collection of articles on Bernardin's consistent ethic of life edited by Rev. Thomas Nairn, OFM, and scheduled for publication by Orbis Press in fall 2008.

4. Bernardin, Consistent Ethic of Life, 79. 5. Bernardin, Celebrating the Ministry of Healing, 2-3. 6. Bernardin, Consistent Ethic of Life, 8-9. 7. Bernardin, Consistent Ethic of Life, 7. 8. Bernardin, Celebrating the Ministry of Healing, 3. 9. Although not discussed in this article, one of the important pieces of Bernardin's consistent ethic of life is

the need for dialogue. There is a sense in which Bernardin sees this as one of the key strategies for individual, institutional and social change. For him, learning goes both ways. For examples, read Bernardin'sConsistent Ethic of Life, 10, 84-85.

10. Bernardin, Consistent Ethic of Life, 247.

Copyright © 2008 by the Catholic Health Association of the United States. For reprint permission, contact Betty Crosby or call (314) 253-3477.

The following is an informal collection of statements by present or former Supreme Court Justices on the death penalty taken from interviews or essays, rather than from Court opinions.

Justice Breyer on the Death Penalty

In his new book, The Court and the World: American Law and the New Global Realities, and in media interviews accompanying its release, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer discusses the relationship between American laws and those of other countries and his dissent in Glossip v. Gross, which questioned the constitutionality of the death penalty. In an interview with The National Law Journal, Breyer summarized the core reasons underlying his Glossip dissent: "You know, sometimes people make mistakes, [executing] the wrong person. It is arbitrary. There is lots of evidence on that. Justice Potter Stewart said it was like being hit by lightning, whether the person is actually executed. If carried out, a death sentence, on average takes place now 18 years after it is imposed. The number of people who are executed has shrunk dramatically. They are centered in a very small number of counties in the United States. Bottom line is, let's go into the issue. It is time to go into it again." In his book, Breyer argues that the laws and practices of foreign countries are relevant to and might be particularly informative on questions regarding the Eighth Amendment. He notes that international opinion has influenced decisions to end the death penalty for juveniles and for crimes that do not result in death. His Glossip opinion also mentioned international practices - that only 22 countries carried out executions in 2013 and that the U.S. was one of only eight that executed more than 10 people - among the reasons American capital punishment may be an unconstitutionally "cruel and unusual punishment." That phrase, he says in his book, is itself of foreign origin. "It uses the word 'unusual,'" Breyer says, "and the founders didn't say unusual in what context." Foreign law and practices, he argues, should form part of that context. (R. Teague Beckwith, "Supreme Court Justice Argues World Opinion Matters on the Death Penalty," TIME, September 14, 2015; A. Liptak, "Justice Breyer Sees Value in a Global View of Law," The New York Times, September 12, 2015; T. Mauro, "Q&A: Justice Breyer's Interview With The NLJ," The National Law Journal, September 12, 2015).

Other Earlier Statements:

"You have to understand that each death penalty case usually comes before the court three times. The average defendant is on death row for 15 years," said Breyer. He continued, "The recanting of witnesses is often raised. That is not enough. It is necessary to have proof that someone else has had to pull the trigger. There would have to be something really wrong for the Supreme Court to hear anything significantly new that was not heard before by the lower

courts. We are presented with roughly the same arguments, just at the last minute." Breyer explained that the court can not rule on the death penalty itself or address the racial disparity of its imposition since "it is mostly imposed by state law, rarely federal law. Only the legislature can abolish the death penalty," said Breyer. Citing the example of French President Mitterand, Breyer utilized his bully pulpit to urge the executive and legislative branches to abolish the death penalty in America. "Europe is against the death penalty now," he said. "In 1980, 2/3 of the French electorate supported the death penalty. Still Mitterand, in a television interview, came out against the death penalty. He immediately went up in the polls because he took a position of conscience. The same thing could happen here." He doubts that abolition of the death penalty will happen. "Politicians were in the popular club in high school. They hold their finger up to the wind to measure popularity," opined Breyer. "Judges are terrible politicians."

(Business Insider, October 21, 2011.)

Justice Ginsburg on the Death Penalty

Ginsburg Interview on the Supreme Court (excerpt)

NLJ: Towards the end of their tenure on the court, justices Harry Blackmun and John Paul Stevens, and even later than that, Justice Lewis Powell Jr., decided they could no longer support the constitutionality of the death penalty. As we see increased problems with lethal injection, what are your thoughts now about the penalty? GINSBURG: I’ve always made the distinction that if I were in the legislature, there’d be no death penalty. If I had been on the court for Furman [v. Georgia, 1972, invalidating the death penalty], I wouldn’t have given us the death penalty back four years later. Stevens and Powell were part of that. I think there wouldn’t have been a big fuss. There was a big fuss initially over the decision that stopped executions. If the court had stayed there, it would have been accepted. That was the golden opportunity. I had to make the decision was I going to be like Brennan and Marshall who took themselves out of the loop [by dissenting in every case upholding the penalty]. There have been some good death penalty decisions. If I took myself out, I couldn’t be any kind of contributor to those.

NLJ: After more than two decades on the court, what types of cases still vex or challenge you?

GINSBURG: Death penalty. For one thing, our jurisprudence is dense and then we have these contributions from Congress like AEDPA [Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act]. Because we had no death penalty in the District of Columbia, my first year here, I asked my clerks to write a memo so I could become familiar with where the court was on the death penalty. It was dense then and it has gotten only worse.

(M. Coyle, National Law Journal, Aug. 22, 2014).

Justice Ginsburg interview at Duke Law School after end of 2014 Court Term

In an interview at Duke Law School, Justice Ginsburg reflected on the Court's 2014 court term and discussed Glossip v. Gross, in which she joined Justice Stephen Breyer in a dissent that questioned the constitutionality of the death penalty.

Ginsburg said she had waited to take such a stance on the death penalty because past justices, "took themselves out of the running," when the did so, leaving, "no room for them to be persuasive with the other justices." She reiterated many of the key points from the dissent, saying, "I think that [Breyer] pointed to evidence that has grown in quantity and in quality. He started out by pointing out that there were a hundred people who had been totally exonerated of the capital crime with which they were charged ... so one thing is the mistakes that are possible in this system. The other is the quality of representation. Another is ... yes there was racial disparity but even more geographical disparity. Most states in the union where the death penalty is theoretically on the books don’t have executions."

Justice Ginsburg also noted the growing isolation of the death penalty. "[L]ast year, I think 43 of the states of the United States had no executions, only seven did, and the executions that took place tended to be concentrated in certain counties in certain states. So the idea that luck of the draw, if you happened to commit a crime in one county in Louisiana, the chances that you would get the death penalty are very high. On the other hand, if you commit the same deed in Minnesota, the chances that you would get the death penalty are almost nil. So that was another one of the considerations that had become clear as the years went on."

(S. Lachman and A. Alman, "Ruth Bader Ginsburg Reflects On A Polarizing Term One Month Out," The Huffington Post, July 29, 2015.)

Ginsburg Supports Abolition

If I had my way there would be no death penalty. But the death penalty for now is the law, and I could say ‘Well, I won’t participate in those cases,’ but then I can’t be an influence. Every time I have to participate in a case where someone has been sentenced to death, I feel that same conflict.

(Reuters, February 5, 2013.)

Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, speaking to law students in San Francisco, at UC Hastings College of the Law:

The subject of capital punishment came up when Hastings Professor Joan Williams, who conducted the 90-minute question-and-answer session, asked the 78-year-old justice what she would like to accomplish in her remaining years on the court. "I would probably go back to the day when the Supreme Court said the death penalty could not be administered with an even hand, but that's not likely to be an opportunity for me," Ginsburg said.

She was referring to the ruling in a 1972 Georgia case that overturned all state death penalty laws, which had allowed judges and juries to impose death for any murder. Four years later, the court upheld another Georgia law that prescribed death for specific categories of murder and gave guidance to juries, a model that California followed when it renewed capital punishment in 1977. Ginsburg described review of impending executions as "a dreadful part of the business," and said she has chosen not to follow the path of the late Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan - who declared in every capital case that they considered the death penalty unconstitutional - so that she could maintain a voice in the debate. (San Francisco Chronicle, September 16, 2011)

Justice Ginsburg Supports Moratorium

U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg recently voiced her support for a moratorium on the death penalty in Maryland and criticized the inadequate funding available for those who represent poor people. "People who are well represented at trial do not get the death penalty," said Ginsburg. "I have yet to see a death case among the dozens coming to the Supreme Court on eve-of-execution stay applications in which the defendant was well represented at trial." (Associated Press, April 10, 2001)

Justice Kennedy's Questions about the Death Penalty

During two recent oral arguments at the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy raised questions to those presenting that were unrelated to the issues in the cases:

In Hall v. Florida, 2014 WL 2178332 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2014), (No. 12-10882), available athttp://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-10882...

JUSTICE KENNEDY: [T]he last ten people Florida has executed have spent an average of 24.9 years on death row. Do you think that that is consistent with the purposes of the death penalty, and . . . is it consistent with sound administration of the justice system?

MR. WINSOR [counsel for the State of Florida]: Well, I certainly think it's consistent with the Constitution, and I think that there are obvious . . .

JUSTICE KENNEDY: That wasn't my question.

MR. WINSOR: Oh, I'm sorry, I apologize.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is it consistent with . . . the purposes that the death penalty is designed to serve, and is it consistent with an orderly administration of justice?

MR. WINSOR: It's consistent with the . . .

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Go ahead.

MR. WINSOR: It is consistent with the purposes of the death penalty certainly.

JUSTICE SCALIA: General Winsor, maybe you should ask us . . . that question, inasmuch . . . as most of the delay has been because of rules that we have imposed.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, let me . . . ask this. Of course most of the delay is at the hands of the defendant. In this case it was 5 years before there was a hearing on the on the . . .Atkins question. Has the Attorney General of Florida *992 suggested to the legislature any . . . measures, any provisions, any statutes, to expedite the consideration of these cases.

MR. WINSOR: Your Honor, there was a statute enacted last session, last spring, that is--it's called the Timely Justice Act, that addresses a number of issues that you raise, and it's presently being challenged in front of the Florida Supreme Court. . . .

In Davis v. Ayala, No. 131428 (Mar. 3, 2015), transcript:

JUSTICE KENNEDY: This doesn't relate to the issues you've been arguing. This crime was, what, 30 years ago and the trial 26 years ago?

MR. DAIN [counsel for death row inmate Hector Ayala]: 1996, yeah, very close.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Has he spent time in solitary confinement, and, if so, how much?

MR. DAIN: He has spent his entire time in what's called administrative segregation. When I visit him, I visit him through glass and wire bars.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is that a single cell?

MR. DAIN: It is a single cell. They're all single cells. Well, San Quentin is on the most it's on Heaven's land in Marin County. It's a 150yearold prison and their administrative segregation is single cells, a very old system, very small, and and

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is it the same thing as solitary confinement?

MR. DAIN: No, it's 23 hours out of the day, that probably is the same. They generally administrative segregation you're not allowed in the general yard anymore. But you are allowed an hour a day --

JUSTICE KENNEDY: One hour. MR. DAIN: of activity.

Justice O'Connor on the Death Penalty (Retired)

Justice O'Connor Stresses Importance of International Law

During a speech hosted by the Southern Center for International Studies in Atlanta, Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor stressed the importance of international law for American courts and the need for the United States to create a more favorable impression abroad. She cited recent Supreme Court cases, including the Court's ruling to ban the execution of those with mental retardation, that illustrate the increased willingness of U.S. courts to take international law into account. "I suspect that over time we will rely increasingly, or take notice at least increasingly, on international and foreign courts in examining domestic issues." O'Connor noted that doing so "may not only enrich our own country's decisions, I think it may create that all important good impression." (World Net Daily, October 31, 2003)

Justice O'Connor Again Voices Concern About Innocence

At the Nebraska State Bar Association's annual meeting, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor expressed her concern about the possibility of executing the innocent and the need for better representation of indigent defendants. O'Connor stated, "More often than we want to recognize, some innocent defendants have been convicted and sentenced to death." She added that that would continue to happen unless indigent defendants were represented by qualified lawyers. Earlier this year, O'Connor expressed similar concerns about executing the innocent while speaking to the Minnesota Women Lawyers' Group. (Nebraska StatePaper.com, Oct. 19, 2001)

Justice O'Connor Questions Death Penalty

In a speech on July 2, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor said there were "serious questions" about whether the death penalty is fairly administerd in the U.S. Noting the number of death row inmates who have been exonerated in recent years, O' Connor stated, "If statistics are any indication, the system may well be allowing some innocent defendants to be executed.'' She also addressed the need for quality representation in capital cases, stating that such representation has too often been inadequate. "Perhaps it's time to look at minimum standards for appointed counsel in death cases and adequate compensation for appointed counsel when they are used,'' she said. In speaking to the Minnesota Women Lawyer's group, O'Connor also expressed her concern about the rising numbers of inmates on death row and of executions since her appointment to the Court. Noting that Minnesota does not have the death penalty, O'Connor said, "You must breathe a big sigh of relief every day.'' (Associated Press, July 2, 2001).

Justice Scalia (Deceased) on the Death Penalty

Justice Scalia said he "wouldn't be surprised" if the U.S. Supreme Court found the death penalty unconstitutional (Commercial Appeal, Sept. 22, 2015, speech at Rhodes College). He repeated those remarks at an appearance at the University of Minnesota Law School on October 20, 2015 (Associated Press, "Scalia: 'Wouldn't Surprise Me' If Death Penalty Struck Down," October 20, 2015).

Antonin Scalia - God's Justice and Ours

In recent years, that philosophy has been particularly well enshrined in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, our case law dealing with the prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments.” Several of our opinions have said that what falls within this prohibition is not static, but changes from

generation to generation, to comport with “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Applying that principle, the Court came close, in 1972, to abolishing the death penalty entirely. It ultimately did not do so, but it has imposed, under color of the Constitution, procedural and substantive limitations that did not exist when the Eighth Amendment was adopted—and some of which had not even been adopted by a majority of the states at the time they were judicially decreed. For example, the Court has prohibited the death penalty for all crimes except murder, and indeed even for what might be called run–of–the–mill murders, as opposed to those that are somehow characterized by a high degree of brutality or depravity. It has prohibited the mandatory imposition of the death penalty for any crime, insisting that in all cases the jury be permitted to consider all mitigating factors and to impose, if it wishes, a lesser sentence. And it has imposed an age limit at the time of the offense (it is currently seventeen) that is well above what existed at common law. If I subscribed to the proposition that I am authorized (indeed, I suppose compelled) to intuit and impose our “maturing” society’s “evolving standards of decency,” this essay would be a preview of my next vote in a death penalty case. As it is, however, the Constitution that I interpret and apply is not living but dead—or, as I prefer to put it, enduring. It means today not what current society (much less the Court) thinks it ought to mean, but what it meant when it was adopted. For me, therefore, the constitutionality of the death penalty is not a difficult, soul–wrenching question. It was clearly permitted when the Eighth Amendment was adopted (not merely for murder, by the way, but for all felonies—including, for example, horse–thieving, as anyone can verify by watching a western movie). And so it is clearly permitted today. There is plenty of room within this system for “evolving standards of decency,” but the instrument of evolution (or, if you are more tolerant of the Court’s approach, the herald that evolution has occurred) is not the nine lawyers who sit on the Supreme Court of the United States, but the Congress of the United States and the legislatures of the fifty states, who may, within their own jurisdictions, restrict or abolish the death penalty as they wish. But while my views on the morality of the death penalty have nothing to do with how I vote as a judge, they have a lot to do with whether I can or should be a judge at all. To put the point in the blunt terms employed by Justice Harold Blackmun towards the end of his career on the bench, when he announced that he would henceforth vote (as Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall had previously done) to overturn all death sentences, when I sit on a Court that reviews and affirms capital convictions, I am part of “the machinery of death.” My vote, when joined with at least four others, is, in most cases, the last step that permits an execution to proceed. I could not take part in that process if I believed what was being done to be immoral.

(Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life at the University of Chicago Divinity School, January 2002)

Justice Stevens (Retired) on the Death Penalty

Video-taped comments by Justice Stevens to the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice Seminar, Feb. 20, 2016. Justice Stevens called for the abolition of the death penalty because of the risks of executing the innocent, its high costs relative to its questionable benefits, and the lengthy time defendants spend on death row. He suggested change could come from the Supreme Court on constitutional grounds, from state legislatures, and from governors granting commutations.

Comments by Justice Stevens at George Washington University, May 19, 2015.

Previous Comments:

On Innocence In a discussion at the University of Florida Law School, former U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens said that recent research reveals that Texas almost certainly executed an innocent man in 1989. Stevens said:

"Within the last year, Jim Liebman, who's a professor at the Columbia Law School and was a former law clerk of mine, has written a book...called The Wrong Carlos...He has demonstrated, I think, beyond a shadow of a doubt that there is a Texas case in which they executed the wrong defendant, and that the person they executed did not in fact commit the crime for which he was punished. And I think it's a sufficient argument against the death penalty...that society should not take the risk that that might happen again, because it's intolerable to think that our government, for really not very powerful reasons, runs the risk of executing innocent people."

Prof. Liebman's research showed that Carlos DeLuna's case involved faulty eyewitness testimony and police failure to investigate an alternative suspect. (T. Nashrulla, "Former Supreme Court Justice Confirms Texas Once Executed An Innocent Man," Buzzfeed News, January 26, 2015; video of John Paul Stevens' discussion, quote begins at 57:00).

Justice Stevens on the Death Penalty

I really think that in regard to the death penalty … I’m not sure that the democratic process won’t provide the answers sooner than the court does, because I do think there is a significantly growing

"I think this country would be much better off if we did not have capital punishment."

-Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens

appreciation of the basic imbalance in cost-per-person benefit analysis. And the application of the death penalty does a lot of harm, and does really very little good.

(Daily Caller, April 22, 2012.)

Justice Stevens on Arbitrariness and the Death Penalty

Arbitrariness in the imposition of the death penalty is exactly the type of thing the Constitution prohibits, as Justice Lewis Powell, Justice Potter Stewart, and I explained in our joint opinion in Gregg v. Georgia (1976). We wrote that capital sentencing procedures must be constructed to avoid the random or capricious imposition of the penalty, akin to the risk of being struck by lightning. Today one of the sources of such arbitrariness is the decision of state prosecutors—which is not subject to review—to seek a sentence of death. It is a discretionary call that may be influenced by the prosecutor’s estimate of the impact of his decision on his chances for reelection or for election to higher office.

(New York Review of Books, April 5, 2012.)

Transcript: My Interview With Retired Justice John Paul Stevens (excerpt) By George Stephanopoulos

I sat down with retired Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens Wednesday in Washington, D.C. Stevens is out with a “Five Chiefs,” a memoir that chronicles his six decades on the court and his relationships with five different chief justices during that time. Here is the full transcript of the interview. GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS: Justice Stevens, thanks for doing this. JOHN PAUL STEVENS: Well, I’m happy to happy to meet you. . . . GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS: You of course, became an outspoken opponent of the death penalty in your time on the court. How did you evolve? Can you summarize how your own views evolved? JOHN PAUL STEVENS: About the death penalty? Well, of course, it’s a long story, because I’ve been involved in that issue for so long. But there also you have to keep in mind, there are always two part to the question. One is, “When do you think it’s constitutional to have the death penalty?”

And the other question is whether one thinks it’s a wise thing to do. And on the second question, whether your opponent is a matter of policy I’ve never felt that it was a particularly wise method of punishment. And several of the members of the court, I can say specifically Warren Burger and Harry Blackmun, although they voted to uphold the penalty consistently early on, they personally did not think it made sense. But my own thinking on the issue, on the constitutional issue evolved over the years, after our first decision in 1975, in the first year that I came in the court, in which at which time I thought the court was adopting procedures and rules that would confine the imposition of the death penalty into a very narrow set of cases. And they took special pains to have fair procedures. And over the years, the– I was disappointed to find they expanded the category of cases, rather dramatically later on, in ways that I don’t think Potter Stewart would have agreed with– who was sort of the principle author of our join opinion on– and they also have relaxed procedures in ways that actually give the prosecutor advantages in capital cases that I don’t think he has in ordinary criminal cases. And so that seemed to me there’s a change in the general atmosphere around capital cases that occurred over the years and made me– GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS: It seems like there may be another evolution now in the country that the case of Troy Davis, executed last week. It appeared with the protests around that that the country may be heading towards a tipping point in another direction, against the death penalty. Is that what you see? JOHN PAUL STEVENS: I don’t know. I’m not a very good judge of public reaction on something like that. But I think there always has been a significant group that felt that the penalty really wasn’t worth it and caused more harm than good. (ABC News, Sep 29, 2011)

Retired Justice John Paul Stevens on His ‘Wrong’ Vote on Texas Death Penalty Case By George Stephanopoulos

Retired Justice John Paul Stevens is a man of few regrets from his nearly 35 years on the Supreme Court, except one – his 1976 vote to reinstate the death penalty. “I really think that I’ve thought over a lot of cases I’ve written over the years. And I really wouldn’t want to do any one of them over…With one exception,” he told me.

“My vote in the Texas death case. And I think I do mention that in that case, I think that I came out wrong on that,” Stevens said. At the time he thought the death penalty would be confined “to a very narrow set of cases,” he said. But instead it was expanded and gave the prosecutor an advantage in capital cases, according to Stevens. The retired associate justice has been an outspoken opponent of the death penalty, but his admission of that 1976 Jurek v. Texas vote comes at a time when the country appears to be revisiting its stance on the death penalty, in light of Troy Davis’ execution last week. He writes in his book, “Five Chiefs,” that he regretted the vote “because experience has shown that the Texas statute has played an important role in authorizing so many deaths sentences in that state.” In a recent Republican presidential debate there was a burst of applause after the moderator mentioned the 234 executions that occurred under Gov. Rick Perry. Stevens said he was “disappointed” when he saw that reaction. “Maybe one believes, and certainly a lot of people sincerely do, that it is an effective deterrent to crime and will in the long run will do more harm than good. I don’t happen to share that view,” he said. “But there are obvious people who do. And, of course, being hard on crime has been– always– is politically popular, let’s put it that way.” (ABC News, Sep 28, 2011)

Supreme Court Justice Stevens Says U.S. "Better Off" Without Capital Punishment

During a "fireside chat" with fellow Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer and hundreds of lawyers and judges who practice in federal courts in Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin,

Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens stated, "I think this country would be much better off if we did not have capital punishment." Stevens noted that he believes the death penalty is constitutional, adding, "But I really think it's a very unfortunate part of our judicial system and I would feel much, much better if more states would really consider whether they think the benefits outweigh the very serious potential injustice, because in these cases the emotions are very, very high on both sides and to have stakes as high as you do in these cases, there is a special potential for error. We cannot

ignore the fact that in recent years a disturbing number of inmates on death row have been exonerated." The "fireside chat" was part of the 7th Circuit Bar Association dinner in Chicago. Justice Stevens and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsberg and Sandra Day O'Connor have all voiced concerns about the death penalty in recent years, but this is perhaps one the most pronounced statements against capital punishment made by a Supreme Court justice since the late Harry Blackmun, who wrote in 1994, "From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death." (Chicago Sun Times, May 12, 2004).

Justice Stevens Addresses Death Penalty for Juveniles

U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens addressed the issue of juveniles and the death penalty while speaking at the 9th Circuit's Judicial Conference on July 18, 2002. Justice Stevens, who wrote the majority opinion in Atkins v. Virginia abolishing the death penalty for those with mental retardation, predicted that juveniles would be the "next area for debate." The United States is "out of step with the views of most countries in the Western world," according to Stevens. Stevens did not anticipate that the Supreme Court would lead the debate and cautioned: "That is more likely to be addressed in the legislative forum than in the judicial forum." Stevens also said that the public was growing more skeptical of the death penalty's deterrent effect and more aware of the possibility that innocent people might be executed. (Washington Post, Aug. 5, 2002)

Justice Powell (Deceased) on the Death Penalty

Justice Lewis Powell was appointed to the Court by President Nixon in 1972. He voted to uphold the constitutionality of the death penalty in 1972 and 1976. He later stated in an interview to his biographer: "I have come to think that capital punishment should be abolished." He stated that he would have changed his vote in capital cases, particularly McCleskey v. Kemp (racial bias in the death penalty) and that the death penalty "serves no

useful purpose." -J. Jeffries, "Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr." 451-52 (1994).

Justice Blackmun (Deceased) on the Death Penalty

In an interview in 1993 on the ABC News program "Nightline," Justice Harry Blackmun said he was reconsidering his views on the death penalty and was "not sure" that courts could administer it fairly. Ultimately, Blackmun expressed his views in a dissent in a capital case, Callins v. Collins (1994), in which he concluded that "the death penalty experiment has failed." (L. Greenhouse, "Death Penalty Is Renounced By Blackmun," N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1994).

• 120755 reads

'Dead Man Walking' nun: My argument with Scalia By Helen Prejean Updated 4:29 PM ET, Mon February 22, 2016

Sister Helen Prejean, a Sister of St. Joseph, ministers to prisoners on death row. She is the

author of "Dead Man Walking." The views expressed are her own.

(CNN)I'm praying for Justice Antonin Scalia, that his passage into eternity was peaceful. I respect his sincerity, even though on the subject of the death penalty, he was my nemesis.

As I was writing "The Death of Innocents," I happened to run into him in an airport, and I said teasingly that I was "taking him on" in my book. And he, personable as he was, jabbed his finger in the air and said, "And I'll be right back at ya!"

In "Innocents," I wrote about two men I believe were innocent: Joseph O'Dell and Dobie Gillis Williams, whose executions Scalia summarily authorized without an apparent qualm,acknowledging that his role on the Supreme Court made him part of the "machinery of death."

Helen Prejean

Scalia's experience of the "meaning" of capital punishment, as he described it in one of his dissenting opinions, couldn't have been more different from my own. In the marble confines of the court, he argued interpretation of Constitutional texts, while I, in state killing chambers, accompanied real human beings -- six of them -- to their deaths, which were a direct result of Scalia's interpretations.

In grasping the "meaning" of state killings, I had one advantage over Scalia. I was there, close up to the anguish and terror of the condemned and their grieving mothers. Scalia, in the cerebral confines of the Court, never touched a tear-stained cheek, never stood present at the grave as families buried their loved ones killed by the state.

One thing the justice and I did have in common, however, was this: he stumped around the country to persuade citizens of the rightness of his "originalist" approach to the Constitution;

I stumped around the country (still do) to persuade citizens to abolish the death penalty, laying out my arguments through stories of personal experience, beliefs of my Catholic faith and logical, fact-infused arguments, including Constitutional analysis.

After all, as citizens, are we not the ultimate proprietors of the Constitution and its meaning for our lives? Are not its protections of life and liberty far too precious to blindly be turned over to legal "experts," every bit as prone to prejudice and blind spots as the rest of us?

I have profoundly disagreed with Scalia on two fronts: jurisprudence and religious faith.

As for his jurisprudence, I do not think that the only correct way to interpret the Constitution is to interpret its words (text) as, supposedly, our 18th century framers understood them.

Given what we now know about the fluid nature of text and context in linguistics, that's an impossible task. Even more impossible is to confine ourselves to the practice of punishment as they practiced it, which, to most modern eyes, was harsh in the extreme.

In 1999, I accompanied Dobie Gillis Williams into the killing chamber of Louisiana three times before my native state finally killed him. An African American with a very low IQ, Dobie was sentenced by an all-white jury to die for supposedly killing a white woman.

I say supposedly because even though the appeals courts upheld Dobie's guilt, I am convinced of his innocence. I tell Dobie's story in"The Death of Innocents," taking readers through our broken system of justice that masks truth and gets poor men like Dobie executed.

Three years after Dobie's death came a Supreme Court decision that, had it come earlier, might well have saved his life, a decision in which Scalia fiercely dissented. In Atkins v Virginia (2002), the court ruled 6-3 that executing people with mental disabilities -- that is with an IQ of 70 and below -- violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual punishments."

In his dissent, Scalia used as his moral criterion an 18th century dictionary's definition of "idiot" as "such a person who cannot account or number twenty pence, nor can tell who was his father or mother, nor how old he is." According to Scalia's perception of the Constitution as not living but dead, that archaic definition should have guided the court's decision and not any modern understanding of diminished mental capacity. Dobie, who had an IQ of 65 but knew exactly who his mama was, would have failed Scalia's "idiot" test.

My second argument with Scalia was the way he interpreted Catholic teaching about the death penalty. Church opposition to government executions has developed considerably in recent years, which to Scalia was anathema. He interpreted his Catholic faith as he interpreted the Constitution, staking his position in unchangeable tradition, upheld by Saints Augustine in the 5th century and Thomas Aquinas in the 12th.

These stalwart teachers, he maintained -- unlike Catholic American bishops so easily swayed by "modern trends," as he saw it -- upheld the righteousness of government-imposed executions as God's will, justified in the same way as the killing of a rabid dog or the amputation of a gangrenous limb.

Thus, Scalia could not brook American bishops' increasing opposition to the death penalty, nor the opposition of Popes John Paul II and Francis -- especially Pope Francis, who must have disturbed the justice considerably in his bold appeal before Congress for global abolition of the death penalty.

At a conference in Chicago in 2002, Scalia's statements about Christian faith vis a vis the death penalty stunned me. Statements such as these:

-- "It seems to me that the more Christian a country is, the less likely it is to regard the death penalty as immoral. Abolition has taken its firmest hold in post-Christian Europe and has least support in the church-going United States."

-- He interpreted St. Paul's words, "The powers that be are ordained of God," to mean: "Government derives its moral authority from God. It is the minister of God with powers to revenge, to execute wrath, including wrath by the sword, which is unmistakably a reference to the death penalty. ...These passages from Romans represent the consensus of Western thought until quite recent times ... regarding the powers of the state. That consensus has been upset by the emergence of democracy."

Democracy, indeed. Do our elected leaders derive the authority to govern from the people or by direct divine infusion? That's theocracy, not democracy.

Death penalty: Why America needs a rethink

Where was Jesus in the Justice's stance of faith? Where is his moral challenge to rise above seeking "an eye for an eye," to pray for and forgive our enemies?

In Chicago, Scalia justified his interpretation of Scripture by making a distinction: individual Christians must follow Jesus' call to forgive, but not the state.

In this distorted reading, state governments as God's ministers have God's blessing to inflict wrath on evildoers and those they deem "enemy."

It seems Scalia was as adept at drawing bright lines in the practice of his faith as he was in his jurisprudence. Now the bright line of death has been drawn across his life. I pray that he finds eternal rest.

I also hope and pray that the ninth new justice will be a person, who not only has an excellent legal mind, but also a compassionate and fair-minded spirit, in close touch with the struggles and aspirations of ordinary people -- especially the most vulnerable among us for whom "equal justice under law" is a cruel chimera if not an outright lie.

DETERRENCE: National Research Council Concludes Deterrence Studies Should Not Influence Death Penalty Policy

A report released on April 18 by the prestigious National Research Council of the National Academies based on a review of more than three decades of research concluded that studies claiming a deterrent effect on murder rates from the death penalty are fundamentally flawed. The report concluded: “The committee concludes that research to date on the effect of capital punishment on homicide is not informative about whether capital punishment decreases, increases, or has no

effect on homicide rates. Therefore, the committee recommends that these studies not be used to inform deliberations requiring judgments about the effect of the death penalty on homicide. Consequently, claims that research demonstrates that capital punishment decreases or increases the homicide rate by a specified amount or has no effect on the homicide rate should not influence policy judgments about capital punishment." (emphasis added). Criminologist Daniel Nagin of Carnegie Mellon, who chaired the panel of experts, said, “We recognize this conclusion will be controversial to some, but nobody is well served by unfounded claims about the death penalty. Nothing is known about how potential murderers actually perceive their risk of punishment."

(D. Nagin and J. Pepper, "Deterrence and the Death Penalty," Committee on Law and Justice at the National Research Council, April 2012; D. Vergano, "NRC: Death penalty effect research 'fundamentally flawed'," USA Today, April 18, 2012.) See Deterrence and Studies. Read the NRC's Report Brief (4 pages).

United States[edit] In October 2015, the Death Penalty Information Center said that there had been 156 exonerations of prisoners on death row in the United States since 1973.[12]

1970–1979[edit]

1977

• Delbert Tibbs, Florida. Convicted 1974.[13]

1980–1989[edit]

1987

• Joseph Green Brown. He was re-arrested in 2012 and charged with another murder in North Carolina.[14]

• Perry Cobb. Illinois. Convicted October 15, 1979.[15]

• Darby J. Tillis. Illinois. Convicted October 15, 1979. Perry Cobb and Darby Tillis, two African American men were convicted of First Degree Murder after a third trial by an all-white jury. The primary witness in the case, Phyllis Santini, was determined to be an accomplice of the actual killer by the Illinois Supreme Court. The Judge in the case, Thomas J. Maloney was later convicted of accepting bribes.[16]

1989

• Randall Dale Adams, Texas (Ex Parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281) (Tex. Crim App. 1989). Convicted 1977.[17][18] The Adams case was the subject of The Thin Blue Line (1988 film).

• On April 8, 2010, former death row inmate Timothy B. Hennis, once exonerated in 1989, was reconvicted of a triple murder, thereby dropping him from the list of those exonerated.[19]

1990–1999[edit]

1993

• Walter McMillian, Alabama. Convicted 1988.[20]

• Gregory R. Wilhoit, Oklahoma. Convicted 1987. Along with Ron Williamson, Wilhoit later became the subject of John Grisham's 2006 non-fiction book The Innocent Man: Murder and Injustice in a Small Town.[21]

1995

• Robert Charles Cruz, Illinois. Convicted 1966. (Cruz disappeared in 1997. His remains were found in 2007.[22])

1996

• Joseph Burrows, Illinois. Convicted 1989. Joseph Burrows was released from death row after his attorney Kathleen Zellner persuaded the real killer to confess at the post-conviction hearing, and Peter Rooney, a reporter for the Champaign-Urbana News-Gazette, obtained a recantation from a key witness.[23] The Burrows case was the subject of a book by Rooney titled Die Free: A True Story of Murder, Betrayal and Miscarried Justice.

• Gary Gauger Illinois. Convicted 1995.[24]

1999

• Shareef Cousin, Louisiana (Louisiana v. Cousin, 710 So. 2d 1065 (1998)). Convicted 1996.[25]

• Anthony Porter, Illinois. Convicted 1983.[26]

• Ron Williamson, Oklahoma. Convicted 1988. Along with Gregory R. Wilhoit, Williamson later became the inspiration for and subject of John Grisham's 2006 non-fiction book The Innocent Man: Murder and Injustice in a Small Town.[21]

2000–2009[edit]

2000

• Earl Washington, Jr., Virginia (pardoned). Convicted 1994 (1984, without life sentence).[27]

2002

• Juan Roberto Melendez-Colon, Florida. Convicted 1984.[28][29][30]

• Ray Krone, Arizona (State v. Krone, 897 P.2d 621 (Ariz. 1995) (en banc)). Convicted 1992.[31][32]

2003

• Nicholas Yarris, Pennsylvania Convicted 1982.[33]

• John Thompson, Louisiana. Convicted 1985.[34]

2004

• Alan Gell, North Carolina. Convicted 1995[35]

2008

• Glen Edward Chapman, North Carolina. Convicted 1995.[36]

• Levon "Bo" Jones, North Carolina. Convicted 1993.[37]

• Michael Blair, Texas. Convicted 1994.[38][39][40]

2009

• Nathson Fields, Illinois. Convicted 1986.[41]

• Paul House, Tennessee. Convicted 1986.[42][43]

• Daniel Wade Moore, Alabama. Convicted 2002.[44]

• Ronald Kitchen, Illinois. Convicted 1988.[45]

• Michael Toney, Texas. Convicted 1999. Toney later died in a car accident on October 3, 2009, just one month and a day after his exoneration.[46]

2010–2015[edit]

2010

• Joe D'Ambrosio, Ohio. Convicted 1989. While he was freed in 2010, but not yet exonerated, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal by the state of Ohio challenging the unconditional writ of habeas corpus and bar to D'Ambrosio's re-prosecution on January 23, 2012, nearly 2 years later, making D'Ambrosio the 140th death row exoneree since 1973.[47][48]

• Anthony Graves, Texas. Convicted 1994.[49]

2011

• Gussie Vann, Tennessee. Convicted 1984

.[50]

2012

• Damon Thibodeaux, Louisiana. Convicted 1997.[51]

• Seth Penalver, Florida. Convicted 1994.[52]

2013

• Reginald Griffin, Missouri. Convicted 1983.[53]

2014

• Glenn Ford, Louisiana. Convicted 1984.[54]

• Carl Dausch, Florida. Convicted 2011.[55]

• Henry Lee McCollum and Leon Brown, North Carolina. Convicted 1984.[56]

• Ricky Jackson and Wiley Bridgeman, Ohio. Convicted 1975.[57]

• Kwame Ajamu (formerly Ronnie Bridgeman), Ohio. Convicted 1975.[58]

2015

• Debra Milke, Arizona. Convicted 1990.[59]

• Anthony Ray Hinton, Alabama. Convicted 1985.[60]

• Willie Manning, Mississippi. Convicted 1996.

• Alfred Brown, Texas. Convicted 2005.

• Lawrence William Lee, Georgia. Convicted 1987.

• Derral Wayne Hodgkins, Florida. Convicted 2013.

• William Antunes, Massachusetts. Convicted 1990.