Case 1:05-cv-01347-GK Document 209-1 Filed 07/29/09 …s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/detention/gitmo/... · Case 1:05-cv-01347-GK Document 209-1 Filed 07/29/09 Page 1 of 27

Case 1:05-cv-01347-GK Document 209-1 Filed 07/29/09 Page 1 of 27

SECRETHNOFORN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

INRE: GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEE LITIGATION

) ) ) ) ) ) )

Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH)

Civil Action No. 05-CV-1347 (GK)

--------------------)

AMENDED FACTUAL RETURN

SECRET/I~OFORN

•


8ECRETiA>IOFORl'1

Respondents hereby submit, as explained herein, an amended factual return pertaining to

the petitioner identified as the subject of the attached Narrative. This amended return is intended

to supersede the material contained in any previously filed return, except for the fact that

petitioner was previously determined by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal to be an enemy

combatant.

This amended return sets forth factual bases' supporting petitioner's lawful, ongoing

detention pursuant to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force and (he President's power

as Commander in Chief.

Dated: November 26,2008 Respectfully submitted,

GREGORY G. KA TSAS Assistant Attorney General

JOHN C. O'QUINN Deputy Assistant Attorney General

, Respondents reserve the right to seek leave to further supplement the record with additional factual bases supporting petitioner's detention, as necessary.

SECRETh'i"OFOR]~

•


•

8 ECRETIiI'l OFORI'l

JOSEPH H. HUNT (D.C. Bar No. 431134) VINCENT M. GARVEY (D.C. Bar No. 127191) TERRY M. HENRY PAUL AHERN SCOTT D. LEV1N Attorneys' United States Department of Justice Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 20 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20530 Tel: 202.306·9193 Fax: 202.305·2685

Attorneys for Respondents

SECRETIIl'!OFOfL"l


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

INRE: GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEE LITIGATION

) ) ) ) ) ) )

--------------------)

Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH)

Civil Action No. 05-CV-1347 (GK)

DECLARATION OF REAR ADMIRAL DA VID THOMAS

•


Declaration or Rear AdmirEl David M, Thomas, Jr.

Pursuant to 28 U,S,C, § J 746, L David M, Thomas, Jr .. hereby declare

under penalty ofpejury under the Ji:\WS of the United States of America that to thr; best of

my knowledge, information, and belief, the following is true. accurate, and correct:

I am a Rear Admiral in the United States Navy, with 31 years of active duty

service, J currently serve as Commander, Joint Task Force-Guantanamo (.ITF-GTMO), at

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, I have held this position since 27 Mal' 2008, As such, I am

directly responsible for the successful execution ofthe JTF-GTMO mission to conduct

detention and interrogation operations in support orthe Global War on Terrorism.

coordinate and implement detaine.c screening operations. and support law enforcement

and war crimes investigations.

The attached narrative and supporting materials Irom tiles of the Department of

Defense or other government agencies contain information used by the Department (11'

Defense to establish the status of the individual who is the subject of the narrative as an

enemy combatant and to substantiate their detention aR an enemy combatant at

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,

Dated:

•

(2J4.(JL(. DA VlD M, THOMAS, JR. Rear Admiral, U ,S, Navy


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FARI·II SAEED BIN MOHAMMED,

Petitioner,

v. Civil Action No. 05-CV-1347 (GK)

GEORGE WALKER BUSH, et al.,

Respondents.

NARRATIVE FOR FARHI SAEED BIN MOHAMMED, ISN 311

Introduction

I. Farhi Saeed Bin Mohammed (Farhi), an-=itizen, used his fraudulent

French passport, along with a fraudulent Pakistani visa provided by a member of the Finsbury

Park Mosque in London, to travel from England to an Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad,

Afghanistan.

-The petitioner is thus lawfully subject to detention as an enemy

combatant, pursuant to, inter alia, the President's power as Commander in Chief and the

Authorization for the Use of Military Force.

2. The factual basis for petitioner's detention is supported by numerous source

documents cited herein and attached hereto. In assessing whether Farhi is an enemy combatant,

the United States has relied upon interviews of him and others conducted by law enforcement

and intelligence personnel, as well as upon information derived from other intelligence sources

and methods. Information received from these sources is commonly reproduced in reports


created by the collecting officer. These reports and intelligence products are routinely relied

upon by military or intelligence personnel in making decisions to act upon threats to our national

security. See Declaration Intellilgel~ce Dec!.); Declaration of

Robert H. Holmes (Holmes Dec!.).

4. As with all detained enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Farhi has been

assigned an Internment Serial Number or ISN. The ISN is an administrative code assigned to

military detainees. Farhi's full ISN is~00311.n which the number "311" is Farhi's

unique identifier and the 'Designation indicates that he is a national of_ Source

documents attached as Exhibits to this narrative may refer to Farhi by name, full ISN, or various

short forms, such as .000311" or "ISN 311." Likewise, other military detainees may be

referred to in source documents and this summary by name or various forms of ISN.

5. The following narrative and attached materials set forth factual bases supporting

Farhi's lawful detention. This narrative is not intended to be a complete explication of the

information in support of Far hi's detention in those documents.

6. As a preliminary matter, it is not uncommon for those engaged in terrorist


activities to use an alias or pseudonym, commonly known in Arabic as a kunya. Declaration of

l1'\11<"'" Decl.). In addition, these names and aliases are sometimes

spelled differently when transliterated to Latin characters. There are many transliterations of the

same names and aliases in the materials cited herein. This narrative does not attempt to delineate

every instance where the cited documents contain transliterations of the same name or alias.

Farhi is known by the following names and aliases: Abdullah, ISN (Oct. 29, 2004);

Saiid Farhi and Oliver Jean Christian Marie Joseph Bayart, ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,2002).

7. In addition to Farhi, this narrative cites to other individuals and third parties

whose names and aliases may be spelled or translated differently among the source documents

cited herein and attached hereto. Unless noted otherwise, this narrative cites to the version of the

name or alias that is detailed in that source. I

General Background

8. AI-Qaida (translated from Arabic as "the Base") was founded by Usama bin

Laden and others in or about 1989 for the purpose of opposing certain governments and officials

with force and violence. Nat'l Comm'n On Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States, The 9/11

Commission Report 56 (2004) ("9/11 Commission Report"). Usama bin Laden is recognized as

the Emir (prince or leader) of al-Qaida. Id. A purpose or goal of al-Qaida, as stated by Usama

bin Laden and other al-Qaida leaders, is to support violent attacks against property and nationals

(both military and civilian) of the United States and other countries. Id. at 59-61.

9. Between 1989 and 2001, al-Qaida established training camps, guesthouses, and

business operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries for the purpose oftraining and

I Through the Department of Defense's administrative process, Petitioner has been approved for transfer to the custody of another sovereign, assuming an acceptable transfer agreement can be reached. This fact, however, has no bearing on the issue of whether Petitioner is lawfully detained by the United States.


supporting violent attacks against property and nationals (both military and civilian) of the

United States and other countries. Id. at 64-67.

10. In 1996, Usama bin Laden issued a public "Declaration of Jihad Against the

Americans." This declaration called for the murder of U.S. military personnel serving on the

Arabian Peninsula. ld. at 48.

11. In February 1998, Usama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri (bin Laden's deputy)

issued afatwa (purported religious ruling) requiring all Muslims able to do so to kill Americans -

whether civilian or military - anywhere in the world. Id. at 47; see also Declaration of._ (AI-Qaida Dec!.).

12. Since 1989, members and associates ofal-Qaida, known and unknown, have

carried out numerous terrorist attacks, including, but not limited to: the attacks against the

American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, which killed approximately 250

people, id. at 68-70; the attack against the USS Cole in October 2000, which killed 17 United

States Navy sailors, id. at 190-93; and the attacks on the United States on September II, 2001,

which killed approximately 3,000 people. Id. passim.

13. The Taliban (students ofIslamic knowledge) is an Islamic fundamentalist group

that was fonned in Afghanistan in 1994. The Taliban in Afghanistan, available at

www.cfr.org/publicationl10551. After two years of violent conflict that included the capture of

Kabul, Afghanistan's capital, the Taliban took control of Afghanistan's national government in

1996. 9111 Commission Report at 65. Although it was never formally recognized by the United

States, id. at 124, the Taliban controlled Afghanistan's national government from 1996 until the

United States-led military campaign ousted the Taliban from power in 2001. Id. at 337-38.

During the period in which the Taliban controlled Afghanistan's national government, it


provided safe harbor and support to al-Qaida and Usama bin Laden. fd. at 64-67.

14. On September 18, 2001, following the attacks on the United States on September

11,2001, Congress adopted the Authorization for the Use of Military Force. 115 Stat. 224

(2001). Recognizing that the attacks of September II, 2001 "render it both necessary and

appropriate that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United States

citizens at home and abroad," Congress authorized the President "to use all necessary and

appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,

authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,2001, or

harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international

terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons." Within weeks,

United States military forces were deployed in Afghanistan. 9/11 Commission Report at 337.

15. The United States led the initial aerial bombing campaign of Afghanistan, with

ground forces composed of United States forces and Afghanistan militia opposed to the Taliban,

including the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance is an association of Afghan groups

opposed to the Taliban. The Northern AlIiance has assisted the United States in its military

campaign in Afghanistan to defeat al-Qaida and the Taliban. 1d. at 330-34; 336-38. In

December 2001, the United States-led military campaign removed the Taliban from control of

Afghanistan'S national government. fd. at 337-38. Taliban and al-Qaida forces, however, have

continued to operate in Afghanistan and attack coalition forces.

16. Currently, two major military operations are underway in Afghanistan. First,

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is a multinational coalition military operation, led by the

United States, initiated in October 200 I to counter terrorism and bring security to Afghanistan in

collaboration with Afghan forces. See www.stateigov/r/paJprs/ps/2006/60083.htm. OEF

Case 1:05-cv-01347-GK Document 209-1 Filed 07/29/09 Page 11 of 27.1/. ••

operations led to the collapse of the Taliban goverrunent and helped bring security and stability

to Afghanistan. Id. OEF involves troops from over 20 nations, including about 19,000 United

States forces and about 3,000 non-United States troops. Id. Second, the International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) is a United Nations-mandated international coalition operating under

the command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). See

WWW.nato.intiisaf/index.html. ISAF was established in 2002 with the goal of creating conditions

for stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan. ISAF is comprised of approximately 50,000

troops from 40 countries. Id

Farhi was a Member of the Algerian Army where He Received Military Training

17. Farhi is an Algerian citizen, born in Cherchelle, Algeria. ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun.

12,2002). Farhi was conscripted into the Algerian Army in 1981 for approximately two years.

ld He received two months of basic training, which included training with Kalishnikov and

Seminov rifles. Id

Farhi Traveled Through Europe Using a False Passport

18. On or about July 14, 1989, Farhi entered France using his authentic Algerian

passport,2 Id The French customs office provided Farhi with a three month tourist visa,

although he had allegedly gone to France to reside and seek employment. Id; ISN 311 FD-302

(Oct. 10,2002). While in France, his Algerian passport expired; Farhi claimed that he discarded

it in the trash. Id He explained that he did so to avoid being deported ifhe was discovered with

an expired passport. Jd. Farhi claimed that he remained in France until approximately 1997. Id.

311 FD-302 (Jun. 12, 2002);_ he subsequently admitted that he entered France illegally and has no

trip. ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 27, 2002).


19. Farhi illegally entered Italy in 1997, allegedly to reside and seek employment.

ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,2002). While in Rome, Farhi purchased a French passport from

Algerian robbers for 100,000 Lira.) Id The passport was in the name of Oliver Jean Christian

Marie Joseph Bayart (hereinafter the "Bayart passport"). Id; ISN 311 FP-302 (Oct. 10, 2002).

Farhi claimed that he became a devout Muslim while in Italy. ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,2002).

He attended three mosques while in Rome: the Altawba Mosque on Cavour Street, the Alkhoda

Mosque in the Cento Celli Neighborhood, and another mosque in the Perioli Neighborhood. Id

Fruhi stated that none of these mosques preached jihad. Id

20. On or about January 7, 2001, Farhi flew to London using the Bayart passport.

ISN 3 II FD-302 (Jun. 12, 2002); ISN 311 FD-302 (Oct. 10, 2002). The passport displayed the

original picture, not Farhi's picture. ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,2002). Farhi explained that he

did not obtain a visa because one was unnecessary to enter England. Id Farhi claimed he

traveled to London at the encouragement of his friends in Italy, who advised him that England

was a better place to live than Italy. Jd. 4

21. As discussed below, Farhi then traveled from London to Afghanistan. Id.; ISN

311 FD-302 (Oct. 10,2002).

Farhi Attended the Finsburv Park Mosque, a Center for Terrorist Recruitment and Training

22. In London, Farhi attended the Finsbury Park Mosque six or seven times. Jd..

Farhi claimed he ended up at the Finsbury Park Mosque after he asked the local people where the

he went to England for work and higher pay. ISN 311 ARB Statement (Mar. 24,2005). He stated that if he wanted to create trouble, he would have gone from Italy to Afghanistan. Id


Arab community was, since he did not know anyone in London, and was told to take the London

Metro to Finsbury Park. ISN 311 FD-302 (Oct. 10,2002). Farhi b(1 )

b(1 )

b(1 ) ISN 31 I ARB Statement (Mar. 24, 2005); ISN 3 I I

ARB Statement (Mar. 26-27, b(1 )

b(1 ) b(2) ~.

23. The Finsbury Park Mosque was known to have been a "hotbed of radical Islam"

that, under the leadership of its former Imam, Abu Hamza aI-Masri, served as a "recruiting

center for jihadists for holy wars from Bosnia to Afghanistan." Craig S. Smith, "New Imam

CaBs for Help In Catching Bombers," New York Times, July 9, 2005. It has historically served

as both an attack planning and propaganda production base, and as a key recruitment and facility

for extremists associated with al-Qaida. Declaration nrlsDury Park Mosque

24. The Finsbury Park Mosque has been described as the place that the mujahideen

meet to go to fight. ISN.FD-302 (Mar. 30,2002). Numerous extremists from across Europe

transited through the Mosque while en route to fight in Afghanistan, Iraq, or other locations.

Finsbury Park Mosque Decl.

LenrUrts," has been linked to the Firisbury Park Mosque,

including Zacarias Moussaoui and Richard Reid .• Finsbury Park Mosque Dec!.


25. Farhi met with an Egyptian by the name of-..,.hile attending the Finsbury

Park Mosque. ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,2002); ISN 311 FD-302 (Oct. 10,2002). It is highly

probable that "is the Farhi described _as the

leader ofthe larger of the two mosques at Finsbury Park. ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,2002).

According to

ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,2002); ISN 3 [I FD-302 (Oct. 10,2002). Farhi

b(1), b(6)

b(1), b(6) ISN 311

FD-302 (Oct. 10, 2002); b(2)

b(1 ) ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. [2, 2002); b(2)

26. As the spiritual leader of the Finsbury Park Mo·squle,

was known to possess extreme views on some Islamic issues. See ISNII FD-302 (Feb. 21,

2002); Finsbury Park Mosque Dec!. ("AI-Qaida associate, and primary inman ofthe Mosque,

sought to incite hatred and violence at the [M]osque

until his detention in May 2004."). He produced video and audio recordings of his speeches and

was a vocal supporter of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) killing civilians.6 ISN.

b(2)


FD-302 (Feb. 21, 2002).

"London Daily Mail, EUP 20050524099003 [0]. los:ses:sed a ten-volume

"Encyclopedia ofthe Afghani Jihad" which included instructions on how to make explosives and

identified the Statue of Liberty as a potential terrorist target. Don Van Natta, Jr., "British Jury

Finds Muslim Cleric Guilty ofInciting Murder," New York Times, February 7, 2006.

27.

Finsbury Park Mosque Dec!.; see ISN

.FD-302 (Feb. 21, 2002) (Detainee

the spiritual leader of the Finsbury Park Mosque,

_while fighting the Soviet military in Afghanistan.).

• detailed that

28. In February convicted in the United Kingdom on

II charges of soliciting murder and racial hatred by using his sermons to encourage followers to

kill non-Muslims. Don Van Natta, Jr., "British Jury Finds Muslim Cleric Guilty ofInciting

Murder," New York Times, February 7, 2006.

29. Approximately two weeks after arriving in London, Farhi met a

Moroccan, at the Finsbury Park Mosque. ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,2002); ISN 311 FD-302


(Oct. 10, 2002). Farhi claimed tha~ecommended that Farhi attend the Baker Street

Mosque in London.7 ISN 311 FD-302 (Oct. 10,2002).

30. Farhi frequented the Baker Street Mosque in London. ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,

2002); ISN 311 FD-302 (Oct. 10,2002). Farhi

_ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,2002); b(2)

31.

b(1 )

Farhi was Recruited to Travel to Afghanistan

32. Farhi traveled to Afghanistan in July 2001. Although Farhi repeatedly stated, as

detailed below, that he traveled to Afghanistan to marry a Swedish woman, his travel pattern is

consistent with that of other Muslim Algerians who were recruited through the Finsbury Park

Mosque to travel to Afghanistan for jihad-related training. In addition, despite the extensive

efforts Farhi took to travel to Afghanistan, he never learned the name or identity of the Swedish

woman. ISN 311 FD-302 (Oct. 10,2002). Farhi also never learned of any additional specifics

of the woman, including her age or address in Afghanistan. Id He claimed that he was told that

Arabs in Afghanistan would introduce him to her. ISN 311 ARB Statement (Mar. 28, 2005).

33. Farhi, b(1). b(6)

b(1), b(6)

7 According to Farhi_claimed that the food at the Baker Street Mosque was good and cheap. ISN 311 FD-302 (Oct. 10,2002). 8 Farhi stated he had no knowledge as to whether the Baker Street prayer group in London was being run by a Palestinian cleric who had been named by the United Nations as a terrorist suspect and whose assets had been frozen. ISN 311 ARB Statement (Mar. 26-27, 2007).

11


See e.g., Id.; ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,2002); ISN 311 FD-302 (Oct. 10,2002);

ISN 311 FM40 (Sep. 9,2003); b(2) Farhi has

explained that such a practice was popular among Algerians in England - they would marry

British citizens to obtain legal residency and then file for divorce. ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,

2002). He claimed that this was the sole reason for his trip to Afghanistan. ISN 311 FD-302

(Oct. 10,2002).

-34. _provided Farhi with a fraudulent Pakistani visa to travel to Pakistan, paid

for his ticket, and informed him to meet with a Moroccan by the name of living in

Islamabad.9 ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12, 2002); ISN 311 FD-302 (Oct. 10, 2002). On or about

June 2 or 3, 2001, Farhi flew from Heathrow Airport in London to Islamabad, Pakistan. ld

Farhi traveled with the Bayart passport, 10 the fraudulent Pakistani visa, 250 British pounds, and

an open ended ticket. ld

35. Upon arriving in Islamabad, Farhi met wit~and an unidentified

Pakistani male, and stayed for a week. ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,2002).

Farhi claimed that _ knew about his pending meeting with the Swedish woman. ld

Farhi traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan, and met up with an

Afghani or Pakistani. ld __ paid for the taxi trip from Islamabad to Peshawar. ISN

9 Fa~hi later claimed that the Pakistani visa that_brought him was a real one, not a fake one. See ISN 311 ARB Statement (Mar. 26-27, 2007). 10 At some point while in London, Farhi attempted to alter the Bayart passport by replacing the original picture with a picture of himself. ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,2002). According to Farhi, he coincidentally encountered a friend from near the Finsbury Park Mosque who took him to a Sudanese man by the name with expertise in forging passports. ld_ took the passport for several hours a picture of Far hi to it. ld Th~s shoddy however, and it was apparent Farhi's picture on the passport wa~ a forgery. Id ~equested 100 British pounds for the job, but Farhi only paid him the 20 British pounds he had on his person. ld


311 FD-302 (Oct. 10,2002). Farhi paid British pounds. Id.; ISN 311 FD-302

(Jun. 12,2002).

36. Approximately four days later, Farhi trave:led by_ automobile to a village near the Afghani border. ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,2002).

Approximately two or three days purchased a 4x4 Mazda Truck, which

and Farhi drove into the mountains until the pass required them to walk. Id.; ISN 311 FD-302

(Oct. 10, 2002). They then walked across the border into Afghanistan and, because they were

never confronted by anyone, they were not required to show any papers. Id. After arriving in

Afghanistan they traveled by taxi to an Algerian guesthouse in the Arab area of Jalalabad,

Afghanistan. Id. Farhi could not explain where the taxi came from nor how they located it. ISN

311 FD-302 (Oct. 10,2002). Farhi claimed the guesthouse was run by a man named. _II who Farhi has described as an Arab and an Algerian. Id.; ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,

2002). _ubsequently returned to Pakistan. ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,2002).

37. Farhi could not explain why~as willing to assist him getting into

Afghanistan. ISN 311 FD-302 (Oct. 10,2002). Farhi stated that_did not know about the

Swedish woman. 12 ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,2002). Farhi did give_50 British pounds

upon his departure. Id.

38. b(1), b(2), b(6)

(Oct. 10, 2002) consistency and to

nalTative will refer to this individual as In a subsequent interview, Farhi

ISN 311 FD-302 (Oct. 10,2002). about the Swedish woman.


b(1), b(2), b(6) ISN.,M40 (Oct. 6,

to Afghanistan for jihad-related training. ISN_

FM40 (Oct. 27, 2004). ~ssisted him with the travel by forging his passport and

providing him the name of a hotel and a contact number once he arrived in Islamabad. Id.; ISN

_FM40 (Oct. 6, 2004). The contact turned out to be a man nanned

proceeded to travel with_o the Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad. ISN _M40

(Oct. 27, 2004).

39. Likewise, detainee A6 A2 took a similar,

indirect route to Afghanistan. ISN.M40 (Oct. 11,2002).

Id.

Id. _

_ Id. One of the individuals provided instructions for _s travel to Afghanistan.

ld. Pursuant to those ins·tru,~ticlns, "VC;lC;U to Islamabad, Pakistan, where he met up

with a man named~ho to the Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad,

Afghanistan. ld.

40. b(1), b(2), b(6)

b(1), b(2), b(6) ISN.FD-302 (Mar. 30, 2002);.

b(2) ISN.stated that if an Algerian wanted to go to Afghanistan, that person would

travel by plane from Algeria to France, change their passport and travel documents at a place

named Barbess in Paris, and then fly to London. ISN .FD-302 (Mar, 30,2002). That person


would then go to the Finsbury Park Mosque and see an individual by the name of_who

would handle any necessary paperwork, including changing passports and obtaining Pakistani

visas. Id The individual could then travel by train to Afghanistan. Id

41. Farhi claimed that he waited two weeks after arriving at the Algerian guesthouse

to ask~bout the Swedish woman because he was embarrassed. 13 ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun.

12, 2002); se , b(2) b(1), b(6)

b(1), b(6) This is the first time Farhi indicated that he was embarrassed about

the Swedish woman, even though he already had traveled from England to Pakistan using a

fraudulent passport and visa, had received a paid ticket for his trip from _ and had received

the assistance of~~o cross into Afghanistan and to arrive at the Algerian

guesthouse in Jalalabad. According to Farhi_informed him that the Swedish woman had

just left Jalalabad. ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,2002); ISN 311 FD-302 (Oct. 10,2002). Farhi

stated that he remained in the area to await the Swedish woman's return. ISN 311 FD-302 (Oct.

10,2002).

42. b(1), b(6)

b(1), b(6) b(2)

b(2) claiming instead that the guesthouse was run by _ ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun.

statement IS Oh\IIOl"

scussed _ See, e.g., ISN 311 FD-302

He also denied staying in an Algerian safe house in was at a he rented with an Algerian roommate. ISN 311 ARB

Statement (Mar. 26-27, 2007); ISN 311 ARB Statement (Mar. 24, 2005).


12,2002); ISN 311 FD-302 (Oct. 10,2002) b(1), b(6)

b(1), b(6)

b(1), b(6) ISNgFM40

(Oct. II, 2002); b(2) b(2)

43. As exemplified above in the case o~Muslim Algerians who were

recruited through the Finsbury Park Mosque were often taken to the Algerian guesthouse in

Jalalabad. ISN_M40 (Oct. 11,2002). _has described the Jalalabad guesthouse as

being run by_Id. b(1), b(2), b(6)

b(1), b(2), b(6) Jd.; b(2)

personal items to a man nanned

_gave his passport and other

who was responsible for holding everyone's

personal items. ISNgrM40 (Oct. 11,2002).

44. b(1), b(2), b(6)

b(1), b(2), b(6) 15

b(2) 16

45. b(1), b(2), b(6)

b(1), b(2), b(6) b(2) b(1), b(2), b(6)


SECRETIINOFORN

b(1), b(6)

46. Detainee A6 A2 identified Farhi as being at the Algerian

guesthouse in Jalalabad, Afghanistan in August 2001. ISN gFM40 (Ju!. 9, 2004). ISN.

could not remember Farhi's name and did not know how long Farhi was at the house. ld

47. b(1), b(2) b(1), b(2)

b(1), b(2) 17 b(2) b(1), b(2)

b(1), b(2)

b(1), b(2) " ld

48. b( 1), b(2), b(6)

b(1), b(2), b(6) 19 b(2) b(1), b(6)

49. b(1), b(2), b(6)

b(1), b(2), b(6)

h(l) h(2) ~(n)b(2) b(1), b(6)

17 The Derunta training complex was located approximately. 15 miles from lalalabad, Afghanistan. Terrorist Training Camps Dec!. The complex was a set of advanced Llj~"'111111

. warfare ~~~

l'V"OW"~ "'~"'''v''o for the Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad. ISN

9 b(1), b(2) b(1),b~ b~)

b(1 )


b(1), b(6)

50. Farhi did admit tha~aid for all his food, although he gave_20 British

pounds upon his eventual departure. ISN 311 FD-302 (Oct. 10, 2002).

51. b(1), b(2) Farhi b(1), b(2)

b(1), b(2)

b(2) b(1), b(2)

b(2) b(1), b(2)

b(1), b(2)

b(l), b(2) Id.

b(l), b(2)

b(1), b(2) ISN_M40 (Oct. 29, 2004);.-

b(2) Upon arriving in Kandahar, they went directly to the Kandahar guesthouse. ISN

~M40 (Oct. 29, 2004).

52. Farhi stated that he traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan, with a man he lived with and

met at the Algerian guesthouse by the name 311 FD-302 (Oct. 10,2002).

Farhi claimed they traveled there because the Swedish woman did not return and it was cooler in

Kabul. Id. One and a half months later they traveled to a small, unknown village described as

being on the road to Bagram. Id. In the village, Farhi met a friend o~ nanned

.who had horses, and Farhi claimed he spent time with the horses. Id

b(2) b(2)


SECRETlfNOFORN

53.

b(1 ) ISN 311 ARB Statement

(Mar. 24, 2005); ISN 311 ARB Statement (Mar. 28, 2005); b(2) He

also claimed that he has not touched a weapon since his military training in Algeria. ISN 311

ARB Statement (Mar. 28, 2005); ISN 311 ARB Statement (Mar. 26-27, 2007).

54. Farhi claimed that, while passing by with a friend, he saw Usama bin Laden

shortly after September 11, 200 I, attending a funeral on the outskirts of Kabul. ISN 311 FD-302

(Jun. 12,2002). Farhi subsequently stated that he did not see bin Laden, but rather that he heard

from others that bin Laden might be attending the funera1.21 ISN 311 ARB Statement (Mar. 24,

2005); ISN 311 ARB Statement (Mar. 28, 2005); ISN 311 ARB Statement (Mar. 26-27, 2007).

55. Farhi has claimed that he did not carry weapons in Afghanistan and that he is

against fighting. ISN 311 FD-302 (Oct. 10,2002); ISN 311 ARB Statement (Mar. 28, 2005);

b(1 ) Since being captured, Farhi has described "jihad" as a defensive act.

ISN 311 FD-302 (Oct. 10, 2002)?2 He has criticized the September 11, 2001 attacks, bin Laden,

and al-Qaida. Jd He also claimed that he never heard of al-Qaida until after September II and

has described it as a "platform" or "foundation." Id; ISN 311 ARB Statement (Mar. 28,2005);

21 Farhi claimed that he first saw Usama bin Laden in a wanted poster. ISN 3] 1 ARB Statement (Mar. 26-27, 2007). Farhi does not that event occurred. 22 Farhi has also claimed and~ever discussed jihad. ISN 311 FD-302 (Oct. 10,2002). discussed jihad, military training, or weapons with him. Id

19


ISN 311 ARB Statement (Mar. 26-27, 2007) b(1 )

b(2) b(2)

56. .... b(1 )

b(2)

57. Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September II, 2001, the

United States and allied forces began their military campaign in Afghanistan against a1-Qaida

and the Taliban in early October 2001. See 9111 Commission Report at 337-38. Airstrikes

against al-Qaida targets in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001. Id. at 337.

_ Declaration o~n Tora Bora ~Decl.).

Dec!.

58. . Tora Bora is the name of a cave complex in the White Mountains of eastern

Afghanistan at the border of Nangarhar, Afghanistan, and Parachinar, Pakistan. ~Decl.

This cave complex was built in the early 1980s to support mujahideen forces that fought against

the Soviets. Id. Usama bin Laden used the cave complex at Tora Bora as his headquarters in the

1990s. Id.

59. b(1), b(2)

b(2) b(1), b(2)


b(1), b(2)

60. In an interview conducted at Guantanamo Bay, Farhi was asked if he knew of any

future plans to attack the United States. ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,2002). Farhi b(1 )

b( 1 ) fd. b(2) When asked about his level, Farhi stated that

he was only in Afghanistan to improve his way of life. ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12, 2002).

Farhi's Arrest and False Statements

61. On or about November 19, 2001, Farhi claimed that he returned to the Algerian

guesthouse in Jalalabad with several Afghanis. ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,2002). He stayed at

the Algerian guesthouse for approximately three weeks and then fled Jalalabad with other Arabs

in a truck. fd.; ISN 311 FD-302 (Oct. 10, 2002). They eventually arrived in Pakistan and stayed

in a village for approximately 16 to 18 days until the Pakistanis turned them over to the Pakistani

police. ISN 3 I I FD-302 (Jun. 12,2002). Farhi used the alias "Abdullah" while he was in

custody with the Pakistanis. fd. While being transported in custody, Farhi was involved in a

vehicle wreck. fd. Farhi was injured and taken to the house of a Pakistani male. fd. Eventually

he was picked up by the Pakistani police, who took him back to the police station and then the

hospital. fd. According to Farhi, the police left behind, at the Pakistani male's house, a bag that

contained his personal items, which included his passport. fd.; ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 27, 2002).

62. At the hospital, Farhi told Pakistani police he was a Frenchman named "Bayart."

ISN 311 FD-302 (Jul. 27, 2002). He also told them his name was "Abdullah." fd. According to

Farhi, he used the Bayar! passport while in the hospital. ISN 311 FD-302 (June 12,2002). That

would appear to be inconsistent with his statement that he last saw the Bayar! passport at the

home of the Pakistani man who assisted him at the accident scene. fd.; ISN 311 FD-302 (Jul. 27,


2002).23

63. Farhi was subsequently interviewed by Americans. ISN 311 FD-302 (Jun. 12,

He later admitted that he lied to his

original interrogators because he hoped to be repatriated to France, rather than Algeria.24 ISN

311 FD-302 (Jui. 27,2002).

Conclnsion

For the reasons described above and in the attached exhibits, among others, Farhi is

lawfully detained by the United States.

22 ,...B8M1iIfiIIl!l4@"J<1!)jRN'"

ISN 311 FD-302 (Jui. 27, 2002).

Documents

Case 1:05-cv-01347-GK Document 209-1 Filed 07/29/09 …s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/detention/gitmo/... · Case 1:05-cv-01347-GK Document 209-1 Filed 07/29/09 Page 1 of 27