Yu vs Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad and People of the Philippines

Petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Judith Yu to enjoin respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad (RTC).

FACTS:

1. In May 26, 2005 RTC rendered decision convicting the petitioner of estafa. Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9, 2005, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted. (Denied)

2. The petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to our Neypes v Court of Appeals, she had a “fresh period” of 15 dys from Nov. 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial or up to Nov. 18, 2005 within which to file a notice of appeal.

3. December 8, 2005, Prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed 10 dys late, arguing that Neypes v Court of Appeals is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases.

4. Petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injuction to enjoin the RTC from acting on the prosecution’s motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the decision.

ISSUE: w/not RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecution’s motions when she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court, applying the “fresh period rule” enunciated in Neypes.

HELD:

The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent

— it is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or as provided by statutes. It may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of the law.

In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period within which to appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a “fresh period” to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:

First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that “[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.” Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction.

Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned – the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It

was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.

Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal on November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from November 3, 2005, the date of receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from further exercising jurisdiction over the prosecution’s motions to dismiss appeal and for execution of the decision. The respondent Judge is also DIRECTED to give due course to the petitioner’s appeal in Criminal Case and to elevate the records of the case to the Court of Appeals for review of the appealed decision on the merits.

Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. vs Villareal

Petition on Certiorari

Facts:1. Petitioner Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. (Boardwalk) is a duly organized and existing domestic corporation engaged in the selling of ready-to- wear (RTW) merchandise. Respondent Elvira A. Villareal (Villareal), on the other hand, is one of Boardwalk's distributors of RTW merchandise.

2. Boardwalk filed an amended complaint for replvin against Villareal covering a 1995 Toyota Tamaraw FX, for the latter's alleged failure to pay a car loan obtained from the former. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 160116, was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.

MTC: judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant adjudging that the former has the right to the possession of the subject motor vehicle and for the latter to pay the costs of the suit.

3. Villareal move for reconsideration.

RTC: reversing the MeTC decision.Defendant Villareal has the right of possession to

and the value of subject vehicle described in the complaint. Hence, plaintiff is directed to deliver the subject vehicle to defendant or its value in case delivery cannot be made.

4. Boardwalk filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by RTC on Dec. 14 2006. Boardwalk received it on Jan. 19, 2007.

5. On February 5, 2007, Boardwalk filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file a Petition for Review, praying that it be granted 30 days, or until March 7, 2007, to file its Petition for Review.

6. On even date, Boardwalk filed a notice of Appeal with the RTC which the said court denied for being a wrong mode of appeal.

CA: In dismissing the Petition for Review, the CA held that Boardwalk erred in filing its Motion for Extension and paying the docket fees therefor with the RTC. It should have done so with the CA as required by Section 125 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. It held that as a result of Boardwalk's erroneous filing and payment of docket fees, it was as if no Motion for Extension was filed, and the subsequent March 7, 2007 filing of its Petition with the appellate court was thus late and beyond the reglementary 15-day period provided for under Rule 42.

The CA added that Boardwalk's prayer for a 30-day extension in its Motion for Extension was irregular, because the maximum period that may be granted is only 15 days pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42. A further extension of 15 days should only be granted for the most compelling reason which is not obtaining in the present case.

ISSUE: w/not petitioner can invoke the liberal construction of the rules to effect substantial justice in accordance with rule 1, section 6 of the 1997 rules of civil procedure.

HELD:

Records show that petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing rules.

The Petition must be accompanied by a Verification and Certification against forum shopping. Copies of the relevant pleadings and other material portions of the record must likewise be attached to the Petition.

The Rules require that the Petition must be accompanied by a Verification and Certification against forum shopping. If the petitioner is a juridical entity, as in this case, it must be shown that the person signing in behalf of the corporation is duly authorized to represent said corporation. In this case, no special power of attorney or board resolution was attached to the Petition showing that Lo was authorized to sign the Petition or represent Boardwalk in the proceedings. In addition, petitioner failed to attach to the Petition copies of the relevant pleadings and other material portions of the record.

Petitioner tried to cure these lapses by subsequently submitting a board resolution showing Lo's authority to sign and act on behalf of Boardwalk, as well as copies of the relevant pleadings. Now, it prays that the Court consider these as substantial compliance with the Rules.

Concededly, this Court in several cases exercised leniency and relaxed the Rules. However, in this case, petitioner committed multiple violations of the Rules which should sufficiently militate against its plea for leniency. As will be shown below, petitioner failed to perfect its appeal by not filing the Petition within the reglementary period and paying the docket and other lawful fees before the proper court. These requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional.

Petitioner erroneously paid the docket fees and other lawful fees with the RTC.

The CA may grant an extension of 15 days only. The grant of another 15-days extension, or a total of 30-days extension is allowed only for the most compelling reason

More significantly, Section 8 of Rule 42 provides that the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner "upon the timely filing of a petition for review and the payment of the corresponding docket and other lawful fees." Undisputably, petitioner's appeal was not perfected because of its failure to timely file the Petition and to pay the docket and other lawful fees before the proper court which is the CA. Consequently, the CA properly dismissed outright the Petition because it never acquired jurisdiction over the same. As a result, the RTC's Decision had long become final and executory.

At this point, it must be emphasized that since petitioner's right of appeal is a mere statutory privilege, it was bound to a strict observance of the periods of appeal, which requirements are not merely mandatory, but jurisdictional.

Nor may the negligence of Boardwalk's former counsel be invoked to excuse it from the adverse effects of the appellate court's pronouncement. His negligence or mistake proceeded from carelessness and ignorance of the basic rules of procedure. This does not constitute excusable negligence that would extricate and excuse Boardwalk from compliance with the Rules.

Boardwalk's request for the Court to review its case on the merits should be denied as well. The import of the Court's foregoing pronouncements necessarily renders the R TC judgment final and unassailable; it became final and executory after the period to appeal expired without Boardwalk perfecting an appeal. As such, the Court may no longer review it.

(Petition Denied)

Santos vs Go

Petition on Certiorari

Facts:

1. The petitioners are corporate directors and officers of Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI). FEPI allegedly entered into a Project Agreement with Manila Southcoast Development Corporation (MSDC), whereby FEPI undertook to develop several parcels of land in Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly owned by MSDC. 

2. Under the terms of the Agreement, FEPI was to convert an approximate area of 1,269 hectares into a first-class residential, commercial, resort, leisure, and recreational complex.  The said Project Agreement clothed FEPI with authority to market and sell the subdivision lots to the public.

3. Respondent Wilson Go offered to buy Lot 17, Block 38 from FEPI.  Lot 17 measured approximately 1,079 square meters and the purchase price agreed upon was P4,304,000.  The Contract to Sell signed by the parties was the standard, printed form prepared by FEPI. 

4. Go fully complied with the terms of the Contract.  FEPI, however, failed to develop the property.  Neither did it release the TCT to Go.  Go demanded fulfillment of the terms and conditions of their agreement.

5. FEPI explained that FEPI’s hands were tied by a cease and desist order issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).  Said order was the subject of several appeals now pending before this Court.  FEPI assured its clients that it had no intention to abandon the project and would resume developing the properties once the disputes had been settled in its favor.

6. Go was neither satisfied nor assured by FEPI’s statements and he made several demands upon FEPI to return his payment of the purchase price in full,

7. Go then filed a complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).  He likewise filed a separate Complaint-Affidavit for estafa under Articles 316 and 318 of RPC in the office of Prosecutor in Pasig.

8. Petitioners alleged that the City Prosecutor of Pasig City has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation on the ground that the complainant was not from Pasig City, the contract was not executed nor were the payments made in Pasig City. They averred that FEPI was not the owner of the project but the developer with authority to sell under a joint venture with MSDC, who is the real owner.

9. Go stressed that the City Prosecutor of Pasig City had jurisdiction over the case.  He argued that the Contract to Sell specifically provided that payment be made at FEPI’s office at Pasig City and the demand letters bore the Pasig City address. Additionally, the acts executed by FEPI appearing in the contract were the acts of an owner and not a mere developer.

PROSECUTOR:no misrepresentation stating that: (1) the Contract to Sell did not mention FEPI as the owner of the property;  

(2) no Deed of Sale had been executed by the parties, then petitioners are not yet bound to deliver the certificate of title

3) the City Prosecutor disavowed any jurisdiction since it is the HLURB, which has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes and controversies involving the sale of lots in commercial subdivision including claims involving refunds under P.D. No. 1344

10. Go appealed the City Prosecutor’s Resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ),

DOJ: reversed the decision

11. Petitioners herein filed with the Court of Appeals,CA: The appellate court opined that a petition for

review pursuant to Rule 43 cannot be availed of as a mode of appeal from the ruling of the Secretary of Justice because the Rule applies only to agencies or officers exercising quasi-judicial functions. The decision to file an information or not is an executive and not a quasi-judicial function.

ISSUE: w/not a petition for review under Rule 43 is a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor to file an information in a criminal case.

HELD:Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

clearly shows that it governs appeals to the Court of Appeals from decisions and final orders or resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals or quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions.  The Department of Justice is not among the agencies included in Section 1 of Rule 43.

We cannot agree with petitioners’ submission that a preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause.

DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners’ petition for review.

Notwithstanding that theirs is a petition for review properly under Rule 45, petitioners want us to reverse the findings of probable cause by the DOJ after their petition for review under Rule 43 from the court a quo failed.  This much we are not inclined to do, for we have no basis to review the DOJ’s factual findings and its determination of probable cause.

courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor in evaluating the offense charged.  He may dismiss the complaint forthwith, if he finds the charge insufficient in form or substance, or without any ground.  Or, he may proceed with the investigation if the complaint in his view is sufficient and in proper form. Findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made with grave abuse of discretion. In this case, petitioners have not shown sufficient nor convincing reason for us to deviate from prevailing jurisprudence. (Petition denied)

Gonzales vs CSC

Petition for Review

Facts:

1. Petitioner Gonzales was one of the two Utility Workers II assigned at the Pharmacy Section of respondent Philippine Children’s Medical Center (PCMC). Petitioner started absenting himself without an approved leave (AWOL) and without explaining the reason for his absence to his superiors.

2. In view of the exigency of petitioner’s functions, HR Manager Officer, wrote a letter directing the petitioner to report for work within three (3) days from receipt of said notice, otherwise, he would be dropped from the rolls.

3. During his absence, petitioner was seen on several occasions within the premises of PCMC, particularly in the Budget Office, Billing and Cashier, and Personnel Clinic. He allegedly visited the clinic without consulting any medical problem and when Dr. Galero once made a surprise visit, he was not found in his house.

4. officer-in-charge of the Pharmacy Section, reported petitioner’s irresponsibility and lack of concern for his work to Dr. Lillian V. Lee, Executive Director of PCMC, recommending that petitioner be dropped from the rolls.Despite the written letter-notice sent to him, petitioner failed to report for work thus constraining PCMC to drop him from the rolls.

5. Petitioner appealed in Civil Service Commission. (denied)

6. He filed a petition for review in the CA, the petition was denied for failure to comply with Section 6 (c), Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court, particularly for failure to attach certified true copies of material portions of the records and supporting papers.

ISSUE: w/not the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing the appeal of herein petitioner based on pure technicality.

HELD:The court already held that Section 6, Rule 43 of

the Revised Rules of Court is not to be construed as imposing the requirement that all supporting papers accompanying the petition should be certified true copies. We compared this provision with its counterpart provision in Rule 42, on petitions for review from the RTC to the CA, and noted that under the latter, only the judgments or final orders of the lower court need to be certified true copies or duplicate originals. In numerous resolutions issued by this Court we emphasized that in an appeal via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 and in an original civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rules 46 and 56, what is required to be a certified true copy is the copy of the questioned judgment, final order or resolution.

Further, we note that petitioner had attached certified true copies of the documents supporting his Motion for Reconsideration and Compliance. As previously held, submission of a required document with the Motion for Reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46.

This Court is not a trier of facts, and its function is limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court. In this case, we find no exceptional circumstance and we find no cogent reason to set aside the factual findings of the CSC in sustaining the action of respondent in the dropping of petitioner from the rolls on the ground that he was found AWOL (absent without official leave).

The CSC noted that petitioner had admitted that effective March 2, 1998, he was absent without approved leave. Petitioner’s unauthorized absences, as found by the CSC, constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, a ground for disciplinary action under E.O. No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987. For his services are essential to the efficient delivery of medical services and the exigencies of the service require his presence in the office.We agree that there is legal basis for dropping petitioner from the rolls.

Jaro vs CA

Petition for Review

Facts:

1. Rosario Vda. de Pelaez (“respondent” for brevity) filed a complaint for prohibition under Section 27 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act (R.A. No. 1199) against petitioner before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Provincial Adjudicator Board, Lucena City, Quezon (“Provincial Adjudicator” for brevity).

2. Respondent alleged in the complaint that the late Rosenda Reyes y Padua (“Rosenda” for brevity) was the original owner of a parcel of coconut land.

3. Rosenda allegedly instituted respondent and her husband, the late Igmedio Pelaez, as tenants of the land. In 1978, Ricardo Padua Reyes (“Ricardo” for brevity), the heir of Rosenda, sold the land to petitioner who, respondent alleged, now wants to eject respondent from the land.

4. Petitioner countered that respondent is not and had never been a tenant of the land for respondent never shared in the harvests nor was respondent given any share as payment for her work. In 1978, when petitioner purchased the land from Ricardo, petitioner allowed respondent to remain on the land allegedly with the understanding that petitioner could remove respondent’s house at any time if petitioner so desired.

5. Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.

In ruling that respondent was not a tenant, the Provincial Adjudicator noted that the affidavits presented as evidence were conflicting and the inconsistencies therein were material to the resolution of the case.

6. Respondent appealed the decision to the DARABDARAB: reversing the decision

7. Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal on certiorari with the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 1, Rule XIV of the DARAB’s New Rules of Procedure.

CA: the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing outright the petition. The Resolution reads:“Upon examination of the present appeal on certiorari, the Court RESOLVED to outrightly DISMISS the same for the following reasons:(a) it should be in the form of a petition for review as required by Supreme Court Revised Adm. Circ. No. 1-95; and(b) the annexes to the petition are certified as true xerox copy by counsel for the petitioner, and not by the proper public official who has custody of the records, in violation of the same Circular and Adm. Circ. No. 3-96.

8. Petitioner filed his Amended Petition. On November 8, 1996, upon verification that his petition had been dismissed, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of Amended Petition. (denied)

ISSUE: w/not petitioner is entitled to an annulment of the impugned decision and resolutions of the darab and the honorable court of appeals?

HELD:As stated earlier, the DARAB decision on its face

does not show that the DARAB blatantly misapplied the fundamental rules of evidence to the facts of the case. The DARAB decision was thus the proper subject of a petition for review. The next crucial issue for our consideration is whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it dismissed outright the appeal and refused to give due course to the amended petition.

At the time that petitioner appealed the DARAB decision to the Court of Appeals, Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 was then the rule that governed appeals to the Court of Appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies, including the DARAB. Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 has now been formulated as Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

To recall, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for two reasons.

First, the appeal was not in the form of a petition for review as required by Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95.

Second, the annexes attached to the petition were neither duplicate originals nor were they certified true copies. The annexes were only certified as true xerox copies by the counsel of petitioner, not by the authority or the corresponding officer or representative of the issuing entity, in contravention of Administrative Circular No. 3-96.

While we agree with the Court of Appeals that the defective petition deserved to be dismissed, the amended petition filed by petitioner should have been given due course. Petitioner filed the amended petition, now in proper form, accompanied by annexes, all of which were certified true copies by the DARAB. This is more than substantial compliance

The amended petition no longer contained the fatal defects that the original petition had but the Court of Appeals still saw it fit to dismiss the amended petition. The Court of Appeals reasoned that “non-compliance in the original petition is admittedly attributable to the petitioner and that no highly justifiable and compelling reason has been advanced to the court for it to depart from the mandatory requirements of Administrative Circular No. 3-96.

The decisions of the Provincial Adjudicator and the DARAB are in sharp conflict with each other. The Court of Appeals could have broken this impasse by giving due course to petitioner’s appeal. The Court of Appeals is in a better position to fully adjudicate the instant case for it can delve into the records to determine the probative value of the evidence supporting the findings of the Provincial Adjudicator and of the DARAB.

After all, the Court of Appeals is empowered by its Revised Internal Rules to require parties to submit additional documents, as it may find necessary to promote the ends of substantial justice. Moreover, the Court of Appeals could order that the original records of the case be elevated to it for the full adjudication of the case. Thus, the remand of this case to the Court of Appeals is necessary for it to decide the appeal on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated October 23, 1996, November 15, 1996 and January 6, 1997 are SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED

to the Court of Appeals which is DIRECTED to reinstate and give due course to the petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 42231, and to decide the same on the merits.

SO ORDERED.