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Case Digest 1 SUCCESSION – JUSTICE HOFILENA USON v. DEL ROSARIO FACTS Maria USON (petitioner) is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who died in 1945. Nebreda left 5 parcels of land in Labrador Pangasinan, which lands are thesubject of an action for recovery of possession and ownership filed by USONagainst Maria DEL ROSARIO. DEL ROSARIO is the common law wife of Nebreda to whom he begotten 4illegitimate children. USON contends that DEL ROSARIO deprived her of the possession a n d enjoyment of the lands in question. The latter, meanwhile, argues that Uson andNebreda executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate ashusband and wife. USON was given an alimony in consideration of which shegave up her rights to inherit any property from Nebreda. The CFI ruled in favor of USON. ISSUE: WON USON is the rightful heir? HELD: YES!When Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land passed from themoment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old CivilCode). As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed anddelivered to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs . Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Usonover the lands in question became vested. The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over thelands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future propertythat her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separationthey had entered into on February 21, 1931,

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 Case Digest1SUCCESSION – JUSTICE HOFILENAUSON v. DEL ROSARIOFACTS•Maria USON (petitioner) is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who died in 1945.•Nebreda left 5 parcels of land in Labrador Pangasinan, which lands are thesubject of an action for recovery of possession and ownership filed by USONagainst Maria DEL ROSARIO.•DEL ROSARIO is the common law wife of Nebreda to whom he begotten 4 illegitimate children.•U S O N c o n t e n d s t h a t D E L R O S A R I O d e p r i v e d h e r o f t h e p o s s e s s i o n a n d enjoyment of the lands in question. The latter, meanwhile, argues that Uson andNebreda executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate ashusband and wife. USON was given an alimony in consideration of which shegave up her rights to inherit any property from Nebreda.•

The CFI ruled in favor of USON.ISSUE:WON USON is the rightful heir?HELD:YES!When Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land passed from themoment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old CivilCode). As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed anddelivered to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustrevs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Usonover the lands in question became vested. The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future propertythat her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separationthey had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simplereason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it berenounced. Additional Facts and Ratio:DEL ROSARIO contends that the 4 illegitimate children she had with Nebreda areentitled to successional rights by virtue of the new civil code promulgated on 1950.HOWEVER, the court ruled that while it is true that rights first declared in the newcivil code are to be given retroactive effect, the same is subject to the condition thatthe said rights will not prejudice vested or acquired rights. Hence, given thebackground of the case, the children cannot have successional rights since USON’srights would be prejudiced. 

Case Digests for Articles 1-10 of Civil CodePersons and Family RelationsElmer RabuyaFiloteo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan263 SCRA 222 (1996)G.R. No. 79543Facts:Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police District inMetro Manila, an old hand at dealing with suspected criminals. A recipient of variousawards and commendations attesting to his competence and performance as a policeofficer, he could not therefore imagine that one day he would be sitting on the other sideof the investigation table as the suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking of apostal delivery van.Filoteo admitted involvement in the crime and pointed to three other soldiers, namely,Edd ie  Sagu inde l ,  Bernardo  Re la to r  and  Jack  Mi rava l les   (who  tu rned  out   to  be  adischarged soldier), as his confederates. At 1:45 in the afternoon of May 30, 1982,petitioner executed a sworn statement in Tagalog before M/Sgt. Arsenio C. Carlos andSgt. Romeo P. Espero.Peitioner however sought later that his confession be inadmissible evidence, saying thatthe law should favour him as an accused.Issue:W h e t h e r   o r   n o t   A r t i c l e   I I I ,   S e c t i o n   1 2   o f   t h e   1 9 8 7   C o n s t i t u t i o n  s h a l l   b e   g i v e n   a retroactive effect and petitioner’s extrajudicial confession be held as inadmissibleevidenceHeld:No, since what he did was not a penal offense. Under the penal law, a person guilty of felony who is not a habitual criminal may be given favour by the law.

Ladera vs. HodgesLadera vs. HodgesNo. 8027-R. September 23, 1952.Reyes, J.B.L., J.Doctrine: Article 315 of the Civil Code (now Article 415, New Civil Code) makes no distinction as to whether the owner of the land is or is not the owner of the building.Facts: Ladera entered into a contract with Hodges whereby the latter promised to sell a lot subject to certain terms and conditions. In case of failure of the purchaser to make a monthly payment within 60 days after it fell due, “this contract may be taken and considered as rescinded and annulled,” in which case all sums of money paid would be considered rentals and the vendor shall be at liberty to dispose of the parcel of land with all the improvements theron to any other person in a manner as if this contract had never been made. After the execution of the contract, Ladera built on a lot a house of mixed materials assessed at P4500.Unfortunately, Ladera failed to pay the agreed installments, whereupon the appellant rescinded the contract and filed an action for ejectment. The MTC rendered a decision upon agreement of the parties- Ladera to vacate and surrender possession of the lot and pay P10 a month until delivery of the premises. The court issued an alias writ of execution and pursuant thereto the sheriff levied upon all rights, interests, and participation over your house standing on the lot. The sheriff posted the notices of the sale but did not publish the same in a newspaper of general circulation.

At the auction sale Ladera did not attend because she had gone to Manila and the sheriff sold the property to Avelina Magno as the highest bidder. On July 6, 1948, Hodges sold the lot to Manuel Villa and on the same day the latter purchased the house from Magno for P200 but this last transaction was not recorded.

Ladera returned to Iloilo after the sale and learned of its results. She went to see the sheriff and upon the latter’s representation that she could redeem the property, she paid him P230 and the sheriff issued a receipt. It does not appear, however, that this money was turned over to Hodges. Thereupon, Ladera spouses filed an action against Hodges, the sheriff, and the judgment sale purchasers, Magno and Villa to set aside the sale and recover the house. The lower court ruled in favor of Ladera. Hodges et al contend that the house being built on land owned by another person should be regarded in law as movable or personal property.

Issue: Whether the house being built on land owned by another should be regarded as movable property.

Held: According to Article 334 of the Civil Code (now 415), Immovable property are the following: “Lands, building, roads, and constructions of all kinds adhering to the soil;” Applying the principle Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemu, the law makes no distinction as to whether the owner of the land is or is not the owner of the building. In view of the plain terms of the statute, the only possible doubt could arise in the case of a house sold for demolition.In the case of immovables by destination, the code requires that they be placed by the owner of the tenement, in order to acquire the same nature or consideration of real property. In cases of immovable by incorporation, the code nowhere requires that the attachment or incorporation be made by the owner of the land. The only criterion is union or incorporation with the soil.

Ladera did not declare his house to be a chattel mortgage. The object of the levy or sale was real property. The publication in a newspaper of general circulation was indispensible. It being admitted that no publication was ever made, the execution sale was void and conferred no title on the purchaser.

The alleged purchaser at the auction sale, Magno, is a mere employee of the creditor Hodges and the low bid made by her as well as the fact that she sold the house to Villa on the same day that Hodges sold him the land, proves that she was merely acting for and in behalf of Hodges.

It should be noted that in sales of immovables, the lack of title of the vendor taints the rights of subsequent purchasers. Unlike in sales of chattels and personalty, in transactions covering real property, possession in good faith is not equivalent to title.

Caveat: Anyone who claims this digest as his own without proper authority shall be held liable under the law of Karma. 

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986) 

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. 

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their publication;2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation. 

HELD: 

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication. 

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. 

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. 

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law. 

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical. 

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible. 

J. Cruz: 

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

Manuel Lara vs Petronilo Del Rosario, Jr.Manuel Lara et al were former taxi drivers of Petronilo Del Rosario, Jr. In September 1950, Del Rosario sold some of his vehicles which led to Lara et al not being needed anymore. Eventually, their services were terminated. Because their employer did not give them their one month’s salary in lieu of the notice required in Article 302 of the Code of Commerce, Lara et al sued Del Rosario.

However, Del Rosario contended that the Code of Commerce was already repealed hence Lara et al have no legal basis. Del Rosario contends that the New Civil Code took effect in August 1950 or a year after release for publication.

ISSUE: When did the New Civil Code took effect?

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Lara et al has no legal basis for their claims since the provision of the COde of Commerce they are relying on was already repealed by the New Civil Code. Their alleged dismissal from service without notice took place in September 1950 after the New Civil Code took effect.

The Supreme Court also clarified that, in an obiter dictum, that the new Civil Code of the Philippines took effect on August 30, 1950. This date is exactly one year after the Official Gazette publishing the Code was released for circulation, the said release having been made on August 30, 1949.

D.M. Consunji vs. CA and Juego

TITLE: D.M. Consunji Inc. v Court of Appeals and Maria J. Juego

CITATION: GR No. 137873, April 20, 2001 | 357 SCRA 249

FACTS:

Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City.  He was immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA) at around 2:15PM.

Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo, performing their work as carpenter at the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building were on board a platform.  Jose was crushed to death when the platform fell due to removal or looseness of the pin, which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock.  Luckily, Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety.

PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed report dated Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Jose’s widow filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages in the RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to receive support from DM Consunji amounting to P644,000.

DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUE: Whether Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.

HELD:

The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code.  Maria Juergo was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.  She filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioner’s personnel. 

Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC).  Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom.  

PILAPIL VS IBAY-SOMERAMarch 28, 2013 ~ vbdiaz

PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et alG.R. No. 80116June 30, 1989

FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling, Pilapil “had an affair with a certain William Chia.” The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled “PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia” was assigned to the court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.

A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.

As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.

ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery, considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner’s MTQ is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint … for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case … is hereby made permanent.

NO

Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.

Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC

July 14, 2012 § Leave a comment

Silverio v. Republic

October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)

 

PARTIES:

petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio

respondent: Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:

On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely” and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with the principle of justice and equality.

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a

reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.

HELD:

No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioner’s basis of the change of his name is that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court denied the petition.

ANCHETA V. GUERSEY-DALAYGON (Succession)

Binding Effect of Judgments 490 SCRA 140 June 8, 2006

Facts: Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died in 1979. She left a will wherein she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard consisting of Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate improvements at Forbes Park, current account with cash balance and shares of stock in A/G Interiors. Two years after her death, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter, Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his shares in A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter.

Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audrey’s will was admitted to probate, filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audrey’s estate. The motion and project of partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator with regards to Richard’s will also filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richard’s undivided interest in the Forbes property was allocated to respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was allocated to their three children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject to the legacy.

Issue: Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled under the circumstances.

Held: A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.

However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of

circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.

Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963 IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor andHeir-appellees, VS. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellantJanuary 31, 1963

FACTS:Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the success ional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of California on the matter; that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his will remain undisturbed.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen?

RULING:The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California; and the conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The California conflict rule says: “If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile.” Christensen being

domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed. Where it is referred back to California, it will form a circular pattern referring to both country back and forth.

GARCIA vs. RECIO G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001 GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, VS. RODERICK A. RECIO,respondentOctober 2, 2001

FACTS:The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino”. Since October 1995, they lived separately; and in 1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.

RULING:The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic, issued by

an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient; and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioner’s failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. However, there are two types of divorce, absolute divorce terminating the marriage and limited divorce merely suspending the marriage. In this case, it is not known which type of divorce the respondent procured.Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree “a party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute commits the offense of bigamy”. This shows that the divorce obtained by the respondent might have been restricted. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other evidences submitted, they don’t absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to the alleged foreign law.Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between the petitioner and respondent can not be declared null and void based on lack of evidence conclusively showing the respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. With the lack of such evidence, the court a quo may declare nullity of the parties’ marriage based on two existing marriage certificates.

FIRST DIVISION

PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTSPHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED, and PEPSICO, INCORPORATED,Petitioners,

- versus -

PEPE B. PAGDANGANAN, and PEPITO A. LUMAJAN,Respondents.

G. R. No. 167866

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,YNARES-SANTIAGO,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CALLEJO, SR.,CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 12, 2006x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The Case

For review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is the 13 February

2004 Decision[1] and 26 June 2005 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68290,

reversing and setting aside the 3 August 2000 [3] Decision and 23 August 2000[4] Order of the Regional

Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163,[5] in Civil Case No. 62726.

The Facts

This case stemmed from a Complaint[6] filed by herein respondents Pepe B. Pagdanganan

(Pagdanganan) and Pepito A. Lumahan (Lumahan) against herein petitioners Pepsi-Cola Products

Philippines, Incorporated (PCPPI) and PEPSICO, Incorporated (PEPSICO) on 22 December 1992, before

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 163, for Sum of Money and Damages.

The facts are beyond dispute. As culled from the records of the case, they are as follows:

Petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO launched a Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) approved and

supervised under-the-crown promotional campaign entitled Number Fever sometime in 1992. With said

marketing strategy, it undertook to give away cash prizes to holders of specially marked crowns and

resealable caps of PEPSI-COLA softdrink products, i.e., Pepsi, 7-Up, Mirinda and Mountain Dew. Specially

marked crowns and resealable caps were said to contain a) a three-digit number, b) a seven-digit alpha-

numeric security code, and c) the amount of the cash prize in any of the following

denominations P1,000.00; P10,000.00; P50,000.00;P100,000.00; and P1,000,000.00.

Petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO engaged the services of D.G. Consultores, a Mexican consultancy

firm with experience in handling similar promotion in other countries, to randomly pre-select 60 winning

three-digit numbers with their matching security codes out of 1000 three-digit numbers seeded in the

market, as well as the corresponding artworks appearing on a winning crown and/or resealable cap.

The mechanics of the Number Fever promo was simple From Monday to Friday, starting 17

February 1992 to 8 May 1992, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO will announce, on national and local

broadcast and print media, a randomly pre-selected [7] winning three-digit number. All holders of

specially marked crowns bearing the winning three-digit number will win the corresponding amount

printed on said crowns and/or resealable caps.

On account of the success of the promotional campaign, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO

extended or stretched out the duration of the Number Fever for another five weeks or until 12 June

1992.

For the extended period, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO again sought the services of D.G.

Consultores to pre-select 25 winning three-digit numbers with their matching security codes as well as

the corresponding artworks to appear on a winning crown and/or resealable cap.

On 25 May 1992, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO announced the notorious three-digit

combination 349 as the winning number for the next day, 26 May 1992. On the same night of the

announcement, however, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO learned of reports that numerous people were

trying to redeem 349 bearing crowns and/or resealable caps with incorrect security codes L-2560-FQ

and L-3560-FQ. Upon verification from the list of the 25 pre-selected [8] winning three-digit numbers,

petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO and the DTI learned that the three-digit combination 349 was indeed the

winning combination for 26 May 1992 but the security codes L-2560-FQ and L-3560-FQ do not

correspond to that assigned to the winning number 349.

Subsequently, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO issued a statement stating in part that:

DEAR VALUED CUSTOMERS

x x x x Some 349 crowns have winning security codes as per the list held in a bank vault

by the Department of Trade and Industry and will be redeemed at full value like all other authenticated winning crowns.

Some other 349 crowns which have security codes L-2560-FQ and L-3560-FQ are

not winning crowns. However, as an act of goodwill to our customers, we will redeem the non-

winning 349 crowns for P500.00 each until June 12, 1992 at all Pepsi plants & warehouses.

x x x x

Sincerely,

ROD SALAZARPresident

PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS PHILS., INC.

Despite the foregoing announcement, on 9 July 1992, respondent Pagdanganan demanded

from petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO and the DTI the payment of the corresponding cash prize of each of

his 349 bearing crown, specifically, four 7-Up [9] crowns and two Mirinda[10] crowns, each displaying the

cash prize ofP1,000,000.00 in addition to one 7-Up[11] crown showing the cash prize

of P100,000.00. Notably, all seven crowns bore the security code L-2560-FQ.

For his part, respondent Lumahan similarly insisted that petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO pay him

the cash value of his two winning crowns, that is, two 7-Up crowns with one exhibiting the cash value

of P1,000,000.00 and the other the amount of P100,000.00.

Petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO refused to take heed of the aforementioned demands.

Affronted by the seeming injustice, respondents Pagdanganan and Lumahan filed a collective

complaint[12] for Sum of Money and Damages before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 163, against

petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO.

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its decision on 3 August 2000, the dispositive part of

which states that:

WHEREFORE, for failure of the plaintiffs to establish a cause of action against

defendants, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED. The defendants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs Pagdanganan and Lumahan

the amounts of P3,500.00 and P1,000.00, respectively. Without costs. SO ORDERED.

In dismissing the complaint, the RTC ratiocinated that:

The preponderance of evidence now on record does not appear to support the

assertion of the plaintiffs that number 349 with security code number L-2560-FQ won the Pepsicos sales promotion game for May 26, 1992. While it is true that number 349 was used both as a winning and non-winning number, still the winning 349 must tally with the corresponding security code contained in the master list of winning crowns.

x x x x x x x [a]mong the 349s enumerated in the list of winning crowns (citation

omitted) as winning numbers were 349 V-2421-JC; 349 A-7963-IS; 349 B-4860-IG; 349 C-3984-RP; 349 D-5863-CO; 349 E-3800-EL; 349 U-3501-MN (sic) and 349 U-3246-NP. Nowhere to be found were nos. 349 L-2560-FQ and L-3560-FQ. This means that it was not possible for both defendants to have won during the entire extended period of the sales promotion of Pepsi Cola because the number did not appear in the master list. It was made clear in the advertisements and posters put up by defendants that to win, the 3-digit number must be matched with the proper security code. The Department of Trade and Industry had been duly informed of the mechanics of the Pepsi Cola sales promotion for the protection of the interest of the public.

Anent the award of P3,500.00 and P1,000.00 to respondents Pagdanganan and Lumahan,

respectively, the RTC justified such grant, by stating to wit:

x x x since the defendants have voluntarily announced their desire to pay

holders of caps or crowns of their products bearing non-winning number 349 as a sign of goodwill, the Court feels that this privilege should also be extended to the plaintiffs despite the institution of the instant case.

Their Partial Motion for Reconsideration[13] having been denied in an Order[14] dated 23

August 2000, respondents Pagdanganan and Lumahan appealed their case to the Court of

Appeals.

In a Decision[15] promulgated on 13 February 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside

the decision of the RTC, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial

Court of Pasig, Branch 163, in Civil Case No. 62726 is REVERSED. Defendants-appellants are hereby ORDERED to pay plaintiffs-appellants Pepe Pagdanganan the sum of P5 million and Pepito Lumahan the sum of P1.2 million.

In a Resolution dated 26 April 2005, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners PCPPI and

PEPSICOs Motion for Reconsideration.

The Issues

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended,

predicated on the following issues:[16]

I.

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ARE ESTOPPED FROM RAISING STARE DECISIS;

II.

WHETHER OR NOT RODRIGO, MENDOZA, PATAN AND DE MESA ARE BINDING ALTHOUGH RESPONDENTS WERE NOT PARTIES THEREIN;

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS RAISE ANY ISSUE THAT HAS NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY RESOLVED IN RODRIGO, MENDOZA, PATAN OR DE MESA;

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE SENATE AND DTI TASK FORCE REPORTS ARE EVEN RELEVANT, OR CONTROLLING; and

V.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS MAY SEEK AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF WITHOUT HAVING APPEALED.

In essence, the present petition raises as fundamental issue for resolution by the Court the

question of whether or not the instant case is already barred by our rulings in the cases of Rodrigo,[17] Mendoza,[18] Patan [19] and, the most recent, De Mesa. [20]

The Courts Ruling

In ordering petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO to pay respondents Pagdanganan and Lumahan the

amounts of P5,000,000.00 and P1,200,000.00, the appellate court articulated that:

x x x [w]e fully agree with the contention of plaintiffs-appellants that such deviation or additional requirement, that is the winning crown must have a corresponding winning security code, imposed by PEPSI was a deviation from the rules approved by DTI.

x x x x x x x [i]t appeared that the matching winning security with code is not an

express requirement in order to win. Taken together with printed promo mechanics, this means that one is a winner as long as he has in his possession the crown with the winning number. The matching winning security code is not required.

With the promo mechanics as the guide, it is undisputable that plaintiffs-

appellants are very well entitled to the cash prizes indicated on their crowns. To deny their claim despite their compliance with the unequivocal requirements of the promotion is contrary to the principle of good faith.

x x x x It is highly inequitable for PEPSI to impose an additional requirement in order to

win as a way to evade the unusually large number of 349 winner-claimants. x x x.

Petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO fault the appellate court for disregarding this Courts

pronouncements in four other Pepsi/349 cases i.e., Mendoza, Rodrigo,Patan and De Mesa that the 349

bearing crowns and/or resealable caps with security codes L-2560-FQ and L-3560-FQ, like those held by

respondents Pagdanganan and Lumahan, are non-winning crowns under the terms of the Number Fever

promo. They reckon that, by virtue of the principle of stare decisis, the aforementioned cases have

already settled the issue of whether or not petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO are liable to holders of non-

winning 349 bearing crowns and/or resealable caps. Simply put, the principle of stare decisis should

have been determinative of the outcome of the case at bar. Rodrigo, Mendoza, Patan and De

Mesa cases having ruled on the very same issues raised in the case at bar, they constitute binding

judicial precedents on how Pepsi/"349" litigations must be disposed of.

On the other hand, respondents Pagdanganan and Lumahan justify the non-application of the

principle of stare decisis by stating that it is required that the legal rights and relations of the parties,

and the facts, and the applicable laws, the issue and evidence are exactly the same, (sic) as those

decided in the cases of Rodrigo,Mendoza and later the de Mesa x x x.[21] They contend, however, that a

comparison of the subject cases show that they are not the same nor identical x x x as evident in the

different questions of law, the findings of facts and evidence and issues involved in said cases x x x. [22] In

fact, respondents Pagdanganan and Lumahan particularly argue that the basis of their action is Breach of

Contract while that of the Rodrigo and Mendoza cases involved complaints for Specific Performance.

The petition is meritorious.

There is no question that the cases of Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan and De Mesa, including the case

at bar, arose from the same set of facts concerning the Number Fever promo debacle of petitioners

PCPPI and PEPSICO. Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan, De Mesa, Pagdanganan and Lumahan are among those

holding supposedly winning 349 Pepsi/7-Up/Mirinda/Mountain Dew soft drink crowns and/or resealable

caps. Said crowns and/or resealable caps were not honored or allowed to be cashed in by petitioners

PCPPI and PEPSICO for failing to contain the correct security code assigned to such winning combination.

As a result, the rejected crown and/or resealable cap holders filed separate complaints for specific

performance/ sum of money/ breach of contract, with damages, all against petitioners PCPPI and

PEPSICO.

A survey of said cases is imperative in order to determine whether or not the principle of stare

decisis will, indeed, bar the relitigation of the instant case.

In 2001, in the case of Mendoza v. Pepsi-Cola Products Phils., Inc. and Pepsico, Inc.,[23] the RTC

dismissed the complaint for specific performance and damages against herein petitioners PCPPI and

PEPSICO. On appeal[24] with the Court of Appeals, the latter dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and

affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. It rationalized that:

The mechanics for the Number Fever promo, both in the original period and for the extension period, was duly approved by the DTI. Television, radio and print advertisements for the promo passed through and were by the DTI. Posters explaining the promo mechanics were posted all over the country and warning ads in newspapers highlighted the importance of the security code. Plaintiff-appellant admitted to have read and understood the mechanics of the promo. His different interpretation of the security codes function should not mean that PEPSI was grossly negligent. The mechanics were clear. A winning number had its own unique, matching security code

which must be authenticated by PEPSI against its official list. The importance of a matching security code had been adequately emphasized in the Warning Ads (citation omitted) and in the new campaign posters (citation omitted) during the extension period both of which were duly approved by DTI. x x x x The function of the security code is not limited to the determination of whether or not a crown is tampered with or fake. It also serves to authenticate the winning number combination whether it had the correct alpha-numeric security code uniquely assigned to each crown as appearing in PEPSIs official list. The campaign posters for the promo period February 17, 1992 to May 10, 1992 as well as for the extension period from May 11, 1992 to June 12, 1992 uniformly enumerated three (3) essential elements of a participating winning crown, to wit: (1) 3-digit winning number; (2) prize denomination; and (3) 7-digit alpha-numeric security code. x x x The promo mechanics stressed that the 3-digit winning number combination must have an authenticated security code, which security code was unique to every crown. Thus, plaintiff-appellants 349 crown must also be measured against the essential elements of a winning participating crown pursuant to the promos mechanics. x x x x Thus, PEPSIs obligation to redeem plaintiff-appellants 349 crown did not arise as his crown did not bear the correct security code, a condition precedent to winning the proffered prize.

A Petition for Review on Certiorari was then filed with this Court. In a Resolution dated 24 July 2002, we

denied Mendozas petition for review for failing to show that the Court of Appeals committed reversible

error.[25]

Similarly, in 2002, in Rodrigo v. Pepsi Cola Products (Phils.), Inc. and Pepsico, Inc., the RTC therein

dismissed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages filed against herein petitioners PCPPI

and PEPSICO. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, stating that:

To resolve the pivotal issue of whether the appellants are the real winners of

the promo, the various advertisements must be read together to give effect to all. From the start of the promotion, Pepsi had highlighted the security code as a major component of each and every crown. In subsequent posters, the companies clarified its role as a measure against tampering or faking crowns. (sic), and emphasized the important role of the security code in identifying and verifying the real winning crown. In its Warning Cheaters posters, the third paragraph succinctly provides that:

Thus if a supposed winning crown is presented to us where the

security code does not match the real security code of the winning number as verified with our master list (known only to authorized personnel of Pepsi and DTI), then we know that the Crown is either fake or tampered with. (Citation omitted.)

Also (sic) the companies published that:

Every crown/cap with a winning number and Authenticated

security wins the amount printed on the crown/cap. (Citation omitted.)

Given said advertisements, the impression an ordinary consumer gets is that the security code distinguishes the real or genuine from the fake winning crown, especially considering the conditions surrounding their issuance i.e., that as early as March 1992, various complaints of tampered crowns had reached the DTI. This construction is bolstered by the subsequent release of the NUMBER FEVER MORE CHANCES TO WIN posters during the extension period wherein the security code is defined as a measure against tampering or faking of crowns (citation omitted) and in the subsequent advertisements which warned the consuming public that the appellee companies would not honor under any circumstances any fake or tampered crown. (Citation omitted.)

The inescapable conclusion is that the crowns held by the appellants are not

winning crowns. x x x .

Undaunted, Rodrigo went to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari but we subsequently

denied his petition, in a Resolution dated 1 October 2001, for failure to show that a reversible error was

committed by the Court of Appeals, hence the aforequoted disquisition was affirmed.

Promulgated in 2003, in Pepsi Cola Products (Phils.) vs. Patan, Jr., the RTC therein dismissed two

consolidated complaints for specific performance and damages against herein petitioners PCPPI and

PEPSICO for lack of cause of action. The Court of Appeals substantially affirmed the findings of the trial

court that therein respondents did not win in the petitioners Number Fever promotional campaign as

their crowns were not the winning crowns. The appellate court, however, awarded therein respondents

P500 each in the interest of justice. When the case came to the Court by means of a Petition for Review

on Certiorari, the finding that the correct security code is an indispensable requirement to be entitled to

the cash prize is concerned, was affirmed. The award of P500 though was deleted as it was our stance

that the offer of P500 for every non-winning 349 crown had long expired on 12 June 1992.

And, in the 2005 case of De Mesa v. Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc., the RTC dismissed the case

under the principle of stare decisis. It elucidated that the instant case, as well as the 2001 Mendoza case,

not only are the legal rights and relations of the parties substantially the same as those passed upon in

the 2002 Rodrigocase, but the facts, the applicable laws, the causes of action, the issues, and the

testimonial and documentary evidence are identical such that a ruling in one case, under the principle

of stare decisis, is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. Subsequently, De Mesa et al., filed

a Petition for Review on Certiorari before us challenging the application of the principle of stare

decisis to said case. In a Decision promulgated 19 August 2005, we denied their recourse to this court

and affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. We held that:

In the instant case, the legal rights and relations of the parties, the facts, the

applicable laws, the causes of action, the issues, and the evidence are exactly the same

as those in the decided cases of Mendoza and Rodrigo, supra. Hence, nothing is left to be argued. The issue has been settled and this Courts final decision in the said cases must be respected. This Courts hands are now tied by the finality of the said judgments. We have no recourse but to deny the instant petition.

The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle

things which are established) is well entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit: [26]

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution

shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

With the above provision of law, in tandem with the foregoing judicial pronouncements, it is

quite evident that the appellate court committed reversible error in failing to take heed of our final,

and executory decisions those decisions considered to have attained the status of judicial precedents in

so far as the Pepsi/349 cases are concerned. For it is the better practice that when a court has laid down

a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all

future cases where the facts are substantially the same.[27] In the case at bar, therefore, we have no

alternative but to uphold the ruling that the correct security code is an essential, nay, critical,

requirement in order to become entitled to the amount printed on a 349 bearing crown and/or

resealable cap.

Likewise, the same principle of judicial precedent will prevent respondents Pagdanganan and

Lumahan from receiving the amounts of P3,500.00 and P1,000.00, respectively, as goodwill

compensation. As we have stated on the case of Patan:

Neither is the award of P500 to respondent Patan, Jr. in the interest of justice

and equity warranted. Respondent Patan, jr. had consistently refused the petitioners offer of P500 for his non-winning 349 crown. Unlike the other holders of the non-winning 349 crowns, x x x who availed themselves of the goodwill money offered by the petitioner, respondent Patan, Jr. rejected the same.

x x x x In this case, the petitioners offer of P500 for every non-winning 349 crown had

long expired on June 12, 1992. The petitioner cannot now be compelled to pay respondent Patan, Jr. P500 as a goodwill gesture, since he had already rejected the same.

The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which has

been established by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases

involving a similar situation. It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability in the law

and does not require identity of or privity of parties. [28] This is unmistakable from the wordings of Article

8 of the Civil Code. It is even said that such decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself

and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the

criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to decide thereby but also of

those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto. [29] Abandonment thereof must be based only on

strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from

this Court would be immeasurably affected and the publics confidence in the stability of the solemn

pronouncements diminished.

To reiterate, there is naught that is left to be brought to court. Those things which have been so

often adjudged ought to rest in peace.[30]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed 13 February

2004 Decision and 26 April 2005 Resolution both of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68290, are

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163, in

Civil Case No. 62726 dismissing the complaint for Sum of Money and Damages is REINSTATED. Further,

respondents Pepe B. Pagdanganan and Pepito A. Lumahan, are not entitled to the award of P3,500.00

and P1,000.00, respectively, as goodwill compensation.

SO ORDERED.