VI. RIGT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION

EAGLE RIDGE GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB vs.CA and EAGLE RIDGE EMPLOYEES UNION (EREU)

G.R. No. 178989|March 18, 2010|Velasco,J.

Nature: Rule 65. Petitioner Eagle Ridge is a corporation engaged in the business of maintaining golf courses. It had, at the end of CY 2005, around 112 rank-and-file employees. The instant case is an off-shot of the desire of a number of these employees to organize themselves as a legitimate labor union and their employers opposition to their aspiration.

FACTS:

1. On December 6, 2005, at least 20% of Eagle Ridges rank-and-file employeesthe percentage threshold required under Article 234(c) of the Labor Code for union registrationhad a meeting where they organized themselves into an independent labor union, named "Eagle Ridge Employees Union" (EREU or Union), elected a set of officers,and ratified their constitution and by-laws.2. EREU formally applied for registration before DOLE Regional Office IV.3. DOLE RO IV granted the application and issued EREU Registration Certificate.4. EREU then filed a petition for certification election in Eagle Ridge Golf & Country Club5. Eagle Ridge opposed this petition and filed a petition for the cancellationof EREUs Reg Certificate. It ascribed misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud to EREU in connection with the adoption of its constitution and by-laws, the numerical composition of the Union, and the election of its officers.EAGLE RIDGEs SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS:1. EREU declared in its application for registration having 30 members, when the minutes of its December 6, 2005 organizational meeting showed it only had 26 members. 2. Discrepancy between the certification issued by the Union secretary and president that 25 members actually ratified the constitution and by-laws on December 6, 2005 and the fact that 26 members affixed their signatures on the documents, making one signature a forgery.3. It also contends that 5 employees who attended the organizational meeting had manifested the desire to withdraw from the union. 4. The five executed individual affidavits orSinumpaang Salaysay on February 15, 2006, attesting that they arrived late at said meeting which they claimed to be drinking spree; that they did not know that the documents they signed on that occasion pertained to the organization of a union; and that they now wanted to be excluded from the Union. The withdrawal of the five, Eagle Ridge maintained, effectively reduced the union membership to 20 or 21, either of which is below the mandatory minimum 20% membership requirement under Art. 234(c) of the Labor Code. Reckoned from 112 rank-and-file employees of Eagle Ridge, the required number would be 22 or 23 employees.EREU/UNIONs COUNTERARGUMENTS:1. Alleged discrepancies are not real for before filing of its application on December 19, 2005, 4 additional employees joined the union on December 8, 2005, thus raising the union membership to 30 members as of December 19, 2005;

2. Tthe understatement by one member who ratified the constitution and by-laws was a typographical error, which does not make it either grave or malicious warranting the cancellation of the unions registration;

3. The retraction of 5 union members should not be given any credence for the reasons that:

a. the sworn statements of the five retracting union members sans other affirmative evidence presented hardly qualify as clear and credible evidence considering the joint affidavits of the other members attesting to the orderly conduct of the organizational meeting;

b. the retracting members did not deny signing the union documents;

c. it can be presumed that "duress, coercion or valuable consideration" was brought to bear on the retracting members; and

d. once the required percentage requirement has been reached, the employees withdrawal from union membership taking place after the filing of the petition for certification election will not affect the petition. It asserted the applicability of said ruling as the petition for certification election was filed on January 10, 2006 or long before February 15, 2006 when the affidavits of retraction were executed by the five union members, thus contending that the retractions do not affect nor be deemed compelling enough to cancel its certificate of registration.

DOLE Regional Director: EREU misrepresented its application. Cancelled registration and delisted EREU from the roster of legitimate labor organizations.

Bureau of Labor Relations: OIC AFFIRMED REGIONAL DIRECTOR BUT NEW BLR DIRECTOR Reversed. EREU shall remain in the roster of legitimate organizations.

COURT OF APPEALS: AFFIRMED BLRISSUE#1 Whether EREU committed misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud to merit cancellation of is registration.HELD: NO

First., The Union submitted the required documents attesting to the facts of the organizational meeting on December 6, 2005, the election of its officers, and the adoption of the Unions constitution and by-laws.

Second. The members of the EREU totaled 30 employees when it applied on December 19, 2005 for registration. The Union thereby complied with the mandatory minimum 20% membership requirement under Art. 234(c). Of note is the undisputed number of 112 rank-and-file employees in Eagle Ridge, as shown in the Sworn Statement of the Union president and secretary and confirmed by Eagle Ridge in its petition for cancellation.

Third. The Union has sufficiently explained the discrepancy between the number of those who attended the organizational meeting showing 26 employees and the list of union members showing 30. The difference is due to the additional four members admitted two days after the organizational meeting as attested to by their duly accomplished Union Membership forms. Consequently, the total number of union members, as of December 8, 2005, was 30, which was truthfully indicated in its application for registration on December 19, 2005.

Fourth. The right of employees to self-organization and membership in a union must not be trammeled by undue difficulties. In this case, when the Union said that the four employee-applicants had been admitted as union members, it is enough to establish the fact of admission of the four that they had duly signified such desire by accomplishing the membership form. The fact, as pointed out by Eagle Ridge, that the Union, owing to its scant membership, had not yet fully organized its different committees evidently shows the direct and valid acceptance of the four employee applicants rather than deter their admissionas erroneously asserted by Eagle Ridge.Fifth. The difference between the number of 26 members, who ratified the Unions constitution and by-laws, and the 25 members shown in the certification of the Union secretary as having ratified it, is, as shown by the factual antecedents, a typographical error. It was an insignificant mistake committed without malice or prevarication. The list of those who attended the organizational meeting shows 26 members, as evidenced by the signatures beside their handwritten names. Thus, the certifications understatement by one member, while not factual, was clearly an error, but neither a misleading one nor a misrepresentation of what had actually happened.

Sixth. In the more meaty issue of the affidavits of retraction executed by six union members, we hold that the probative value of these affidavits cannot overcome those of the supporting affidavits of 12 union members and their counsel as to the proceedings and the conduct of the organizational meeting on December 6, 2005.

The six affiants of the affidavits of retraction were not presented in a hearing before the Hearing Officer (DOLE Regional Director), as required under the Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code which provides:

Section 11.Affirmation of testimonial evidence. Any affidavit submittedby a party to prove his/her claims or defensesshall be re-affirmed by the presentation of the affiantbefore theMed-Arbiter orHearing Officer, as the case may be.Any affidavit submittedwithout the re-affirmation of the affiantduring a scheduled hearing shallnot be admitted in evidence, except when the party against whom the affidavit is being offered admits all allegations therein and waives the examination of the affiant.

It is settled that affidavits partake the nature of hearsay evidence, since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statement, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.The above rule affirms the general requirement in adversarial proceedings for the examination of the affiant by the party against whom the affidavit is offered. In the instant case, it is required for affiants to re-affirm the contents of their affidavits during the hearing of the instant case for them to be examined by the opposing partySeventh. The fact that six union members, indeed, expressed the desire to withdraw their membership through their affidavits of retraction will not cause the cancellation of registration on the ground of violation of Art. 234(c) of the Labor Code requiring the mandatory minimum 20% membership of rank-and-file employees in the employees union.Eighth. It may not be amiss to note, given the factual antecedents of the instant case, that Eagle Ridge has apparently resorted to filing the instant case for cancellation of the Unions certificate of registration to bar the holding of a certification election. This can be gleaned from the fact that the grounds it raised in its opposition to the petition for certification election are basically the same grounds it resorted to in the instant case for cancellation of EREUs certificate of registration. This amounts to a clear circumvention of the law and cannot be countenanced.ISSUE#2: Whether the withdrawal of the 6 union members can detrimentally affect the registration of the Union.HELD: NO. Twenty percent (20%) of 112 rank-and-file employees in Eagle Ridge would require a union membership of at least 22 employees (112 x 205 = 22.4). When the EREU filed its application for registration on December 19, 2005, there were clearly 30 union members. Thus, when the certificate of registration was granted, there is no dispute that the Union complied with the mandatory 20% membership requirement.

Besides, it cannot be argued that the six affidavits of retraction retroact to the time of the application of registration or even way back to the organizational meeting. Prior to their withdrawal, the six employees in question werebona fideunion members. More so, they never disputed affixing their signatures beside their handwritten names during the organizational meetings. While they alleged that they did not know what they were signing, it bears stressing that their affidavits of retraction were not re-affirmed during the hearings of the instant case rendering them of little, if any, evidentiary value.

With the withdrawal of six union members, there is still compliance with the mandatory membership requirement under Art. 234(c), for the remaining 24 union members constitute more than the 20% membership requirement of 22 employees.

Philippine Skylanders vsNLRC

GR 127374

Facts:

In November 1993 the Philippine Skylanders Employees Association (PSEA), a local labor union affiliated with the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), won in the certification election conducted among the rank and file employees of Philippine Skylanders, Inc. (PSI). Its rival union, Philippine Skylanders Employees Association-WATU (PSEA-WATU) immediately protested the result of the election before the Secretary of Labor.

Several months later, PSEA sent PAFLU a notice of disaffiliation.

PSEA subsequently affiliated itself with the National Congress of Workers (NCW), changed its name to Philippine Skylanders Employees Association National Congress of Workers (PSEA-NCW), and to maintain continuity within the organization, allowed the former officers of PSEA-PAFLU to continue occupying their positions as elected officers in the newly-formed PSEA-NCW.

On 17 March 1994 PSEA-NCW entered into a collective bargaining agreement with PSI which was immediately registered with the Department of Labor and Employment.

Meanwhile, apparently oblivious to PSEAs shift of allegiance, PAFLU Secretary General Serafin Ayroso wrote Mariles C. Romulo requesting a copy of PSIs audited financial statement. On 30 July 1994 PSI through its personnel manager Francisco Dakila denied the request citing as reason PSEAs disaffiliation from PAFLU and its subsequent affiliation with NCW.Issue: WON PSEAs disaffiliation is legitimate.Held:

At the outset, let it be noted that the issue of disaffiliation is an inter-union conflict the jurisdiction of which properly lies with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) and not with the Labor Arbiter.

We upheld the right of local unions to separate from their mother federation on the ground that as separate and voluntary associations, local unions do not owe their creation and existence to the national federation to which they are affiliated but, instead, to the will of their members. Yet the local unions remain the basic units of association, free to serve their own interests subject to the restraints imposed by the constitution and by-laws of the national federation, and free also to renounce the affiliation upon the terms laid down in the agreement which brought such affiliation into existence.

There is nothing shown in the records nor is it claimed by PAFLU that the local union was expressly forbidden to disaffiliate from the federation nor were there any conditions imposed for a valid breakaway. As such, the pendency of an election protest involving both the mother federation and the local union did not constitute a bar to a valid disaffiliation.

It was entirely reasonable then for PSI to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with PSEA-NCW. As PSEA had validly severed itself from PAFLU, there would be no restrictions which could validly hinder it from subsequently affiliating with NCW and entering into a collective bargaining agreement in behalf of its members.

Policy considerations dictate that in weighing the claims of a local union as against those of a national federation, those of the former must be preferred. Parenthetically though, the desires of the mother federation to protect its locals are not altogether to be shunned. It will however be to err greatly against the Constitution if the desires of the federation would be favored over those of its members. That, at any rate, is the policy of the law. For if it were otherwise, instead of protection, there would be disregard and neglect of the lowly workingmen.

Tanduay Distillery Labor Union v. NLRC G.R. No. 75037April 30, 1987

Doctrine: It cannot be said that the stipulation providing that the employer may dismiss an employee whenever the union recommends his expulsion either for disloyalty or for any violation of its by-laws and constitution is illegal or constitute of unfair labor practice. It is an indirect restriction on the right of an employee to self-organization. It is a solemn pronouncement of a policy that while an employee is given the right to join a labor organization, such right should only be asserted in a manner that will not spell the destruction of the same organization.Facts: Private respondents were all employees of Tanduay Distillery, Inc., (TDI) and members of the Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (TDLU), a duly organized and registered labor organization and the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the petitioner company. A CBA was executed between TDI and TDLU. The CBA was duly ratified by a majority of the workers in TDI including herein private respondents. The CBA had a term of three (3) years and also contained a union security clause, which provides: All workers who are or may during the effectivity of this Contract, become members of the Union in accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws shall, as a condition of their continued employment, maintain membership in good standing in the Union for the duration of the agreement. While the CBA was in effect and within the contract bar period the private respondents joined another union, the Kaisahan Ng Manggagawang Pilipino KAMPIL) and organized its local chapter in TDI, with private respondents Pedro Esteral and Lamberts Santos being elected President and Vice-President, respectively. KAMPIL filed a petition for certification election to determine union representation in TDI, which compelled TDI to file a grievance with TDLU based on their CBA. TDLU conducted an investigation of its erring members in accordance with its by-laws wherein herein private respondents were present and given a chance to explain their side. A resolution was ordered by TDLU wherein they expelled the private respondents from TDLU for disloyalty to the TDLU, whereby the latter notified TDI that private respondents had been expelled from TDLU and demanded that TDI terminate the employment of private, respondents because they had lost their membership with TDLU. The private respondents then filed with the MOLE a complaint for illegal dismissal against TDI and Benjamin Agaloos, in his capacity as President of TDLU. The cases were jointly heard and tried by the Labor Arbiter. The Med-Arbiter granted the private respondents' petition calling for a certification election among the rank and file employees of TDI. The Med-Arbiter's Order stated, inter-alia that the existence of an uncertified CBA cannot be availed of as a bar to the holding of a certification election. On appeal of TDI and TDLU to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), the order for the holding of a certification election was reversed and set aside. Kampil filed a motion for reconsideration whereby the BLR ruled that it should be given due course, because CBA has now expired, there appears to be no more obstacle in allowing a certification election to be conducted among the rank and file of respondent. The contract bar rule will no longer apply in view of the supervening event, that is, the expiration of the contract. TDLU filed a petition for review of the BLR decision the SC but it denied the same. Labor Arbiter rendered a decision denying TDI's application to terminate the private respondents and ordering TDI to reinstate the complainants with backwages. This decision of the arbiter was upheld by the respondent NLRC. TDI and TDLU moved for reconsideration but NLRC denied the same, hence this petition.Issue: WON TDI was justified in terminating private respondents' employment due to TDLU's demand for the enforcement of the Union Security Clause of the CBA between TDI and TDLU.Held: Article 249 (e) of the Labor Code recognizes the closed shop arrangement as a form of union security. They do not constitute unfair labor practice nor are they violations of the freedom of association clause of the Constitution. There is no showing in these petitions of any arbitrariness or a violation of the safeguards enunciated in the decisions of this Court interpreting union security arrangements brought to us for review. The action of the respondent company in enforcing the terms of the closed-shop agreement is a valid exercise of its rights and obligations under the contract. The dismissal by virtue thereof cannot constitute an unfair labor practice, as it was in pursuance of an agreement that has been found to be regular and of a closed-shop agreement which under our laws is valid and binding. As members of the TDLU, the private respondents owe fealty and are required under the Union Security Clause to maintain their membership in good standing with it during the term thereof, a requirement which ceases to be binding only during the 60-day freedom period immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA. When the private respondents organized and joined the KAMPIL Chapter in TDI and filed the corresponding petition for certification election in November 1980, there was no freedom period to speak of yet.

The Labor Code mandates that "no certification election shall be entertained if a Collective Bargaining Agreement which has been submitted in accordance with Article 231 of the Code exists between the employer and a legitimate labor organization except within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the life of such collective agreement (Art. 257). The members ignorance of nor their dissatisfaction with the terms and condition would not justify breach thereof or the formation by them of a union of their own.

It cannot be said that the stipulation providing that the employer may dismiss an employee whenever the union recommends his expulsion either for disloyalty or for any violation of its by-laws and constitution is illegal or constitute of unfair labor practice, for such is one of the matters on which management and labor can agree in order to bring about harmonious relations between them and the union, and cohesion and integrity of their organization And as an act of loyalty a union may certainly require its members not to affiliate with any other labor union and to consider its infringement as a reasonable cause for separation. It is an indirect restriction on the right of an employee to self-organization. It is a solemn pronouncement of a policy that while an employee is given the right to join a labor organization, such right should only be asserted in a manner that will not spell the destruction of the same organization. The law requires loyalty to the union on the part of its members in order to obtain to the full extent its cohesion and integrity. It is clear that BLRs order which this Court upheld did not pass upon the question of legality or illegality of the dismissal of private respondents from TDI by reason of their expulsion from TDLU for disloyalty. Hence, no inference could be derived from the dismissal of said petition that either the BLR or this Court has decided in favor of private respondents insofar as the question of union disloyalty and their suspension and termination from employment of TDI is concerned.

Simply put, the BLR ordered the holding of a certification election because the CBA in question had already expired, its expiry date being June 30, 1982. Consequently, there appears to be no more obstacle in allowing a certification election. "... [T]he contract bar rule will not apply in view of the supervening event, that is, the expiration of the CBA."

But the fact that the CBA had expired and the BLR ordering the holding of a certification election could not and did not wipe out or cleanse private respondents from the acts of disloyalty. WHEREFORE the decision of NLRC is SET ASIDE. The expulsion of private respondents are hereby SUSTAINED.Villar vs. Inciong

L-50283-84

April 20, 1983

FACTS:

AEU under FUR attempted to have a certification election but due to the opposition of AEU-PAFLU, the petition was denied by the Med-Arbiter.

AEU-PAFLU then called a special meeting among members and it was there decided that an investigation of certain people would be held pursuant to the constitution and by-laws of the Federation, of all of the petitioners and one Felipe Manlapao, for "continuously maligning, libelling and slandering not only the incumbentofficersbut even the union itself and the federation;" spreading 'false propaganda' that the unionofficerswere 'merely appointees of the management', and for causing divisiveness in the union.

A Trial Committee was then formed to investigate the local union's charges against the petitioners for acts of disloyalty. AEU-PAFLU and the Company concluded a new CBA which, besides granting additionalbenefitsto theworkers, also reincorporated the same provisions of the existing CBA, including the union security clause reading, to wit:

All members of the UNION as of the signing of thisAgreementshall remain members thereof in good standing. Therefore, any members who shall resign, be expelled, or shall in any manner cease to be a member of the UNION, shall be dismissed from hisemploymentupon written request of the UNION to the Company.

The petitioners were summoned to appear before the PAFLU Trial Committee for the aforestated investigation of the charges filed against them but they did not attend and instead requested for a "Bill of Particulars" of the charges which had been formalized by the AEU-PAFLUofficers; they contend that their actions were merely exercise of the right to freedom of association.

Not recognizing PAFLU's jurisdiction over their case, petitioners again refused to participate in the investigation rescheduled and conducted. Instead, they merely appeared to file theirAnswerto the charges and moved for a dismissal.

Based on the findings and recommendations of the PAFLU trial committee, the PAFLU President found the petitioners guilty of the charges against them and it was requested that they be terminated in conformity with the security clause in the CBA. Meanwhile, they were placed under preventive suspension and denied access to the workplace.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Minister acted with grave abuse of discretion when he affirmed the decision of the RO4-Officer-in-Charge allowing the preventive suspension and subsequent dismissal of petitioners by reason of theexerciseof their right to freedom of association.

HELD:

It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to legal objection. It is implicit in the freedom of association ordained by the Constitution. However, a closed shop is a valid form of union security, and such provision in a CBA is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution.

Here, the Company and the AEU-PAFLU entered into a CBA with a union security clause and the stipulation for closed-shop is clear and unequivocal and it leaves no room for doubt that the employer is bound, under the collective bargainingagreement, to dismiss the employees, herein petitioners, for non-unionmembership.

Petitioners became non-union members upon their expulsion from the generalmembershipof the AEU-PAFLU pursuant to the Decision of the PAFLU national president.

PAFLU had the authority to investigate petitioners on the charges filed by their co-employeesin the local union and after finding them guilty as charged, to expel them from the roll ofmembershipunder the constitution of the PAFLU to which the local union was affiliated.

According to the OIC: dtripped of non-essentials, the basic and fundamental issue in this case tapers down to the determination of WHETHER OR NOT PAFLU HAD THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE OPPOSITORS AND, THEREAFTER, EXPEL THEM FROM THE ROLL OFMEMBERSHIPOF THE AMIGOEMPLOYEESUNION-PAFLU.

Recognized and salutary is the principle that when a labor union affiliates with a mother union, it becomes bound by the laws and regulations of the parent organization.

When a labor union affiliates with a parent organization or mother union, or accepts a charter from a superior body, it becomes subject to the laws of the superior body under whose authority the local union functions. The constitution, by-laws and rules of the parent body, together with the charter it issues pursuant thereto to the subordinate union, constitute an enforceable contract between the parent body and the subordinate union, and between the members of the subordinate union inter se.

'Due process' simply means that the parties were given the opportunity to be heard. In the instant case, ample and unmistakable evidence exists to show that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity to present their evidence, but they themselves disdained or spurned the said opportunity given to them.

Inherent in every labor union, or any organization, is the right of self-preservation. When members of a labor union, therefore, sow the seeds of dissension and strife within the union; when they seek the disintegration and destruction of the very union to which they belong, they thereby forfeit their rights to remain as members of the union which they seek to destroy.

We, therefore, hold and rule that petitioners, although entitled to disaffiliate from their union and form a new organization of their own, must, however, suffer the consequences of their separation from the union under the security clause of the CBA.

Ferrer, et al. vs. NLRC,G.R. No. 100898, promulgated on July 5, 1993:

FACTS: Petitioners Ferrer and others were regular and permanent employees of the Occidental Foundry Corporation (OFC). They had been in the employe of OFC for about ten years at the time of their dismissal in 1989.

On May 6, 1989, petitioner Ferrer and companions filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a complaint seeking the expulsion from SAMAHAN of its officers headed by president Capitle. The complaint was founded on the said officers' alleged lack of attention to the economic demands of the workers. However, on September 4, 1989, petitioners Diaz and Ferrer withdrew the petition.

On September 10, 1989, petitioners conducted a special election of officers of the SAMAHAN. FFW, to which SAMAHAN was affiliated, questioned the election. Nonetheless, the elected set of officers tried to dissuade the OFC from remitting union dues to the officers led by Capitle.

The intra-union squabble came to a head when, on September 11, 1989, the union officials headed by Capitle expelled Ferrer, et al. from the union.

Ferrer and his four companions turned to the Federation of Democratic Labor Unions (FEDLU). They volunteered to be admitted as members of the FEDLU and requested that they be represented ("katawanin") by said federation before the DOLE in the complaint which they intended to file against the union (SAMAHAN), the FFW and the company for illegal dismissal, reinstatement, and other benefits in accordance with law.

Thereafter, on various dates, petitioners sent individual letters to the Company professing innocence of the charges levelled against them by the SAMAHAN and the FFW and pleading that they be reinstated. Their letters elicited no response.

Thus, contending that their dismissal was without cause and in utter disregard of their right to due process of law, petitioners through the FEDLU, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice before the NLRC against Hui Kam Chang, OFC, M.S. Velasco (as representative of the FFW), the FFW, and the SAMAHAN officers headed by Capitle.

RULING: In the first place, the union has a specific provision for the permanent or temporary "expulsion" of its erring members in its constitution and by-laws ("saligang batas at alituntunin"). Under the heading Membership and Removal ("pag-aanib at pagtitiwalag"), it states:

SEC. 4. Ang sinumang kasapi ay maaring itwalag (sic) ng Samahan pangsamantala o tuluyan sa pamamgitan (sic) ng tatlo't ikaapat (3/4) na bahagi ng dami ng bilang ng Pamunuang Tagapapaganap.Pagkaraan lamang sa pandinig sa kanyang kaso. Batay sa sumusunod:

(a) Sinumang gumawa ng mga bagay bagay na labag at lihis sa patakaran ng Samahan.

(b) Sinumang gumawa ng mga bagay na maaring ikabuwag ng Samahan.

(c) Hindi paghuhulog ng butaw sa loob ng tatlong buwan na walang sakit o Doctor's Certificate.

(d) Hindi pagbibigay ng abuloy na itinadhana ng Samahan.

(e) Sinumang kasapi na natanggal sa kapisanan at gustong sumapi uli ay magpapanibago ng bilang, mula sa taon ng kanyang pagsapi uli sa Samahan.

No hearing ("pandinig") was ever conducted by the SAMAHAN to look into petitioners' explanation of their moves to oust the union leadership under Capitle, or their subsequent affiliation with FEDLU. While it is true that petititioners' actions might have precipitated divisiveness and, later, showed disloyalty to the union, still, the SAMAHAN should have observed its own constitution and by-laws by giving petitioners an opportunity to air their side and explain their moves. If, after an investigation the petitioners were found to have violated union rules, then and only then should they be subjected to proper disciplinary measures.

What aggravated the situation in this case is the fact that OFC itself took for granted that the SAMAHAN had actually conducted an inquiry and considered the CBA provision for the closed shop as self-operating that, upon receipt of a notice that some members of the SAMAHAN had failed to maintain their membership in good standing in accordance with the CBA, it summarily dismissed petitioners. To make matters worse, the labor arbiter and the NLRC shared the same view in holding that "(t)he matter or question, therefore, of determining why and how did complainants fail to retain membership in good standing is not for the company to inquire via formal investigation."

Petitioners' alleged act of sowing disunity among the members of the SAMAHAN could have been ventilated and threshed out through a grievance procedure within the union itself. But resort to such procedure was not pursued. What actually happened in this case was that some members, including petitioners, tried to unseat the SAMAHAN leadership headed by Capitle due to the latter's alleged inattention to petitioners' demands for the implementation of the P25-wage increase which took effect on July 1, 1989. The intra-union controversy was such that petitioners even requested the FFW to intervene to facilitate the enforcement of the said wage increase.

Petitioners sought the help of the FEDLU onlyafterthey had learned of the termination of their employment upon the recommendation of Capitle. Their alleged application with federations other than the FFW can hardly be considered as disloyalty to the SAMAHAN, nor may the filing of such applications denote that petitioners failed to maintain in good standing their membership in the SAMAHAN. The SAMAHAN is a different entity from FFW, the federation to which it belonged. Neither may it be inferred that petitioners sought disaffiliation from the FFW for petitioners had not formed a union distinct from that of the SAMAHAN. Parenthetically, the right of a local union to disaffiliate from a federation in the absence of any provision in the federation's constitution preventing disaffiliation of a local union is legal.(People's Industrial and Commercial Employees and Workers Org. [FFW] vs. People's Industrial and Commercial Corp., 112 SCRA 440 [1982])Such right is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association.(Tropical Hut Employees' Union-CGW vs. Tropical Hut Food Market, Inc., 181 SCRA 173 [1990])PHILIPPINE DIAMOND HOTEL AND RESORT, INC. (MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL) v. MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION CASE DIGEST

494 SCRA 195 (2006)FACTS:The Diamond Hotel Employee's Union (the union) filed a petition for Certification Election before the DOLE-National Capital Region (NCR) seeking certification as the exclusive bargaining representative of its members. The DOLE-NCR denied said petition as it failed to comply with the legal requirements.

The Union later notified petitioner hotel of its intention to negotiate for collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Human Resource Department of Diamond Hotel rejected the notice and advised the union since it was not certified by the DOLE as the exclusive bargaining agent, it could not be recognized as such. Since there was a failure to settle the dispute regarding the bargaining capability of the union, the union went on to file a notice of strike due to unfair labor pracritce (ULP) in that the hotel refused to bargain with it and the rank-and-file employees were being harassed and prevented from joining it. In the meantime, Kimpo filed a complaint for ULP against petitioner hotel.

After several conferences, the union suddenly went on strike. The following day, the National Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) joined the strike and openly extended its support to the union. The some of the entrances were blocked by the striking employees. The National Labour Relations Commission (NLRC) representative who conducted an ocular inspection of the Hotel premises confirmed in his Report that the strikers obstructed the free ingress to and egress from the Hotel. The NLRC thus issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) directing the strikers to immediately "cease and desist from obstructing the free ingress and egress from the Hotel premises. During the implementation of the order, the striking employees resisted and some of the guards tasked to remove the barricades were injured. The NLRC declared that the strike was illegal and that the union officers and members who participated were terminated on the grounds of participating in an illegal strike.

The union contended that the strike was premised on valid ground and that it had the capacity to negotiate the CBA as the representatives of the employees of Diamond Hotel. The union contended that their dismissal is tantamount to an unfair labour practice and union busting.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC Resolution dismissing the complaints of Mary Grace, Agustin and Rowena and of the union. It modified the NLRC Resolution, however, by ordering the reinstatement with back wages of union members.

ISSUE:Whether or not the dismissal of the union members is valid on the grounds of participating in an illegal strike

HELD:Even if the purpose of a strike is valid, the strike may still be held illegal where the means employed are illegal. Thus, the employment of violence, intimidation, restraint or coercion in carrying out concerted activities which are injurious to the rights to property renders a strike illegal. And so is picketing or the obstruction to the free use of property or the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, when accompanied by intimidation, threats, violence, and coercion as to constitute nuisance.

As the appellate court correctly held, the union officers should be dismissed for staging and participating in the illegal strike, following paragraph 3, Article 264(a) of the Labor Code which provides that ". . .any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during strike may be declared to have lost his employment status . . ."

An ordinary striking worker cannot, thus be dismissed for mere participation in an illegal strike. There mustbe proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike, unlike a union officer who may be dismissed by mere knowingly participating in an illegal strike and/or committing an illegal act during a strike.

Hence, while petitioner's act of holding a special election to oust Capitles, et al. may be considered as an act of sowing disunity among the SAMAHAN members, and, perhaps, disloyalty to the union officials, which could have been dealt with by the union as a disciplinary matter, it certainly cannot be considered as constituting disloyalty to the union. Faced with a SAMAHAN leadership which they had tried to remove as officials, it was but a natural act of self-preservation that petitioners fled to the arms of the FEDLU after the union and the OFC had tried to terminate their employment. Petitioners should not be made accountable for such an act.

INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION V. WATERFRONT HOTEL DAVAO (2010)

Peralta, J.

- Nov 2000: the Hotel sent DOLE a Notice of Suspension of Operations for 6 months due to severe and serious business losses.

- During the suspension, Rojas, Pres. of Davao insular Hotel Free Employees Union (DIHFEU-NFL) the recognized labor org in the Hotel, sent the Hotel several letters asking it to reconsider its decision. The Union members wanted to keep their jobs and to help the Hotel, so it suggested several ideas in its Manifesto to solve the high cost on payroll, such as: downsize manpower structure to 100 rank-and-file EEs, a new pay scale, etc.

- DIHFEU-NFL signed a MOA where the Hotel agreed to re-open the hotel. The retained EEs individually signed a reconfirmation of Employment. In June 2001, the Hotel resumed its business operations.

- Aug 2002: Darius Joves and Debbie Planas, local officers of the National Federation of Labor (NFL), filed a Notice of Mediation before the NCMB, stating that the Union involved was "DARIUS JOVES/DEBBIE PLANAS ET. AL, National Federation of Labor." The issue was the diminution of wages and benefits through unlawful MOA. In support of his authority to file the complaint, Joves, assisted by Atty. Cullo, presented several SPAs which were, undated and unnotarized.

- Petitioner and respondent signed a Submission Agreement, where the union stated was "INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL."

- The Hotel filed with the NCMB a Manifestation with Motion for a Second Preliminary Conference, alleging that the persons who filed the complaint in the name of the Insular Hotel Employees Union-NFL have no authority to represent the Union.

- Cullo confirmed that the case was filed not by the IHEU-NFL but by the NFL. When asked to present his authority from NFL, Cullo admitted that the case was filed by individual employees named in the SPAs.

- The Hotel argued that the persons who signed the complaint were not the authorized representatives of the Union indicated in the Submission Agreement nor were they parties to the MOA. It filed a Motion to Withdraw, which Cullo then filed an Opposition to where the same was captioned:

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR And 79 Individual Employees, Union Members, Complainants,

-versus-

Waterfront Insular Hotel Davao, Respondent.

Cullo reiterated that the complainants were not representing IHEU-NFL.

- The Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator (AVA) denied the Motion to Withdraw.

- The Hotel submitted its MR and stressed that the Submission Agreement was void because the Union did not consent thereto.

- Cullo filed a Comment/Opposition to the Hotel's MR. Again, Cullo admitted that the case was not initiated by the IHEU-NFL, saying that the individual complainants are not representing the union but filing the complaint through their appointed attorneys-in-fact to assert their individual rights as workers who are entitled to the benefits granted by law and stipulated in the collective bargaining agreement. There is no mention there of Insular Hotel Employees Union, but only National Federation of Labor (NFL). The local union was not included as party-complainant considering that it was a party to the assailed MOA.

- The AVA denied the MR. He, however, ruled that the Hotel was correct when it objected to NFL as proper party-complainant, as the proper one is INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL. In the submission agreement, the party complainant written is INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL and not the NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and 79 other members. However, since the NFL is the mother federation of the local union, and signatory to the existing CBA, it can represent the union.

- Cullo, in subsequent documents, started using the caption "Insular Hotel Employees Union-NFL, Complainant."

- The case was remanded to the NCMB. The Hotel reiterated to the NCMB that the individual union members have no standing. The Hotel did not appear before the NCMB to select a new AVA. The new AVA decided in favor of Cullo, declaring the MOA invalid.

- The Hotel appealed to the CA, questioning among others the jurisdiction of the NCMB. The CA ruled in favor of the Hotel, declaring the MOA VALID and ENFORCEABLE.

Issues:

1. Did CA err in finding that the AVA has no jurisdiction over the case because the notice of mediation does not mention the name of the local union but only the affiliate federation -- NO.

2. Do the individual members of the Union have the requisite standing to question the MOA before the NCMB? -- NO.

3. If the individual members of the Union have no authority to file the case, does the federation to which the local union is affiliated have the standing to do so? -- NO.

4. (moot issue) W/N IHEU-NFL is a non-entity as DIHEU-NFL is the only recognized bargaining unit -- YES, but Hotel is estopped from questioning the same as it did not raise the said issue in the proceedings before the NCMB and the Voluntary Arbitrators.

Ratio:

1. In the Notice of Mediation filed before the NCMB, it stated that the union involved was "DARIUS JOVES/DEBBIE PLANAS ET. AL., National Federation of Labor." In the Submission Agreement, however, it stated that the union involved was "INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL." Cullo clarified in subsequent documents captioned as "National Federation of Labor and 79 Individual Employees, Union Members, Complainants" that the individual complainants are not representing the union, but filing the complaint through their appointed attorneys-in-fact.

- While it is undisputed that a submission agreement was signed by respondent and "IHEU-NFL," then represented by Joves and Cullo, this Court finds that there are two circumstances which affect its validity: first, the Notice of Mediation was filed by a party who had no authority to do so; second, that the Hotel had persistently questioned the authority of Joves, Cullo and the individual members of the Union to file the complaint before the NCMB.

- Procedurally, the first step to submit a case for mediation is to file a notice of preventive mediation with the NCMB. It is only after this step that a submission agreement may be entered into by the parties concerned.

Section 3, Rule IV of the NCMB Manual of Procedure provides who may file a notice of preventive mediation, to wit: Any certified or duly recognized bargaining representative may file a notice or request for preventive mediation... In the absence of a certified or duly recognized bargaining representative, any legitimate labor organization in the establishment may file a notice, request preventive mediation or declare a strike, but only on grounds of unfair labor practice.

- It is clear that only a certified or duly recognized bargaining agent may file a notice or request for preventive mediation. It is curious that even Cullo himself admitted that the case was filed not by the Union but by individual members thereof. Clearly, therefore, the NCMB had no jurisdiction to entertain the notice filed before it.- Even though the Hotel signed a Submission Agreement, it had immediately manifested its desire to withdraw from the proceedings after it became apparent that the Union had no part in the complaint. Only 4 days had lapsed after the signing of the Submission Agreement when the Hotel called the attention of the AVA that the persons who filed the instant complaint in the name of Insular Hotel Employees Union-NFL had no authority to represent the Union. The Hotel cannot be estopped in raising the jurisdictional issue, because it is basic that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

2. Petitioners have not been duly authorized to represent the union.

In Atlas Farms v. NLRC:

x x x Pursuant to Art 260, the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to the voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by parties to a CBA.

- The CBA recognizes that DIHFEU-NFL is the exclusive bargaining representative of all permanent employees. The inclusion of the word "NFL" after the name of the local union merely stresses that the local union is NFL's affiliate. It does not, however, mean that the local union cannot stand on its own. The local union owes its creation and continued existence to the will of its members and not to the federation to which it belongs.

3. Coastal Subic Bay Terminal v. DOLE:

x x x A local union does not owe its existence to the federation with which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation to the will of its members. Mere affiliation does not divest the local union of its own personality, neither does it give the mother federation the license to act independently of the local union. It only gives rise to a contract of agency, where the former acts in representation of the latter. Hence, local unions are considered principals while the federation is deemed to be merely their agent. x x x

- The NFL had no authority to file the complaint in behalf of the individual employees.

4. In its Memorandum, the Hotel contends that IHEU-NFL is a non-entity. While DOLE states that "IHEU-NFL" is not a registered labor organization, the Hotel is estopped from questioning the same as it did not raise the said issue in the proceedings before the NCMB and the Voluntary Arbitrators. The main theory posed by the Hotel was W/N the individual employees had the authority to file the complaint notwithstanding the apparent non-participation of the union. It never put in issue the fact that DIHFEU-NFL was not the same as IHEU-NFL.

Dispositive: CA AFFIRMED.

Palacol v. Calleja

Facts:

Manila CCBPI Sales Force Union is the CB agent of all regular salesmen, regular helpers, and relief helpers of the Manila Plant and Sales Office of Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils.

Under the new CBA, employees were granted a general salary increase to be given in lump sum

The Union President submitted to Coca-Cola the ratification by the union members of the new CBA and authorization for the company to deduct union dues equivalent to Php 20/month + 10% by way of special assessment from the CBA lump-sum pay granted

As per the Unions Board resolution, the special assessment was for putting up a cooperative and credit union, purchase vehicles and other items needed for the officers and the general membership, and payment for services rendered by union officers, consultants. However, there was a proviso stating that the matter of allocation shall be at the discretion of the incumbent President

The Authorization and CBA ratification was obtained through a secret referendum, with 672 members authorizing the 10% special assessment (170 opposed). However, two more groups of members (170 and 185) subsequently manifested their intention of withdrawing or disauthorizing the deduction of any amount from their CBA lump sum

At this point, there were a total of 528 objectors, with the remainder of 272 supporters

Coca-Cola filed with the BLR an action for interpleader in order to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties

Palacol et al, filed a motion/complaint for intervention, claiming to be among those union members who either did not sign any individual written authorization or those who subsequently withdrew their signatures

10% special assessment was a violation of Art. 241(o) in relation to Art. 222(b)

Union countered that the deductions not only have the popular indorsement and approval of the general membership, but likewise complied with the legal requirements of Art. 241(n) and (o) since the board resolution had been duly approved in a general membership meeting and that the collection of a special fund for labor education and research is mandated

Med-Arbiter: return the amount to personnel, deduction was unauthorized

BLR, on appeal: special assessment was authorized

Issue(s):

w/n the deduction of the special assessment by the Union was made in accordance with the LC

Held:

No. Union has failed to comply with the procedure to legitimize the special assessment under Art. 241(n). It did not submit to the company a written resolution of a majority of all the members at a general membership meeting duly called for the purpose. In addition, it had the minutes recorded by a union director instead of the union secretary. Neither did those minutes list the members present as well as the votes cast.

What the Union did holding 3 local membership meetings on separate occasions, on different dates, and at various venues was contrary to the requirements of a general membership meeting. Likewise, merely submitting the minutes of the local membership meetings to the company to authorize the deduction instead of the written resolution adopted at the general meeting fell short of the legal requirements. Therefore, the levy of the special assessment under (n) is invalid.

On the purpose of the levy:

Only the collection of a special fund for labor and education research is mandated. The two other purposes (purchase of vehicles and other items, and payment of services rendered by union officers) should be supported by the regular union dues. Moreover, the payment of services is prohibited by Art. 222(b), falling under the category of similar charge. The additional proviso giving the President unlimited discretion to allocate the proceeds is also susceptible of abuse and must be disallowed.

Can a special assessment be validly deducted by a labor union from the lump-sum pay of its members, granted under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), notwithstanding a subsequent disauthorization of the same by a majority of the union members?

No. Even assuming that it was validly levied, and granting that individual written authorizations were obtained by the Union, there can be no valid check-off considering that the majority of the union members had already withdrawn their individual authorizations. A withdrawal of individual authorizations is equivalent to no authorization at all (cf. Galvadores v. Trajano).

Re: the form of the withdrawals:

Union disauthorizations are not valid for being collective in form

SC there is nothing in the law which requires that the disauthorization must be in individual form

SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR vs. HON. FERRER-CALLEJA (1989)

FACTS:

Petitioner SPF filed with the DOLE a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of private respondent Apex Minong Co. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition and directed the holding of the certification election. During the pre-election conference, petitioner union objected to the inclusion in the list of workers prepared by Apex the following: (1) employees occupying the positions of Supervisor I, II and III; (2) employees under confidential/special payrolls; and (3) employees who were not paying dues. According to petitioner, the mentioned employees were disqualified from participating in the certification election since the Supervisors were managerial employees while the last two were disqualified by virtue of their non-membership in the Union and their exclusion from the benefits of the collective bargaining agreement. After the certification of election was conducted, respondent Union filed an urgent motion to open the challenged ballots. The Med-Arbiter granted the motion and directed the challenged ballots be opened and inventoried. Petitioner appealed to the BLR wherein respondent Director Ferrer-Calleja dismissed said appeal and affirmed the decision of the Med-Arbiter and ordered that the 197 ballots should be opened and canvassed. As a consequence of the opening and canvass of the challenged ballots, the Med-Arbiter

Issue: Whether respondent Director committed grave abuse of discretion in not excluding the 197 employees from voting in the certification election

Held: NOThe functions of the questioned positions are not managerial in nature because they only execute approved and established policies leaving little or no discretion at all whether to implement the said policies or not. The respondent Director, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioner's appeal from the Med-Arbiter's Order to open and count the challenged ballots in denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and in certifying the respondent Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of respondent Apex .

As regards the employees in the confidential payroll, the petitioner has not shown that the nature of their jobs is classified as managerial except for its allegation that they are considered by management as occupying managerial positions and highly confidential. Neither can payment or non-payment of union dues be the determining factor of whether the challenged employees should be excluded from the bargaining unit since the union shop provision in the CBA applies only to newly hired employees but not to members of the bargaining unit who were not members of the union at the time of the signing of the CBA. It is, therefore, not impossible for employees to be members of the bargaining unit even though they are non-union members or not paying union dues.

G.R. No. 77231 May 31, 1989

SAN JOSE CITY ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE, INC. (SAJELCO),petitioner vs MINISTRY OF LABOR

FACTS: July 29, 1986, private respondent Manggagawang Nagkakaisa ng SAJELCO-Association of Democratic Labor Organization (MAGKAISA-ADLO) filed a petition for direct certification election with the Regional Office No. 111 of the Department of Labor and Employment in San Fernando, Pampanga. The petition alleged that MAGKAISAADLO is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Ministry of Labor and Employment; that there are more or less fifty-four (54) rank and file employees in SAJELCO; that almost 62% of the employees sought to be represented have supported the filing of the petition; that there has been no valid certification election held in SAJELCO during the twelve (12) month period prior to the filing of the petitionand that there is no other union in the bargaining unit.

SAJELCO opposed the petition for direct certification election contending,inter alia, that the employees who sought to be represented by private respondent are members-consumers of the Cooperative itself and at the same time composed the General Assembly which, pursuant to the By-laws is also the final arbiter of any dispute arising in the Cooperative.

Med Arbiter granted the direct certification election. Reason: while some of the members of petitioner union are members of the cooperative, it cannot be denied that they are also employees within the contemplation of the Labor Code and are therefore entitled to enjoy all the benefits of employees, including the right to self-organization.

Appealed to BLR. Dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the med arbiter.

manifested that a direct certification election was conducted in SAJELCO, there being no restraining order from this Court enjoining the holding thereof Likewise, Atty. Soto was of the opinion that in view of the direct certification election conducted, the petition brought before this Court by SAJELCO has become moot and academic. Attached to his letter is a copy of the minutes of the certification election held on April 13, 1987 showing that of forty three (43) employees who voted, thirty (30) voted for respondent union and thirteen (13) voted for no union

RULING: mentions two types of employees, namely: the members-consumers and the members of their immediate families. As regards employees of SAJELCOwho are members-consumers, the rule is settled that they are not qualified to form, join or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining. The reason for withholding from employees of a cooperative who are members-co-owners the right tocollective bargaining is clear: an owner cannot bargain with himself. However, employees who are not members-consumers may form, join or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining notwithstanding the fact that employees of SAJELCO who are not members-consumers were employed ONLY because they are members of the immediate family of membersconsumers. The fact remains that they are not themselves members-consumers, and as such, they are entitled to exercise the rights of all workers to organization, collective bargaining, negotiations and others as are enshrined in Section 8, Article III and Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, Labor Code of the Philippines and other related laws.

UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION (UPSU),vs.HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA

FACTS: Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on March 20, 1995 the union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, which provides:

Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, pressing for resolution its contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join unions, contravenes Art. III, 8 of the Constitution which provides:

The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

ISSUES:

1) whether or not the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. are managerial employees and

2) whether or not Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from forming, joining or assisting labor unions, violates Art. III, 8 of the Constitution.

RULING:

1) YES. The route managers cannot thus possibly be classified as mere supervisors because their work does not only involve, but goes far beyond, the simple direction or supervision of operating employees to accomplish objectives set by those above them. They are not mere functionaries with simple oversight functions but business administrators in their own right.

supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment." Thus, their only power is to recommend. Certainly, the route managers in this case more than merely recommend effective management action. They perform operational, human resource, financial and marketing functions for the company, all of which involve the laying down of operating policies for themselves and their teams

The term "manager" generally refers to "anyone who is responsible for subordinates and other organizational resources." Managers constitute three levels of a pyramid:

FIRST-LINE MANAGERS: The lowest level in an organization at which individuals are responsible for the work of others is called first-line or first-level management. First-line managers direct operating employees only; they do not supervise other managers

MIDDLE MANAGERS: Middle managers direct the activities of other managers and sometimes also those of operating employees. Middle managers' principal responsibilities are to direct the activities that implement their organizations' policies and to balance the demands of their superiors with the capacities of their subordinates

TOP MANAGERS: Composed of a comparatively small group of executives, top management is responsible for the overall management of the organization. It establishes operating policies and guides the organization's interactions with its environment

In the Case, entitled Worker's Alliance Trade Union (WATU) v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc., decided on November 13, 1991, the Secretary of Labor found: we find that only those employees occupying the position of route manager and accounting manager are managerial employees.

2) NO. The real intent of Art. III, 8 is evident in Lerums proposal. The Commission intended the absolute right to organize of government workers, supervisory employees, and security guards to be constitutionally guaranteed. By implication, no similar absolute constitutional right to organize for labor purposes should be deemed to have been granted to top-level and middle managers.

Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, 8 infringed by a ban against managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes "not contrary to law." In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor organizations

In Bulletin Publishing Co., Inc. v. Hon. Augusto Sanchez, this Court elaborated on this rationale, thus:

The rationale for this inhibition has been stated to be, because if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership. 32PABLO ARIZALA, SERGIO MARIBAO, LEONARDO JOVEN, and FELINO BULANDUSvs.THE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Under the Industrial Peace Act, 1 government-owned or controlled corporations had the duty to bargain collectively and were otherwise subject to the obligations and duties of employers in the private sector. 2 The Act also prohibited supervisors to become, or continue to be, members of labor organizations composed of rank-and-file employees, 3 and prescribed criminal sanctions for breach of the prohibition. 4

Under the regime of said Industrial Peace Act that the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS, for short) became bound by a collective bargaining agreement executed between it and the labor organization representing the majority of its employees, the GSIS Employees Association. The agreement contained a "maintenance-of-membership" clause

The petitioners occupied supervisory positions in the GSIS. Pablo Arizala and Sergio Maribao were, respectively, the Chief of the Accounting Division, and the Chief of the Billing Section of said Division, in the Central Visayas Regional Office of the GSIS. Leonardo Joven and Felino Bulandus were, respectively, the Assistant Chief of the Accounting Division (sometimes Acting Chief in the absence of the Chief) and the Assistant Chief of the Field Service and Non-Life Insurance Division (and Acting Division Chief in the absence of the Chief), of the same Central Visayas Regional Office of the GSIS. Demands were made on all four of them to resign from the GSIS Employees Association, in view of their supervisory positions.

They refused to do so. Consequently, two (2) criminal cases for violation of the Industrial Peace Act were lodged against them in the City Court of Cebu: one involving Arizala and Maribao 6 and the other, Joven and Bulandus. Which resulted to their conviction.

They argued that when the so called "1973 Constitution" took effect on January 17, 1973 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1104, the case of Arizala and Maribao was still pending in the Court of Appeals and that of Joven and Bulandus, pending decision in the City Court of Cebu; that since the provisions of that constitution and of the Labor Code subsequently promulgated (eff., November 1, 1974), repealing the Industrial Peace Act-placed employees of all categories in government-owned or controlled corporations without distinction within the Civil Service, and provided that the terms and conditions of their employment were to be "governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations" and hence, no longer subject of collective bargaining, the appellants ceased to fall within the coverage of the Industrial Peace Act and should thus no longer continue to be prosecuted and exposed to punishment for a violation thereof. They pointed out further that the criminal sanction in the Industrial Peace Act no longer appeared in the Labor Code

ISSUE: whether or not the petitioners' criminal liability for a violation of the Industrial Peace Act may be deemed to have been obliterated in virtue of subsequent legislation and the provisions of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

RULING: YES. the right of self-organization and collective bargaining had been withdrawn by the Labor Code from government employees including those in government-owned and controlled corporations- chiefly for the reason that the terms and conditions of government employment, all embraced in civil service, may not be modified by collective bargaining because set by law. It is therefore immaterial, they say, whether supervisors are members of rank-and-file unions or not; after all, the possibility of the employer's control of the members of the union thru supervisors thus rendering collective bargaining illusory, which is the main reason for the prohibition, is no longer of any consequence.

the disappearance from the law of the prohibition on supervisors being members of labor organizations composed of employees under their supervision. The Labor Code (PD 442) allowed supervisors (if not managerial) to join rank-and-file unions. And under the Implementing Rules of RA 6715, supervisors who were members of existing labor organizations on the effectivity of said RA 6715 were explicitly authorized to "remain therein."

that the maintenance by supervisors of membership in a rank-and-file labor organization even after the enactment of a statute imposing a prohibition on such membership, is not only not a crime, but is explicitly allowed, under present law.

The repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal

It submittedthe ff:

(a) the minutes of its organizational meeting held on December 6, 2005 showing 26 founding members who elected its union officers by secret ballot;

(b) the list of rank-and-file employeesof Eagle Ridge who attended the organizational meeting and the election of officers with their individual signatures;

(c) the list of rank-and-file employeeswho ratified the unions constitution and by-laws showing the very same list as those who attended the organizational meeting and the election of officers with their individual signatures except the addition of four employees without their signatures,i.e., Cherry Labajo, Grace Pollo, Annalyn Poniente and Rowel Dolendo;

(d) the unions constitution and by-lawsas approved on December 6, 2005;

(e) the list of officers and their addresses;

(f) the list of union members showing a total of 30 members; and

(g) the Sworn Statement of the unions elected president and secretary. All the foregoing documents except the sworn statement of the president and the secretary were accompanied by Certifications by the union secretary duly attested to by the union president.

ART. 234.REQUIREMENTS OF REGISTRATION. Anyapplicant labor organization, association or group of unions or workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following requirements:

(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;

(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the labor organization, theminutes of the organizational meetings and the list of workers who participated in such meetings;

(c) Thenames of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate;

x x x x

(e) Four copies (4) of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union,minutes of its adoption or ratificationand thelist of the members who participated in it.

x x x x

Art. 241. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization.

(o) Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special assessments, attorney's fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees may be checked off from any amount due to an employee without an individual written authorization duly signed by the employee. The authorization should specifically state the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction;

Art. 222. Appearances and Fees.

(b) No attorneys fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any collective bargaining negotiations or conclusion of the collective agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of the contracting union; Provided, however, that attorney's fees may be charged against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and void.

Art. 241. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization.

(n) No special assessment or other extraordinary fees may be levied upon the members of a labor organization unless authorized by a written resolution of a majority of all the members at a general membership meeting duly called for the purpose. The secretary of the organization shall record the minutes of the meeting including the list of all members present, the votes cast, the purpose of the special assessment or fees and the recipient of such assessments or fees. The record shall be attested to by the president;

1