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JAGUALING V. CA | EDUAVE, 194 SCRA 607

FACTS:

Eduave claims that she inherited a parcel of land from her parents, which later increased in size due to

erosion caused by typhoon Ineng. In 1973 Jagualing asked her permission to plant corn and bananas

provided that they prevent squatters to come to the area.

The land was the subject of a reconveyance case between Janita Eduave vs. Heirs of Antonio Factura

which was the subject of judgment by compromise in view of the amicable settlement of the parties. In

the amicable settlement the heirs of Antonio Factura (Jagualing), ceded a portion of the land with an

area of 1,289 square meters more or less to Eduave.

Later, Jagualing denied the claim of ownership of Eduave, and asserted that they are the real owners of

the land in litigation containing an area of 18,000 square meters more or less. According to them, they

acquired the land by acquisitive prescription since they have occupied the land since 1969. They

presented tax declarations and photos of actual occupation to prove claim of prescription.

Eduave filed an action to quiet title and/or remove a cloud over the property in question against

Jagualing. RTC dismissed the complaint for failure of Eduave to establish by preponderance of evidence

their claim of ownership over the land in litigation and that the land is a delta thus is part of public

domain not susceptible of appropriation.

The CA found that the island was formed by the branching off of the river and subsequent thereto the

accumulation of alluvial deposits. Basing its ruling on Articles 463 and 465 of the Civil Code the Court of

Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, declared private respondents as the lawful and true

owners of the land subject of this case and ordered petitioners to vacate the premises and deliver

possession of the land to private respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Jagualing acquired the island thru prescription?

HELD: No.

From the evidence thus submitted, CA had sufficient basis for the finding that the property of Eduave

actually existed and was identified prior to the branching off or division of the river. The CA, therefore,

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properly applied Article 463 of the Civil Code which allows the ownership over a portion of land

separated or isolated by river movement to be retained by the owner thereof prior to such separation or

isolation. The parcel of land in question is part of an island that formed in a non-navigable and non-

flotable river; from a small mass of eroded or segregated outcrop of land, it increased to its present size

due to the gradual and successive accumulation of alluvial deposits. In this regard the CA also did not err

in applying Article 465 of the Civil Code. Under this provision, the island belongs to the owner of the

land along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof; or more accurately, because the island is longer

than the property of private respondents, they are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that portion

which corresponds to the length of their property along the margin of the river.

It is well-settled that lands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner. This preferential right is,

under Article 465, also granted the owners of the land located in the margin nearest the formed island

for the reason that they are in the best position to cultivate and attend to the exploitation of the same.

In fact, no specific act of possession over the accretion is required. If, however, the riparian owner fails

to assert his claim thereof, the same may yield to the adverse possession of third parties, as indeed evenaccretion to land titled under the torrens system must itself still be registered.

However, Jagualing failed to prove adverse possession of the land for the required period and their

possession cannot be considered in good faith since by their admission they have recognized Eduaves

ownership over the land. Thus the land still belongs to Eduave.

Islands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner nearest to its margin. However such accretion

may be lost to third parties thru prescription.

Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. vs Ernesto Santos &

Riverland, Inc.

G.R. No. 1530004

November 5, 2004

Facts:

Subject of the present petition for review on certiorari is the Decision, dated January 30, 2002, as well as

the April 12, 2002, Resolution of the Court of Appeals, The appellate court reversed the Decision, dated

October 4, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, and likewise denied petitioner's Motion for

Reconsideration.

On October 26, 1990, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement which amicably ended all their

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pending litigations. The pertinent portions of the Agreement, include the following: (1) Defendant

Foundation shall pay Plaintiff Santos P14.5 Million on (a) P1.5 Million immediately upon the execution of

this agreement and (b) The balance of P13 Million shall be paid, whether in one lump sum or in

installments, at the discretion of the Foundation, within a period of not more than two years from the

execution of this agreement; (2) Immediately upon the execution of this agreement (and [the] receipt of

the P1.5 Million), plaintiff Santos shall cause the dismissal with prejudice of Civil Cases; (3) Failure of

compliance of any of the foregoing terms and conditions by either or both parties to this agreement

shall ipso facto and ipso jure automatically entitle the aggrieved party to a writ of execution for the

enforcement of this agreement.

In compliance with the Compromise Agreement, respondent Santos moved for the dismissal of the

aforesaid civil cases. He also caused the lifting of the notices of lis pendens on the real properties

involved. For its part, petitioner SVHFI, paid P1.5 million to respondent Santos, leaving a balance of P13

million.

On October 28, 1992, respondent Santos sent another letter to petitioner inquiring when it would pay

the balance of P13 million. There was no response from petitioner. Consequently, respondent Santos

applied with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, for the issuance of a writ of execution of its

compromise judgment dated September 30, 1991. The RTC granted the writ.

Petitioner, however, filed numerous motions to block the enforcement of the said writ. The challenge of

the execution of the aforesaid compromise judgment even reached the Supreme Court. All these efforts,

however, were futile.

On November 22, 1994, petitioner's real properties located in Mabalacat, Pampanga were auctioned. In

the said auction, Riverland, Inc. was the highest bidder for P12 million and it was issued a Certificate of

Sale covering the real properties subject of the auction sale. Subsequently, another auction sale was

held on February 8, 1995, for the sale of real properties of petitioner in Bacolod City. Again, Riverland,

Inc. was the highest bidder. The Certificates of Sale issued for both properties provided for the right of

redemption within one year from the date of registration of the said properties.

On June 2, 1995, Santos and Riverland Inc. filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Damages alleging

that there was delay on the part of petitioner in paying the balance of P13 million.

Issues:

a)W/N the CA committed reversible error when it awarded legal interest in favor of the respondents

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the rights and obligations of the parties thereto. The purpose of the compromise is precisely to replace

and terminate controverted claims.

As to the remaining P13 million, the terms and conditions of the compromise agreement are clear and

unambiguous. It provides that the balance of P13 Million shall be paid, whether in one lump sum or ininstallments, at the discretion of the Foundation, within a period of not more than two (2) years from

the execution of this agreement.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated January 30, 2002 of the Court

of Appeals and its April 12, 2002 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 55122 are AFFIRMED. Costs against

petitioner. SO ORDERED

Rodzssen Supply Co. Inc. vs. Far East Bank & Trust Co. (357 SCRA 618)

14JAN

FACTS:

Petitioner opened with respondent a domestic letter of credit (LOC) in favor of Ekman and Company,

Inc. (Ekman) for the purchase of five hydraulic loaders. The first three hydraulic loaders were received

by the petitioner before the expiry of LOC and respondent paid Ekman. The remaining two hydraulic

loaders were received by the petitioner after the expiry of LOC/contract but respondent still paid

Ekman. Petitioner refused to pay respondent. Respondent filed a case. Petitioner answered by way of

affirmative defense that respondent had no cause of action being allegedly in bad faith and breach of

contract. The trial court and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of respondent to recover from the cost of

two hydraulic loaders.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is entitled of reimbursement from petitioner for its payment out of

mutual negligence.

RULING:

YES. Petitioner should pay respondent bank the amount the latter expended for the equipment

belatedly delivered by Ekman and voluntarily received and kept by petitioner. Respondent banks right

to seek recovery from petitioner is anchored, not upon the inefficacious Letter of Credit, but on Article

2142 of the Civil Code which reads: Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical

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(2) Whether or not the Court may award damages to the offended parties in the criminal case despite

the filing of a civil action against the employer of the truck driver.

Held:

(1) No. In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to enforce civil

liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a separate action forquasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured

party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the

same negligent act or omission of the accused. This is the rule against double recovery.In other words,

the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil

liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto either of which may be enforced against the culprit,

subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party can not recover

damages under both types of liability. In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate

civil action for damages against petitioner as employer of the accused, based on quasi delict, under

Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Petitioner, as employer of the accused who has been

adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, cannot be held subsidiarily liable becauseof the filing of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. In view of the reservation to file,

and the subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not instituted with

the criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the

Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

(2) No. The award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil action for the

recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against

the employer. The only issue brought before the trial court in the criminal action is whether accused

Dunca is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for

recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed againstthe petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver. The policy against double recovery requires that

only one action be maintained for the same act or omission whether the action is brought against the

employee or against his employer. The injured party must choose which of the available causes of action

for damages he will bring.

Tamargo vs CA

G.R. No. 85044 June 3 1992 [Parental Authority]

FACTS:

In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle. Jennifer's

natural parents filed civil complaints for damages with the RTC against Bundoc's natural parents.

In December 1981, spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was granted in

November 1982.

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Adelberto's parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable parties to

the action since parental authority had shifted to them from the moment the petition for adoption was

decreed. Spouses Tamargo contended that since Adelberto was then actually living with his natural

parents, parental authority had not ceased by mere filing and granting of the petition for adoption. Trial

court dismissed the spouses Tamargo's petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by Adelberto.

RULING:

No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: "Parents and other persons exercising parental

authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their

unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the

appropriate defences provided by law." In the case at bar, parental authority over Adelberto was still

lodged with the natural parents at the time the shooting incident happened. It follows that the naturalparents are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

SC held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting

parents, at the time the shooting happened. It do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to

the decree of the adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time

when adopting parents had no actual custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may be

essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.

Rescissible Contracts: Oria vs McMicking G.R. No. L-7003

Facts: Gutierrez Hermanos filed an action for recovery of a sum of money against Oria Hermanos & Co.

and herein plaintiff filed an action for recovery also for the same defendant. Before the institution of the

suits, members of the Company dissolved their relations and entered into a liquidation. Tomas Oria y

Balbas acting in behalf of his co-owners entered into a contract with the herein plaintiff for the purpose

of transferring and selling all the property which the Oria Hermanos & Co. owned and among the goods

stated on that instrument was the steamship Serpantes and which the subject of this litigation. When

the Trail Court resolved the action for recovery filed by Gutierrez Hermanos and jugdment was in hisfavor, The sheriff demanded to Tomas Oria y Balbas to make payment but the latter said there were no

funds to pay the same. The sheriff then levied on the steamer, took possession of the same and

announced it for public auction. Herein plaintiff claimed that he is the owner of the steamer by virtue of

the selling of all the properties of the said Company.

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Issue(s): 1. Whether or not there was a valid sale between Oria Hermanos & Co. to Manuel Oria y

Gonzales as against the creditors of the company.

2. Whether or not the sale was fraudulent.

Held: At the time of said sale the value of the assets of Oria Hermanos & Co., as stated by the partners

themselves, was P274,000. The vendee of said sale was a son of Tomas Oria y Balbas and a nephew of

the other two persons heretofore mentioned which said three brothers together constituted all of the

members of said company.The plaintiff is a young man of 25 years old and has no property before the

said selling. The court had laid down the rules in determining whether a there has been fraud

prejudicing creditors: 1) consideration of conveyance is fictitious; 2) transfer was made while the suit

against him (Tomas Oria y Balbas) was pending; 3) sale by insolvent debtor; 4) evidence of insolvency; 5)

transfer of all properties; 6) the sale was made between father and son; 7) and the failure of the vendee

to take exclusive possession of the property. The case at bar shows every one of the badges of fraud.