2013

ILIA STATE UNIVERSITY

2013

ISBN 978-9941-18-181-8

3/5,,0162,

ILIA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS3/5 Cholokashvili Ave, Tbilisi, 0162, Georgia

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Policy, Advocacy, and Civil Society Development in Georgia Project (G-PAC), the East West Management Institute (EWMI), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), or the US Government.

...................................................................................................................... 7

New Life of Old Tbilisi ................................................................................................................ 9

Acknowledgement ............................................................................................................... 9

Abstract ........................................................................................................................... 10

Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 10

Substance of the Initiatives ................................................................................................... 11

Contravercies over the Policy ............................................................................................... 19

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 20

Questions for the In-Class Discussions ................................................................................... 21

Reforming Civil Registry Services in Georgia: a quick e-Government modernization case ...................... 23

Background ...................................................................................................................... 23

The legacy ........................................................................................................................ 24

Early Days ........................................................................................................................ 24

Public awareness campaigns ................................................................................................. 25

Legislation Changes ........................................................................................................... 25

Growth and Maturity .......................................................................................................... 26

The flexible funding model a factor of success and self-sustainability .......................................... 26

Leadership and support ....................................................................................................... 26

The electronic ID project ..................................................................................................... 27

Development of Internal competencies and the IT Team ............................................................. 29

Information systems development ......................................................................................... 29

e-Government services ....................................................................................................... 30

The expansion phase the new ambitious functions and the mandate ........................................... 31

Managing new external projects ............................................................................................ 33

Sustainability towards political changes ................................................................................... 34

PSDA in the context of Georgian e-governance model: achievements, problems and promises ............ 35

Summary ......................................................................................................................... 36

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9Case Study By Adrian AtkinsonConsultant

European Consulting for Developing Countries Marine Egutia

ConsultantEuropean Consulting for Developing Countries

Zviad ArchuadzeHead

Economic Aairs Oce. Tbilisi City Hall

New Life of Old Tbilisi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTWe would like to take this opportunity to express our profound gratitude and deepest appreciation

to the EU Delegation to Georgia for funding this initiative and to European Consulting for Developing Countries (ECFDC) for its invaluable technical assistance we received while developing the case study.

A great deal of appreciation goes to the contribution of the Tbilisi City Hall Economic Aairs Oce (EAO) sta and specically, to Ms. Mariam Mamulashvili, Chief Specialist of EAO and Mr. Tornike Abuladze, Executive Director of Georgian Developer Company ARCI for their technical input and the valuable information they provided about the Program.

We would like to extend our sincere gratitude to the USAID funded Policy, Advocacy, and Civil Society Development in Georgia (G-PAC) and MPA Faculty of the Ilia State University for including the case study in the teaching process and for introducing incentives (small grants) for the students to produce further case studies describing the policy/decision making process in Georgian reality, thus ensuring sustainability of the initiative.

We also take this opportunity to express a deep sense of gratitude to Mr. Jason Swantek, Public Policy Advisor, (G-PAC); Professors of Columbia University Mr. Arvid Lukauskas and Mr.William B. Eimecke; Mr. Archil Abashidze, Assistant Professor, Ilia State University; and Ms. Arianna Briganti

The Case Study was funded by the European Union

The Case Study was implemented by the European Consulting for Developing Countries

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Development economist- GIZ/CIM Expert for Sustainable Economic Development for Peer-Review and very useful feedback.

Our nal thanks go to the Columbia University Professor Richard Greenwald, who under auspices of USAID funded G-PAC provided an excellent training in case study development to Ilia State University sta, which appeared instrumental for strengthening the University capacity in case study development.

ABSTRACTe case study is designed for universitys students studying Public Policy, Political Science, and

related elds interested in various aspects of policy advocacy, formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. e main purpose of the case study is not to evaluative the eectiveness of the policy, but to provide students with deep insight on how policies/decisions are made in a real world.

is is an interesting case for learning purposes, since it describes a policy process that was successful in many ways: A successful advocacy campaign launched by the Developers Association (business sector) attracted attention of Tbilisi City Hall, which, due to its high political capital at that time, gained support and funding from the Central Government of Georgia and ensured unprecedented cross-sectoral cooperation aligning the interests of Business/developers, Financial Sector/banks as well as the citizens and the City.

Despite all the mentioned successes this initiative remains one of the controversial policies in Georgia. Implementation of the public policy takes time and the nal results of it could be observed accordingly. e Program in question ends in 2014, therefore still it is not possible to assess objectively nal outcomes of it. Until then both supporters and the opponents of the policy have their own, mutually exclusive visions on the necessities, eectiveness, and sustainability of the policy in question.

INTRODUCTIONIn 2008, not only did Georgia feel the impact of the global nancial crisis but on top of this it has

been aected by the ve days war with Russia. e situation has been aggravated by a deep internal political crisis, culminating in the opposition parties demonstrating throughout the capital city. Amongst all the economic sectors in Tbilisi, the construction sector proved to be particularly sensitive to the situation. Between 2007 and the end of 2008, production in this sector declined from 17% to 13% of the citys gross product.

is situation did not only aect the construction industry but also the industries supplying mate-rials and components, both locally produced and imported (thus aecting also the commercial sector), as well as banking activity relating both to loans to the companies and mortgages to purchasers of new apartments. As a result of these developments employment in the construction eld has dropped pre-cipitately between 2007 and 2009 with the city experiencing a substantial number of unnished build-

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ings. is has clearly aected negatively the image of the city. Furthermore, many dwellers that took out a mortgage found themselves without money and without an apartment. e situation urged for the revival of the industry, thus Tbilisi City Hall decided to take a lead and started advocating this issue in front of the Central Government. As a result a new initiative labelled New Life of Old Tbilisi has been developed in order to revive the industry coupled with steps designed to renovate the old city and at the same time it has the scope of improving the citizens living conditions.

SUBSTANCE OF THE INITIATIVES

Methodology

e information presented below derived from various material including PowerPoint presentations, some statistical information, and a series of interviews. e latter commenced with the Head of the Economic Aairs Oce and his sta and then continued with the developers involved in the implementation of the initiative.

Further interviews were then held with those professionals involved in the program as well as with a sample of beneciaries. e following information was provided:

e origin of the initiative and how the stakeholders involved came together;

e goals and objectives formulated in order to guide the initiative;

e timetable of the initiative including: formulation, announcement, the various implementation phase (past and present), formal closure;

e nancial resources provided by City Hall and how these were disbursed;

e problems encountered during the program implementation;

e achievements of the initiative in terms of key outputs;

General evaluation of the initiative in broader perspective.

Background Information

To understand the nature of this crisis it is necessary to pinpoint the historical context. With the end of the Soviet era, the government has relinquished almost all the responsibility for housing, assuming that a new real estate markets would have spontaneously developed. e transition was quite chaotic1 involving many agencies with little coordination or transparency and little sense of fairness. By the late 1990s however, private banks did start to lend to an emerging development industry and mortgage lending became a signicant part of the banks portfolios. Yet, the 1990s were a dark decade with many

1 See Joseph Salukvadze, J. (2009) Market Versus Planning? Mechanisms of Spatial Change in Post-Soviet Tbilisi. In Urban Culture and Urban Planning in Tbilisi: Where West and East Meet; Van Asche, Salukvadze & Shavishvili (eds). Lewiston, Queenston & Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press; p 159-187

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false starts threatened by civil war and economic chaos and little progress in new housing construction were achieved.

Aer the turn of the century the political and economic situation has commenced to stabilise, the housing development sector increased haltingly, as the industry has gained experience in nding suitable sites, developing concepts and plans, hence in negotiating nancial support. In fact the nancial support would come from both the nancial institutions as well as from the real estates sale and payment oen was done on a monthly basis.

It was a general assumption that 2008 Global nancial crisis in combination with Georgia-Russia 5 day war breaded crisis in the construction sector in Georgia. However, the reality was that the Georgian real estate industry was already in crisis. In fact, the developers have started selling the apartments even before the construction has commenced (selling the property on paper) failing to consider ination, namely, the construction material price increase in some 35% yearly. On the top of this, there was widespread very poor management and accountability in the sector, which hindered the capacity of the developers to properly meet their contractual obligations. e price apartments have been sold for and the credits issued by the banks were no longer sucient for covering the construction costs. As a consequence an increasing number of developers faced a serious nancial crisis. A suitable solution would have been to re-negotiate the loans process with the banks, which were uncooperative demanding developers to pay any outstanding loans back regardless of the state of their developments.

e situation went worst when many householders who had made down payment for the apartments, decided to stop paying the monthly installments once they have noticed that no progress has been made towards the completion of their dwellings. Many have demanded the refund of their down payments in order to buy an apartment elsewhere.

Furthermore, the banks ceased lending for mortgages so that no more money was available to those householders who were still willing to make payments. e situation has been exacerbated by the world nancial crises aecting the real estate business and causing a continuous falling price worldwide. Given this fact the citizens of Tbilisi willing to buy apartments have been waiting for the prices to bottom out.

As a result the construction of 41 major multifunctional buildings (consisted of multiple multi-storeyed buildings) was challenged. 36 out of 41 multiple constructions have been completely stopped and abandoned.

Construction sector crises aected other related businesses as well. Renovation of apartments, purchasing equipment and furniture to furnish apartments signicantly decreased. Work-shops producing and businesses importing the construction materials almost stopped functioning.

e stalemate continued for many months with the banks lacking the condence to try to resolve the problems. With the government no longer accepting responsibility for what was happening between the developers and the banks, initially no consideration was given by banks or developers to the notion that perhaps government intervention would be necessary to resolve the impasse. However, an Association of the major developers entered into tentative discussions with the Central Government and with City Hall to see if they could help to nd a solution.

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It was a right time (so called window of opportunity) for Developers Association to enter in the negotiation with the City Hall, since the City at the time was already deeply concerned with the problems faced by the Tbilisi citizens who had paid for their apartments and because of construction sector crisis were le without money and place to live, increased unemployment, unnished buildings damaging the City image, and the general state of existing housing, especially in historical parts of the Capital.

Stakeholders Involved in Developing a Solution to the Crisis

e problem solution required joined eorts from the developers, City Hall, and the Banks, with the Central Government providing the legal framework and the nance that would make the whole solution work. Getting this initiative o the ground required convincing all the partners that it would work. is was done by one of the leaders of the Developers Association. e development company ARCI devised the details of the initiative in close cooperation with the Economic Aairs Oce of Tbilisi City Hall. As soon as the dra concept of the initiative was ready the leaders of the Developers Association launched an advocacy campaign. First they had to convince the top man-agement of the Tbilisi City Hall to support the initiative. For this purpose they presented the concept to the Vice Mayor and his advisory committee of architects and urban developers. e presentation placed a main emphasis on the possible outcomes of the initiative, which could address very im-portant challenges for the City, such as: problems of unnished buildings damaging the citys image, interests of those citizens who were le without accommodation and the money they had paid for it, very poor living conditions of the citizens living in extremely damaged buildings in the historic parts of the City, the amelioration of the condition of housing in the old city, and unemployment generation. e concept was very persuasive in addressing those issues and received the green light from City Hall.

e second step was to convince the Central Government to provide the nance for the initia-tive. Since the main decision makers in the Central Government were the Prime Minister and his Economic Team, developers put much emphasis on the nancial advantages of the initiative while advocating it in front of the Central Government. Given the loss of tax revenues as a consequence of the real estate crash, ARCI development chairing the Developers Association at that time was able to present macro-economic calculations to the Prime Minister demonstrating that the revival of the industry would generate tax revenues considerably greater than the amount the suggested initiative would cost. To get public support, the leaders of ARCI launched a series of presentations not only to the main participants but also to the politicians, universities, the general public through the media and even foreign embassies eventually 49 such presentations were made and the concept became generally accepted.

Well conducted advocacy campaign, including convincing calculations demonstrating nan-cial advantage of the initiative, support from Tbilisi City Hall, and positive public opinion ap-peared very convincing for the Central Government to approve the initiative. So, the negotiations with the Central Government have started and eventually the Prime Minister agreed to provide the required budget.

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New Life of Old Tbilisi

Aer elevation set of the problems onto the government's policy agenda, Tbilisi City Hall in consultation with the wide group of stakeholders designed the program to address the issues in question. In July 2009, the Government Regulation # 121 entitled of the State Targeted Program on Rehabilitation of Old Tbilisi, was adopted, setting out the details of the Program. A total budget of the program was US$ 55 million. e program was announced on the 25th of September, to run until 2014. During this time span developers had to meet the following obligations: complete construction of target buildings, register completed buildings ocially, to re-house the target Old City residents to new apartments, and transmit vacated lands under the ownership of the Tbilisi City Hall.

e program had a number of goals and objectives dened as follows:

To improve the living conditions of the inhabitants of the old city

To contribute to the rehabilitation of the historical areas of the city

To maintain jobs and create additional employment

To complete buildings where construction had been halted

To ensure that citizens would obtain the apartments for which they had made partial payments

To stimulate the banking sector to recommence lending for housing

To bring the construction sector back to health

e program principles of the initiative include:

Participation of all stakeholders would be encouraged;

Participation of residents of the old city should be entirely voluntary;

City Hall should not intervene in negotiations between old city residents and developers;

e residents should indicate their satisfaction regarding oered new apartments and move there prior to the developers taking possession of their houses.

e basic idea of the program was that developers would be assisted to nd nance to complete their buildings if they agreed to re-house the residents of dilapidated properties in the old city. e main incentives for the developers to participate was that within the framework of this initiative they could complete their constructions, regain the trust with the banks and clients as well as cover their target construction related loans. e Citys interest, in turn, was to improve the living condition of those citizens who lived in the dilapidated buildings of the old town and for those ones who were le without housing due to the crises that hit the construction sector. Tbilisi had also a strong interest in the rehabilitation and development of the historical part of the city. Once the dwellers had been re-housed into new apartments, e City Hall would become the owner of the vacated properties. e City Hall, has bought vacated lands from various developers paying sometimes more than current market value2 taking into account the

2 For instance if some house owners currently occupied 100 square metres of space, they might demand 120 or even more square metres in new apartments

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interests of the key stakeholders as well as the nature of the program. e vacated lands, now owned by the Local Government could have been purchased back by the developers at cost price. If this would not be the case it was at the discretion of Tbilisi City Hall to decide how to use the properties.

Problems in Implementation

Diculties would arise in any attempt to redevelop lots in the old city. All built-up land in the old city is divided up by cadastre into individual lots and there is a registry oce that records ownership but which collects no additional information. Most of the lots in the old city accommodate houses that may be one or up to a maximum of four stories, most also possessing courtyards or small gardens. Most of the houses have more than one owner as a consequence of families having grown large with several members having joint ownership that might include absent co-owners or even a loss of knowledge of co-owners.

Registration of ownership is not compulsory and as long as householders and co-owners remained in agreement, lots remained unregistered. Clearly if a decision was taken by the owners to sell the lots or parts of them then it would be necessary to register these. In the case of participation in the New Life of Old Tbilisi Program, lot registration was required. Furthermore, if there was more than one owner, they had to come to an agreement and elect one spokesperson for the purposes of negotiating on behalf of all their interests.

Many negotiations failed between owners living in the same lots even before it came to negotiations between owners and developers, simply because co-owners could not reach satisfactory agreement amongst themselves concerning their demands. Internally, the participants had to unfold their expectations for a replacement of their current accomodation. In many cases where some owners were keen to participate by making reasonable proposals, other inhabitants of the lots made a too high demand, thus decreasing the chance to win the competition. For instance, if they currently occupied 100 square metres of space, they might demand 120 or even more square metres in their replacement accomodation. is in combination with high expectations regarding the location and quality were making the program cost very high.

Program Implementation

Meanwhile, the developers whose construction has been halted had the chance to partake in the program and compete for funding. Consequently they went in search for potential participants in the

Living conditions before the Program Started.

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old city. Two calls were announced in which negotiations between owners and developers had to be completed and bids presented to the City Hall, respectively by 25th September 2009 (total budget of $US 30 million and by 21st May 2010 (budget of $US 25 million).

In order to leave no doubt concerning the method of selection and the measurement of ob-jectivity, a formula has been developed by the City Hall for the selection of winners. Negotiating parties were well aware about the formula and how it worked. is ensured transparency and accountability and provided the participants with the chance of foreseeing the results.

Although several criteria entered into the formula, the most important was simply which proposals cost the least per square metre of land; this was in order to maximise the amount of land that would be turned over to City Hall and also avoid exaggerated demands of those living in the old city for what they should receive by way of new housing.

Second Phase

A second phase of the program was announced in April 2011. is program no longer involves the citizens of the old city but is concerned with the completion of the unnished buildings. e three-way contracts involving developers, banks and City Hall include an undertaking that the City Hall purchases unsold apartments at a price of US$ 400 per square metre. Hence, avoiding losses for the banks in the case of developers facing diculties in paying back.

Whilst this is less than the current market price for apartments even in the suburbs, it is more than the construction price and so comprises a further incentive for developers to complete their buildings and move on to further construction. is provides incentives for those companies that were unsuccessful in the rst phase of the Program to re-apply to recover their earlier investments and in the process add to the citys housing stock.

e case study does not cover second phase of the program due to stark dierences in goals and objectives between these two phases.

Program Monitoring and Evaluation

e monitoring phase of the program was also a participatory process. Tbilisi City Hall and the Central Government were responsible for overall monitoring of the program with particular focus on the apartments construction progress; schedule of dismantling old buildings; location, number, size, and price of the vacated lands submitted to the City Hall; number of the families who got new apartments. In addition, within the framework of the program contracts were signed between: a) Citizens and developers; b) Developers and Tbilisi Government; c) Developers and nancial institutions (banks). In the mentioned contracts specic obligations were imposed on each contracting party, simultaneously granting them a mechanism of controlling the fullment of other partys responsibilities. All information was gathered and analysed by Tbilisi City Hall, who also kept the public and Central Government well informed.

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e result of the competition was that 48 agreements between owners and developers were reached and out of these the City Hall oered to nance 22. e funding made available by the City Hall was not intended to be given to the developers to complete their buildings. Central to the program was to restore condence between banks, the developers and the citizenry. us, in each of the successful cases, developers discussed the amount of money that would be necessary to complete their buildings and negotiated loans from their bank with the money they expected to receive from the sale of the old city lots as the guarantee that would satisfy the banks that they would not lose in the case of default. In order to encourage the banks to agree to the loan and whilst the developers were required to present collateral against the loans, City Hall provided a further element of support by co-signing three-way contracts together with the developers and the banks and the City.

Mortgage lending thence recommenced so that householders could again make down payments and monthly contributions to acquire apartments in new developments. Meanwhile, the funds provided by the Central Government to City Hall were used to purchase the lots that had been vacated in the old city following the relocation of residents. In all, 246 residents were oered and accepted new apartments and in the process 73 lots made available in the old city for renovation or reconstruction. As the two major players on the banking side, the Bank of Georgia and the TBC Bank disbursed over ninety percent of the available funds with a relatively even distribution amongst the developers, none receiving more than 17%.

Living Conditions Aer the First Phase of the Program.

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Chart 1. Status of the Phase One of the Program as of August 06, 2013

Program ParametersFinal results to be achieved by the end of the project

Program results as of August 2013

# of developers participating in the Program

2215 developers already met their obligations

#of vacated cadastres submitted to City Hall

106 73

Size of vacated space 62, 000 sqm 48,000# of families moved to the new apartments

422 246

Program budget $ 55 million$ 47 Million already transferred to developers

us, whilst 62,000 square metres of land in the old city was included in the winning bids 42,000 of which already had been vacated by mid August 2013. Out of 22 buildings 15 have been completed by the developers. e Program did therefore lead to the completion of large numbers of apartments and in general played a major role in restoring the construction sector to health.

Of particular interest to the Tbilisi City Hall was the way in which employment in the construction sector, including materials supply, recovered. e statistics relating to the depth of the depression in the construction sector from 2007 and its strong recovery in 2011, including employment are indicated in Figures 5 and 6. However, the recovery in question was in many ways result of the intervention made by the Program. To measure objectively sustainability of the sector recovery, it is necessary to have turnover and employment trends not only for the program implementation period, but also aer the state intervention ends. e program did have a major eect in restoring condence amongst the banks to recommence lending to developers and home investors.

Figure 5 Figure 6

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Despite the fact that Tbilisi City Hall ensured monitoring of the program, civil society organizations involvement in the nal evaluation of the program is highly desirable (due to high program budget, changed political situation in the country, and some people who initiated and supported the program in public sector leaving their positions). is will ensure development of the comprehensive, objective and reliable report about the program achievements. Civil Societys role is also crucial in communicating the ndings of the nal evaluation to the public, thus keeping them informed about the eectiveness of the state budget spending in this particular case. Until then both opponents and the supporters of the policy have their own, mutually exclusive, truth/vision on the necessity, eectiveness, and sustainability of the initiative.

CONTRAVERCIES OVER THE POLICYOn the question was the New Life of Old Tbilisi initiative just one time government intervention

or it was a stimulus for construction business development? the answers from experts were mutually exclusive. If supporters of the policy argue that it was necessary to support the construction business, since it had been a very important driving force for Georgian economy creating employment opportunities and failure of this sector could create serious problems to other related businesses as well, not to say anything about the citizens, whose interests were vital.3

However, opponents of the policy argue that like in other business if developers failed to meet their obligations and bankrupted, taxpayers money should not be spent for their survival. Special emphasis was placed on a poor management (including nancial management) of the developers. Experts opposing this policy believe that these eorts serve for articial survival of the construction business and banking sector. ese pseudo-businessmen who employed nancial pyramids and spent public money for their own benets do not deserve to be supported by the Government.

In response to the arguments Tbilisi City Hall stated that necessity of supporting construction business was also determined by the desire of the City to improve living condition of its citizens and protect interest of those people who already paid for new apartments and because of crisis in construction sector were le without apartment and money. In addition, Tbilisi City Hall believes that with this initiative many other construction related businesses have been saved.4

However, opponents also argued that this was unjustiably expensive project and anyway it will not guarantee sustainable revival of the construction sector, since experts believe that construction business will continue to behave in a same way.5

In response to the opponents arguments about expensive project supporters of the initiative argued that the Georgian Government would generate activity through construction work and services

3 M. Butbaia. Business and Management. May 30, 2010. Available at:. http://www.aaf.ge/index.php?menu=2&jurn=0&rubr=1&mas=717

4 M. Butbaia. Business and Management. May 30, 2010. Available at:. http://www.aaf.ge/index.php?menu=2&jurn=0&rubr=1&mas=717

5 M. Butbaia. Business and Management. May 30, 2010. Available at:. http://www.aaf.ge/index.php?menu=2&jurn=0&rubr=1&mas=717

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that could add as much as $ 390 million to the economy. Its risk is limited by the increase in tax revenues and the sale value of Old Tbilisi Land. Proponents of the initiative also talk about developers behaviour change; they narrowed down their business and their activities became more focused. Simultaneously, they (developers) improved cooperation and collaboration among themselves through initiating and implementing joint programs/projects.6 Some experts think that the program needs to be judged against the concrete results,7 once again emphasising importance of the availability comprehensive and objective data regarding the Program progress.

CONCLUSIONis is the case study demonstrating advantages and disadvantages of the complex policy applicable

to many other policies made in Georgia. is was the main reason while selecting this policy for the students learning purposes.

Main ndings of the case study are the following: 1) a well-designed and conducted advocacy campaign can help elevate an issue onto a governments policy agenda for further actions; 2) advocacy campaign with excellent collaboration among all levels of government, civil society and business during the policy formulation and implementation do not necessarily ensure the eectiveness of the policy; 3) short, medium and long-term M&E is essential to measure the real impact of the policy in addressing the problem; 4) To implement a complex policy, government (central/ local) needs to have both strong political capital and sucient resources to implement policy. Both elements (political capital and resources) are critical to build a trust necessary to ensure excellent collaboration among the diverse groups of stakeholders at all levels of policy implementation; 5) Time in many cases appears one of the important concerns for the policy implementation, since, governments and political situations can be changed, people who initiated the policy can lose their political inuence or/and leave their positions, thus, negatively aecting the nal outcomes and the sustainability of the policy. 6) the participation of the wide groups of stakeholders at all levels of the policy implementation has a critical importance to ensure public awareness about the program, informed decision-making and accountability of all participated parties, continuity of the policy, accomplishment of the expected results and eective spending of the public resources.

6 e Economist. New Life of Old Tbilisi. October 06, 2010. http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2010/10/rebuilding_old_tbilisi

7 M. Butbaia. Business and Management. May 30, 2010. Available at:. http://www.aaf.ge/index.php?menu=2&jurn=0&rubr=1&mas=717

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QUESTIONS FOR IN-CLASS DISCUSSIONS Do you think that this policy was a real Citys priority worth being addressed?

What do you think about what the program contributed in the revival of the construction sector? Do you think that right approach had been employed by Tbilisi City Hall to address the problem?

What do you think what are the major strengths and weaknesses of the program?

What do you think about the role of the Central Government and civil society in this particular case?

Do you think that the policy enjoyed the right participating actors; what kind of additional structures or actors would you recommend and why?

What kind of measures can be taken for ensuring sustainability of the policy?

e contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of European Consulting for Developing Countries and can in no way be taken to reect the views of the European Union

ECFDCEuropean Consulting for Developing Countries1095 BX Amsterdam. e NetherlandsOce: +31 (0) 20 616 54 78; Mobile: +31 (0) 62 499 60 67Fax: +31 (0)20 331 29 86info@ecfdc.orgwww.ecfdc.org

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:

Author: Merab LabadzeInvited Lecturer

Reforming Civil Registry Services in Georgia: a quick e-Government modernization case

In parallel to widespread economic liberalization the reforms in public administration were ac-tively implemented by the Government of Georgia (GoG) that came to power aer 2003 Rose Revo-lution. e Civil Registry Agency of Georgia was ocially established in early 2006 to address the urgent need of reforming government services concerning personal documentation, civil acts registra-tion and citizenship. e tasks of modernization essentially were interwoven with getting processes in order through eective use of information technology. CRA development also is an integral part of general e-Government progress in Georgia showcasing its typical approaches, achievements and problematic areas.

e applied strategies, most important tasks/projects and their implementation are discussed be-low concluding a case of successful development of modern electronic services.

BackgroundEstablished in early 2006 the National Agency of Civil Registry or Civil Registry Agency (CRA)

was one of the major successful Public Administration (PA) modernization cases in Georgia that mas-terfully integrated back-oce IT and e-services delivery to citizens.

e goals of CRA were:

1) Formation of unied data registry of Georgian citizens and foreigners living in Georgia.

2) Realization of its activities according to the assigned by the law competencies.

3) Formation of united system based on principles of the electronic governance.

4) Improvement of legislation related the Civil Registry.

5) Establishment of the identity of Georgian citizens and foreigners living in Georgia.

CRA not only achieved its goals ahead of the planned timeline, but it has become a competency center for government reforms in public services delivery being transformed to the new Public Service Development Agency in mid 2012.

e declaration of electronic governance system development as one of the goals was essential for the CRA from the beginning that was successfully achieved. But looking back it was dicult to imagine the current accomplishments.

e initial challenge for the agency management was to transform outdated and unreliable system of Civil Acts registration to the modern and ecient structure delivering high-quality services. And the challenge was signicant considering the baseline situation and lack of reforming tradition back in 2005.

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e legacyBefore the reform started in 2005 the services of civil acts registration were under control of Min-

istry of Internal Aairs. Many Georgians would remember the fraudulent practices of acquiring a pass-port or other documents in local passport desks queuing in old-soviet-style corridors, waiting for the service and occasionally asked for bribes to quicken the process or resolve the issue.

All documentation was processed on paper. e passport and ID registering soware was installed as a separate instance in each local branch, oen causing duplication of ID numbers and other personal data. No central database existed. Neither was citizen service culture existent.

Early DaysReorganization and modernization of Civil Registry was considered a priority of the Government

of Georgia (GoG) reforming agenda and supported initially by USAID/Caucasus Registry and Procure-ment Reform for Georgia (RPG) projectinvolving OSCE as implementing partner.

e CRA has been established as a semi-independent Agency a Legal Entity of Public Law(LEPL) under the Ministry of Justice in January 2006. e organizational structure of the agency consisted of the Central oce and 70 rayon branches/territorial units.

Despite some delays with the infrastructure renovation and refurbishment the newly created Civil Registry Agency uptake was in large a quick success meeting almost all initial goals (Yard).

Starting from the initial phase the CRA reforming project comprehensively targeted the following areas of output:

Evaluation,planning,andanalysis;

Legislationandregulations;

Administrativeandorganizationalreform,includingtraining;

Systemandsoftwaredesign,hardwarespecificationstosupportthecivilregistryITsystem;

Renovationsandrefurbishingofcentralandregionaloffices;

IDcardsandcivilstatusactsarchivedigitization;

Publicawareness(Yard)

e IT development was supported by the contracted foreign expert bringing more eective struc-ture to organization development and systems design.

e quick development of IT infrastructure was considered a success story of the project from its 1st phase: CRA has connected regional oces to a Virtual Private Network (VPN), providing secure sharing of data. As of September 2006, CRA has begun producing all passports from the scanned docu-ments, with all data and photo captured in a central database.

As outlined above one of the important directions of CRA activities was digitization. It has started with scanning and digitization of archived death certicates, and continued with Birth, Name Change, Marriage and Child Adoption. Currently all prioritized types of documents dated back to 1994 have been digitized and included into centrally managed database. Starting with death certicates was justi-

25

ed by need of improving voter lists for elections. e parallel process of resolving cases of data du-plication in older documents was launched. e local branches have processed all Form 1 application documents. Additional photo ID database was created. Later photo searching engine was built upon the database.

Adding new services opportunities and regular modication of all information systems has become a norm for CRA.

Apart of electronic systems development all territorial units underwent major refurbishment creat-ing a recognizable and welcoming environment with open space of service counters, photo kiosks and bank desks. Initially only several Territorial Units were renovated making a contrast between the old and new centers startlingly visible. According to the external evaluator: A visit to an old registration center revealed crumbling faade on the exterior walls, holes in the roof and ceiling, a gloomy hallway lled with people waiting to le into a small oce to be interviewed by a sta person sitting behind a crowded desk in short, a picture of chaos. By contrast, every new registration centre welcomes regis-trants into a bright, professional reception area with orderly queues waiting to meet with a receptionist at a window similar to a modern bank teller station (Yard).

Public awareness campaignse 1st phase public awareness campaign was designed to alter the practice of not-registering civil

acts by the citizens, especially in remote rural areas and areas with large minority populations. e media messages presented CRA as: Apolitical, Targeted to society, Professional, Customer-oriented, Comfortable, Modern, using latest equipment and facilities, Flexible, providing one-stop registration for all needs. (Yard)

Big public awareness campaign was launched regarding the amnesty in correcting old docu-ments. E.g. persons with changed age (typically sportsmen) and other minor irregularities in the regis-tration documents were allowed to correct their data without penalties.

Public condence in the CRA measured during the rst phase was quite high giving it a support to further improvement and implementing innovation.

e PR information ow included weekly briengs, commercials, socio-commercials, especially regarding eID and nding oneself in the voters list.

Legislation Changese initial phase of the project implementation also has revealed a necessity of addressing the leg-

islative issues concerning personal data protection, voters lists validation, laws regulating who and what gets registered, Laws on Institutions, and also regulations allowing the fast track processing.

ese issues were successfully addressed during the next phase of the project and the necessary legislative changes and regulations were adopted.

26

Growth and Maturitye second phase of the project started in 2007 with new priority goals and ambitious projects. e

departure of one of supporting implementation partners OSCE has been addressed through engaging another high-prole international agency UNDP.

International donors continued to play signicant role in the Agency development contributing to infrastructure investment and Information Systems development with up-to 80% of co-funding. e donor list consists of USAID, UNDP, EU, CIDA, UNISEF, GTZ/GIZ.

e rst and major task of creating of the central database of all acts registrations was successfully accomplished. From April 2008 the unied database and registration system was established making the data duplication impossible.

Another important project was introduction of a biometric passport in 2009 that also has con-tributed to increasing levels of validity and reliability of the documents. Georgian biometric passport is compliant with EU directives regarding the documents standards and aids implementation of visa facilitation process under negotiation with EU.

e processes and services related to migration and citizenship issues have been delegated to CRA from 2010, also of apostil and legalization services. Respective Information Systems were created. With that all functional elements of registering, processing and maintaining information regarding the citizen were integrated under the CRA umbrella.

e exible funding model a factor of success and self-sustainabilityCRA as a separate legal entity was allowed to generate income from its services. e ecient fund-

ing model was created covering the services cost, and also free services (birth, death) and free services to certain groups of population. E.g. the passport cost of 100 GEL contains a component to renance free services. Its interesting to observe that quick track services available at CRA for additional fee are frequently used by Georgians contributing to signicant part of overall CRA incomes. e clear and transparent fees helped to eliminate any shadowy practices and build costumer condence.

e standard processing time of all services is 10 working days that is signicantly 3-4 times less than before.

Leadership and supportCRA reform has beneted from dierent layers of support, including the highest level. e Presi-

dent of Georgia was particularly pushing forward passports and electronic ID (eID) projects, the Min-istry of Justice provided institutional support. But the main driving force of progress was the activity of CRA team, constantly seeking improvement and areas for innovation.

27

More ideas were generated in the team, including attracting additional resources. e initial phase reform was considered a big success, building trust in donors and creating credits for future develop-ment. e favorable donor assistance has matched the ideas and innovations generated in the team. e Agency Heads led the innovative approach and supported generations of new ideas (e.g. just caf allowing customers to leisurely wait for the fast track service to complete). e main credits for the bottom-up initiatives support and promotion were attributed to George Vashadze long time Head of the CRA.

e electronic ID projecte new electronic ID project aimed in the rst hand to improving the quality and security of the

personal ID document, older version of which with its laminated coat was much less secured against falsication. Secondly eID oers secure identication and authorization in the electronic environment. And thirdly eID provides a digital signature to utilize electronic services. As of July 2013 more than 800000 Georgian citizens hold eIDs.

e e-ID project timeline

Still the new eID remains the most discussed issue with opponents from conservative religious circles and privacy activists. e dynamics of eID distribution shows the consistent stable growth aer its launch that was partially ensured by the campaigning among the target groups, e.g. students, public servants, NGOs.

28

eID card monthly issuance

e sharp decline in number of new eID issuance could be observed aer 2012 October parliamen-tary elections and the government change that no longer passionately prioritizes the active use of eIDs for receiving the electronic services.

Some popular concerns related to the eID use are misleading the citizens. e problem is not with the ID card itself or electronic chip but with what information could be obtained with the ID number. Oen the popular bank cards hold more information about the behavior of the owner than the ID card. eID has much higher level of protection than paper-based ID document. According to the Agency man-agers simple and direct communication with the citizens would get more people convinced of necessity to obtain new eID.

e new government stance has become more liberal allowing the citizens to choose whether to use the services available securely through eID. e Georgian legislation linking the use of e-Govern-ment services only with eID prevents the majority of citizens not holding the electronic identication from direct application to e-services through the Internet. Currently alternative identication through a video-call is being considered for legal adoption and widespread promotion. e mentioned method is currently used for distantly serving Georgian citizens living abroad and willing to apply for a pass-port, civil acts, higher-education document copies or other remote services. e video-identication serves an alternative gateway to the advanced e-services.

29

Development of Internal competencies and the IT Teame CRA and its territorial units sta was almost completely renewed during the early days of the

Agency. Currently about 1100 persons work for PSDA and its 65 territorial units.

e rapidly changing environment and new processes introduction required a exible and respon-sive training system that was successfully implemented in the Agency. Topics of Process management, legal and technical aspects were communicated during the series of local on-site training events. Head Oce sta was also trained in higher level competencies.

Regular communication practices contributed to keeping the competency standards high- sending the leaets, discussing the cases, providing the latest information, etc. Currently the territorial units sta possesses acceptable professional level, and introduction of Public Service Halls provides new, higher standards for services provision and delivery.

e IT sta compensation issue usually hampering attraction of qualied IT personnel to the state institutions was solved with support of international donors.

According to the Agency managers Public sector in Georgia has been developing much faster and more innovations were implemented in comparison to the business sector attracting IT profession-als seeking application of their skills to new projects. Generally theres a decit of highly qualied IT professionals in Georgia. e Agency has been hiring the IT professionals with growth potential and investing in them with tailored training and also by immersing into the real projects, that is typical for e-Government champions in Georgia.

Having a strong IT team has become particularly important considering the new mission of public services development outside the Agency.

Information systems developmentIn the rst phase of CRA Information Systems development was outsourced but this decision ap-

peared to have one signicant fault that was caused by dynamic internal development of the Agency, its business processes and organizational structure. It was impossible to reect all frequent changes in the commercial o-the-shelf soware designed for the established processes management. e deci-sion was made to create and strengthen in-house team consisting initially only of three persons. e IT team was made responsible for development of all Information Systems and quickly adopted to the changing environment.

e 4 core back oce information systems were developed in the Agency: Passport and ID issu-ance system, Civil Acts System, Apostil and Legalization, Citizenship and Migration. e new approach of citizen centered services delivery has been emphasized from the beginning. e information sys-tems were developed quickly, sometimes lacking operational sophistication. Aer deployment further tweaking of the systems and quality improvement were performed. e agency opted for reduced plan-ning time in favor of quick launch of information systems and related services.

30

e new experience that IT sta gained is ability to fast track planning of Information Systems that allows developing systems quickly, identifying shortcomings and rapidly addressing them.

CRA was one of the rst public agencies forming Business Analysis Service, and by this eciently addressing the Information Systems planning gaps that oen appear between the demands of the man-agement and IT developers. Sometimes simple change of one element in the processes map allowed solving the issue.

e Business Analysis Service has integrated the experience gained during dierent internal In-formation Systems development. It has built up a knowledge base and modules that could be easily reapplied to the new systems development, including the external services or projects development that Agency oers to external customers.

e-Government servicese most popular current services provided through the Agency information systems are avail-

able online and could indicate the stage of e-government development in Georgia. e total number of services exceeds 50. e popular services include: Passport, ID, Birth registration, Death registration, Marriage registration, Residence card, Citizenship of Georgia, Visa, Registration of a minor (under 14).

Dynamics of the Civil Acts registration

31

Most services are fully digitized with exclusion of the rst time application for ID and collecting of biometric data. Further repeated applications could be performed completely online with eID.

e services are oered through the unied portal of the Public Service Hall and also consoli-dated at the national e-Governance portal my.gov.ge. e information organization and grouping of the services is dierent on the mentioned portals. e former groups the services and the information regarding them for dierent groups (individual, business) according to the agency responsible for their processing, and the latter oers direct access to all electronic services available for the person with eID, even beyond the government responsibilities.

e usage of eID for directly receiving the services still remains low.

New alternative identication promoted centrally for my.gov.ge portal use allows authorization through the username and password obtained personally in the Public Service Hall.

Among other new directions of the Agency work there are plans for eID promotion in organiza-tions by allowing digital signature for signing the documents on behalf of organizations.

e Transaction phase of 4-stage e-government model could be identied here considering also a local peculiarity of more pro-active Government and less responsive/enthusiastic citizens.

e expansion phase the new ambitious functions and the mandateBy 2012 CRA has become an experienced State Agency praised for quick achievements and reli-

ability. at allowed for signicant expansion and change of its mandate Public Service Development Agency (PSDA) was created in July 2012 on the basis of CRA.

e need for expansion was based on real examples of externalization of the accumulated exper-tise. CRA already was assisting Ministry of Health and other agencies beyond its formal functional competencies.

A good example of side projects is cooperation with UNISEF in its Positive Motherhood guide-book project. CRA assisted UNISEF in dissemination and popularization of the Guidebook. CRA had initiated its piloting and translation to minorities languages. Additional service was deployed by CRA SMS notications to mothers during the rst 6-years of childcare consisting of key messages regarding the childs physical and mental development. e service has become very popular. Starting from 2010 all mothers of the yearly cohort of nearly 60 thousand newborns are receiving this service. e service is provided in Georgian, Russian, Armenian and Azeri according to the initial record of birth registration.

is and other areas where CRA was invited as a certain guarantor of the success of reforms made it essential to transform the CRA. e successful experience of the Agency was considered worth sharing with other state institutions. A whole new function of oering outsourcing services was assigned to the CRA that has been transformed to Public Service Development Agency.

32

Current mandate and organization structure positionsthe Agency as a competitive consultant and implementation partner able to evaluate, plan and execute large scale development projects and attract external funding.

Before reorganization the gap analysis was performed by local consulting company in cooperation with the Agency management. e new business style management model was created. ere is a chair-man and directors responsible for 7 departments. Horizontal cooperation is also supported. e spe-cic cross-department councils have been created, e.g. the Management Council, direction specic councils, HR committee, Development Committee. E.g. Development committee monitors implemen-tation of strategic projects. e management council is supervising the Agency Strategy Development.Services heads could also sit in committees contributing to deeper horizontal cooperation and weighted decision-making.

Chairman

Department of Development of

Information Technologies

Department of Civil

Registry

Department of Research

and Development

Department of Marketing

Communication, Sales and Feedback

Department of Database and IT

Infrastructure Management

Department of Strategic Projects Management and

Reforms

Department of Support

Department of HR Management Oce of Internal

Audit

Oce of Business

Analysis and Project

Management

Oce of Civil Acts and Citizens

Registration

Oce of Citizenship and

Migration

Oce of Apostil and Legalization

Commission for Citizenship

Issues

Oce of Remote Services

Oce of Logistics

Oce of IT Support

Territorial Units

Centers for Personalization of Biometrical

Documents

Oce of Soware

Development

Oce of Development

of IT Infrastructure

Oce of Identication

Services Development

Oce of Support to IT Development

Oce of Research

Organizational Chart of Public Service Development Agency

Oce of Innovation

Management

Oce of Feedback

Oce of Sales

Oce of Data Integrity

Analysis and Database

Architecture

Oce of Data Quality

Management

Oce of IT Infrastructure

Oce of Management of Consumer

Relations

Oce of Communication

with Donors

Secretariat of Governmental Commission on Migration

Oce of Strategic Projects

Management

Oce of Marketing

Communication and PR

Accounting

Clerical Oce

Procurement Oce

Juridical Oce

Oce of Financial

Analysis and Budgeting

Security Oce

Oce of Infrastructure

Monitoring

33

e new organizational structure reects ambitious aspirations of the Agency. e CRA functions were delegated to the Civil Registry department. e existing before Information Technology direc-tion has been split into IT Development Department and Databases and IT Infrastructure Manage-ment Department. e 3 new departments have been formed: 1) Marketing Communication, Sales and Feedback Department, 2) R&D Department 3) Strategic Projects and Reforms Department creating a mighty arm for delivering external assistance to client state agencies.

Another important unit -Research and Development (R&D) department consists of Oce of Re-search, Business Analysis Oce and Innovation Management Oce. R&D Department is responsible for analysis of all internal or external services and also concludes Business Analysis Service. Any in-novation that is planned for implementation is in the rst hand validated in R&D Department. e potential impact of new services is also evaluated, and necessary research conducted.

Improving organizational structure and streamlining internal processes is also performed under supervision of Business Analysis Oce.

e initiative to receive assistance, analyze gaps and develop interventions should originate from the other State agency (or even business) and the PSDA responds to it.

Other reformer institutions and IT competence powerhouses like the Ministry of Finance or Min-istry of Internal Aairs also possess the development capacity but are concentrated mainly on internal tasks. PSDA expands beyond its initial framework of responsibilities.

e core competencies of the Agency reside with Business Processes Reengineering, new services development and packaging for customer, and also with increasing the internal eciency. e high quality expertise allows prociently addressing needs of external customers.

As for the prior core CRA services the development plans are linked to further perfection of digital services currently accessible on Public Service Hall website and also through my.gov.ge portal managed by the Data Exchange Agency. e goal: to deliver more services in the most convenient way for the user.

e new services currently are being built upon the existing ones that are re-shued, sophisticated and re-packaged. Internal document processing is completely digitized across all oces in the coun-try. e internal Information Systems advancements allow technically completing all requests in 24 hours in case appropriate human resources are allocated.

Managing new external projectsHelping out troubled Maritime Transport Administration (MTA) in necessary quick reform is one

good example of PSDA new mandate. e Maritime Administration was blacklisted by the EU due to fraudulent and uncontrollable practices of Seaman Passports issuance. MTA does not have IT depart-ment and capable IT sta; they also lack experience of managing large-scale development projects.

34

In addition to the new reforming project management PSDA has provided MTA also with infra-structure and technological solutions on credit conditions. e Agency took responsibility for printing the Seaman Passports and helping maintaining the respective database i.e. the processes where it holds the highest expertise.

Another example of externalization of the Agency is development of municipal Community Cen-ters that is considered an expansion of government services and e-services to the regions.

Municipal community centers project is in the pilot stage. e Municipality level was considered quite low in terms of e-Government development and appeared in the focus of Public Services Devel-opment Agency. e concept of Municipal Community Centers currently envisages providing of the major central government services (Civil Registry, Public Registry) and local government services.

Municipal Community Centers are connected to the Internet with ber optics and oer free Wi-Fi inside and outside of the buildings. Plans for e-libraries are also in the pipeline. Development plans include deployment of Document Management Information Systems and Municipal Case Management System. PSDA is responsible for development of Municipal case Management System (MMS) that in-cludes internal operations management with identied 10 processes directly linked to the municipal services. e pilot will be implemented in 6 municipalities with plans for expansion of both the num-ber of services/processes and the number of covered municipalities.

e PSDA team is developing the information systems in correlation with the existing legisla-tion, analyzing business processes and re-engineering them. e Agency is targeting implementing of ecient standards for services processing that could be exibly used by dierent municipalities and adjusted to their local human capacity or other factors.

In its new mandate PSDA is targeting the underdeveloped State agencies and institutions in the rst hand applying case-to-case approach. No centralized mapping of needs or e-government gap anal-ysis was performed on the central government level. ough the involved ministries participate and support PSDA projects, e.g. Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure is actively engaged in Municipal Community Centers project.

Sustainability towards political changesPSDA has sustained the October 2012 government change relatively intact. Aer the new top man-

agement got familiarized with the Agency work none of the projects have been stopped. e new Head of the Agency was also a long-term employee of CRA and had working connections in the team and the insiders knowledge.

e new decentralization strategy might have an inuence on the Municipal Community Centers project but as the municipal services are expected to stay and expand the project is not expected to be revoked.

35

PSDA in the context of Georgian e-governance model: achievements, problems and promisesWith development of Public Service Hall concept (Justice House in Georgian) many front of-

ces of territorial units of CRA were joined in one space typically in the regional centers. e joint big front desk of Public Service Hall serves a rst contact point for the citizen applying for dierent services consolidated under umbrella of the Ministry of Justice and beyond. PSDA continues to manage the services under its responsibility but the front desk operations are delegated to Public Service Halls with exception of smaller territorial units. Public Service Hall itself has become a semi-independent structure concentrating on eciently oering one-stop-services from dierent State institutions and receiving international acclaim and recognition.

From the overall Government services reform point of view there is another rationale for expan-sion of PSDA. At certain stage the divergence between the highly advanced organizations services and the ones that are stuck with older approaches/infrastructure/systems is becoming vivid and distracts the citizens accustomed to best examples. us all state institutions now need to catch-up with the best practices.

In this context several problems remain unsolved. Many linked/joint inter-agency services could not be integrated due to low level of counterpart agency digitization. E.g. veterans are getting their doc-uments for application to some benets on paper that is hardly incorporable to electronic information systems. Another example is related to Voters Electoral Lists where the Department of General Courts sends paper-based information regarding incapability of certain persons.

Currently the data related to the citizen are gathered in several databases/registries, namely, in Civil Registry, Public Registry, Ministry of Internal Aairs, and also in the Ministry of Education. All agen-cies prefer to use their own data, and despite the Unied Registry Law requirements and existing data exchange services the unied storage and maintenance of one type of data in one responsible agency would allow better system eciency, security and personal data protection.

Another common problem is related to the Information Security. e Information Security Of-cers do not in reality practice a holistic approach; they would mainly protect the Agency from the Internet threats. Internal systems and data leakage prevention is implemented on much lesser scale. Currently the database administrator can assign any authorization level in the system. e strict separa-tion of the employee workspace that is common in Business would be benecial for the Public Agencies too. at would also prevent data loss due to irresponsible employee behavior.

ere is also a lack of vision for integrated e-Gov development on the central level. Dierent state organizations/agencies tend to interact with caution. Its true the centrally planned country wide e-Government plan results in more even development of basic e-services in all state agencies and their better interaction. But Georgian model also has its benets. Rapid development of core Information Systems allowed quick building of quality services and then improving the existing ones, whilst in many centrally planned e-Government projects the mentioned phase is oen stuck in long-term preparation and planning period.

36

In Georgian case the rapid development of services is a serious asset. PSDA managers believe that cross-agency or policy issues like e-Security and Privacy protection could be introduced to the power-ful existing reality just with tuning of some systems or regulations. e combination of registries and nancial other existing Government services would be the next task at hand.

e success of the Public Service Hall in services delivery and inventive re-packaging has become a priority ahead of distance e-services development. In a physical one-stop-shop spaces in 12 locations across the country all e-government services are oered through advanced Information Systems but classic use of them through electronic access channels needs to be communicated and popularized among Georgian citizens.

Summarye development of Government services in Georgia was enabled by several leading institutions

without strict overall policy. Example of CRA inception, growth and expansion prove that e-Govern-ment champions in Georgia continue to grow beyond their initial development plans. Filling the gaps created by the uneven reforms in dierent policy areas in the country now is becoming a responsibility of the experienced, condent and qualied reformer teams valuing their achievements but also ready for the new challenges. is model could be considered an innovation itself that is even more appealing taking into account the high failure rate of e-government initiatives worldwide, rooted to copy-paste formulas, centralized plans and universal prescriptions. Unlocked human potential and giving a green light to creative imagination of the motivated sta has created a favorable climate for the sustained growth and competent achievements.

37

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10,958 16,232 13,757 5,072 3,172.5 17.05

123.336 64.860 41.563 N/A 116.9 70.4

23.057 213.9 328.27 73.8 7.5 3.1

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