Capitaos and Chiefs: Oral Tradition and Colonial Society in Malawi

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Capitaos and Chiefs: Oral Tradition and Colonial Society in MalawiAuthor(s): Tony WoodsSource: The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1990), pp. 259-268Published by: Boston University African Studies CenterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/219337 .

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The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 23, 2 (1990) 259

CAPITAOS AND CHIEFS: ORAL TRADITION AND COLONIAL SOCIETY IN MALAWI By Tony Woods

The relaxation of restrictions at the Malawi National Archives has created important new opportunities for that country's historians.1 But before researchers can realize the enormous potential offered by new archival sources, they must understand the flaws and biases in the official records as fully as possible.2 One of the best ways to do so is by carefully examining what oral evidence tells us about colonial society.3 During the summer of 1985, I attempted to do this by collecting testimonies about three topics: the use of machillas (or hammocks) by colonial officials, indigenous perceptions of planters, and the evolution of modern chieftaincy.4 Unfortunately, the information I obtained about these topics indicated that Malawi's archival sources contain biases which may distort the country's historiography and cause scholars to overlook important themes.

The colonial society described by my informants was clearly different than the one typically portrayed. Africans were far more removed from the colonial administration and much closer to the unofficial community than is commonly accepted. Africans' relations with the planters were also far more ambiguous than the literature would suggest. Finally, the state's dependence on the planters' own hierarchy of agents to establish indirect rule suggests that Malawi's colonial administration was more dependent on capitalist activity than supportive of it.

This portrait of colonial society is not necessarily any more accurate than the image captured by colonial officials. But its very existence shows that archival records have serious limitations which can skew our understanding of

1The National Archives of Malawi were for all intents and purposes closed from the late 1960s until the early 1980s. As a result, many of the studies from this era were based extensively on oral data. Three of the most important are: Melvin Page, "Malawians in the Great War and After" (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1977); Megan Vaughan, "Social and Economic Change in Southern Malawi" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1982); and Elias Mandala, "Capitalism, Ecology and Society: The Tchiri

(Shire) Valley of Malawi" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1983).

2As I recently pointed out in a different context; see Tony Woods, "The Myth of the Capitalist Class: Unofficial Sources and Political Economy in Colonial Malawi, 1895-1924," History in Africa 16 (1989), 363- 378.

3As Melvin Page pointed out; see Melvin Page, "Malawians in the Great War: Oral History in

Reconstructing Africa's Recent Past," The Oral History Review 8, 1 (1980), 49-61. 1 recently made the same

point in a context similar to this paper, see Tony Woods, "Planters, Administrators, and Chiefs: Oral Tradition and Colonial Historiography in Malawi," International Journal of Oral History, 10, 3 (1989), 210-222.

4Two individuals made this work both possible and profitable. Kings Phiri, then chair of the History Department at Chancellor College, allowed me to coordinate some of my work with the Zomba History

Project and thus saved me immense amounts of time and effort in locating informants. Gaudy Maluza, my indefatigable research assistant, provided me with invaluable assistance once I was in the field. Without their generous assistance, I could not have done this fieldwork.



260 TONY WOODS

the colonial world. It also shows that historians must find a way to reconcile the official record with the unofficial memory before an accurate portrayal of colonial Malawi is possible. Most important, it shows that colonialism was far more complicated than officials in Zomba either knew or were willing to concede.

'They Came by Machilla"

One of the most pernicious facets of colonialism was the use of machillas, hammocks slung under one or two poles and carried by teams of Africans.

During the first years of empire, Europeans in Malawi travelled almost

exclusively by machilla, thus avoiding the stress and exhaustion caused by long walks in the country's tropical environment.5 The indigenous community, who travelled by foot, rather naturally resented this method of transportation, and informants continually mentioned the onus of seeing their compatriots forced to

carry European settlers and officials. But machilla travel was more than a psychological affront; it was also a

symbol of colonial repression, in large part because of Lieutenant Edward Alston. Alston, an administrator during the 1890s, not only travelled by machilla

virtually all the time, but he also insisted that his carriers transport his dogs as well, especially his "best friend" Donnie.6 Carrying Europeans was bad enough, but carrying their dogs was too much. Nevertheless, Alston not only insisted that his machilla men carry Donnie from Mlanje to Zomba, but he also forced them to carry another dog from Zomba to the lake.7

Alston's excesses were entirely characteristic of officials in "the conquest state."8 Unlike later administrations, the first colonial governments, charged with

subduing the indigenous population, "introduced violence on a locally unprecedented scale."9 Certainly in Malawi, Sir Harry Johnston's and, to a lesser

5For more on machillas, see P.A. Cole King, 'Transport and Communication in Malawi to 1891, with a

summary to 1918,' in B. Pachai, ed., The Early History of Malawi (Thetford, 1975), 86-92.

6National Archives of Malawi (hereafter N.A.M.), Historical Manuscripts, AL 1/1/1, Alston Diaries, June 18, 1895.

7N.A.M., Alston diaries, April 29,1896.

8The "conquest state" is a term coined by John Lonsdale in John Lonsdale, "The Conquest State of

Kenya," mimeo. When Professor Lonsdale generously gave me a copy of this paper in the fall of 1985, he indicated that it had been prepared for J. de Moor & H. Wesseling, eds., Colonial Warfare (Leiden, 1986). Unfortunately, I have never been able to track down that volume. For more accessible revisions in the

history of the colonial state, see John Lonsdale and Bruce Berman, "Coping with the Contradictions: The

Development of the Colonial State in Kenya, 1895-1914," Journal of African History 20, 4 (1979) 487-505; Lonsdale and Berman, "Crises of Accumulation, Coercion and the Colonial State: The Development of the Labour Control System in Kenya, 1919-1929," Canadian Journal of African Studies, 14, 1 (1980), 55-81; and Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State (Madison, 1985).

9Lonsdale, 'The Conquest State,' 1.



CAPITAOS AND CHIEFS 261

extent, Sir Alfred Sharpe's administrations brutally terrorized the African

community so much that even today informants recall them with fear.10 That a quintessential symbol of colonial repression should evolve from

this era is therefore no surprise. What shocked me, however, were my informants' stubborn assertions that administration officers used machillas far into the colonial period.11 Such testimony not only contradicts written records, but it also shows that conventional wisdom about the official community did not change significantly over time.12

Nothing demonstrated this point more than my interview with Chief Likambale and his family.13 The chief, one of my best informants, stubbornly insisted that European officials had abandoned machillas as a means of

transport by 1910. However, when his son and brother insisted that administrators had used them throughout the colonial period, he deferred to their opinion. I

subsequently asked the chief why he had not insisted upon correcting the record about machillas. Regarding me sternly, he passionately declared that since the

Europeans even had their dogs transported in machillas, who cared about the facts. His family looked skeptical, but Likambale clearly took great pleasure when I said that I knew the story he was describing. More important, he let me know that the machilla's symbolic value was as appropriate for the 1920s as for the 1890s. Such an inference is shocking because the sensitivity of administrators

definitely improved over time.14 But clearly, from beginning to end, Africans felt humiliated by colonial officials, and no improvement of personnel was enough to overturn the first impression made by Johnston's men. So the extension of the machilla tradition inexorably leads to the conclusion that colonial administrators were so remote from the indigenous community that officials could never shake the conquest state image.

Such detachment debunks many of the studies which depend on secretariat notes. The governor and chief secretary may well have written extensive and convincing reports home about African affairs, but the bases for these missives becomes very suspect if the indigenous community could ascribe

conquest actions to the officials providing the raw data for the reports. Moreover, the impact of the policies drawn up in Zomba, based on field reports, must also. be viewed with considerable suspicion. Finally, it also shows that the

10Ironically, neither really has this reputation in the historiography. Johnston's main biographer, Roland Oliver, lauds him immensely, while Sharpe's biographer, Robert Boeder, also gives Sharpe high marks. See Roland Oliver, Sir Harry Johnston and the Scramble for Africa (London, 1957), and Robert B.

Boeder, Alfred Sharpe of Nyasaland: Builder of Empire (Blantyre, 1981).

1lFor instance, Waison Dziko insisted that machillas were used until 1930, Interview, Waison Dziko, Litonton village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 9, 1985; Patterson Nkhazingi insisted that machillas were used until 1932, Interview, Paterson Nkhazingi, Chiunda village, T.A. Mlumbe, Zomba, July 21, 1985.

12The actual abandonment of the machilla is hard to date precisely. However, district reports indicate that DCs were travelling by foot far more by 1911 principally by omission. In other words, although machilla men were still on the books as employees, the reports say that the officials walked, and the machilla men were really general laborers.

13Interview, Andrew and Michael Likambale, Likambale Village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 4,1985.

14Most notably with the assumption of authority by the Colonial Office in 1904, an event which led to officers being required to learn the indigenous languages.



262 TONY WOODS

indigenous community never viewed the colonial administration with anything but loathing, an important distinction given the Africans' view towards other Europeans.

"All Planters Were Bad"

Another group of Europeans important to the indigenous community were the planters who played such a prominent part in Malawian life from the colony's early years. Indeed, John Buchanan, the country's first European settler, actually declared the territory a British Protectorate in 1891. Moreover, that great watershed in Malawi's history, the Chilembwe Rebellion, had its most important moment on the A.L. Bruce estates.

Like most groups of people, the planters were a mixed lot. Even old settlers concede that some of their brethren could get "short-tempered" with their labor and tenants.15 And, like many things in Malawian history, much work needs to be done before we can establish a thorough and systematic history of the planter class.16 Nevertheless, there is a distinct tradition emerging in the country's historiography that emphasizes the conflict between planters and indigenous society.17 Based almost exclusively on archival records, this viewpoint suggests that the exploitive characteristics of the estate system hopelessly poisoned relations between African and European.

Oral evidence, on the other hand, suggests that such a contradiction is not entirely accurate. Indeed, Malawians voice clear and distinct views suggesting attitudes towards the European capitalists developed more from individual actions than from an archetype. Ironically, this discrimination also indicates that the planters themselves had far more impact on the daily lives of the indigenous community than the administrators about whom only caricatures exist. Perhaps the most astonishing feature of the distinctions made about the planters is the frequent admission that many planters were actually good people.l1 Such assertions not only undermine the underlying assumption in the conventional historiography, but they also call for a reexamination of both the planter class and relations between planters and workers.

The area in which I conducted my research is an especially good place in which to record traditions about the planters. To the north, John Buchanan established the first estates in Malawi along the Mlunguzi. His long tenure in the pre-colonial period and his initially warm relations with the government allowed him to alienate an extensive amount of land. This territory eventually became one of the Blantyre & East Africa Company's largest holdings and was sold off in small blocks to planters in the 1920s and 1930s. To the south, A.L. Bruce alienated a vast tract of land, which became the estate upon which John

5Interview, Eric and Cynthia Emitage, Newlands Rest Home, Limbe, June 15,1985.

16Although Robin Palmer has made a promising start on this task, see Palmer, "White Farmers in Malawi: Before and After the Depression," African Affairs, 84, 335 (1985), 211-246.

17A tradition best exemplified by Leroy Vail, 'The State and the Creation of Colonial Malawi's

Agriculural Economy," in Robert Rotberg, ed, Imperialism, Colonialism, and Hunger (Lexington, 1983).

18For instance, see Interview, Issa and Amini Mdoka, Mdoka village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 4, 1985.




Chilembwe and followers obtained their greatest triumph in the abortive 1915 rebellion. Like the Buchanan holdings, this estate remained in operation for an extended period of time, as did a number of smaller holdings located in the area.

What is particularly useful for research on the development of oral traditions is the fact that much of this alienated land was reclaimed by the government after the 1930s. There are still a number of fairly large estates in the immediate vicinity, but nowhere near the number there once were in the early colonial period. Oral data about conditions on the estates, and more particularly about the attitude of their owners, is consequently less likely to be influenced by contemporary problems with planters. In essence, information about life on European tracts in my research area remains historical and relies on the presence of oral tradition in a way which continuous estate cultivation might curtail.

The information about the planters themselves is naturally less uniform than the data on government officials. On some occasions, informants refused to comment on the planters at all, insisting that they had no direct knowledge about them.19 For those who had, time has made precise identification difficult, though notable estate owners had local nick-names which still clearly identify them. For instance, John Buchanan has become Makanani, while W.L. Walker has become Uka. But in other cases, failing memories and idiosyncratic identifications have made it virtually impossible for the interviewer to identify the person being described.20 Despite these difficulties, it is still fairly easy to discern that not all planters were the ogres depicted in current historiography.

Nevertheless, some informants still maintain that "there was no planter who was good," while others imply that life was always unpleasant on the estates.21 For example, Paterson Nkhazingi insisted that "people in thangata land were under a harsh regime . . . when it came to working in the field, you were brutalized."22 Yet, when asked about Makanani, he stated that

I heard that he was very merciful. During the 1914 Chilembwe rising he helped quite a lot. ... It was declared that all the

people would be killed. Makanani said that that was illogical. One man's mistake should not be paid by every African. The Europeans wanted to kill all the Africans between Chiradzulu and Zomba. Makanani refused to allow this and people were saved.

The existence of such a tradition about Buchanan is not especially surprising; after all, he apparently enjoyed good relations with the African community. His linguistic skill allowed him to communicate easily with local inhabitants, and he apparently used this ability to help his neighbors as much as

19Interview, Dunken Mtengule, Gelemu village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 14, 1985.

20Interview, Skamu Nadwanga, Skamu village, T.A. Mlumbe, Zomba, July 15, 1985.

21Interview, Edward Sapato, Yavi village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 10, 1985.

22Thangata was the system of forced labor used on many early estates. Interview, Paterson Nkhazingi, Chiunda village, T.A. Mlumbe, Zomba, July 21,1985.



264 TONY WOODS

he could.23 He not only warned the indigenous population about the dangers of colonialism, but he eventually broke with Johnston because of the brutality with which the little commissioner ruled the territory as well.24 Certainly such a man might well act as Nkhazingi suggested in the face of Zomba's almost hysterical reaction to Chilembwe's Revolt. However, Buchanan had been dead for almost twenty years by the time Chilembwe acted and clearly could not have done so.25

But like Alston and Donnie, Buchanan has assumed a larger-than-life role in the oral historiography. For Paterson Nkhanzingi, he clearly became the quintessential "good" European who defied an oppressive colonial regime regardless of when it acted. In essence, despite Nkhanzingi's admission that life on the estates he knew was harsh, he was aware that some planters had a good rapport with the local community and acted on its behalf. He simply ascribed the actions of these individuals, whom he probably did not know by name, to Buchanan, regardless of when or where they occurred.

But oral testimony adds an interesting dimension to the harsh planters as well. Informants often insist that their employers were concerned and considerate men even if life on their estate was hard. Indeed, they insist that many of the worst abuses occurred because the African overseers, not the planters were a brutal lot. One informant declared that "the Europeans were okay but the African - our fellow Africans were overseeing people - he was the one who mistreated people. He hit people."26 Another informant backed up this story by claiming that "It is like that.... Uka [Walker] was such a European; once a capitao was said to have mistreated a labourer and he [the capitao] was called and shouted at."27

Blaming capitaos for the brutality on the estates is not unusual, of course. Throughout the colonial era, Europeans had an extremely difficult time controlling their African collaborators.28 Informants invariably ascribed some of the chronic brutality on the estates to the African overseers, implicitly defending their European employers. But by doing so, they are also suggesting that, in spite of apparently closer contact with the indigenous community, the planters still did not entirely control their own destinies. Indeed, reading between the lines, one can even discern the idea that the capitaos were as responsible for estate management as the Europeans, a conclusion that sharply undermines the notions

23Interview, Saladi Muchimbo, Lambulira village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 9, 1985.

240ne informant noted that Buchanan "was the one who told my ancestors to leave Maisi ... [because] the number of Europeans was increasing," Interview, Aida Chandika, Kapachika village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 9, 1985; Likambale added that "people liked Buchanan because he noted their complaints," Interview, Andrew Likambale, Limkambale village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 4, 1985.

25It is also worth noting that someone apparently did intercede and prevent Bruce managers from

avenging their losses; Interview, Stephen Saidi Kapile, Machirika village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 11, 1985.

26Interview, Andrew Likambale, Likambale village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 4,1985.

27Capitaos were overseers and foremen on plantations. Interview, Michael Likambale, Likambale

village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 4,1985.

28Interview, Andrew and Michael Likambale, Likambale village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 4, 1985.




of European superiority in agriculture and absolute planter control on the estates.29

There are limits to the notion of benevolent planters, however. Informants still recall how planters insisted that someone in their families must use tobacco after they protested about being paid with this commodity rather than with cash or goods more easily traded.30 They remember that the work was very hard.31 And one informant after another complained about W.J. Livingstone, the manager at the A.L. Bruce estates. Livingstone, the villain in the Chilembwe rebellion, was unquestionably a brutal and hard-driving manager who deserves the reputation which has continued to this day.

Yet even with Livingstone, informants equivocate a bit. An informant claiming to have been a capitao on the Bruce estate pointed out that "since we used to work with [the planters] and were kept by them, they were good."32 The same informant later mentioned that "capitaos never found it hard with him [Livingstone]."33 He and others also mentioned that even the brutal life on the Bruce estate was often preferable to the dangers outside the area, particularly for the Lomwe from Mozambique.34 Thus, even when they discussed the most brutal planters, informants still note that the Europeans had good qualities which should not be forgotten. In essence, the good planters were everywhere and not just a man designated as Makanani on the next estate.

These tales about the planters strongly suggest that the traditional notions about the estate economy need some revision. At least in the early colonial period, there seems to have been a far more amiable link between management and labor than the literature on political economy allows. Obviously the planters were not uplifting souls who brought light into darkness; but they also were not the people who crushed the peasants in collusion with the state. Instead, the planters seem to have developed relations with their tenants which depended as much on reciprocity as on coercion.

"We Were Chiefs When We Got Here"

In contrast to planters and administrators, much work has recently been done on the establishment of traditional authority in Malawi.35 In 1912, the colonial administration, alarmed by the dispersion of the African population and the lack of enforceable authority, began establishing chieftaincies in order to start

29Even the notorious WJ. Livingstone (see below) depended on African "rangers" to police his estate and enforce his authority, Interview, Waison Dziko, Litonton village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 9,1985.

Interview, Stephen Saidi Kapile, Machirika village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 1, 1985.

31Interview, Helena Chitonde, Kutsamba village, T.A. Mlumbe, Zomba, July 21,1985.

32Interview, Stephen Saidi Kapile, Machirika village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 1, 1985.


3Interview, Edward Sapato, Yavi village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 10, 1985.

35Landeg White and Leroy Vail have led the way in this field. For their latest work, see Vail and

White, "Tribalism and Malawi," in Vail, ed., The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (Berkeley, 1988); see also Landeg White, "'Tribes' in the Aftermath of the Chilembwe Rising," African Affairs, 82, 333

(1984), 511-542.



266 TONY WOODS

indirect rule.36 The Chilembwe rebellion, raising the specter of open defiance to the government, hastened the process, and the 1920s saw a dramatic rise in the number of traditional authorities and ethnic identifications culminating in the formal establishment of indirect rule in 1932. This process is the subject of many oral traditions, although the exact pedigree of the people who ascended to chieftaincies and headmenships remains obscure.

Some of the traditional authorities granted power had legitimate claims to their positions. But on the local level, particularly among village headmen, there was a great deal of confusion about who should actually assume the new political positions. This uncertainty was hardly surprising. The immediate pre-colonial period was very chaotic in the Shire highlands. Invasions and slave-raiding undermined traditional authority even before the Europeans arrived. Once they had, Sir Harry Johnston's and Sir Alfred Sharpe's disdain of traditional authorities and the migration of numerous laborers into the region only accelerated this erosion. By 1912, it was very unclear who local traditional authorities really were.

When the British began to identify village headmen, there was therefore considerable uncertainty about who should assume the new positions. Oral informants are frequently aware of this ambivalence. In many cases, respondents claim that real headmen lost their places to interlopers because they were afraid to identify themselves, thus allowing less timid locals to usurp their positions. In one rather spectacular case, a local inhabitant went to the district commissioner (D.C.) to complain that the new chief was really an imposter and found himself installed instead.37

In other cases, people claim that local authorities were appointed because they had been chiefs in the territories from which they migrated. One Lomwe chief insisted that his family's position derived from its authority in Mozambique.38 It was his father who travelled to the Bruce estate from Mozambique, and then brought the rest of his clan to his new village. As a result, it was only proper that he should become the local headman when the colonial administration actually established sub-rulers. In essence, this family brought their chieftaincy into Malawi with them.

The appointment of chiefs also appears to have been based on local popularity. Informants claim that the colonial authorities held elections in which the people themselves decided who their local authority would be.39 In some cases, informants actually assert that chiefs were replaced if they fell from favor in the local community.40 In such cases though, the nephew of the deposed chief assumed his uncle's position in keeping with the traditional succession pattern in

36One of the results of this effort was the production of a list of "traditional" authorities by the colonial administration, Record of Principal Chiefs and Headmen, Nyasaland (Zomba, 1911). To the best of my knowledge, the only extant copy of this work is located in the Society of Malawi's library in Limbe.

37Interview, Ketulo Master, Litonton village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 9,1985.

38Interview, Yavi Hawera, Yavi village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 10, 1985.

39Interviews, Whiskey Harry Milonde, Milonde village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 2, 1985; Mary Maliro, Panje village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 4,1985.

4Interview, Aida Chandika, Kapachika village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 9,1985.




an mbumba, the local kinship group. Yet, like many things, this pattern of tranquilty and honesty soon becomes frayed when one begins considering what each of these newly appointed chiefs did before he ascended to his new position.

Such an investigation uncovers a disturbing trend; virtually all of the new chiefs had an administrative position with a planter or the administration. The honest citizen who became chief after pointing out the imposter was a capitao in the Public Works Department. The Lomwe chief was a carpenter, one of the more highly skilled positions in the Bruce estate's plantation economy. These incidents themselves might well be coincidence, but further investigation shows that there was a method at work here. One informant claimed that his area's original traditional authority "was not chief. He was a capitao in P.W.D. - in the roads department. He was a chief at his job. All his people feared him. As you may know, capitaos in those days were respected.'41 Another informant bluntly mentioned that individuals "were given the chieftaincy because they were responsible for the other workers.'42

There is always a possibility that the capitaos actually became overseers for the government and the planters because they were chiefs in their own rights. The latter authority would allow them to control the labor that the estate owners so desperately wanted and effectively administer areas for the colonial government. But such a hypothesis does not hold up. In at least one case, the governor's cook became a chief upon his retirement from the State House.43 It is scarcely conceivable that a chief would become the governor's cook and then return to his constituency and reassert his traditional prerogatives.

Even more important evidence comes from the former Bruce estate capitao. This man claimed that before 1913 "there were no chiefs.... Chiefs are a new phenomenon.'44 He also pointed out that the chiefs allegedly afraid to identify themselves were actually unwilling to obtain tenga-tenga carriers (the military's African work force) for the war effort. As a result, the administration turned to other villagers to gather the much-needed carriers and rewarded them with chieftaincies after the conflict.45 Certainly such a system would explain the phenomenal rates of recruitment which occurred in many districts even after the people had become aware of the very real dangers associated with the tenga-tenga jobs.46 The ex-capitao also asserted that the chiefs appointed later gained their positions from their cooperation with colonial authorities rather than any lineage claim. In his own case, he frankly admitted that he became a village headman because the A.L. Bruce managers recommended him for the job.

41Interview, Dunken Mtengule, Gelemu village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 14, 1985. Mtengule was

specifically describing how Gemeru became chief in this instance.

42Interview, Helena Chitonde, Kutsamba village, T.A. Mlumbe, Zomba, July 21,1985.

43Interview, Dunken Mtengule, Gelemu village, T.A. Chikowi, Zomba, July 14, 1985. In this case, Mtengule was describing a chief called "James."


45Interview, Baluesi Nandoli, Robertson village, T.A. Mlumbe, Zomba, July 17, 1985. Nandoli

specifically mentioned that Yao chiefs obtained their positions for "playing the war game."

46This problem is more fully addressed in Page's dissertation; see Page, "Malawians in the Great War and After," 77-83.



268 TONY WOODS

This evidence strongly suggests that the emergence of the traditional authority hierarchy was simply the last step in the development of a cadre of dedicated collaborators. Both the government, isolated and alienated, and the planters, dependent upon local leaders because of their dramatic undercapitalization, needed a strong group of people who could do their bidding among the indigenous community. Members of this group subsequently were rewarded with positions in the new ethnic hierarchy which emerged after the First World War. Chiefs became in the neo-traditional societies what they already were in the changing colonial economic order: the organizers and overseers who kept the empire functioning.

Yet, the new chiefs clearly had limited authority. They could be sacked if the people they represented felt they were doing a bad job. At the same time though, they had to satisfy the demands of the weak European economy and government. In essence, they had to serve two masters, both Europeans and Africans. Their ability to do so indicates that both groups received enough benefits to keep the system operating. Certainly the chiefs could rely on the state's capacity to coerce behavior, but their continued tenure indicates that hegemony was becoming as important as domination. In essence, the new chiefs were holding up a society delicately balanced between competing ambitions.

Thus, the oral evidence illustrates that the establishment of indirect rulers involved more than a cynical attempt by the state to exert greater control in rural areas. It was also the synthesis of indigenous culture with the new economic order; a fusion characterized by the dominance of emergent relations of production grafted onto a supposedly traditional system. What is remarkable is the degree to which this amalgam depended on the Africans themselves, both rulers and ruled. Colonialism here does not appear to be the extension of naked force over a subjugated people but rather a symbiotic reciprocity - a subtle ballet bound together by ambition and compromise.

This analysis of the oral evidence in Southern Malawi suggests that the dependence of scholars on archival records has produced an incomplete and often distorted record. The traditions about European officials alone imply that the officers in Zomba may well have been more isolated than their superiors in Whitehall could ever imagine. Moreover, the evidence from the villages indicates that the rural economy and society functioned far differently than the world Zomba assumed it was ruling. There were strong underpinnings of ambition and reciprocity which held the tenuous structure together and which need to be analyzed far more carefully than they have been before.

The common interests of Africans and expatriates certainly suggest that colonialism may have been far more complex than scholars have been willing to consider. They also hint that the colonial system may have been a more Byzantine entity than the imperial masters could appreciate. As a result, researchers can easily overlook important ideas if they rely too heavily on archival material. Scholars must strive to capture all the subtleties of colonial society by integrating official data into frameworks derived from other sources. Only then will the lingering legacy of the official mind be put in its proper place and a truly African past emerge from the colonial era.



Documents

Capitaos and Chiefs: Oral Tradition and Colonial Society in Malawi