G.R. No. 109387 April 25, 1994 LEONARDO LIM DE MESA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RODRIGO V. COSICO, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Biñan, Laguna; ROGELIO S. MOLINA, Branch Sheriff; and ALFREDO, NUMERIANO, ZENAIDA, ROGELIO, YOLANDA, OLIVIA, BENJAMIN, TERESITA and WILSON, all surnamed LIM DE MESA, respondents. REGALADO, J.: In a resolution promulgated on March 4, 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29818, entitled ("Leonardo Lim de Mesa vs. Hon. Rodrigo V. Cosico, etc., et al.,") respondent court denied due course to the petition for certiorari which sought the nullification of three orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna which were issued as incidents of Civil Case No. B-1942 thereof. Petitioner is now before us impugning the forestalled resolution. 1 The case stemmed from an action for partition filed by herein private respondents against their eldest brother, herein petitioner Leonardo Lim de Mesa, and his sister Leticia Lim de Mesa, which suit was docketed in the Regional Trial Court of Laguna, Branch 24, as Civil Case No. B-1942. Private respondents prayed therein for the partition of the property left by their parents, Manuel de Mesa and Lucia Lim, consisting of a house and lot in Sta. Rosa Estate Subdivision, Laguna and a funeral parlor; that petitioner Leonardo de Mesa be compelled to render an accounting of the income of the funeral parlor business from October 24, 1980, the date when the mother of the parties died; and that private respondent Rogelio Lim de Mesa be declared the owner of eight-tenths (8 /10) of the entire estate, as the other heirs had assigned their interests to him. In his answer, petitioner admitted that their deceased parents left the house and lot described in the complaint, but claimed that the funeral parlor, known as Lim de Mesa Memorial Chapel, was solely owned by him. Petitioner also alleged that their deceased parents left other properties and businesses which are in the possession and under the management of the two other plaintiffs therein. After trial, the court rendered the following judgment: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. Ordering the partition of the estate of the deceased spouses Manuel de Mesa and Lucia Lim described in paragraph 1 of the complaint as Lot No. 329 of the Sta. Rosa Estate Subdivision with a residential house of strong material(s) and a funeral business therein, all located at Sta. Rosa, Laguna, among the following surviving heirs in the following proportions; 1. Rogelio Lim de Mesa - 9.8787872 /13 shares representing the sum total of his participations plus all the shares sold to him by co-heirs Alfredo, Numeriano, Zenaida, Yolanda, Olivia, Benjamin, and Teresita, all surnamed Lim de Mesa 2. Leonardo Lim de Mesa - 0.6515151 /13 share 3. Leticia Lim de Mesa - 1.818181 /13 share 4. Wilson Lim de Mesa - 0.6515151 /13 share as regards the property of the estate, namely, Lot No. 329 and the residential house of strong material(s) erected therein, and — 1. Rogelio Lim de Mesa - 8 /11 shares 2. Leonardo Lim de Mesa - 1 /11 shares 3. Leticia Lim de Mesa - 1 /11 shares 4. Wilson Lim de Mesa - 1 /11 shares

as regards the proceeds from the funeral business from November 1980 up to the present after an accounting thereof to be rendered by Leonardo Lim de Mesa. 2. Ordering the defendants Leonardo Lim de Mesa and Leticia Lim de Mesa and plaintiff Wilson Lim de Mesa to execute a deed of confirmation of the Extra-Judicial Partition with Sale (Exhibit "H") and "Reformation of Instrument" (Exhibit "I") dated January 27, 1983 and November 12, 1984, respectively. 3. Ordering defendant Leonardo Lim de Mesa to render an accounting of the operation and management of the funeral business from November 1980 up to the present within thirty (30) days from the date this decision becomes final. 4. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of P20,000.00 as reimbursement for attorney's fees. 5. Ordering defendants to pay costs of suits. 2 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the aforesaid judgment with some modifications, that is, by deleting those portions thereof directing therein defendants Leonardo and Leticia Lim de Mesa, aside from plaintiff Wilson Lim de Mesa, to execute a deed confirming the extrajudicial partition with sale and the reformation of instrument, and to pay the awards for moral damages and attorney's fees. 3 Not satisfied therewith, petitioners further sought relief from this Court which, however, denied their appeal in a resolution dated January 27, 1992. On June 4, 1992, entry of said judgment was made, thereby making the judgment of the lower court, as modified by respondent Court of Appeals, final and executory. Thereafter, private respondents filed a motion for execution which was granted by the lower court. 4 A writ of execution was issued, but the same was returned unsatisfied on September 21, 1992 due to petitioner's refusal to comply with the same. Private respondents then filed a motion to enforce judgment which was granted by the lower court in its order dated October 14, 1992. 5 Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion to be furnished copies of the basic pleadings and/or orders. Private respondents filed their opposition thereto, arguing that petitioner was not entitled to the relief prayed for since private respondents were entitled to execution as a matter of right, and that all incidental matters flowing therefrom may be resolved motu proprio without prior notice and hearing to petitioner. The court a quo acted on petitioner's motion by an order, dated November 13, 1992, directing private respondent Rogelio Lim de Mesa to furnish petitioner a copy of the deed of partition and such documents as the latter would specify. 6 Private respondents then filed a motion to resolve the incident subject of the order of October 14, 1992 and this, in turn, led to the issuance of the lower court's order dated November 18, 1992. 7 Upon motion filed by private respondents, the lower court issued another order, dated November 25, 1992, granting the former's motion for a writ of possession and delineation of property lines. 8 Petitioner thereafter moved for the reconsideration of the orders dated November 18 and 25, 1992, contending that the same were issued in violation of Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, as these were issued ex parte. 9 In its order dated December 23, 1992, the court below denied the motion for reconsideration. 10 A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals assailing, on the same grounds, the following orders of the trial court, to wit: 1. ORDER dated October 14, 1992 designating Atty. Luzod, Jr. to sign the deed of partition for and in behalf of Leonardo Lim de Mesa, petitioner, to enforce the judgment, and ordering petitioner to explain within 10 days from notice why he should not be cited (for) contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3 (a) in relation to Sec. 6 and 7, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court; 2. ORDER dated November 18, 1992, giving petitioner an extension of 15 days to render an accounting and in case of failure, to cite him (for) contempt of court (for) violation of Sec. 3(b) in relation to Sec. 6, (Rule 71), Rules of Court, and if he continues to disobey, the public respondent may be constrained to order his imprisonment.

3. ORDER dated November 25, 1992, granting a writ of possession directing the respondent Sheriff to place private respondent Rogelio Lim de Mesa in possession of the property pertaining to him by virtue of ANNEXES "X", "A", to "A-4". 11 In its resolution of March 4, 1993, as stated at the outset, respondent Court of Appeals ruled against therein petitioner, 12 hence the instant petition with the following assignment of errors: 1. The Court of Appeals erred in applying Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, in concluding that the judgment in the action for partition in Civil Case No. B-1942 became final and executory as of June 4, 1992 and the prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution the issuance of which is a ministerial duty of the court. 2. The Court of Appeals also erred in holding that the three (3) assailed orders in Civil Case No. B-1942 were issued consequent to the execution of a judgment that has already become final and executory. 3. The Court of Appeals finally erred in holding that the three (3) assailed orders in Civil Case No. B-1942 having been issued ex-parte is of no moment where the execution is a matter of right and the losing party need not be given advance notice of hearing of such motion. 13 It is from the foregoing perceptions that the main thrust of herein petitioner's arguments postulates the supposed nullity of the writ of execution issued by the trial court since the same was issued without prior notice and hearing. We disagree. Jurisprudentially entrenched is the rule that a judgment ordering partition with damages is final and duly appealable, notwithstanding the fact, which petitioner seeks to capitalize on, that further proceedings will still have to take place in the trial court. 14 There are two stages involved in the special civil action of judicial partition and accounting under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is concerned with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise legally proscribed and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the desired partition either because a co-ownership does not exist or a partition is legally prohibited. It may also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, that partition is proper in the premises, and that an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, "the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties." 15 In either case, whether the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. 16 The second stage commences when the parties are unable to agree upon the partition ordered by the court. In that event, partition shall be effected for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second phase may also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the Court after the parties have been accorded the opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just shares in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. Such an order is, to be sure, also final and appealable. 17 In the decision ordering partition, the execution of that part of the judgment which will not necessitate any further proceedings may be enforced. Further proceedings, such as the appointment of commissioners to carry out the partition and the rendition and approval of the accounting, may be had without prejudice to the execution of that part of the judgment which needs no further proceedings. Thus, it has been held that execution was entirely proper to enforce the defendant's obligation to render an accounting and to exact payment of the money value of the plaintiffs' shares in the personal property and attorney's fees due defendants, as well as the costs of the suit and damages. 18

In the present case, the decision ordering partition and the rendition of accounting had already become final and executory. The execution thereof thus became a matter of right on the part of the plaintiffs, herein private respondents, and is a mandatory and ministerial duty on the part of the court. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the judgment debtor need not be given advance notice of the application for execution nor be afforded prior hearings thereon.

On the bases of the foregoing considerations, therefore, the Court of Appeals acted correctly in holding that the failure to serve a copy of the motion for execution on petitioner is not a fatal defect. In fact, there was no necessity for such service.

However, notwithstanding our aforesaid observations, the orders of the trial court dated October 14, 1992 and November 25, 1992, respectively directing Atty. Luzod, Jr. to sign the deed of partition for and in behalf of petitioner and granting the writ of possession, must be set aside for having been rendered in excess of jurisdiction. The trial court cannot compel herein petitioner to sign the extrajudicial deed of partition prepared solely by private respondents. Concomitantly, it cannot issue a writ of possession pursuant to the said extrajudicial partition.

An action for partition, which is typically brought by a person claiming to be the owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be his co-owners, may readily be seen to simultaneously present two principal issues. Firstly, there is the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned. Secondly, assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary issue of how the property is to be divided between the plaintiff and the defendants, that is, what portion should go to which co-owner. After a judgment is rendered in an action for partition declaring that the property in question shall be divided among the parties thereto, the procedure provided by law thereafter is that, if the parties can agree among themselves, then the partition can be made by them through the proper instruments of conveyance which shall be submitted for approval of the court, and such partition with the court order confirming the same shall be recorded in the office of the proper registry of deeds. But, if the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the court shall by order appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and proportion of the property as the court in such order shall direct.

The decision in Civil Case No. B-1942 merely declares that partition is proper and forthwith specified therein the respective aliquot shares of the parties to the real estate and to the proceeds of the funeral business. Withal, it did not specifically state, by metes and bounds and by adequate description, the particular portion of the real estate to be assigned to each party. Actual partition is, therefore, necessary. Since the parties, however, cannot agree on the actual division and allocation of the property held in common, the trial court should order the appointment of commissioners to carry out the partition, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 69. WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED and the questioned orders of the trial court dated October 14, 1992 and November 25, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE. The court a quo is directed to immediately appoint and constitute the necessary number of commissioners who shall expeditiously effect the partition of the subject property in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-10474 February 28, 1958 BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA respondent. Clodualdo P. Surio for petitioners. Moises B. Ramos for respondents. LABRADOR, J.: Certiorari against decision of the Court of Appeals, Third Division, affirming with slight modification a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring plaintiffs owners of one-half portion of four parcels of land described in the complaint, with costs. The judgment was rendered in an action instituted by Felisa Sinopera, administrative of the estate of Teodoro Tolete, to recover from defendants one-half share of the aforesaid parcels of land, which, it is alleged belong to the deceased Teodoro Tolete. According, to the facts found by the Court of Appeals, Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. He left for parcels of land, lots Nos. 12006, 119967, 14352 and 12176 of the cadastral survey of San Manuel, Pangasinan He left as heirs his widow, Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and nieces, children of deceased brothers and sisters. On July 25, 1946, without any judicial proceedings, his widow executed an affidavit stating that "the deceased Teodoro Tolete left no children or respondent neither ascendants or acknowledged natural children neither brother, sisters, nephews or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, the legitimate wife of the deceased, the one and only person to inherit the above properties" (Record on Appeal, p. 9). This affidavit was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On the same day, she executed a deed of sale of all the above parcels of land in favor of Benny Sampilo for the sum of P10,000. This sale was also registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On June 17, 1950, Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold the said parcels of land to Honorato Salacup for P50,000 and this sale was also registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan (See Annexes "A", "B", "C", attached to the complaint). In March, 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the estate of Teodoro Tolete (Special Proceeding No. 3694, Pangasinan), and having secured her appointment as administratrix, brought the present action on June 20, 1950. Notice of lis pendens was filed in the Office of the Register of Deeds and said notice was recorded on certificates of title covering the said properties on June 26, 1950. This notice, however, was subsequent to the registration of the deed of sale, in favor of Honorato Salacup, which took place on June 17, 1950. The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute the affidavit of adjudication and that Honorato Salacup acquired no rights to the lands sold to him, and that neither had Benny Sampilo acquired any right to the said properties. Sampilo and Salacup filed an amended answer alleging that the complaint states no cause of action; that if such a cause exists the same is barred by the statute of limitations; that defendants are innocent purchasers for value; and that the complaint is malicious, frivolous and spurious, intended to harass and inconvenience the defendants. After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment for the plaintiff, Felisa Sinopera, declaring that the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A", the deed of sale Exhibit "B", and the deed of sale Exhibit "C", are all null and void; declaring plaintiff owner of one-half portion of the four parcels of land in question, and finally declaring that the usufructuary rights of Leoncia de Leon to said properties are terminated. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals. This court held that the annulment of the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", by the trial court was correct but that the annulment of the deeds Exhibits "B" and "C", insofar as one-half of the properties, conveyed is concerned, and in adjudicating one-half of the same to the heirs of the deceased, is premature. Hence, it modified the judgment, declaring that Exhibits "B" and "C" are null and void only insofar as the properties thereby conveyed exceed the portion that the responds to Leoncia de Leon. Therefore, it ordered the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Teodoro Tolete, for disposition according to the law, one-half of the lands described in the complaint, but reserved to Honorato Salacup the right to claim and secure adjudication in his favor of whatever portion of said properties may correspond to

Leoncia de Leon and also his right to bring an action for the damages that he may have suffered against Leoncia de Leon and Benny Sampilo. Benny Sampilo and Honorato Salacup have appealed to this Court by certiorari and have assigned the following errors in their brief: I The Court of Appeals erred in affirming that respondent Felisa Sinopera's right of action to recover her and her co-heirs' participation to the lands in question had not prescribed at the time the action to recover was filed. II The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the petitioners are innocent purchasers for value. III The Court of Appeals erred in aiming the lower court's denial of petitioner's motion for new trial. In support of the first assignment of error, it is argued that as the action was instituted almost four years after the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds Of Pangasinan, the right of action of the administratrix has prescribed and lapsed because the same was not brought within the period of two years as Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, and as decided in the cases of McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211 and Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 869. Section 4 of Rule 74 provides, in part, as follows: SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — If it shall appear at any time within two years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation of the such heir or such other person may compel the settlement estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. . . . Section 1, which is mentioned in Section 4, reads as follows: SEC. 1. Extrajudcial settlement by agreement between the heirs. — If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after the death of the decedent. It will be noted that the provision next above-quoted contains two parts, the first referring to a case in which there are two or more heirs interested in the estate of a deceased person, and the second in which there is only one heir. The section was taken from Section 596 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2331). Said Section 596 as amended, was as follows: SEC. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal Proceedings. — Whenever all the heirs of a person who died intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity and there are no debts due from the estate, or all the debts have been paid the heirs may, by agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, and not otherwise, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in court.

We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. In Section 1, it is required that if there are two or more heirs, both or all of them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is made more imperative in the old law (Section 596, Act No. 190) by the addition of the clause "and not otherwise." By the title of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" are indicates the persons to answer for rights violated by the extrajudicial settlement. On the other hand, it is also significant that no mention is made expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons who did not take part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof. There cannot be any doubt that those who took part or had knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to them the law is clear that if they claim to have been in any manner deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or interest within the period of two years, and both the distributes and estate would be liable to them for such rights or interest. Evidently, they are the persons in accordance with the provision, may seek to remedy, the prejudice to their rights within the two-year period. But as to those who did not take part in the settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent or of the settlement, there is no direct or express provision is unreasonable and unjust that they also be required to assert their claims within the period of two years. To extend the effects of the settlement to them, to those who did not take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any express legal provision to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right to due process of law. In the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, cited by the appellants in this case, we held: It will be noted that while the law (see. 754) provides that the order of distribution may be had upon the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, no provision is made for notice, by publication or otherwise, of such application. The proceeding, therefore, is to all intents and purposes ex parte. As will be seen our law is very vague and incomplete; and certainly it cannot be held that a purely ex parte proceeding, had without notice by personal service or by publication, by which the court undertakes to distribute the property of deceased persons, can be conclusive upon minor heirs who are not represented therein.

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution would affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect is made, either directly or by implication. We have examined the two cases cited by appellants and there is no similarity at all between the circumstances on which the ruling therein had been predicated and those of the case at bar.

Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, we are of the opinion and so hold that the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because not all the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals having found that the decedent left aside from his widow, nephews and nieces living at the time of his death.

The next contention of appellants is that plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations. The origin of the Provision (Section 4, Rule 74), upon which this contention is predicated, which is Section 596 of Act No. 190, fails to support the contention. In the first Place, there is nothing therein, or in its source which shows clearly a statute of limitations and a bar of action against third person's. It is only a bar against the parties who had taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings but not against third persons not Parties thereto. In the second place, the statute of limitations is contained in a different chapter of Act No. 190, Chapter XL, and if Section 596 of the Act had been meant to be a statute of limitations, it would naturally have been included in the chapter which defines the statute. But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, it is still unavailing to the defendants. The action is one based on fraud, as the widow of the deceased owner of the lands had declared in her affidavit of partition that the deceased left no nephews or niece, or other heirs except herself. Plaintiff's right which is based on fraud and which has a period of four years (Section 43, par. 3, Act no. 190; Article 1146, Civil Code), does not appear to have lapsed the action was instituted. Judicial proceedings where instituted in March, 1950 and these proceedings must have been instituted soon after the discovery of fraud. In any case, the defendants have the burden of proof as to their claim of the statute of limitations,

which is their defense, and they have not proved that when the action was instituted, four years had already elapsed from the date that the interested parties had actual knowledge of the fraud. The second assignment of error, i.e., that the defendants-appellants are innocent purchasers for value was rejected as unfounded by the court of Appeals. Said court said. The claim that defendants-appellants did not have sufficient knowledge or notice of the claim of the heirs of Teodoro Tolete, deceased, over the land in question does not find support in the evidence of record. As regards defendant Benny Sampilo, it is an admitted fact that he is a nephew of Leoncia de Leon and he had been living with the latter. Both Benny Sampilo and the heirs of the deceased who are claiming the property are residents of San Manuel, Pangasinan. It is hard, therefore, to believe that Benny Sampilo did not know the existence of said heirs, and that he was not aware that they were nephews and nieces, children of the deceased brothers, of the deceased Teodoro Tolete. The fact furthermore that Benny Sampilo accompanied his aunt Leoncia de Leon to Sison, Pangasinan, when the later saw Notary Public Ladislao Villamil, who was the former's uncle, to have him prepare the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A", and the deed of conveyance Exhibit "B" by which on the same date she conveyed to Sampilo all the property which she had adjudicated to herself, both of which she acknowledged before said notary public, coupled with the fact that there is no sufficient showing that the consideration for the conveyance of P10,000 had in fact been paid, strengthens our belief that said Benny Sampilo knew that the deceased Teodoro Tolete had other heirs who may claim the property, and that the immediate conveyance thereof to him was a strategem concocted to defeat the former's rights. And as regards Honorato Salacup, while the claim that no notice of lis pendens appeared annotated in the certificates of title issued to Benny Sampilo when he acquired the property might be true, for he purchased the property on June 17, 1950, and the notice of lis pendens was noted on said certificates of title on June 26, 1950, nevertheless, he cannot claim that he was a purchaser in good faith for value of the property. It is well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that a purchaser of registered lands who has knowledge of facts which should put him upon inquiry and investigate as to the possible defects of the title of the vendor and fails to make such inquiry and investigation cannot claim that he as a purchaser in good faith for value and he had acquired a valid title thereto. Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil., 644; Dayao vs. Diaz, G.R. L-4106, May 29, 1952. Finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, we hereby affirm it in toto, with costs against the petitioners. So ordered.

G.R. No. 146587. July 2, 2002] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the General Manager of the PHILIPPINE INFORMATION AGENCY (PIA), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the HEIRS OF LUIS SANTOS as herein represented by DR. SABINO SANTOS and PURIFICACION SANTOS IMPERIAL, respondents. D E C I S I O N VITUG, J.: Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19 September 1969 before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Bulacan, docketed Civil Cases No. 3839-M, No. 3840-M, No. 3841-M and No. 3842-M, covering a total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the “Voice of the Philippines” project. Petitioner, through the Philippine Information Agency (“PIA”), took over the premises after the previous lessee, the “Voice of America,” had ceased its operations thereat. Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979, or more than nine years after the institution of the expropriation proceedings, the trial court issued this order - "WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered: "Condemning the properties of the defendants in Civil Cases Nos. 3839-M to 3842-M located at KM 43, MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan and covered by several transfer certificates of title appearing in the Commissioners’ Appraisal Report consisting of the total area of 544,980 square meters, as indicated in plan, Exhibit A, for plaintiff, also marked as Exhibit I for the defendants, and as Appendix ‘A’ attached to the Commissioners’ Appraisal Report, for the purpose stated by the plaintiff in its complaint; "Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants the just compensation for said property which is the fair market value of the land condemned, computed at the rate of six pesos (P6.00) per square meter, with legal rate of interest from September 19, 1969, until fully paid; and "Ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs of suit, which includes the aforesaid fees of commissioners, Atty. Victorino P. Evangelista and Mr. Pablo Domingo."[1] The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square meter property previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents, which forms part of the expropriated area. It would appear that the national government failed to pay to herein respondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision, such that a little over five years later, or on 09 May 1984, respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. On 07 June 1984, the Bulacan RTC, after ascertaining that the heirs remained unpaid in the sum of P1,058,655.05, issued a writ of execution served on the plaintiff, through the Office of the Solicitor General, for the implementation thereof. When the order was not complied with, respondents again filed a motion urging the trial court to direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to release to them the amount of P72,683.55, a portion of the sum deposited by petitioner at the inception of the expropriation proceedings in 1969, corresponding to their share of the deposit. The trial court, in its order of 10 July 1984, granted the motion. In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22,[2] transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining portion was retained by the PIA. This fact notwithstanding, and despite the 1984 court order, the Santos heirs remained unpaid, and no action was taken on their case until 16 September 1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis Santos subject to such final computation as might be approved by the court. This time, the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and

motion, submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6.00 per square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the alternative, to cause the return to them of the expropriated property. On 01 March 2000, the Bulacan RTC ruled in favor of respondents and issued the assailed order, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 and declaring it to be unenforceable on the ground of prescription - "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby: "1) declares the decision rendered by this Court on February 26, 1979 no longer enforceable, execution of the same by either a motion or an independent action having already prescribed in accordance with Section 6, Rule 39 of both the 1964 Revised Rules of Court and the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; "2) denies the plaintiff’s Manifestation and Motion to Permit Plaintiff to Deposit in Court Payment for Expropriated Properties dated September 16, 1999 for the reason stated in the next preceding paragraph hereof; and "3) orders the return of the expropriated property of the late defendant Luis Santos to his heirs conformably with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De Villaroya, 153 SCRA 291, without prejudice to any case which the parties may deem appropriate to institute in relation with the amount already paid to herein oppositors and the purported transfer of a portion of the said realty to the Bulacan State University pursuant to Proclamation No. 22 issued by President Joseph Ejercito."[3] Petitioner brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals but the petition was outrightly denied. It would appear that the denial was based on Section 4, Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provided that the filing of a motion for reconsideration in due time after filing of the judgment, order or resolution interrupted the running of the sixty-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari; and that if a motion for reconsideration was denied, the aggrieved party could file the petition only within the remaining period, but which should not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of such denial. The reglementary period, however, was later modified by A.M. No. 00-2-03 S.C., now reading thusly: “Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. --- The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.” The amendatory provision, being curative in nature, should be made applicable to all cases still pending with the courts at the time of its effectivity. In Narzoles vs. NLRC,[4] the Court has said: “The Court has observed that Circular No. 39-98 has generated tremendous confusion resulting in the dismissal of numerous cases for late filing. This may have been because, historically, i.e., even before the 1997 revision to the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party had a fresh period from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. Were it not for the amendments brought about by Circular No. 39-98, the cases so dismissed would have been resolved on the merits. Hence, the Court deemed it wise to revert to the old rule allowing a party a fresh 60-day period from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. x x x “The latest amendments took effect on September 1, 2000, following its publication in the Manila Bulletin on August 4, 2000 and in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 7, 2000, two newspapers of general circulation. “In view of its purpose, the Resolution further amending Section 4, Rule 65, can only be described as curative in nature, and the principles governing curative statutes are applicable. “Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements. (Erectors, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 256

SCRA 629 [1996].) They are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable persons to carry into effect that which they have designed or intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute was invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with. (Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. vs. Dela Serna, 312 SCRA 22 [1999].) Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive. (Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr., 239 SCRA 11 [1994].)”[5] At all events, petitioner has a valid point in emphasizing the "public nature" of the expropriated property. The petition being imbued with public interest, the Court has resolved to give it due course and to decide the case on its merits. Assailing the finding of prescription by the trial court, petitioner here posited that a motion which respondents had filed on 17 February 1984, followed up by other motions subsequent thereto, was made within the reglementary period that thereby interrupted the 5-year prescriptive period within which to enforce the 1979 judgment. Furthermore, petitioner claimed, the receipt by respondents of partial compensation in the sum of P72,683.55 on 23 July 1984 constituted partial compliance on the part of petitioners and effectively estopped respondents from invoking prescription expressed in Section 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court.[6] In opposing the petition, respondents advanced the view that pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, the failure of petitioner to execute the judgment, dated 26 February 1979, within five years after it had become final and executory, rendered it unenforceable by mere motion. The motion for payment, dated 09 May 1984, as well as the subsequent disbursement to them of the sum of P72,683.55 by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan, could not be considered as having interrupted the five-year period, since a motion, to be considered otherwise, should instead be made by the prevailing party, in this case by petitioner. Respondents maintained that the P72,683.55 paid to them by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan pursuant to the 1984 order of the trial court was part of the initial deposit made by petitioner when it first entered possession of the property in 1969 and should not be so regarded as a partial payment. Respondents further questioned the right of PIA to transfer ownership of a portion of the property to the Bulacan State University even while the just compensation due the heirs had yet to be finally settled. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose.[7] Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it.[8] The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.[9] Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first, the taking must be for public use, and second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property.[10] These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter.[11] In determining “public use,” two approaches are utilized - the first is public employment or the actual use by the public, and the second is public advantage or benefit.[12] It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to constant growth, which is to say that as society advances, its demands upon the individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted.[13]

The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose. Respondents question the public nature of the utilization by petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out that its present use differs from the purpose originally contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. The argument is of no moment. The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public use, which, decidedly, it is. In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents would exhort on the pronouncement in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya[14] where the unpaid landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question. It might be borne in mind that the case involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to which the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application. The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under Republic Act No. 7160[15] cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of government. For local governments to be able to wield the power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national legislature, but even then, this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but only of inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be.[16] Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic[17] where the private landowners had remained unpaid ten years after the termination of the expropriation proceedings, this Court ruled - “The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what amount. Said lots have been the subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and executory judgment in said proceedings, they were condemned for public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold to the government. x x x It follows that both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots - which are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated - but only to demand the fair market value of the same. "Said relief may be granted under plaintiffs' prayer for: `such other remedies, which may be deemed just and equitable under the premises'."[18] The Court proceeded to reiterate its pronouncement in Alfonso vs. Pasay City[19] where the recovery of possession of property taken for public use prayed for by the unpaid landowner was denied even while no requisite expropriation proceedings were first instituted. The landowner was merely given the relief of recovering compensation for his property computed at its market value at the time it was taken and appropriated by the State. The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings provides not only for the payment of just compensation to herein respondents but likewise adjudges the property condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties, as well as their privies, are bound.[20] Petitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes, exercised dominion over the property pursuant to the judgment. The exercise of such rights vested to it as the condemnee indeed has amounted to at least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the 1979 judgment, thereby preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of non-execution. In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the fact that the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property.[21] After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title;[22] thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance.[23] Respondents, in arguing laches against petitioner did not take into account that the same argument could likewise apply against them. Respondents first instituted proceedings for payment against petitioner on 09 May 1984, or five years after the 1979 judgment had become final. The unusually long delay in bringing the action to compel payment against herein petitioner would militate against them. Consistently with the rule that one should take good care of his own concern,

respondents should have commenced the proper action upon the finality of the judgment which, indeed, resulted in a permanent deprivation of their ownership and possession of the property.[24] The constitutional limitation of “just compensation” is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.[25] Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.[26] In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.[27] The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and “took” the property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum[28] should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time.[29] Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis for the payment when no agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to contractual obligations.[30] In other words, a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken into account to alter the value of the currency.[31] All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority left to it being to order its execution. Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount shall have been fully paid. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 31 July 2000, of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari, as well as its resolution of 04 January 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, dated 01 March 2000, are SET ASIDE. Let the case be forthwith remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for the proper execution of its decision promulgated on 26 February 1979 which is hereby REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.