Carone - Creation in the Timaeus

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Creation in the "Timaeus": The Middle WayAuthor(s): Gabriela Roxana CaroneSource: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 37, No. 3 (September2004), pp. 211-226Published by: De GruyterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40913974 .

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Creation in the Timaeus: The Middle Way Gabriela Roxana Carone

Plato's Timaeus presents us with a cosmology in which a benevolent god (referred to as demiurgos: artisan, craftsman) is introduced as creating a world-order or kosmos out of chaos. Timaeus, a learned astronomer from Southern Italy, delivers a long speech, which he calls both a 'likely myth' (eikos muthos) and a 'likely account' (eikos logos).1 To what extent fiction and argumentative discourse are there intertwined continues to be a matter of dispute, and affects one of the most crucial exegetical questions that this dialogue raises: Is Plato in the Timaeus committed to the view that the universe has a temporal beginning?

This is a vexed question, as the history of the dialogue's interpretation shows, with 'literalists' typically answering 'yes', while 'non-literalists' affirm the contrary.2 Which side is right? On the one hand, we have the

1 Cf., e.g., Tim 29c-e, 30b and Morgan (2000: 271 ff.). All translations are my own.

2 For a literal interpretation cf. Vlastos (1939: 379-99), (1964: 402 ff.); Hackforth (1959: 17 ff.); T.M. Robinson (1970: 64-5), (1979: 105-8), (1993: 99 ff.); Guthrie (1978: 302-5); Mohr (1989: 293 ff.); Berti (1997: 119-32); Vallejo (1997: 141-8); Reale (1997: 149-64); Hankinson (1998: 111). Against, cf. Taylor (1928: 66-9, 79-80); Mondolfo (1934: 70 ff.); Cornford (1937: 37 ff., 176, 203 ff.); Cherniss (1944: 421-31); Taran (1971: 372 ff.); Brisson (1974: 104-5), (1991: 38, 49 n. 21), (1992: 36-7); Grube (1980: 162-3); Ostenfeld (1982: 240-2); Baltes (1996); Wright (2000: 15). In antiquity we can count Aristotle (de Cáelo 1 10, 280a 28 ff.; Metaph XII 6, 1071b37-2a2), Plutarch (de An Proc 1014a-b) and Atticus (apud Proclus in Tim 1 283, 27 ff. Diehl) in the first camp, and Xenocrates (fr. 54 Heinze), Crantor (apud Plutarch de An Proc 1012f-13b) and Proclus (In Tim 1 285, 26-8; 1 287, 28-288, 1 Diehl) in the second.

APEIRON a journal for ancient philosophy and science 0003-6390/2004/3703 211-226 $12.00 ©Academic Printing & Publishing



212 Gabriela Roxana Carone

textual assertion that the universe 'has come into being, originating from a principle' (gegonen, ap' arches tinos arxamenos), since the universe is a sensible thing, and all sensible things are generated {Tim 28b-c). On the other hand, one could express qualms about taking this assertion literally or as expressing creation as a single event in the past, so that the genesis of the world could have a different meaning. And, as I shall show, other passages from the same dialogue could serve to qualify the gegone of 28b7 or even go against its temporal interpretation as punctual generation in the past.3 In a later work, Plato considers the possibility that the human race never had a beginning, which would entail that he at least did not rule out that the universe could be beginningless (see Laws VI 781e-2a).4 Perhaps Plato himself is encouraging us, through his chosen form of writing, to think a little harder about this question, and in this regard the heated discussion that the Timaeus has occasioned may well respond to a Platonic invitation.5 Yet I think that it is possible, by taking a close look at the evidence, to weigh different interpretations and see which, if any, entails fewest philosophical difficulties and makes the text of the Timaeus most philosophically cogent. If it turns out, as I shall suggest, that neither of the standard views have approached the matter appropriately, maybe we can take that result as an incentive to question the terms in which the debate has generally been posed.

Thus, it is my goal in this paper to re-open the discussion, not with the purpose of perpetuating its traditional terms, but with an eye to proposing that some crucial arguments typically offered in favour of one interpretation or the other may rest on a false dichotomy. Instead, I shall defend a middle way, which retains some of the merits but does away, I hope, with some of the difficulties of both outlooks. To the first group of interpreters I shall concede that Plato does mean that the universe 'has

3 In addition, Phaedrus 245c ff. could be seen to contradict a literal reading of the creation of soul in the Timaeus (34b 10 ff.), given that in the former dialogue soul is said to be ungenerated.

4 'Every man should comprehend this well: that the generation of humans (ton anthrõpõn genesis) either has had no beginning (arche) at all nor will it ever have any end, but it has always been and assuredly will be (all' en te aei kai estai pantos); or else, the length of time that would have passed since it began is incalculable'.

5 This situation - which needn't be 'disturbing', pace Dillon (1989: 72) - might be suggested by the fact that his direct disciples, such as Aristotle and Xenocrates - cf. above, n. 2 - were in disagreement about the matter.



Creation in the Timaeus 213

come into being' in a literal sense; however, this need not be read, as literalists have usually done, to mean that the Demiurge created the universe as a single and isolated event in the past. Rather, I shall suggest that the Timaeus provides strong evidence for a view of creation as a perpetual process, which reconciles some of the intuitions of the literalist and the non-literalist in this regard, even though it does grant to the non-literalist that the sequential order of precosmos and cosmos presented in the myth should not be taken as a temporal one. Here I shall engage with Vlastos' arguments to the contrary, and show why, in essence, I find them flawed. Finally, I shall suggest that the Timaeus does indeed encourage us to search for a deeper meaning underlying creational talk (as non-literalists claim), and that such a meaning can be analysed in terms of an emphatic assertion of cosmic teleology, understood not just as a result but as a process according to which generation of order constantly takes place. Let us then proceed to review some of the classical arguments that have been provided for and against a literal interpretation of creation in the Timaeus.

1 Gegone at Tim 28b7

We should start by looking at what is usually known as Timaeus' 'proemium', given that much turns on what status, mythical or not, one gives to the lines that lead to the conclusion that the Demiurge is the Creator of the universe. The specific argument for the generation of the universe is presented in the following form: (i) the universe is tangible and visible and possesses body: it is thus sensible; (ii) all sensible things are in process of becoming and generated (gignomena kai genneta); (iii) therefore, this cosmos has come into being {gegone, 28b7-c2). This, for Hackforth, constitutes an 'unadorned logical argument' and T.M. Robin- son writes: 'Whatever Plato may have meant, he certainly speaks of the beginning of the world as though it took place in time.'6 Literalists often insist that this argument is presented before the start of any mythical account (the word muthos being introduced only later, at 29d2), so that it would be unsound to take it figuratively.7

6 Hackforth (1959: 19); Robinson (1995: 64-5). Cf. Vlastos (1964: 403-4).

7 Cf. Hackforth (1959: 17 ff.), Vlastos (1964: 402-3), T.M. Robinson (1979: 105 ff.), Prior



214 Gabriela Roxana Catone

Contrast this with non-literalists such as Cornford, who argues that the word 'becoming' (genesis, gignesthai) is ambiguous, and can mean either (a) coming into existence at some time; or (b) being in process of change. In the latter sense, 'it is true that in such becoming something new is always appearing, something old passing away; but the process itself can be conceived as going on perpetually, without beginning or end'. According to Cornford, (b) best fits the use oí genesis at Tim 28b7-c2, since the whole argument is introduced in the context of a twofold distinction of entities, where 'that which is always, and has no genesis' is contrasted to 'that which always becomes (to gignomenon aei) and never is' (27d6-8al). For Cornford, 'the application of the premiss to the visible world must mean that the world belongs to the lower level of existence as described'. Cornford in turn follows ancient interpreters in understanding the expression 'it has come into being' (gegone) in terms of the possession of 'a derivative and dependent existence which is not self- sufficing'.8

Thus, this line of argument advises us to take the gegone at 28b6 as pointing to the more general concept of genesis as process of change, side by side with those passages where the world itself is connected with the realm of becoming (genesis kai to pan toàe, 29d7-el; genesis kai kosmos, 29e4) and where we are told that, 'as being (ousia) is to becoming (genesis), so is truth (aïétheia) to belief (pistis)' (29c3). If so, genesis would pertain to the world, or indeed be coextensive with it, at least in the sense that the sensible world is in a process of constant change in some or other respect.9

(1985: 95) and Berti (1997: 119-32). Against, cf. Cornford (1937: 37 ff.); Taran (1971: 382 ff.). For studies on the nature of the proemium and the eikos logos in the Timaeus cf. Runia (1997: 101-18); Donini (1988: 5-52).

8 See Cornford (1937: 24-6); also Cherniss (1944: 422), Taran (1971: 384). On whether the controversial 'always' (aei) at 28al should be kept in a reading of the text, cf. Cornford (1937: 25-6); Hackforth (1959: 18-19); Whittaker (1969), (1973); T.M. Robin- son (1979: 105); Dillon (1989: 60-63).

9 M. Frede (1988) has challenged the idea that the 'becoming' in the Timaeus should be understood as change at least in some sense, by contending that, if there is some respect in which something is becoming, there is another one in which it isn't becoming, i.e., is, but objects of experience do not have any kind of being whatso- ever, since this would go against 'the clear and straightforward contrast between being and becoming' established by Plato at Tim 27d6-8al (40). His argument,




Now, to judge by the way these two interpretations have been posed, it would seem that they are irreconcilable. And literalists have tradi- tionally complained that, with regard to the argument at 28b4-c2, 'no metaphorical or figurative language infiltrates this sequence of proposi- tions':10 the text does seem to conclude that the world 'has come into being' (gegone), and not just that it is a thing that becomes, or gignomenon.

Yet, I suggest, there is no need to take one side or the other. Instead, a via media is possible between these two opposing interpretations. Let us readily concede that it is possible to read the gegone at 28b 7 as literally meaning 'has come into being', and not just as metaphorically standing for 'it becomes'. But 'has come into being' does not exclude the possibility that generation is a perpetual process instead of an isolated event at the beginning of time. In fact, gegone literally means 'has come into being' rather than 'came into being', as literalists sometimes mistranslate.11 This

though, is unconvincing, since Plato immediately qualifies the contrast at 28a3-4 by saying that 'what becomes . . . never really is' (to gignomenon . . . ontds oudepote on). As a matter of fact, Frede concedes this point on p. 39: Tlato may be ready to admit that ordinary objects of experience . . . can have "being" in an ordinary sense of the verb "to be", but he here would be denying that they could be said to be in some philosophical sense of "to be" '; though his argument then overlooks this provision. Plato is not denying being or existence to sensible particulars, since he does indeed attribute 'existence' (ousia) or 'being' (einai) to them in the Timaeus: specifically, he speaks of 'generated existence' (ousia gignomene) at 35al-3 and 'scattered existence' (ousia skedasie) at 37a5; see also 52d3 for attribution of einai to genesis. What sensibles certainly don't have is real being in the sense of the constantly unchanging being of the Forms (cf. 29b6, 37e-8a), and these terms seem sufficient to account for the contrast between genesis and ousia in this context. For further discussion on being and becoming cf. Code (1988), Bolton (1975), Nehamas (1975), Irwin (1977), Jordan (1983: 48-66), Prior (1985: 89-93); on the philosophical meaning of being cf. Vlastos (1965), Kahn (1981). For the contrast in Plato as one that includes also the predicative and veridical meanings of 'to be', see my (1998: 117-8) with further references there. I think this point can be maintained as a general understanding of 'becoming' in the Timaeus, which is independent of the further question whether gegone should, pace Cornford, be read in the specific sense of 'has come into being' rather than as merely standing for a process of becoming as such.

10 Cf. Vlastos (1964: 403) quoting Hackforth (1959: 19).

11 See here, e.g., T.M. Robinson (1995: 65).



216 Gabriela Roxana Corone

opens up room for taking the process of generation to be still ongoing, or indeed perpetual,12 as suggested in turn by Tim 38cl-3:

Whereas the model (paradeigma) exists in all eternity, the former [=the universe or our anos at 38b6] continuously for all time has come into being {dia telous ton hapanta chronon gegonds), exists and will exist.

Once more, then, the use of the perfect tense (as opposed to the aorist) here at 38cl (gegoriõs) - as much as at 28b7 (gegone) - plus the adverbial expression 'continuously for all time', seem to indicate that the coming into being of the world did not occur 'once upon a time', but is a continuous process.

In addition, there are some other passages where creation by god is depicted not merely as having taken place in the past, but also as occurring in the present, something that would again support the view of creation as a perpetual process. Thus e.g., in the middle of the description of the creation of time, we find the use of the words 'makes' (poiei, 37d6) and 'contrives' (niéchanatai, 37e3) - in a passage where, interestingly, Plato is talking specifically about tense (37e4 ff.), so that one would expect him to be particularly careful about the tenses he is using.

2 Re-assessing alternatives

My interpretation, I contend, has the advantage of exempting us from overimaginative solutions to problems posed by the text: we do not need, as Cornford does, to stretch the meaning of gegone at 28b 7, and to this extent we do not need to side with the traditional non-literalist. But neither do we need to postulate, with Vlastos (and with ancient literalists), a precosmic time in which chaos would have literally taken place before creation by the Demiurge. Other problems too beset the traditional literal interpretation, but I shall first briefly focus on the intriguing issue of time in the Timaeus, and why Vlastos' valiant attempt at making his literal view compatible with it ultimately fails.

12 This view was suggested by Proclus (In Tim I 282, 27-30; 288, 14-17; 290, 23-291, 1; III 51, 7-10 Diehl) and I believe the text supports it. Cf. my (1991: 51 ff.).




Time is presented in the Timaeus as generated by god together with the orderly universe, and as related to measurement. According to Tim 37d6-7 (cf. 38a), time is an 'image of eternity which moves with number'; we are also told that 'days, nights, months and years did not exist before the heaven came into being, but were contrived at the same time as it was framed' (37el-3; cf. 38b6). That is, the notion of number, and therefore that of order, is included in the very characterization of 'time'. In addition, time is coexistent with the kosmos as an ordered whole - as suggested by its coming into being 'at the same time' as the universe - so that without order there is no time. But if this is so, there seems to be no room for a Demiurge creating the universe from a temporally previous state of chaos.13

Now, one way out of this difficulty is to postulate a second kind of time (apart from the one referred to at Tim 37c-8c, as cosmic time implying order, and marked by the celestial clock). This avenue has been explored by Vlastos among others, who calls this second kind of time 'precosmic time', and characterizes it as an irreversible temporal succes- sion of past and future which cannot be measured.14

We must note, however, that the text seems prima facie to rule out this possibility, for we are told that even past and future are created by the Demiurge (37e4). Vlastos, in fact, sees this difficulty, but replies mainly with arguments from silence, claiming that Plato at least does not deny the existence of a second kind of time. What is problematic about Vlastos' account is not so much its lack of textual evidence (which might be required for such a large claim) but its misreading of portions of text. For even past and future are described as 'generated kinds of time' (chronou gegonota eidé, 37e4). Vlastos would like to take past and future as 'attributes' of time - as a rendering of chronou gegonota eidé at 37e4 - which could therefore, as 'attributes', have existed independently of

13 This point has been stressed often: cf., among others, Cherniss (1944: 426-7 n. 361-2), Taran (1971: 378-80), Brisson (1991: 49). Compare the argument in Proclus (In Tim III 49, 20-50, 7 Diehl).

14 Cf. Vlastos (1964: 410-1). For a 'precosmic time' understood as duration cf. also Skemp (1942: 111), followed by Hackforth (1959: 22). For more recent defences of the same view, cf. Mohr (1985: 65) and Vallejo (1997: 147). In antiquity, Proclus reports and criticizes a theory of a 'twofold time' in support of a literal view of the precosmic chaos (In Tim 1 286, 20 ff. Diehl).



218 Gabriela Roxana Corone

cosmic time.15 But 'eidos' cannot mean 'attribute', but rather means 'kind' of time. And since we are told that time was generated together with the universe, it would follow that any kind of time was generated together with the universe. In addition, Plato explicitly links past and future to the measurability of time when he says at 38a7-8 that they are 'kinds of time ... which circles according to number'. This suggests that simple duration is insufficient for time, which instead requires orderly sequence.

Let us also think a little about the trait of goodness that defines the Demiurge, and his desire to make things good as far as possible (29e- 30a). Such traits seem however incompatible with the thought that the Demiurge should have remained inactive, apparently for no good reason, while the precosmic chaos occurred.

Dialogues before and after the Timaeus seem to support this suggestion. In the Republic (II 380d-lc) we read that, being perfect, god cannot change except for the worse. We must note that this is said in a context where general claims are being made about the nature of god as such (cf. 379a-b on the need to represent god 'as he really is'), and that, a fortiori, these claims would apply not only to the Olympians - whose traditional accounts are being criticized in that dialogue - , but to any kind of god represented in the form of myth. Laws X (900c ff.) in turn suggests that god cannot be inactive or lazy since his concern for the world is definitory of his goodness, and he does not lack the power to exercise it. The Timaeus, in addition, emphasizes the point that envy is absent from the divine nature, and instead god wished everything to be good so far as possible (29e, cf. Phaedrus 247a). It would then seem that god's essential features - such as benevolence and providence - would have to be constantly displayed, and the ancients already found this point alluded to in the Timaeus through the suggestion that 'god remained in his same accustomed manner' (42e5-6).16 Thus, we can see philosophical reasons

15 Cf. Vlastos (1964: 410-12).

16 Cf. Cherniss (1944: 425); Taran (1971: 380-1). Vallejo's (1997: 147) contrary claim that 'the immutability of god is compatible with any action that is coherent with his nature' (such as creation from chaos) is simply question-begging, for it could be argued (and the Laws does argue: see X 900c8-lc6) that it is not coherent with god's goodness not to care for the world when he could do so (as would be the case if one postulates a pre-cosmic state).




for doubting the literal description of a god which suddenly initiates his cosmic ordering.

Furthermore, in the Timaeus the universe itself and the heavenly bodies are called 'gods',17 and the World-Soul is called 'divine' (36e), both these terms indicating immortality.18 This trait is recurrently stated. Not only do we hear that both the universe, its soul and the heavenly bodies are immortal in the Timaeus (cf. 33a2, 36e4, 40b5, 42e7, 43a4-5, 69c6), but also other dialogues confirm the same thought.19 Can this, however, be squared with other passages in the Timaeus apparently suggesting - as literalists claim - that all those entities did have a punctual beginning, as once and only once generated by god (31b, 34a-b, 41d)? On the face of it, there would appear to be no problem, since the traditional Greek gods were conceived as being born and not dying. However, the picture in the Timaeus appears to be different. For the text indicates that generation and corruption go hand in hand (gignomenon kai apollumenon, 28a3, which recalls the Republic assertion that 'everything generated undergoes corruption', VIII 546a2). If so, a belief in the immortality of the world seems to presuppose a belief that it was not generated.

But doesn't the text after all concede the universe is actually dissolvable, though it will not be dissolved by god's will? (41a7-b6) This concession, however, does not alter the point just made. For the claim at 28a was that everything that is generated is actually dissolved, not just merely 'dissolvable'. So, even the denial at 41a-b that the universe will be dissolved - much as one may concede it is 'dissolvable' - appears to demand that it has not come into being, if non-dissolution implies non-generation.

17 Cf. 34b8, 40c-d, 68e3-4, 92c7.

18 Cf., e.g., Mugnier (1930) and my (1991: 117-34).

19 Cf., e.g., Phaedrus 245c-6a, Laws XII 967d6-7. The heavenly bodies are called 'gods' at R VI 508a4, Laws VII 821b-c, X 899a-b; for the universe as god see also Laws VII 821a2.



220 Gabriela Roxana Gavone

3 Creation and the Demiurge

Now, Tim 41a-b does, however, seem to be revealing in a different respect. For it helps us see that the existence, as much as the immortality, of the universe, is not necessary, or de iure, but dejado contingent upon the existence of a superior cause.20 This form of thinking already paves the way for an understanding of why Plato may have chosen the imagery of creation. To talk about creation is, at a deeper level, to talk about explanatory principles.

In this regard, the choice of a medium which represents events in a sequential order may still fulfil an important goal. It has often been observed that cosmogonists prior to Plato had depicted the world as created by aimless and random forces; so Plato wants to meet them on their own ground and show, conversely, that the universe is the result of a teleological plan.21 This is the same strategy he follows in the haws, where he claims the superiority of birth of soul over body (X 892a-c) but where no precosmic chaos is mentioned at all; rather, disorderly motion is there proved to be a hypothesis: how the world would be z/it were not governed, as it is, by intelligence (cf. X 898b-c). One could think of the precosmic chaos in the Timaeus as having similar counterfactual value: although it is not likely that it could have existed in time, it still helps us see how the world would be if the principles posited by the materialists prevailed, i.e., if god were absent from the universe and its tendency to

20 What is this higher principle that the universe depends on? At the very least, it is the Forms (cf. 50c7-d4). Along similar lines, we read in the Phaedrus that the Forms are those things 'by being in relation to which god is divine' (pros hoisper theos on theios estin, 249c5-6, cf. 247d), and the traditional image of the gods' being nurtured on nectar and ambrosia - a key to their immortality - is replaced by the metaphor of the gods' being nurtured on the Forms (247c-e), which again indicates that the Forms are the ultimate foundation of the gods' divinity and immortality. It is outside the scope of this paper to delve into the question whether the Demiurge should be taken to stand for a principle other than the Forms, and, in that case, whether he should be taken as a nous separate or immanent to the universe, even though I shall reject the view that he is a personal creator in the form of a deus ex machina. One should also note that the Demiurge embodies an intelligence which, as such, seems inferior and subordinate to the Forms, which constitute its proper object (cf. Tim 51b-e). For a discussion of this issue see my (forthcoming), Chapter 2.

21 Cf., e.g., Cornford (1937: 31), with special reference to the Atomists.




disorder were left unchecked.22 And we seem at least licensed not to take the order of the narration as necessarily representing the real sequence of events by Timaeus' remark that 'as far as the soul is concerned, although we are attempting to describe it after the body, the god did not contrive it to be younger, since he would not have permitted that the older should be governed by the younger; but, since we very much participate in what is casual and random, we also tend to speak in the same fashion' (34blO-c4). Indeed, as was already suggested in antiquity,23 the sequential presentation of events in the myth (such as, first, the prevalence of disorder, second, that of god's design) can be taken to depict dynamically and in isolation two factors, called in the Timaeus necessity and nous, which in fact coexist in the cosmos as a 'combination' (sustasis) in which nous rules over necessity (cf. 48a).

If this is so, what about the 'Creator God' (potetes, 28c3)? It seems that the Demiurge should be called 'creator' not so much in the sense of a god who anthropomorphically created the world 'once upon a time', but, rather, insofar as he is the efficient cause which is perpetually generating and in that way sustaining the order of the universe.24 (Thus, we are told

22 Thus, at Tim 53a8-b4, where it is said that the condition 'without plan or measure' (alogds kai ametms) belongs to things 'whenever god is absent from something' (hotan apëi tinos theos), we can take the hotan as conditional. Cf. LSJ ad loc. This passage, in addition, is most useful for showing that god's constant presence in the universe is required if the latter is to continue being orderly, as I pointed out in my (1991: 52, 59-60).

23 See, e.g., Xenocrates and Proclus (mentioned in n. 2 above).

24 The causally efficient character of this god, as principle of orderly motion in the universe, is emphasized by his being called a 'creator' (potetes, 28c3) and 'principle of becoming and order' (geneseõs kai kosmou . . . arche, 29e4), and presented as a cause of the generation of all things (Tim 28a, c), with an emphasis on its function of ordering (cf., e.g., 53bl, 69c) or bringing goodness to a state of affairs (29e-30a). Thus, we have good reason to believe that the Demiurge belongs to the order of what the Timaeus calls 'primary' or 'divine' causes (46c-e, 68e-9a), i.e., those 'causes which, by using intelligence (meta novi), are artisans (démiourgoï) of fair and good effects' (46e). These causes are in turn distinguished from 'secondary' or 'necessary causes', which 'occur by other things being moved and in turn moving other things by necessity' (46el-2), and pertain to the order of the bodily (cf. 46c-d, 48a-b). The latter becomes 'errant' (cf. pianamene aitia, 48a) without nous, in which case they can be characterized as those 'causes which, if /when deprived of intelligence, in each case produce random and disorderly effects', 46e5-6. The primary function of nous, however, consists in turning those same causes into co-causes or auxiliaries (insofar




at 46e5-6 that in each case where intelligence is absent random and disorderly effects occur.) That is, the Demiurge in the Timaeus seems to have not only the function of generating order (cf. 29e4) as a cause (aition, 28c2) but also, if this generation is perpetual, that of keeping the cosmos in good order. This in turn corresponds to the function oí governing that the myth allots to him (cf. 48a2, 41a-2e, 71d); a governance which, despite its usual description in the past, must also be understood as present if the world is to continue being orderly, as we read that everything behaves without plan and measure (alogds kai arneiros) whenever god is absent from something (hotan apëi tinos theos, 53a8-b4), in a context where god must allude to the Demiurge.25 So, if the world is good and fair (as is taken for granted at 29a5, 92c), i.e., orderly (cf. 87c4-5), it is implied that god must be constantly present in it to sustain it.

Let us recall, however, that the artisanal metaphor, suggesting a definite product and different steps of the work starting and developing in time, has proved a most useful way for Plato to highlight the teleological arrangement of the world, like any good product of art, which is made not at random but with a definite purpose (cf. Grg 503e-4a) seeking to fulfil an end through a chain of means.26 In this respect, it is interesting to note that even Aristotle, while taking creation in the Timaeus literally and thus criticizing Plato in favour of the view that the universe is eternal,27 more than once, however, resorted to the artisanal metaphor - which he elsewhere seemed to have criticized as nonsensical - 28 to

as that is possible), and this is mythically represented by the persuasion that nous exerts upon necessity (48a). In other words, the teleological action of nous works by relying on what we may call mechanical conditions, which provide the means without which an end cannot be fulfilled: see below, n. 26.

25 Since it is subsequently said that [he] gave shape to (dieschematizato) the precosmic traces with forms and numbers (b4-5).

26 I analyse the way in which means and ends, or mechanism and teleology, interact in the Timaeus' cosmological picture in my (forthcoming), Chapter 2.

27 De Cáelo 1 10, 279bl2-80all, 280a28 ff.

28 Thus, in a context in which he upbraids Plato for the use of metaphors which he calls mere 'empty words' (kenologein), Aristotle asks 'what [note: not "who"] is it that works looking to the Forms?' (ti gar esti to ergazomenon pros tas ideas apoblepon, Metaph 1 9, 991al9-23). The whole passage runs as follows: 'Nor are the other things from Forms in any of the usual ways of speaking. And to say that the Forms are




emphasize the teleological arrangement in the cosmos.29 This shows that both Plato and Aristotle would agree on the usefulness of artisanal metaphors in the context of discussing natural teleology, much as their respective accounts differ in substantial respects. It is, then, this teleological arrangement of the world in the Timaeus that the dialogue invites us to turn our attention to, and which its talk of creation from an intelligent principle helps emphasize. The universe, however, is not an inert product of craftsmanship, but a living being itself (30d, 32d, 92c), whose life is constantly being renewed (cf. Politicus 270a3-5), and whose order is the result of constant intelligent rule over its necessary tendencies (Tim 48a, 53a7-b4). As a matter of fact, there may be more than one layer to this teleological picture: for, just as the Demiurge imposes order upon disorder, so does Timaeus (albeit with more difficulty) try to impose order upon random modes of speaking (cf. 34b-c).30 (After all, the best form of discourse is in the Phaedrus (264c) described as a zdion - like the universe in the Timaeus - and in the Philebus (64c) a complete or accomplished argument is described as a kosmos). To see the world being created by a benevolent god out of chaos is to see Timaeus' discourse in

paradigms and that the other things participate in them is to use empty words and utter poetic metaphors. For what is that thing which works looking to the Forms?' This vocabulary is quite similar to that in the Timaeus (cf. apergazesthai and blepein of the Demiurge at 28a and 28c-9a), so that Aristotle's reference must be to the Demiurge, which he, however, evidently fails to take as a personal entity, and surrounds with a tone of complaint as doing no explanatory work. Cf. Guthrie (1978: 255-6, n. 3); (1981: 246-7).

29 Thus, he tells us that 'god and nature do nothing in vain', that nature 'aspires to the best', that god 'has perfected' the universe, that nature has 'devised' one's hands for a certain purpose, and calls nature itself 'demiurgic': cf., e.g., de Cáelo 1 4, 271a33, GC II 10, 336b27-32, PA 687a6 ff., 645a9. (Compare here the Timaeus' reference to primary or 'demiurgic' causes as belonging to an 'intelligent nature', 46d-e). That the language is metaphorical, though, seems suggested by passages such as de Cáelo II 9, 291a24, talking about how it is 'as if (hõsper) nature had providence or pronoia. For discussion of these and like passages see, e.g., Mansion (1946: 261 ff.); Preus (1975: 246-7); Guthrie (1981: 106-9); Kahn (1985); Balme (1972: 93-6); Lennox (1987: 276-9), (1997: 171-3). Clearly, however, Aristotle's account in general tries to stay away from the notion of an intelligent entity pervading the universe in the form of a Platonic cosmic soul, and is distinctive in its attempt to explain teleology by appeal to nature as an internal principle of motion in things and as a concept in principle distinct from soul or even a designing mind.

30 See here Osborne (1996).



224 Gabriela Roxana Carone

the making; what the result shows us, however, is that the universe as such is less subject to randomness and chaos than human ways of speaking may suggest, and instead provides a paradigm for anyone wishing (through discourse or in their actions) to create a kostnos.31

4 Conclusion

In this paper I have presented a reading which allows for the claim that the universe 'has come into being' at Tim 28b7 to be read in a literal sense (rather than the metaphorical sense defended by Cornford and others). I have shown, however, that this claim need not be understood as a claim about the generation of the universe from a temporally previous chaotic state. In fact, this reading seems precluded given, particularly, that Vlastos' arguments for a pre-cosmic time cannot be sustained, as I hope to have demonstrated. Instead, the Timaeus presents evidence in favour of the view that creation itself is a continual process, one through which the orderly universe can be seen as having come into being 'for all time' (38c); accordingly, it is no wonder that, precisely in the context of describing time, the Demiurge's creational activities should be portrayed in the present rather than in the past tense (37d-e), in a way that highlights the former's role as one of sustaining cosmic order rather than merely generating it once (indeed, even the use of the perfect tense rather than the aorist at 28b7 is suggestive, iorgegone allows that the process of creation is still with us). Such a role can in turn be interpreted as one of securing the rule of teleology in the universe, and in this regard creational images, emphasizing planning and design, prove quite useful. To this extent non-literalists may have been right to insist that we ought to look for a deeper meaning underlying the creation story, even though I hope to have shown that this conclusion does not entail, as has often been assumed, that talk of the universe as 'having come into being' at 28b7 should not be given the literal weight that it deserves.

Department of Philosophy University of Colorado

Boulder, CO 80309-0232 U.S.A.

caroneObuffmail.colorado.edu

31 On the paradigmatic nature of the universe from an ethical point of view, cf. my (forthcoming), Chapter 3.




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Carone - Creation in the Timaeus