Capitalist Cuban Case. PDF

8/11/2019 Capitalist Cuban Case. PDF

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/capitalist-cuban-case-pdf 1/35

Capitalist Dependency and Socialist Dependency: The Case of CubaAuthor(s): Robert A. Packenham

Source: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Spring, 1986), pp.59-92Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of MiamiStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/165736 .

Accessed: 25/04/2014 12:42

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve

and extend access to Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 189.253.128.242 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 12:42:28 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=miami

http://www.jstor.org/stable/165736?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp





http://www.jstor.org/stable/165736?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=miami



CAPITALIST

EPENDENCY

AND

SOCIALISTDEPENDENCY:

THE

CASE OF

CUBA

by

ROBERTA. PACKENHAM

INTRODUCTION

IS

SOCIALISM

A

MEANS

TO

ELIMINATE

or reduce

dependency

and its

alleged

concomitants?

According

to

a

number of

authors,

in-

cluding

those

of the most

influential

recent

approaches

to the

study

of LatinAmerican politics and development, it is. Indeed, for most of

these authors socialism

is the

only

desirable or

acceptable

way

to ad-

dress the

problems

of

dependent

capitalism.

For

them,

capitalism

is

inherently exploitative

and

repressive;

socialism is

the

only

desir-

able

or

acceptable

path

to a more

autonomous,

egalitarian,

free and

just

society

(Cardoso

and

Faletto,

1979:

ix-xxiv,

209-216).

As

some

of

the

foregoing

implies,

and

as

is obvious to

anyone

fa-

miliar with the

literature,

for

many

authors

the truth or

falsity

of this

view is

not

a

matter amenable to resolution

by

anything

so

mundane

as reference to historical

experience.

For such

analysts,

this view is

true

by

definition.

The

analyst

using

this

perspective

first assumes

it to

be true and then demonstrates that

it is true

by citing

data that

support

it

(Cardoso

and

Faletto,

1979:

x).

In

this

interpretation,

the

practice

of

comparing hypotheses

against

evidence and

rejecting

or

modifying

the

hypothesis

if

the evidence fails to

be

supportive

is

formal, undialectical,

positivist,

ethnocentric,

and

bourgeois

(Cordoso,

1977:15).

Additionally, there is another problem with a different origin but

the

same

result.

Edy

Kaufman

(1976:14-15)

has noted that

manypoli-

cymakers

and

partisans

of both Communist

and

capitalist

countries

reject,

apriori,

the

possibility

of

any

analogies, parallels,

or

compari-

sons of

the

influences exerted

by

the two

superpowers

on

smaller

countries. Extreme

partisans

of

both

camps,

Kaufman

reports,

Robert

A.

Packenham

s

Professorof PoliticalScience at Stanford

University.

Recentpublications include TheDependency Perspectiveand Analytic

Dependency;,

in

NORTH/SOUTH

RELATIONS

y

Charles Doran et al

(eds.)

(Praeger,

1983),

and

The

Changing

Political Discourse

in

Brazil,

1964-1985,

n

Wayne

Selcher's

(ed.)

POLITICAL IBERALIZATIONN

BRAZIL

Westview,

986).

The author s indebted to

Stephen

Krasner,

who

made

useful criticisms of the initial draftof this

article.

59

CAPITALIST

EPENDENCY

AND


THE

CASE OF

CUBA

by

ROBERTA. PACKENHAM

INTRODUCTION

IS

SOCIALISM

A

MEANS

TO

ELIMINATE

or reduce

dependency

and its

alleged

concomitants?

According

to

a

number of

authors,

in-

cluding

those

of the most

influential

recent

approaches

to the

study



is the

only

desirable or

acceptable

way

to ad-

dress the

problems

of

dependent

capitalism.

For

them,

capitalism

is


and

repressive;

socialism is

the

only

desir-

able

or

acceptable

path

to a more

autonomous,

egalitarian,

free and

just

society

(Cardoso

and

Faletto,

1979:

ix-xxiv,

209-216).

As

some

of

the

foregoing

implies,

and

as

is obvious to

anyone

fa-

miliar with the

literature,

for

many

authors

the truth or

falsity

of this

view is

not

a


by

anything

so

mundane


experience.

For such

analysts,

this view is

true

by

definition.

The

analyst

using

this

perspective

first assumes

it to


it is true

by citing

data that

support

it

(Cardoso

and

Faletto,

1979:

x).

In

this

interpretation,

the

practice

of


against

evidence and

rejecting

or

modifying

the

hypothesis

if


be

supportive

is


positivist,

ethnocentric,

and

bourgeois

(Cordoso,

1977:15).


the

same

result.

Edy

Kaufman

(1976:14-15)

has noted that

manypoli-

cymakers

and

partisans

of both Communist

and

capitalist

countries

reject,

apriori,

the

possibility

of

any


or

compari-

sons of

the

influences exerted

by

the two

superpowers

on

smaller

countries. Extreme

partisans

of

both

camps,

Kaufman

reports,

Robert

A.

Packenham

s


University.


Dependency;,

in

NORTH/SOUTH

RELATIONS

y

Charles Doran et al

(eds.)

(Praeger,

1983),

and

The

Changing

Political Discourse

in

Brazil,

1964-1985,

n

Wayne

Selcher's

(ed.)


BRAZIL

Westview,

986).


Stephen

Krasner,

who

made


article.

59

CAPITALIST

EPENDENCY

AND


THE

CASE OF

CUBA

by

ROBERTA. PACKENHAM

INTRODUCTION

IS

SOCIALISM

A

MEANS

TO

ELIMINATE

or reduce

dependency

and its

alleged

concomitants?

According

to

a

number of

authors,

in-

cluding

those

of the most

influential

recent

approaches

to the

study



is the

only

desirable or

acceptable

way

to ad-

dress the

problems

of

dependent

capitalism.

For

them,

capitalism

is


and

repressive;

socialism is

the

only

desir-

able

or

acceptable

path

to a more

autonomous,

egalitarian,

free and

just

society

(Cardoso

and

Faletto,

1979:

ix-xxiv,

209-216).

As

some

of

the

foregoing

implies,

and

as

is obvious to

anyone

fa-

miliar with the

literature,

for

many

authors

the truth or

falsity

of this

view is

not

a


by

anything

so

mundane


experience.

For such

analysts,

this view is

true

by

definition.

The

analyst

using

this

perspective

first assumes

it to


it is true

by citing

data that

support

it

(Cardoso

and

Faletto,

1979:

x).

In

this

interpretation,

the

practice

of


against

evidence and

rejecting

or

modifying

the

hypothesis

if


be

supportive

is


positivist,

ethnocentric,

and

bourgeois

(Cordoso,

1977:15).


the

same

result.

Edy

Kaufman

(1976:14-15)

has noted that

manypoli-

cymakers

and

partisans

of both Communist

and

capitalist

countries

reject,

apriori,

the

possibility

of

any


or

compari-

sons of

the

influences exerted

by

the two

superpowers

on

smaller

countries. Extreme

partisans

of

both

camps,

Kaufman

reports,

Robert

A.

Packenham

s


University.


Dependency;,

in

NORTH/SOUTH

RELATIONS

y

Charles Doran et al

(eds.)

(Praeger,

1983),

and

The

Changing

Political Discourse

in

Brazil,

1964-1985,

n

Wayne

Selcher's

(ed.)


BRAZIL

Westview,

986).


Stephen

Krasner,

who

made


article.

59

CAPITALIST

EPENDENCY

AND


THE

CASE OF

CUBA

by

ROBERTA. PACKENHAM

INTRODUCTION

IS

SOCIALISM

A

MEANS

TO

ELIMINATE

or reduce

dependency

and its

alleged

concomitants?

According

to

a

number of

authors,

in-

cluding

those

of the most

influential

recent

approaches

to the

study



is the

only

desirable or

acceptable

way

to ad-

dress the

problems

of

dependent

capitalism.

For

them,

capitalism

is


and

repressive;

socialism is

the

only

desir-

able

or

acceptable

path

to a more

autonomous,

egalitarian,

free and

just

society

(Cardoso

and

Faletto,

1979:

ix-xxiv,

209-216).

As

some

of

the

foregoing

implies,

and

as

is obvious to

anyone

fa-

miliar with the

literature,

for

many

authors

the truth or

falsity

of this

view is

not

a


by

anything

so

mundane


experience.

For such

analysts,

this view is

true

by

definition.

The

analyst

using

this

perspective

first assumes

it to


it is true

by citing

data that

support

it

(Cardoso

and

Faletto,

1979:

x).

In

this

interpretation,

the

practice

of


against

evidence and

rejecting

or

modifying

the

hypothesis

if


be

supportive

is


positivist,

ethnocentric,

and

bourgeois

(Cordoso,

1977:15).


the

same

result.

Edy

Kaufman

(1976:14-15)

has noted that

manypoli-

cymakers

and

partisans

of both Communist

and

capitalist

countries

reject,

apriori,

the

possibility

of

any


or

compari-

sons of

the

influences exerted

by

the two

superpowers

on

smaller

countries. Extreme

partisans

of

both

camps,

Kaufman

reports,

Robert

A.

Packenham

s


University.


Dependency;,

in

NORTH/SOUTH

RELATIONS

y

Charles Doran et al

(eds.)

(Praeger,

1983),

and

The

Changing

Political Discourse

in

Brazil,

1964-1985,

n

Wayne

Selcher's

(ed.)


BRAZIL

Westview,

986).


Stephen

Krasner,

who

made


article.

59







JOURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICANSTUDIES AND

WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF


WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF


WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF


WORLD AFFAIRS

reach

he

point

of

absurdity

by

denying

the

possibility

of

a

compari-

son,

on the

grounds

that

the

policies

of the

superpowers

are

not

identicaland are thereforenot

comparable.

his

paper

assumes that

comparisons

are

possible.

Indeed,

without

this

assumption,

the

claim

that socialism is

superior

to

capitalism

s

nonsense.

For

those who do believe that historical

experience

can,

and

should,

be

examined

as a means

to

illuminate

the

truth-value f such

claims,

however,

comparative

analyses

of

capitalist

and

socialist

cases

are

indispensable.

Kaufman

reports

that,

on

his

visits to

both

LatinAmericaand Eastern

Europe,

he

encounteredcriticism

of

the

paramountsuperpoweryet very little awareness of the restrictions

imposed by

the

rival

superpower

in

other

regions

(1976:15).

The

present study

hopes

to

heighten

that awareness

through

a

compara-

tive

analysis

of the

rival

superpowers

in

the same

region.

Broadly

speaking,

two

ways

of

comparingcapitalist

with

socialist

dependen-

cy immediately suggest

themselves and

appear

to

dominate

the lit-

erature: ross-sectional

comparisons

and

longitudinal

comparisons.

When one

does cross-sectional

comparisons,

one

typically

com-

pares, say,

the

situation

of

Eastern

European

countries

vis-a-vis he

U.S.S.R.with the situationof LatinAmericancountries vis-a-vis he

United States.When one does

longitudinal analysis,

one can

com-

pare

the

situationof the same

country

before

and

afterthe adventof

socialism:

say,

Cuba before and

after

1959,

Chile before and after

1970,

Nicaragua

before and after

1979,

Grenada before and

after

1979.

In this

paper

the

longitudinal

method is used and the

case se-

lected for

analysis

is

Cuba.

The longitudinalmethod normallyenables the analystto hold

variablesconstant to a

greater

extent

than

is

possible

when two

dif-

ferentcountriesare

studied.

Language,

historical

radition

and

mem-

ory,

cultural

baselines,

basic

geographic

and material

circumstances,

and

population

are all factors that

remain more

or

less constant

whenever

a

particular

case

is studied over time. When some

pro-

found

event,

like

the

Cuban

Revolution,

occurs

in

one

country,

one

can more or

less

hold these other

factorsconstant and make reason-

able inferences about

the

degree

and

form

of

changes

in

the

country

that

may

havebeen

brought

about (or not)

by

that

profound

event.

Of

course,

in

fact,

other

variables

do

change;

it is

not true that the

profound

event

is

the

only

alteration.So the method

is

not

airtight

(to

say

the

least).

No method

is

airtight.

However,

he method of lon-

gitudinal

analysis

-

comparing

different

systems

within

the

same

reach

he

point

of

absurdity

by

denying

the

possibility

of

a

compari-

son,

on the

grounds

that

the

policies

of the

superpowers

are

not


comparable.

his

paper

assumes that

comparisons

are

possible.

Indeed,

without

this

assumption,

the

claim

that socialism is

superior

to

capitalism

s

nonsense.

For


experience

can,

and

should,

be

examined

as a means

to

illuminate

the

truth-value f such

claims,

however,

comparative

analyses

of

capitalist

and

socialist

cases

are

indispensable.

Kaufman

reports

that,

on

his

visits to

both


Europe,

he


of

the


imposed by

the

rival

superpower

in

other

regions

(1976:15).

The

present study

hopes

to

heighten

that awareness

through

a

compara-

tive

analysis

of the

rival

superpowers

in

the same

region.

Broadly

speaking,

two

ways

of

comparingcapitalist

with

socialist

dependen-


themselves and

appear

to

dominate

the lit-


comparisons

and

longitudinal

comparisons.

When one


comparisons,

one

typically

com-

pares, say,

the

situation

of

Eastern

European

countries

vis-a-vis he




one can

com-

pare

the


country

before

and

afterthe adventof

socialism:

say,

Cuba before and

after

1959,


1970,

Nicaragua

before and after

1979,

Grenada before and

after

1979.

In this

paper

the

longitudinal


case se-

lected for

analysis

is

Cuba.



greater

extent

than

is

possible

when two

dif-

ferentcountriesare

studied.

Language,

historical

radition

and

mem-

ory,

cultural

baselines,

basic

geographic

and material

circumstances,

and

population


remain more

or

less constant

whenever

a

particular

case


pro-

found

event,

like

the

Cuban

Revolution,

occurs

in

one

country,

one

can more or

less

hold these other



the

degree

and

form

of

changes

in

the

country

that

may

havebeen

brought

about (or not)

by

that

profound

event.

Of

course,

in

fact,

other

variables

do

change;

it is

not true that the

profound

event

is

the

only


is

not

airtight

(to

say

the

least).

No method

is

airtight.

However,

he method of lon-

gitudinal

analysis

-

comparing

different

systems

within

the

same

reach

he

point

of

absurdity

by

denying

the

possibility

of

a

compari-

son,

on the

grounds

that

the

policies

of the

superpowers

are

not


comparable.

his

paper

assumes that

comparisons

are

possible.

Indeed,

without

this

assumption,

the

claim

that socialism is

superior

to

capitalism

s

nonsense.

For


experience

can,

and

should,

be

examined

as a means

to

illuminate

the

truth-value f such

claims,

however,

comparative

analyses

of

capitalist

and

socialist

cases

are

indispensable.

Kaufman

reports

that,

on

his

visits to

both


Europe,

he


of

the


imposed by

the

rival

superpower

in

other

regions

(1976:15).

The

present study

hopes

to

heighten

that awareness

through

a

compara-

tive

analysis

of the

rival

superpowers

in

the same

region.

Broadly

speaking,

two

ways

of

comparingcapitalist

with

socialist

dependen-


themselves and

appear

to

dominate

the lit-


comparisons

and

longitudinal

comparisons.

When one


comparisons,

one

typically

com-

pares, say,

the

situation

of

Eastern

European

countries

vis-a-vis he




one can

com-

pare

the


country

before

and

afterthe adventof

socialism:

say,

Cuba before and

after

1959,


1970,

Nicaragua

before and after

1979,

Grenada before and

after

1979.

In this

paper

the

longitudinal


case se-

lected for

analysis

is

Cuba.



greater

extent

than

is

possible

when two

dif-

ferentcountriesare

studied.

Language,

historical

radition

and

mem-

ory,

cultural

baselines,

basic

geographic

and material

circumstances,

and

population


remain more

or

less constant

whenever

a

particular

case


pro-

found

event,

like

the

Cuban

Revolution,

occurs

in

one

country,

one

can more or

less

hold these other



the

degree

and

form

of

changes

in

the

country

that

may

havebeen

brought

about (or not)

by

that

profound

event.

Of

course,

in

fact,

other

variables

do

change;

it is

not true that the

profound

event

is

the

only


is

not

airtight

(to

say

the

least).

No method

is

airtight.

However,

he method of lon-

gitudinal

analysis

-

comparing

different

systems

within

the

same

reach

he

point

of

absurdity

by

denying

the

possibility

of

a

compari-

son,

on the

grounds

that

the

policies

of the

superpowers

are

not


comparable.

his

paper

assumes that

comparisons

are

possible.

Indeed,

without

this

assumption,

the

claim

that socialism is

superior

to

capitalism

s

nonsense.

For


experience

can,

and

should,

be

examined

as a means

to

illuminate

the

truth-value f such

claims,

however,

comparative

analyses

of

capitalist

and

socialist

cases

are

indispensable.

Kaufman

reports

that,

on

his

visits to

both


Europe,

he


of

the


imposed by

the

rival

superpower

in

other

regions

(1976:15).

The

present study

hopes

to

heighten

that awareness

through

a

compara-

tive

analysis

of the

rival

superpowers

in

the same

region.

Broadly

speaking,

two

ways

of

comparingcapitalist

with

socialist

dependen-


themselves and

appear

to

dominate

the lit-


comparisons

and

longitudinal

comparisons.

When one


comparisons,

one

typically

com-

pares, say,

the

situation

of

Eastern

European

countries

vis-a-vis he




one can

com-

pare

the


country

before

and

afterthe adventof

socialism:

say,

Cuba before and

after

1959,


1970,

Nicaragua

before and after

1979,

Grenada before and

after

1979.

In this

paper

the

longitudinal


case se-

lected for

analysis

is

Cuba.



greater

extent

than

is

possible

when two

dif-

ferentcountriesare

studied.

Language,

historical

radition

and

mem-

ory,

cultural

baselines,

basic

geographic

and material

circumstances,

and

population


remain more

or

less constant

whenever

a

particular

case


pro-

found

event,

like

the

Cuban

Revolution,

occurs

in

one

country,

one

can more or

less

hold these other



the

degree

and

form

of

changes

in

the

country

that

may

havebeen

brought

about (or not)

by

that

profound

event.

Of

course,

in

fact,

other

variables

do

change;

it is

not true that the

profound

event

is

the

only


is

not

airtight

(to

say

the

least).

No method

is

airtight.

However,

he method of lon-

gitudinal

analysis

-

comparing

different

systems

within

the

same

60000







PACKENHAM:

UBA

-

CAPITALIST

S.

SOCIALIST

EPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:

UBA

-

CAPITALIST

S.

SOCIALIST

EPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:

UBA

-

CAPITALIST

S.

SOCIALIST

EPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:

UBA

-

CAPITALIST

S.

SOCIALIST

EPENDENCY

country

over time

-

clearly

has natural

strengths

that

deserve to be

exploited. Comparative olitics

can

be

done

bycomparing

different

systems

over time

within the same

country

as

well as

by

comparing

different

countries

to one

another.

Within

Latin

America

Cuba

s

by

far he best case available

f

one

wants

to

make

systematic

longitudinal

comparisons

of

capitalism

with socialism. Its

experience

with

socialism

is now more

than

a

quarter-century

ld.

By

contrast,

he

socialist

experiments

in

Chile

and Grenada

were

very

short-lived Allende's

socialist

experiment

lasted

only

three

years,

the

NewJewel

regime

only

four.The Nicara-

guan experimenthas hadonlysix orsevenyears.Moreover,he emo-

tionalism,

politicization,

and

theatricality

hat

have

pervadedanaly-

ses of

Cuba

and thatdominate

writing

about

the other cases are now

abating

a

bit

in

the Cuban

case,

although

they

are

still

common.

STRUCTURALECONOMIC

DEPENDENCY

BEFORE

AND

AFTER

1959

BASIC

TO

THE

DEPENDENT

ONDITION

s structural

ependen-

cy:

monoculture,

reliance on

exports,

trade

partner

concentration,

capital dependency,

technological

dependency,

and

the like. Not

only

Cuba's

eaders,

but

many

intellectuals

outside

Cuba,

thought

Cuba's tructural

conomic

dependency

would

change

significantly

under socialism.

Some

think

it has

changed

significantly

(LeoGrande,

1979).

Letus see

what has

happened.

Diversification

of

Production/Monoculture

in

Production

The more diversifieda nation's conomy,the less the degree of

dependency.

The less diversified

the

economy,

the

greater

the de-

gree

of

dependency.

Thus,

an

economy

with a varied

production

structure

e.g.,

one that

produces

industrial

goods

rather han

just

primary

products,

a

variety

of

agricultural

products

rather

han

just

one, etc.,

is less

dependent

than

an

economy

based

overwhelmingly

on

just

one

product.

Before

the

Revolution

Cuba

was a classic

case of monoculture

(relianceon one cropsugar)asthe mainpropof the nationalecono-

my.

In

the

early stages

of the

Revolution,

diversification

was

an

idealistic

goal..., promoted

vigorously

but

irrationally

n

1961-63

with

poor

results.

Since

1964

economic

realitypushed

diver-

sificationdown

to the

bottom

of

Cuba's

priorities.

n

spite

of

great

ex-

pectations,

sugar

continues

to

be

the

dominant

sector

in

the

econo-

country

over time

-

clearly

has natural

strengths

that

deserve to be


can

be

done

bycomparing

different

systems

over time

within the same

country

as

well as

by

comparing

different

countries

to one

another.

Within

Latin

America

Cuba

s

by


f

one

wants

to

make

systematic

longitudinal

comparisons

of

capitalism

with socialism. Its

experience

with

socialism

is now more

than

a

quarter-century

ld.

By

contrast,

he

socialist

experiments

in

Chile

and Grenada

were

very


socialist

experiment

lasted

only

three

years,

the

NewJewel

regime

only

four.The Nicara-


tionalism,

politicization,

and

theatricality

hat

have

pervadedanaly-

ses of

Cuba

and thatdominate

writing

about


abating

a

bit

in

the Cuban

case,

although

they

are

still

common.

STRUCTURALECONOMIC

DEPENDENCY

BEFORE

AND

AFTER

1959

BASIC

TO

THE

DEPENDENT

ONDITION

s structural

ependen-

cy:

monoculture,

reliance on

exports,

trade

partner

concentration,

capital dependency,

technological

dependency,

and

the like. Not

only

Cuba's

eaders,

but

many

intellectuals

outside

Cuba,

thought

Cuba's tructural

conomic

dependency

would

change

significantly

under socialism.

Some

think

it has

changed

significantly

(LeoGrande,

1979).

Letus see

what has

happened.

Diversification

of


in

Production


dependency.


the

economy,

the

greater

the de-

gree

of

dependency.

Thus,

an

economy

with a varied

production

structure

e.g.,

one that

produces

industrial

goods

rather han

just

primary

products,

a

variety

of

agricultural

products

rather

han

just

one, etc.,

is less

dependent

than

an

economy

based

overwhelmingly

on

just

one

product.

Before

the

Revolution

Cuba

was a classic

case of monoculture


my.

In

the

early stages

of the

Revolution,

diversification

was

an

idealistic

goal..., promoted

vigorously

but

irrationally

n

1961-63

with

poor

results.

Since

1964

economic

realitypushed

diver-

sificationdown

to the

bottom

of

Cuba's

priorities.

n

spite

of

great

ex-

pectations,

sugar

continues

to

be

the

dominant

sector

in

the

econo-

country

over time

-

clearly

has natural

strengths

that

deserve to be


can

be

done

bycomparing

different

systems

over time

within the same

country

as

well as

by

comparing

different

countries

to one

another.

Within

Latin

America

Cuba

s

by


f

one

wants

to

make

systematic

longitudinal

comparisons

of

capitalism

with socialism. Its

experience

with

socialism

is now more

than

a

quarter-century

ld.

By

contrast,

he

socialist

experiments

in

Chile

and Grenada

were

very


socialist

experiment

lasted

only

three

years,

the

NewJewel

regime

only

four.The Nicara-


tionalism,

politicization,

and

theatricality

hat

have

pervadedanaly-

ses of

Cuba

and thatdominate

writing

about


abating

a

bit

in

the Cuban

case,

although

they

are

still

common.

STRUCTURALECONOMIC

DEPENDENCY

BEFORE

AND

AFTER

1959

BASIC

TO

THE

DEPENDENT

ONDITION

s structural

ependen-

cy:

monoculture,

reliance on

exports,

trade

partner

concentration,

capital dependency,

technological

dependency,

and

the like. Not

only

Cuba's

eaders,

but

many

intellectuals

outside

Cuba,

thought

Cuba's tructural

conomic

dependency

would

change

significantly

under socialism.

Some

think

it has

changed

significantly

(LeoGrande,

1979).

Letus see

what has

happened.

Diversification

of


in

Production


dependency.


the

economy,

the

greater

the de-

gree

of

dependency.

Thus,

an

economy

with a varied

production

structure

e.g.,

one that

produces

industrial

goods

rather han

just

primary

products,

a

variety

of

agricultural

products

rather

han

just

one, etc.,

is less

dependent

than

an

economy

based

overwhelmingly

on

just

one

product.

Before

the

Revolution

Cuba

was a classic

case of monoculture


my.

In

the

early stages

of the

Revolution,

diversification

was

an

idealistic

goal..., promoted

vigorously

but

irrationally

n

1961-63

with

poor

results.

Since

1964

economic

realitypushed

diver-

sificationdown

to the

bottom

of

Cuba's

priorities.

n

spite

of

great

ex-

pectations,

sugar

continues

to

be

the

dominant

sector

in

the

econo-

country

over time

-

clearly

has natural

strengths

that

deserve to be


can

be

done

bycomparing

different

systems

over time

within the same

country

as

well as

by

comparing

different

countries

to one

another.

Within

Latin

America

Cuba

s

by


f

one

wants

to

make

systematic

longitudinal

comparisons

of

capitalism

with socialism. Its

experience

with

socialism

is now more

than

a

quarter-century

ld.

By

contrast,

he

socialist

experiments

in

Chile

and Grenada

were

very


socialist

experiment

lasted

only

three

years,

the

NewJewel

regime

only

four.The Nicara-


tionalism,

politicization,

and

theatricality

hat

have

pervadedanaly-

ses of

Cuba

and thatdominate

writing

about


abating

a

bit

in

the Cuban

case,

although

they

are

still

common.

STRUCTURALECONOMIC

DEPENDENCY

BEFORE

AND

AFTER

1959

BASIC

TO

THE

DEPENDENT

ONDITION

s structural

ependen-

cy:

monoculture,

reliance on

exports,

trade

partner

concentration,

capital dependency,

technological

dependency,

and

the like. Not

only

Cuba's

eaders,

but

many

intellectuals

outside

Cuba,

thought

Cuba's tructural

conomic

dependency

would

change

significantly

under socialism.

Some

think

it has

changed

significantly

(LeoGrande,

1979).

Letus see

what has

happened.

Diversification

of


in

Production


dependency.


the

economy,

the

greater

the de-

gree

of

dependency.

Thus,

an

economy

with a varied

production

structure

e.g.,

one that

produces

industrial

goods

rather han

just

primary

products,

a

variety

of

agricultural

products

rather

han

just

one, etc.,

is less

dependent

than

an

economy

based

overwhelmingly

on

just

one

product.

Before

the

Revolution

Cuba

was a classic

case of monoculture


my.

In

the

early stages

of the

Revolution,

diversification

was

an

idealistic

goal..., promoted

vigorously

but

irrationally

n

1961-63

with

poor

results.

Since

1964

economic

realitypushed

diver-

sificationdown

to the

bottom

of

Cuba's

priorities.

n

spite

of

great

ex-

pectations,

sugar

continues

to

be

the

dominant

sector

in

the

econo-

61111







JOURNAL

OF INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES AND

WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES AND

WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES AND

WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES AND

WORLD AFFAIRS

my,

and

only

modest advances have been

made

in

the diversification

of the

nonsugar

sector

(Mesa-Lago

1981:179).

The overall result is that

Sugar

monoculture is more

pro-

nounced now

than before the

Revolution

Mesa-Lago,

981:

64).

In

the fifties and

early

sixties,

Fidel

Castroand other

Cuban eaders

in-

sisted

that the

economic

doctrine of

comparative

advantage

used to

justify

Cuba's

ugar

monoculture

was

a

mystification

of

capitalist

co-

nomic

ideology,

designed

to

keep

Cuba

in

economic servitude.

By

the

mid-seventies, however,

Castro

was

attacking

what he called

anti-sugar

ttitudes

and

he

pledged

that Cuba would

stick

to

sugar preciselybecause of the comparativeadvantagesof thatprod-

uct

(Castro

as

quoted by

Mesa-Lago,

981:

65).

Overall

Dependency

on

Trade

The

larger

he trade

sector

in

relation

to total

economic

activity

the more

dependent

the

country's

economy.

In

1946-58

the

average

ratio

of

Cuba's

xports

to

GNP

was

30.6%

and

declining

while that

of

imports

was

25.7%

and

increasing.

Total rade

as a

percent

of GNP

was

56.3%

and

stagnant.

What

happened

afterthe Revolution?

A

rigorous comparison

is

difficult,

if not

impossible,

because

after

he Revolution

he

Cubans

stopped

computing

GNP

and

began

to make

other

computations

instead:

global

social

product

(GSP),

total

material

product

(TMP),

and

gross

material

product

(GMP).

These

concepts

were

developed

in the

Soviet

Union

and are

not di-

rectly comparable

o the Western

concept

of

GNP

(Mesa-Lago,

981:

199-202).

If

one

ignores

this

problem,

and

directly compares

trade/

GNP

before

1959

with

trade/GMP

after

1959,

then there

appears

to

havebeen a reductionin overalltradedependency.In1962-78,aver-

age proportion

of

exports

in relation to the

GMP

(Gross

Material

Product)

was

only

21%

and

the

average

ratio of

total

trade

to GMP

was

only

48.5%

(Mesa-Lago

1981:

79;

LeoGrande,

1979:

5-8).

How-

ever,

GNPand GMPare

not

the

same,

and therefore his

comparison

is

misleading.

Moreover,

as

we shall see

below,

export

figures

are

massively

distorted

by

the

world

sugar price,

whereas

import

ratios

are

much more

stable and reliable indicators

of trade

dependence.

Some

of these

problems

are avoided

by

tracing

trends

in trade

dependency

after the Revolution,using consistent definitions and

indicators rom

1962

to

1978.

These

data

show that Cuba's radede-

pendency

increased

in the

1970s

as

compared

to the

1960s.

This

pat-

tern holds

on all three indicatorsof

trade

as a

percentage

of GMP: x-

ports

went

up,

from an

average

of

16%

of

GMP

in

the

1960s

to an

my,

and

only


made

in

the diversification

of the

nonsugar

sector

(Mesa-Lago

1981:179).


Sugar

monoculture is more

pro-

nounced now

than before the

Revolution

Mesa-Lago,

981:

64).

In

the fifties and

early

sixties,

Fidel

Castroand other

Cuban eaders

in-

sisted

that the

economic

doctrine of

comparative

advantage

used to

justify

Cuba's

ugar

monoculture

was

a

mystification

of

capitalist

co-

nomic

ideology,

designed

to

keep

Cuba

in

economic servitude.

By

the


Castro

was

attacking

what he called

anti-sugar

ttitudes

and

he

pledged

that Cuba would

stick

to


uct

(Castro

as

quoted by

Mesa-Lago,

981:

65).

Overall

Dependency

on

Trade

The

larger

he trade

sector

in

relation

to total

economic

activity

the more

dependent

the

country's

economy.

In

1946-58

the

average

ratio

of

Cuba's

xports

to

GNP

was

30.6%

and

declining

while that

of

imports

was

25.7%

and

increasing.

Total rade

as a

percent

of GNP

was

56.3%

and

stagnant.

What

happened


A

rigorous comparison

is

difficult,

if not

impossible,

because

after

he Revolution

he

Cubans

stopped

computing

GNP

and

began

to make

other

computations

instead:

global

social

product

(GSP),

total

material

product

(TMP),

and

gross

material

product

(GMP).

These

concepts

were

developed

in the

Soviet

Union

and are

not di-

rectly comparable

o the Western

concept

of

GNP

(Mesa-Lago,

981:

199-202).

If

one

ignores

this

problem,

and

directly compares

trade/

GNP

before

1959

with

trade/GMP

after

1959,

then there

appears

to


age proportion

of

exports

in relation to the

GMP

(Gross

Material

Product)

was

only

21%

and

the

average

ratio of

total

trade

to GMP

was

only

48.5%

(Mesa-Lago

1981:

79;

LeoGrande,

1979:

5-8).

How-

ever,

GNPand GMPare

not

the

same,

and therefore his

comparison

is

misleading.

Moreover,

as

we shall see

below,

export

figures

are

massively

distorted

by

the

world

sugar price,

whereas

import

ratios

are

much more


of trade

dependence.

Some

of these

problems

are avoided

by

tracing

trends

in trade

dependency


indicators rom

1962

to

1978.

These

data


pendency

increased

in the

1970s

as

compared

to the

1960s.

This

pat-

tern holds


trade

as a

percentage

of GMP: x-

ports

went

up,

from an

average

of

16%

of

GMP

in

the

1960s

to an

my,

and

only


made

in

the diversification

of the

nonsugar

sector

(Mesa-Lago

1981:179).


Sugar

monoculture is more

pro-

nounced now

than before the

Revolution

Mesa-Lago,

981:

64).

In

the fifties and

early

sixties,

Fidel

Castroand other

Cuban eaders

in-

sisted

that the

economic

doctrine of

comparative

advantage

used to

justify

Cuba's

ugar

monoculture

was

a

mystification

of

capitalist

co-

nomic

ideology,

designed

to

keep

Cuba

in

economic servitude.

By

the


Castro

was

attacking

what he called

anti-sugar

ttitudes

and

he

pledged

that Cuba would

stick

to


uct

(Castro

as

quoted by

Mesa-Lago,

981:

65).

Overall

Dependency

on

Trade

The

larger

he trade

sector

in

relation

to total

economic

activity

the more

dependent

the

country's

economy.

In

1946-58

the

average

ratio

of

Cuba's

xports

to

GNP

was

30.6%

and

declining

while that

of

imports

was

25.7%

and

increasing.

Total rade

as a

percent

of GNP

was

56.3%

and

stagnant.

What

happened


A

rigorous comparison

is

difficult,

if not

impossible,

because

after

he Revolution

he

Cubans

stopped

computing

GNP

and

began

to make

other

computations

instead:

global

social

product

(GSP),

total

material

product

(TMP),

and

gross

material

product

(GMP).

These

concepts

were

developed

in the

Soviet

Union

and are

not di-

rectly comparable

o the Western

concept

of

GNP

(Mesa-Lago,

981:

199-202).

If

one

ignores

this

problem,

and

directly compares

trade/

GNP

before

1959

with

trade/GMP

after

1959,

then there

appears

to


age proportion

of

exports

in relation to the

GMP

(Gross

Material

Product)

was

only

21%

and

the

average

ratio of

total

trade

to GMP

was

only

48.5%

(Mesa-Lago

1981:

79;

LeoGrande,

1979:

5-8).

How-

ever,

GNPand GMPare

not

the

same,

and therefore his

comparison

is

misleading.

Moreover,

as

we shall see

below,

export

figures

are

massively

distorted

by

the

world

sugar price,

whereas

import

ratios

are

much more


of trade

dependence.

Some

of these

problems

are avoided

by

tracing

trends

in trade

dependency


indicators rom

1962

to

1978.

These

data


pendency

increased

in the

1970s

as

compared

to the

1960s.

This

pat-

tern holds


trade

as a

percentage

of GMP: x-

ports

went

up,

from an

average

of

16%

of

GMP

in

the

1960s

to an

my,

and

only


made

in

the diversification

of the

nonsugar

sector

(Mesa-Lago

1981:179).


Sugar

monoculture is more

pro-

nounced now

than before the

Revolution

Mesa-Lago,

981:

64).

In

the fifties and

early

sixties,

Fidel

Castroand other

Cuban eaders

in-

sisted

that the

economic

doctrine of

comparative

advantage

used to

justify

Cuba's

ugar

monoculture

was

a

mystification

of

capitalist

co-

nomic

ideology,

designed

to

keep

Cuba

in

economic servitude.

By

the


Castro

was

attacking

what he called

anti-sugar

ttitudes

and

he

pledged

that Cuba would

stick

to


uct

(Castro

as

quoted by

Mesa-Lago,

981:

65).

Overall

Dependency

on

Trade

The

larger

he trade

sector

in

relation

to total

economic

activity

the more

dependent

the

country's

economy.

In

1946-58

the

average

ratio

of

Cuba's

xports

to

GNP

was

30.6%

and

declining

while that

of

imports

was

25.7%

and

increasing.

Total rade

as a

percent

of GNP

was

56.3%

and

stagnant.

What

happened


A

rigorous comparison

is

difficult,

if not

impossible,

because

after

he Revolution

he

Cubans

stopped

computing

GNP

and

began

to make

other

computations

instead:

global

social

product

(GSP),

total

material

product

(TMP),

and

gross

material

product

(GMP).

These

concepts

were

developed

in the

Soviet

Union

and are

not di-

rectly comparable

o the Western

concept

of

GNP

(Mesa-Lago,

981:

199-202).

If

one

ignores

this

problem,

and

directly compares

trade/

GNP

before

1959

with

trade/GMP

after

1959,

then there

appears

to


age proportion

of

exports

in relation to the

GMP

(Gross

Material

Product)

was

only

21%

and

the

average

ratio of

total

trade

to GMP

was

only

48.5%

(Mesa-Lago

1981:

79;

LeoGrande,

1979:

5-8).

How-

ever,

GNPand GMPare

not

the

same,

and therefore his

comparison

is

misleading.

Moreover,

as

we shall see

below,

export

figures

are

massively

distorted

by

the

world

sugar price,

whereas

import

ratios

are

much more


of trade

dependence.

Some

of these

problems

are avoided

by

tracing

trends

in trade

dependency


indicators rom

1962

to

1978.

These

data


pendency

increased

in the

1970s

as

compared

to the

1960s.

This

pat-

tern holds


trade

as a

percentage

of GMP: x-

ports

went

up,

from an

average

of

16%

of

GMP

in

the

1960s

to an

62222







PACKENHAM:

CUBA-

CAPITALISTVS.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:

CUBA-

CAPITALISTVS.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:

CUBA-

CAPITALISTVS.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:

CUBA-

CAPITALISTVS.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

average

of

26%

in the

1970s;

imports

went from 24 -

31%;

and

total

trade ncreased from

40 to

56%.

In

1978,

total tradehad

reached

69%

of

GMP,

wice the

figure

(34.6%)

for

1962

(Mesa-Lago,

981:

80).

The

world

price

of

sugar

affects the indicators or both

exports

and total trade.

High prices

for

sugar

in

the

early

1970s

increased

them,

whereas low

prices

of

sugar

in

the

1960s

had decreased

them.

However,

no

parallel

distortion s

observed

with

respect

to

imports,

which are

consistently,

and

significantly,higher

than

export/GMP

ratios.Thus

Castro

complained

in

1978

that we have an

importer's

mentality

...

exports

must be

increased

with

(capitalist

countries)

and with the socialist region as well (Quoted in MesaLago,1981:

82).

In this

respect,

then,

dependence

under

socialism is

at

least as

great

as

it was

under

capitalism.

Monoculture

In

Exports

The more

diversified the

export

structure,

he less

dependent

the

country,

and vice

versa.

The

early

attempt by

the

Revolutionary

government

o

diversify

he

export

structure

was no more

successful

thanthe earlydriveto industrializeand diversify he overallecono-

my.

Thus,

from the

1920s

to the

1950s,

sugar's

hare of

total

exports

ranged

from

70

to

92%,

averaging

81%

overall. From

1959

to

1976,

however,

sugar's

hare of

total

exports

still

ranged

from

74 to

90%,

with an

average

of

82%.

In

short,

Cuba's

xport

structurecontinued

to be as

dependent during

the

Revolutionary

eriod

as it

had before

(Mesa-Lago,

981:

82-83;

LeoGrande,

1979:

8-11).

Trade-Partner

Concentration

A countrythatrelies

heavily

on

only

one or a few

trading

part-

ners is

more

dependent

than

a

country

with

a

larger

number

of trade

partners.

Before

the

Revolution,

rom

1946

to

1958,

Cuba's radewith

the United

States

averaged

69%

annually.

Of

this

total,

imports

from

the

U.S.

(77%)

surpassed

exports

to

the

U.S.

(63%)

(LeoGrande,

1979:14).

After he

Revolution,

rom

1961

o

1976,

the

average

annual

share of

Cuba's radewith

the USSRwas

48.5%.

Again,

mports

from

the Soviet

Union

(52%)

accounted for a

higher

proportion

of

the

total thanexportsto the SovietUnion (43%) (LeoGrande,1979:15).

Thus,

f

one

compares

the

average

or

Cuba's

rade

with

the two

prin-

cipal

countries

only,

for

the

years

before

and

after

1959,

then

there

has

been

significant

reduction

in

trade-partner

oncentration.

An

additional

point

should

be

noted,

however:

trade-partner

concentration

becomes much

higher

after

1959

if

the

indicator

n-

average

of

26%

in the

1970s;

imports

went from 24 -

31%;

and

total

trade ncreased from

40 to

56%.

In

1978,

total tradehad

reached

69%

of

GMP,

wice the

figure

(34.6%)

for

1962

(Mesa-Lago,

981:

80).

The

world

price

of

sugar


exports

and total trade.

High prices

for

sugar

in

the

early

1970s

increased

them,

whereas low

prices

of

sugar

in

the

1960s

had decreased

them.

However,

no

parallel

distortion s

observed

with

respect

to

imports,

which are

consistently,

and


than

export/GMP

ratios.Thus

Castro

complained

in

1978

that we have an

importer's

mentality

...

exports

must be

increased

with

(capitalist

countries)


82).

In this

respect,

then,

dependence

under

socialism is

at

least as

great

as

it was

under

capitalism.

Monoculture

In

Exports

The more

diversified the

export

structure,

he less

dependent

the

country,

and vice

versa.

The

early

attempt by

the

Revolutionary

government

o

diversify

he

export

structure

was no more

successful


my.

Thus,

from the

1920s

to the

1950s,

sugar's

hare of

total

exports

ranged

from

70

to

92%,

averaging

81%

overall. From

1959

to

1976,

however,

sugar's

hare of

total

exports

still

ranged

from

74 to

90%,

with an

average

of

82%.

In

short,

Cuba's

xport

structurecontinued

to be as

dependent during

the

Revolutionary

eriod

as it

had before

(Mesa-Lago,

981:

82-83;

LeoGrande,

1979:

8-11).

Trade-Partner

Concentration

A countrythatrelies

heavily

on

only

one or a few

trading

part-

ners is

more

dependent

than

a

country

with

a

larger

number

of trade

partners.

Before

the

Revolution,

rom

1946

to

1958,

Cuba's radewith

the United

States

averaged

69%

annually.

Of

this

total,

imports

from

the

U.S.

(77%)

surpassed

exports

to

the

U.S.

(63%)

(LeoGrande,

1979:14).

After he

Revolution,

rom

1961

o

1976,

the

average

annual

share of

Cuba's radewith

the USSRwas

48.5%.

Again,

mports

from

the Soviet

Union

(52%)

accounted for a

higher

proportion

of

the


Thus,

f

one

compares

the

average

or

Cuba's

rade

with

the two

prin-

cipal

countries

only,

for

the

years

before

and

after

1959,

then

there

has

been

significant

reduction

in

trade-partner

oncentration.

An

additional

point

should

be

noted,

however:

trade-partner

concentration

becomes much

higher

after

1959

if

the

indicator

n-

average

of

26%

in the

1970s;

imports

went from 24 -

31%;

and

total

trade ncreased from

40 to

56%.

In

1978,

total tradehad

reached

69%

of

GMP,

wice the

figure

(34.6%)

for

1962

(Mesa-Lago,

981:

80).

The

world

price

of

sugar


exports

and total trade.

High prices

for

sugar

in

the

early

1970s

increased

them,

whereas low

prices

of

sugar

in

the

1960s

had decreased

them.

However,

no

parallel

distortion s

observed

with

respect

to

imports,

which are

consistently,

and


than

export/GMP

ratios.Thus

Castro

complained

in

1978

that we have an

importer's

mentality

...

exports

must be

increased

with

(capitalist

countries)


82).

In this

respect,

then,

dependence

under

socialism is

at

least as

great

as

it was

under

capitalism.

Monoculture

In

Exports

The more

diversified the

export

structure,

he less

dependent

the

country,

and vice

versa.

The

early

attempt by

the

Revolutionary

government

o

diversify

he

export

structure

was no more

successful


my.

Thus,

from the

1920s

to the

1950s,

sugar's

hare of

total

exports

ranged

from

70

to

92%,

averaging

81%

overall. From

1959

to

1976,

however,

sugar's

hare of

total

exports

still

ranged

from

74 to

90%,

with an

average

of

82%.

In

short,

Cuba's

xport

structurecontinued

to be as

dependent during

the

Revolutionary

eriod

as it

had before

(Mesa-Lago,

981:

82-83;

LeoGrande,

1979:

8-11).

Trade-Partner

Concentration

A countrythatrelies

heavily

on

only

one or a few

trading

part-

ners is

more

dependent

than

a

country

with

a

larger

number

of trade

partners.

Before

the

Revolution,

rom

1946

to

1958,

Cuba's radewith

the United

States

averaged

69%

annually.

Of

this

total,

imports

from

the

U.S.

(77%)

surpassed

exports

to

the

U.S.

(63%)

(LeoGrande,

1979:14).

After he

Revolution,

rom

1961

o

1976,

the

average

annual

share of

Cuba's radewith

the USSRwas

48.5%.

Again,

mports

from

the Soviet

Union

(52%)

accounted for a

higher

proportion

of

the


Thus,

f

one

compares

the

average

or

Cuba's

rade

with

the two

prin-

cipal

countries

only,

for

the

years

before

and

after

1959,

then

there

has

been

significant

reduction

in

trade-partner

oncentration.

An

additional

point

should

be

noted,

however:

trade-partner

concentration

becomes much

higher

after

1959

if

the

indicator

n-

average

of

26%

in the

1970s;

imports

went from 24 -

31%;

and

total

trade ncreased from

40 to

56%.

In

1978,

total tradehad

reached

69%

of

GMP,

wice the

figure

(34.6%)

for

1962

(Mesa-Lago,

981:

80).

The

world

price

of

sugar


exports

and total trade.

High prices

for

sugar

in

the

early

1970s

increased

them,

whereas low

prices

of

sugar

in

the

1960s

had decreased

them.

However,

no

parallel

distortion s

observed

with

respect

to

imports,

which are

consistently,

and


than

export/GMP

ratios.Thus

Castro

complained

in

1978

that we have an

importer's

mentality

...

exports

must be

increased

with

(capitalist

countries)


82).

In this

respect,

then,

dependence

under

socialism is

at

least as

great

as

it was

under

capitalism.

Monoculture

In

Exports

The more

diversified the

export

structure,

he less

dependent

the

country,

and vice

versa.

The

early

attempt by

the

Revolutionary

government

o

diversify

he

export

structure

was no more

successful


my.

Thus,

from the

1920s

to the

1950s,

sugar's

hare of

total

exports

ranged

from

70

to

92%,

averaging

81%

overall. From

1959

to

1976,

however,

sugar's

hare of

total

exports

still

ranged

from

74 to

90%,

with an

average

of

82%.

In

short,

Cuba's

xport

structurecontinued

to be as

dependent during

the

Revolutionary

eriod

as it

had before

(Mesa-Lago,

981:

82-83;

LeoGrande,

1979:

8-11).

Trade-Partner

Concentration

A countrythatrelies

heavily

on

only

one or a few

trading

part-

ners is

more

dependent

than

a

country

with

a

larger

number

of trade

partners.

Before

the

Revolution,

rom

1946

to

1958,

Cuba's radewith

the United

States

averaged

69%

annually.

Of

this

total,

imports

from

the

U.S.

(77%)

surpassed

exports

to

the

U.S.

(63%)

(LeoGrande,

1979:14).

After he

Revolution,

rom

1961

o

1976,

the

average

annual

share of

Cuba's radewith

the USSRwas

48.5%.

Again,

mports

from

the Soviet

Union

(52%)

accounted for a

higher

proportion

of

the


Thus,

f

one

compares

the

average

or

Cuba's

rade

with

the two

prin-

cipal

countries

only,

for

the

years

before

and

after

1959,

then

there

has

been

significant

reduction

in

trade-partner

oncentration.

An

additional

point

should

be

noted,

however:

trade-partner

concentration

becomes much

higher

after

1959

if

the

indicator

n-

63333







JOURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND WORLD AFFAIRS

cludes

not

only

the Soviet Union

but

also the countries

of the

CMEA

(Council

for MutualEconomic

Assistance),

whose trade

policies

are

influenced

by

the Soviet Unionmuch more

strongly

than trade

poli-

cies

of

U.S.

allies are

influenced

by

the

United

States.

If

we

use

this

indicator,

which is more

appropriate

han thatfor the U.S.S.R.

lone,

the difference between the

pre-1959

and

post-1959periods

vanishes.

From

1961

hrough

1978

the Socialist

countries

absorbed an

annual

average

of

73%

of

Cuba's rade

(Mesa-Lago,

1981:

92)

as

compared

with the

averagepre-1959 igure

for the U.S.of

69%.

By1978

-

the

last

year

for

which

I

have

figures

-

Cuban

trade with the

USSRalone

reached69%(Mesa-Lago, 981:92). Bearing n mind thistrend,plus

the

close

political

and

economic

relationship

between

the

USSRand

the CMEA

ountries,

it

can

reasonably

be

maintained

that

in

terms

of trade

partner

concentration,

Cuba

today

is as vulnerable to

exter-

nal

economic

and

political

influence

as it was

before

the

Revolution

(Mesa-Lago,

981:

94;

see also

LeoGrande,

1979:13,17).

Finally,

even

if

one

uses the lowest

possible

indicator,

he

abso-

lute level of

trade-concentration

s still

very

high.

Capital Dependency

Although

direct

private foreign

investment

has

been

virtually

eliminated

in

Cubasince

the

Revolution,

his does

not

mean

depen-

dency

on

foreign capital

has

disappeared;

to

the

contrary,

t

is

mas-

sive. The Soviet

Union

is the

largest

source,

by

far,

of this

foreign capi-

tal

dependency

Soviet

capital

comes

mainly

in

the form of

(1)

repayable

loans,

(2)

nonrepayable

credits to finance Soviet-Cuban

trade

deficits,

(3)

direct aid

for

economic

development,

(4)

subsi-

dies to Cubanexports (especially sugar and nickel) as well as to

Cuban

imports

(especially

oil),

and

(5)

grants

for

military

assist-

ance.

Total

Soviet

capital

nflow to

Cuba,

as

of

1976,

was

estimated to

be

at least

$10

billion,

of which about

half

($4.9 billion)

had to be re-

paid

(Mesa-Lago,

1981:

103).

Total economic aid from

the

Soviet

Union to

Cuba

hrough

1979

has

been estimated

at

$16.7

billion. Mil-

itary

aid for

the

same

period

is

estimated at

$3.7

billion

(Blasier,

1983:100-125).

It is

very

difficultto make

precise comparisons

between the lev-

els

of

Cuban

capital dependency

before

and

after

1959

because

of

problems

of

data

comparability.

However,

those who have

studied

the

problem agree

that

the

USSR

has

clearly

replaced

the U.S.as

the

major

ource

of

Cuban

nvestment

capital

(LeoGrande,

1979:18).

Of

course,

Soviet investments

by

their

very

nature involve nei-

cludes

not

only

the Soviet Union

but

also the countries

of the

CMEA

(Council

for MutualEconomic

Assistance),

whose trade

policies

are

influenced

by


strongly

than trade

poli-

cies

of

U.S.

allies are

influenced

by

the

United

States.

If

we

use

this

indicator,

which is more

appropriate


lone,


pre-1959

and

post-1959periods

vanishes.

From

1961

hrough

1978

the Socialist

countries

absorbed an

annual

average

of

73%

of

Cuba's rade

(Mesa-Lago,

1981:

92)

as

compared

with the


for the U.S.of

69%.

By1978

-

the

last

year

for

which

I

have

figures

-

Cuban

trade with the

USSRalone


the

close

political

and

economic

relationship

between

the

USSRand

the CMEA

ountries,

it

can

reasonably

be

maintained

that

in

terms

of trade

partner

concentration,

Cuba

today

is as vulnerable to

exter-

nal

economic

and

political

influence

as it was

before

the

Revolution

(Mesa-Lago,

981:

94;

see also

LeoGrande,

1979:13,17).

Finally,

even

if

one

uses the lowest

possible

indicator,

he

abso-

lute level of

trade-concentration

s still

very

high.

Capital Dependency

Although

direct

private foreign

investment

has

been

virtually

eliminated

in

Cubasince

the

Revolution,

his does

not

mean

depen-

dency

on

foreign capital

has

disappeared;

to

the

contrary,

t

is

mas-

sive. The Soviet

Union

is the

largest

source,

by

far,

of this

foreign capi-

tal

dependency

Soviet

capital

comes

mainly

in

the form of

(1)

repayable

loans,

(2)

nonrepayable


trade

deficits,

(3)

direct aid

for

economic

development,

(4)

subsi-


Cuban

imports

(especially

oil),

and

(5)

grants

for

military

assist-

ance.

Total

Soviet

capital

nflow to

Cuba,

as

of

1976,

was

estimated to

be

at least

$10

billion,

of which about

half

($4.9 billion)

had to be re-

paid

(Mesa-Lago,

1981:

103).


the

Soviet

Union to

Cuba

hrough

1979

has

been estimated

at

$16.7

billion. Mil-

itary

aid for

the

same

period

is

estimated at

$3.7

billion

(Blasier,

1983:100-125).

It is

very

difficultto make

precise comparisons

between the lev-

els

of

Cuban

capital dependency

before

and

after

1959

because

of

problems

of

data

comparability.

However,

those who have

studied

the

problem agree

that

the

USSR

has

clearly

replaced

the U.S.as

the

major

ource

of

Cuban

nvestment

capital

(LeoGrande,

1979:18).

Of

course,

Soviet investments

by

their

very

nature involve nei-

cludes

not

only

the Soviet Union

but

also the countries

of the

CMEA

(Council

for MutualEconomic

Assistance),

whose trade

policies

are

influenced

by


strongly

than trade

poli-

cies

of

U.S.

allies are

influenced

by

the

United

States.

If

we

use

this

indicator,

which is more

appropriate


lone,


pre-1959

and

post-1959periods

vanishes.

From

1961

hrough

1978

the Socialist

countries

absorbed an

annual

average

of

73%

of

Cuba's rade

(Mesa-Lago,

1981:

92)

as

compared

with the


for the U.S.of

69%.

By1978

-

the

last

year

for

which

I

have

figures

-

Cuban

trade with the

USSRalone


the

close

political

and

economic

relationship

between

the

USSRand

the CMEA

ountries,

it

can

reasonably

be

maintained

that

in

terms

of trade

partner

concentration,

Cuba

today

is as vulnerable to

exter-

nal

economic

and

political

influence

as it was

before

the

Revolution

(Mesa-Lago,

981:

94;

see also

LeoGrande,

1979:13,17).

Finally,

even

if

one

uses the lowest

possible

indicator,

he

abso-

lute level of

trade-concentration

s still

very

high.

Capital Dependency

Although

direct

private foreign

investment

has

been

virtually

eliminated

in

Cubasince

the

Revolution,

his does

not

mean

depen-

dency

on

foreign capital

has

disappeared;

to

the

contrary,

t

is

mas-

sive. The Soviet

Union

is the

largest

source,

by

far,

of this

foreign capi-

tal

dependency

Soviet

capital

comes

mainly

in

the form of

(1)

repayable

loans,

(2)

nonrepayable


trade

deficits,

(3)

direct aid

for

economic

development,

(4)

subsi-


Cuban

imports

(especially

oil),

and

(5)

grants

for

military

assist-

ance.

Total

Soviet

capital

nflow to

Cuba,

as

of

1976,

was

estimated to

be

at least

$10

billion,

of which about

half

($4.9 billion)

had to be re-

paid

(Mesa-Lago,

1981:

103).


the

Soviet

Union to

Cuba

hrough

1979

has

been estimated

at

$16.7

billion. Mil-

itary

aid for

the

same

period

is

estimated at

$3.7

billion

(Blasier,

1983:100-125).

It is

very

difficultto make

precise comparisons

between the lev-

els

of

Cuban

capital dependency

before

and

after

1959

because

of

problems

of

data

comparability.

However,

those who have

studied

the

problem agree

that

the

USSR

has

clearly

replaced

the U.S.as

the

major

ource

of

Cuban

nvestment

capital

(LeoGrande,

1979:18).

Of

course,

Soviet investments

by

their

very

nature involve nei-

cludes

not

only

the Soviet Union

but

also the countries

of the

CMEA

(Council

for MutualEconomic

Assistance),

whose trade

policies

are

influenced

by


strongly

than trade

poli-

cies

of

U.S.

allies are

influenced

by

the

United

States.

If

we

use

this

indicator,

which is more

appropriate


lone,


pre-1959

and

post-1959periods

vanishes.

From

1961

hrough

1978

the Socialist

countries

absorbed an

annual

average

of

73%

of

Cuba's rade

(Mesa-Lago,

1981:

92)

as

compared

with the


for the U.S.of

69%.

By1978

-

the

last

year

for

which

I

have

figures

-

Cuban

trade with the

USSRalone


the

close

political

and

economic

relationship

between

the

USSRand

the CMEA

ountries,

it

can

reasonably

be

maintained

that

in

terms

of trade

partner

concentration,

Cuba

today

is as vulnerable to

exter-

nal

economic

and

political

influence

as it was

before

the

Revolution

(Mesa-Lago,

981:

94;

see also

LeoGrande,

1979:13,17).

Finally,

even

if

one

uses the lowest

possible

indicator,

he

abso-

lute level of

trade-concentration

s still

very

high.

Capital Dependency

Although

direct

private foreign

investment

has

been

virtually

eliminated

in

Cubasince

the

Revolution,

his does

not

mean

depen-

dency

on

foreign capital

has

disappeared;

to

the

contrary,

t

is

mas-

sive. The Soviet

Union

is the

largest

source,

by

far,

of this

foreign capi-

tal

dependency

Soviet

capital

comes

mainly

in

the form of

(1)

repayable

loans,

(2)

nonrepayable


trade

deficits,

(3)

direct aid

for

economic

development,

(4)

subsi-


Cuban

imports

(especially

oil),

and

(5)

grants

for

military

assist-

ance.

Total

Soviet

capital

nflow to

Cuba,

as

of

1976,

was

estimated to

be

at least

$10

billion,

of which about

half

($4.9 billion)

had to be re-

paid

(Mesa-Lago,

1981:

103).


the

Soviet

Union to

Cuba

hrough

1979

has

been estimated

at

$16.7

billion. Mil-

itary

aid for

the

same

period

is

estimated at

$3.7

billion

(Blasier,

1983:100-125).

It is

very

difficultto make

precise comparisons

between the lev-

els

of

Cuban

capital dependency

before

and

after

1959

because

of

problems

of

data

comparability.

However,

those who have

studied

the

problem agree

that

the

USSR

has

clearly

replaced

the U.S.as

the

major

ource

of

Cuban

nvestment

capital

(LeoGrande,

1979:18).

Of

course,

Soviet investments

by

their

very

nature involve nei-

64444







PACKENHAM:CUBA

-

CAPITALIST

VS.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:CUBA

-

CAPITALIST

VS.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:CUBA

-

CAPITALIST

VS.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:CUBA

-

CAPITALIST

VS.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ther

Soviet-ownership

f

Cuban

properties norrepatriation

f

profits

in the normalsense of those terms. Other

ways

in

which the Soviets

may own Cubanpropertyand/or extract profits rom their in-

vestments

will

be discussed

below.

Debt

Dependency

In

1959

Cuba's

oreign

debt

was

$45.5

million.

This was less

than

1951

when

its debt had

been

$68.2

million

(LeoGrande,

1979:

19).

By

1976,

before the economic

crisis

hit

Latin

America,

a conser-

vativeestimate

of

Cuba's

ebt was

$6.2

billion.This was

136

times the

1959figure.In1975Cuba's ebtwas the third argest n LatinAmerica

in

absolute

terms,

after Brazil and

Mexico,

and

the

largest by

far

in

per

capita

erms:

4

times

thatof

Brazil,

3

times thatof

Mexico

(Mesa-

Lago,

1981:106).

By

the

end of

1977

Cuba

owed

$5.2

billion to social-

ist countries and

$4.2

billion to

capitalist

countries.Interest

rates to

the socialist countries

ranged

from zero to

2.5%.

Interest

ratesto the

capitalist

countries varied

but,

in

general,

were much

higher.

In

1972,

Cuba

signed

an

agreement

with

the USSR

o

suspend

its debt

payments

until

1986.

It

appears

that Cuba

is even

less

likely

to be

able to payin 1986thanit was in 1972 (Mesa-Lago, 981:104,105).

In

short,

25

years

after

he

Revolution,

Cuba's

debt

dependency

is

hundreds

of times

greater

than

it

had been under

capitalism.

Cuba's

ituation

with

regard

to the debt

crisis

is

certainly

no better

than that of

capitalist

countries

in the

region.

A

strong

argument

could be

made that

it is worse.

Energy Dependency

Cuba'sdependence upon foreign energy is immense, because

its naturalendowment

in

energy

resources

-

oil,

gas,

coal,

hydro-

power

-

is

very poor.

Dependency

on

oil

is

particularly

cute. The

level

of

Cuban

oil

imports

s on a

par

with countries

which are much

larger

and more

industrialized.

Astonishingly,virtually

all of Cuba's

oil comes

from

just

one

country:

In

1967-76

the

USSR

upplied

an

average

of

98%

of

Cuban

oil

imports.

This

oil

comes from Black Sea

ports

6,400

miles

away

Mesa-Lago,

981:

99).

The

freight

costs are

enormous,

amounting

to

7.3%

of total costs

in

the

1970s.

This

partic-

ularkind of oil

dependency

has

profound

mplications

orCuba's

o-

litical and

diplomatic

dependency

as

well

(Mesa-Lago,

1981:

101;

LeoGrande,

979:26;

Thomas,

1971:

701,719-720;

Dominguez,

1978:

162-63).

With

respect

to these

measurements,

clearly

fundamental

and

essential,

Cuba's

nergy dependency

has not declined.

ther

Soviet-ownership

f

Cuban


f

profits


ways

in

which the Soviets


vestments

will

be discussed

below.

Debt

Dependency

In

1959

Cuba's

oreign

debt

was

$45.5

million.

This was less

than

1951

when

its debt had

been

$68.2

million

(LeoGrande,

1979:

19).

By

1976,

before the economic

crisis

hit

Latin

America,

a conser-

vativeestimate

of

Cuba's

ebt was

$6.2

billion.This was

136

times the


in

absolute

terms,

after Brazil and

Mexico,

and

the

largest by

far

in

per

capita

erms:

4

times

thatof

Brazil,

3

times thatof

Mexico

(Mesa-

Lago,

1981:106).

By

the

end of

1977

Cuba

owed

$5.2

billion to social-

ist countries and

$4.2

billion to

capitalist

countries.Interest

rates to


ranged

from zero to

2.5%.

Interest

ratesto the

capitalist

countries varied

but,

in

general,

were much

higher.

In

1972,

Cuba

signed

an

agreement

with

the USSR

o

suspend

its debt

payments

until

1986.

It

appears

that Cuba

is even

less

likely

to be


In

short,

25

years

after

he

Revolution,

Cuba's

debt

dependency

is

hundreds

of times

greater

than

it

had been under

capitalism.

Cuba's

ituation

with

regard

to the debt

crisis

is

certainly

no better

than that of

capitalist

countries

in the

region.

A

strong

argument

could be

made that

it is worse.

Energy Dependency



in

energy

resources

-

oil,

gas,

coal,

hydro-

power

-

is

very poor.

Dependency

on

oil

is

particularly

cute. The

level

of

Cuban

oil

imports

s on a

par

with countries

which are much

larger

and more

industrialized.


all of Cuba's

oil comes

from

just

one

country:

In

1967-76

the

USSR

upplied

an

average

of

98%

of

Cuban

oil

imports.

This

oil


ports

6,400

miles

away

Mesa-Lago,

981:

99).

The

freight

costs are

enormous,

amounting

to

7.3%

of total costs

in

the

1970s.

This

partic-

ularkind of oil

dependency

has

profound

mplications

orCuba's

o-

litical and

diplomatic

dependency

as

well

(Mesa-Lago,

1981:

101;

LeoGrande,

979:26;

Thomas,

1971:

701,719-720;

Dominguez,

1978:

162-63).

With

respect

to these

measurements,

clearly

fundamental

and

essential,

Cuba's

nergy dependency

has not declined.

ther

Soviet-ownership

f

Cuban


f

profits


ways

in

which the Soviets


vestments

will

be discussed

below.

Debt

Dependency

In

1959

Cuba's

oreign

debt

was

$45.5

million.

This was less

than

1951

when

its debt had

been

$68.2

million

(LeoGrande,

1979:

19).

By

1976,

before the economic

crisis

hit

Latin

America,

a conser-

vativeestimate

of

Cuba's

ebt was

$6.2

billion.This was

136

times the


in

absolute

terms,

after Brazil and

Mexico,

and

the

largest by

far

in

per

capita

erms:

4

times

thatof

Brazil,

3

times thatof

Mexico

(Mesa-

Lago,

1981:106).

By

the

end of

1977

Cuba

owed

$5.2

billion to social-

ist countries and

$4.2

billion to

capitalist

countries.Interest

rates to


ranged

from zero to

2.5%.

Interest

ratesto the

capitalist

countries varied

but,

in

general,

were much

higher.

In

1972,

Cuba

signed

an

agreement

with

the USSR

o

suspend

its debt

payments

until

1986.

It

appears

that Cuba

is even

less

likely

to be


In

short,

25

years

after

he

Revolution,

Cuba's

debt

dependency

is

hundreds

of times

greater

than

it

had been under

capitalism.

Cuba's

ituation

with

regard

to the debt

crisis

is

certainly

no better

than that of

capitalist

countries

in the

region.

A

strong

argument

could be

made that

it is worse.

Energy Dependency



in

energy

resources

-

oil,

gas,

coal,

hydro-

power

-

is

very poor.

Dependency

on

oil

is

particularly

cute. The

level

of

Cuban

oil

imports

s on a

par

with countries

which are much

larger

and more

industrialized.


all of Cuba's

oil comes

from

just

one

country:

In

1967-76

the

USSR

upplied

an

average

of

98%

of

Cuban

oil

imports.

This

oil


ports

6,400

miles

away

Mesa-Lago,

981:

99).

The

freight

costs are

enormous,

amounting

to

7.3%

of total costs

in

the

1970s.

This

partic-

ularkind of oil

dependency

has

profound

mplications

orCuba's

o-

litical and

diplomatic

dependency

as

well

(Mesa-Lago,

1981:

101;

LeoGrande,

979:26;

Thomas,

1971:

701,719-720;

Dominguez,

1978:

162-63).

With

respect

to these

measurements,

clearly

fundamental

and

essential,

Cuba's

nergy dependency

has not declined.

ther

Soviet-ownership

f

Cuban


f

profits


ways

in

which the Soviets


vestments

will

be discussed

below.

Debt

Dependency

In

1959

Cuba's

oreign

debt

was

$45.5

million.

This was less

than

1951

when

its debt had

been

$68.2

million

(LeoGrande,

1979:

19).

By

1976,

before the economic

crisis

hit

Latin

America,

a conser-

vativeestimate

of

Cuba's

ebt was

$6.2

billion.This was

136

times the


in

absolute

terms,

after Brazil and

Mexico,

and

the

largest by

far

in

per

capita

erms:

4

times

thatof

Brazil,

3

times thatof

Mexico

(Mesa-

Lago,

1981:106).

By

the

end of

1977

Cuba

owed

$5.2

billion to social-

ist countries and

$4.2

billion to

capitalist

countries.Interest

rates to


ranged

from zero to

2.5%.

Interest

ratesto the

capitalist

countries varied

but,

in

general,

were much

higher.

In

1972,

Cuba

signed

an

agreement

with

the USSR

o

suspend

its debt

payments

until

1986.

It

appears

that Cuba

is even

less

likely

to be


In

short,

25

years

after

he

Revolution,

Cuba's

debt

dependency

is

hundreds

of times

greater

than

it

had been under

capitalism.

Cuba's

ituation

with

regard

to the debt

crisis

is

certainly

no better

than that of

capitalist

countries

in the

region.

A

strong

argument

could be

made that

it is worse.

Energy Dependency



in

energy

resources

-

oil,

gas,

coal,

hydro-

power

-

is

very poor.

Dependency

on

oil

is

particularly

cute. The

level

of

Cuban

oil

imports

s on a

par

with countries

which are much

larger

and more

industrialized.


all of Cuba's

oil comes

from

just

one

country:

In

1967-76

the

USSR

upplied

an

average

of

98%

of

Cuban

oil

imports.

This

oil


ports

6,400

miles

away

Mesa-Lago,

981:

99).

The

freight

costs are

enormous,

amounting

to

7.3%

of total costs

in

the

1970s.

This

partic-

ularkind of oil

dependency

has

profound

mplications

orCuba's

o-

litical and

diplomatic

dependency

as

well

(Mesa-Lago,

1981:

101;

LeoGrande,

979:26;

Thomas,

1971:

701,719-720;

Dominguez,

1978:

162-63).

With

respect

to these

measurements,

clearly

fundamental

and

essential,

Cuba's

nergy dependency

has not declined.

65555







JOURNAL

OF


WORLD

AFFAIRS

OURNAL

OF


WORLD

AFFAIRS

OURNAL

OF


WORLD

AFFAIRS

OURNAL

OF


WORLD

AFFAIRS

Technological

Dependency

In

analyzing capitalist countries, dependency

theorists

put

great

weight

on

technology.

Their

argument

s

that,

no matterwhat

happens

with other

indicators,

Latin

American

countries who

are

tied

to international

capitalism

are

both constrained and

exploited

through

lack of

autonomous

capability

n

basic

technology.

Depen-

dence

upon

foreign technology

is

perceived

as

an almost absolute

barrier

o autonomous

development

within the context

of

world

cap-

italism. Socialism

is

supposed

to

be the

way

to

break this barrier.

Although

data are

scarce,

regarding

Cuba's

echnological

de-

pendence, it is possible to make inferences aboutits dependency in

this area based

upon

whether

or not

Cuban

technological

innova-

tions are observable

in

economic,

or

other,

spheres.

On

this

basis,

there is

no evidence

of

any

reduction

in

the

degree

of

technological

dependency

compared

to that level under

capitalism.

By

contrast,

the

technological

dependency

of

capitalist

countries

in

Latin

Ameri-

ca,

and

in

other

parts

of the Third

World,

while

still

great,

has de-

clined

in

some areas

(Grieco,

1982;

Street

and

James,

1979).

Al-

though

there

is no

evidence the Cubans have

reduced

their

technology dependence

since

1959,

there has

consistently

been firm

evidence to show that

they

now have a

more balanced

appreciation

of the benefits of Western

capitalist

echnology

than was

true

in

the

early years.

Thus the Cuban

economist

(and

later

Vice

President),

Carlos

Rafael

Rodriguez,

stated

publicly,

in

1975,

that the socialist

camp

lacks a whole

range

of

technology

which is

only

available

rom

the

West.

In

1977,

Fidel Castro

himself

stated that the

United States

is the most

advanced

country

in

the world

in

technology

and sci-

ence; Cubacould benefit from everythingthatAmericahas (Both

quoted

in

Mesa-Lago,

981:

91).

Let us sum

up

Cuban

structural economic

dependence

as

follows:

Aspect

of

Economic

Dependency

Change/No

Change

Since

1959

Monocultureof

NationalProduction

No

Change

Overall

Trade

Dependency

No

Change

Monocultureof

Exports

No

Change

Trade

Partner

Concentration:

No

Change

USA/ComeconCountries

Trade

Partner

Concentrations:

Less

Dependency

USA/USSR

CapitalDependency

No

Change

Debt

Dependency

More

Dependency

EnergyDependency

More

Dependency

Technological

Dependency

No

Change

Technological

Dependency

In


theorists

put

great

weight

on

technology.

Their

argument

s

that,

no matterwhat

happens

with other

indicators,

Latin

American

countries who

are

tied

to international

capitalism

are


exploited

through

lack of

autonomous

capability

n

basic

technology.

Depen-

dence

upon

foreign technology

is

perceived

as

an almost absolute

barrier

o autonomous

development

within the context

of

world

cap-

italism. Socialism

is

supposed

to

be the

way

to

break this barrier.

Although

data are

scarce,

regarding

Cuba's

echnological

de-


this area based

upon

whether

or not

Cuban

technological

innova-


in

economic,

or

other,

spheres.

On

this

basis,

there is

no evidence

of

any

reduction

in

the

degree

of

technological

dependency

compared

to that level under

capitalism.

By

contrast,

the

technological

dependency

of

capitalist

countries

in

Latin

Ameri-

ca,

and

in

other

parts

of the Third

World,

while

still

great,

has de-

clined

in

some areas

(Grieco,

1982;

Street

and

James,

1979).

Al-

though

there

is no


reduced

their


since

1959,

there has

consistently

been firm


they

now have a

more balanced

appreciation


capitalist

echnology

than was

true

in

the

early years.

Thus the Cuban

economist

(and

later

Vice

President),

Carlos

Rafael

Rodriguez,

stated

publicly,

in

1975,

that the socialist

camp

lacks a whole

range

of

technology

which is

only

available

rom

the

West.

In

1977,

Fidel Castro

himself

stated that the

United States

is the most

advanced

country

in

the world

in

technology

and sci-


quoted

in

Mesa-Lago,

981:

91).

Let us sum

up

Cuban

structural economic

dependence

as

follows:

Aspect

of

Economic

Dependency

Change/No

Change

Since

1959

Monocultureof

NationalProduction

No

Change

Overall

Trade

Dependency

No

Change

Monocultureof

Exports

No

Change

Trade

Partner

Concentration:

No

Change


Trade

Partner

Concentrations:

Less

Dependency

USA/USSR

CapitalDependency

No

Change

Debt

Dependency

More

Dependency

EnergyDependency

More

Dependency

Technological

Dependency

No

Change

Technological

Dependency

In


theorists

put

great

weight

on

technology.

Their

argument

s

that,

no matterwhat

happens

with other

indicators,

Latin

American

countries who

are

tied

to international

capitalism

are


exploited

through

lack of

autonomous

capability

n

basic

technology.

Depen-

dence

upon

foreign technology

is

perceived

as

an almost absolute

barrier

o autonomous

development

within the context

of

world

cap-

italism. Socialism

is

supposed

to

be the

way

to

break this barrier.

Although

data are

scarce,

regarding

Cuba's

echnological

de-


this area based

upon

whether

or not

Cuban

technological

innova-


in

economic,

or

other,

spheres.

On

this

basis,

there is

no evidence

of

any

reduction

in

the

degree

of

technological

dependency

compared

to that level under

capitalism.

By

contrast,

the

technological

dependency

of

capitalist

countries

in

Latin

Ameri-

ca,

and

in

other

parts

of the Third

World,

while

still

great,

has de-

clined

in

some areas

(Grieco,

1982;

Street

and

James,

1979).

Al-

though

there

is no


reduced

their


since

1959,

there has

consistently

been firm


they

now have a

more balanced

appreciation


capitalist

echnology

than was

true

in

the

early years.

Thus the Cuban

economist

(and

later

Vice

President),

Carlos

Rafael

Rodriguez,

stated

publicly,

in

1975,

that the socialist

camp

lacks a whole

range

of

technology

which is

only

available

rom

the

West.

In

1977,

Fidel Castro

himself

stated that the

United States

is the most

advanced

country

in

the world

in

technology

and sci-


quoted

in

Mesa-Lago,

981:

91).

Let us sum

up

Cuban

structural economic

dependence

as

follows:

Aspect

of

Economic

Dependency

Change/No

Change

Since

1959

Monocultureof

NationalProduction

No

Change

Overall

Trade

Dependency

No

Change

Monocultureof

Exports

No

Change

Trade

Partner

Concentration:

No

Change


Trade

Partner

Concentrations:

Less

Dependency

USA/USSR

CapitalDependency

No

Change

Debt

Dependency

More

Dependency

EnergyDependency

More

Dependency

Technological

Dependency

No

Change

Technological

Dependency

In


theorists

put

great

weight

on

technology.

Their

argument

s

that,

no matterwhat

happens

with other

indicators,

Latin

American

countries who

are

tied

to international

capitalism

are


exploited

through

lack of

autonomous

capability

n

basic

technology.

Depen-

dence

upon

foreign technology

is

perceived

as

an almost absolute

barrier

o autonomous

development

within the context

of

world

cap-

italism. Socialism

is

supposed

to

be the

way

to

break this barrier.

Although

data are

scarce,

regarding

Cuba's

echnological

de-


this area based

upon

whether

or not

Cuban

technological

innova-


in

economic,

or

other,

spheres.

On

this

basis,

there is

no evidence

of

any

reduction

in

the

degree

of

technological

dependency

compared

to that level under

capitalism.

By

contrast,

the

technological

dependency

of

capitalist

countries

in

Latin

Ameri-

ca,

and

in

other

parts

of the Third

World,

while

still

great,

has de-

clined

in

some areas

(Grieco,

1982;

Street

and

James,

1979).

Al-

though

there

is no


reduced

their


since

1959,

there has

consistently

been firm


they

now have a

more balanced

appreciation


capitalist

echnology

than was

true

in

the

early years.

Thus the Cuban

economist

(and

later

Vice

President),

Carlos

Rafael

Rodriguez,

stated

publicly,

in

1975,

that the socialist

camp

lacks a whole

range

of

technology

which is

only

available

rom

the

West.

In

1977,

Fidel Castro

himself

stated that the

United States

is the most

advanced

country

in

the world

in

technology

and sci-


quoted

in

Mesa-Lago,

981:

91).

Let us sum

up

Cuban

structural economic

dependence

as

follows:

Aspect

of

Economic

Dependency

Change/No

Change

Since

1959

Monocultureof

NationalProduction

No

Change

Overall

Trade

Dependency

No

Change

Monocultureof

Exports

No

Change

Trade

Partner

Concentration:

No

Change


Trade

Partner

Concentrations:

Less

Dependency

USA/USSR

CapitalDependency

No

Change

Debt

Dependency

More

Dependency

EnergyDependency

More

Dependency

Technological

Dependency

No

Change

66666







PACKENHAM:

CUBA- CAPITALIST

VS.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCYACKENHAM:

CUBA- CAPITALIST

VS.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCYACKENHAM:

CUBA- CAPITALIST

VS.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCYACKENHAM:

CUBA- CAPITALIST

VS.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

It is

clear that Cubahas

neither

eliminated,

nor

significantly

re-

duced

its

structural

economic

dependency

since

1959

in

terms

of

these indicators.Given the

centrality

of economic factors

(modes

of

production

and

exchange)

in

Marxist

heory,

and neo-Marxist

per-

spectives

and heuristicorientations oward

analyses

of

dependen-

cy,

and

given

the

optimistic

predictions

of those

theories about the

transforming

ffects

that socialism would

render to these relation-

ships,

the

above

assessment reveals some

glaring

inconsistencies.


NON-EXPLOITATIVEAND BENEVOLENT?

DESPITE

THE

FOREGOING,

many

analysts

continue to

reject,

or

to

minimize,

the

degree

and

significance

of

Cuba

dependence

since

1959.

There

are

several

ways

in

which

this

has

been

done.

One

way

has

simply

been to

ignore

the

subject.

Thus Cardosoaffirms hat

the

Cubanrevolution

has

proved

that

dependency

can

be

broken. He

proves

his

by referring

to

Cuba's

relationship

with

the United

States

n

detail,

while he remains silent on the

subject

of

Cuba's ela-

tionship

with the SovietUnion (Cardoso,1973a:2).

A

second

way

has

been

to

dispute

the

analysis

(about

Cuba's

economic

dependence

since

1959)

and

to

argue

that Cuba's

depen-

dency

has

actually

declined,

in

terms

of

those indicators.The most

important

analysis

of this sort is

that

of

LeoGrande

1979).

When he

compared

Cubanstructural-economic

ependency

before

1959

with

thatafter

1959,

he found

that

6

indicatorsout of 28

showed no

signifi-

cant

change

in

dependency,and

16

showed

improvement.

While

LeoGrande'swork is serious and useful in manyrespects, it also has

serious

methodological

flaws.As

Mesa-Lago

1981:

229)

points

out,

of

those

16

indicators,

10

were

used

to

measure one variable

(trade

partner

oncentration,

n

which a

significant

reduction

n

dependen-

cy

was

registered)

while in

anothervariable

that

s,

the

foreign

debt,

that showed a

significant

ncrease

in

dependency)

only

one indica-

tor was used.

LeoGrandealso

defines

dependency

in

terms of

capi-

talist

characteristics,

uch as

profit

remittancesand income

inequali-

ties,

and then

points

to the

absence,

or

reduction,

of those

characteristicsunder socialism as proof thatdependency has been

eliminated

or reduced because

of

socialism. This

is

tautological.

When

dependency

declines

for an

indicator,

he

attributes t to social-

ism;

when

it does not

decline,

he attributes

t

to a

legacy

of

capital-

ism. In

other

words: heads socialism

wins,

tails

capitalism

loses.

It is

clear that Cubahas

neither

eliminated,

nor

significantly

re-

duced

its

structural

economic

dependency

since

1959

in

terms

of


centrality

of economic factors

(modes

of

production

and

exchange)

in

Marxist

heory,

and neo-Marxist

per-

spectives


analyses

of

dependen-

cy,

and

given

the

optimistic

predictions

of those

theories about the

transforming

ffects



ships,

the

above


glaring

inconsistencies.



DESPITE

THE

FOREGOING,

many

analysts

continue to

reject,

or

to

minimize,

the

degree

and

significance

of

Cuba

dependence

since

1959.

There

are

several

ways

in

which

this

has

been

done.

One

way

has

simply

been to

ignore

the

subject.


the

Cubanrevolution

has

proved

that

dependency

can

be

broken. He

proves

his

by referring

to

Cuba's

relationship

with

the United

States

n

detail,


subject

of

Cuba's ela-

tionship


A

second

way

has

been

to

dispute

the

analysis

(about

Cuba's

economic

dependence

since

1959)

and

to

argue

that Cuba's

depen-

dency

has

actually

declined,

in

terms

of


important

analysis

of this sort is

that

of

LeoGrande

1979).

When he

compared


ependency

before

1959

with

thatafter

1959,

he found

that

6

indicatorsout of 28

showed no

signifi-

cant

change

in

dependency,and

16

showed

improvement.

While


serious

methodological

flaws.As

Mesa-Lago

1981:

229)

points

out,

of

those

16

indicators,

10

were

used

to


(trade

partner

oncentration,

n

which a

significant

reduction

n

dependen-

cy

was

registered)

while in

anothervariable

that

s,

the

foreign

debt,

that showed a

significant

ncrease

in

dependency)

only

one indica-

tor was used.

LeoGrandealso

defines

dependency

in

terms of

capi-

talist

characteristics,

uch as

profit


inequali-

ties,

and then

points

to the

absence,

or

reduction,

of those


eliminated

or reduced because

of

socialism. This

is

tautological.

When

dependency

declines

for an

indicator,

he


ism;

when

it does not

decline,

he attributes

t

to a

legacy

of

capital-

ism. In

other


wins,

tails

capitalism

loses.

It is

clear that Cubahas

neither

eliminated,

nor

significantly

re-

duced

its

structural

economic

dependency

since

1959

in

terms

of


centrality

of economic factors

(modes

of

production

and

exchange)

in

Marxist

heory,

and neo-Marxist

per-

spectives


analyses

of

dependen-

cy,

and

given

the

optimistic

predictions

of those

theories about the

transforming

ffects



ships,

the

above


glaring

inconsistencies.



DESPITE

THE

FOREGOING,

many

analysts

continue to

reject,

or

to

minimize,

the

degree

and

significance

of

Cuba

dependence

since

1959.

There

are

several

ways

in

which

this

has

been

done.

One

way

has

simply

been to

ignore

the

subject.


the

Cubanrevolution

has

proved

that

dependency

can

be

broken. He

proves

his

by referring

to

Cuba's

relationship

with

the United

States

n

detail,


subject

of

Cuba's ela-

tionship


A

second

way

has

been

to

dispute

the

analysis

(about

Cuba's

economic

dependence

since

1959)

and

to

argue

that Cuba's

depen-

dency

has

actually

declined,

in

terms

of


important

analysis

of this sort is

that

of

LeoGrande

1979).

When he

compared


ependency

before

1959

with

thatafter

1959,

he found

that

6

indicatorsout of 28

showed no

signifi-

cant

change

in

dependency,and

16

showed

improvement.

While


serious

methodological

flaws.As

Mesa-Lago

1981:

229)

points

out,

of

those

16

indicators,

10

were

used

to


(trade

partner

oncentration,

n

which a

significant

reduction

n

dependen-

cy

was

registered)

while in

anothervariable

that

s,

the

foreign

debt,

that showed a

significant

ncrease

in

dependency)

only

one indica-

tor was used.

LeoGrandealso

defines

dependency

in

terms of

capi-

talist

characteristics,

uch as

profit


inequali-

ties,

and then

points

to the

absence,

or

reduction,

of those


eliminated

or reduced because

of

socialism. This

is

tautological.

When

dependency

declines

for an

indicator,

he


ism;

when

it does not

decline,

he attributes

t

to a

legacy

of

capital-

ism. In

other


wins,

tails

capitalism

loses.

It is

clear that Cubahas

neither

eliminated,

nor

significantly

re-

duced

its

structural

economic

dependency

since

1959

in

terms

of


centrality

of economic factors

(modes

of

production

and

exchange)

in

Marxist

heory,

and neo-Marxist

per-

spectives


analyses

of

dependen-

cy,

and

given

the

optimistic

predictions

of those

theories about the

transforming

ffects



ships,

the

above


glaring

inconsistencies.



DESPITE

THE

FOREGOING,

many

analysts

continue to

reject,

or

to

minimize,

the

degree

and

significance

of

Cuba

dependence

since

1959.

There

are

several

ways

in

which

this

has

been

done.

One

way

has

simply

been to

ignore

the

subject.


the

Cubanrevolution

has

proved

that

dependency

can

be

broken. He

proves

his

by referring

to

Cuba's

relationship

with

the United

States

n

detail,


subject

of

Cuba's ela-

tionship


A

second

way

has

been

to

dispute

the

analysis

(about

Cuba's

economic

dependence

since

1959)

and

to

argue

that Cuba's

depen-

dency

has

actually

declined,

in

terms

of


important

analysis

of this sort is

that

of

LeoGrande

1979).

When he

compared


ependency

before

1959

with

thatafter

1959,

he found

that

6

indicatorsout of 28

showed no

signifi-

cant

change

in

dependency,and

16

showed

improvement.

While


serious

methodological

flaws.As

Mesa-Lago

1981:

229)

points

out,

of

those

16

indicators,

10

were

used

to


(trade

partner

oncentration,

n

which a

significant

reduction

n

dependen-

cy

was

registered)

while in

anothervariable

that

s,

the

foreign

debt,

that showed a

significant

ncrease

in

dependency)

only

one indica-

tor was used.

LeoGrandealso

defines

dependency

in

terms of

capi-

talist

characteristics,

uch as

profit


inequali-

ties,

and then

points

to the

absence,

or

reduction,

of those


eliminated

or reduced because

of

socialism. This

is

tautological.

When

dependency

declines

for an

indicator,

he


ism;

when

it does not

decline,

he attributes

t

to a

legacy

of

capital-

ism. In

other


wins,

tails

capitalism

loses.

67777







JOURNAL

OF INTERAMERICANSTUDIES

AND WORLD

AFFAIRS

OURNAL


AND WORLD

AFFAIRS

OURNAL


AND WORLD

AFFAIRS

OURNAL


AND WORLD

AFFAIRS

Even

so,

LeoGrandeconcludes that

structural

conomic

dependen-

cy

has not

been

eliminated,

only

(in

his

view)

reduced. While this

work is

interesting,

it does not

effectively

challenge

the idea that

structural conomic

dependency

under

socialism remains

veryhigh.

A

third

approach

has

perhaps

been

the

most

subtle

and influen-

tial

in

dealing

with

the evidence

of

continued structural conomic

dependence

under socialism.

This

approach

concedes that

the

tran-

sition to socialism

has neither

eliminated,

nor

reduced,

dependency

as measured

by

the

foregoing

structural-economic

erms.

However,

it

does

suggest

thatwhile

dependency

in

those

terms

-

convention-

al dependence - has continued since 1959, the exploitationthat

characterized

capitalist

dependency

has

been

eliminated,

or at least

reduced,

under

socialism.

The

USSR

s

described as

a socialist

coun-

try

whose

relationship

to Cuba is

nonexploitative.

As Fidel Castro

himself

has

put

it,

How

can the Soviet

Union be labeled

imperialist?

Where are its

monopoly corporations?

Where

is

its

participation

n the

multina-

tional

companies?

What

factories,

what

mines,

what oil fields

does it

own

in the

underdeveloped

world?

What

worker

s

exploited

in

any

countryof Asia, Africa,or LatinAmericaby Sovietcapital?(Fagen,

1978a:

74).

In

this

view,

the Cuban

regime

and

its

foreign

and

domestic

pol-

icies are

fundamentally

Cuban,

n-Sovietand

independent

of

Sovi-

et

influence

except

in

ways

that

have

helped

Cuba

(Fagen,

1978a:69-

78).

The

argument

is

also

that even

though

structurally

Cuba's

international

ies and situation still

imply

a

significant

level

of vul-

nerability,

hese ties and situation

have not

in

the

main

conditioned

the Cubaneconomy in negativewaysas farasachievingthe primary

goal

of

directing

development

toward

human

wellbeing

and

more

equitable

distribution

Fagen,

1978b:

300).

Therefore,

Cuban for-

eign policies

have been

nationalistic,autonomous,

and authentical-

ly

Cuban,'

rather

han

influenced

by

the

USSR.Greatstress

is

laid

on

an

alleged

convergence

of interests between

Cuba

and the USSR

(Erisman,

1985;

Duncan,

1985).

According

o this

interpretation,

he

domestic transformation

o socialism has met

the real

needs

of the

vast

majority

of

the Cuban

people.

Whereas

dependence

upon

capitalismis perceived to have had malign consequences for the

Cuban

population,

conventional

dependence

upon

the

Soviet

Union,

a

socialist

country,

s

perceived

to have

benign

consequences

for the

Cuban

people

(Fagen,

1978a

and

1978b; Brundenius,1984;

Halebsky

and

Kirk,

1985).

Even

so,


structural

conomic

dependen-

cy

has not

been

eliminated,

only

(in

his

view)

reduced. While this

work is

interesting,

it does not

effectively

challenge

the idea that

structural conomic

dependency

under

socialism remains

veryhigh.

A

third

approach

has

perhaps

been

the

most

subtle

and influen-

tial

in

dealing

with

the evidence

of


dependence

under socialism.

This

approach

concedes that

the

tran-

sition to socialism

has neither

eliminated,

nor

reduced,

dependency

as measured

by

the

foregoing

structural-economic

erms.

However,

it

does

suggest

thatwhile

dependency

in

those

terms

-

convention-


characterized

capitalist

dependency

has

been

eliminated,

or at least

reduced,

under

socialism.

The

USSR

s

described as

a socialist

coun-

try

whose

relationship

to Cuba is

nonexploitative.

As Fidel Castro

himself

has

put

it,

How

can the Soviet

Union be labeled

imperialist?

Where are its


Where

is

its

participation

n the

multina-

tional

companies?

What

factories,

what

mines,

what oil fields

does it

own

in the

underdeveloped

world?

What

worker

s

exploited

in

any


1978a:

74).

In

this

view,

the Cuban

regime

and

its

foreign

and

domestic

pol-

icies are

fundamentally

Cuban,

n-Sovietand

independent

of

Sovi-

et

influence

except

in

ways

that

have

helped

Cuba

(Fagen,

1978a:69-

78).

The

argument

is

also

that even

though

structurally

Cuba's

international


imply

a

significant

level

of vul-

nerability,


have not

in

the

main

conditioned


goal

of

directing

development

toward

human

wellbeing

and

more

equitable

distribution

Fagen,

1978b:

300).

Therefore,

Cuban for-

eign policies

have been


and authentical-

ly

Cuban,'

rather

han

influenced

by

the

USSR.Greatstress

is

laid

on

an

alleged

convergence


Cuba

and the USSR

(Erisman,

1985;

Duncan,

1985).

According

o this

interpretation,

he


o socialism has met

the real

needs

of the

vast

majority

of

the Cuban

people.

Whereas

dependence

upon


Cuban

population,

conventional

dependence

upon

the

Soviet

Union,

a

socialist

country,

s

perceived

to have

benign

consequences

for the

Cuban

people

(Fagen,

1978a

and


Halebsky

and

Kirk,

1985).

Even

so,


structural

conomic

dependen-

cy

has not

been

eliminated,

only

(in

his

view)

reduced. While this

work is

interesting,

it does not

effectively

challenge

the idea that

structural conomic

dependency

under

socialism remains

veryhigh.

A

third

approach

has

perhaps

been

the

most

subtle

and influen-

tial

in

dealing

with

the evidence

of


dependence

under socialism.

This

approach

concedes that

the

tran-

sition to socialism

has neither

eliminated,

nor

reduced,

dependency

as measured

by

the

foregoing

structural-economic

erms.

However,

it

does

suggest

thatwhile

dependency

in

those

terms

-

convention-


characterized

capitalist

dependency

has

been

eliminated,

or at least

reduced,

under

socialism.

The

USSR

s

described as

a socialist

coun-

try

whose

relationship

to Cuba is

nonexploitative.

As Fidel Castro

himself

has

put

it,

How

can the Soviet

Union be labeled

imperialist?

Where are its


Where

is

its

participation

n the

multina-

tional

companies?

What

factories,

what

mines,

what oil fields

does it

own

in the

underdeveloped

world?

What

worker

s

exploited

in

any


1978a:

74).

In

this

view,

the Cuban

regime

and

its

foreign

and

domestic

pol-

icies are

fundamentally

Cuban,

n-Sovietand

independent

of

Sovi-

et

influence

except

in

ways

that

have

helped

Cuba

(Fagen,

1978a:69-

78).

The

argument

is

also

that even

though

structurally

Cuba's

international


imply

a

significant

level

of vul-

nerability,


have not

in

the

main

conditioned


goal

of

directing

development

toward

human

wellbeing

and

more

equitable

distribution

Fagen,

1978b:

300).

Therefore,

Cuban for-

eign policies

have been


and authentical-

ly

Cuban,'

rather

han

influenced

by

the

USSR.Greatstress

is

laid

on

an

alleged

convergence


Cuba

and the USSR

(Erisman,

1985;

Duncan,

1985).

According

o this

interpretation,

he


o socialism has met

the real

needs

of the

vast

majority

of

the Cuban

people.

Whereas

dependence

upon


Cuban

population,

conventional

dependence

upon

the

Soviet

Union,

a

socialist

country,

s

perceived

to have

benign

consequences

for the

Cuban

people

(Fagen,

1978a

and


Halebsky

and

Kirk,

1985).

Even

so,


structural

conomic

dependen-

cy

has not

been

eliminated,

only

(in

his

view)

reduced. While this

work is

interesting,

it does not

effectively

challenge

the idea that

structural conomic

dependency

under

socialism remains

veryhigh.

A

third

approach

has

perhaps

been

the

most

subtle

and influen-

tial

in

dealing

with

the evidence

of


dependence

under socialism.

This

approach

concedes that

the

tran-

sition to socialism

has neither

eliminated,

nor

reduced,

dependency

as measured

by

the

foregoing

structural-economic

erms.

However,

it

does

suggest

thatwhile

dependency

in

those

terms

-

convention-


characterized

capitalist

dependency

has

been

eliminated,

or at least

reduced,

under

socialism.

The

USSR

s

described as

a socialist

coun-

try

whose

relationship

to Cuba is

nonexploitative.

As Fidel Castro

himself

has

put

it,

How

can the Soviet

Union be labeled

imperialist?

Where are its


Where

is

its

participation

n the

multina-

tional

companies?

What

factories,

what

mines,

what oil fields

does it

own

in the

underdeveloped

world?

What

worker

s

exploited

in

any


1978a:

74).

In

this

view,

the Cuban

regime

and

its

foreign

and

domestic

pol-

icies are

fundamentally

Cuban,

n-Sovietand

independent

of

Sovi-

et

influence

except

in

ways

that

have

helped

Cuba

(Fagen,

1978a:69-

78).

The

argument

is

also

that even

though

structurally

Cuba's

international


imply

a

significant

level

of vul-

nerability,


have not

in

the

main

conditioned


goal

of

directing

development

toward

human

wellbeing

and

more

equitable

distribution

Fagen,

1978b:

300).

Therefore,

Cuban for-

eign policies

have been


and authentical-

ly

Cuban,'

rather

han

influenced

by

the

USSR.Greatstress

is

laid

on

an

alleged

convergence


Cuba

and the USSR

(Erisman,

1985;

Duncan,

1985).

According

o this

interpretation,

he


o socialism has met

the real

needs

of the

vast

majority

of

the Cuban

people.

Whereas

dependence

upon


Cuban

population,

conventional

dependence

upon

the

Soviet

Union,

a

socialist

country,

s

perceived

to have

benign

consequences

for the

Cuban

people

(Fagen,

1978a

and


Halebsky

and

Kirk,

1985).

68888







PACKENHAM:

CUBA- CAPITALIST

VS.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:

CUBA- CAPITALIST

VS.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:

CUBA- CAPITALIST

VS.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:

CUBA- CAPITALIST

VS.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

Proponents

of this third

approach

have

advanced

their

claims at

two levels

which are interrelated

empirically

but

which are

separa-

ble analytically.First,they argue in abstract erms that the mecha-

nisms of

capitalistexploitation

are eliminated

under socialism

and

replaced by nonexploitative

socialist mechanisms.

Second,

they

argue

that

specific,

concrete features

-

both internaland

external

-

of

Cuba's

dependency

under socialism have

been

much more

be-

nign

and less

exploitative

than those

of

capitalistdependency.

Letus

consider these

arguments

and see to what extent

the evidence

sup-

ports

them.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY: MECHANISMS

OF INFLUENCE

AND

EXPLOITATION

ACCORDING

TO

THE

dependencia

approach

to Latin

American

development,

exploitation

in

peripheral

capitalist

countries does

not occur

simply

through

domination

by

foreign

powers

but

through

an alliance

of

foreign

capitalists,

domestic

capitalists

and the

depen-

dent

capitalist

state.

According

to this

model,

these actors

combine

to dominateandexploit the popularclasses. Theremaybe disputes

within

the

camp

of the dominant

actors but such

disputes

do not

alterthe fundamental

characterof the

relationship

n

which the

tri-

ple

alliance

(or

tri-pe

alliance)

of

foreign,

national,

and state

elites,

on the

one

hand,

dominate

and

exploit

the

popular

classes on

the

other.'

Socialism

is

supposed

to

change

all

this

in

a much

more

posi-

tive direction.

Indeed,

in

most

of

these formulations he

only way

to

bring

about theachievement

of

a more

egalitarian

or

more

justsoci-

ety s to destroycapitalistnstitutionsandto construct athstoward

socialism defined

in

Marxist

terms

(Cardoso

and

Faletto,

1979:

xxiii-xxiv).

The situation that has

prevailed

in

Cuba since

1959

does not

support

these

arguments.Although

the mechanisms

and

specific

featuresof Cubansocialist

dependency

differsomewhat from

those

of

capitalist dependency,

Cuba has

experienced

mechanisms and

processes

of dominationand

exploitation

since

1959.

These

mecha-

nisms

and

processes

have

not been discussed or even noted

in

the

dependencia literature.Althoughin some waysthe socialist mecha-

nisms

may

be more

benign

thantheir

capitalistcounterparts,

n

other

ways they

are

malign, repressive,

and

exploitative.

The remainderof

this section will

analyze

the main

mechanisms of influence and ex-

ploitation,

ollowed

by

a detailed

discussion

of the

way

they

have

op-

erated

in

Cuba

since

1959.

Proponents

of this third

approach

have

advanced

their

claims at

two levels


empirically

but

which are

separa-


nisms of


are eliminated

under socialism

and



Second,

they

argue

that

specific,

concrete features

-

both internaland

external

-

of

Cuba's

dependency


been

much more

be-

nign

and less

exploitative

than those

of


Letus

consider these

arguments


the evidence

sup-

ports

them.

SOCIALIST


OF INFLUENCE

AND

EXPLOITATION

ACCORDING

TO

THE

dependencia

approach

to Latin

American

development,

exploitation

in

peripheral

capitalist

countries does

not occur

simply

through

domination

by

foreign

powers

but

through

an alliance

of

foreign

capitalists,

domestic

capitalists

and the

depen-

dent

capitalist

state.

According

to this

model,

these actors

combine


within

the

camp

of the dominant

actors but such

disputes

do not


characterof the

relationship

n

which the

tri-

ple

alliance

(or

tri-pe

alliance)

of

foreign,

national,

and state

elites,

on the

one

hand,

dominate

and

exploit

the

popular

classes on

the

other.'

Socialism

is

supposed

to

change

all

this

in

a much

more

posi-

tive direction.

Indeed,

in

most

of


only way

to

bring


of

a more

egalitarian

or

more

justsoci-


socialism defined

in

Marxist

terms

(Cardoso

and

Faletto,

1979:

xxiii-xxiv).


prevailed

in

Cuba since

1959

does not

support

these

arguments.Although

the mechanisms

and

specific


dependency

differsomewhat from

those

of


Cuba has

experienced

mechanisms and

processes

of dominationand

exploitation

since

1959.

These

mecha-

nisms

and

processes

have


in

the


nisms

may

be more

benign

thantheir


n

other

ways they

are

malign, repressive,

and

exploitative.

The remainderof

this section will

analyze

the main


ploitation,

ollowed

by

a detailed

discussion

of the

way

they

have

op-

erated

in

Cuba

since

1959.

Proponents

of this third

approach

have

advanced

their

claims at

two levels


empirically

but

which are

separa-


nisms of


are eliminated

under socialism

and



Second,

they

argue

that

specific,

concrete features

-

both internaland

external

-

of

Cuba's

dependency


been

much more

be-

nign

and less

exploitative

than those

of


Letus

consider these

arguments


the evidence

sup-

ports

them.

SOCIALIST


OF INFLUENCE

AND

EXPLOITATION

ACCORDING

TO

THE

dependencia

approach

to Latin

American

development,

exploitation

in

peripheral

capitalist

countries does

not occur

simply

through

domination

by

foreign

powers

but

through

an alliance

of

foreign

capitalists,

domestic

capitalists

and the

depen-

dent

capitalist

state.

According

to this

model,

these actors

combine


within

the

camp

of the dominant

actors but such

disputes

do not


characterof the

relationship

n

which the

tri-

ple

alliance

(or

tri-pe

alliance)

of

foreign,

national,

and state

elites,

on the

one

hand,

dominate

and

exploit

the

popular

classes on

the

other.'

Socialism

is

supposed

to

change

all

this

in

a much

more

posi-

tive direction.

Indeed,

in

most

of


only way

to

bring


of

a more

egalitarian

or

more

justsoci-


socialism defined

in

Marxist

terms

(Cardoso

and

Faletto,

1979:

xxiii-xxiv).


prevailed

in

Cuba since

1959

does not

support

these

arguments.Although

the mechanisms

and

specific


dependency

differsomewhat from

those

of


Cuba has

experienced

mechanisms and

processes

of dominationand

exploitation

since

1959.

These

mecha-

nisms

and

processes

have


in

the


nisms

may

be more

benign

thantheir


n

other

ways they

are

malign, repressive,

and

exploitative.

The remainderof

this section will

analyze

the main


ploitation,

ollowed

by

a detailed

discussion

of the

way

they

have

op-

erated

in

Cuba

since

1959.

Proponents

of this third

approach

have

advanced

their

claims at

two levels


empirically

but

which are

separa-


nisms of


are eliminated

under socialism

and



Second,

they

argue

that

specific,

concrete features

-

both internaland

external

-

of

Cuba's

dependency


been

much more

be-

nign

and less

exploitative

than those

of


Letus

consider these

arguments


the evidence

sup-

ports

them.

SOCIALIST


OF INFLUENCE

AND

EXPLOITATION

ACCORDING

TO

THE

dependencia

approach

to Latin

American

development,

exploitation

in

peripheral

capitalist

countries does

not occur

simply

through

domination

by

foreign

powers

but

through

an alliance

of

foreign

capitalists,

domestic

capitalists

and the

depen-

dent

capitalist

state.

According

to this

model,

these actors

combine


within

the

camp

of the dominant

actors but such

disputes

do not


characterof the

relationship

n

which the

tri-

ple

alliance

(or

tri-pe

alliance)

of

foreign,

national,

and state

elites,

on the

one

hand,

dominate

and

exploit

the

popular

classes on

the

other.'

Socialism

is

supposed

to

change

all

this

in

a much

more

posi-

tive direction.

Indeed,

in

most

of


only way

to

bring


of

a more

egalitarian

or

more

justsoci-


socialism defined

in

Marxist

terms

(Cardoso

and

Faletto,

1979:

xxiii-xxiv).


prevailed

in

Cuba since

1959

does not

support

these

arguments.Although

the mechanisms

and

specific


dependency

differsomewhat from

those

of


Cuba has

experienced

mechanisms and

processes

of dominationand

exploitation

since

1959.

These

mecha-

nisms

and

processes

have


in

the


nisms

may

be more

benign

thantheir


n

other

ways they

are

malign, repressive,

and

exploitative.

The remainderof

this section will

analyze

the main


ploitation,

ollowed

by

a detailed

discussion

of the

way

they

have

op-

erated

in

Cuba

since

1959.

69999







JOURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND

WORLD

AFFAIRS

OURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND

WORLD

AFFAIRS

OURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND

WORLD

AFFAIRS

OURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND

WORLD

AFFAIRS

One

way

the Soviet

Union

influences Cuban domestic and for-

eign policies

and institutions is

through

the

leverage

established

by

Cuba's

structural

economic

dependency

on the Soviet Union.

The

structural

economic

characteristics

previously

described

are

fungi-

ble,

or

translatable,

into

influences

over

specific policies

and

institu-

tions

within

Cuba.

A

Russian

embassy

official,

Rudolf

Shliapnikov,

told Cuban

Communist

party

official Anibal

Escalante,

in

1967,

that

We

have

only

to

say

that

repairs

are

being

held

up

at Baku

for

three

weeks and

that's that

(From

a

speech

by

Radl Castro as

quoted

in

Thomas,

1971:

701) (Baku

is

the Soviet Union's

port

for

shipping

oil

to Cuba.) If one multiplies that chilling comment across the broad

spectrum

of the

USSR's

points

of

economic

leverage,

then

one

begins

to

appreciate

the

magnitude

of

Soviet

influence on Cuban affairs.

Mesa-Lago

describes some of

these

points

of

leverage

as follows:

The USSRhas the

capacity

to

cut the

supply

to the island of vir-

tually

all

oil,

most

capital,

foodstuffs,

and raw

materials,

about

one-

third

of

basic

capital

and

intermediate

goods,

and

probably

all

weap-

onry.

Additionally,

oss of Soviet

markets

would

mean an end to their

buying

about half

of

Cuban

sugar

at three times

the

price

of

the mar-

ket aswell aspurchaseof substantialamounts of nickel also at a sub-

sidized

price.

The

USSR

could also exert

powerful

influence

over

such

COMECON

ountries as the

GDR, Czechoslovakia,

and

Bulgar-

ia,

which

are

particularly

he

key

ones

in

trade

with

Cuba,

o

stop

eco-

nomic relationswith Cuba.

Finally

the

USSRcould stick to

the

1972

agreements

and

ask Cuba

to

start

repaying

n

1986

the

debt owed

the

Soviets. These are not

hypothetical

scenarios because

in

1968

the

USSRused the oil stick

and

in

the

1970s

the

economic-aid carrot o

influence crucial

shifts in Cuban

foreign

and domestic

policies

...

(Mesa-Lago,

981:1987).

LeoGrande,

who

sees

Cuba

as less

constrained

by

the

USSR

than does

Mesa-Lago,

writes

in

a

similar vein:

...

Cuba

is

highly

vulnerable

to

a

conscious

policy

of

politico-

economic coercion on the

part

of the

Soviet Union. Most

analysts

of

Cuban-Soviet elations

are

convinced

that the

USSR

ook

advantage

of this

vulnerability

n

late

1967

and

early

1968

by delaying petroleum

shipments

to

Cuba and

by moving

very

slowly

in

the

1968

annual

trade

agreement negotiations.

Shortly

hereafterCuban

foreign

poli-

cy

moved more

into line with Soviet

policy;

e.g.,

Cuba

oned down

its

denunciationsof pro-Sovietcommunistpartiesin LatinAmerica,re-

treated

from its

active

support

of

guerrilla

forces

in

the

continent,

and in

August

1968

gave qualified

support

to the Soviet intervention

in

Czechoslovakia ..

(LeoGrande,

1979:

26).

This

mechanism

of

influence

is more

potent

in

the case of so-

cialist

dependency

on the Soviet Union

than ever was true of

capital-

One

way

the Soviet

Union


eign policies

and institutions is

through

the

leverage

established

by

Cuba's

structural

economic

dependency


The

structural

economic

characteristics

previously

described

are

fungi-

ble,

or

translatable,

into

influences

over

specific policies

and

institu-

tions

within

Cuba.

A

Russian

embassy

official,

Rudolf

Shliapnikov,

told Cuban

Communist

party

official Anibal

Escalante,

in

1967,

that

We

have

only

to

say

that

repairs

are

being

held

up

at Baku

for

three

weeks and

that's that

(From

a

speech

by

Radl Castro as

quoted

in

Thomas,

1971:

701) (Baku

is

the Soviet Union's

port

for

shipping

oil


spectrum

of the

USSR's

points

of

economic

leverage,

then

one

begins

to

appreciate

the

magnitude

of

Soviet


Mesa-Lago

describes some of

these

points

of

leverage

as follows:

The USSRhas the

capacity

to

cut the

supply


tually

all

oil,

most

capital,

foodstuffs,

and raw

materials,

about

one-

third

of

basic

capital

and

intermediate

goods,

and

probably

all

weap-

onry.

Additionally,

oss of Soviet

markets

would


buying

about half

of

Cuban

sugar

at three times

the

price

of

the mar-


sidized

price.

The

USSR

could also exert

powerful

influence

over

such

COMECON

ountries as the


and

Bulgar-

ia,

which

are

particularly

he

key

ones

in

trade

with

Cuba,

o

stop

eco-


Finally

the

USSRcould stick to

the

1972

agreements

and

ask Cuba

to

start

repaying

n

1986

the

debt owed

the


hypothetical

scenarios because

in

1968

the


and

in

the

1970s

the


influence crucial

shifts in Cuban

foreign

and domestic

policies

...

(Mesa-Lago,

981:1987).

LeoGrande,

who

sees

Cuba

as less

constrained

by

the

USSR

than does

Mesa-Lago,

writes

in

a

similar vein:

...

Cuba

is

highly

vulnerable

to

a

conscious

policy

of

politico-


part

of the

Soviet Union. Most

analysts

of


are

convinced

that the

USSR

ook

advantage

of this

vulnerability

n

late

1967

and

early

1968


shipments

to

Cuba and

by moving

very

slowly

in

the

1968

annual

trade


Shortly

hereafterCuban

foreign

poli-

cy

moved more


policy;

e.g.,

Cuba

oned down

its


treated

from its

active

support

of

guerrilla

forces

in

the

continent,

and in

August

1968

gave qualified

support


in

Czechoslovakia ..

(LeoGrande,

1979:

26).

This

mechanism

of

influence

is more

potent

in

the case of so-

cialist

dependency

on the Soviet Union


capital-

One

way

the Soviet

Union


eign policies

and institutions is

through

the

leverage

established

by

Cuba's

structural

economic

dependency


The

structural

economic

characteristics

previously

described

are

fungi-

ble,

or

translatable,

into

influences

over

specific policies

and

institu-

tions

within

Cuba.

A

Russian

embassy

official,

Rudolf

Shliapnikov,

told Cuban

Communist

party

official Anibal

Escalante,

in

1967,

that

We

have

only

to

say

that

repairs

are

being

held

up

at Baku

for

three

weeks and

that's that

(From

a

speech

by

Radl Castro as

quoted

in

Thomas,

1971:

701) (Baku

is

the Soviet Union's

port

for

shipping

oil


spectrum

of the

USSR's

points

of

economic

leverage,

then

one

begins

to

appreciate

the

magnitude

of

Soviet


Mesa-Lago

describes some of

these

points

of

leverage

as follows:

The USSRhas the

capacity

to

cut the

supply


tually

all

oil,

most

capital,

foodstuffs,

and raw

materials,

about

one-

third

of

basic

capital

and

intermediate

goods,

and

probably

all

weap-

onry.

Additionally,

oss of Soviet

markets

would


buying

about half

of

Cuban

sugar

at three times

the

price

of

the mar-


sidized

price.

The

USSR

could also exert

powerful

influence

over

such

COMECON

ountries as the


and

Bulgar-

ia,

which

are

particularly

he

key

ones

in

trade

with

Cuba,

o

stop

eco-


Finally

the

USSRcould stick to

the

1972

agreements

and

ask Cuba

to

start

repaying

n

1986

the

debt owed

the


hypothetical

scenarios because

in

1968

the


and

in

the

1970s

the


influence crucial

shifts in Cuban

foreign

and domestic

policies

...

(Mesa-Lago,

981:1987).

LeoGrande,

who

sees

Cuba

as less

constrained

by

the

USSR

than does

Mesa-Lago,

writes

in

a

similar vein:

...

Cuba

is

highly

vulnerable

to

a

conscious

policy

of

politico-


part

of the

Soviet Union. Most

analysts

of


are

convinced

that the

USSR

ook

advantage

of this

vulnerability

n

late

1967

and

early

1968


shipments

to

Cuba and

by moving

very

slowly

in

the

1968

annual

trade


Shortly

hereafterCuban

foreign

poli-

cy

moved more


policy;

e.g.,

Cuba

oned down

its


treated

from its

active

support

of

guerrilla

forces

in

the

continent,

and in

August

1968

gave qualified

support


in

Czechoslovakia ..

(LeoGrande,

1979:

26).

This

mechanism

of

influence

is more

potent

in

the case of so-

cialist

dependency

on the Soviet Union


capital-

One

way

the Soviet

Union


eign policies

and institutions is

through

the

leverage

established

by

Cuba's

structural

economic

dependency


The

structural

economic

characteristics

previously

described

are

fungi-

ble,

or

translatable,

into

influences

over

specific policies

and

institu-

tions

within

Cuba.

A

Russian

embassy

official,

Rudolf

Shliapnikov,

told Cuban

Communist

party

official Anibal

Escalante,

in

1967,

that

We

have

only

to

say

that

repairs

are

being

held

up

at Baku

for

three

weeks and

that's that

(From

a

speech

by

Radl Castro as

quoted

in

Thomas,

1971:

701) (Baku

is

the Soviet Union's

port

for

shipping

oil


spectrum

of the

USSR's

points

of

economic

leverage,

then

one

begins

to

appreciate

the

magnitude

of

Soviet


Mesa-Lago

describes some of

these

points

of

leverage

as follows:

The USSRhas the

capacity

to

cut the

supply


tually

all

oil,

most

capital,

foodstuffs,

and raw

materials,

about

one-

third

of

basic

capital

and

intermediate

goods,

and

probably

all

weap-

onry.

Additionally,

oss of Soviet

markets

would


buying

about half

of

Cuban

sugar

at three times

the

price

of

the mar-


sidized

price.

The

USSR

could also exert

powerful

influence

over

such

COMECON

ountries as the


and

Bulgar-

ia,

which

are

particularly

he

key

ones

in

trade

with

Cuba,

o

stop

eco-


Finally

the

USSRcould stick to

the

1972

agreements

and

ask Cuba

to

start

repaying

n

1986

the

debt owed

the


hypothetical

scenarios because

in

1968

the


and

in

the

1970s

the


influence crucial

shifts in Cuban

foreign

and domestic

policies

...

(Mesa-Lago,

981:1987).

LeoGrande,

who

sees

Cuba

as less

constrained

by

the

USSR

than does

Mesa-Lago,

writes

in

a

similar vein:

...

Cuba

is

highly

vulnerable

to

a

conscious

policy

of

politico-


part

of the

Soviet Union. Most

analysts

of


are

convinced

that the

USSR

ook

advantage

of this

vulnerability

n

late

1967

and

early

1968


shipments

to

Cuba and

by moving

very

slowly

in

the

1968

annual

trade


Shortly

hereafterCuban

foreign

poli-

cy

moved more


policy;

e.g.,

Cuba

oned down

its


treated

from its

active

support

of

guerrilla

forces

in

the

continent,

and in

August

1968

gave qualified

support


in

Czechoslovakia ..

(LeoGrande,

1979:

26).

This

mechanism

of

influence

is more

potent

in

the case of so-

cialist

dependency

on the Soviet Union


capital-

70000







PACKENHAM:

UBA

-

CAPITALISTS.SOCIALIST EPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:

UBA

-


ACKENHAM:

UBA

-


ACKENHAM:

UBA

-


ist

dependency

because the Soviet

state

controlsand

coordinatesthe

instrumentsof

economic

leverage

to

a far

greaterdegree

than the

United

States ever controlled U.S. economic activities

in

Cuba.

In-

deed,

failureof the U.S.

government

to

guide

U.S.

private

nvestment

and trade

policies

in

a direction

conducive

to the U.S.

public

interest

during

he

1950s

has

been identified

as

a

major

law

in

U.S.

policy

that

not

only

contributed to difficulties

with

Cuba

but

also led to

the

eventual

collapse

of the

U.S.-Cuba

elationship

(Johnson,

1965).

A

second

mechanism

-

really

a set of mechanisms

-

is

organiza-

tional.

Many

organizations

nstitutionalize

he

linkages

between the

Soviet Unionand Cuba.It hasbeen suggested that studyingSoviet

relations

with

LatinAmericawithout

studying

the

relations

between

the Communist

Party

of the Soviet Union

(CPSU)

and the Latin

AmericanCPs

would be as

unrealisticas

ignoring

multinational

or-

porations

n

examining

U.S.

policies

toward

the

area

(Blasier,

1983:

68).

This

certainly

holds for

Cuba,

yet many

dependencia

analyses

of

Cuba

which

express great

concern

regarding

activitiesof

multina-

tional

corporations

prior

o

1959

are silent

on

the

subject

of the

CPSU

after

1959.

On the basis of a detailed

study

by

Andres

Suarez,

Jorge

Dominguez

has concluded

that,

in

the first half of the

1960s,

Prime

MinisterFidel

Castro

acquiesced

in the

formationand de-

velopment

of a

revolutionary

party,

and

eventually

a

Communist

party,

irstas

an

effort o obtain further

upport

from

the Soviet

Union,

then

as

a condition of

continued Soviet

support...

Subsequent

events

furthervalidated Suarez's

analysis,

when

he

extended

it into the

1970s.

As

the disastrous

year

of

1970

came to an

end,

the Soviet

Union

once

again

rescued

Cuba,

but

this time on con-

ditionthata

major

reorganization

ofthe Cuban

government,

under

Soviet

guidance,

be undertaken

(Dominguez

1978:

159;

emphasis

added).

Thus not

only

the CubanCommunist

Party,

ut the entire Cuban

bureaucratic

pparatus,

was

reshaped

in

significant

measure

by

the

SovietUnion.

The main

instrument

orthis

reshaping

was the Cuban-

SovietCommission

for

Economic,

Scientific,

and

Technical

Collabo-

ration,

established

in

1970.

According

to

Domfnguez,

the details

of

this

agreement

made evident how vast and

decisive

Soviet

influ-

ence would

become within the

Cuban

government...

The

Com-

mission henceforth coordinated the

efforts of the

Cuban Ministries

of

Foreign

TradeMerchantMarine

and

Ports,

Basic

Industries,

and

Mining

and

Metallurgy.

t also coordinated

the activitiesof the

Agen-

cy

for

AgriculturalDevelopment,

the

Agricultural

Mechanization

ist

dependency

because the Soviet

state

controlsand

coordinatesthe

instrumentsof

economic

leverage

to

a far

greaterdegree

than the

United


in

Cuba.

In-

deed,

failureof the U.S.

government

to

guide

U.S.

private

nvestment

and trade

policies

in

a direction

conducive

to the U.S.

public

interest

during

he

1950s

has

been identified

as

a

major

law

in

U.S.

policy

that

not

only


with

Cuba

but

also led to

the

eventual

collapse

of the

U.S.-Cuba

elationship

(Johnson,

1965).

A

second

mechanism

-

really

a set of mechanisms

-

is

organiza-

tional.

Many

organizations

nstitutionalize

he

linkages

between the


relations

with

LatinAmericawithout

studying

the

relations

between

the Communist

Party

of the Soviet Union

(CPSU)

and the Latin

AmericanCPs

would be as

unrealisticas

ignoring

multinational

or-

porations

n

examining

U.S.

policies

toward

the

area

(Blasier,

1983:

68).

This

certainly

holds for

Cuba,

yet many

dependencia

analyses

of

Cuba

which

express great

concern

regarding

activitiesof

multina-

tional

corporations

prior

o

1959

are silent

on

the

subject

of the

CPSU

after

1959.


study

by

Andres

Suarez,

Jorge

Dominguez

has concluded

that,

in


1960s,

Prime

MinisterFidel

Castro

acquiesced

in the

formationand de-

velopment

of a

revolutionary

party,

and

eventually

a

Communist

party,

irstas

an


upport

from

the Soviet

Union,

then

as

a condition of

continued Soviet

support...

Subsequent

events


analysis,

when

he

extended

it into the

1970s.

As

the disastrous

year

of

1970

came to an

end,

the Soviet

Union

once

again

rescued

Cuba,

but

this time on con-

ditionthata

major

reorganization

ofthe Cuban

government,

under

Soviet

guidance,

be undertaken

(Dominguez

1978:

159;

emphasis

added).

Thus not

only

the CubanCommunist

Party,

ut the entire Cuban

bureaucratic

pparatus,

was

reshaped

in

significant

measure

by

the

SovietUnion.

The main

instrument

orthis

reshaping

was the Cuban-

SovietCommission

for

Economic,

Scientific,

and

Technical

Collabo-

ration,

established

in

1970.

According

to

Domfnguez,

the details

of

this

agreement


decisive

Soviet

influ-

ence would

become within the

Cuban

government...

The

Com-


efforts of the

Cuban Ministries

of

Foreign

TradeMerchantMarine

and

Ports,

Basic

Industries,

and

Mining

and

Metallurgy.

t also coordinated


Agen-

cy

for


the

Agricultural

Mechanization

ist

dependency

because the Soviet

state

controlsand

coordinatesthe

instrumentsof

economic

leverage

to

a far

greaterdegree

than the

United


in

Cuba.

In-

deed,

failureof the U.S.

government

to

guide

U.S.

private

nvestment

and trade

policies

in

a direction

conducive

to the U.S.

public

interest

during

he

1950s

has

been identified

as

a

major

law

in

U.S.

policy

that

not

only


with

Cuba

but

also led to

the

eventual

collapse

of the

U.S.-Cuba

elationship

(Johnson,

1965).

A

second

mechanism

-

really

a set of mechanisms

-

is

organiza-

tional.

Many

organizations

nstitutionalize

he

linkages

between the


relations

with

LatinAmericawithout

studying

the

relations

between

the Communist

Party

of the Soviet Union

(CPSU)

and the Latin

AmericanCPs

would be as

unrealisticas

ignoring

multinational

or-

porations

n

examining

U.S.

policies

toward

the

area

(Blasier,

1983:

68).

This

certainly

holds for

Cuba,

yet many

dependencia

analyses

of

Cuba

which

express great

concern

regarding

activitiesof

multina-

tional

corporations

prior

o

1959

are silent

on

the

subject

of the

CPSU

after

1959.


study

by

Andres

Suarez,

Jorge

Dominguez

has concluded

that,

in


1960s,

Prime

MinisterFidel

Castro

acquiesced

in the

formationand de-

velopment

of a

revolutionary

party,

and

eventually

a

Communist

party,

irstas

an


upport

from

the Soviet

Union,

then

as

a condition of

continued Soviet

support...

Subsequent

events


analysis,

when

he

extended

it into the

1970s.

As

the disastrous

year

of

1970

came to an

end,

the Soviet

Union

once

again

rescued

Cuba,

but

this time on con-

ditionthata

major

reorganization

ofthe Cuban

government,

under

Soviet

guidance,

be undertaken

(Dominguez

1978:

159;

emphasis

added).

Thus not

only

the CubanCommunist

Party,

ut the entire Cuban

bureaucratic

pparatus,

was

reshaped

in

significant

measure

by

the

SovietUnion.

The main

instrument

orthis

reshaping

was the Cuban-

SovietCommission

for

Economic,

Scientific,

and

Technical

Collabo-

ration,

established

in

1970.

According

to

Domfnguez,

the details

of

this

agreement


decisive

Soviet

influ-

ence would

become within the

Cuban

government...

The

Com-


efforts of the

Cuban Ministries

of

Foreign

TradeMerchantMarine

and

Ports,

Basic

Industries,

and

Mining

and

Metallurgy.

t also coordinated


Agen-

cy

for


the

Agricultural

Mechanization

ist

dependency

because the Soviet

state

controlsand

coordinatesthe

instrumentsof

economic

leverage

to

a far

greaterdegree

than the

United


in

Cuba.

In-

deed,

failureof the U.S.

government

to

guide

U.S.

private

nvestment

and trade

policies

in

a direction

conducive

to the U.S.

public

interest

during

he

1950s

has

been identified

as

a

major

law

in

U.S.

policy

that

not

only


with

Cuba

but

also led to

the

eventual

collapse

of the

U.S.-Cuba

elationship

(Johnson,

1965).

A

second

mechanism

-

really

a set of mechanisms

-

is

organiza-

tional.

Many

organizations

nstitutionalize

he

linkages

between the


relations

with

LatinAmericawithout

studying

the

relations

between

the Communist

Party

of the Soviet Union

(CPSU)

and the Latin

AmericanCPs

would be as

unrealisticas

ignoring

multinational

or-

porations

n

examining

U.S.

policies

toward

the

area

(Blasier,

1983:

68).

This

certainly

holds for

Cuba,

yet many

dependencia

analyses

of

Cuba

which

express great

concern

regarding

activitiesof

multina-

tional

corporations

prior

o

1959

are silent

on

the

subject

of the

CPSU

after

1959.


study

by

Andres

Suarez,

Jorge

Dominguez

has concluded

that,

in


1960s,

Prime

MinisterFidel

Castro

acquiesced

in the

formationand de-

velopment

of a

revolutionary

party,

and

eventually

a

Communist

party,

irstas

an


upport

from

the Soviet

Union,

then

as

a condition of

continued Soviet

support...

Subsequent

events


analysis,

when

he

extended

it into the

1970s.

As

the disastrous

year

of

1970

came to an

end,

the Soviet

Union

once

again

rescued

Cuba,

but

this time on con-

ditionthata

major

reorganization

ofthe Cuban

government,

under

Soviet

guidance,

be undertaken

(Dominguez

1978:

159;

emphasis

added).

Thus not

only

the CubanCommunist

Party,

ut the entire Cuban

bureaucratic

pparatus,

was

reshaped

in

significant

measure

by

the

SovietUnion.

The main

instrument

orthis

reshaping

was the Cuban-

SovietCommission

for

Economic,

Scientific,

and

Technical

Collabo-

ration,

established

in

1970.

According

to

Domfnguez,

the details

of

this

agreement


decisive

Soviet

influ-

ence would

become within the

Cuban

government...

The

Com-


efforts of the

Cuban Ministries

of

Foreign

TradeMerchantMarine

and

Ports,

Basic

Industries,

and

Mining

and

Metallurgy.

t also coordinated


Agen-

cy

for


the

Agricultural

Mechanization

71111







JOURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES AND

WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES AND

WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES AND

WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES AND

WORLD AFFAIRS

Agency,

the Institutes

of

Fishing

and

of

Civil

Aeronautics,

and the

Electric Power

Enterprise.

The

Cuban-Soviet

Commission itself

be-

came a new

agency

which

pushed

the Cuban

government

toward

furtherbureaucratization nd

centralization

of

power.

The

Commis-

sion

met

frequently

and

regularly.

ll

the

agencies

it

coordinated

were

required

to

have

systematic,

ormal bureaucratic

procedures

under

the

guidance

of

Soviet technicians

(whose

numbers

in

Cuba

consequently

increased

vastly

in the

early

1970s)

in

order

to make

effective

use

of Soviet

assistance

(Dominguez,

1978:159-160;

em-

phases

added).

In 1972 Cubajoined the Council for MutualEconomicAssist-

ance

(CMEA,

or

COMECON).

From

the

mid-1970s

on,

the

Cuban

5-year

plans

(a

conceptual

device

borrowed

from the

USSR)

have

been

fully

coordinated

with the Soviet

5-yearplans.

Even

the

Cuban

system

of national

accounting

has been revised

along

Soviet

lines

(Dominguez,

1978;

Mesa-Lago,

981:199-202).

In

short,

the Soviets

are

deeply

involved

in

every

sector

of Cuba's

conomy

and

in most

government

ministries.

In

addition

to the ones mentioned

above,

they

are

also involved

in

the

Ministry

of Interior

and its

espionage

branch, he DGI (Direcci6n Generalde Inteligencia), which works

closely

with

the Soviet KGB

(Talbott,

1978b:

39;

Dominguez,

1978:

160).

A

third

mechanism

is

provided

by

the

high degree

of

common

interests

share

by

Fidel

Castro

and

the

Cuban

leaders,

on the

one

hand,

with those

of Soviet leaders

on the other. While

this

commonality

of interests

s

by

no

means

complete,

it is extraordinari-

ly

high by any

standard,

and

much

higher

than that shared

by

either

partywith the Cubanpeople.

Whatare

the

major

nterests of Fidel

Castro

and the Cuban

rul-

ing

elite?As

Hugh

Thomasand

his

colleagues

have

recently pointed

out

(1984; 5),

the

regime's

nterests

or

priorities

have remained

rela-

tively

unchanged

since

1959.

They

are,

in

order of

importance,

(1)

maintaining

Castro's

power

undiluted;

(2)

converting

Cuba

into a

worldclass

actorwith

major

nternational

nfluence;

and

(3)

trans-

forming

Cuban

society.

Castro

has

had considerable success

in

achieving

these

goals,

and

the

degree

of

success has been

directly

relatedto the orderof priority.This success owes much to the Soviet

Union.

Soviet

support

has been

indispensable

for

the

survival

of the

Castro

regime,

both

economically

and

militarily.

t

has enabled

Cas-

tro to

play

an

international

role

he

otherwise

could

never

have

played

in

his efforts

to

reshape

Cuban

society.

Agency,

the Institutes

of

Fishing

and

of

Civil

Aeronautics,

and the

Electric Power

Enterprise.

The

Cuban-Soviet

Commission itself

be-

came a new

agency

which

pushed

the Cuban

government

toward


centralization

of

power.

The

Commis-

sion

met

frequently

and

regularly.

ll

the

agencies

it

coordinated

were

required

to

have

systematic,

ormal bureaucratic

procedures

under

the

guidance

of

Soviet technicians

(whose

numbers

in

Cuba

consequently

increased

vastly

in the

early

1970s)

in

order

to make

effective

use

of Soviet

assistance

(Dominguez,

1978:159-160;

em-

phases

added).


ance

(CMEA,

or

COMECON).

From

the

mid-1970s

on,

the

Cuban

5-year

plans

(a

conceptual

device

borrowed

from the

USSR)

have

been

fully

coordinated

with the Soviet

5-yearplans.

Even

the

Cuban

system

of national

accounting

has been revised

along

Soviet

lines

(Dominguez,

1978;

Mesa-Lago,

981:199-202).

In

short,

the Soviets

are

deeply

involved

in

every

sector

of Cuba's

conomy

and

in most

government

ministries.

In

addition


above,

they

are

also involved

in

the

Ministry

of Interior

and its

espionage


closely

with

the Soviet KGB

(Talbott,

1978b:

39;

Dominguez,

1978:

160).

A

third

mechanism

is

provided

by

the

high degree

of

common

interests

share

by

Fidel

Castro

and

the

Cuban

leaders,

on the

one

hand,

with those

of Soviet leaders

on the other. While

this

commonality

of interests

s

by

no

means

complete,


ly

high by any

standard,

and

much

higher

than that shared

by

either


Whatare

the

major

nterests of Fidel

Castro

and the Cuban

rul-

ing

elite?As

Hugh

Thomasand

his

colleagues

have

recently pointed

out

(1984; 5),

the

regime's

nterests

or

priorities

have remained

rela-

tively

unchanged

since

1959.

They

are,

in

order of

importance,

(1)

maintaining

Castro's

power

undiluted;

(2)

converting

Cuba

into a

worldclass

actorwith

major

nternational

nfluence;

and

(3)

trans-

forming

Cuban

society.

Castro

has


in

achieving

these

goals,

and

the

degree

of

success has been

directly


Union.

Soviet

support

has been

indispensable

for

the

survival

of the

Castro

regime,

both

economically

and

militarily.

t

has enabled

Cas-

tro to

play

an

international

role

he

otherwise

could

never

have

played

in

his efforts

to

reshape

Cuban

society.

Agency,

the Institutes

of

Fishing

and

of

Civil

Aeronautics,

and the

Electric Power

Enterprise.

The

Cuban-Soviet

Commission itself

be-

came a new

agency

which

pushed

the Cuban

government

toward


centralization

of

power.

The

Commis-

sion

met

frequently

and

regularly.

ll

the

agencies

it

coordinated

were

required

to

have

systematic,

ormal bureaucratic

procedures

under

the

guidance

of

Soviet technicians

(whose

numbers

in

Cuba

consequently

increased

vastly

in the

early

1970s)

in

order

to make

effective

use

of Soviet

assistance

(Dominguez,

1978:159-160;

em-

phases

added).


ance

(CMEA,

or

COMECON).

From

the

mid-1970s

on,

the

Cuban

5-year

plans

(a

conceptual

device

borrowed

from the

USSR)

have

been

fully

coordinated

with the Soviet

5-yearplans.

Even

the

Cuban

system

of national

accounting

has been revised

along

Soviet

lines

(Dominguez,

1978;

Mesa-Lago,

981:199-202).

In

short,

the Soviets

are

deeply

involved

in

every

sector

of Cuba's

conomy

and

in most

government

ministries.

In

addition


above,

they

are

also involved

in

the

Ministry

of Interior

and its

espionage


closely

with

the Soviet KGB

(Talbott,

1978b:

39;

Dominguez,

1978:

160).

A

third

mechanism

is

provided

by

the

high degree

of

common

interests

share

by

Fidel

Castro

and

the

Cuban

leaders,

on the

one

hand,

with those

of Soviet leaders

on the other. While

this

commonality

of interests

s

by

no

means

complete,


ly

high by any

standard,

and

much

higher

than that shared

by

either


Whatare

the

major

nterests of Fidel

Castro

and the Cuban

rul-

ing

elite?As

Hugh

Thomasand

his

colleagues

have

recently pointed

out

(1984; 5),

the

regime's

nterests

or

priorities

have remained

rela-

tively

unchanged

since

1959.

They

are,

in

order of

importance,

(1)

maintaining

Castro's

power

undiluted;

(2)

converting

Cuba

into a

worldclass

actorwith

major

nternational

nfluence;

and

(3)

trans-

forming

Cuban

society.

Castro

has


in

achieving

these

goals,

and

the

degree

of

success has been

directly


Union.

Soviet

support

has been

indispensable

for

the

survival

of the

Castro

regime,

both

economically

and

militarily.

t

has enabled

Cas-

tro to

play

an

international

role

he

otherwise

could

never

have

played

in

his efforts

to

reshape

Cuban

society.

Agency,

the Institutes

of

Fishing

and

of

Civil

Aeronautics,

and the

Electric Power

Enterprise.

The

Cuban-Soviet

Commission itself

be-

came a new

agency

which

pushed

the Cuban

government

toward


centralization

of

power.

The

Commis-

sion

met

frequently

and

regularly.

ll

the

agencies

it

coordinated

were

required

to

have

systematic,

ormal bureaucratic

procedures

under

the

guidance

of

Soviet technicians

(whose

numbers

in

Cuba

consequently

increased

vastly

in the

early

1970s)

in

order

to make

effective

use

of Soviet

assistance

(Dominguez,

1978:159-160;

em-

phases

added).


ance

(CMEA,

or

COMECON).

From

the

mid-1970s

on,

the

Cuban

5-year

plans

(a

conceptual

device

borrowed

from the

USSR)

have

been

fully

coordinated

with the Soviet

5-yearplans.

Even

the

Cuban

system

of national

accounting

has been revised

along

Soviet

lines

(Dominguez,

1978;

Mesa-Lago,

981:199-202).

In

short,

the Soviets

are

deeply

involved

in

every

sector

of Cuba's

conomy

and

in most

government

ministries.

In

addition


above,

they

are

also involved

in

the

Ministry

of Interior

and its

espionage


closely

with

the Soviet KGB

(Talbott,

1978b:

39;

Dominguez,

1978:

160).

A

third

mechanism

is

provided

by

the

high degree

of

common

interests

share

by

Fidel

Castro

and

the

Cuban

leaders,

on the

one

hand,

with those

of Soviet leaders

on the other. While

this

commonality

of interests

s

by

no

means

complete,


ly

high by any

standard,

and

much

higher

than that shared

by

either


Whatare

the

major

nterests of Fidel

Castro

and the Cuban

rul-

ing

elite?As

Hugh

Thomasand

his

colleagues

have

recently pointed

out

(1984; 5),

the

regime's

nterests

or

priorities

have remained

rela-

tively

unchanged

since

1959.

They

are,

in

order of

importance,

(1)

maintaining

Castro's

power

undiluted;

(2)

converting

Cuba

into a

worldclass

actorwith

major

nternational

nfluence;

and

(3)

trans-

forming

Cuban

society.

Castro

has


in

achieving

these

goals,

and

the

degree

of

success has been

directly


Union.

Soviet

support

has been

indispensable

for

the

survival

of the

Castro

regime,

both

economically

and

militarily.

t

has enabled

Cas-

tro to

play

an

international

role

he

otherwise

could

never

have

played

in

his efforts

to

reshape

Cuban

society.

72222







PACKENHAM:

CUBA-

CAPITALIST

VS.

SOCIALIST DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:

CUBA-

CAPITALIST

VS.


ACKENHAM:

CUBA-

CAPITALIST

VS.


ACKENHAM:

CUBA-

CAPITALIST

VS.


What are

the main interests of

the

USSR

in

Cuba? Cuba

has

been,

in

Blasier's

terminology,

an

economic

liability

for

the

USSR

but

a

political

asset

(1983: 99-128):

Cuba

may

be the Soviet

Union'smost

important

political

wind-

fall since WorldWar

I

...

Cubahas

played

a

unique

role

in

bolstering

the

authority

and

appeal

of

Soviet

doctrine,

the

universal claims

of

which

require

intermittent

validation. Communist

Cuba has

helped

make the

Sovietcontention that communism

is the wave of the

future

more believable.

Thus

the

Marxist-Leninist

egime

in

Cuba has

strengthened

Soviet

influence,

most

particularly

n

the Third

World.

But

Cuba

has

had more than a

demonstration

effect;

Castro

has

sought to mobilize revolutionaryorces around the world and

sup-

ported,

where it suited

him,

Soviet

political

objectives.

Soviet

eaders

have

been

particularly

pleased

that

Cuba introduced the

first

Com-

munist state in the Western

Hemisphere,

and

it

has

been a useful

ally

in

political

competition

with the

United States

(Blasier,

1983:

99).

In

addition,

Cuba has

been

able

to

do

in

Africa,

the

Middle

East,

the Caribbean and

Central America

things

that the Russians

cannot

do

as

well or

at

all. It

represents

Soviet

positions

in

the

Non-Aligned

Movement. It

supports

unpopular

Soviet

actions

in

Czechoslovakia,

Afghanistan,

and Poland.

Thus,

although

the

interests

of Fidel Castro

and the

Soviets

are

not identical

by any

means,

they

are

relatively

congenial.

Each is

use-

ful to

the other and

both sides

know

it. With

respect

to these two sets

of

actors,

therefore,

the

widely-held

thesis

of

convergence

of inter-

ests has

a

great

deal of

validity.

However,

it is

critically

important

to make a distinction

between

the Cuban

ruling

elite and

the

Cuban

population

as

a whole. What

Cuban interests are served by supporting the Soviet invasions of

Czechoslovakia

and

Afghanistan

and Soviet

sponsorship

of

military

suppression

in Poland?

These

policies

make no sense

in

terms of

the

interests

of the Cuban

people.

They

make

great

sense,

however,

in

terms

of

the interests of

Fidel

Castro.

Thus,

Castro

has

his own reasons for

approving

Soviet

military

upport

for

faltering

socialist

governments

in

Czechoslovakia,

Afghanistan

and

Poland.

He

would

hope

to

have

such

support

if

the

Cuban

gov-

ernment

were

similarly

hreatened... The main

justification

or Sovi-

et military uppressionis that socialist regimesarebeing threatened

with

'foreign

intervention'

by

'imperialist'

nations ...

if

Castro

is

counting

on

the

USSR

to

protect

him from

'imperialism'

(or

local

forces

linked to

'imperialism'),

he

must

necessarilyapprove

he Sovi-

et

defense

of 'socialism'

elsewhere

(Blasier,

1983:

109;

emphasis

added).

What are


the

USSR

in

Cuba? Cuba

has

been,

in

Blasier's

terminology,

an

economic

liability

for

the

USSR

but

a

political

asset

(1983: 99-128):

Cuba

may

be the Soviet

Union'smost

important

political

wind-

fall since WorldWar

I

...

Cubahas

played

a

unique

role

in

bolstering

the

authority

and

appeal

of

Soviet

doctrine,

the

universal claims

of

which

require

intermittent


Cuba has

helped

make the


is the wave of the

future

more believable.

Thus

the

Marxist-Leninist

egime

in

Cuba has

strengthened

Soviet

influence,

most

particularly

n

the Third

World.

But

Cuba

has

had more than a

demonstration

effect;

Castro

has


sup-

ported,

where it suited

him,

Soviet

political

objectives.

Soviet

eaders

have

been

particularly

pleased

that

Cuba introduced the

first

Com-


Hemisphere,

and

it

has

been a useful

ally

in

political

competition

with the

United States

(Blasier,

1983:

99).

In

addition,

Cuba has

been

able

to

do

in

Africa,

the

Middle

East,

the Caribbean and

Central America

things

that the Russians

cannot

do

as

well or

at

all. It

represents

Soviet

positions

in

the

Non-Aligned

Movement. It

supports

unpopular

Soviet

actions

in

Czechoslovakia,

Afghanistan,

and Poland.

Thus,

although

the

interests

of Fidel Castro

and the

Soviets

are

not identical

by any

means,

they

are

relatively

congenial.

Each is

use-

ful to

the other and

both sides

know

it. With

respect

to these two sets

of

actors,

therefore,

the

widely-held

thesis

of

convergence

of inter-

ests has

a

great

deal of

validity.

However,

it is

critically

important


between

the Cuban

ruling

elite and

the

Cuban

population

as

a whole. What


Czechoslovakia

and

Afghanistan

and Soviet

sponsorship

of

military

suppression

in Poland?

These

policies

make no sense

in

terms of

the

interests

of the Cuban

people.

They

make

great

sense,

however,

in

terms

of

the interests of

Fidel

Castro.

Thus,

Castro

has

his own reasons for

approving

Soviet

military

upport

for

faltering

socialist

governments

in

Czechoslovakia,

Afghanistan

and

Poland.

He

would

hope

to

have

such

support

if

the

Cuban

gov-

ernment

were

similarly


justification

or Sovi-


with

'foreign

intervention'

by

'imperialist'

nations ...

if

Castro

is

counting

on

the

USSR

to

protect

him from

'imperialism'

(or

local

forces

linked to

'imperialism'),

he

must

necessarilyapprove

he Sovi-

et

defense

of 'socialism'

elsewhere

(Blasier,

1983:

109;

emphasis

added).

What are


the

USSR

in

Cuba? Cuba

has

been,

in

Blasier's

terminology,

an

economic

liability

for

the

USSR

but

a

political

asset

(1983: 99-128):

Cuba

may

be the Soviet

Union'smost

important

political

wind-

fall since WorldWar

I

...

Cubahas

played

a

unique

role

in

bolstering

the

authority

and

appeal

of

Soviet

doctrine,

the

universal claims

of

which

require

intermittent


Cuba has

helped

make the


is the wave of the

future

more believable.

Thus

the

Marxist-Leninist

egime

in

Cuba has

strengthened

Soviet

influence,

most

particularly

n

the Third

World.

But

Cuba

has

had more than a

demonstration

effect;

Castro

has


sup-

ported,

where it suited

him,

Soviet

political

objectives.

Soviet

eaders

have

been

particularly

pleased

that

Cuba introduced the

first

Com-


Hemisphere,

and

it

has

been a useful

ally

in

political

competition

with the

United States

(Blasier,

1983:

99).

In

addition,

Cuba has

been

able

to

do

in

Africa,

the

Middle

East,

the Caribbean and

Central America

things

that the Russians

cannot

do

as

well or

at

all. It

represents

Soviet

positions

in

the

Non-Aligned

Movement. It

supports

unpopular

Soviet

actions

in

Czechoslovakia,

Afghanistan,

and Poland.

Thus,

although

the

interests

of Fidel Castro

and the

Soviets

are

not identical

by any

means,

they

are

relatively

congenial.

Each is

use-

ful to

the other and

both sides

know

it. With

respect

to these two sets

of

actors,

therefore,

the

widely-held

thesis

of

convergence

of inter-

ests has

a

great

deal of

validity.

However,

it is

critically

important


between

the Cuban

ruling

elite and

the

Cuban

population

as

a whole. What


Czechoslovakia

and

Afghanistan

and Soviet

sponsorship

of

military

suppression

in Poland?

These

policies

make no sense

in

terms of

the

interests

of the Cuban

people.

They

make

great

sense,

however,

in

terms

of

the interests of

Fidel

Castro.

Thus,

Castro

has

his own reasons for

approving

Soviet

military

upport

for

faltering

socialist

governments

in

Czechoslovakia,

Afghanistan

and

Poland.

He

would

hope

to

have

such

support

if

the

Cuban

gov-

ernment

were

similarly


justification

or Sovi-


with

'foreign

intervention'

by

'imperialist'

nations ...

if

Castro

is

counting

on

the

USSR

to

protect

him from

'imperialism'

(or

local

forces

linked to

'imperialism'),

he

must

necessarilyapprove

he Sovi-

et

defense

of 'socialism'

elsewhere

(Blasier,

1983:

109;

emphasis

added).

What are


the

USSR

in

Cuba? Cuba

has

been,

in

Blasier's

terminology,

an

economic

liability

for

the

USSR

but

a

political

asset

(1983: 99-128):

Cuba

may

be the Soviet

Union'smost

important

political

wind-

fall since WorldWar

I

...

Cubahas

played

a

unique

role

in

bolstering

the

authority

and

appeal

of

Soviet

doctrine,

the

universal claims

of

which

require

intermittent


Cuba has

helped

make the


is the wave of the

future

more believable.

Thus

the

Marxist-Leninist

egime

in

Cuba has

strengthened

Soviet

influence,

most

particularly

n

the Third

World.

But

Cuba

has

had more than a

demonstration

effect;

Castro

has


sup-

ported,

where it suited

him,

Soviet

political

objectives.

Soviet

eaders

have

been

particularly

pleased

that

Cuba introduced the

first

Com-


Hemisphere,

and

it

has

been a useful

ally

in

political

competition

with the

United States

(Blasier,

1983:

99).

In

addition,

Cuba has

been

able

to

do

in

Africa,

the

Middle

East,

the Caribbean and

Central America

things

that the Russians

cannot

do

as

well or

at

all. It

represents

Soviet

positions

in

the

Non-Aligned

Movement. It

supports

unpopular

Soviet

actions

in

Czechoslovakia,

Afghanistan,

and Poland.

Thus,

although

the

interests

of Fidel Castro

and the

Soviets

are

not identical

by any

means,

they

are

relatively

congenial.

Each is

use-

ful to

the other and

both sides

know

it. With

respect

to these two sets

of

actors,

therefore,

the

widely-held

thesis

of

convergence

of inter-

ests has

a

great

deal of

validity.

However,

it is

critically

important


between

the Cuban

ruling

elite and

the

Cuban

population

as

a whole. What


Czechoslovakia

and

Afghanistan

and Soviet

sponsorship

of

military

suppression

in Poland?

These

policies

make no sense

in

terms of

the

interests

of the Cuban

people.

They

make

great

sense,

however,

in

terms

of

the interests of

Fidel

Castro.

Thus,

Castro

has

his own reasons for

approving

Soviet

military

upport

for

faltering

socialist

governments

in

Czechoslovakia,

Afghanistan

and

Poland.

He

would

hope

to

have

such

support

if

the

Cuban

gov-

ernment

were

similarly


justification

or Sovi-


with

'foreign

intervention'

by

'imperialist'

nations ...

if

Castro

is

counting

on

the

USSR

to

protect

him from

'imperialism'

(or

local

forces

linked to

'imperialism'),

he

must

necessarilyapprove

he Sovi-

et

defense

of 'socialism'

elsewhere

(Blasier,

1983:

109;

emphasis

added).

73333







JOURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICANSTUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF


JOURNAL

OF


JOURNAL

OF


What his

example suggests,

and

the

next

section documents

in

a

more

systematic

and

comprehensive

fashion,

is

that

most

policies

in Cubado not serve the interestsof the Cuban

population

as a whole

nearly

so much

as

they

serve the interests of

the Cuban

ruling

elite

and

its Soviet

sponsors.

If,

as

Evans,Cardoso,

and

other

dependencia

writers

claim,

there is a

tri-pe

alliance of

multinational,state,

and

local

capital

in

countries

on the

periphery

f

capitalism

that ex-

ploits

the

population

of these

countries,

then there

is

also a

bi-poalli-

ance of

Sovietand

Cuban

elites which

exploits

the Cuban

population

in

ways

and to

degrees

never

realized

in

pre-1959

Cuba

or

in

other

peripheralcapitalistcountries.2

Unfortunately,

his

sort of

analysis

is never made

by

partisans

of

the

Castro

egime

or

by

proponents

of the

dependencia

perspective

on

LatinAmerican

development.

They

reject

or

ignore

even

the

pos-

sibility

of

conflicting

interests between

the

Cuban elite and the

Cuban

population. They

claim or assume

that

what has been

good

for the Cuban and Soviet

elites has

also been

good

for the

Cuban

people.

Yet,

if the standards

hey

use to

analyze critically

such

pe-

ripheralcapitalist

countries

as,

say,

Brazil,

or

Cuba before

1959,

are

applied

to Cubaafter1959,thenitbecomes clearthat he Castro lite,

whose interests

are

dialectically

and

intimately

intertwined

with

those of

the Soviet

government,

s

systematically

dominating

and ex-

ploiting

the

Cuban

people.

Letus now turnto

the concrete manifes-

tationsof those common

interests,

and

of the

other mechanisms

just

described.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY: SPECIFICFEATURES

DEPENDENCIA

uthors,

defenders

of

Cuban

socialism,

and other

analysts

have

offered a numberof

hypotheses

about

the

specific pro-

cesses, institutions,

and

policies they

believe have characterized

o-

cialist

dependency

in

Cuba.

Following

are five such

hypotheses:

First,

hey say

that

under

socialism

there is no

capitalist

nvest-

ment

and therefore

noprofit

repatriation

rom Cubato the USSR.

n

this

view,

whereas

capitalist

economic

dependency

involved invest-

ments

and

profits

and

was therefore

exploitative,

socialist economic

dependency does not involve investments andprofitsand therefore

is not

exploitative.

Second,

socialism

has made

possible

changes

in

Cuba's

nternal

social structure

which were

impossible

under

capitalism

and which

are

more

just

and

equitable

than the

pre-1959 capitalist

social

system.

What his

example suggests,

and

the

next

section documents

in

a

more

systematic

and

comprehensive

fashion,

is

that

most

policies


population

as a whole

nearly

so much

as

they


the Cuban

ruling

elite

and

its Soviet

sponsors.

If,

as

Evans,Cardoso,

and

other

dependencia

writers

claim,

there is a

tri-pe

alliance of


and

local

capital

in

countries

on the

periphery

f

capitalism

that ex-

ploits

the

population

of these

countries,

then there

is

also a

bi-poalli-

ance of

Sovietand

Cuban

elites which

exploits

the Cuban

population

in

ways

and to

degrees

never

realized

in

pre-1959

Cuba

or

in

other


Unfortunately,

his

sort of

analysis

is never made

by

partisans

of

the

Castro

egime

or

by

proponents

of the

dependencia

perspective

on

LatinAmerican

development.

They

reject

or

ignore

even

the

pos-

sibility

of

conflicting

interests between

the

Cuban elite and the

Cuban

population. They

claim or assume

that

what has been

good


elites has

also been

good

for the

Cuban

people.

Yet,

if the standards

hey

use to

analyze critically

such

pe-

ripheralcapitalist

countries

as,

say,

Brazil,

or

Cuba before

1959,

are

applied


whose interests

are

dialectically

and

intimately

intertwined

with

those of

the Soviet

government,

s

systematically

dominating

and ex-

ploiting

the

Cuban

people.

Letus now turnto



interests,

and

of the

other mechanisms

just

described.

SOCIALIST


DEPENDENCIA

uthors,

defenders

of

Cuban

socialism,

and other

analysts

have

offered a numberof

hypotheses

about

the

specific pro-


and

policies they


o-

cialist

dependency

in

Cuba.

Following

are five such

hypotheses:

First,

hey say

that

under

socialism

there is no

capitalist

nvest-

ment

and therefore

noprofit

repatriation


n

this

view,

whereas

capitalist

economic

dependency

involved invest-

ments

and

profits

and

was therefore

exploitative,

socialist economic


is not

exploitative.

Second,

socialism

has made

possible

changes

in

Cuba's

nternal

social structure

which were

impossible

under

capitalism

and which

are

more

just

and

equitable

than the

pre-1959 capitalist

social

system.

What his

example suggests,

and

the

next

section documents

in

a

more

systematic

and

comprehensive

fashion,

is

that

most

policies


population

as a whole

nearly

so much

as

they


the Cuban

ruling

elite

and

its Soviet

sponsors.

If,

as

Evans,Cardoso,

and

other

dependencia

writers

claim,

there is a

tri-pe

alliance of


and

local

capital

in

countries

on the

periphery

f

capitalism

that ex-

ploits

the

population

of these

countries,

then there

is

also a

bi-poalli-

ance of

Sovietand

Cuban

elites which

exploits

the Cuban

population

in

ways

and to

degrees

never

realized

in

pre-1959

Cuba

or

in

other


Unfortunately,

his

sort of

analysis

is never made

by

partisans

of

the

Castro

egime

or

by

proponents

of the

dependencia

perspective

on

LatinAmerican

development.

They

reject

or

ignore

even

the

pos-

sibility

of

conflicting

interests between

the

Cuban elite and the

Cuban

population. They

claim or assume

that

what has been

good


elites has

also been

good

for the

Cuban

people.

Yet,

if the standards

hey

use to

analyze critically

such

pe-

ripheralcapitalist

countries

as,

say,

Brazil,

or

Cuba before

1959,

are

applied


whose interests

are

dialectically

and

intimately

intertwined

with

those of

the Soviet

government,

s

systematically

dominating

and ex-

ploiting

the

Cuban

people.

Letus now turnto



interests,

and

of the

other mechanisms

just

described.

SOCIALIST


DEPENDENCIA

uthors,

defenders

of

Cuban

socialism,

and other

analysts

have

offered a numberof

hypotheses

about

the

specific pro-


and

policies they


o-

cialist

dependency

in

Cuba.

Following

are five such

hypotheses:

First,

hey say

that

under

socialism

there is no

capitalist

nvest-

ment

and therefore

noprofit

repatriation


n

this

view,

whereas

capitalist

economic

dependency

involved invest-

ments

and

profits

and

was therefore

exploitative,

socialist economic


is not

exploitative.

Second,

socialism

has made

possible

changes

in

Cuba's

nternal

social structure

which were

impossible

under

capitalism

and which

are

more

just

and

equitable

than the

pre-1959 capitalist

social

system.

What his

example suggests,

and

the

next

section documents

in

a

more

systematic

and

comprehensive

fashion,

is

that

most

policies


population

as a whole

nearly

so much

as

they


the Cuban

ruling

elite

and

its Soviet

sponsors.

If,

as

Evans,Cardoso,

and

other

dependencia

writers

claim,

there is a

tri-pe

alliance of


and

local

capital

in

countries

on the

periphery

f

capitalism

that ex-

ploits

the

population

of these

countries,

then there

is

also a

bi-poalli-

ance of

Sovietand

Cuban

elites which

exploits

the Cuban

population

in

ways

and to

degrees

never

realized

in

pre-1959

Cuba

or

in

other


Unfortunately,

his

sort of

analysis

is never made

by

partisans

of

the

Castro

egime

or

by

proponents

of the

dependencia

perspective

on

LatinAmerican

development.

They

reject

or

ignore

even

the

pos-

sibility

of

conflicting

interests between

the

Cuban elite and the

Cuban

population. They

claim or assume

that

what has been

good


elites has

also been

good

for the

Cuban

people.

Yet,

if the standards

hey

use to

analyze critically

such

pe-

ripheralcapitalist

countries

as,

say,

Brazil,

or

Cuba before

1959,

are

applied


whose interests

are

dialectically

and

intimately

intertwined

with

those of

the Soviet

government,

s

systematically

dominating

and ex-

ploiting

the

Cuban

people.

Letus now turnto



interests,

and

of the

other mechanisms

just

described.

SOCIALIST


DEPENDENCIA

uthors,

defenders

of

Cuban

socialism,

and other

analysts

have

offered a numberof

hypotheses

about

the

specific pro-


and

policies they


o-

cialist

dependency

in

Cuba.

Following

are five such

hypotheses:

First,

hey say

that

under

socialism

there is no

capitalist

nvest-

ment

and therefore

noprofit

repatriation


n

this

view,

whereas

capitalist

economic

dependency

involved invest-

ments

and

profits

and

was therefore

exploitative,

socialist economic


is not

exploitative.

Second,

socialism

has made

possible

changes

in

Cuba's

nternal

social structure

which were

impossible

under

capitalism

and which

are

more

just

and

equitable

than the

pre-1959 capitalist

social

system.

74444







PACKENHAM:CUBA

-

CAPITALIST

VS. SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:CUBA

-

CAPITALIST

VS. SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:CUBA

-

CAPITALIST

VS. SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:CUBA

-

CAPITALIST

VS. SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

Third,

ocialism

has

broken

the

pattern

of

dependency

on

im-

ported

U.S.culture

and

replaced

it with

authentically

nationalcultur-

al

expressions.

Fourth,

ocialism

has

made

possible

true,

substantive emoc-

racy

rather han

authoritarianism,

r the

formal,

proceduralpolitical

democracy

that obtained

before

1959.

Finally

since

1959

Cuba's

oreign diplomatic

and

military

activi-

ties have been

autonomous,

independent,

authentically

national

policies

in

the Cubannational

interest, whereas,

before

1959,

these

activities

and

policies

were

subordinated

o,

and

exploited

by,

he

in-

terestsof the United States.

Notice that these

hypotheses

stress

the internal

aspects

of

post-

1959

Cuban

development

as

much as

-

if

not

more than

-

the exter-

nal

aspects.

This is consistent

with the

analysis

these

authorsmake

of

peripheral

capitalist

countries,

where

the main

emphasis

is

also

on

the internal

manifestations or

expressions

of

dependency

(Cardoso

and

Faletto, 979,

passim).

Their dea is that nternaldevel-

opment patterns

are

inextricably

ntertwined

with

the external con-

text,

whether

capitalist

or

socialist,

and that

the

transformationrom

capitalist

o socialist

dependency

will be associatedwith the

benign

patterns

of

development

just

hypothesized.

Letus examine

specific

featuresof Cuba'sdomestic and

foreign

policies

and

institutions in the context of socialist

dependency,

in

order o see how these

hypotheses

stand

up.

It

will

be shown

that,

ar

from

confirming

these five

hypotheses,

the

evidence

stronglyrejects

them and

supports

instead the

hypotheses

about

the

mechanisms

and

processes

of socialist

dependency

and

exploitation

that were

presented in the preceding section.

Social and Economic

Aspects

Mostdiscussions

of

this

topic

claim thatthe Revolution's

ccom-

plishments

in

the social

sphere

have been enormous.

While eco-

nomic

problems

are

noted,

these

are attributed o the

U.S.economic

embargo. They

are neither taken

very seriously

nor

given

much

weight

as

a

commentary

on

the

Revolution.While this

picture

may

contain

some elements

of

truth,

t also contains two errors:

1)

The

assessment

of social

gains

is

incomplete;

(2)

it

misperceives

and un-

derestimates

the

economic

failings

or both.

We

begin

with the

Revolution's

roudest

achievement,

the so-

cial

gains.

Post-1959

ccomplishments

in

the areasof

literacy,

duca-

tional

opportunity,

ural

development,

land

reform,

housing,

health

Third,

ocialism

has

broken

the

pattern

of

dependency

on

im-

ported

U.S.culture

and

replaced

it with

authentically

nationalcultur-

al

expressions.

Fourth,

ocialism

has

made

possible

true,

substantive emoc-

racy

rather han

authoritarianism,

r the

formal,

proceduralpolitical

democracy

that obtained

before

1959.

Finally

since

1959

Cuba's

oreign diplomatic

and

military

activi-

ties have been

autonomous,

independent,

authentically

national

policies

in

the Cubannational

interest, whereas,

before

1959,

these

activities

and

policies

were

subordinated

o,

and

exploited

by,

he

in-


Notice that these

hypotheses

stress

the internal

aspects

of

post-

1959

Cuban

development

as

much as

-

if

not

more than

-

the exter-

nal

aspects.

This is consistent

with the

analysis

these

authorsmake

of

peripheral

capitalist

countries,

where

the main

emphasis

is

also

on

the internal

manifestations or

expressions

of

dependency

(Cardoso

and

Faletto, 979,

passim).


opment patterns

are

inextricably

ntertwined

with

the external con-

text,

whether

capitalist

or

socialist,

and that

the

transformationrom

capitalist

o socialist

dependency


benign

patterns

of

development

just

hypothesized.

Letus examine

specific


foreign

policies

and


dependency,

in


hypotheses

stand

up.

It

will

be shown

that,

ar

from

confirming

these five

hypotheses,

the

evidence

stronglyrejects

them and

supports

instead the

hypotheses

about

the

mechanisms

and

processes

of socialist

dependency

and

exploitation

that were


Social and Economic

Aspects

Mostdiscussions

of

this

topic


ccom-

plishments

in

the social

sphere

have been enormous.

While eco-

nomic

problems

are

noted,

these


U.S.economic

embargo. They

are neither taken

very seriously

nor

given

much

weight

as

a

commentary

on

the


picture

may

contain

some elements

of

truth,


1)

The

assessment

of social

gains

is

incomplete;

(2)

it

misperceives

and un-

derestimates

the

economic

failings

or both.

We

begin

with the

Revolution's

roudest

achievement,

the so-

cial

gains.

Post-1959

ccomplishments

in

the areasof

literacy,

duca-

tional

opportunity,

ural

development,

land

reform,

housing,

health

Third,

ocialism

has

broken

the

pattern

of

dependency

on

im-

ported

U.S.culture

and

replaced

it with

authentically

nationalcultur-

al

expressions.

Fourth,

ocialism

has

made

possible

true,

substantive emoc-

racy

rather han

authoritarianism,

r the

formal,

proceduralpolitical

democracy

that obtained

before

1959.

Finally

since

1959

Cuba's

oreign diplomatic

and

military

activi-

ties have been

autonomous,

independent,

authentically

national

policies

in

the Cubannational

interest, whereas,

before

1959,

these

activities

and

policies

were

subordinated

o,

and

exploited

by,

he

in-


Notice that these

hypotheses

stress

the internal

aspects

of

post-

1959

Cuban

development

as

much as

-

if

not

more than

-

the exter-

nal

aspects.

This is consistent

with the

analysis

these

authorsmake

of

peripheral

capitalist

countries,

where

the main

emphasis

is

also

on

the internal

manifestations or

expressions

of

dependency

(Cardoso

and

Faletto, 979,

passim).


opment patterns

are

inextricably

ntertwined

with

the external con-

text,

whether

capitalist

or

socialist,

and that

the

transformationrom

capitalist

o socialist

dependency


benign

patterns

of

development

just

hypothesized.

Letus examine

specific


foreign

policies

and


dependency,

in


hypotheses

stand

up.

It

will

be shown

that,

ar

from

confirming

these five

hypotheses,

the

evidence

stronglyrejects

them and

supports

instead the

hypotheses

about

the

mechanisms

and

processes

of socialist

dependency

and

exploitation

that were


Social and Economic

Aspects

Mostdiscussions

of

this

topic


ccom-

plishments

in

the social

sphere

have been enormous.

While eco-

nomic

problems

are

noted,

these


U.S.economic

embargo. They

are neither taken

very seriously

nor

given

much

weight

as

a

commentary

on

the


picture

may

contain

some elements

of

truth,


1)

The

assessment

of social

gains

is

incomplete;

(2)

it

misperceives

and un-

derestimates

the

economic

failings

or both.

We

begin

with the

Revolution's

roudest

achievement,

the so-

cial

gains.

Post-1959

ccomplishments

in

the areasof

literacy,

duca-

tional

opportunity,

ural

development,

land

reform,

housing,

health

Third,

ocialism

has

broken

the

pattern

of

dependency

on

im-

ported

U.S.culture

and

replaced

it with

authentically

nationalcultur-

al

expressions.

Fourth,

ocialism

has

made

possible

true,

substantive emoc-

racy

rather han

authoritarianism,

r the

formal,

proceduralpolitical

democracy

that obtained

before

1959.

Finally

since

1959

Cuba's

oreign diplomatic

and

military

activi-

ties have been

autonomous,

independent,

authentically

national

policies

in

the Cubannational

interest, whereas,

before

1959,

these

activities

and

policies

were

subordinated

o,

and

exploited

by,

he

in-


Notice that these

hypotheses

stress

the internal

aspects

of

post-

1959

Cuban

development

as

much as

-

if

not

more than

-

the exter-

nal

aspects.

This is consistent

with the

analysis

these

authorsmake

of

peripheral

capitalist

countries,

where

the main

emphasis

is

also

on

the internal

manifestations or

expressions

of

dependency

(Cardoso

and

Faletto, 979,

passim).


opment patterns

are

inextricably

ntertwined

with

the external con-

text,

whether

capitalist

or

socialist,

and that

the

transformationrom

capitalist

o socialist

dependency


benign

patterns

of

development

just

hypothesized.

Letus examine

specific


foreign

policies

and


dependency,

in


hypotheses

stand

up.

It

will

be shown

that,

ar

from

confirming

these five

hypotheses,

the

evidence

stronglyrejects

them and

supports

instead the

hypotheses

about

the

mechanisms

and

processes

of socialist

dependency

and

exploitation

that were


Social and Economic

Aspects

Mostdiscussions

of

this

topic


ccom-

plishments

in

the social

sphere

have been enormous.

While eco-

nomic

problems

are

noted,

these


U.S.economic

embargo. They

are neither taken

very seriously

nor

given

much

weight

as

a

commentary

on

the


picture

may

contain

some elements

of

truth,


1)

The

assessment

of social

gains

is

incomplete;

(2)

it

misperceives

and un-

derestimates

the

economic

failings

or both.

We

begin

with the

Revolution's

roudest

achievement,

the so-

cial

gains.

Post-1959

ccomplishments

in

the areasof

literacy,

duca-

tional

opportunity,

ural

development,

land

reform,

housing,

health

75555







JOURNAL


AND WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL


AND WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL


AND WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL


AND WORLD AFFAIRS

care,

nutritional

standards,

employment,

class

relations,

moral

re-

forms

(against prostitution,gambling,corruption,

and

homosexu-

ality),

and racialand sexual

equality

are

widely

noted andhave been

described

in

detail

by many

authors.

However,

even in this

sphere

of

greatest

accomplishment,

the

record

is

by

no means all

positive

or

nonexploitative,

nor is this

progress necessarily

related to the Revo-

lution, socialism,

Soviet

support;

much

of it

has

roots in

the

capitalist

period.

In

the

first

place,

in

comparison

with other

Latin

American

countries

Cubabefore

1959

was not

only relatively

well-off,

as

mea-

sured by per capitaincome, but also quite progressivein terms of

such

social indicators as

literacy,

educational

opportunity,

and

per

capita

evels of

energy consumption,

daily

newspaper

circulation,

ra-

dios,

television

sets,

and

physicians.

Indeed,

Cubawas

on

a

par

with

many European

countries

according

to these indicators

(Gonzalez,

1974:14-19).

f

it

is

true

thatthese

patterns

refer

o

aggregate

statistics

of resources

concentrated

n

the

cities,

it is

also true that

n

1959

most

Cubans

(56%)

were urbanites

(Gonzalez,

1974:14).

This

point

is

not

sufficientlynoted. In addition the Cubanpopulationwas 75% iter-

ate and

99%

Spanish-speaking.

How

many

radios

did

the

rich

listen

to

compared

to the

poor?

Nutritional evels were

higher

and infant

mortality

rates

substantially

lower

in

Cuba than

in

most of Latin

America.

Besides,

there was never the

phenomenon

of boat

people,

even

under Batista.

Second,

some of

Castro's ocial

accomplishments

are more

ap-

parent

than

real. Much

employment

s

still

disguised

unemploy-

ment.

Rural-urban

isparities

persist

(del

Aguila,

1984:172).

The

po-

liticalelite, which is ipsofacto the economic and social elite, is still

overwhelmingly

male and white

(Dominguez,

1978:

226).

In

these

respects

and

others,

the

unequal

and/or

exploitative

featuresattrib-

uted to

capitalism

continue

under

socialism

-

at

times

to

lesser de-

gree,

otherwise to

the

same,

or even a

greater,

degree.

Political

power

of Cubanwomen

is no

greater

oday

than

it was

in

1959

(Dominguez,

1978:

494-504).

Homophobia

is far

greater

under

Cuban socialism

than

it

ever

was

under

capitalism,

n

part

because

now

it is

backed

by

the force of Fidel Castro's

ersonalityand the Cubanstateapparatus

in

addition to cultural

predilections.

Access to the

political

elite for

blacks and mulattoes

(Batista

himself

was

mulatto)

has

remained

about the

same

(Dominguez,

1978:

224-227).

Third,

here

has

been a dramatic

worsening

in

many

areas

dur-

ing

the

course of the Revolution.

First

mpulses

towardsocial

equali-

care,

nutritional

standards,

employment,

class

relations,

moral

re-

forms


and

homosexu-

ality),


equality

are

widely

noted andhave been

described

in

detail

by many

authors.

However,

even in this

sphere

of

greatest

accomplishment,

the

record

is

by

no means all

positive

or

nonexploitative,

nor is this



lution, socialism,

Soviet

support;

much

of it

has

roots in

the

capitalist

period.

In

the

first

place,

in

comparison

with other

Latin

American

countries

Cubabefore

1959

was not

only relatively

well-off,

as

mea-


such


literacy,

educational

opportunity,

and

per

capita

evels of

energy consumption,

daily

newspaper

circulation,

ra-

dios,

television

sets,

and

physicians.

Indeed,

Cubawas

on

a

par

with

many European

countries

according

to these indicators

(Gonzalez,

1974:14-19).

f

it

is

true

thatthese

patterns

refer

o

aggregate

statistics

of resources

concentrated

n

the

cities,

it is

also true that

n

1959

most

Cubans

(56%)

were urbanites

(Gonzalez,

1974:14).

This

point

is

not


ate and

99%

Spanish-speaking.

How

many

radios

did

the

rich

listen

to

compared

to the

poor?


higher

and infant

mortality

rates

substantially

lower

in

Cuba than

in

most of Latin

America.

Besides,

there was never the

phenomenon

of boat

people,

even

under Batista.

Second,

some of

Castro's ocial

accomplishments

are more

ap-

parent

than

real. Much

employment

s

still

disguised

unemploy-

ment.

Rural-urban

isparities

persist

(del

Aguila,

1984:172).

The

po-


overwhelmingly

male and white

(Dominguez,

1978:

226).

In

these

respects

and

others,

the

unequal

and/or

exploitative

featuresattrib-

uted to

capitalism

continue

under

socialism

-

at

times

to

lesser de-

gree,

otherwise to

the

same,

or even a

greater,

degree.

Political

power

of Cubanwomen

is no

greater

oday

than

it was

in

1959

(Dominguez,

1978:

494-504).

Homophobia

is far

greater

under

Cuban socialism

than

it

ever

was

under

capitalism,

n

part

because

now

it is

backed

by



in


predilections.

Access to the

political

elite for


(Batista

himself

was

mulatto)

has

remained

about the

same

(Dominguez,

1978:

224-227).

Third,

here

has

been a dramatic

worsening

in

many

areas

dur-

ing

the


First

mpulses

towardsocial

equali-

care,

nutritional

standards,

employment,

class

relations,

moral

re-

forms


and

homosexu-

ality),


equality

are

widely

noted andhave been

described

in

detail

by many

authors.

However,

even in this

sphere

of

greatest

accomplishment,

the

record

is

by

no means all

positive

or

nonexploitative,

nor is this



lution, socialism,

Soviet

support;

much

of it

has

roots in

the

capitalist

period.

In

the

first

place,

in

comparison

with other

Latin

American

countries

Cubabefore

1959

was not

only relatively

well-off,

as

mea-


such


literacy,

educational

opportunity,

and

per

capita

evels of

energy consumption,

daily

newspaper

circulation,

ra-

dios,

television

sets,

and

physicians.

Indeed,

Cubawas

on

a

par

with

many European

countries

according

to these indicators

(Gonzalez,

1974:14-19).

f

it

is

true

thatthese

patterns

refer

o

aggregate

statistics

of resources

concentrated

n

the

cities,

it is

also true that

n

1959

most

Cubans

(56%)

were urbanites

(Gonzalez,

1974:14).

This

point

is

not


ate and

99%

Spanish-speaking.

How

many

radios

did

the

rich

listen

to

compared

to the

poor?


higher

and infant

mortality

rates

substantially

lower

in

Cuba than

in

most of Latin

America.

Besides,

there was never the

phenomenon

of boat

people,

even

under Batista.

Second,

some of

Castro's ocial

accomplishments

are more

ap-

parent

than

real. Much

employment

s

still

disguised

unemploy-

ment.

Rural-urban

isparities

persist

(del

Aguila,

1984:172).

The

po-


overwhelmingly

male and white

(Dominguez,

1978:

226).

In

these

respects

and

others,

the

unequal

and/or

exploitative

featuresattrib-

uted to

capitalism

continue

under

socialism

-

at

times

to

lesser de-

gree,

otherwise to

the

same,

or even a

greater,

degree.

Political

power

of Cubanwomen

is no

greater

oday

than

it was

in

1959

(Dominguez,

1978:

494-504).

Homophobia

is far

greater

under

Cuban socialism

than

it

ever

was

under

capitalism,

n

part

because

now

it is

backed

by



in


predilections.

Access to the

political

elite for


(Batista

himself

was

mulatto)

has

remained

about the

same

(Dominguez,

1978:

224-227).

Third,

here

has

been a dramatic

worsening

in

many

areas

dur-

ing

the


First

mpulses

towardsocial

equali-

care,

nutritional

standards,

employment,

class

relations,

moral

re-

forms


and

homosexu-

ality),


equality

are

widely

noted andhave been

described

in

detail

by many

authors.

However,

even in this

sphere

of

greatest

accomplishment,

the

record

is

by

no means all

positive

or

nonexploitative,

nor is this



lution, socialism,

Soviet

support;

much

of it

has

roots in

the

capitalist

period.

In

the

first

place,

in

comparison

with other

Latin

American

countries

Cubabefore

1959

was not

only relatively

well-off,

as

mea-


such


literacy,

educational

opportunity,

and

per

capita

evels of

energy consumption,

daily

newspaper

circulation,

ra-

dios,

television

sets,

and

physicians.

Indeed,

Cubawas

on

a

par

with

many European

countries

according

to these indicators

(Gonzalez,

1974:14-19).

f

it

is

true

thatthese

patterns

refer

o

aggregate

statistics

of resources

concentrated

n

the

cities,

it is

also true that

n

1959

most

Cubans

(56%)

were urbanites

(Gonzalez,

1974:14).

This

point

is

not


ate and

99%

Spanish-speaking.

How

many

radios

did

the

rich

listen

to

compared

to the

poor?


higher

and infant

mortality

rates

substantially

lower

in

Cuba than

in

most of Latin

America.

Besides,

there was never the

phenomenon

of boat

people,

even

under Batista.

Second,

some of

Castro's ocial

accomplishments

are more

ap-

parent

than

real. Much

employment

s

still

disguised

unemploy-

ment.

Rural-urban

isparities

persist

(del

Aguila,

1984:172).

The

po-


overwhelmingly

male and white

(Dominguez,

1978:

226).

In

these

respects

and

others,

the

unequal

and/or

exploitative

featuresattrib-

uted to

capitalism

continue

under

socialism

-

at

times

to

lesser de-

gree,

otherwise to

the

same,

or even a

greater,

degree.

Political

power

of Cubanwomen

is no

greater

oday

than

it was

in

1959

(Dominguez,

1978:

494-504).

Homophobia

is far

greater

under

Cuban socialism

than

it

ever

was

under

capitalism,

n

part

because

now

it is

backed

by



in


predilections.

Access to the

political

elite for


(Batista

himself

was

mulatto)

has

remained

about the

same

(Dominguez,

1978:

224-227).

Third,

here

has

been a dramatic

worsening

in

many

areas

dur-

ing

the


First

mpulses

towardsocial

equali-

76666







PACKENHAM:

CUBA- CAPITALIST

VS.


ACKENHAM:

CUBA- CAPITALIST

VS.


ACKENHAM:

CUBA- CAPITALIST

VS.


ACKENHAM:

CUBA- CAPITALIST

VS.


ty

have

been

replaced

by

a

distinct turn towarda social

elitism,

not

the old

capitalist

orm

but a new socialist

form.

Thus,

initial

opposi-

tion to

sociolismo

buddyism

or

cronyism)

has

given

way

to a

new

class of

party

functionaries and

state bureaucratswith

privileged

housing,

department

tores,

vacation

villas,

access to

hardcurrencies

and

luxury

goods

(Gonzalez,

1974:

10;

Dominguez,

1978, 232;

Maidique,

1983:

32).

As

in

the Soviet

Union,

rates of divorce have

in-

creased

dramatically

ince

1959

and

now

stand

at a

very high

level

even

weighed

on a world scale

(Domfnguez,

1978:

501;

Maidique,

1983:

30).

Corruption

and

illegal

economic

profiteering

have

increased.

Fourth,

given

the natureof

the

Cuban

state,

and of

state-society

relations

since the

Revolution,

most of

these

social benefits have

very

high political

costs

directly,

and

necessarily,

associated

with

them.

The

government

apparatus

hat

provides

food,

housing,

health

care,

and educational

opportunity

has enormous

power

over individuals

and

groups

in

Cuban

society

for

that

very

reason.

Every

Cuban

knows

this,

and such

knowledge, together

with other

political

mechanisms

of

the Cuban

state,

makes

significant

dissent

by

Cubancitizens both

risky

and

costly.

Astatewhich is able and

willing

to

deny

food to

po-

litical

nonconformists,

and which exercises

that

power,

has a

unique

instrument

or

compelling

popular

support

at its

disposal.

Finally,

he

argument

hata combination

of

socialist transforma-

tion,

a

profoundly

undemocratic

political system,

and a massive eco-

nomic

decline,

was

necessary

to

accomplish

social

change

is

a dubi-

ous one. For

example,

Costa

Rica

has manifested a

comparably

progressive

socioeconomic

profile

-

low

unemployment,

high

healthstandards,ow illiteracy while retainingapluralistic,demo-

cratic

political system;

it

also

displays

a

higher

standardof

living

and

much

greater

economic

dynamism

than Cuba.

Thus,

and

in

light

of

these

considerations,

he

social

achievements of the revolution

ap-

pear

less

impressive

than

many analyses suggest.

Some achieve-

ments

may

have been easier to

bring

about under a socialist

depen-

dency,

but

it was

by

no means the

only

way

to

achieve

them,

and

obviously

has had an

exploitative

side as

well.

In

addition,

an enormous economic

price

has

been

paid

and

is

still

being paid.

Before1959 Cubahad one of the most

progressive

socioeconomic

profiles

of

any country

in Latin

America.

In

1952

it

ranked

3rd

among

all Latin

American

countries

in

gross

national

product

per

capita.

Since

1959,

Cubahas been transformed

nto one

of the least

productive

countries

in

the

region:

it ranked

15th

n

a list

ty

have

been

replaced

by

a


elitism,

not

the old

capitalist

orm

but a new socialist

form.

Thus,

initial

opposi-

tion to

sociolismo

buddyism

or

cronyism)

has

given

way

to a

new

class of

party

functionaries and


privileged

housing,

department

tores,

vacation

villas,

access to

hardcurrencies

and

luxury

goods

(Gonzalez,

1974:

10;

Dominguez,

1978, 232;

Maidique,

1983:

32).

As

in

the Soviet

Union,


in-

creased

dramatically

ince

1959

and

now

stand

at a

very high

level

even

weighed

on a world scale

(Domfnguez,

1978:

501;

Maidique,

1983:

30).

Corruption

and

illegal

economic

profiteering

have

increased.

Fourth,

given

the natureof

the

Cuban

state,

and of

state-society

relations

since the

Revolution,

most of

these


very

high political

costs

directly,

and

necessarily,

associated

with

them.

The

government

apparatus

hat

provides

food,

housing,

health

care,

and educational

opportunity

has enormous

power

over individuals

and

groups

in

Cuban

society

for

that

very

reason.

Every

Cuban

knows

this,

and such

knowledge, together

with other

political

mechanisms

of

the Cuban

state,

makes

significant

dissent

by

Cubancitizens both

risky

and

costly.


willing

to

deny

food to

po-

litical

nonconformists,

and which exercises

that

power,

has a

unique

instrument

or

compelling

popular

support

at its

disposal.

Finally,

he

argument

hata combination

of


tion,

a

profoundly

undemocratic

political system,

and a massive eco-

nomic

decline,

was

necessary

to

accomplish

social

change

is

a dubi-

ous one. For

example,

Costa

Rica

has manifested a

comparably

progressive

socioeconomic

profile

-

low

unemployment,

high


cratic

political system;

it

also

displays

a

higher

standardof

living

and

much

greater

economic

dynamism

than Cuba.

Thus,

and

in

light

of

these

considerations,

he

social


ap-

pear

less

impressive

than


Some achieve-

ments

may

have been easier to

bring


depen-

dency,

but

it was

by

no means the

only

way

to

achieve

them,

and

obviously

has had an

exploitative

side as

well.

In

addition,


price

has

been

paid

and

is

still

being paid.


progressive

socioeconomic

profiles

of

any country

in Latin

America.

In

1952

it

ranked

3rd

among

all Latin

American

countries

in

gross

national

product

per

capita.

Since

1959,


nto one

of the least

productive

countries

in

the

region:

it ranked

15th

n

a list

ty

have

been

replaced

by

a


elitism,

not

the old

capitalist

orm

but a new socialist

form.

Thus,

initial

opposi-

tion to

sociolismo

buddyism

or

cronyism)

has

given

way

to a

new

class of

party

functionaries and


privileged

housing,

department

tores,

vacation

villas,

access to

hardcurrencies

and

luxury

goods

(Gonzalez,

1974:

10;

Dominguez,

1978, 232;

Maidique,

1983:

32).

As

in

the Soviet

Union,


in-

creased

dramatically

ince

1959

and

now

stand

at a

very high

level

even

weighed

on a world scale

(Domfnguez,

1978:

501;

Maidique,

1983:

30).

Corruption

and

illegal

economic

profiteering

have

increased.

Fourth,

given

the natureof

the

Cuban

state,

and of

state-society

relations

since the

Revolution,

most of

these


very

high political

costs

directly,

and

necessarily,

associated

with

them.

The

government

apparatus

hat

provides

food,

housing,

health

care,

and educational

opportunity

has enormous

power

over individuals

and

groups

in

Cuban

society

for

that

very

reason.

Every

Cuban

knows

this,

and such

knowledge, together

with other

political

mechanisms

of

the Cuban

state,

makes

significant

dissent

by

Cubancitizens both

risky

and

costly.


willing

to

deny

food to

po-

litical

nonconformists,

and which exercises

that

power,

has a

unique

instrument

or

compelling

popular

support

at its

disposal.

Finally,

he

argument

hata combination

of


tion,

a

profoundly

undemocratic

political system,

and a massive eco-

nomic

decline,

was

necessary

to

accomplish

social

change

is

a dubi-

ous one. For

example,

Costa

Rica

has manifested a

comparably

progressive

socioeconomic

profile

-

low

unemployment,

high


cratic

political system;

it

also

displays

a

higher

standardof

living

and

much

greater

economic

dynamism

than Cuba.

Thus,

and

in

light

of

these

considerations,

he

social


ap-

pear

less

impressive

than


Some achieve-

ments

may

have been easier to

bring


depen-

dency,

but

it was

by

no means the

only

way

to

achieve

them,

and

obviously

has had an

exploitative

side as

well.

In

addition,


price

has

been

paid

and

is

still

being paid.


progressive

socioeconomic

profiles

of

any country

in Latin

America.

In

1952

it

ranked

3rd

among

all Latin

American

countries

in

gross

national

product

per

capita.

Since

1959,


nto one

of the least

productive

countries

in

the

region:

it ranked

15th

n

a list

ty

have

been

replaced

by

a


elitism,

not

the old

capitalist

orm

but a new socialist

form.

Thus,

initial

opposi-

tion to

sociolismo

buddyism

or

cronyism)

has

given

way

to a

new

class of

party

functionaries and


privileged

housing,

department

tores,

vacation

villas,

access to

hardcurrencies

and

luxury

goods

(Gonzalez,

1974:

10;

Dominguez,

1978, 232;

Maidique,

1983:

32).

As

in

the Soviet

Union,


in-

creased

dramatically

ince

1959

and

now

stand

at a

very high

level

even

weighed

on a world scale

(Domfnguez,

1978:

501;

Maidique,

1983:

30).

Corruption

and

illegal

economic

profiteering

have

increased.

Fourth,

given

the natureof

the

Cuban

state,

and of

state-society

relations

since the

Revolution,

most of

these


very

high political

costs

directly,

and

necessarily,

associated

with

them.

The

government

apparatus

hat

provides

food,

housing,

health

care,

and educational

opportunity

has enormous

power

over individuals

and

groups

in

Cuban

society

for

that

very

reason.

Every

Cuban

knows

this,

and such

knowledge, together

with other

political

mechanisms

of

the Cuban

state,

makes

significant

dissent

by

Cubancitizens both

risky

and

costly.


willing

to

deny

food to

po-

litical

nonconformists,

and which exercises

that

power,

has a

unique

instrument

or

compelling

popular

support

at its

disposal.

Finally,

he

argument

hata combination

of


tion,

a

profoundly

undemocratic

political system,

and a massive eco-

nomic

decline,

was

necessary

to

accomplish

social

change

is

a dubi-

ous one. For

example,

Costa

Rica

has manifested a

comparably

progressive

socioeconomic

profile

-

low

unemployment,

high


cratic

political system;

it

also

displays

a

higher

standardof

living

and

much

greater

economic

dynamism

than Cuba.

Thus,

and

in

light

of

these

considerations,

he

social


ap-

pear

less

impressive

than


Some achieve-

ments

may

have been easier to

bring


depen-

dency,

but

it was

by

no means the

only

way

to

achieve

them,

and

obviously

has had an

exploitative

side as

well.

In

addition,


price

has

been

paid

and

is

still

being paid.


progressive

socioeconomic

profiles

of

any country

in Latin

America.

In

1952

it

ranked

3rd

among

all Latin

American

countries

in

gross

national

product

per

capita.

Since

1959,


nto one

of the least

productive

countries

in

the

region:

it ranked

15th

n

a list

77777







JOURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICANSTUDIES

AND

WORLD

AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF


AND

WORLD

AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF


AND

WORLD

AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF


AND

WORLD

AFFAIRS

of

20 countries

in

gross

national

productper capita

n

1981.

No other

country

dropped

in

ranking,

rom

1952

to

1981,

by

more than

3

plac-

es; Cuba

dropped

12

places

(Thomas et

al,

1984:

29).

In

short,

the

Cuban

Revolution

has

performed

poorly

in

terms of both

productivi-

ty

and

creating

new wealth

(as

distinguished

from

dividing

up

wealth

that

has

already

been

created).

True,

there have been

no

capitalist

investments,

and

thus no

profit

remittances,

by

the Soviet Union. Socialist

systems, by

defini-

tion,

do not make

capitalist

investments or remit

capitalist profits.

Moreover,

ince Marxisteconomic terms define

profit

as

exploita-

tive, it follows that a profit-lesssystem is non-exploitative n that re-

spect.

These

points

are true

by

definition.

However,

to

anyone

not

bound

by

Marxist

definitions,

t is

apparent

hat

capitalist

nvestment

and

profits

can offer benefits

in

a

generative,productive,

positive-

sum

process.

While

this

notion

is

unacceptable

to

Marxists,

ven so-

phisticated

ones,

elsewhere

it is considered as

elementary

econom-

ics.

Criticsoften cite

examples

of

profits

exceeding

total investment

to

illustrate he

exploitative

effects of

capitalism.

Such

arguments g-

nore

several

things,

such as the

multiplier

effects of the

capital

in-

vested, as well as those cases where investmentswere unproductive

and

the investor ost

his

investment.

Risk

of such losses

is

one factor

which

entitles

an investor to

profits.

Finally,

critics overlook

the

fact

that

the Cubans hemselves

now

frequently

reject

theoretical

prem-

ises about

the

exploitative

effects of

capital

at

the

practical

level

when

they appeal

for direct

private

investment,

commercial loans

and hard

capitalist

currencies.

Inconsistency

in

Cuban

adherence to

Marxist

heory

is evidenced

by

the ambivalence towards trade. On

the one hand,free tradeandinvestmentare described asexploitative

in

effect;

on the

other,

Cuba

protests any

limitation on that trade

(such

as that

posed

by

the

U.S.

embargo,

pejoratively,

ut inaccurate-

ly,

termed a

blockade)

as hurtful

o

the

economy

when,

theoretically

at

least,

it

should be

considered

beneficial.

Increasingly

t has come

to

seem

as if

social

gains

of the

Revolu-

tion

have come

largely

from

dismantling

the

productive

mecha-

nisms of

capitalistdependency

without

replacing

them

in

effective

ways.

A

once

productive

island has

thus

been transformed

nto an

economic liability.Its problems stem from a varietyof sources, in-

cluding arbitrary

nd

ill-informed nterventions

of

Fidel Castro

him-

self.

The

U.S.

economic

embargo

has

been cited as

one reason. The

most fundamental

problems,

however,

are inherent

in the

character

of Cuba's

ssociated-dependent

socialist

situation;

hey

are structur-

of

20 countries

in

gross

national

productper capita

n

1981.

No other

country

dropped

in

ranking,

rom

1952

to

1981,

by

more than

3

plac-

es; Cuba

dropped

12

places

(Thomas et

al,

1984:

29).

In

short,

the

Cuban

Revolution

has

performed

poorly

in

terms of both

productivi-

ty

and

creating

new wealth

(as

distinguished

from

dividing

up

wealth

that

has

already

been

created).

True,

there have been

no

capitalist

investments,

and

thus no

profit

remittances,

by


systems, by

defini-

tion,

do not make

capitalist


capitalist profits.

Moreover,


profit

as

exploita-


spect.

These

points

are true

by

definition.

However,

to

anyone

not

bound

by

Marxist

definitions,

t is

apparent

hat

capitalist

nvestment

and

profits

can offer benefits

in

a


positive-

sum

process.

While

this

notion

is

unacceptable

to

Marxists,

ven so-

phisticated

ones,

elsewhere

it is considered as

elementary

econom-

ics.

Criticsoften cite

examples

of

profits

exceeding

total investment

to

illustrate he

exploitative

effects of

capitalism.

Such

arguments g-

nore

several

things,

such as the

multiplier

effects of the

capital

in-


and

the investor ost

his

investment.

Risk

of such losses

is

one factor

which

entitles

an investor to

profits.

Finally,

critics overlook

the

fact

that


now

frequently

reject

theoretical

prem-

ises about

the

exploitative

effects of

capital

at

the

practical

level

when

they appeal

for direct

private

investment,

commercial loans

and hard

capitalist

currencies.

Inconsistency

in

Cuban

adherence to

Marxist

heory

is evidenced

by



in

effect;

on the

other,

Cuba

protests any


(such

as that

posed

by

the

U.S.

embargo,

pejoratively,

ut inaccurate-

ly,

termed a

blockade)

as hurtful

o

the

economy

when,

theoretically

at

least,

it

should be

considered

beneficial.

Increasingly

t has come

to

seem

as if

social

gains

of the

Revolu-

tion

have come

largely

from

dismantling

the

productive

mecha-

nisms of


without

replacing

them

in

effective

ways.

A

once

productive

island has

thus

been transformed

nto an


cluding arbitrary

nd


of

Fidel Castro

him-

self.

The

U.S.

economic

embargo

has

been cited as

one reason. The

most fundamental

problems,

however,

are inherent

in the

character

of Cuba's

ssociated-dependent

socialist

situation;

hey

are structur-

of

20 countries

in

gross

national

productper capita

n

1981.

No other

country

dropped

in

ranking,

rom

1952

to

1981,

by

more than

3

plac-

es; Cuba

dropped

12

places

(Thomas et

al,

1984:

29).

In

short,

the

Cuban

Revolution

has

performed

poorly

in

terms of both

productivi-

ty

and

creating

new wealth

(as

distinguished

from

dividing

up

wealth

that

has

already

been

created).

True,

there have been

no

capitalist

investments,

and

thus no

profit

remittances,

by


systems, by

defini-

tion,

do not make

capitalist


capitalist profits.

Moreover,


profit

as

exploita-


spect.

These

points

are true

by

definition.

However,

to

anyone

not

bound

by

Marxist

definitions,

t is

apparent

hat

capitalist

nvestment

and

profits

can offer benefits

in

a


positive-

sum

process.

While

this

notion

is

unacceptable

to

Marxists,

ven so-

phisticated

ones,

elsewhere

it is considered as

elementary

econom-

ics.

Criticsoften cite

examples

of

profits

exceeding

total investment

to

illustrate he

exploitative

effects of

capitalism.

Such

arguments g-

nore

several

things,

such as the

multiplier

effects of the

capital

in-


and

the investor ost

his

investment.

Risk

of such losses

is

one factor

which

entitles

an investor to

profits.

Finally,

critics overlook

the

fact

that


now

frequently

reject

theoretical

prem-

ises about

the

exploitative

effects of

capital

at

the

practical

level

when

they appeal

for direct

private

investment,

commercial loans

and hard

capitalist

currencies.

Inconsistency

in

Cuban

adherence to

Marxist

heory

is evidenced

by



in

effect;

on the

other,

Cuba

protests any


(such

as that

posed

by

the

U.S.

embargo,

pejoratively,

ut inaccurate-

ly,

termed a

blockade)

as hurtful

o

the

economy

when,

theoretically

at

least,

it

should be

considered

beneficial.

Increasingly

t has come

to

seem

as if

social

gains

of the

Revolu-

tion

have come

largely

from

dismantling

the

productive

mecha-

nisms of


without

replacing

them

in

effective

ways.

A

once

productive

island has

thus

been transformed

nto an


cluding arbitrary

nd


of

Fidel Castro

him-

self.

The

U.S.

economic

embargo

has

been cited as

one reason. The

most fundamental

problems,

however,

are inherent

in the

character

of Cuba's

ssociated-dependent

socialist

situation;

hey

are structur-

of

20 countries

in

gross

national

productper capita

n

1981.

No other

country

dropped

in

ranking,

rom

1952

to

1981,

by

more than

3

plac-

es; Cuba

dropped

12

places

(Thomas et

al,

1984:

29).

In

short,

the

Cuban

Revolution

has

performed

poorly

in

terms of both

productivi-

ty

and

creating

new wealth

(as

distinguished

from

dividing

up

wealth

that

has

already

been

created).

True,

there have been

no

capitalist

investments,

and

thus no

profit

remittances,

by


systems, by

defini-

tion,

do not make

capitalist


capitalist profits.

Moreover,


profit

as

exploita-


spect.

These

points

are true

by

definition.

However,

to

anyone

not

bound

by

Marxist

definitions,

t is

apparent

hat

capitalist

nvestment

and

profits

can offer benefits

in

a


positive-

sum

process.

While

this

notion

is

unacceptable

to

Marxists,

ven so-

phisticated

ones,

elsewhere

it is considered as

elementary

econom-

ics.

Criticsoften cite

examples

of

profits

exceeding

total investment

to

illustrate he

exploitative

effects of

capitalism.

Such

arguments g-

nore

several

things,

such as the

multiplier

effects of the

capital

in-


and

the investor ost

his

investment.

Risk

of such losses

is

one factor

which

entitles

an investor to

profits.

Finally,

critics overlook

the

fact

that


now

frequently

reject

theoretical

prem-

ises about

the

exploitative

effects of

capital

at

the

practical

level

when

they appeal

for direct

private

investment,

commercial loans

and hard

capitalist

currencies.

Inconsistency

in

Cuban

adherence to

Marxist

heory

is evidenced

by



in

effect;

on the

other,

Cuba

protests any


(such

as that

posed

by

the

U.S.

embargo,

pejoratively,

ut inaccurate-

ly,

termed a

blockade)

as hurtful

o

the

economy

when,

theoretically

at

least,

it

should be

considered

beneficial.

Increasingly

t has come

to

seem

as if

social

gains

of the

Revolu-

tion

have come

largely

from

dismantling

the

productive

mecha-

nisms of


without

replacing

them

in

effective

ways.

A

once

productive

island has

thus

been transformed

nto an


cluding arbitrary

nd


of

Fidel Castro

him-

self.

The

U.S.

economic

embargo

has

been cited as

one reason. The

most fundamental

problems,

however,

are inherent

in the

character

of Cuba's

ssociated-dependent

socialist

situation;

hey

are structur-

78888







PACKENHAM:UBA

-

CAPITALIST

S.

SOCIALIST

EPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:UBA

-

CAPITALIST

S.

SOCIALIST

EPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:UBA

-

CAPITALIST

S.

SOCIALIST

EPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:UBA

-

CAPITALIST

S.

SOCIALIST

EPENDENCY

al.

As

Leontiev

pointed

out more than a decade

ago, they

are

funda-

mentally

the same as those that

plagued

the

Soviet Union and other

socialist countries, .e. the

characteristically

ow

productivity

of

labor,

rooted

in

the basic differences between

a

socialistic and an

in-

dividualistic

ociety.

Leontiev

went

on to

argue

thatthe

productivity

of labor

seems

to

be

lower now than

it

was before the revolution. With

the

same

equipment

and under otherwise identical

physical

conditions

the same

worker,

or the

same

group

of

workers,

eems to

produce

in

all branches

of

industry

and

agriculture

maller

amounts

of

goods,

or

goods of lowerquality,orboth, than would have been producedbe-

fore

the revolution.

The so-called

moral

ncentives... seem ineffective as a means of

inducing

laborers,

white-collar

workers,

managerial

and

supervisory

personnel

to

perform

heir

respective

jobs

as well as

they

did

before

the revolution ...

(Leontiev

1971,

pp.

19,

21).

Subsequent

events have confirmed this

analysis.

While

the Cu-

bans

have made some

adjustments,

heir

ideological

and

political

commitments

prevent

them

from

correcting

hese

structural

efects,

which areinherentin the Cubanmodel.

Thus,

once socialist

Cubadivided

up

-

and

fairlyrapidly

at that

-

the fruitsof

its earlier

capitalistdevelopment,

economic costs of the

present

system

have become more evident.

To be

sure,

some claim economic and

social costs

apply only

to

the

Cuban

upper

and middle

classes,

i.e.,

for

gusanos

(literally

worms',

he

epithet

used

by

the

Castro

regime

to

refer o Cubanex-

iles).

However,

most of the

approximately

125,000

Cuban

boat

peo-

ple,

who

left

in

1980,

were

poor

and

working

class. To

date

a

tenth of

the Cubanpopulationhasfled the island.Ithasbeen estimated that

up

to two million more would leave

if

they

could.3

Nothing

remotely

resembling

these

phenomena

existed before

1959,

not

even

during

the worst

days

of

Batista.

Political

aspects

If

there are

problems

and costs

in

the social

and economic are-

as,

even more

profound

modes of

exploitation

under socialist de-

pendency

occur in

the

political,

cultural,

and

military-diplomatic

r-

eas. These affect not

only

the

affluent,

but also the middle and

working

class as well as

the

poor people

of

Cuba,

directly

and

intensely.

There

is

no democratic

rule in

Cuba

n

the sense

of

citizens ex-

ercising

any

control

over

governmental

officials.To

the

contrary,

he

al.

As

Leontiev

pointed


ago, they

are

funda-

mentally


plagued

the



characteristically

ow

productivity

of

labor,

rooted

in


a

socialistic and an

in-

dividualistic

ociety.

Leontiev

went

on to

argue

thatthe

productivity

of labor

seems

to

be

lower now than

it


the

same

equipment


physical

conditions

the same

worker,

or the

same

group

of

workers,

eems to

produce

in

all branches

of

industry

and

agriculture

maller

amounts

of

goods,

or


fore

the revolution.

The so-called

moral


inducing

laborers,

white-collar

workers,

managerial

and

supervisory

personnel

to

perform

heir

respective

jobs

as well as

they

did

before

the revolution ...

(Leontiev

1971,

pp.

19,

21).

Subsequent


analysis.

While

the Cu-

bans

have made some

adjustments,

heir

ideological

and

political

commitments

prevent

them

from

correcting

hese

structural

efects,


Thus,

once socialist

Cubadivided

up

-

and

fairlyrapidly

at that

-

the fruitsof

its earlier



present

system


To be

sure,


social costs

apply only

to

the

Cuban

upper

and middle

classes,

i.e.,

for

gusanos

(literally

worms',

he

epithet

used

by

the

Castro

regime

to

refer o Cubanex-

iles).

However,

most of the

approximately

125,000

Cuban

boat

peo-

ple,

who

left

in

1980,

were

poor

and

working

class. To

date

a

tenth of


up


if

they

could.3

Nothing

remotely

resembling

these

phenomena

existed before

1959,

not

even

during

the worst

days

of

Batista.

Political

aspects

If

there are

problems

and costs

in

the social

and economic are-

as,

even more

profound

modes of

exploitation

under socialist de-

pendency

occur in

the

political,

cultural,

and

military-diplomatic

r-


only

the

affluent,


working

class as well as

the

poor people

of

Cuba,

directly

and

intensely.

There

is

no democratic

rule in

Cuba

n

the sense

of

citizens ex-

ercising

any

control

over

governmental

officials.To

the

contrary,

he

al.

As

Leontiev

pointed


ago, they

are

funda-

mentally


plagued

the



characteristically

ow

productivity

of

labor,

rooted

in


a

socialistic and an

in-

dividualistic

ociety.

Leontiev

went

on to

argue

thatthe

productivity

of labor

seems

to

be

lower now than

it


the

same

equipment


physical

conditions

the same

worker,

or the

same

group

of

workers,

eems to

produce

in

all branches

of

industry

and

agriculture

maller

amounts

of

goods,

or


fore

the revolution.

The so-called

moral


inducing

laborers,

white-collar

workers,

managerial

and

supervisory

personnel

to

perform

heir

respective

jobs

as well as

they

did

before

the revolution ...

(Leontiev

1971,

pp.

19,

21).

Subsequent


analysis.

While

the Cu-

bans

have made some

adjustments,

heir

ideological

and

political

commitments

prevent

them

from

correcting

hese

structural

efects,


Thus,

once socialist

Cubadivided

up

-

and

fairlyrapidly

at that

-

the fruitsof

its earlier



present

system


To be

sure,


social costs

apply only

to

the

Cuban

upper

and middle

classes,

i.e.,

for

gusanos

(literally

worms',

he

epithet

used

by

the

Castro

regime

to

refer o Cubanex-

iles).

However,

most of the

approximately

125,000

Cuban

boat

peo-

ple,

who

left

in

1980,

were

poor

and

working

class. To

date

a

tenth of


up


if

they

could.3

Nothing

remotely

resembling

these

phenomena

existed before

1959,

not

even

during

the worst

days

of

Batista.

Political

aspects

If

there are

problems

and costs

in

the social

and economic are-

as,

even more

profound

modes of

exploitation

under socialist de-

pendency

occur in

the

political,

cultural,

and

military-diplomatic

r-


only

the

affluent,


working

class as well as

the

poor people

of

Cuba,

directly

and

intensely.

There

is

no democratic

rule in

Cuba

n

the sense

of

citizens ex-

ercising

any

control

over

governmental

officials.To

the

contrary,

he

al.

As

Leontiev

pointed


ago, they

are

funda-

mentally


plagued

the



characteristically

ow

productivity

of

labor,

rooted

in


a

socialistic and an

in-

dividualistic

ociety.

Leontiev

went

on to

argue

thatthe

productivity

of labor

seems

to

be

lower now than

it


the

same

equipment


physical

conditions

the same

worker,

or the

same

group

of

workers,

eems to

produce

in

all branches

of

industry

and

agriculture

maller

amounts

of

goods,

or


fore

the revolution.

The so-called

moral


inducing

laborers,

white-collar

workers,

managerial

and

supervisory

personnel

to

perform

heir

respective

jobs

as well as

they

did

before

the revolution ...

(Leontiev

1971,

pp.

19,

21).

Subsequent


analysis.

While

the Cu-

bans

have made some

adjustments,

heir

ideological

and

political

commitments

prevent

them

from

correcting

hese

structural

efects,


Thus,

once socialist

Cubadivided

up

-

and

fairlyrapidly

at that

-

the fruitsof

its earlier



present

system


To be

sure,


social costs

apply only

to

the

Cuban

upper

and middle

classes,

i.e.,

for

gusanos

(literally

worms',

he

epithet

used

by

the

Castro

regime

to

refer o Cubanex-

iles).

However,

most of the

approximately

125,000

Cuban

boat

peo-

ple,

who

left

in

1980,

were

poor

and

working

class. To

date

a

tenth of


up


if

they

could.3

Nothing

remotely

resembling

these

phenomena

existed before

1959,

not

even

during

the worst

days

of

Batista.

Political

aspects

If

there are

problems

and costs

in

the social

and economic are-

as,

even more

profound

modes of

exploitation

under socialist de-

pendency

occur in

the

political,

cultural,

and

military-diplomatic

r-


only

the

affluent,


working

class as well as

the

poor people

of

Cuba,

directly

and

intensely.

There

is

no democratic

rule in

Cuba

n

the sense

of

citizens ex-

ercising

any

control

over

governmental

officials.To

the

contrary,

he

79999







JOURNAL

OF INTERAMERICANSTUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL


JOURNAL


JOURNAL


logic

of

the

Revolution,

both

publicly

and

within the

ruling

circles,

is the reverse:

eaders

guide,

direct,

and control

citizens in

the

ways

of

Revolutionary

ruth and virtue. The idea of citizens

controlling

leaders

is

characterized

by

the

leadership

as

bourgeois,

reactionary,

and

counterrevolutionary.

n

Cuba,

the

Revolutionand its

leaders

legitimate

the

constitution,

the

courts,

the

administration,

he

party,

the mass

organizations,

and the elections

-

and

not

vice

versa

(Dominguez,

1978:

261).

Accordingly,

within

Cuba

itself

power

centers,

first

and fore-

most,

on

Fidel

Castro,

and,

second,

on the

people

closest

to him.

Fidel Castrohas been undisputed socialistcaudillo of Cubafor

more than a

quarter

century,

.e.

for most

of

his

adult life

and

that of

the entire

post-1959

system.

It is a

remarkable

chievementwith

few

parallels

on

a

world scale.

Castro

has well

met

his first

priority

of

maintaining

his

power

undiluted

during

this

period.

Especially

in

the

1970s

and

1980s,

the

CubanCommunist

Party

(CCP),

the civilian

bureaucracy,

and

the

military

have

grown

in

numbers,

organizational apacity

and

complexity,

and

influence,

al-

though

all remain

systematically

subordinated to Fidel

Castro

and

the CCP.Below this

hierarchy

of

power

are the mass

organizations:

the

Committeesfor

the Defense of

the Revolution

CDRs),

the

Fede-

ration

of

CubanWomen

(FMC),

labor

unions,

youth

organizations.

Finally

here are elected

legislative

bodies

(assemblies)

and

judicial

structuresat

national,

provincial,

and local level.

However,

except

in

limited,

controlled

ways,

these

bodies

do

not

have the

functions

as-

sociated

with them

in

political

democracies.

These

political

mechanisms are used

for

various

domestic

and

foreignpolicy objectivesset by the political elite. One of the main

stated

objectives

is

to

create

new

socialist

citizens who

will

be free

of

the values

and

characteristics

hat

are

glorified

and

practiced

in

politically-liberal,

apitalist

societies.

The

regime

is

resolutely

anti-

liberal. Liberal ocieties

place

a

high

value

on

individualism,

com-

petition,

pluralism,

basic

freedoms and

group autonomy.

Fromthe

point

of view

of

the Cuban

system,

these

values

and

practices

are

egotistical,

alienating, atomizing,

divisive,

and

undisciplined.

The

aim of

the Revolution

s,

and

must

be,

to eliminate them.

Cuba'sead-

ersarguethatthese values andpracticesaredeeply ingrainedas a re-

sult

of

Cuba's

ong previous

capitalist history.

To

get

rid

of

them,

therefore,

the state needs

a

vanguard

of

enlightened

teachers

and

leaders to correct

the

unenlightened

masses

to a

realizationof

their

true needs and

interests.

logic

of

the

Revolution,

both

publicly

and

within the

ruling

circles,

is the reverse:

eaders

guide,

direct,

and control

citizens in

the

ways

of

Revolutionary


controlling

leaders

is

characterized

by

the

leadership

as

bourgeois,

reactionary,

and


n

Cuba,

the

Revolutionand its

leaders

legitimate

the

constitution,

the

courts,

the

administration,

he

party,

the mass

organizations,

and the elections

-

and

not

vice

versa

(Dominguez,

1978:

261).

Accordingly,

within

Cuba

itself

power

centers,

first

and fore-

most,

on

Fidel

Castro,

and,

second,

on the

people

closest

to him.


more than a

quarter

century,

.e.

for most

of

his

adult life

and

that of

the entire

post-1959

system.

It is a

remarkable

chievementwith

few

parallels

on

a

world scale.

Castro

has well

met

his first

priority

of

maintaining

his

power

undiluted

during

this

period.

Especially

in

the

1970s

and

1980s,

the

CubanCommunist

Party

(CCP),

the civilian

bureaucracy,

and

the

military

have

grown

in

numbers,


and

complexity,

and

influence,

al-

though

all remain

systematically


Castro

and

the CCP.Below this

hierarchy

of

power

are the mass

organizations:

the

Committeesfor

the Defense of

the Revolution

CDRs),

the

Fede-

ration

of

CubanWomen

(FMC),

labor

unions,

youth

organizations.

Finally

here are elected

legislative

bodies

(assemblies)

and

judicial

structuresat

national,

provincial,

and local level.

However,

except

in

limited,

controlled

ways,

these

bodies

do

not

have the

functions

as-

sociated

with them

in

political

democracies.

These

political

mechanisms are used

for

various

domestic

and


stated

objectives

is

to

create

new

socialist

citizens who

will

be free

of

the values

and

characteristics

hat

are

glorified

and

practiced

in


apitalist

societies.

The

regime

is

resolutely

anti-


place

a

high

value

on

individualism,

com-

petition,

pluralism,

basic

freedoms and

group autonomy.

Fromthe

point

of view

of

the Cuban

system,

these

values

and

practices

are

egotistical,


divisive,

and

undisciplined.

The

aim of

the Revolution

s,

and

must

be,

to eliminate them.

Cuba'sead-


sult

of

Cuba's

ong previous

capitalist history.

To

get

rid

of

them,

therefore,

the state needs

a

vanguard

of

enlightened

teachers

and

leaders to correct

the

unenlightened

masses

to a

realizationof

their

true needs and

interests.

logic

of

the

Revolution,

both

publicly

and

within the

ruling

circles,

is the reverse:

eaders

guide,

direct,

and control

citizens in

the

ways

of

Revolutionary


controlling

leaders

is

characterized

by

the

leadership

as

bourgeois,

reactionary,

and


n

Cuba,

the

Revolutionand its

leaders

legitimate

the

constitution,

the

courts,

the

administration,

he

party,

the mass

organizations,

and the elections

-

and

not

vice

versa

(Dominguez,

1978:

261).

Accordingly,

within

Cuba

itself

power

centers,

first

and fore-

most,

on

Fidel

Castro,

and,

second,

on the

people

closest

to him.


more than a

quarter

century,

.e.

for most

of

his

adult life

and

that of

the entire

post-1959

system.

It is a

remarkable

chievementwith

few

parallels

on

a

world scale.

Castro

has well

met

his first

priority

of

maintaining

his

power

undiluted

during

this

period.

Especially

in

the

1970s

and

1980s,

the

CubanCommunist

Party

(CCP),

the civilian

bureaucracy,

and

the

military

have

grown

in

numbers,


and

complexity,

and

influence,

al-

though

all remain

systematically


Castro

and

the CCP.Below this

hierarchy

of

power

are the mass

organizations:

the

Committeesfor

the Defense of

the Revolution

CDRs),

the

Fede-

ration

of

CubanWomen

(FMC),

labor

unions,

youth

organizations.

Finally

here are elected

legislative

bodies

(assemblies)

and

judicial

structuresat

national,

provincial,

and local level.

However,

except

in

limited,

controlled

ways,

these

bodies

do

not

have the

functions

as-

sociated

with them

in

political

democracies.

These

political

mechanisms are used

for

various

domestic

and


stated

objectives

is

to

create

new

socialist

citizens who

will

be free

of

the values

and

characteristics

hat

are

glorified

and

practiced

in


apitalist

societies.

The

regime

is

resolutely

anti-


place

a

high

value

on

individualism,

com-

petition,

pluralism,

basic

freedoms and

group autonomy.

Fromthe

point

of view

of

the Cuban

system,

these

values

and

practices

are

egotistical,


divisive,

and

undisciplined.

The

aim of

the Revolution

s,

and

must

be,

to eliminate them.

Cuba'sead-


sult

of

Cuba's

ong previous

capitalist history.

To

get

rid

of

them,

therefore,

the state needs

a

vanguard

of

enlightened

teachers

and

leaders to correct

the

unenlightened

masses

to a

realizationof

their

true needs and

interests.

logic

of

the

Revolution,

both

publicly

and

within the

ruling

circles,

is the reverse:

eaders

guide,

direct,

and control

citizens in

the

ways

of

Revolutionary


controlling

leaders

is

characterized

by

the

leadership

as

bourgeois,

reactionary,

and


n

Cuba,

the

Revolutionand its

leaders

legitimate

the

constitution,

the

courts,

the

administration,

he

party,

the mass

organizations,

and the elections

-

and

not

vice

versa

(Dominguez,

1978:

261).

Accordingly,

within

Cuba

itself

power

centers,

first

and fore-

most,

on

Fidel

Castro,

and,

second,

on the

people

closest

to him.


more than a

quarter

century,

.e.

for most

of

his

adult life

and

that of

the entire

post-1959

system.

It is a

remarkable

chievementwith

few

parallels

on

a

world scale.

Castro

has well

met

his first

priority

of

maintaining

his

power

undiluted

during

this

period.

Especially

in

the

1970s

and

1980s,

the

CubanCommunist

Party

(CCP),

the civilian

bureaucracy,

and

the

military

have

grown

in

numbers,


and

complexity,

and

influence,

al-

though

all remain

systematically


Castro

and

the CCP.Below this

hierarchy

of

power

are the mass

organizations:

the

Committeesfor

the Defense of

the Revolution

CDRs),

the

Fede-

ration

of

CubanWomen

(FMC),

labor

unions,

youth

organizations.

Finally

here are elected

legislative

bodies

(assemblies)

and

judicial

structuresat

national,

provincial,

and local level.

However,

except

in

limited,

controlled

ways,

these

bodies

do

not

have the

functions

as-

sociated

with them

in

political

democracies.

These

political

mechanisms are used

for

various

domestic

and


stated

objectives

is

to

create

new

socialist

citizens who

will

be free

of

the values

and

characteristics

hat

are

glorified

and

practiced

in


apitalist

societies.

The

regime

is

resolutely

anti-


place

a

high

value

on

individualism,

com-

petition,

pluralism,

basic

freedoms and

group autonomy.

Fromthe

point

of view

of

the Cuban

system,

these

values

and

practices

are

egotistical,


divisive,

and

undisciplined.

The

aim of

the Revolution

s,

and

must

be,

to eliminate them.

Cuba'sead-


sult

of

Cuba's

ong previous

capitalist history.

To

get

rid

of

them,

therefore,

the state needs

a

vanguard

of

enlightened

teachers

and

leaders to correct

the

unenlightened

masses

to a

realizationof

their

true needs and

interests.

80000







81111

ACKENHAM:CUBA- CAPITALIST

VS. SOCIALIST DEPENDENCY







The

Cuban

political

system

is elitist and

hierarchical

both

in

its

principles,

which

undergird

and

legitimize

it,

and

in its

political

in-

stitutions and

processes.

The latter have become

enormously

power-

ful devices

for

controlling

Cuban citizens.

There is

literally

no

sphere

of

human

activity

that

is

immune from state

supervision

be-

cause there are no

moral or ethical constraints on

state action

vis-a-vis

the individual

except

the needs of

the

Revolution,

which are

deter-

mined

by

the

top

leadership.

State

penetration

of

any

area

of

individual and

group

life

is

legit-

imate.

The combination of

elaborate,

powerful

state

organizational

structures, the legitimating myths of the Revolution, Fidel Castro's

charisma,

together

with

other

factors,

all assure

that,

in

practical

terms,

the actual

degree

of that

penetration

is

enormous.

In

these

circumstances,

civil liberties

have no

meaning

either

conceptually

or

practically,

nor

does the idea of

the

autonomy

of

in-

dividuals

and

groups

from state

power.

The

idea of a

legitimate

op-

position

is

foreign

and subversive.

The

operative principle

is:

Within the

Revolution,

anything;

outside the

Revolution,

nothing '

This

standard

can be

very

elastic,

meaning

whatever the state

choos-

es it to mean.

Communications

media are

totally

controlled

by

the

political

elite. Criticism of the

regime

and its leaders

-

even

(especially?)

jokes

about them

-

are

prohibited.

According

to

Hugh

Thomas

(1971:1463),

Compared

with

the Cuban

press,

that of

Spain

(under

Franco)

might

be considered

sparkling'

Lee

Lockwood notes

that

the Cuban

media are not

only

dull,

dogmatic, repetitious,

and

syco-

phantic

but also uninformative.

In

fact,

he

writes,

the

Cuban

press

is so mediocre that even Fidel can't stand it; I had personally wit-

nessed

how

every

morning

at

breakfast

he

read the

AP

and

UPI wire

service

reports

first

(and

carefully)

before

skimming idly through

Granmd'

(Lockwood,

1970:18).

Castro

has

railed

at

the U.S. media

because

of their

alleged

elitism,

monopoly power,

and subservience

to

government policies,

yet

these

charges

apply

to

his own

system

more

accurately

than

to

the U.S.

system. Clearly

control of the

media,

both

print

and

electronic,

affords Castro

a

powerful

instrument with

which to

direct and dominate

the Cuban

population.

To

give

just

one

example,

the Cuban

government

controls all information

pertaining

to

the human and material

costs

of Cuba's

military

activities

in Africa.

It is

inconceivable

that the

government

would

(or could)

tolerate

investigative

reporting

or

a

pluralistic,

free

press.

The

political

elite

utilize mass

organizations

to

enforce

loyalty

The

Cuban

political

system

is elitist and

hierarchical

both

in

its

principles,

which

undergird

and

legitimize

it,

and

in its

political

in-

stitutions and

processes.


enormously

power-

ful devices

for

controlling

Cuban citizens.

There is

literally

no

sphere

of

human

activity

that

is

immune from state

supervision

be-

cause there are no


state action

vis-a-vis

the individual

except

the needs of

the

Revolution,

which are

deter-

mined

by

the

top

leadership.

State

penetration

of

any

area

of

individual and

group

life

is

legit-

imate.

The combination of

elaborate,

powerful

state

organizational


charisma,

together

with

other

factors,

all assure

that,

in

practical

terms,

the actual

degree

of that

penetration

is

enormous.

In

these

circumstances,

civil liberties

have no

meaning

either

conceptually

or

practically,

nor

does the idea of

the

autonomy

of

in-

dividuals

and

groups

from state

power.

The

idea of a

legitimate

op-

position

is

foreign

and subversive.

The

operative principle

is:

Within the

Revolution,

anything;

outside the

Revolution,

nothing '

This

standard

can be

very

elastic,

meaning

whatever the state

choos-

es it to mean.

Communications

media are

totally

controlled

by

the

political


regime

and its leaders

-

even

(especially?)

jokes

about them

-

are

prohibited.

According

to

Hugh

Thomas

(1971:1463),

Compared

with

the Cuban

press,

that of

Spain

(under

Franco)

might

be considered

sparkling'

Lee

Lockwood notes

that

the Cuban

media are not

only

dull,


and

syco-

phantic


In

fact,

he

writes,

the

Cuban

press


nessed

how

every

morning

at

breakfast

he

read the

AP

and

UPI wire

service

reports

first

(and

carefully)

before


Granmd'

(Lockwood,

1970:18).

Castro

has

railed

at

the U.S. media

because

of their

alleged

elitism,

monopoly power,

and subservience

to


yet

these

charges

apply

to

his own

system

more

accurately

than

to

the U.S.

system. Clearly

control of the

media,

both

print

and

electronic,

affords Castro

a

powerful

instrument with

which to

direct and dominate

the Cuban

population.

To

give

just

one

example,

the Cuban

government


pertaining

to


costs

of Cuba's

military

activities

in Africa.

It is

inconceivable

that the

government

would

(or could)

tolerate

investigative

reporting

or

a

pluralistic,

free

press.

The

political

elite

utilize mass

organizations

to

enforce

loyalty

The

Cuban

political

system

is elitist and

hierarchical

both

in

its

principles,

which

undergird

and

legitimize

it,

and

in its

political

in-

stitutions and

processes.


enormously

power-

ful devices

for

controlling

Cuban citizens.

There is

literally

no

sphere

of

human

activity

that

is

immune from state

supervision

be-

cause there are no


state action

vis-a-vis

the individual

except

the needs of

the

Revolution,

which are

deter-

mined

by

the

top

leadership.

State

penetration

of

any

area

of

individual and

group

life

is

legit-

imate.

The combination of

elaborate,

powerful

state

organizational


charisma,

together

with

other

factors,

all assure

that,

in

practical

terms,

the actual

degree

of that

penetration

is

enormous.

In

these

circumstances,

civil liberties

have no

meaning

either

conceptually

or

practically,

nor

does the idea of

the

autonomy

of

in-

dividuals

and

groups

from state

power.

The

idea of a

legitimate

op-

position

is

foreign

and subversive.

The

operative principle

is:

Within the

Revolution,

anything;

outside the

Revolution,

nothing '

This

standard

can be

very

elastic,

meaning

whatever the state

choos-

es it to mean.

Communications

media are

totally

controlled

by

the

political


regime

and its leaders

-

even

(especially?)

jokes

about them

-

are

prohibited.

According

to

Hugh

Thomas

(1971:1463),

Compared

with

the Cuban

press,

that of

Spain

(under

Franco)

might

be considered

sparkling'

Lee

Lockwood notes

that

the Cuban

media are not

only

dull,


and

syco-

phantic


In

fact,

he

writes,

the

Cuban

press


nessed

how

every

morning

at

breakfast

he

read the

AP

and

UPI wire

service

reports

first

(and

carefully)

before


Granmd'

(Lockwood,

1970:18).

Castro

has

railed

at

the U.S. media

because

of their

alleged

elitism,

monopoly power,

and subservience

to


yet

these

charges

apply

to

his own

system

more

accurately

than

to

the U.S.

system. Clearly

control of the

media,

both

print

and

electronic,

affords Castro

a

powerful

instrument with

which to

direct and dominate

the Cuban

population.

To

give

just

one

example,

the Cuban

government


pertaining

to


costs

of Cuba's

military

activities

in Africa.

It is

inconceivable

that the

government

would

(or could)

tolerate

investigative

reporting

or

a

pluralistic,

free

press.

The

political

elite

utilize mass

organizations

to

enforce

loyalty

The

Cuban

political

system

is elitist and

hierarchical

both

in

its

principles,

which

undergird

and

legitimize

it,

and

in its

political

in-

stitutions and

processes.


enormously

power-

ful devices

for

controlling

Cuban citizens.

There is

literally

no

sphere

of

human

activity

that

is

immune from state

supervision

be-

cause there are no


state action

vis-a-vis

the individual

except

the needs of

the

Revolution,

which are

deter-

mined

by

the

top

leadership.

State

penetration

of

any

area

of

individual and

group

life

is

legit-

imate.

The combination of

elaborate,

powerful

state

organizational


charisma,

together

with

other

factors,

all assure

that,

in

practical

terms,

the actual

degree

of that

penetration

is

enormous.

In

these

circumstances,

civil liberties

have no

meaning

either

conceptually

or

practically,

nor

does the idea of

the

autonomy

of

in-

dividuals

and

groups

from state

power.

The

idea of a

legitimate

op-

position

is

foreign

and subversive.

The

operative principle

is:

Within the

Revolution,

anything;

outside the

Revolution,

nothing '

This

standard

can be

very

elastic,

meaning

whatever the state

choos-

es it to mean.

Communications

media are

totally

controlled

by

the

political


regime

and its leaders

-

even

(especially?)

jokes

about them

-

are

prohibited.

According

to

Hugh

Thomas

(1971:1463),

Compared

with

the Cuban

press,

that of

Spain

(under

Franco)

might

be considered

sparkling'

Lee

Lockwood notes

that

the Cuban

media are not

only

dull,


and

syco-

phantic


In

fact,

he

writes,

the

Cuban

press


nessed

how

every

morning

at

breakfast

he

read the

AP

and

UPI wire

service

reports

first

(and

carefully)

before


Granmd'

(Lockwood,

1970:18).

Castro

has

railed

at

the U.S. media

because

of their

alleged

elitism,

monopoly power,

and subservience

to


yet

these

charges

apply

to

his own

system

more

accurately

than

to

the U.S.

system. Clearly

control of the

media,

both

print

and

electronic,

affords Castro

a

powerful

instrument with

which to

direct and dominate

the Cuban

population.

To

give

just

one

example,

the Cuban

government


pertaining

to


costs

of Cuba's

military

activities

in Africa.

It is

inconceivable

that the

government

would

(or could)

tolerate

investigative

reporting

or

a

pluralistic,

free

press.

The

political

elite

utilize mass

organizations

to

enforce

loyalty







JOURNAL

OF INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND

WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND

WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND

WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND

WORLD AFFAIRS

to the

regime

and

its

objectives

and

to

supervise

and

punish

possible

counterrevolutionaries.

Of

these

the most

important

are

the Com-

mittees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs). These were

founded

in

1960

with a

membership

of about

800,000

persons;

by

1983

they

had over

5

million

members,

or more than half

the

entire

population

(and

about

80%

of

the

adult

population).

The

specific

goals

have been

many

and

have variedsomewhat

over

time:

e.g. vigi-

lance,

local

government, public

health,

civil

defense;

of

which

the

major

continuing

theme has been

vigilance.

CDRs exist

to inte-

grate

Cubans

nto the

Revolution.

Being integrated

s,

in

effect,

a

requirement ornormallife in Cuba,whateverone'sfeelings toward

revolutionary

rule

and

policies

... even former

members of the

pre-

revolutionaryupper

class,

still

living

in

Cuba

in

mansions

with do-

mestic

servants,

have been

reported belonging

to a

committee,

be-

cause

being

a member

makes

life

easier

(Dominguez,

1978:

264).

By

contrast,

nonintegration

s more than

inconvenient,

it

is

danger-

ous.

Nonintegrated

ersons

are

publicly

vilified;

CDR

militants

hold

repudiation

meetings'

to

chastise,browbeat,

and

humiliate

those

who

want to leave

Cuba.

Merely

not

belonging

to

the

CDRs s

a political act. In a society that insists on revolutionarymilitancy,

those who

stand

on the sidelines

are vulnerable

(Domfnguez,

1978:

260-267;

del

Aguila,

1984:154-156).

With these

tools,

the

regime

does not need to use a

large

amount

of

physical

violence,

or

imprison large

numbers

of

people,

in

order

to

operate

a

totalitarian

ystem.

Of

course,

politically

moti-

vated

violence,

imprisonment,

and torture

have

been used

by

the re-

gime

on thousands

of

Cubans.

However,

he circumstances

just

de-

scribed, plus the U.S. escape hatch hroughwhich a full tenth of

the

population

have

passed,

have

kept

the amount of

overt

physical

violence

and

imprisonment

in

Cuba

to

relatively

low

levels com-

pared

to

regimes

in

the

USSR,

he

PRC,

or

Cambodia.

Nevertheless,

the

system

is no less totalitarian

or

all

that.

Moreover,

here are

other

effective forms of

violence

besides

political

murderand

physical

or-

ture and

imprisonment,

a

point

made

frequently

against

capitalist

culture but seldom

against

Cuba,

where

it

applies

with even

greater

force.

Culture

and Education

Nowhereare

the

influences

of the Soviet

model

of

development

in

Cuba

more

evident,

and

more

contrary

o

human

well

being,

than

in

the cultural

and

educational

spheres.

Intellectual

work at all

levels

is

intensely politicized.

All

cultural,

artistic,

and educational

to the

regime

and

its

objectives

and

to

supervise

and

punish

possible


Of

these

the most

important

are

the Com-


founded

in

1960

with a

membership

of about

800,000

persons;

by

1983

they

had over

5

million

members,

or more than half

the

entire

population

(and

about

80%

of

the

adult

population).

The

specific

goals

have been

many

and

have variedsomewhat

over

time:

e.g. vigi-

lance,

local

government, public

health,

civil

defense;

of

which

the

major

continuing

theme has been

vigilance.

CDRs exist

to inte-

grate

Cubans

nto the

Revolution.

Being integrated

s,

in

effect,

a


revolutionary

rule

and

policies

... even former

members of the

pre-

revolutionaryupper

class,

still

living

in

Cuba

in

mansions

with do-

mestic

servants,

have been

reported belonging

to a

committee,

be-

cause

being

a member

makes

life

easier

(Dominguez,

1978:

264).

By

contrast,

nonintegration

s more than

inconvenient,

it

is

danger-

ous.

Nonintegrated

ersons

are

publicly

vilified;

CDR

militants

hold

repudiation

meetings'

to

chastise,browbeat,

and

humiliate

those

who

want to leave

Cuba.

Merely

not

belonging

to

the

CDRs s


those who

stand

on the sidelines

are vulnerable

(Domfnguez,

1978:

260-267;

del

Aguila,

1984:154-156).

With these

tools,

the

regime


large

amount

of

physical

violence,

or

imprison large

numbers

of

people,

in

order

to

operate

a

totalitarian

ystem.

Of

course,

politically

moti-

vated

violence,

imprisonment,

and torture

have

been used

by

the re-

gime

on thousands

of

Cubans.

However,

he circumstances

just

de-


the

population

have

passed,

have

kept

the amount of

overt

physical

violence

and

imprisonment

in

Cuba

to

relatively

low

levels com-

pared

to

regimes

in

the

USSR,

he

PRC,

or

Cambodia.

Nevertheless,

the

system


or

all

that.

Moreover,

here are

other

effective forms of

violence

besides

political

murderand

physical

or-

ture and

imprisonment,

a

point

made

frequently

against

capitalist

culture but seldom

against

Cuba,

where

it

applies

with even

greater

force.

Culture

and Education

Nowhereare

the

influences

of the Soviet

model

of

development

in

Cuba

more

evident,

and

more

contrary

o

human

well

being,

than

in

the cultural

and

educational

spheres.

Intellectual

work at all

levels

is


All

cultural,

artistic,

and educational

to the

regime

and

its

objectives

and

to

supervise

and

punish

possible


Of

these

the most

important

are

the Com-


founded

in

1960

with a

membership

of about

800,000

persons;

by

1983

they

had over

5

million

members,

or more than half

the

entire

population

(and

about

80%

of

the

adult

population).

The

specific

goals

have been

many

and

have variedsomewhat

over

time:

e.g. vigi-

lance,

local

government, public

health,

civil

defense;

of

which

the

major

continuing

theme has been

vigilance.

CDRs exist

to inte-

grate

Cubans

nto the

Revolution.

Being integrated

s,

in

effect,

a


revolutionary

rule

and

policies

... even former

members of the

pre-

revolutionaryupper

class,

still

living

in

Cuba

in

mansions

with do-

mestic

servants,

have been

reported belonging

to a

committee,

be-

cause

being

a member

makes

life

easier

(Dominguez,

1978:

264).

By

contrast,

nonintegration

s more than

inconvenient,

it

is

danger-

ous.

Nonintegrated

ersons

are

publicly

vilified;

CDR

militants

hold

repudiation

meetings'

to

chastise,browbeat,

and

humiliate

those

who

want to leave

Cuba.

Merely

not

belonging

to

the

CDRs s


those who

stand

on the sidelines

are vulnerable

(Domfnguez,

1978:

260-267;

del

Aguila,

1984:154-156).

With these

tools,

the

regime


large

amount

of

physical

violence,

or

imprison large

numbers

of

people,

in

order

to

operate

a

totalitarian

ystem.

Of

course,

politically

moti-

vated

violence,

imprisonment,

and torture

have

been used

by

the re-

gime

on thousands

of

Cubans.

However,

he circumstances

just

de-


the

population

have

passed,

have

kept

the amount of

overt

physical

violence

and

imprisonment

in

Cuba

to

relatively

low

levels com-

pared

to

regimes

in

the

USSR,

he

PRC,

or

Cambodia.

Nevertheless,

the

system


or

all

that.

Moreover,

here are

other

effective forms of

violence

besides

political

murderand

physical

or-

ture and

imprisonment,

a

point

made

frequently

against

capitalist

culture but seldom

against

Cuba,

where

it

applies

with even

greater

force.

Culture

and Education

Nowhereare

the

influences

of the Soviet

model

of

development

in

Cuba

more

evident,

and

more

contrary

o

human

well

being,

than

in

the cultural

and

educational

spheres.

Intellectual

work at all

levels

is


All

cultural,

artistic,

and educational

to the

regime

and

its

objectives

and

to

supervise

and

punish

possible


Of

these

the most

important

are

the Com-


founded

in

1960

with a

membership

of about

800,000

persons;

by

1983

they

had over

5

million

members,

or more than half

the

entire

population

(and

about

80%

of

the

adult

population).

The

specific

goals

have been

many

and

have variedsomewhat

over

time:

e.g. vigi-

lance,

local

government, public

health,

civil

defense;

of

which

the

major

continuing

theme has been

vigilance.

CDRs exist

to inte-

grate

Cubans

nto the

Revolution.

Being integrated

s,

in

effect,

a


revolutionary

rule

and

policies

... even former

members of the

pre-

revolutionaryupper

class,

still

living

in

Cuba

in

mansions

with do-

mestic

servants,

have been

reported belonging

to a

committee,

be-

cause

being

a member

makes

life

easier

(Dominguez,

1978:

264).

By

contrast,

nonintegration

s more than

inconvenient,

it

is

danger-

ous.

Nonintegrated

ersons

are

publicly

vilified;

CDR

militants

hold

repudiation

meetings'

to

chastise,browbeat,

and

humiliate

those

who

want to leave

Cuba.

Merely

not

belonging

to

the

CDRs s


those who

stand

on the sidelines

are vulnerable

(Domfnguez,

1978:

260-267;

del

Aguila,

1984:154-156).

With these

tools,

the

regime


large

amount

of

physical

violence,

or

imprison large

numbers

of

people,

in

order

to

operate

a

totalitarian

ystem.

Of

course,

politically

moti-

vated

violence,

imprisonment,

and torture

have

been used

by

the re-

gime

on thousands

of

Cubans.

However,

he circumstances

just

de-


the

population

have

passed,

have

kept

the amount of

overt

physical

violence

and

imprisonment

in

Cuba

to

relatively

low

levels com-

pared

to

regimes

in

the

USSR,

he

PRC,

or

Cambodia.

Nevertheless,

the

system


or

all

that.

Moreover,

here are

other

effective forms of

violence

besides

political

murderand

physical

or-

ture and

imprisonment,

a

point

made

frequently

against

capitalist

culture but seldom

against

Cuba,

where

it

applies

with even

greater

force.

Culture

and Education

Nowhereare

the

influences

of the Soviet

model

of

development

in

Cuba

more

evident,

and

more

contrary

o

human

well

being,

than

in

the cultural

and

educational

spheres.

Intellectual

work at all

levels

is


All

cultural,

artistic,

and educational

82222







PACKENHAM:

CUBA- CAPITALIST


ACKENHAM:

CUBA- CAPITALIST


ACKENHAM:

CUBA- CAPITALIST


ACKENHAM:

CUBA- CAPITALIST


activity

s evaluated

and

rewarded

exclusively

in

terms of

its contri-

bution

to

the

Revolution,

as

judged by

the

political

elite.

Intellectual

independence

and criticism

of

the

regime

are met with

official con-

tempt,

mass

humiliation,

and

various forms of

psychological

and

physical

repression.

The

most notorious

examples

are

those

of the

poets

Heberto Padilla and

Armando Valladaresand the dramatist

Anton

Arrufat,

ut

they

are

only

the

tip

of the

iceberg

(See

Ripoll,

1982).

Today

the vast

majority

(one

estimate is

95%)

of Cuban

writers

and creative

artistsare

in

exile. Mostare not

ex-Batistianos;

most

op-

posed Batista.Manywereactively nvolvedin the fightagainsthis re-

gime,

and

some even had

positions

in

the

Castro

government

n

the

early

years.

When the cultural

regimentation

and

dogmatism

became

intolerable,

hey

left.

Many

of these

exiles have

made,

and

are now

making,distinguished

contributions

n

the cultural

sphere.

One has

only

to

mention,

for

example,

the works

of

a

Carlos

Franqui,

a

Cabrera

nfante,

or

a dozen

distinguished

social

scientists.On the is-

land

itself,

however,

he

picture

is

very

different.

As

Thomas

and his

colleagues report:

In

1964,

in a

famous interview n

Paris,

novelist

Alejo Carpentier

was asked

why

he

had

not

written a novel

about the

Cuban Revolu-

tion.

He

answered that

unfortunatley

he had

been raised

and

educat-

ed

long

before

the Revolution

and the

burden

of

creating

newrevolu-

tionary

novels would have to fall on the

shoulders

of a

younger

generation.

'Twenty

ears

from

now,'

he

affirmed,

we will be

able to

read the

literaryproduction

of the new

Cuba.'Those

20

years

have

elapsed.

Tragically,

he Cuban revolution cannot offer a

single

nota-

ble

novelist,

a

famous

poet,

a

penetrating

essayist,

not even a

fresh

contributionto Marxistanalysis... Censorshipand fear havesmoth-

ered

creativity

n

Cuba.What s left on the

island

is

merely

the

inces-

sant

voice of official

propaganda

(Thomas

et

al,

1984:

42-43).

The

situation

would seem

to

be better

at the level of

mass edu-

cation.

However,

as

is often the

case,

impressive

figures regarding

aggregate

gains

in

educational

opportunity

are

misleading.

For

one

thing,

despite

claims to

the

contrary,

igher

education remainselit-

ist

in

Cuba

Thomas

et

a

1984:

p.

41).

Tests

of

political

loyalty

and

political

achievement are

applied

at all levels

of

the

educational

sys-

tem to determinewho has access to the best facilities and training.

Second,

the

quality

of

education has not

kept

pace

with

the

in-

crease

in

the

overall

quantity

of

educational

opportunity,

which,

as

noted

earlier,

were

already

relatively

great

before

1959.

To

the

con-

trary,

he

dogmatic,

politicized

characterof

education

has

impover-

activity

s evaluated

and

rewarded

exclusively

in

terms of

its contri-

bution

to

the

Revolution,

as

judged by

the

political

elite.

Intellectual

independence

and criticism

of

the

regime

are met with

official con-

tempt,

mass

humiliation,

and

various forms of

psychological

and

physical

repression.

The

most notorious

examples

are

those

of the

poets

Heberto Padilla and


Anton

Arrufat,

ut

they

are

only

the

tip

of the

iceberg

(See

Ripoll,

1982).

Today

the vast

majority

(one

estimate is

95%)

of Cuban

writers

and creative

artistsare

in

exile. Mostare not

ex-Batistianos;

most

op-


gime,

and

some even had

positions

in

the

Castro

government

n

the

early

years.

When the cultural

regimentation

and

dogmatism

became

intolerable,

hey

left.

Many

of these

exiles have

made,

and

are now


contributions

n

the cultural

sphere.

One has

only

to

mention,

for

example,

the works

of

a

Carlos

Franqui,

a

Cabrera

nfante,

or

a dozen

distinguished

social


land

itself,

however,

he

picture

is

very

different.

As

Thomas

and his

colleagues report:

In

1964,

in a

famous interview n

Paris,

novelist

Alejo Carpentier

was asked

why

he

had

not

written a novel

about the

Cuban Revolu-

tion.

He

answered that

unfortunatley

he had

been raised

and

educat-

ed

long

before

the Revolution

and the

burden

of

creating

newrevolu-

tionary


shoulders

of a

younger

generation.

'Twenty

ears

from

now,'

he

affirmed,

we will be

able to

read the

literaryproduction

of the new

Cuba.'Those

20

years

have

elapsed.

Tragically,


single

nota-

ble

novelist,

a

famous

poet,

a

penetrating

essayist,

not even a

fresh


ered

creativity

n


island

is

merely

the

inces-

sant

voice of official

propaganda

(Thomas

et

al,

1984:

42-43).

The

situation

would seem

to

be better

at the level of

mass edu-

cation.

However,

as

is often the

case,

impressive

figures regarding

aggregate

gains

in

educational

opportunity

are

misleading.

For

one

thing,

despite

claims to

the

contrary,

igher


ist

in

Cuba

Thomas

et

a

1984:

p.

41).

Tests

of

political

loyalty

and

political

achievement are

applied

at all levels

of

the

educational

sys-


Second,

the

quality

of

education has not

kept

pace

with

the

in-

crease

in

the

overall

quantity

of

educational

opportunity,

which,

as

noted

earlier,

were

already

relatively

great

before

1959.

To

the

con-

trary,

he

dogmatic,

politicized

characterof

education

has

impover-

activity

s evaluated

and

rewarded

exclusively

in

terms of

its contri-

bution

to

the

Revolution,

as

judged by

the

political

elite.

Intellectual

independence

and criticism

of

the

regime

are met with

official con-

tempt,

mass

humiliation,

and

various forms of

psychological

and

physical

repression.

The

most notorious

examples

are

those

of the

poets

Heberto Padilla and


Anton

Arrufat,

ut

they

are

only

the

tip

of the

iceberg

(See

Ripoll,

1982).

Today

the vast

majority

(one

estimate is

95%)

of Cuban

writers

and creative

artistsare

in

exile. Mostare not

ex-Batistianos;

most

op-


gime,

and

some even had

positions

in

the

Castro

government

n

the

early

years.

When the cultural

regimentation

and

dogmatism

became

intolerable,

hey

left.

Many

of these

exiles have

made,

and

are now


contributions

n

the cultural

sphere.

One has

only

to

mention,

for

example,

the works

of

a

Carlos

Franqui,

a

Cabrera

nfante,

or

a dozen

distinguished

social


land

itself,

however,

he

picture

is

very

different.

As

Thomas

and his

colleagues report:

In

1964,

in a

famous interview n

Paris,

novelist

Alejo Carpentier

was asked

why

he

had

not

written a novel

about the

Cuban Revolu-

tion.

He

answered that

unfortunatley

he had

been raised

and

educat-

ed

long

before

the Revolution

and the

burden

of

creating

newrevolu-

tionary


shoulders

of a

younger

generation.

'Twenty

ears

from

now,'

he

affirmed,

we will be

able to

read the

literaryproduction

of the new

Cuba.'Those

20

years

have

elapsed.

Tragically,


single

nota-

ble

novelist,

a

famous

poet,

a

penetrating

essayist,

not even a

fresh


ered

creativity

n


island

is

merely

the

inces-

sant

voice of official

propaganda

(Thomas

et

al,

1984:

42-43).

The

situation

would seem

to

be better

at the level of

mass edu-

cation.

However,

as

is often the

case,

impressive

figures regarding

aggregate

gains

in

educational

opportunity

are

misleading.

For

one

thing,

despite

claims to

the

contrary,

igher


ist

in

Cuba

Thomas

et

a

1984:

p.

41).

Tests

of

political

loyalty

and

political

achievement are

applied

at all levels

of

the

educational

sys-


Second,

the

quality

of

education has not

kept

pace

with

the

in-

crease

in

the

overall

quantity

of

educational

opportunity,

which,

as

noted

earlier,

were

already

relatively

great

before

1959.

To

the

con-

trary,

he

dogmatic,

politicized

characterof

education

has

impover-

activity

s evaluated

and

rewarded

exclusively

in

terms of

its contri-

bution

to

the

Revolution,

as

judged by

the

political

elite.

Intellectual

independence

and criticism

of

the

regime

are met with

official con-

tempt,

mass

humiliation,

and

various forms of

psychological

and

physical

repression.

The

most notorious

examples

are

those

of the

poets

Heberto Padilla and


Anton

Arrufat,

ut

they

are

only

the

tip

of the

iceberg

(See

Ripoll,

1982).

Today

the vast

majority

(one

estimate is

95%)

of Cuban

writers

and creative

artistsare

in

exile. Mostare not

ex-Batistianos;

most

op-


gime,

and

some even had

positions

in

the

Castro

government

n

the

early

years.

When the cultural

regimentation

and

dogmatism

became

intolerable,

hey

left.

Many

of these

exiles have

made,

and

are now


contributions

n

the cultural

sphere.

One has

only

to

mention,

for

example,

the works

of

a

Carlos

Franqui,

a

Cabrera

nfante,

or

a dozen

distinguished

social


land

itself,

however,

he

picture

is

very

different.

As

Thomas

and his

colleagues report:

In

1964,

in a

famous interview n

Paris,

novelist

Alejo Carpentier

was asked

why

he

had

not

written a novel

about the

Cuban Revolu-

tion.

He

answered that

unfortunatley

he had

been raised

and

educat-

ed

long

before

the Revolution

and the

burden

of

creating

newrevolu-

tionary


shoulders

of a

younger

generation.

'Twenty

ears

from

now,'

he

affirmed,

we will be

able to

read the

literaryproduction

of the new

Cuba.'Those

20

years

have

elapsed.

Tragically,


single

nota-

ble

novelist,

a

famous

poet,

a

penetrating

essayist,

not even a

fresh


ered

creativity

n


island

is

merely

the

inces-

sant

voice of official

propaganda

(Thomas

et

al,

1984:

42-43).

The

situation

would seem

to

be better

at the level of

mass edu-

cation.

However,

as

is often the

case,

impressive

figures regarding

aggregate

gains

in

educational

opportunity

are

misleading.

For

one

thing,

despite

claims to

the

contrary,

igher


ist

in

Cuba

Thomas

et

a

1984:

p.

41).

Tests

of

political

loyalty

and

political

achievement are

applied

at all levels

of

the

educational

sys-


Second,

the

quality

of

education has not

kept

pace

with

the

in-

crease

in

the

overall

quantity

of

educational

opportunity,

which,

as

noted

earlier,

were

already

relatively

great

before

1959.

To

the

con-

trary,

he

dogmatic,

politicized

characterof

education

has

impover-

83333







JOURNAL

OF INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND WORLD

AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND WORLD

AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND WORLD

AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND WORLD

AFFAIRS

ished its

quality,

which is

now inferior

not

only

to what it was before

1959

but

is also inferior o its

counterparts

oday

in

democraticcoun-

tries such as CostaRica.Whenthe liberalU.S.

Congressman

Stephen

Solarz

(New York)

visited

Cuba

in

1978,

he

met with a

group

of

16

students at

the

University

of Havana.

According

to

journalist

Strobe

Talbott,

he

studentswere

impressive

in

delivering

set

pieces

con-

sistent

with

current

government

policy,

but

on

subjects

where the

government's

ine was not

yet clearly

defined,

students and

teachers

alike were

intellectually

ncapacitated.

At

the

end,

...

Solarz hanked

(his

hosts)

for a

revealing

demonstrationof 'democraticcentralism'

at work. The students seemed unawareof his irony (Talbott,1978:

31).

Scholarlyanalyses

of Cubaneducation confirm

this

journalistic

impression. According

to a

very sympathetic

study

of

The

Enter-

prise

of

History

n

Socialist Cuba:

As

long

as

problems persist

in

Cuba

(and

they

do

persist),

as

long

as

the

security

of the Revolution s

challenged

from

without,

the

emphasis

will

continue to

fall

on

the exhortation to

revolutionary

duty

and

patriotic

sacrifice.

Appreciation

of the

present,

together

with a recognition of the achievements of the Revolution,require

awarenessof

a certain version

of

the

past.

It is this central

task

that

Cuban

historiography

s

given.

It

is with the old

past

that the new

present

is

compared,

a

comparison

thatseeks to underscore

the vices

of

capitalism

and

the

virtues

of

socialism. The recent

literaturehas

examined the

nature

of

capitalism

in

prerevolutionary

Cuba,

an in-

quiry

that

begins

with

the

Spanish conquest

and

emphasizes

exploi-

tation,

corruption,

and

oppression

in

the

old

regime

-

in

short,

a

chronicle of how

truly

bad

the old

days

were.

The achievements

ofthe

Revolution,

by implication,

are

thereby

et

off

in

relief-

accomplish-

ments never to be taken for

granted

(Perez, 1985: 4;

emphases

added).

At

the level

of

secondary

education,

Cuban

officials

themselves

have

conceded

publicly

various

shortcomings

in

quality:

shoddy

constructionand

durability

of school

buildings

and

facilities,

rising

dropout

rates,

increases

in

cheating

on

the

part

of students and

teachers

(Thomas

et

al,

1984:

42).

The Militarizationof Cuban Society

Regimentation

nd

politicization

of

education

and

culture

have

parallels

in the militarization

of

society,

which,

in

turn,

has both in-

ternal

and external

aspects.

Militarization

f Cuban

society

is

partly

rooted

in

the

guerrilla

experience

that defeated

Batista.

Concepts

developed

and habits

ished its

quality,

which is

now inferior

not

only


1959

but


counterparts

oday

in

democraticcoun-


Congressman

Stephen

Solarz

(New York)

visited

Cuba

in

1978,

he

met with a

group

of

16

students at

the

University

of Havana.

According

to

journalist

Strobe

Talbott,

he

studentswere

impressive

in

delivering

set

pieces

con-

sistent

with

current

government

policy,

but

on

subjects

where the

government's

ine was not

yet clearly

defined,

students and

teachers

alike were

intellectually

ncapacitated.

At

the

end,

...

Solarz hanked

(his

hosts)

for a

revealing



31).

Scholarlyanalyses


this

journalistic


to a

very sympathetic

study

of

The

Enter-

prise

of

History

n

Socialist Cuba:

As

long

as

problems persist

in

Cuba

(and

they

do

persist),

as

long

as

the

security

of the Revolution s

challenged

from

without,

the

emphasis

will

continue to

fall

on

the exhortation to

revolutionary

duty

and

patriotic

sacrifice.

Appreciation

of the

present,

together


awarenessof

a certain version

of

the

past.

It is this central

task

that

Cuban

historiography

s

given.

It

is with the old

past

that the new

present

is

compared,

a

comparison


the vices

of

capitalism

and

the

virtues

of


literaturehas

examined the

nature

of

capitalism

in

prerevolutionary

Cuba,

an in-

quiry

that

begins

with

the

Spanish conquest

and

emphasizes

exploi-

tation,

corruption,

and

oppression

in

the

old

regime

-

in

short,

a

chronicle of how

truly

bad

the old

days

were.

The achievements

ofthe

Revolution,

by implication,

are

thereby

et

off

in

relief-

accomplish-


granted

(Perez, 1985: 4;

emphases

added).

At

the level

of

secondary

education,

Cuban

officials

themselves

have

conceded

publicly

various

shortcomings

in

quality:

shoddy

constructionand

durability

of school

buildings

and

facilities,

rising

dropout

rates,

increases

in

cheating

on

the

part

of students and

teachers

(Thomas

et

al,

1984:

42).


Regimentation

nd

politicization

of

education

and

culture

have

parallels


of

society,

which,

in

turn,

has both in-

ternal

and external

aspects.

Militarization

f Cuban

society

is

partly

rooted

in

the

guerrilla

experience

that defeated

Batista.

Concepts

developed

and habits

ished its

quality,

which is

now inferior

not

only


1959

but


counterparts

oday

in

democraticcoun-


Congressman

Stephen

Solarz

(New York)

visited

Cuba

in

1978,

he

met with a

group

of

16

students at

the

University

of Havana.

According

to

journalist

Strobe

Talbott,

he

studentswere

impressive

in

delivering

set

pieces

con-

sistent

with

current

government

policy,

but

on

subjects

where the

government's

ine was not

yet clearly

defined,

students and

teachers

alike were

intellectually

ncapacitated.

At

the

end,

...

Solarz hanked

(his

hosts)

for a

revealing



31).

Scholarlyanalyses


this

journalistic


to a

very sympathetic

study

of

The

Enter-

prise

of

History

n

Socialist Cuba:

As

long

as

problems persist

in

Cuba

(and

they

do

persist),

as

long

as

the

security

of the Revolution s

challenged

from

without,

the

emphasis

will

continue to

fall

on

the exhortation to

revolutionary

duty

and

patriotic

sacrifice.

Appreciation

of the

present,

together


awarenessof

a certain version

of

the

past.

It is this central

task

that

Cuban

historiography

s

given.

It

is with the old

past

that the new

present

is

compared,

a

comparison


the vices

of

capitalism

and

the

virtues

of


literaturehas

examined the

nature

of

capitalism

in

prerevolutionary

Cuba,

an in-

quiry

that

begins

with

the

Spanish conquest

and

emphasizes

exploi-

tation,

corruption,

and

oppression

in

the

old

regime

-

in

short,

a

chronicle of how

truly

bad

the old

days

were.

The achievements

ofthe

Revolution,

by implication,

are

thereby

et

off

in

relief-

accomplish-


granted

(Perez, 1985: 4;

emphases

added).

At

the level

of

secondary

education,

Cuban

officials

themselves

have

conceded

publicly

various

shortcomings

in

quality:

shoddy

constructionand

durability

of school

buildings

and

facilities,

rising

dropout

rates,

increases

in

cheating

on

the

part

of students and

teachers

(Thomas

et

al,

1984:

42).


Regimentation

nd

politicization

of

education

and

culture

have

parallels


of

society,

which,

in

turn,

has both in-

ternal

and external

aspects.

Militarization

f Cuban

society

is

partly

rooted

in

the

guerrilla

experience

that defeated

Batista.

Concepts

developed

and habits

ished its

quality,

which is

now inferior

not

only


1959

but


counterparts

oday

in

democraticcoun-


Congressman

Stephen

Solarz

(New York)

visited

Cuba

in

1978,

he

met with a

group

of

16

students at

the

University

of Havana.

According

to

journalist

Strobe

Talbott,

he

studentswere

impressive

in

delivering

set

pieces

con-

sistent

with

current

government

policy,

but

on

subjects

where the

government's

ine was not

yet clearly

defined,

students and

teachers

alike were

intellectually

ncapacitated.

At

the

end,

...

Solarz hanked

(his

hosts)

for a

revealing



31).

Scholarlyanalyses


this

journalistic


to a

very sympathetic

study

of

The

Enter-

prise

of

History

n

Socialist Cuba:

As

long

as

problems persist

in

Cuba

(and

they

do

persist),

as

long

as

the

security

of the Revolution s

challenged

from

without,

the

emphasis

will

continue to

fall

on

the exhortation to

revolutionary

duty

and

patriotic

sacrifice.

Appreciation

of the

present,

together


awarenessof

a certain version

of

the

past.

It is this central

task

that

Cuban

historiography

s

given.

It

is with the old

past

that the new

present

is

compared,

a

comparison


the vices

of

capitalism

and

the

virtues

of


literaturehas

examined the

nature

of

capitalism

in

prerevolutionary

Cuba,

an in-

quiry

that

begins

with

the

Spanish conquest

and

emphasizes

exploi-

tation,

corruption,

and

oppression

in

the

old

regime

-

in

short,

a

chronicle of how

truly

bad

the old

days

were.

The achievements

ofthe

Revolution,

by implication,

are

thereby

et

off

in

relief-

accomplish-


granted

(Perez, 1985: 4;

emphases

added).

At

the level

of

secondary

education,

Cuban

officials

themselves

have

conceded

publicly

various

shortcomings

in

quality:

shoddy

constructionand

durability

of school

buildings

and

facilities,

rising

dropout

rates,

increases

in

cheating

on

the

part

of students and

teachers

(Thomas

et

al,

1984:

42).


Regimentation

nd

politicization

of

education

and

culture

have

parallels


of

society,

which,

in

turn,

has both in-

ternal

and external

aspects.

Militarization

f Cuban

society

is

partly

rooted

in

the

guerrilla

experience

that defeated

Batista.

Concepts

developed

and habits

84444







PACKENHAM:CUBA

-

CAPITALIST

VS. SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:CUBA

-

CAPITALIST

VS. SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:CUBA

-

CAPITALIST

VS. SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:CUBA

-

CAPITALIST

VS. SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

forged

during

those

years

continue to affect

Cuba,

only they

are now

reinforced and

supplemented by

the

penetration

of

numerous as-

pects

of

the Soviet

model into Cuban

political organizations

and

pro-

cesses. For

example,

in

1980,13

out

of16

members of the

PoliticalBu-

reau

of

the PCC

had been

early guerrilla

ollowers of Fidel and

Raul

Castro

Thomas

etal,

1984:15).

Regular

rmedforces of Cubaare

the

largest

in

all of

Latin

America

with the

possible exception

of

Brazil,

a

country

with

13

times as

many

nhabitants nd

74

times as

much ter-

ritory.

Even

f

Cuba

eels its defense needs are

greater

han does

Bra-

zil,

this

huge

disparity

is

still

notable. There are now

between

200,000 and375,000 membersin Cuba's egulararmed orces.Inad-

dition,

there

are

another

100,000

to

500,000

men

and women in

the

militia,

several thousand

border

guards,

10-15,000

state

securitypo-

lice,

a Youth

Labor

Army

f

100,000,

and severalhundred

thousand

members

of the

military

reserves

(See

del

Aguila,

1985:

160-161;

Thomas

etal,

1984:

57;

Dominguez,

1978:

346-50;

Fagen,

1978a:

77).

If

one adds

to

this the

para-military

spects

of

the

CDRs

and other

mass

organizations,

one

sees

that

virtually

he entire

population

is

militarized

n

one

way

or another.

ndeed,

Castro

has

stated

that,

n-

stead

of a

vote,

he would offer

a

gun

to

every

citizen,

and

he has

said

many

times

that

he

had

created an armed

camp

in his

nation

(Thom-

as et

al,

1984:

57).

All

this

is a far

cry

indeed from the

47,812

poorly-

trained,

ineffective

troops

of Batista's

rmy,navy,

and reserve

forces

at their

greatest

strength (Dominguez,

1978:

346-47)

It is

these facts

that

have

led Thomas

to

say

that,

n

Cuba,

the

emphasis

on war and

weapons,

on

the

importance

of

fighting,

borderson the

psychopath-

ic

(1984:

784).

Foreign

and

Military

Policies

The

subject

of

Cuban

foreign

policy

before

1959

is

complex.

U.S.

government

influence

was

enormous

at

times,

as

the

history

of

the

PlattAmendmentand

many

aspects

of U.S.relationswith

the

gov-

ernments

of Grau

San

Martinand

Fulgencio

Batista

attest. U.S.

pri-

vate interests

also were

very

influential

in

Cuba.

In

these

respects,

among

others,

Cuban

politics

was

heavily

influenced

by

the

United

States. On the other hand, the pluralisticcharacterof U.S.govern-

ment

institutions,

and of its

public-private

relations,

diluted and

complicated

U.S.

influence and

provided political

and

economic

space

or

maneuvering

both within

Cuba and

in

Cuba's

oreign

policy.

The

character

f Soviet nstitutions

and,

therefore,

of Soviet

n-

fluence

on

Cuba,

are

very

different.

Today

Cuba

s much more

tightly

forged

during

those

years

continue to affect

Cuba,

only they

are now

reinforced and

supplemented by

the

penetration

of

numerous as-

pects

of

the Soviet

model into Cuban


and

pro-

cesses. For

example,

in

1980,13

out

of16

members of the

PoliticalBu-

reau

of

the PCC

had been

early guerrilla


Raul

Castro

Thomas

etal,

1984:15).

Regular


the

largest

in

all of

Latin

America

with the

possible exception

of

Brazil,

a

country

with

13

times as

many

nhabitants nd

74

times as

much ter-

ritory.

Even

f

Cuba


greater

han does

Bra-

zil,

this

huge

disparity

is

still


between


dition,

there

are

another

100,000

to

500,000

men

and women in

the

militia,

several thousand

border

guards,

10-15,000

state

securitypo-

lice,

a Youth

Labor

Army

f

100,000,

and severalhundred

thousand

members

of the

military

reserves

(See

del

Aguila,

1985:

160-161;

Thomas

etal,

1984:

57;

Dominguez,

1978:

346-50;

Fagen,

1978a:

77).

If

one adds

to

this the

para-military

spects

of

the

CDRs

and other

mass

organizations,

one

sees

that

virtually

he entire

population

is

militarized

n

one

way

or another.

ndeed,

Castro

has

stated

that,

n-

stead

of a

vote,

he would offer

a

gun

to

every

citizen,

and

he has

said

many

times

that

he

had

created an armed

camp

in his

nation

(Thom-

as et

al,

1984:

57).

All

this

is a far

cry

indeed from the

47,812

poorly-

trained,

ineffective

troops

of Batista's

rmy,navy,

and reserve

forces

at their

greatest


1978:

346-47)

It is

these facts

that

have

led Thomas

to

say

that,

n

Cuba,

the

emphasis

on war and

weapons,

on

the

importance

of

fighting,

borderson the

psychopath-

ic

(1984:

784).

Foreign

and

Military

Policies

The

subject

of

Cuban

foreign

policy

before

1959

is

complex.

U.S.

government

influence

was

enormous

at

times,

as

the

history

of

the

PlattAmendmentand

many

aspects


the

gov-

ernments

of Grau

San

Martinand

Fulgencio

Batista

attest. U.S.

pri-

vate interests

also were

very

influential

in

Cuba.

In

these

respects,

among

others,

Cuban

politics

was

heavily

influenced

by

the

United


ment

institutions,

and of its

public-private

relations,

diluted and

complicated

U.S.

influence and

provided political

and

economic

space

or

maneuvering

both within

Cuba and

in

Cuba's

oreign

policy.

The

character


and,

therefore,

of Soviet

n-

fluence

on

Cuba,

are

very

different.

Today

Cuba

s much more

tightly

forged

during

those

years

continue to affect

Cuba,

only they

are now

reinforced and

supplemented by

the

penetration

of

numerous as-

pects

of

the Soviet

model into Cuban


and

pro-

cesses. For

example,

in

1980,13

out

of16

members of the

PoliticalBu-

reau

of

the PCC

had been

early guerrilla


Raul

Castro

Thomas

etal,

1984:15).

Regular


the

largest

in

all of

Latin

America

with the

possible exception

of

Brazil,

a

country

with

13

times as

many

nhabitants nd

74

times as

much ter-

ritory.

Even

f

Cuba


greater

han does

Bra-

zil,

this

huge

disparity

is

still


between


dition,

there

are

another

100,000

to

500,000

men

and women in

the

militia,

several thousand

border

guards,

10-15,000

state

securitypo-

lice,

a Youth

Labor

Army

f

100,000,

and severalhundred

thousand

members

of the

military

reserves

(See

del

Aguila,

1985:

160-161;

Thomas

etal,

1984:

57;

Dominguez,

1978:

346-50;

Fagen,

1978a:

77).

If

one adds

to

this the

para-military

spects

of

the

CDRs

and other

mass

organizations,

one

sees

that

virtually

he entire

population

is

militarized

n

one

way

or another.

ndeed,

Castro

has

stated

that,

n-

stead

of a

vote,

he would offer

a

gun

to

every

citizen,

and

he has

said

many

times

that

he

had

created an armed

camp

in his

nation

(Thom-

as et

al,

1984:

57).

All

this

is a far

cry

indeed from the

47,812

poorly-

trained,

ineffective

troops

of Batista's

rmy,navy,

and reserve

forces

at their

greatest


1978:

346-47)

It is

these facts

that

have

led Thomas

to

say

that,

n

Cuba,

the

emphasis

on war and

weapons,

on

the

importance

of

fighting,

borderson the

psychopath-

ic

(1984:

784).

Foreign

and

Military

Policies

The

subject

of

Cuban

foreign

policy

before

1959

is

complex.

U.S.

government

influence

was

enormous

at

times,

as

the

history

of

the

PlattAmendmentand

many

aspects


the

gov-

ernments

of Grau

San

Martinand

Fulgencio

Batista

attest. U.S.

pri-

vate interests

also were

very

influential

in

Cuba.

In

these

respects,

among

others,

Cuban

politics

was

heavily

influenced

by

the

United


ment

institutions,

and of its

public-private

relations,

diluted and

complicated

U.S.

influence and

provided political

and

economic

space

or

maneuvering

both within

Cuba and

in

Cuba's

oreign

policy.

The

character


and,

therefore,

of Soviet

n-

fluence

on

Cuba,

are

very

different.

Today

Cuba

s much more

tightly

forged

during

those

years

continue to affect

Cuba,

only they

are now

reinforced and

supplemented by

the

penetration

of

numerous as-

pects

of

the Soviet

model into Cuban


and

pro-

cesses. For

example,

in

1980,13

out

of16

members of the

PoliticalBu-

reau

of

the PCC

had been

early guerrilla


Raul

Castro

Thomas

etal,

1984:15).

Regular


the

largest

in

all of

Latin

America

with the

possible exception

of

Brazil,

a

country

with

13

times as

many

nhabitants nd

74

times as

much ter-

ritory.

Even

f

Cuba


greater

han does

Bra-

zil,

this

huge

disparity

is

still


between


dition,

there

are

another

100,000

to

500,000

men

and women in

the

militia,

several thousand

border

guards,

10-15,000

state

securitypo-

lice,

a Youth

Labor

Army

f

100,000,

and severalhundred

thousand

members

of the

military

reserves

(See

del

Aguila,

1985:

160-161;

Thomas

etal,

1984:

57;

Dominguez,

1978:

346-50;

Fagen,

1978a:

77).

If

one adds

to

this the

para-military

spects

of

the

CDRs

and other

mass

organizations,

one

sees

that

virtually

he entire

population

is

militarized

n

one

way

or another.

ndeed,

Castro

has

stated

that,

n-

stead

of a

vote,

he would offer

a

gun

to

every

citizen,

and

he has

said

many

times

that

he

had

created an armed

camp

in his

nation

(Thom-

as et

al,

1984:

57).

All

this

is a far

cry

indeed from the

47,812

poorly-

trained,

ineffective

troops

of Batista's

rmy,navy,

and reserve

forces

at their

greatest


1978:

346-47)

It is

these facts

that

have

led Thomas

to

say

that,

n

Cuba,

the

emphasis

on war and

weapons,

on

the

importance

of

fighting,

borderson the

psychopath-

ic

(1984:

784).

Foreign

and

Military

Policies

The

subject

of

Cuban

foreign

policy

before

1959

is

complex.

U.S.

government

influence

was

enormous

at

times,

as

the

history

of

the

PlattAmendmentand

many

aspects


the

gov-

ernments

of Grau

San

Martinand

Fulgencio

Batista

attest. U.S.

pri-

vate interests

also were

very

influential

in

Cuba.

In

these

respects,

among

others,

Cuban

politics

was

heavily

influenced

by

the

United


ment

institutions,

and of its

public-private

relations,

diluted and

complicated

U.S.

influence and

provided political

and

economic

space

or

maneuvering

both within

Cuba and

in

Cuba's

oreign

policy.

The

character


and,

therefore,

of Soviet

n-

fluence

on

Cuba,

are

very

different.

Today

Cuba

s much more

tightly

85555







JOURNAL


AND WORLD AFFAIRS

OURNAL


AND WORLD AFFAIRS

OURNAL


AND WORLD AFFAIRS

OURNAL


AND WORLD AFFAIRS

tied

to the Soviet

government_

n its

foreign

and domestic

policies

than it ever was

to the

United

States

government.

In

fact,

the

majorconstrainton Soviet influence is its

physical

distance from Cuba.

This

leaves both

the

USSRand

Cubasomewhat

vulnerable.Ironical-

ly,physical

distance is one

of

the factors

dependencia

thinkers

reject

as

relevant

o

dependency

because

it is

not,

per

se,

an

aspect

of their

touchstone

distinction between

capitalism

and

socialism.

Soviet

nfluence was

insignificant

at the

beginning

of

the Revo-

lution.

It

became

important

only

about

18

months

after

Castro

came

to

power

in

January

959

(Blasier,

1983:

100-103).

Through

most

of

the 1960sthe relationshipgrew,but there were also majordifferenc-

es between

the

Sovietand

Cuban

governments

on domestic and

for-

eign

policies.

The Cubans veered from one

extreme to

another

in

their

economic

policies

and favored

nsurrectionary

iolence

against

established

governments

in

LatinAmerican countries. The Soviets

opposed

both these tendencies. In the

1970s,

however,

differences

declined between the Cuban and Soviet

governments

in

both

do-

mestic and

foreign policy

areas.

Domestically,

since

1970

the

Cuban

polity,

economy,

and

society

have

increasingly

been

reorganized

along

Soviet lines. In the international

sphere,

particularly

ince

1968,

the

Cuban

government

has

accepted

the Soviet

government

as

its

senior

partner

n

foreign

policy.

Thus,

Cuba

has

supported

Sovi-

et

policy

in

Czechoslovakia

(1968),

Afghanistan

(1979),

Poland

(1981),

Angola

(1979),

Ethiopia

1979)

Nicaragua

1979),

and

El

Sal-

vador

(1979).

The Cubanshave

been

an

effective

sponsor

of Soviet

policies

in

Africaand

Central

Americaand have served as active

sup-

porters

in

the

Non-Aligned

Movement

of

Third World

countries.

Theyhave also sided with the USSRagainstthe People'sRepublicof

China

(PRC).

Since the late

1960s

there has

been

no

important

oreign policy

question

on

which the

Cubanshave

publicly

challenged

the Soviet

Union.

On

the

contrary,

he

Cubans

have followed

the

Soviet ead

as

loyally

as

any

East

European country

(perhaps

more

loyally

than

most)

even

on issues as distastefulas

Czechoslovakia,

Afghanistan,

and

Poland.

If

privatedisagreements

or

qualifications

exist,

they

are

not

expressed

publicly.

The scale and scope of Cuban nvolvementwith Sovietforeign

and

militarypolicies

are

astonishing

for a

country

of

10

million

peo-

ple

which never

imagined,

let alone

implemented,

such levels

of

militaryactivity

n

the

context of

capitalist

dependency.

Cubanmili-

taryoperations

n

Africa

and the

Middle East

exploded

in

magnitude

tied

to the Soviet

government_

n its

foreign

and domestic

policies

than it ever was

to the

United

States

government.

In

fact,

the


physical

distance from Cuba.

This

leaves both

the

USSRand

Cubasomewhat


ly,physical

distance is one

of

the factors

dependencia

thinkers

reject

as

relevant

o

dependency

because

it is

not,

per

se,

an

aspect

of their

touchstone

distinction between

capitalism

and

socialism.

Soviet

nfluence was

insignificant

at the

beginning

of

the Revo-

lution.

It

became

important

only

about

18

months

after

Castro

came

to

power

in

January

959

(Blasier,

1983:

100-103).

Through

most

of


es between

the

Sovietand

Cuban

governments

on domestic and

for-

eign

policies.


extreme to

another

in

their

economic

policies

and favored

nsurrectionary

iolence

against

established

governments

in


opposed


1970s,

however,

differences


governments

in

both

do-

mestic and

foreign policy

areas.

Domestically,

since

1970

the

Cuban

polity,

economy,

and

society

have

increasingly

been

reorganized

along


sphere,

particularly

ince

1968,

the

Cuban

government

has

accepted

the Soviet

government

as

its

senior

partner

n

foreign

policy.

Thus,

Cuba

has

supported

Sovi-

et

policy

in

Czechoslovakia

(1968),

Afghanistan

(1979),

Poland

(1981),

Angola

(1979),

Ethiopia

1979)

Nicaragua

1979),

and

El

Sal-

vador

(1979).

The Cubanshave

been

an

effective

sponsor

of Soviet

policies

in

Africaand

Central


sup-

porters

in

the

Non-Aligned

Movement

of

Third World

countries.


China

(PRC).

Since the late

1960s

there has

been

no

important

oreign policy

question

on

which the

Cubanshave

publicly

challenged

the Soviet

Union.

On

the

contrary,

he

Cubans

have followed

the

Soviet ead

as

loyally

as

any

East

European country

(perhaps

more

loyally

than

most)

even


Czechoslovakia,

Afghanistan,

and

Poland.

If


or

qualifications

exist,

they

are

not

expressed

publicly.


and

militarypolicies

are

astonishing

for a

country

of

10

million

peo-

ple

which never

imagined,

let alone

implemented,

such levels

of

militaryactivity

n

the

context of

capitalist

dependency.

Cubanmili-

taryoperations

n

Africa

and the

Middle East

exploded

in

magnitude

tied

to the Soviet

government_

n its

foreign

and domestic

policies

than it ever was

to the

United

States

government.

In

fact,

the


physical

distance from Cuba.

This

leaves both

the

USSRand

Cubasomewhat


ly,physical

distance is one

of

the factors

dependencia

thinkers

reject

as

relevant

o

dependency

because

it is

not,

per

se,

an

aspect

of their

touchstone

distinction between

capitalism

and

socialism.

Soviet

nfluence was

insignificant

at the

beginning

of

the Revo-

lution.

It

became

important

only

about

18

months

after

Castro

came

to

power

in

January

959

(Blasier,

1983:

100-103).

Through

most

of


es between

the

Sovietand

Cuban

governments

on domestic and

for-

eign

policies.


extreme to

another

in

their

economic

policies

and favored

nsurrectionary

iolence

against

established

governments

in


opposed


1970s,

however,

differences


governments

in

both

do-

mestic and

foreign policy

areas.

Domestically,

since

1970

the

Cuban

polity,

economy,

and

society

have

increasingly

been

reorganized

along


sphere,

particularly

ince

1968,

the

Cuban

government

has

accepted

the Soviet

government

as

its

senior

partner

n

foreign

policy.

Thus,

Cuba

has

supported

Sovi-

et

policy

in

Czechoslovakia

(1968),

Afghanistan

(1979),

Poland

(1981),

Angola

(1979),

Ethiopia

1979)

Nicaragua

1979),

and

El

Sal-

vador

(1979).

The Cubanshave

been

an

effective

sponsor

of Soviet

policies

in

Africaand

Central


sup-

porters

in

the

Non-Aligned

Movement

of

Third World

countries.


China

(PRC).

Since the late

1960s

there has

been

no

important

oreign policy

question

on

which the

Cubanshave

publicly

challenged

the Soviet

Union.

On

the

contrary,

he

Cubans

have followed

the

Soviet ead

as

loyally

as

any

East

European country

(perhaps

more

loyally

than

most)

even


Czechoslovakia,

Afghanistan,

and

Poland.

If


or

qualifications

exist,

they

are

not

expressed

publicly.


and

militarypolicies

are

astonishing

for a

country

of

10

million

peo-

ple

which never

imagined,

let alone

implemented,

such levels

of

militaryactivity

n

the

context of

capitalist

dependency.

Cubanmili-

taryoperations

n

Africa

and the

Middle East

exploded

in

magnitude

tied

to the Soviet

government_

n its

foreign

and domestic

policies

than it ever was

to the

United

States

government.

In

fact,

the


physical

distance from Cuba.

This

leaves both

the

USSRand

Cubasomewhat


ly,physical

distance is one

of

the factors

dependencia

thinkers

reject

as

relevant

o

dependency

because

it is

not,

per

se,

an

aspect

of their

touchstone

distinction between

capitalism

and

socialism.

Soviet

nfluence was

insignificant

at the

beginning

of

the Revo-

lution.

It

became

important

only

about

18

months

after

Castro

came

to

power

in

January

959

(Blasier,

1983:

100-103).

Through

most

of


es between

the

Sovietand

Cuban

governments

on domestic and

for-

eign

policies.


extreme to

another

in

their

economic

policies

and favored

nsurrectionary

iolence

against

established

governments

in


opposed


1970s,

however,

differences


governments

in

both

do-

mestic and

foreign policy

areas.

Domestically,

since

1970

the

Cuban

polity,

economy,

and

society

have

increasingly

been

reorganized

along


sphere,

particularly

ince

1968,

the

Cuban

government

has

accepted

the Soviet

government

as

its

senior

partner

n

foreign

policy.

Thus,

Cuba

has

supported

Sovi-

et

policy

in

Czechoslovakia

(1968),

Afghanistan

(1979),

Poland

(1981),

Angola

(1979),

Ethiopia

1979)

Nicaragua

1979),

and

El

Sal-

vador

(1979).

The Cubanshave

been

an

effective

sponsor

of Soviet

policies

in

Africaand

Central


sup-

porters

in

the

Non-Aligned

Movement

of

Third World

countries.


China

(PRC).

Since the late

1960s

there has

been

no

important

oreign policy

question

on

which the

Cubanshave

publicly

challenged

the Soviet

Union.

On

the

contrary,

he

Cubans

have followed

the

Soviet ead

as

loyally

as

any

East

European country

(perhaps

more

loyally

than

most)

even


Czechoslovakia,

Afghanistan,

and

Poland.

If


or

qualifications

exist,

they

are

not

expressed

publicly.


and

militarypolicies

are

astonishing

for a

country

of

10

million

peo-

ple

which never

imagined,

let alone

implemented,

such levels

of

militaryactivity

n

the

context of

capitalist

dependency.

Cubanmili-

taryoperations

n

Africa

and the

Middle East

exploded

in

magnitude

86666







PACKENHAM:

CUBA- CAPITALISTVS.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:

CUBA- CAPITALISTVS.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:

CUBA- CAPITALISTVS.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:

CUBA- CAPITALISTVS.

SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

during

the

collaborative

phase

of

Cuban-Soviet

relations,

which

began

in

the late

1960s

and

which is still

going

on. The

highest

total

numberof Cuban

roops

and

military

advisers

n

those

regions,

at

any

time

in

the

1960s,

was an estimated

750-1,000

in

1966.

By1976

it

had

increased to

an

estimated

16-19,000,

and

by

1978

to an

estimated

38-

39,000 (Blasier,

1983:112).

Cuban forces

abroad

in the late

1970s

accounted

for

two-thirds

of the

military

and technical

personnel

stationed

by

all

Communist

states

in

the Third

World

exceeding

Soviet

troops

in

Afghanistan

and

Vietnamese forces

in

SoutheastAsia. In

addition

to

troops,

Cuba

dispatchedtechnicians, advisers,and constructionsworkers o Alge-

ria,

Iraq,

Jamaica,

Libya,Mozambique,Nicaragua,

Vietnam,

and Gre-

nada n the

late

1970s

and

early1980s

(Thomas

etal, 1984:12;

ee

also

Mesa-Lago,

981:

50-53;

and

del

Aguila,

1984:125).

In

1978

Cubahad not

only

about

35,000

military

roops

and ad-

visers

in

Angola

and

Ethiopia

but 200

in

Libya,

000

in

Mozambique,

300-400

in

South

Yemen,

100-150

n

Guinea

Bissau,

50

in

Tanzania,

20

in

Iraq,

and

15-60

in

Zambia

(Blasier,

1983:112).

A

fewyears

later,

in

1981-83,

Cuba's

verseas

militarypresence

continued at the

same

level in most of the foregoingcountries (except for Guinea-Bissau,

where it

dropped

to

50)

although

it

increased to

3,000

in

Libya,

1,000

in

Mozambique,

2,200

in

Iraq,

and 800

in

South

Yemen. In

ad-

dition there

were

170

Cuban

military personnel

in

Algeria

and

2-4,000

in

Nicaragua.

Another

22-25,000

economic

technicians

were

operating

n

these countries

(del

Aguila,

1984:125).

According

to

Fidel

Castro,

more

than

100,000

members

of

the Cuban

armed

forces

had served

in

Africa

by

the

end

of

1980.

In

1982

Cuba had

about

70,000

military

roops,

military

advisers,

and civilian

advisers

in 23 countriesaroundthe world (Thomas et al, 1984:12).

Not

only militarypersonnel

but

weapons

capabilities

ncreased

very

rapidlyduring

this

period.

In

1981

here-were

about

2,400

Soviet

military

advisers

n

Cuba

o

provide

training

and

support-for

he

mili-

taryequipment

that had flowed into

Cubasince

1975

(in

additionto

several thousand

Soviet civilian

advisors).

Cuba's

ground

and air

forces,

nearly

all

provided

by

the

Soviets,

ncluded

200

MIG

ighters

and

50

other

kinds of

combat

aircraft;

8

combat

helicopters;

650

tanks;1,500 anti-aircraft uns; and dozens of militarytransportair-

craft,

including

at least

7

long-range jets

each

capable

of

carrying

150-200

combat

equipped troops

(Cirincione

and

Hunter,

1984:

175).

In

short,

he

military

has

been,

by

far,

he most

dynamic

ector

of the

Cuban

economy

for at least a

decade. The

Soviets have

paid

during

the

collaborative

phase

of

Cuban-Soviet

relations,

which

began

in

the late

1960s

and

which is still

going

on. The

highest

total

numberof Cuban

roops

and

military

advisers

n

those

regions,

at

any

time

in

the

1960s,

was an estimated

750-1,000

in

1966.

By1976

it

had

increased to

an

estimated

16-19,000,

and

by

1978

to an

estimated

38-

39,000 (Blasier,

1983:112).

Cuban forces

abroad

in the late

1970s

accounted

for

two-thirds

of the

military

and technical

personnel

stationed

by

all

Communist

states

in

the Third

World

exceeding

Soviet

troops

in

Afghanistan

and

Vietnamese forces

in

SoutheastAsia. In

addition

to

troops,

Cuba


ria,

Iraq,

Jamaica,


Vietnam,

and Gre-

nada n the

late

1970s

and

early1980s

(Thomas

etal, 1984:12;

ee

also

Mesa-Lago,

981:

50-53;

and

del

Aguila,

1984:125).

In

1978

Cubahad not

only

about

35,000

military

roops

and ad-

visers

in

Angola

and

Ethiopia

but 200

in

Libya,

000

in

Mozambique,

300-400

in

South

Yemen,

100-150

n

Guinea

Bissau,

50

in

Tanzania,

20

in

Iraq,

and

15-60

in

Zambia

(Blasier,

1983:112).

A

fewyears

later,

in

1981-83,

Cuba's

verseas

militarypresence

continued at the

same


where it

dropped

to

50)

although

it

increased to

3,000

in

Libya,

1,000

in

Mozambique,

2,200

in

Iraq,

and 800

in

South

Yemen. In

ad-

dition there

were

170

Cuban

military personnel

in

Algeria

and

2-4,000

in

Nicaragua.

Another

22-25,000

economic

technicians

were

operating

n

these countries

(del

Aguila,

1984:125).

According

to

Fidel

Castro,

more

than

100,000

members

of

the Cuban

armed

forces

had served

in

Africa

by

the

end

of

1980.

In

1982

Cuba had

about

70,000

military

roops,

military

advisers,

and civilian

advisers


Not


but

weapons

capabilities

ncreased

very

rapidlyduring

this

period.

In

1981

here-were

about

2,400

Soviet

military

advisers

n

Cuba

o

provide

training

and

support-for

he

mili-

taryequipment


Cubasince

1975

(in

additionto

several thousand

Soviet civilian

advisors).

Cuba's

ground

and air

forces,

nearly

all

provided

by

the

Soviets,

ncluded

200

MIG

ighters

and

50

other

kinds of

combat

aircraft;

8

combat

helicopters;

650


craft,

including

at least

7

long-range jets

each

capable

of

carrying

150-200

combat

equipped troops

(Cirincione

and

Hunter,

1984:

175).

In

short,

he

military

has

been,

by

far,

he most

dynamic

ector

of the

Cuban

economy

for at least a

decade. The

Soviets have

paid

during

the

collaborative

phase

of

Cuban-Soviet

relations,

which

began

in

the late

1960s

and

which is still

going

on. The

highest

total

numberof Cuban

roops

and

military

advisers

n

those

regions,

at

any

time

in

the

1960s,

was an estimated

750-1,000

in

1966.

By1976

it

had

increased to

an

estimated

16-19,000,

and

by

1978

to an

estimated

38-

39,000 (Blasier,

1983:112).

Cuban forces

abroad

in the late

1970s

accounted

for

two-thirds

of the

military

and technical

personnel

stationed

by

all

Communist

states

in

the Third

World

exceeding

Soviet

troops

in

Afghanistan

and

Vietnamese forces

in

SoutheastAsia. In

addition

to

troops,

Cuba


ria,

Iraq,

Jamaica,


Vietnam,

and Gre-

nada n the

late

1970s

and

early1980s

(Thomas

etal, 1984:12;

ee

also

Mesa-Lago,

981:

50-53;

and

del

Aguila,

1984:125).

In

1978

Cubahad not

only

about

35,000

military

roops

and ad-

visers

in

Angola

and

Ethiopia

but 200

in

Libya,

000

in

Mozambique,

300-400

in

South

Yemen,

100-150

n

Guinea

Bissau,

50

in

Tanzania,

20

in

Iraq,

and

15-60

in

Zambia

(Blasier,

1983:112).

A

fewyears

later,

in

1981-83,

Cuba's

verseas

militarypresence

continued at the

same


where it

dropped

to

50)

although

it

increased to

3,000

in

Libya,

1,000

in

Mozambique,

2,200

in

Iraq,

and 800

in

South

Yemen. In

ad-

dition there

were

170

Cuban

military personnel

in

Algeria

and

2-4,000

in

Nicaragua.

Another

22-25,000

economic

technicians

were

operating

n

these countries

(del

Aguila,

1984:125).

According

to

Fidel

Castro,

more

than

100,000

members

of

the Cuban

armed

forces

had served

in

Africa

by

the

end

of

1980.

In

1982

Cuba had

about

70,000

military

roops,

military

advisers,

and civilian

advisers


Not


but

weapons

capabilities

ncreased

very

rapidlyduring

this

period.

In

1981

here-were

about

2,400

Soviet

military

advisers

n

Cuba

o

provide

training

and

support-for

he

mili-

taryequipment


Cubasince

1975

(in

additionto

several thousand

Soviet civilian

advisors).

Cuba's

ground

and air

forces,

nearly

all

provided

by

the

Soviets,

ncluded

200

MIG

ighters

and

50

other

kinds of

combat

aircraft;

8

combat

helicopters;

650


craft,

including

at least

7

long-range jets

each

capable

of

carrying

150-200

combat

equipped troops

(Cirincione

and

Hunter,

1984:

175).

In

short,

he

military

has

been,

by

far,

he most

dynamic

ector

of the

Cuban

economy

for at least a

decade. The

Soviets have

paid

during

the

collaborative

phase

of

Cuban-Soviet

relations,

which

began

in

the late

1960s

and

which is still

going

on. The

highest

total

numberof Cuban

roops

and

military

advisers

n

those

regions,

at

any

time

in

the

1960s,

was an estimated

750-1,000

in

1966.

By1976

it

had

increased to

an

estimated

16-19,000,

and

by

1978

to an

estimated

38-

39,000 (Blasier,

1983:112).

Cuban forces

abroad

in the late

1970s

accounted

for

two-thirds

of the

military

and technical

personnel

stationed

by

all

Communist

states

in

the Third

World

exceeding

Soviet

troops

in

Afghanistan

and

Vietnamese forces

in

SoutheastAsia. In

addition

to

troops,

Cuba


ria,

Iraq,

Jamaica,


Vietnam,

and Gre-

nada n the

late

1970s

and

early1980s

(Thomas

etal, 1984:12;

ee

also

Mesa-Lago,

981:

50-53;

and

del

Aguila,

1984:125).

In

1978

Cubahad not

only

about

35,000

military

roops

and ad-

visers

in

Angola

and

Ethiopia

but 200

in

Libya,

000

in

Mozambique,

300-400

in

South

Yemen,

100-150

n

Guinea

Bissau,

50

in

Tanzania,

20

in

Iraq,

and

15-60

in

Zambia

(Blasier,

1983:112).

A

fewyears

later,

in

1981-83,

Cuba's

verseas

militarypresence

continued at the

same


where it

dropped

to

50)

although

it

increased to

3,000

in

Libya,

1,000

in

Mozambique,

2,200

in

Iraq,

and 800

in

South

Yemen. In

ad-

dition there

were

170

Cuban

military personnel

in

Algeria

and

2-4,000

in

Nicaragua.

Another

22-25,000

economic

technicians

were

operating

n

these countries

(del

Aguila,

1984:125).

According

to

Fidel

Castro,

more

than

100,000

members

of

the Cuban

armed

forces

had served

in

Africa

by

the

end

of

1980.

In

1982

Cuba had

about

70,000

military

roops,

military

advisers,

and civilian

advisers


Not


but

weapons

capabilities

ncreased

very

rapidlyduring

this

period.

In

1981

here-were

about

2,400

Soviet

military

advisers

n

Cuba

o

provide

training

and

support-for

he

mili-

taryequipment


Cubasince

1975

(in

additionto

several thousand

Soviet civilian

advisors).

Cuba's

ground

and air

forces,

nearly

all

provided

by

the

Soviets,

ncluded

200

MIG

ighters

and

50

other

kinds of

combat

aircraft;

8

combat

helicopters;

650


craft,

including

at least

7

long-range jets

each

capable

of

carrying

150-200

combat

equipped troops

(Cirincione

and

Hunter,

1984:

175).

In

short,

he

military

has

been,

by

far,

he most

dynamic

ector

of the

Cuban

economy

for at least a

decade. The

Soviets have

paid

87777







JOURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND WORLD AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND WORLD AFFAIRS

most of the

economic

costs

in

this sector.

One

of the main

arguments

of

dependencia

writers

s

that

foreign capital

is concentrated

n

the

most

dynamic

sectors of

the

associated-dependent

countries,

and

therefore hat

foreign capital

s more influential

han mere

aggregate

investments

would

suggest. By

this

logic

of

dynamic-sector

naly-

sis the

Soviet role

in

Cuba

is

greater

than

U.S.

capital

ever

was in

Cuba.

Many

commentators

maintain hat Cuba's

oreign

policy

reflects

Cuba's

own

interests.

However,

t is not

plausible

that a

country

of

Cuba's

ize,

location and

precarious

economy

would,

in its

own

in-

terests, have 70,000 troops and militaryadvisers in 23 countries

around

the

world,

mostly

in

Africa

and

the

Middle

East,

where the

troops

are

Cuban

but the

officers and the uniformsare Russian.

It is

also

argued

that

this

foreign military

nvolvement

s

popular

n

Cuba.

Butwhat does

popular

mean in

Cuba,

where dissent

is

counterrev-

olutionary

and

antinational,

where the media and

the means of

pro-

duction

are

state-controlled,

and where a

strong

apparatus

of

politi-

cal

mobilizationand

vigilance

s in

place?

If

it is so

popular

nd

in

Cuba's

nterests,

why

are data

on

casualties

unreported

in

Cuba?

the deadburied outside Cuba? nd the wounded

kept

outof the

pub-

lic

eye?

(Leiken,1981:100;

Pastor,

983:191).

Why,despite

intense

po-

litical

pressures

and

safeguards

against

release

of

information

on the

subject,

is

there still evidence

of resistance

to the

African wars

among

the

managerial

elite?

of insubordination

among

some

troops ?

nd

of

widespreadunhappiness

among

the Cuban

people

concerning

compulsory

military

service?

(Dominguez,

1978:

355).

CONCLUSION

THIS

PAPER

OES NOT

maintain hat Cuban

Revolutionary

nstitu-

tions and

policies

totally

replicate

Soviet

models and

preferences.

Neither

did

pre-1959

Cuba

respond automatically

o influences

from

the United

States.The

paper

does

reject,

however,

the

proposition

that Cuba's

domestic

development

and

foreign

relations under so-

cialism

have been autonomous and

nonexploitative

and

puts

fortha

verydifferenthypothesis,namely,thata bi-pealliance of Cubanand

Soviet elites

is

systematically

dominating

and

exploiting

the

Cuban

people

for its own ends.4

This

conclusion

conflicts

sharply

with that of

dependencia

au-

thors

regarding

he character

and

consequences

of socialist

depen-

most of the

economic

costs

in

this sector.

One

of the main

arguments

of

dependencia

writers

s

that

foreign capital

is concentrated

n

the

most

dynamic

sectors of

the


countries,

and

therefore hat

foreign capital

s more influential

han mere

aggregate

investments

would

suggest. By

this

logic

of

dynamic-sector

naly-

sis the

Soviet role

in

Cuba

is

greater

than

U.S.

capital

ever

was in

Cuba.

Many

commentators

maintain hat Cuba's

oreign

policy

reflects

Cuba's

own

interests.

However,

t is not

plausible

that a

country

of

Cuba's

ize,

location and

precarious

economy

would,

in its

own

in-


around

the

world,

mostly

in

Africa

and

the

Middle

East,

where the

troops

are

Cuban

but the


It is

also

argued

that

this

foreign military

nvolvement

s

popular

n

Cuba.

Butwhat does

popular

mean in

Cuba,

where dissent

is

counterrev-

olutionary

and

antinational,

where the media and

the means of

pro-

duction

are

state-controlled,

and where a

strong

apparatus

of

politi-

cal

mobilizationand

vigilance

s in

place?

If

it is so

popular

nd

in

Cuba's

nterests,

why

are data

on

casualties

unreported

in

Cuba?


kept

outof the

pub-

lic

eye?

(Leiken,1981:100;

Pastor,

983:191).

Why,despite

intense

po-

litical

pressures

and

safeguards

against

release

of

information

on the

subject,

is


of resistance

to the

African wars

among

the

managerial

elite?

of insubordination

among

some

troops ?

nd

of


among

the Cuban

people

concerning

compulsory

military

service?

(Dominguez,

1978:

355).

CONCLUSION

THIS

PAPER

OES NOT

maintain hat Cuban

Revolutionary

nstitu-

tions and

policies

totally

replicate

Soviet

models and

preferences.

Neither

did

pre-1959

Cuba


o influences

from

the United

States.The

paper

does

reject,

however,

the

proposition

that Cuba's

domestic

development

and

foreign

relations under so-

cialism


nonexploitative

and

puts

fortha


Soviet elites

is

systematically

dominating

and

exploiting

the

Cuban

people

for its own ends.4

This

conclusion

conflicts

sharply

with that of

dependencia

au-

thors

regarding

he character

and

consequences

of socialist

depen-

most of the

economic

costs

in

this sector.

One

of the main

arguments

of

dependencia

writers

s

that

foreign capital

is concentrated

n

the

most

dynamic

sectors of

the


countries,

and

therefore hat

foreign capital

s more influential

han mere

aggregate

investments

would

suggest. By

this

logic

of

dynamic-sector

naly-

sis the

Soviet role

in

Cuba

is

greater

than

U.S.

capital

ever

was in

Cuba.

Many

commentators

maintain hat Cuba's

oreign

policy

reflects

Cuba's

own

interests.

However,

t is not

plausible

that a

country

of

Cuba's

ize,

location and

precarious

economy

would,

in its

own

in-


around

the

world,

mostly

in

Africa

and

the

Middle

East,

where the

troops

are

Cuban

but the


It is

also

argued

that

this

foreign military

nvolvement

s

popular

n

Cuba.

Butwhat does

popular

mean in

Cuba,

where dissent

is

counterrev-

olutionary

and

antinational,

where the media and

the means of

pro-

duction

are

state-controlled,

and where a

strong

apparatus

of

politi-

cal

mobilizationand

vigilance

s in

place?

If

it is so

popular

nd

in

Cuba's

nterests,

why

are data

on

casualties

unreported

in

Cuba?


kept

outof the

pub-

lic

eye?

(Leiken,1981:100;

Pastor,

983:191).

Why,despite

intense

po-

litical

pressures

and

safeguards

against

release

of

information

on the

subject,

is


of resistance

to the

African wars

among

the

managerial

elite?

of insubordination

among

some

troops ?

nd

of


among

the Cuban

people

concerning

compulsory

military

service?

(Dominguez,

1978:

355).

CONCLUSION

THIS

PAPER

OES NOT

maintain hat Cuban

Revolutionary

nstitu-

tions and

policies

totally

replicate

Soviet

models and

preferences.

Neither

did

pre-1959

Cuba


o influences

from

the United

States.The

paper

does

reject,

however,

the

proposition

that Cuba's

domestic

development

and

foreign

relations under so-

cialism


nonexploitative

and

puts

fortha


Soviet elites

is

systematically

dominating

and

exploiting

the

Cuban

people

for its own ends.4

This

conclusion

conflicts

sharply

with that of

dependencia

au-

thors

regarding

he character

and

consequences

of socialist

depen-

most of the

economic

costs

in

this sector.

One

of the main

arguments

of

dependencia

writers

s

that

foreign capital

is concentrated

n

the

most

dynamic

sectors of

the


countries,

and

therefore hat

foreign capital

s more influential

han mere

aggregate

investments

would

suggest. By

this

logic

of

dynamic-sector

naly-

sis the

Soviet role

in

Cuba

is

greater

than

U.S.

capital

ever

was in

Cuba.

Many

commentators

maintain hat Cuba's

oreign

policy

reflects

Cuba's

own

interests.

However,

t is not

plausible

that a

country

of

Cuba's

ize,

location and

precarious

economy

would,

in its

own

in-


around

the

world,

mostly

in

Africa

and

the

Middle

East,

where the

troops

are

Cuban

but the


It is

also

argued

that

this

foreign military

nvolvement

s

popular

n

Cuba.

Butwhat does

popular

mean in

Cuba,

where dissent

is

counterrev-

olutionary

and

antinational,

where the media and

the means of

pro-

duction

are

state-controlled,

and where a

strong

apparatus

of

politi-

cal

mobilizationand

vigilance

s in

place?

If

it is so

popular

nd

in

Cuba's

nterests,

why

are data

on

casualties

unreported

in

Cuba?


kept

outof the

pub-

lic

eye?

(Leiken,1981:100;

Pastor,

983:191).

Why,despite

intense

po-

litical

pressures

and

safeguards

against

release

of

information

on the

subject,

is


of resistance

to the

African wars

among

the

managerial

elite?

of insubordination

among

some

troops ?

nd

of


among

the Cuban

people

concerning

compulsory

military

service?

(Dominguez,

1978:

355).

CONCLUSION

THIS

PAPER

OES NOT

maintain hat Cuban

Revolutionary

nstitu-

tions and

policies

totally

replicate

Soviet

models and

preferences.

Neither

did

pre-1959

Cuba


o influences

from

the United

States.The

paper

does

reject,

however,

the

proposition

that Cuba's

domestic

development

and

foreign

relations under so-

cialism


nonexploitative

and

puts

fortha


Soviet elites

is

systematically

dominating

and

exploiting

the

Cuban

people

for its own ends.4

This

conclusion

conflicts

sharply

with that of

dependencia

au-

thors

regarding

he character

and

consequences

of socialist

depen-

88888







PACKENHAM:CUBA - CAPITALISTVS. SOCIALIST DEPENDENCYACKENHAM:CUBA - CAPITALISTVS. SOCIALIST DEPENDENCYACKENHAM:CUBA - CAPITALISTVS. SOCIALIST DEPENDENCYACKENHAM:CUBA - CAPITALISTVS. SOCIALIST DEPENDENCY

dency.

These authors

frequently

call for

studies of concrete

situa-

tions

of


and

occasionally

have made

such

studies,

but

they

never

study

concrete situationsof socialist

depen-

dency.

It

is

hoped

that

this

examination of

specific

features

and

mechanisms of

a

socialist

dependency

will

contribute

to

the com-

parative

analysis

of

capitalist

and socialist

dependency.

Barriers o

such

comparativeanalysis

are

many.

They

include

not

only

the

intellectual stricturesof

Marxism

but also numerous so-

ciological,

historical,

and

political

obstacles.

These barriers

make

it

difficultfor

most scholars

writing

about LatinAmericaeven to think

of analyzingsocialist cases in anythinglike the same criticalspirit

routinely

applied

to

capitalist

cases. Critical

analyses

of

capitalist

cases are not

necessarily perceived

as

containing

an

anti-capitalist

bias,

critical

analyses

of socialist cases

are

often

perceived

as

anti-socialist

er

se.

The

first is

considered

permissible;

the

sec-

ond

is

not.

These barriers o

objective

criticism

go

back at least to

the Viet-

nam Warand to

taboos

generated during

the

era

of

Joseph

McCarthy

in the

United States. Some roots extend even farther

back.

In

the

1930s

George

Orwell discovered to

his

sorrow hatthe

intelligentsia

could

not

conceive

of

directing

upon

Russia

anything

ike

the same

stringency

of criticism

they

used on their own nation.

Later,

n

Cata-

lonia Orwell

learned

that,

while the

Communist-controlled

overn-

ment was

filling

up

the

jails

with

themost

devoted

fighters

or

Span-

ish

freedom,

men who

had

given

up everything

for

the

cause,

he

intelligentsia

who

controlled the Western

press

did not

know,

and re-

fused to

know,

because

they

were committed not to the fact

but to

the abstraction Trilling,1952:xvii, xxii).

It is

time to

consider not the abstractionbut the

fact

of

socialist

dependency.

If

real-world ases of

capitalism

are

compared

to

ideal-

world cases of

socialism,

the

socialist case will

always

look

better.

The

same criterianeed

to

be

applied

to both.

A

genuine

comparison

does

not

necessarily

lead to a

particular

et of conclusions

and

opin-

ions about the relative merits of the

two

kinds

of

dependent

situa-

tions,

but it

does allow

the debate

to

take

place

on

more

realistic

grounds

and thus to facilitatea

more

valid

appraisal

of human

well-

being

in

dependent

countries.

dency.

These authors

frequently

call for

studies of concrete

situa-

tions

of


and

occasionally

have made

such

studies,

but

they

never

study


depen-

dency.

It

is

hoped

that

this

examination of

specific

features

and

mechanisms of

a

socialist

dependency

will

contribute

to

the com-

parative

analysis

of

capitalist

and socialist

dependency.

Barriers o

such

comparativeanalysis

are

many.

They

include

not

only

the


Marxism


ciological,

historical,

and

political

obstacles.

These barriers

make

it

difficultfor

most scholars

writing



routinely

applied

to

capitalist

cases. Critical

analyses

of

capitalist

cases are not


as

containing

an

anti-capitalist

bias,

critical

analyses

of socialist cases

are

often

perceived

as

anti-socialist

er

se.

The

first is

considered

permissible;

the

sec-

ond

is

not.

These barriers o

objective

criticism

go

back at least to

the Viet-

nam Warand to

taboos

generated during

the

era

of

Joseph

McCarthy

in the


back.

In

the

1930s

George


his

sorrow hatthe

intelligentsia

could

not

conceive

of

directing

upon

Russia

anything

ike

the same

stringency

of criticism

they


Later,

n

Cata-

lonia Orwell

learned

that,

while the


overn-

ment was

filling

up

the

jails

with

themost

devoted

fighters

or

Span-

ish

freedom,

men who

had

given

up everything

for

the

cause,

he

intelligentsia

who


press

did not

know,

and re-

fused to

know,

because

they


but to


It is

time to


fact

of

socialist

dependency.

If

real-world ases of

capitalism

are

compared

to

ideal-

world cases of

socialism,

the

socialist case will

always

look

better.

The

same criterianeed

to

be

applied

to both.

A

genuine

comparison

does

not

necessarily

lead to a

particular

et of conclusions

and

opin-


two

kinds

of

dependent

situa-

tions,

but it

does allow

the debate

to

take

place

on

more

realistic

grounds


more

valid

appraisal

of human

well-

being

in

dependent

countries.

dency.

These authors

frequently

call for

studies of concrete

situa-

tions

of


and

occasionally

have made

such

studies,

but

they

never

study


depen-

dency.

It

is

hoped

that

this

examination of

specific

features

and

mechanisms of

a

socialist

dependency

will

contribute

to

the com-

parative

analysis

of

capitalist

and socialist

dependency.

Barriers o

such

comparativeanalysis

are

many.

They

include

not

only

the


Marxism


ciological,

historical,

and

political

obstacles.

These barriers

make

it

difficultfor

most scholars

writing



routinely

applied

to

capitalist

cases. Critical

analyses

of

capitalist

cases are not


as

containing

an

anti-capitalist

bias,

critical

analyses

of socialist cases

are

often

perceived

as

anti-socialist

er

se.

The

first is

considered

permissible;

the

sec-

ond

is

not.

These barriers o

objective

criticism

go

back at least to

the Viet-

nam Warand to

taboos

generated during

the

era

of

Joseph

McCarthy

in the


back.

In

the

1930s

George


his

sorrow hatthe

intelligentsia

could

not

conceive

of

directing

upon

Russia

anything

ike

the same

stringency

of criticism

they


Later,

n

Cata-

lonia Orwell

learned

that,

while the


overn-

ment was

filling

up

the

jails

with

themost

devoted

fighters

or

Span-

ish

freedom,

men who

had

given

up everything

for

the

cause,

he

intelligentsia

who


press

did not

know,

and re-

fused to

know,

because

they


but to


It is

time to


fact

of

socialist

dependency.

If

real-world ases of

capitalism

are

compared

to

ideal-

world cases of

socialism,

the

socialist case will

always

look

better.

The

same criterianeed

to

be

applied

to both.

A

genuine

comparison

does

not

necessarily

lead to a

particular

et of conclusions

and

opin-


two

kinds

of

dependent

situa-

tions,

but it

does allow

the debate

to

take

place

on

more

realistic

grounds


more

valid

appraisal

of human

well-

being

in

dependent

countries.

dency.

These authors

frequently

call for

studies of concrete

situa-

tions

of


and

occasionally

have made

such

studies,

but

they

never

study


depen-

dency.

It

is

hoped

that

this

examination of

specific

features

and

mechanisms of

a

socialist

dependency

will

contribute

to

the com-

parative

analysis

of

capitalist

and socialist

dependency.

Barriers o

such

comparativeanalysis

are

many.

They

include

not

only

the


Marxism


ciological,

historical,

and

political

obstacles.

These barriers

make

it

difficultfor

most scholars

writing



routinely

applied

to

capitalist

cases. Critical

analyses

of

capitalist

cases are not


as

containing

an

anti-capitalist

bias,

critical

analyses

of socialist cases

are

often

perceived

as

anti-socialist

er

se.

The

first is

considered

permissible;

the

sec-

ond

is

not.

These barriers o

objective

criticism

go

back at least to

the Viet-

nam Warand to

taboos

generated during

the

era

of

Joseph

McCarthy

in the


back.

In

the

1930s

George


his

sorrow hatthe

intelligentsia

could

not

conceive

of

directing

upon

Russia

anything

ike

the same

stringency

of criticism

they


Later,

n

Cata-

lonia Orwell

learned

that,

while the


overn-

ment was

filling

up

the

jails

with

themost

devoted

fighters

or

Span-

ish

freedom,

men who

had

given

up everything

for

the

cause,

he

intelligentsia

who


press

did not

know,

and re-

fused to

know,

because

they


but to


It is

time to


fact

of

socialist

dependency.

If

real-world ases of

capitalism

are

compared

to

ideal-

world cases of

socialism,

the

socialist case will

always

look

better.

The

same criterianeed

to

be

applied

to both.

A

genuine

comparison

does

not

necessarily

lead to a

particular

et of conclusions

and

opin-


two

kinds

of

dependent

situa-

tions,

but it

does allow

the debate

to

take

place

on

more

realistic

grounds


more

valid

appraisal

of human

well-

being

in

dependent

countries.

89999







JOURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND

WORLD

AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND

WORLD

AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND

WORLD

AFFAIRS

JOURNAL

OF

INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND

WORLD

AFFAIRS

NOTES

1.

The

concept

of the

tri-pealliance,comprised

of

foreignprivatecapi-

tal,

national

privatecapital,

and

national

public

or state

capital,

is elaborat-

ed

in

Cardoso

(1973b);

Evans

(1979);

and

Cardoso

and Faletto

(1979).

2.

On

the

tri-pe

alliance see

note

1

above

and

the

accompanying

text.

Whereasthe

tri-pe

alliance in

capitalist

cases is

comprised

of

foreign

pri-

vate

capital,

national

privatecapital,

and national

public

or state

capital,

he

bi-pe

alliance

in socialist cases is

comprised

of

foreign

state elites and

na-

tional

state elites.

In

socialist

cases,

of

course,

privatecapitalists

are

nonex-

istent or

insignificant.

3.

Two

million

is

the estimate of

Jorge Domfnguez

as cited

by

Maidique(1983:31). One million is the estimate of Skidmoreand Smith

(1984: 284).

4.

On

the

concept

of

a

bi-pe

alliance,

see notes

1 and 2

above and the

accompanying

texts.

REFERENCES

BLASIER,

.

(1983)

The

Giant's

Rival:The USSRand

LatinAmerica.Pitts-

burgh,

PA:

University

of

Pittsburgh

Press.

BRUNDENIUS,

D.

(1984)

Revolutionary

Cuba:

The

Challenge

of

Economic

Growthwith Equity.Boulder,CO:WestviewPress.

CARDOSO,

E

(1977)

The

Consumption

of

Dependency Theory

in

the

United

States.

Latin

AmericanResearchReview

12,

3:

7-24.

(1973a)

Cuba:

Lesson or

Symbol?:'pp.

1-9

in

D. Barkin and

N.

Manitzas

eds.)

Cuba:

The

Logic

of the Revolution.

Andover,

MA:

Warner

ModularPublications

Inc.,

Module

267.

(1973b)

'Associated-Dependent

Development:' pp.

142-176

in

A.

Stepan

(ed.)

Authoritarian razil.

New

Haven,

CT:

Yale

University

Press.

CARDOSO,

E and

E.

FALETTO

1979)

Dependency

and

Development

in

LatinAmerica.Berkeley,CA:Universityof CaliforniaPress.

CIRINCIONE,

.,

and L.

HUNTER

1984)

Military

Threats,

Actualand

Po-

tential,

pp.

173-192

n R. Leiken

(ed.)

Central

America:

Anatomy

of a

Conflict.

New

York,

NY:

Pergamon

Press.

del

AGUILA,

.

(1984)

CUBA:

DILEMMAS

F

A

REVOLUTION.

oulder,

CO:

Westview

Press.

DOMINGUEZ,J.

1978)

Cuba:Order

and Revolution.

Cambridge,

MA:Har-

vard

University

Press.

DUNCAN,

WR.

(1985)

The Soviet Union

and

Cuba:

Interests and Influ-

ence. New

York,

NY:

Praeger

Publishers.

ERISMAN,

.

(1985)

Cuba's

nternationalRelations:The

Anatomy

of

a

Na-

tionalistic

Foreign

Policy.

Boulder,

CO:

Westview

Press.

EVANS,

.

(1979)

Dependent Development:

The Alliance of

Multinational,

State,

and Local

Capital

n Brazil. Princeton

University

Press.

NOTES

1.

The

concept

of the


of

foreignprivatecapi-

tal,

national

privatecapital,

and

national

public

or state

capital,

is elaborat-

ed

in

Cardoso

(1973b);

Evans

(1979);

and

Cardoso

and Faletto

(1979).

2.

On

the

tri-pe

alliance see

note

1

above

and

the

accompanying

text.

Whereasthe

tri-pe

alliance in

capitalist

cases is

comprised

of

foreign

pri-

vate

capital,

national

privatecapital,

and national

public

or state

capital,

he

bi-pe

alliance


comprised

of

foreign

state elites and

na-

tional

state elites.

In

socialist

cases,

of

course,

privatecapitalists

are

nonex-

istent or

insignificant.

3.

Two

million

is

the estimate of

Jorge Domfnguez

as cited

by


(1984: 284).

4.

On

the

concept

of

a

bi-pe

alliance,

see notes

1 and 2

above and the

accompanying

texts.

REFERENCES

BLASIER,

.

(1983)

The

Giant's

Rival:The USSRand

LatinAmerica.Pitts-

burgh,

PA:

University

of

Pittsburgh

Press.

BRUNDENIUS,

D.

(1984)

Revolutionary

Cuba:

The

Challenge

of

Economic


CARDOSO,

E

(1977)

The

Consumption

of

Dependency Theory

in

the

United

States.

Latin


12,

3:

7-24.

(1973a)

Cuba:

Lesson or

Symbol?:'pp.

1-9

in

D. Barkin and

N.

Manitzas

eds.)

Cuba:

The

Logic

of the Revolution.

Andover,

MA:

Warner

ModularPublications

Inc.,

Module

267.

(1973b)


Development:' pp.

142-176

in

A.

Stepan

(ed.)


New

Haven,

CT:

Yale

University

Press.

CARDOSO,

E and

E.

FALETTO

1979)

Dependency

and

Development

in


CIRINCIONE,

.,

and L.

HUNTER

1984)

Military

Threats,

Actualand

Po-

tential,

pp.

173-192

n R. Leiken

(ed.)

Central

America:

Anatomy

of a

Conflict.

New

York,

NY:

Pergamon

Press.

del

AGUILA,

.

(1984)

CUBA:

DILEMMAS

F

A

REVOLUTION.

oulder,

CO:

Westview

Press.

DOMINGUEZ,J.

1978)

Cuba:Order

and Revolution.

Cambridge,

MA:Har-

vard

University

Press.

DUNCAN,

WR.

(1985)

The Soviet Union

and

Cuba:


ence. New

York,

NY:

Praeger

Publishers.

ERISMAN,

.

(1985)

Cuba's


Anatomy

of

a

Na-

tionalistic

Foreign

Policy.

Boulder,

CO:

Westview

Press.

EVANS,

.

(1979)


The Alliance of

Multinational,

State,

and Local

Capital

n Brazil. Princeton

University

Press.

NOTES

1.

The

concept

of the


of

foreignprivatecapi-

tal,

national

privatecapital,

and

national

public

or state

capital,

is elaborat-

ed

in

Cardoso

(1973b);

Evans

(1979);

and

Cardoso

and Faletto

(1979).

2.

On

the

tri-pe

alliance see

note

1

above

and

the

accompanying

text.

Whereasthe

tri-pe

alliance in

capitalist

cases is

comprised

of

foreign

pri-

vate

capital,

national

privatecapital,

and national

public

or state

capital,

he

bi-pe

alliance


comprised

of

foreign

state elites and

na-

tional

state elites.

In

socialist

cases,

of

course,

privatecapitalists

are

nonex-

istent or

insignificant.

3.

Two

million

is

the estimate of

Jorge Domfnguez

as cited

by


(1984: 284).

4.

On

the

concept

of

a

bi-pe

alliance,

see notes

1 and 2

above and the

accompanying

texts.

REFERENCES

BLASIER,

.

(1983)

The

Giant's

Rival:The USSRand

LatinAmerica.Pitts-

burgh,

PA:

University

of

Pittsburgh

Press.

BRUNDENIUS,

D.

(1984)

Revolutionary

Cuba:

The

Challenge

of

Economic


CARDOSO,

E

(1977)

The

Consumption

of

Dependency Theory

in

the

United

States.

Latin


12,

3:

7-24.

(1973a)

Cuba:

Lesson or

Symbol?:'pp.

1-9

in

D. Barkin and

N.

Manitzas

eds.)

Cuba:

The

Logic

of the Revolution.

Andover,

MA:

Warner

ModularPublications

Inc.,

Module

267.

(1973b)


Development:' pp.

142-176

in

A.

Stepan

(ed.)


New

Haven,

CT:

Yale

University

Press.

CARDOSO,

E and

E.

FALETTO

1979)

Dependency

and

Development

in


CIRINCIONE,

.,

and L.

HUNTER

1984)

Military

Threats,

Actualand

Po-

tential,

pp.

173-192

n R. Leiken

(ed.)

Central

America:

Anatomy

of a

Conflict.

New

York,

NY:

Pergamon

Press.

del

AGUILA,

.

(1984)

CUBA:

DILEMMAS

F

A

REVOLUTION.

oulder,

CO:

Westview

Press.

DOMINGUEZ,J.

1978)

Cuba:Order

and Revolution.

Cambridge,

MA:Har-

vard

University

Press.

DUNCAN,

WR.

(1985)

The Soviet Union

and

Cuba:


ence. New

York,

NY:

Praeger

Publishers.

ERISMAN,

.

(1985)

Cuba's


Anatomy

of

a

Na-

tionalistic

Foreign

Policy.

Boulder,

CO:

Westview

Press.

EVANS,

.

(1979)


The Alliance of

Multinational,

State,

and Local

Capital

n Brazil. Princeton

University

Press.

NOTES

1.

The

concept

of the


of

foreignprivatecapi-

tal,

national

privatecapital,

and

national

public

or state

capital,

is elaborat-

ed

in

Cardoso

(1973b);

Evans

(1979);

and

Cardoso

and Faletto

(1979).

2.

On

the

tri-pe

alliance see

note

1

above

and

the

accompanying

text.

Whereasthe

tri-pe

alliance in

capitalist

cases is

comprised

of

foreign

pri-

vate

capital,

national

privatecapital,

and national

public

or state

capital,

he

bi-pe

alliance


comprised

of

foreign

state elites and

na-

tional

state elites.

In

socialist

cases,

of

course,

privatecapitalists

are

nonex-

istent or

insignificant.

3.

Two

million

is

the estimate of

Jorge Domfnguez

as cited

by


(1984: 284).

4.

On

the

concept

of

a

bi-pe

alliance,

see notes

1 and 2

above and the

accompanying

texts.

REFERENCES

BLASIER,

.

(1983)

The

Giant's

Rival:The USSRand

LatinAmerica.Pitts-

burgh,

PA:

University

of

Pittsburgh

Press.

BRUNDENIUS,

D.

(1984)

Revolutionary

Cuba:

The

Challenge

of

Economic


CARDOSO,

E

(1977)

The

Consumption

of

Dependency Theory

in

the

United

States.

Latin


12,

3:

7-24.

(1973a)

Cuba:

Lesson or

Symbol?:'pp.

1-9

in

D. Barkin and

N.

Manitzas

eds.)

Cuba:

The

Logic

of the Revolution.

Andover,

MA:

Warner

ModularPublications

Inc.,

Module

267.

(1973b)


Development:' pp.

142-176

in

A.

Stepan

(ed.)


New

Haven,

CT:

Yale

University

Press.

CARDOSO,

E and

E.

FALETTO

1979)

Dependency

and

Development

in


CIRINCIONE,

.,

and L.

HUNTER

1984)

Military

Threats,

Actualand

Po-

tential,

pp.

173-192

n R. Leiken

(ed.)

Central

America:

Anatomy

of a

Conflict.

New

York,

NY:

Pergamon

Press.

del

AGUILA,

.

(1984)

CUBA:

DILEMMAS

F

A

REVOLUTION.

oulder,

CO:

Westview

Press.

DOMINGUEZ,J.

1978)

Cuba:Order

and Revolution.

Cambridge,

MA:Har-

vard

University

Press.

DUNCAN,

WR.

(1985)

The Soviet Union

and

Cuba:


ence. New

York,

NY:

Praeger

Publishers.

ERISMAN,

.

(1985)

Cuba's


Anatomy

of

a

Na-

tionalistic

Foreign

Policy.

Boulder,

CO:

Westview

Press.

EVANS,

.

(1979)


The Alliance of

Multinational,

State,

and Local

Capital

n Brazil. Princeton

University

Press.

90000







PACKENHAM:

CUBA

-

CAPITALIST

VS. SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:

CUBA

-

CAPITALIST

VS. SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:

CUBA

-

CAPITALIST

VS. SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

ACKENHAM:

CUBA

-

CAPITALIST

VS. SOCIALIST

DEPENDENCY

FAGEN,

R.

(1978a)

Cuba nd the Soviet Union '

The

Wilson

Quarterly

2,1

(Winter):

69-78.

(1978b)

'A

Funny

Thing

Happened

on the

Way

to

the

Market:

Thoughts

on

Extending

Dependency

Ideas. International

Organization

32,1

(Winter:

287-300.

GONZALEZ,

.

(1974)

Cuba Under Castro:The

Limits

of Charisma.Bos-

ton:

Houghton

Mifflin.

GRIECO,

.

(1982)

Between

Dependency

and

Autonomy.

nternational

Organization

36,

3

(Summer):

609-632.

HALEBSKY,

.,

andJ.KIRK

eds.)

(1985)

Cuba:

Twenty-five

Years

of

Revolu-

tion,1959-1984.NewYork,NY:PraegerPublishers.

JOHNSON,

L.

(1965)

U.S.

Business

Investments

in

Cuba and the

Rise

of

Castro.

WorldPolitics

17,

3

(April):

440-59.

KAUFMAN,

.

(1976)

The

Superpowers

and their

Spheres

of

Influence.

New

York,

NY:

St.

Martins'

Press.

LEIKENR.

(1981)

EasternWinds

in

Latin America

Foreign

Policy

42

(Spring):

94-113.

LEOGRANDE,

W

(1979)

Cuban

Dependency:

A

Comparison

of

Pre-Revo-

lutionary

and

Post-Revolutionary

nternational

Economic

Relations '

Cuban Studies9, 2 (July):1-28.

LEONTIEV,

(1971)

The

Troublewith

Cuban Socialism. The New

York

Review

of Books

(7

January):

19-23.

LOCKWOOD,

.

(1970)

Introduction o 'This

Shame

Will

be Welcome

... :'

A

Speech

by

Fidel

Castro.

he

NewYorkReviewof Books

(24

Sep-

tember):

18-20.

MAIDIQUE,

M.

(1983)

Fidel'sPlantation.

The Stanford

Magazine

11,

4:

26-32.

MESA-LAGO,

.

(1981)

The

Economyof SocialistCuba;ATwo-DecadeAp-

praisal.Albuquerque,

NM:

University

of New

Mexico Press.

PASTOR,

.

(1983)

Cuba nd the Soviet

Union:

Does

CubaAct

Alone?,

p.

191-209

n B.

Levine

(ed.)

The New

Cuban Presence

in

the

Caribbean.

Boulder,

CO:WestviewPress.

PEREZ,

L.

(1985)

Toward New

Future,

Froma New

Past:The

Enterprise

of

History

n

Socialist

Cuba. Cuban Studies

15,1

(Winter):

1-13.

RIPOLL,

C.

(1982)

The

Cuban

Scene: Censors

and

Dissenters.

Partisan

Review

48,

4:1-16

(reprinted

by

the

Cuban-American

National

Founda-

tion,Washington,DC).

SKIDMORE,

.E.and PH. SMITH

1984)

Modern

LatinAmerica.

NewYork:

Oxford

University

Press.

STREET,J.

nd

D.JAMES

eds.) (1979)

TechnologyProgress

n Latin

Ameri-

ca.

Boulder,

CO:WestviewPress.

FAGEN,

R.

(1978a)


The

Wilson

Quarterly

2,1

(Winter):

69-78.

(1978b)

'A

Funny

Thing

Happened

on the

Way

to

the

Market:

Thoughts

on

Extending

Dependency


Organization

32,1

(Winter:

287-300.

GONZALEZ,

.

(1974)


Limits

of Charisma.Bos-

ton:

Houghton

Mifflin.

GRIECO,

.

(1982)

Between

Dependency

and

Autonomy.

nternational

Organization

36,

3

(Summer):

609-632.

HALEBSKY,

.,

andJ.KIRK

eds.)

(1985)

Cuba:

Twenty-five

Years

of

Revolu-


JOHNSON,

L.

(1965)

U.S.

Business

Investments

in

Cuba and the

Rise

of

Castro.

WorldPolitics

17,

3

(April):

440-59.

KAUFMAN,

.

(1976)

The

Superpowers

and their

Spheres

of

Influence.

New

York,

NY:

St.

Martins'

Press.

LEIKENR.

(1981)

EasternWinds

in

Latin America

Foreign

Policy

42

(Spring):

94-113.

LEOGRANDE,

W

(1979)

Cuban

Dependency:

A

Comparison

of

Pre-Revo-

lutionary

and

Post-Revolutionary

nternational

Economic

Relations '


LEONTIEV,

(1971)

The

Troublewith


York

Review

of Books

(7

January):

19-23.

LOCKWOOD,

.

(1970)


Shame

Will

be Welcome

... :'

A

Speech

by

Fidel

Castro.

he


(24

Sep-

tember):

18-20.

MAIDIQUE,

M.

(1983)

Fidel'sPlantation.

The Stanford

Magazine

11,

4:

26-32.

MESA-LAGO,

.

(1981)

The



NM:

University

of New

Mexico Press.

PASTOR,

.

(1983)

Cuba nd the Soviet

Union:

Does

CubaAct

Alone?,

p.

191-209

n B.

Levine

(ed.)

The New

Cuban Presence

in

the

Caribbean.

Boulder,

CO:WestviewPress.

PEREZ,

L.

(1985)

Toward New

Future,

Froma New

Past:The

Enterprise

of

History

n

Socialist

Cuba. Cuban Studies

15,1

(Winter):

1-13.

RIPOLL,

C.

(1982)

The

Cuban

Scene: Censors

and

Dissenters.

Partisan

Review

48,

4:1-16

(reprinted

by

the

Cuban-American

National

Founda-


SKIDMORE,

.E.and PH. SMITH

1984)

Modern

LatinAmerica.

NewYork:

Oxford

University

Press.

STREET,J.

nd

D.JAMES

eds.) (1979)

TechnologyProgress

n Latin

Ameri-

ca.

Boulder,

CO:WestviewPress.

FAGEN,

R.

(1978a)


The

Wilson

Quarterly

2,1

(Winter):

69-78.

(1978b)

'A

Funny

Thing

Happened

on the

Way

to

the

Market:

Thoughts

on

Extending

Dependency


Organization

32,1

(Winter:

287-300.

GONZALEZ,

.

(1974)


Limits

of Charisma.Bos-

ton:

Houghton

Mifflin.

GRIECO,

.

(1982)

Between

Dependency

and

Autonomy.

nternational

Organization

36,

3

(Summer):

609-632.

HALEBSKY,

.,

andJ.KIRK

eds.)

(1985)

Cuba:

Twenty-five

Years

of

Revolu-


JOHNSON,

L.

(1965)

U.S.

Business

Investments

in

Cuba and the

Rise

of

Castro.

WorldPolitics

17,

3

(April):

440-59.

KAUFMAN,

.

(1976)

The

Superpowers

and their

Spheres

of

Influence.

New

York,

NY:

St.

Martins'

Press.

LEIKENR.

(1981)

EasternWinds

in

Latin America

Foreign

Policy

42

(Spring):

94-113.

LEOGRANDE,

W

(1979)

Cuban

Dependency:

A

Comparison

of

Pre-Revo-

lutionary

and

Post-Revolutionary

nternational

Economic

Relations '


LEONTIEV,

(1971)

The

Troublewith


York

Review

of Books

(7

January):

19-23.

LOCKWOOD,

.

(1970)


Shame

Will

be Welcome

... :'

A

Speech

by

Fidel

Castro.

he


(24

Sep-

tember):

18-20.

MAIDIQUE,

M.

(1983)

Fidel'sPlantation.

The Stanford

Magazine

11,

4:

26-32.

MESA-LAGO,

.

(1981)

The



NM:

University

of New

Mexico Press.

PASTOR,

.

(1983)

Cuba nd the Soviet

Union:

Does

CubaAct

Alone?,

p.

191-209

n B.

Levine

(ed.)

The New

Cuban Presence

in

the

Caribbean.

Boulder,

CO:WestviewPress.

PEREZ,

L.

(1985)

Toward New

Future,

Froma New

Past:The

Enterprise

of

History

n

Socialist

Cuba. Cuban Studies

15,1

(Winter):

1-13.

RIPOLL,

C.

(1982)

The

Cuban

Scene: Censors

and

Dissenters.

Partisan

Review

48,

4:1-16

(reprinted

by

the

Cuban-American

National

Founda-


SKIDMORE,

.E.and PH. SMITH

1984)

Modern

LatinAmerica.

NewYork:

Oxford

University

Press.

STREET,J.

nd

D.JAMES

eds.) (1979)

TechnologyProgress

n Latin

Ameri-

ca.

Boulder,

CO:WestviewPress.

FAGEN,

R.

(1978a)


The

Wilson

Quarterly

2,1

(Winter):

69-78.

(1978b)

'A

Funny

Thing

Happened

on the

Way

to

the

Market:

Thoughts

on

Extending

Dependency


Organization

32,1

(Winter:

287-300.

GONZALEZ,

.

(1974)


Limits

of Charisma.Bos-

ton:

Houghton

Mifflin.

GRIECO,

.

(1982)

Between

Dependency

and

Autonomy.

nternational

Organization

36,

3

(Summer):

609-632.

HALEBSKY,

.,

andJ.KIRK

eds.)

(1985)

Cuba:

Twenty-five

Years

of

Revolu-


JOHNSON,

L.

(1965)

U.S.

Business

Investments

in

Cuba and the

Rise

of

Castro.

WorldPolitics

17,

3

(April):

440-59.

KAUFMAN,

.

(1976)

The

Superpowers

and their

Spheres

of

Influence.

New

York,

NY:

St.

Martins'

Press.

LEIKENR.

(1981)

EasternWinds

in

Latin America

Foreign

Policy

42

(Spring):

94-113.

LEOGRANDE,

W

(1979)

Cuban

Dependency:

A

Comparison

of

Pre-Revo-

lutionary

and

Post-Revolutionary

nternational

Economic

Relations '


LEONTIEV,

(1971)

The

Troublewith


York

Review

of Books

(7

January):

19-23.

LOCKWOOD,

.

(1970)


Shame

Will

be Welcome

... :'

A

Speech

by

Fidel

Castro.

he


(24

Sep-

tember):

18-20.

MAIDIQUE,

M.

(1983)

Fidel'sPlantation.

The Stanford

Magazine

11,

4:

26-32.

MESA-LAGO,

.

(1981)

The



NM:

University

of New

Mexico Press.

PASTOR,

.

(1983)

Cuba nd the Soviet

Union:

Does

CubaAct

Alone?,

p.

191-209

n B.

Levine

(ed.)

The New

Cuban Presence

in

the

Caribbean.

Boulder,

CO:WestviewPress.

PEREZ,

L.

(1985)

Toward New

Future,

Froma New

Past:The

Enterprise

of

History

n

Socialist

Cuba. Cuban Studies

15,1

(Winter):

1-13.

RIPOLL,

C.

(1982)

The

Cuban

Scene: Censors

and

Dissenters.

Partisan

Review

48,

4:1-16

(reprinted

by

the

Cuban-American

National

Founda-


SKIDMORE,

.E.and PH. SMITH

1984)

Modern

LatinAmerica.

NewYork:

Oxford

University

Press.

STREET,J.

nd

D.JAMES

eds.) (1979)

TechnologyProgress

n Latin

Ameri-

ca.

Boulder,

CO:WestviewPress.

91111







92

JOURNAL

OF INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND

WORLD

AFFAIRS

TALBOTT,

.

(1978a)

'A

Display

of

Group-Think

Time

Magazine

(26

June):

31.

(1978b)

Comrade idel WantsYou Time

Magazine

(10July):

36-39.

THOMAS,

H.

(1984)

Coping

with

Cuba,

p.

775-789

in I.

Horowitz

(ed.)

Cuban

Communism,

5th

edition. New

Brunswick,

NJ:

Transaction

Books.

(1977)

The

Cuban

Revolution.

New

York,

NY:

Harper

and Row.

(1971)

Cuba:

The

Pursuit

of Freedom.

NewYork,

NY:

Harper

and Row.

THOMAS,H., FAURIOL,G.,

and J. WEISS

(1984)

The Cuban Revolution:

Twenty-Five

Years

Later.

Boulder,

CO:WestviewPress.

TRILLING,.(1952) Introduction, p.v-xxiii n George Orwell'sHomage

to

Catalonia.

New

York,

NY:Harcourt

Brace

Jovanovich.

92

JOURNAL

OF INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND

WORLD

AFFAIRS

TALBOTT,

.

(1978a)

'A

Display

of

Group-Think

Time

Magazine

(26

June):

31.

(1978b)


Magazine

(10July):

36-39.

THOMAS,

H.

(1984)

Coping

with

Cuba,

p.

775-789

in I.

Horowitz

(ed.)

Cuban

Communism,

5th

edition. New

Brunswick,

NJ:

Transaction

Books.

(1977)

The

Cuban

Revolution.

New

York,

NY:

Harper

and Row.

(1971)

Cuba:

The

Pursuit

of Freedom.

NewYork,

NY:

Harper

and Row.


and J. WEISS

(1984)


Twenty-Five

Years

Later.

Boulder,

CO:WestviewPress.


to

Catalonia.

New

York,

NY:Harcourt

Brace

Jovanovich.

92

JOURNAL

OF INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND

WORLD

AFFAIRS

TALBOTT,

.

(1978a)

'A

Display

of

Group-Think

Time

Magazine

(26

June):

31.

(1978b)


Magazine

(10July):

36-39.

THOMAS,

H.

(1984)

Coping

with

Cuba,

p.

775-789

in I.

Horowitz

(ed.)

Cuban

Communism,

5th

edition. New

Brunswick,

NJ:

Transaction

Books.

(1977)

The

Cuban

Revolution.

New

York,

NY:

Harper

and Row.

(1971)

Cuba:

The

Pursuit

of Freedom.

NewYork,

NY:

Harper

and Row.


and J. WEISS

(1984)


Twenty-Five

Years

Later.

Boulder,

CO:WestviewPress.


to

Catalonia.

New

York,

NY:Harcourt

Brace

Jovanovich.

92

JOURNAL

OF INTERAMERICAN

STUDIES

AND

WORLD

AFFAIRS

TALBOTT,

.

(1978a)

'A

Display

of

Group-Think

Time

Magazine

(26

June):

31.

(1978b)


Magazine

(10July):

36-39.

THOMAS,

H.

(1984)

Coping

with

Cuba,

p.

775-789

in I.

Horowitz

(ed.)

Cuban

Communism,

5th

edition. New

Brunswick,

NJ:

Transaction

Books.

(1977)

The

Cuban

Revolution.

New

York,

NY:

Harper

and Row.

(1971)

Cuba:

The

Pursuit

of Freedom.

NewYork,

NY:

Harper

and Row.


and J. WEISS

(1984)


Twenty-Five

Years

Later.

Boulder,

CO:WestviewPress.


to

Catalonia.

New

York,

NY:Harcourt

Brace

Jovanovich.

Documents

Capitalist Cuban Case. PDF