Case Digest Week 4 and 5

8/12/2019 Case Digest Week 4 and 5

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/case-digest-week-4-and-5 1/22

CASE DIGEST: Guingona, Jr. vs. CaragueG.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991

FACTS:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billionfor debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known asthe General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations forthe DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight HundredSixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising theBudget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the NewSociety,” and by PD No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee andPayment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising

out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.”

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation fordebt service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetarypriority to education.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it beinghigher than the budget for education.

HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress ismandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not therebyfollow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power torespond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other statepolicies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, toprovide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not onlya matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, thevery survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriatedan amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court findsand so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional



Guingona v Carague Digest Facts:Petitioner senators question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt

service in the 1990 budget which was authorized by PD 81. Petitioners seek that (1)PD 81, PD 1177 (Sec 31), and PD 1967 be declared unconstitutional, and (2) restrainthe disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.While respondents contend that the petition involves a political question(repeal/amendment of said laws)

Issue: Whether or not subject laws has been impliedly repealed by the 1987Constitution

NO.(1). Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon.Equally fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law isgenerally applied prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.

(2) The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all theiressential terms and conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein.

The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in orderto enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and othernormal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteedby it when they shall become due without the need to enact a separate lawappropriating funds therefor as the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enablethe government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect andmaintain the credit standing of the country.

http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/11/guingona-v-carague-digest.html





MACALINTAL VS COMELECFACTS:This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filedby Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of thePhilippine Bar, seeking a declaration thatcertain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)1suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual andmaterial legal interestin the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properlyand lawfullyused and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as alawyer.ISSUES:A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registrationof voters who areimmigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere actof executing anaffidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate theresidencyrequirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?B. Does Section 18.5of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winningcandidates fornational offices and party list representatives including the President and theVice-President violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII oftheConstitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shallbeproclaimed as winners by Congress?C. May Congress, through the JointCongressional Oversight Committee created in Section25 of Rep. Act No. 9189,exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve theImplementing Rules andRegulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgatewithout violating theindependence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A oftheConstitution?HELD:In resolving the issues , the application of the rules in Statutory

Construction must be applied1. All laws are presumed to be constitutional2. The constitution must be construed as a whole3.In case of doubt in the interpretation of the provision of the constitution, suchmeaning must bededuced from the discussions of the members of theconstitutional commission.

A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution of theRepublic of the Philippines?Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the coverage of the absentee voting process, towit:



Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

Political Law – Inquiry in Aid of Legislation – When not Allowed

It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses

unlawfully and unjustly enrichedthemselves at the expense of the Filipino people. Thatthey obtained with the help of the Bengzon law office and Ricardo Lopa – Cory’s brother

in law, among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the

country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated

Mining Corporation. Sen. Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that

Lopa took over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-

Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on

the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public

Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testifybefore the committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him.

Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter

to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and

malicious. Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon

which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s

and Bengzon’s plea. Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to

subpoena them and require their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the

Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant

disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage,

prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the Bengzon et al filed the present

petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive

relief.



ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.

HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no

suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a

possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as “The Anti -Graft and

Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by

the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory,

particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39

corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no

intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really

“in aid of legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of

Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of

the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the “Anti-

Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”, a matter that appears more within the province of the

courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr.

Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.

Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.

Granted.

FACTS: On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the

Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG), filed a complaint with

Sandiganbayan against the petitioners of this case. PCGG allege, among others, that:

defendants (petitioners therein) Benjamin â€œKokoyâ€• Romualdez and Juliette.

Gomez Romualdez, alleged â€œcroniesâ€• of former President Marcos and First Lady

Imelda Romualdez Marcos, engaged in schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich

themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. Among these stratagems are (1)

obtained control of some big business enterprises such as MERALCO, Pilipinas Shell,

and PCI Bank, (2) manipulated the formation of Erectors Holding Inc, to appear viable

and borrow more capital, reaching a total of more that P2 billion, (3) collaborated withlawyers (petitioners therein) of the Bengzon Law Offices in concealing funds and

properties, in maneuvering the purported sale of interests in certain corporations, in

misusing the Meralco Pension Fund worth P25 million, and in cleverly hiding behind the

veil of corporate entity. On 13 September 1988, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a

speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over of SolOil Incorporated by Ricardo

Lopa (who died during the pendency of this case) and called upon the senate to look



into possible violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or RA 3019. The

Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or Blue Ribbon Committee

(SBRC) started its investigation through a hearing on 23 May 1989, but Lopa and

Bengzon declined to testify. The SBRC rejected petitioner Bengzonâ€™s plea and

voted to pursue its investigation. Petitioner claims that the SBRC, in requiring their

attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose.

Hence this petition.

ISSUES:

1. WON the court has jurisdiction over this case.

2. WON the SBRCâ€™s inquiry has a valid legislative purpose.

3. WON the sale or disposition of the Romualdez corporations is a purely private

transaction which is beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into.

4. WON the inquiry violates the petitionersâ€™ right to due process.

HELD:

1. YES. As the court held in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the Constitution provided

for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings

of the departments of the government, and it is the judiciary that was vested of the

powers to determine the scope, nature and extent of such powers.

2. NO. The speech of Sen. Enrile contained no suggestion on contemplated legislation;

he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA 3019.

The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent SBRC was to find out WON

the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in

connection with the alleged sale of the 36/39 corporations of Kokoy Romualdez to the

Lopa Group. There appears, therefore, no intended legislation involved. The inquiry alsois not conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 2123 (SR 2123), as the committee

alleges. The inquiry under SR 2123 is to look into the charges against PCGG filed by

stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26

Article XVIII of the Constitution.

3. YES. Mr. Lopa and the petitioners are not connected with the government and did

their acts as private citizens, hence such a case of alleged graft and corruption is within

the jurisdiction, not of the SBRC, but of the courts. Sandiganbayan already took

jurisdiction of this issue before the SBRC did. The inquiry of the respondent committee

into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be anencroachment of into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction.

4. NO. The Constitution provides the right of an accused of a crime to remain silent; this

extends also to respondents in administrative investigation but only if they partake of the

nature of a criminal proceeding. This is not so in this case. BUT since the court already

held that the inquiry is not in aid of legislation, the petitioners therein cannot be

compelled to testify.

http://philippinelaw.info/statutes/ra3019.html






Bautista v. SalongaFacts

:I n t h e c a s e o f S a r m i e n t o I I I v s . M i s o n , t h e S u p r e m e C o ur t h e l d t h a t o n l y t h o s e appointments expressly mentioned in the firstsentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII are to be reviewedbyt h e C o m m i s s i o n o n A p p o i n t m e n t s , n a m e l y , " t h e h e a d s of t h e e x e c u t i v e d e p a r t m e n t , ambassadors, other public ministers andconsuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rankof co lone l or nava l capta in , and o ther o f f ice rs whose appo in tments a r e vested in him in thisConstitution." All other appointments by the President are tobe made without the participationof the Commission on Appointments.Since the appointment

of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rightsis not specificallyprovided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of theCivilService Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on

Audi t, whoseappointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the Presidentwith the consent oftheCommiss ion on Appoin tm ents . The Pres ident app o in ts th e Chai rman an d Me mb er s of th eCommission on Human Rights pursuant to thesecond sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is,without the confirmation



of the Commission on Appointments because they are among theofficers ofgovernment "whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint."

AndSection 2(c) , Execut ive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, author izes thePresident to appoint theChairman and Members of the Commission on Human RightsOn 27

August 1987, the President of the Philippines designated Mary Concepcion Bautistaas

"Act ing Chai rman, Commiss ion on Human Rights . " Real iz ingperhaps the need forap e r m a n e n t c h a i r m a n a n d m e m b e r s o f t h e C o m m i s s i o n o n H u ma n R i g h t s , b e f i t t i n g a n independent off ice, as mandated by theConstitution, the President of the Philippines on 17December 1988 extendedto Bautista a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission.By vi rtueof such appointment, Bautista was advised by the President that shecouldq u a l i f y a n d e n t e r u p o n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e d u t i e s o f t he o f f i c e o f C h a i r m a n o f t h e Commission on Human Rights, requiring her tofurnish the office of the President and the CivilService Commission with copies ofher oath of office.On 22 December 1988, before the Chief Justice Fernan, Bautista took

her oath of office by virtueof her appointment as Chairman of the Commissionon Human Rights.Immedia tely, after taking her oath of office as Chairman ofthe Commission on HumanRights, Bautista discharged the functions and dutiesof the Office of Chairman of the Commissionon Human Rights.On 9 January 1989,Bautista received a letter from the Secretary of the CommissiononAppointments requesting her to submit to the Commission certain information anddocuments asrequired by its rules in connection with the confirmation of herappointment as Chairman of theCommission on Human Rights. On 10 January 1989,the Commission on Appointments' Secretaryagain wrote Bautista requesting herpresence at a meeting of the Commission on AppointmentsCommittee on Justice,Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights set for 19 January 1989 at 9A.M.at the Conference Room, 8th Floor, Kanlaon Tower I, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City thatwoulddeliberate on her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on HumanRights.On 13 January 1989, Bautista wrote to the Chairman of the Commission on

Appointments stating,for the reasons therein given, why she considered theCommission on Appointments as havingno jurisdiction to review her appointment asChairman of the Commission on Human Rights.In Commission’s comment (in thiscase), dated 3 February 1989, there is attached asAnnex 1 a letter of theCommission on Appointments' Secretary to the Executive Secretary, Hon.Cata linoMacaraig, Jr. making reference to the "ad interim appointment which HerExcellencye x t e n d e d t o A t t y . M a r y C o n c e p c i o n B a u t i s t a o n 1 4 J an u a r y 1 9 8 9 a s C h a i r p e r s o n o f t h e Commission on Human Rights"and informing Secretary Macaraig that, as previously conveyed tohim in a letter of 25January 1989, the Commission on Appointments disapproved Bautista's "adinterimappointment' as Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights in view of herrefusalto submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments.On the same date (1February 1989), the Commission on Appointments' Secretary informedBautistathat the motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of her "ad interim appointmentasChairman of the Commission on Human Rights" was denied by the Commission on Appointments.



In Annex 3 o f Commiss ion 's same comment , dated 3 February 1989,i s a news i temappearing in the 3 February 1989 issue of the "Manila Standard"reporting that the Presidenthaddesignated PCHR Commissioner Hesiquio R. Mallillinas "Acting Chairman of the Commission"pending the resolution of Bautista's case

which had been elevated to the Supreme Court.On 20 January 1989, or evenbefore the respondent Commission on Appointmentshadacted on her "ad in ter im appoin tment as Chai rman o f the Commiss ion on Human Righ ts"Bautista filed with this Court the present petition forcertiorari with a prayer for the immediateissuance of a restraining order, to declare"as unlawful and unconstitutional and withoutanyl e g a l f o r c e a n d e f f e c t a n y a c t i o n o f t h e C o m m i s s i o n o n A p po i n t m e n t s a s w e l l a s o f t h e Committee on Justice, Judic ia l and BarCouncil and Human Rights, on the lawfully extendedappointment of theBautista as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, on the groundthatthey have no lawful and constitutional authority to confirm and to review her

appointment."Issue:Whether the President, subsequent to her act of 17December 1988, and after Bautistahad qualified for the office to which shehad been appointed, by taking the oath of officeandactua l ly assuming and d ischarg ing the f unct ions and dut ies t hereof, could extend anotherappointment to Bautista on 14 January 1989Held:WhenHer Excellency, the President converted Bautista's designation as Acting Chairmanto apermanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights on 17December1988, significantly she advised Bautista (in the same appointment letter) that,by virtue of suchappointment, she could qualify and enter upon theperformance of the duties of the office (of Chairman of the Commission on HumanRights). All that remained for Bautista to do was to rejector accept the appointment. Obviously,she accepted the appointment by taking her oath of officebefore the Chief JusticeFernan and assuming immediately thereafter the functions and duties of theChairman of the Commission on Human Rights.Bautista 's appointment there fore on 17December 1988 as Chairman of theCommission on Human Rights was a completed act on thepart of thePresident.Constitut ional Law, to begin with, is concerned with power notpoli tica l convenience,wisdom, exigency, or even necessity. Neither the Executive northe Legislative (Commission onAppointments) can create power where the Constitutionconfers none. The evident constitutionalintent is to strike a careful and delicate balance,in the matter of appointments to publicoffice,b e t w e e n t h e P r e s i d e n t a n d C o n g r e s s ( t h e l a t t e r a c t in g t h r o u g h t h e C o m m i s s i o n o n Appointments). To tilt one side orthe other of the scale is to dis rupt or alter such balance of power. In otherwords, to the extent that the Constitution has blocked off certain appointmentsfor thePresident to make with the participation of the Commission on Appointments, so alsohasthe Const i tu t ion mandated that the Pres ident can confer no power of participation in theCommission on Appointments overother appointments exclusively reserved for her by theConstitution. The exerciseof political options that finds no support in the Constitution cannot besustained.Nor can



the Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of itsconstitutionallydelimited power to review presidential appointments, create power toconfirm appointments thatthe Constitution has reserved to the President alone. Stateddifferently, when the appointment isone that the Constitution mandates is for thePresident to make without the participation of theCommission on Appointments, the

executive's voluntary act of submitting such appointment tothe Commission on Appointments and the latter 's act of conf irming or re ject ing the same, aredonewithout or in excess of jurisdiction.Assuming that the Executive may voluntarily allowthe Commission on Appointments toexercise the power of review over anappointment otherwise solely vested by the Constitution inthe President. Yet, asalready noted, when the President appointed Bautista on 17 December1988 tothe position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights with the advice to herthat

by virtue of such appointment (not, until confirmed by the Commission on Appointments), shecould qual if y and enter upon the performance of her duties

after taking her oath of office, thepresidential act of appointment to thesubject position which, under the Constitution, is to bemade, in the first place,without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, was thenand there acomplete and finished act, which, upon the acceptance by Bautista, as shown byhertaking of the oath of office and actual assumption of the duties of saidoffice, installed her,indubitably and unequivocally, as the lawful Chairman of theCommission on Human Rights for aterm of seven (7) years. There was thus no vacancyin the subject office on 14 January 1989 towhich an appointment could be validlymade. In fact, there is no vacancy in said office to thisday.Nor can respondentsimpressively contend that the new appointment or re-appointmenton 14 January1989 was an ad interim appointment, because, under the Constitutional design,

adinterim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the President to make,i.e., withoutthe participation of the Commission on Appointments. Ad interimappointments, by theirverynature under the 1987 Const i tu t i on , ex tend on ly to appo in tment swh er e the re vi ew of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That iswhy ad interim appointments are to remainvalid until disapproval by theCommission on Appointments or until the next adjournmentof Congress; but appo in tmentsthat are for the Presi dent sole l y t o m ake, that is , wi thou t t heparticipation of the Commission on Appointments, can not be ad interim appointments.Bautistacan still be removed but her removal must be for cause and with her right to

dueprocess properly safeguarded. In the case of NASECO vs. NLRC, thisCourt held that before arank-and-file employee of the NASECO, a government-owned corporation, could be dismissed,she was entitled to a hearing and due process.How much more, in the case of the Chairman of aconstitutionally mandatedINDEPENDENT OFFICE, like the Commission on Human Rights. If thereare chargesagainst Bautista for misfeasance or malfeasance in office, charges may befiledagainst her with the Ombudsman. If he finds a prima facie case against her, thecorrespondinginformation/s can be filed with the Sandiganbayan which may in turn



order her suspension fromoffice while the case or cases against her are pending beforesaid court

Political Law – Appointments – CHR

On 27 Aug 1987, Cory designated Bautista as the Acting Chairwoman of CHR. In

December of the same year, Cory made the designation of Bautista permanent. The

CoA, ignoring the decision in the Mison case, averred that Bautista cannot take her seat

w/o their confirmation. Cory, through the Exec Sec, filed with the CoA communications

about Bautista’s appointment on 14 Jan 1989. Bautista refused to be placed under the

CoA’s review hence she filed a petition before the SC. On the other hand, Mallillin

invoked EO 163- A stating that since CoA refused Bautista’s appointment, Bautista

should be removed. EO 163-A provides that the tenure of the Chairman and theCommissioners of the CHR should be at the pleasure of the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista’s appointment is subject to CoA’s confirmation.

HELD: Since the position of Chairman of the CHR is not among the positions mentioned

in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which

are to be made with the confirmation of the CoA it follows that the appointment by the

President of the Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation

of the CoA. To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the

CHR is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and

Members of the CSC, the CoE and the COA, whose appointments are expressly vested

by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the CoA. The President appoints

the Chairman and Members of the CHR pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16, Art.

7, that is, without the confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers of

government “whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint.” And Sec

2(c), EO 163 authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the

CHR.

Because of the fact that the president submitted to the CoA on 14 Jan 1989 the

appointment of Bautista, the CoA argued that the president though she has the sole

prerogative to make CHR appointments may from time to time ask confirmation with the

CoA. This is untenable according to the SC. The Constitution has blocked off certainappointments for the President to make with the participation of the Commission on

Appointments, so also has the Constitution mandated that the President can confer no

power of participation in the Commission on Appointments over other appointments

exclusively reserved for her by the Constitution. Theexercise of political options that

finds no support in the Constitution cannot be sustained. Further, EVEN IF THE

PRESIDENT MAY VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO THE COMMISSION ON

http://www.clicksor.com/





APPOINTMENTS AN APPOINTMENT THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION SOLELY

BELONGS TO HER, STILL, THERE WAS NO VACANCY TO WHICH AN

APPOINTMENT COULD BE MADE ON 14 JANUARY 1989. There can be no ad interim

appointments in the CHR for the appointment thereto is not subject to CoA’s

confirmation. Appointments to the CHr is always permanent in nature.

The provisions of EO 163-A is unconstitutional and cannot be invoked by Mallillin. The

Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the

president for it is constitutionally guaranteed that they must have a term of office.

Gutierrez vs. HR

Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez vs. The House Of Representatives Committee On Justice,

et.al.

G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011

Carpio, Morales, J.:

Doctrine: x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta

movere. As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated “when

the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because

something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a

further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is

initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee onJustice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.”

Facts: On July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, et.al. (Baraquel

group) filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner. On August 3, 2010, private

respondents Renato Reyes et.al. (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint.

Both impeachment complaints were endorsed by different Party-List Representatives.

On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the

Committee on Rules, instructed the Deputy Secretary General for Operations to include

the two complaints in the Order of Business, which was complied with by their inclusion

in the Order of Business for the following day.On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of

Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent.

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both

complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it

at exactly the same time.

Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress



was published on September 2, 2010.

On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1,

2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the motion,

however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for her to file

an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to eachof the 55 members of public respondent.

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two

complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of

public trust, sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of substance of

the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their

allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be

rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a notice directing

her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days.

Issue: When is impeachment deemed initiated? (Does the present impeachmentcomplaint violate the one-year bar rule under the Constitution?)

Held: The one-year bar rule. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution

reads: “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more

than once within a period of one year.”

Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment

complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010

of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second

impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.

Following petitioner’s line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the

endorsement by a member of the House – steps done prior to the filing – would already

initiate the impeachment proceedings.

Contrary to petitioner’s emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution

mentions is impeachment “proceedings.” Her reliance on the singular tense of the word

“complaint” to denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic rule

of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural sense.

The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint,

for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of

an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick

alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or

torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the

impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed,

more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important

is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the



candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.

Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall

be decided without debate, but any debate thereon is only made subject to the five-

minute rule. Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a motion to refer a

matter or question to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof,but only as to the propriety of the referral. With respect to complaints for impeachment,

the House has the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment complaint to the

Committee on Justice where official records and further debate show that an

impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has already been

referred to the said committee and the one year period has not yet expired, lest it

becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment

proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of

deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of

three session days within which to make the proper referral. As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment

proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution states that “[a] verified complaint for

impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any

citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be

included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper

Committee within three session days thereafter.”

x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. As

pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated “when the House

deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior

to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the

proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins,

when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.

This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.”

Allowing an expansive construction of the term “initiate” beyond the act of referral allows

the unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee shall conduct

overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of one of the complaints ends with

the affirmance of a resolution for impeachment or the overriding[ of a contrary resolution

(as espoused by public respondent), or the House transmits the Articles of

Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group), or the Committee on Justice

concludes its first report to the House plenary regardless of the recommendation (as



posited by respondent-intervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod the very

purpose behind the constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too

loosely would disrupt the series of steps operating in unison under one proceeding.

Facts:

- 22July2010: 4 days before the 15th Congress opened its first session, private

respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim and spouses Pestaño (Baraquel

group) filed an impeachment complaint against Gutierrez upon endorsement of Party-

List Representatives Walden Bello and Arlene Bag-ao

- 27July2010: HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker

Belmonte who then, on August 2, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the

Order of Business

- 3Aug2010: private respondents Renato Reyes Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan,

Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed

an impeachment complaint againsta herein petitioner endorsed by Representatives

Colmenares, Casiño, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus

- HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment

Proceedings of the 14thCongress and HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House

Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 9, directed the Committee on Rules to include it

in the Order of Business

- 11Aug2010: HOR simultaneously referred the two complaints to the House

Committee on Justice (HCOJ for brevity)



- After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints

sufficient in form

- 2Sept2010: The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the

15th

Congress was published

- After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7, 2010 found the two

complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of

public trust, sufficient in substance

- Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging Resolutions of

September 1 and 7 alleging that she was denied due process and that these violated

the one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings

Issue/s:

1. Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy

2. Whether the belated publication of the Rules of Procedure of Impeachment

Proceedings of the 15thCongress denied due process to the Petitioner

3. Whether the simultaneous referral of the two complaints violated the Constitution

Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.

Ratio:

1. 1. NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION

- Francisco Jr. vs HOR: Judicial review is not only a power but a duty of the judiciary

- the 1987 Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive

power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of

such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These



limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar

on the impeachment of one and the same official .

-the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion

of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language

of Baker v. Carr , “ judicially discoverable standards” for determining the validity of the

exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review

1. 2. DUE PROCESS: Is there a need to publish as a mode of promulgation the

Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings?

- (P) alleges that the finding of sufficiency in form and substance of the

impeachment complaints is tainted with bias as the Chairman of the HCOJ’s, Rep.

Tupas, father has a pending case with her at the Sandiganbayan

- Presumption of regularity

- The determination of sufficiency of form and exponent of the express grant of

rule-making power in the HOR

- the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and

providing that there must be a “verified complaint or resolution”, and that the substance

requirement is met if there is “a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and

determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee”

- The Constitution itself did not provide for a specific method of promulgating the

Rules.

- impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and

not for the punishment of the offender



1. 3. THE ONE-YEAR BAR RULE

- (P): start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint

against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the

15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second

impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.

- INITIATIVE: Filing of impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking

initial action of said complaint (referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice)

- IMPEACH: to file the case before the Senate

- Rationale of the one-year bar: “that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold:

1)”to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its

principal task [of] legislation,”

“…that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the

candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.”

(Gutierrez vs. HOR, 2011)



ABAKADA v. PurisimaG.R. No. 166715,August 14, 2008FACTS:RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collectionofthe Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). Thelawintends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue

targetsby providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation ofa Rewards andIncentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board(Board).

It covers allofficials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least sixmonths of service,regardless of employment status.The Fund is sourced from thecollection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, asdetermined by the Development Budget and CoordinatingCommittee (DBCC). Anyincentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIRand the BOC inproportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the targetedamountof tax revenue.Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition

challenging theconstitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contendthat, by establishing asystem of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] theofficials and employees of theBIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bountyhunters" as they will do their best onlyincons idera t ion o f suc h rewards. Thus, the sys tem o f rewards and ince nt iv es in vi te scorruption and undermines the constitutionally mandatedduty of these officials andemployees to serve the people with utmost responsibility,integrity, loyalty and efficiencyISSUES:1 . W / N R A 9 3 3 5 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ? 2 .W /N the l im i ta t ion thescope o f the sys tem of rewards and incent ives on ly to o f f ic ia lsand

employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee ofequalprotection.3.W /N the law und ul y del ega tes the pow er to f i xrevenue targets to the Pres identRATIO:1.Yes.The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required torebut it.Petitioners' claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOCofficials andemployees into "bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any



factual andlegalb a s i s a n d p u r e l y s p e c ul a t i v e . Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officersmay by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A systemof incentives for exceeding the setexpectations of a public office is not

anathema to the concept of publ ic accountabil ity . In fact, it recognizes andreinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to publicservice ofdeserving government personnel.2.No. Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus underth e DOF . Th ey pr in ci pa ll yperform the special function of being theinstrumentalities through which the Stateexercises one of its great inherentfunctions - taxation. Indubitably, such substantialdi st in ct io n is ge rm an eand in t imate ly re la ted to the purpose o f thelaw. Hence, theclassification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC underRA 9335 fully satisfythe demands of equal protection.

3.No. RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide thePresident infixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out theprovisions of thelaw. Revenue targets are based on the original estimatedrevenue collection expectedrespectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscalyear as approved by the DBCC andstated in the BESF submitted by thePresident to Congress. Thus, the determination of revenue targets doesnot rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of theDBCC.DISPOSITIVE PORTION:WHEREFORE, the petition is herebyPARTIALLY GRANTED.Section 12 of RA 9335creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee toapprove the implementing rules andre gu la t io ns of the la w i s de cl ar edUNCONSTITUTIONALand thereforeNULLandVOID.The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 isUPHELD. PursuanttoS e c t i o n 1 3 o f R A 9 3 3 5 , t h e r e s t o f t h e p r o v i s i o n s r e m a in i n a n d e f f e c t .SO ORDERED

ABAKADA Guro Party List v PurisimaG.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008FACTS:1.





However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislativesphere," the Constitution imposes two basicand related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or

judicial power.

And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought andexhaustively considered, procedures" specifiedunder the Constitution including theprocedure for enactment of laws and presentment.Thus, any post-enactmentcongressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. Inparticular, congressionaloversight must be confined to thefollowing:(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection withit, its power to ask heads of departments toappear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matterpertaining to theirdepartments and its power of confirmation

and(2) investigation and monitoring

of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiriesinaid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed bythe Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in thisclass.Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative

agency to present the proposed implementing rules andregulations of a law to Congresswhich, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" toapprove or disapprovesuch regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislativeveto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of aninward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutinyand investigation) to an agency to whichCongress has by law initially delegated broadpowers. It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution's diagram ofpower asit entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing itsown laws

Documents

Case Digest Week 4 and 5