Upload
yehuda
View
22
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
DESCRIPTION
REVENUE final conference Brussels 29th - 30th November 2005. Case study Oslo: PT optimisation under different rules for revenue use. Jon-Terje Bekken Institute of Transport Economics, Oslo. Based on 3 different analyses. Process evaluation The context of toll roads in Norway - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Citation preview
Case study Oslo:PT optimisation under different rules for revenue
use
REVENUE final conferenceBrussels
29th - 30th November 2005
Jon-Terje BekkenInstitute of Transport Economics,
Oslo
Based on 3 different analyses• Process evaluation
– The context of toll roads in Norway– The political compromises behind them
• Acceptability analysis– Attitudes among citizens– SP analysis of politicians and planners
• Model scenarios– Optimal packages– Restrictions on revenue use
Process evaluation
• What are the characteristics of the contents and the organisation of the packages?
• What are the impacts of the organisation of the packages on the political goals and priorities in the region?
Summary of process evaluationThe most important findings from the
process evaluation:• There are strong restrictions on Revenue
use:– Modes– Regions
• Earmarking of revenue necessary for a political compromise
• All participants have a right to veto the proposed schemes– focus is kept on positive measures – “fair” regional distribution of the revenue
Acceptability
• Acceptability among the voters– No case for a referendum
• Preferences among decision makers– Politicians focus on acceptability and
compromises– Administration propose schemes with
focus on efficiency?
Acceptability of the Oslo packages - population
4544
40
36
4644
4648
454243
414138
36
30
3838
3432
414139
4542
34
393635
3334
24
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
Positive towards the toll ring Passing the ring to work and positive towards it
Before the toll ring started
Oslo Package 2
The probability to recommend different measures Average score
3.9
3.8
3.4
3.3
3.4
6.6
6.1
5.8
5.8
5.4
5.2
4.10
6.8
6.1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Increased road tolls
Increased tolls in rush hour
Reduced parking in city centre
Increased parking fees in city centre
Car free city centre
Increased frequency
Reduced fare
Politicians
Administration
Preferences among politicians and administrationGeneral findings:
– Support for the package approach– Important with central Government funds – Inconsistency between expected effect of
measures and recommendations– Politicians sceptical towards restrictive
measures – opposite with administration
How to find a political acceptable package
Summary acceptability
The most important findings from the acceptability surveys were:
• The attitude towards the toll ring increasingly positive over time.
• The public acceptance of a prolongation of the toll ring is strongly dependent on the revenue use (earmarking)
• The administrative level is more likely to recommend restrictive measures compared to the political level.
• Both the political level and the administrative levels are more positive towards packages compared to the public.
• It is important that the central Government also contributes to the packages for the actors to agree.
Model scenarios• Scenario A/Oslopackage 1:
Low toll fare (1 euro) Fixed subsidy level for public transport and fixed capacity constraints in the peak period.
• Scenario B/Oslo package 2: Additional toll fare (+0,25 Euro) and PT fare (+0,1
euro) targeted on capacity increase in peak period. Fixed subsidy level but flexible capacity in the peak period.
• Scenario C/Oslo package 3: SMCP (around 4 Euro) and optimal subsidy level for
PT in the region.
Revenue useScenarioPricing Revenue use Investment
A1 Oslo package 1: Low toll fare (€1) Fixed subsidy level for public transport and fixed PT capacity constraints in the peak period.
RU 1: Fixed subsidy level in each market segments
Road investments only
B1 Oslo package 2: Additional toll fare (+€0.25) and PT fare (+€0.1) targeted on capacity increase in peak period. Fixed subsidy level but flexible PT capacity in the peak period.
RU 1: Fixed subsidy level in each market segments
Revenue earmarked to public transport, but not including operational cost
B2 As B1 RU 2: Fixed total subsidy level for all market segments, but possible regional redistribution
Revenues earmarked to public transport, but not including operational cost
C1 Oslo package 3: SMCP (around €4) and optimal subsidy level for PT in the region.
RU 1: Fixed subsidy level in each market segments
Revenues earmarked to public transport with the possibility to use the revenue for operational costs
C2 RU 2: Fixed total subsidy level for all market segments, but possible regional redistribution
Revenues earmarked to public transport with the possibility to use the revenue for operational costs
C3 RU 3: Welfare optimal subsidy level without financial constraints
Revenues earmarked to public transport with the possibility to use the revenue for operational costs
The relationship is based on a UITP
database with additional cities
FINMODExternal conditions for the transport market•Population/demography•Costs of car use and parking•PT fares and service provision•Income level•Urban sprawl/density
PT TripsInitial
Exogenous framework conditions
Car journeysInitial
Car ownershipInitial
Optimization
OPTIMIZATION MODEL:•Socio-economics•Business economics
Max W= (ticket revenue-operating costs) + user benefits - external costs
Production effectiveness
Market effective
Socially effectiveOptimized factors:•Service provision and fares•Level of subsidy•Demand for PT and car traffic
Framework for optimization•Degrees of freedom for optimization•Restrictions on revenue use
SMCP for PT – change in fare level
-30 %
-20 %
-10 %
0 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
50 %
60 %
MC car 4,26
25%mcpf
MC car 0 25%mcpf MC car 0 15%mcpf
Rel
ativ
e d
iffer
ence
s in
far
es f
rom
Osl
o pa
ckag
e 1
Capacity peak non-capacity peak Off peak
No constraints on revenue use
SMCP for PT – optimal revenue use
-100 %
-50 %
0 %
50 %
100 %
150 %
200 %
MC car 4,26 25%mcpf
MC car 0 25%mcpf MC car 0 15%mcpf
Rel
ativ
e d
iffer
ence
s fr
om O
slo
pa
ckag
e 1
off peak frequency peak frequency
Off peak vehicle size Additional peak vehicle size
No constraints on revenue use
SMCP for PT – costs and benefits
-115
-16
-101
173
123
157
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
MC car 4,26 25%mcpf MC car 0 25%mcpf MC car 0 15%mcpf
Ch
ang
es
fro
m O
slo
pac
kag
e 1
( m
ill
€)
Profit Passenger benefit
External benefit Total social benefit
No constraints on revenue use
SMCP for PT - with restrictions on revenue use
21 % 21 %
57 %44 % 43 %
13 % 13 %27 %
145 % 146 %134 %
-20 %0 %
20 %40 %60 %80 %
100 %120 %140 %160 %
No transfers betweenmodes
Transfers betweenmodes allowed
Transfers betweenmodes, Internal
optimisation
Fixed total subsidy
Rel
ativ
e di
ffere
nces
from
Osl
o pa
ckag
e 1
Fare level Capacity peak (euro/trips) Off peak
Network km (1000/hour) off peak Network km (1000/hour) peak
SMCP for PT – Optimal allocation of revenue on different modes
-100 %
-50 %
0 %
50 %
100 %
150 %
200 %
250 %
Bus Tram Metro Bus Train Average
Oslo city Akershus region All modes
fare level capacity peak fare level off peak
frequency peak Total number of trips
Summary of optimisations• Oslo package 2
– a total social benefit of 211 mill euro compared to Oslo package 1 and
– 10 percent more PT passengers• Oslo package 3
– a total social benefit of 322 mill euro compared to Oslo package 1 and
– 33 percent more PT passengers• The SMCP of PT
– should reduce the capacity peak fare level under the toll fare regimes of Oslo package 1 and 2,
– should increase if road pricing were introduced in the toll fare regime of Oslo package 3.
• The optimised subsidy level – is 115 mill euro higher in the Oslo package 1 scenario– Is 103 mill euro higher under the Oslo package 2 scenarios, due to
the increased toll fare. – If road pricing is introduced (Oslo package 3), there will be no need
to increase PT subsidies.
Summary of optimisations (2)The main points to draw from the model scenarios of Oslo
in terms of welfare are:• There are social benefits from increased subsidies for PT
(Oslo package 2)• There are only small benefits from allowing transfers of
revenue between the different modes and regions• Oslo package 2 is a step in the right direction, but only a
small improvement compared to Oslo package 1. • A road-pricing scheme is superior to the other scenarios • The result from the scenarios is very sensitive to the
level of MCPF (marginal cost of public funds). The result is also sensitive to the internalisation and the level of external costs associated with car traffic.
Overall key points Oslo• The current fare setting regimes of Oslo package 1
and 2 are not based on any first-best pricing rules• The estimations are sensible of the marginal cost
of public funds • Oslo package 2 is a small step in the right direction
– compared to Oslo package 1• There are positive cost benefit ratio from increased
subsidies for PT and reallocation between modes.• The road pricing scheme is a “superior scheme”• Earmarking up front necessary to make Oslo
package 2 viable• Focus on efficiency after the scheme has been
politically accepted