Cases on NatRes

G.R. No. 115634Apr 27, 2000FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA, respondents., D E C I S I O NQUISUMBING, J.:For review is the decision.1 [Rollo, pp. 22-27.] dated May 27, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191, denying the petition filed by herein petitioners for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in order to annul the Order dated May 27, 1992, by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order had denied petitioners (a) Motion to Dismiss the replevin case filed by herein private respondents, as well as (b) petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of said trial court dated April 24, 1992, granting an application for a Writ of replevin..2 [CA Records, p. 43.]

The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as follows:"1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one thousand and twenty six (1,026) board feet of illegally sourced lumber valued at P8,544.75, being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by [a certain] Jose Vargas.2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one thousand two hundred twenty four and ninety seven (1,224.97) board feet of illegally-sourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, being driven by one Constancio Abuganda and owned by [a certain] Manuela Babalcon. ".3 [Rollo, p. 23.

Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR (Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial Environment and Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan..4 [Id. at 23.] Seizure receipts were issued but the drivers refused to accept the receipts..5 [Id. at 74.] Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed before the Provincial Prosecutors Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda, in Criminal Case No. 3795, for violation of Section 68 [78), Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code..6 [Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forestland, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . .

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. ( mphasis supplied.)]

On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer Calub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabon and Abuganda. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public Prosecutor..7 [Rollo, p. 70.]

On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143, was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan and Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at Barangay Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded with forest products with an equivalent volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly filed a criminal complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and several John Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code..8 [Id. at 23, 78.]

In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. But note the trial court ordered that a copy of the decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice, in order that the necessary criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagarao and all other persons responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code. For it appeared that it was Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and ordered that cut timber be loaded on it..9 [Id. at 75, 85.]

Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an application for replevin against herein petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan. The trial court granted the application for replevin and issued the corresponding writ in an Order dated April 24, 1992..10 [CA Records, p. 43.] Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court..11 [Supra, note 4.]

Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with application for Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order. The Court issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting further proceedings in the civil case for replevin; and enjoining private respondents from taking or attempting to take the motor vehicles and forest products seized from the custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed the petitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest products seized are kept in a secured place and protected from deterioration, said property being in custodia legis and subject to the direct order of the Supreme Court..12 Id. at 18-19.

12 In a Resolution issued on September 28, 1992, the Court referred said petition to respondent appellate court for appropriate disposition..13 [Id. at 21.]On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit. It ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. According to the appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his duly authorized representative to order the confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance used for that purpose is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or policies on that matter, added the appellate court. The DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court said. For it prescribes the guidelines in the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in the commission of offenses penalized under Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277..14 [Id. at 26-A.]

Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners failed to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to render a report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners failure to comply with the procedure laid down by DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the admission of petitioners counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure, according to the appellate court, the subject vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis..15 [Id. at 25-27.]

Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in petitioners claim that private respondents complaint for replevin is a suit against the State. Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves under the principle of state immunity as the property sought to be recovered in the instant suit had not yet been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of the government. Moreover, according to respondent appellate court, there could be no pecuniary liability nor loss of property that could ensue against the government. It reasoned that a suit against a public officer who acted illegally or beyond the scope of his authority could not be considered a suit against the State; and that a public officer might be sued for illegally seizing or withholding the possession of the property of another..16 [Id. at 27.]

Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based on the claim that the subject vehicles were validly seized and held in custody because they were contradicted by its own findings..17 [Ibid.] Their petition was found without merit..18 [Ibid.]

Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors:.19 [Id. at 6.](1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MERE SEIZURE OF A CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705 AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 277 DOES NOT PLACE SAID CONVEYANCE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS;(2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE OPERATIVE ACT GIVING RISE FOR THE SUBJECT CONVEYANCE TO BE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS IS ITS LAWFUL SEIZURE BY THE DENR PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705, AS AMENDED BY E.O. NO. 277; AND(3) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN AGAINST THE PETITIONERS IS NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE.

In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is in custodia legis.(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against the State.

We will now resolve both issues.

The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78. Section 78 states:Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forestland, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.

This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing authority to possess and transport said load of forest products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the persons responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the public prosecutor.

The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. They read as follows:Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.

Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. -- A forest officer or employee of the Bureau [Department] or any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense... [ mphasis supplied.]

Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code, as follows:Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture. -- All conveyances used in the transport of any forest product obtained or gathered illegally whether or not covered with transport documents, found spurious or irregular in accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of P.D. No. 705, shall be confiscated in favor of the government or disposed of in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.

Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance. -- The Secretary or his duly authorized representative such as the forest officers and/or natural resources officers, or deputized officers of the DENR are authorized to seize said conveyances subject to policies and guidelines pertinent thereto. Deputized military personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forest products and their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field offices, and turn over said forest products and conveyances for proper action and disposition. In case where the apprehension is made by DENR field officer, the conveyance shall be deposited with the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED Office as the case may be, for safekeeping wherever it is most convenient and secured. [ mphasis supplied.]

Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code.

Note further that petitioners failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances.

Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise..20 [Bagalihog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614, 621 (1991)]

In Mamanteo, et. al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264, promulgated on July 28, 1999, the case involves property to be seized by a Deputy Sheriff in a replevin suit. But said property were already impounded by the DENR due to violation of forestry laws and, in fact, already forfeited in favor of the government by order of the DENR. We said that such property was deemed in custodia legis. The sheriff could not insist on seizing the property already subject of a prior warrant of seizure. The appropriate action should be for the sheriff to inform the trial court of the situation by way of partial Sheriffs Return, and wait for the judges instructions on the proper procedure to be observed.

Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we elucidated further:". . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily be undermined by the simple devise of a writ of replevin...".21 [Mamanteo, et. al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264, July 28, 1999, citing Pacis v. Hon. Averia,18 SCRA 907 (1966)]

On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the two impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, a suit against the State?

Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent..22 [CONST., Art. XVI, sec. 3.] And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable..23 [De Leon, The Law on Public Officers and Election Law, 2nd ed., 1994, pp. 228-229.] However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption..24 [Philippine Racing Club, Inc., et al. v. Bonifacio, et al., 109 Phil. 233, 241 (1960)] In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature..25 [Sanders v. Veridiano II, 162 SCRA 88, 96 (1988)] In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the States consent.

Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the Solicitor Generals line for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss..26 [Section 1, Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Court.

SECTION 1. Grounds. -- Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;(c) That venue is improperly laid;(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; and(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.] If not invoked at the proper time, this ground for dismissal could be deemed waived and the court could take cognizance of the case and try it..27 [Soto v. Jareno, 144 SCRA 116, 119 [1986). See also Section 1[j), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Court.]

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191 is SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992, and the Writ of replevin issued in the Order dated April 24, 1992, are ANNULLED. The Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Branch 29, is directed to take possession of the subject motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, for delivery to the custody of and appropriate disposition by petitioners. Let a copy of this decision be provided the Honorable Secretary of Justice for his appropriate action, against any and all persons responsible for the abovecited violation of the Revised Forestry Code.Costs against private respondents.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 108619Jul 31, 1997EPIFANIO LALICAN, petitioner vs. HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents., D E C I S I O NROMERO, J.:The issue posed for resolution in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order is whether or not a charge of illegal possession of "lumber" is excluded from the crime of illegal possession of "timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines), as amended, to warrant the quashal of an information charging the former offense or a "nonexistent crime."

On July 23, 1991, an information for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, was filed by the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against petitioner Epifanio Lalican, 1 Ruben Benitez, Allan Pulgar and Jose Roblo before the Regional Trial Court of that city. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 9543, the information reads:That on or about the 9th day of February, 1991, at Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan, City of Puerto Princesa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without lawful authority or permit, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control 1,800 board feet of assorted species and dimensions of lumber on board two (2) passenger jeeps, with a value of Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P14,000.00), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount aforestated.CONTRARY TO LAW.

At their arraignment on August 9, 1991, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.On August 23, 1991, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 refers to "timber and other forest products" and not to "lumber," and asserting that "timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is sawed into beams, planks or boards, petitioner alleged that said decree "does not apply to 'lumber.'" He added that the law is "vague and standardless" as it does not specify the authority or the legal documents required by existing forest laws and regulations. Hence, petitioner asserted that the information should be quashed as it violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law. 2

The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not for the courts to determine the wisdom of the law nor to set out the policy of the legislature which deemed it proper that the word "timber" should include "lumber" which is a "product or derivative after the timber is cut." The position of the prosecution was that to hold otherwise would result in the easy circumvention of the law, for one could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. The prosecution asserted that the issue raised by petitioner was more semantical than a question of law. 3

On September 24, 1991, the lower court, 4 guided by the principles that penal laws should be construed strictly against the state and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, issued an order quashing the information. It held that the distinction between "timber" and "lumber" is not artificial nor a matter of semantics as the law itself distinguishes the two terms. Sec. 3(q) of P.D. No. 705 classifies "timber" as a forest product while Sec. 3(aa) thereof considers "lumber" as a finished wood product. Adding that unlicensed cutting, gathering and/or collecting of "timber" is penalized under Sec. 68 while sale of "lumber" without compliance with grading rules established by the government is prohibited by Sec. 79, the lower court categorically stated that:Logically, lumber, being a manufactured wood product, poses no more danger to forest lands by being cut, gathered, collected or removed. It is in fact, only bought and sold. Thus, Sec. 68 cannot be made to apply to lumber.

The court, however, refrained from exploring the constitutional issues raised by petitioner upon a holding that the case could be resolved on some other grounds or issues. 5

The prosecution filed a motion for the reconsideration of this Order, pointing out that under the Primer on Illegal Logging of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), timber is not just any piece of wood for it may consist of squared and manufactured timber or one which has been sawn to pieces to facilitate transportation or hauling. It stressed that to consider a person who had made lumber out of timber as not criminally liable is an absurd interpretation of the law.

Moreover, the prosecution underscored the facts that when apprehended, the accused presented Private Land Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February 10, 1991 which had expired; that while the certificate of origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the product were not equipped with certificates of transport agreement. Added to this was the fact that, if the product were indeed lumber, then the accused could have presented a certificate of lumber origin, lumber sale invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for transportation from one point to another. 6

Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration contending that the DENR primer's definition of "timber" is erroneous because the law itself distinguishes "timber" from "sawn lumber." The non-inclusion of "lumber" in Sec. 68 could only mean a clear legislative intent to exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized under that section. 7

Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the Presiding Judge of Branch 49 inhibited himself from taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 9543. The case was subsequently assigned to Branch 52.

On June 10, 1992, the lower court 8 issued the herein questioned order setting aside the quashal Order of the previous judge. It declared that from the law itself, it is evident that what is sought to be penalized is not the possession, without the required legal documents, of timber only but also of "other forest products." It stated that even if lumber is not timber, still, lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally prohibited by the law which includes "wood" in the definition of forest products.

Petitioner sought the reconsideration of this Order but the lower court denied it. Hence, the instant petition arguing that the lower court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the quashal order and in denying his motion for reconsideration on the ground that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 neither specifies nor includes "lumber" in the phrase "timber or other forest products."

The petition is devoid of merit.Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 which was issued on July 25, 1987 by then President Corazon C. Aquino, provides:Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.


Punished then in this section are: (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.

In the recent case of Mustang, Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 9 this Court, thru Justice Hilario Davide, held:The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads:(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood product.This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market ." Simply put , lumber is a processed log or timber.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.

Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under Executive Order No. 277, are the following:WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; andWHEREAS, to overcome these difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts to make our forestry laws more responsive to present situations and realities; . . .

To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law.10 After all, the phrase "forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merely result in tautology. As the lower court said:Even should it be conceded that lumber is not timber and is thus not covered by the prohibition, still it cannot be denied that lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally and, to the same extent, prohibited. Sec. 3(q) of PD 705 as amended or otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code defines forest products, viz., . . .

Stress must be given to the term WOOD embodied in the definition of forest product (supra). If we are to follow the rather tangential argument by the accused that lumber is not timber, then, it will be very easy for a person to circumvent the law. He could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. It is rather too narrow an interpretation. But the law also provided a plug for the loophole. If lumber is not timber, then surely, lumber is wood. . . . .

If in seeking to abate the proceedings the accused also seek to imply that lumber seized in their possession were procured from lawful source, all they have to do is produce the legal documents contemplated by the law. It is not the mere cutting or possession of timber, forest products or whatever that is prohibited and penalized by the law. What is prohibited and penalized is the act of cutting or possessing of timber, wood, or other forest products without lawful authority.

The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the quashal of the information. The petition simply has no legal basis. Certiorari may be issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. 11 Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of power. 12

On the other hand, certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion. 13 Where the court has jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct, its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. 14 As this Court said:. . . When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil action of certiorari. 15

In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions. 16

The unavailability of the writ of certiorari, and even that of prohibition, in this case is borne out of the fact that what petitioner considers as grave abuse of discretion in this case is the denial of his motion to quash the information filed against him and three others. This Court has consistently defined the proper procedure in case of denial of a motion to quash. The accused has to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. 17

Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied. That the appropriate recourse is to proceed to trial and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction, as well as the denial of the motion to quash, is impelled by the fact that a denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory procedural aspect which cannot be appealed nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. 18 The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. 19 An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 20 However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari would not only delay the administration of justice but also would unduly burden the courts. 21

Petitioner may not seek refuge under Flordelis v. Himalaloan 22 for his contention that a denial of a motion to quash may be the subject of a petition for certiorari. That case has an entirely different factual milieu from the one at bar. The information herein not being "patently defective" nor that the offense charged has prescribed, 23 this case may not be considered an exception to the rule on the proper remedy for the denial of a motion to quash.

With respect to the constitutionality of Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 which petitioner would have this Court consider, 24 this Court has always desisted from delving on constitutional issues. Thus, even if all the requisites for judicial review of a constitutional matter are present in a case, 25 this Court will not pass upon a constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case or if the case can be disposed of on some other grounds, such as the application of the statute or general law. 26

The Court can well take judicial notice of the deplorable problem of deforestation in this country, considering that the deleterious effects of this problem are now imperiling our lives and properties, more specifically, by causing rampaging floods in the lowlands. While it is true that the rights of an accused must be favored in the interpretation of penal provisions of law, it is equally true that when the general welfare and interest of the people are interwoven in the prosecution of a crime, the Court must arrive at a solution only after a fair and just balancing of interests. This the Court did in arriving at the foregoing interpretation of Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Reform Code. This task, however, has not at all been a difficult one considering that, contrary to petitioner's assertion, his rights to due process and equal protection of the law have not been clearly shown to have been jeopardized.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED. The lower court is enjoined to proceed with dispatch in the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9543. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against, petitioner.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 131270Mar 17, 2000PERFECTO PALLADA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent., D E C I S I O NMENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for review of the decision1 [Per Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes (now Associate Justice of this Court), concurred in by Justices B.A. Adefuin-Dela Cruz and Demetrio C. Demetria.] of the Court of Appeals affirming petitioner's conviction of illegal possession of lumber in violation of 682 [Renumbered 78 by Republic Act No. 7161.] of the Revised Forestry Code3 [Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. - Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (As amended by PD No.1559, and by EO No. 277, prom, July 25, 1987, emphasis added).] (P.D. No. 705, as amended) by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon.

The facts are as follows:Sometime in the latter part of 1992, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) office in Bukidnon received reports that illegally cut lumber was being delivered to the warehouse of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation in Valencia, Bukidnon. The company is engaged in rice milling and trading.

DENR officers, assisted by elements of the Philippine National Police, raided the company's warehouse in Poblacion, Valencia on the strength of a warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon and found a large stockpile of lumber of varying sizes cut by a chain saw. As proof that the company had acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17, 1992. The DENR officers did not, however, give credit to the receipts considering that R. L. Rivero Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been suspended. What is more, the pieces of lumber were cut by chain saw and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill operator.

The team made an inventory of the seized lumber which, all in all, constituted 29,299.25 board feet, worth P488,334.45 in total. The following day, September 29, 1992, the first batch of lumber, consisting of 162 pieces measuring 1,954.66 board feet, was taken and impounded at the FORE stockyard in Sumpong, Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The seizure order4 [Records, p. 28.] was served on petitioner Perfecto Pallada as general manager of the company, but he refused to acknowledge it.

On October 1, 1992, the raiding team returned for the remaining lumber. Company president Francisco Tankiko and a certain Isaias Valdehueza, who represented himself to be a lawyer, asked for a suspension of the operations to enable them to seek a lifting of the warrant. The motion was filed with the court which issued the warrant but, on October 5, 1992, the motion was denied.5 [Id., p. 136-C.] Accordingly, the remaining lumber was confiscated. By October 9, 1992, all the lumber in the warehouse had been seized. As before, however, petitioner Pallada refused to sign for the seizure orders issued by the DENR officers (Exhs. E, F & G).

On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with Noel Sy, as assistant operations manager, and Francisco Tankiko, as president of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, and Isaias Valdehueza, were charged with violation of 68 of P.D .No. 705, as amended. The Information alleged:6 [Id., p. 1.]That on or about the 1st day of October, 1992, and prior thereto at the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation Compound, municipality of Valencia, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally possess 2,115 pieces [of] lumber of different dimensions in the total volume of 29,299 .25 board feet or equivalent to 69.10 cubic meters with an estimated value of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR PESOS AND 45/100 (P488,334.45) Philippine Currency, without any authority, license or legal documents from the government, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the amount of P488,334.45.Contrary to and in violation of Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277.

As all the accused pleaded not guilty, trial ensued. Then on July 27, 1994, judgment was rendered as follows:7 [Id., p. 255.]WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Perfecto Pallada and Francisco Tankiko guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having in their possession timber products worth of P488,334.45 without the legal documents as charged in the information in violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, as amended and are, therefore, each sentenced to suffer imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion temporal as maximum. The lumber subject of the crime are confiscated in favor of the government.

Accused Isaias Valdehueza and Noel Sy are ACQUITTED for lack of evidence against them.

Petitioner and Francisco Tankiko appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, on October 31, 1997, affirmed petitioner's conviction but acquitted Tankiko for lack of proof of his participation in the purchase or acquisition of the seized lumber.8 [CA Decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 28.]

Hence this petition which raises the following issues:9 [Petition, p. 2; Id., p. 4.]I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER PALLADA.II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE CERTIFICATE OF TIMBER ORIGIN WAS NOT THE PROPER DOCUMENT TO JUSTIFY PETITIONER'S POSSESSION OF THE SQUARED TIMBER OR FLITCHES.III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE PRESENCE OF ERASURES IN THE CERTIFICATE OF TIMBER ORIGIN RENDER THEM VALUELESS AS EVIDENCE.

First. During the trial, the defense presented the following documents, as summarized by the trial court, to establish that Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation's possession of the seized lumber was legal:10 [RTC Decision, pp. 3-5; Records, pp. 249-251.]1. Exh. 6 - Certificate of Timber Origin (CTO for short), dated December 15, 1991, for 56 pieces of flitches equivalent to 12.23 cubic meters, transported from Bombaran, Lanao del Sur of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. Taken from the forest area of Wahab and H.D. PangcogaExh. 6-A - Auxiliary InvoiceExh. 6-B - Certificate of Transport Agreement (CTA, for short)Exh. 6-C - Tally Sheet, dated December 14, 1992, for 463 pieces of lumber equivalent to 5,056.94 board feetExh. 6-D - Delivery Receipt, dated December 16, 1991, from WHP Enterprises of Maguing, Lanao del Sur, to the Corporation for the lumber mentioned in Exh. "6-C"Exh. 6-F - Cash Voucher for P58,832.45 in payment to WHP Enterprises, dated December 16, 1991, for the 5,056.94 board feet of lumberExh. 6-D-1 - [C]arbon copy of Exh. "6-D" above

2. Exh. 7 - CTO, (undated), for 961 pieces of log equivalent to 25.4 cubic meter[s] taken from the forest area of a certain Somira M. Ampuan in Lama Lico, Bombaran of the ARMMExh. 7-A - Auxiliary InvoiceExh. 7-B - CTAExh. 7-C - Tally Sheet, dated February 6, 1992, for 961 pieces of lumber equal to 10,758.2 board feet Exh. 7-D - Delivery Receipt to Golden Harvest Corporation issued by SMA Trading Company, dated February 6, 1992Exh. 7-E - Official Receipt for environmental fee issued to Somira M. Ampuan, dated August 9, 1991Exh. 7-F - Cash Voucher for P126,562.05 issued by the Corporation in payment to SMA Trading Company for 10,758.02 board feet of lumber, dated February 6, 1992

3. Exh. 8 - CTO for 678 pieces of chain-sawn lumber with an equivalent volume of 18.93 cubic meter from the forest area of Wahab Pangcoga and H.D. Pangcoga, dated February 25, 1992Exh. 8-A - Auxiliary InvoiceExh. 8-B - CTAExh. 8-C - Tally Sheet for the 678 pieces of lumberExh. 8-D - Delivery Receipt to Golden Harvest Corporation issued by WHP Enterprises,Exh. 8-E - Official Receipt for environmental feeExh. 8-F - Cash Voucher for P93,614.50 in payment for 8,024.99 board feet of lumber issued by the Corporation payable to WHP Enterprise.

4. Exh. 9 - CTO for 426 pieces of logs (?) with an equivalent volume of 12.24 cubic meters from licensee Somira M. Ampuan of Lama Lico, Bombaran, Lanao del Sur, consigned to the Corporation, (undated). Stamped "Release 3/2/92"Exh. 9-A - Auxiliary InvoiceExh. 9-B - CTA, dated March 20, 1992Exh. 9-C - Tally Sheet, dated March 20, 1992Exh. 9-D - Delivery Receipt issued by SMA Trading Company to the Corporation, dated March 20, 1992Exh. 9-E - Official Receipt for environmental feeExh. 9-F - Cash Voucher, for P64,299.50 to pay [for] 5,189 board feet of lumberExh. 9-D-1 - Xerox copy of Exh. "9-D"

The trial court acted correctly in not giving credence to the Certificates of Timber Origin presented by petitioner since the lumber held by the company should be covered by Certificates of Lumber Origin.11 [Id., p. 5; Id., p. 251.] For indeed, as BFD Circular No. 10-8312 [Issued on February 28, 1983, now superseded by DENR Administrative Order No. 07, issued on February 17, 1994.] states in pertinent parts: In order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof, the attached Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . which form[s] part of this circular [is] hereby adopted as accountable forms for official use by authorized BFD officers. . . .

5. Lumber . . . transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . as herein required shall be considered as proceeding from illegal sources and as such, shall be subject to confiscation and disposition in accordance with LOI 1020 and BFD implementing guidelines.

Petitioner contends that the term "timber" includes lumber and, therefore, the Certificates of Timber Origin and their attachments should have been considered in establishing the legality of the company's possession of the lumber.13 [Petition, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 7-8.] In support of his contention, petitioner invokes our ruling in Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.14 [257 SCRA 430 (1996).]

The contention has no merit. The statement in Mustang Lumber that lumber is merely processed timber and, therefore, the word "timber" embraces lumber, was made in answer to the lower court's ruling in that case that the phrase "possess timber or other forest products" in 68 of P.D. No. 705 means that only those who possess timber and forest products without the documents required by law are criminally liable, while those who possess lumber are not liable. On the other hand, the question in this case is whether separate certificates of origin should be issued for lumber and timber. Indeed, different certificates of origin are required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest products.15 [DENR Administrative Circular No. 07, 2&17 (series of 1994).] As already noted, the opening paragraph of BFD Circular No. 10-83 expressly states that the issuance of a separate certificate of origin for lumber is required in order to "pinpoint accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof."

Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a substitute for Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were justified in convicting petitioner, considering the numerous irregularities and defects found in the documents presented by the latter. According to the trial court:16 [RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Records, p. 251-252 (emphasis in the original).]

Although the CTO marked Exh. "6" mentions 56 pieces of flitches, the supporting documents, like the Tally Sheet, the Delivery Receipt from the lumber dealer and the Cash Voucher describe 463 pieces of lumber. . . .

In like manner, Exh. "7" and Exh. "9" mention 961 and 420 pieces of log, respectively. But the supporting documents describe the forest product[s] as lumber.

The CTO marked Exh. "[8]" reveals a half-truth: it mentions 678 pieces of hand-sawn lumber. Its Auxiliary Invoice also states the same load of lumber. Someone may have noticed the "mistake" of mentioning lumber in the Auxiliary Invoice and so the words "flitches 87 pieces" were written down and enclosed in parenthesis.

The said exhibits also appear to be questionable, [t]hus[:]The CTO marked Exh. "6" is consigned to "any buyer (sic) Cagayan de Oro", but its Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. "6-A") mentions Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation as the consignee. Moreover, the CTO states (at the back page) that the same is covered by Auxiliary Invoice No. 00491; in fact, the Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. 6-A) has invoice number 000488.

In the CTO marked Exhibit "7", the original typewritten name of the consignee was clearly erased and changed to "Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, Valencia, Bukidnon". In the Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. "7-A") the blank space for the name and address of the consignee was smudged with a typewriter correction fluid (the better to erase what was originally typewritten in it?) and changed to "Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, Valencia, Bukidnon".The CTO marked Exh. "9" and its Auxiliary Invoice marked Exh. "9-A" [were] "doctored" in the same manner as Exh. "[7]" and Exh. "[7-A]".17 [The original consignee's name, still legible, reads: "NORTHWEST FOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION, ______, TAGOLCAN, MIS. OR."]

Additionally, all the Auxiliary Invoice were not properly accomplished: the data required to be filled are left in blank.

Indeed, aside from the fact that the Certificate of Timber Origin in Exh. 7 bears no date, the dorsal side bears the certification that the logs were "scaled on August 7, 1991," while the receipt attached to that Certificate is dated February 6, 1992. Moreover, the four delivery receipts list the sizes and volume of the lumber sold, indicating that the company purchased cut lumber from the dealers, thus belying the testimony of petitioner that when the company bought the forest products, they were still in the form of flitches and logs, and they were cut into lumber by the company.18 [TSN, pp. 10, 13 & 22, March 12, 1994.]

These irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they are found not only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court in giving no credence to the same.19 [Compare DENR Administrative Order No. 59-93, series of 1993, 6 in relation to 2.8, which provides that certificates of origin with erased or tampered vital entries, such as the name and address of consignee, are void (now superseded by DENR Administrative Order No.07, series of 1994.)]

It is argued that the irregularities in the documentary exhibits should not be taken against petitioner because the documents came from lumber dealers. In addition, it is contended that the CTOs and Auxiliary Receipts, being public documents, should be accorded the presumption of regularity in their execution.20 [Petition, pp. 6-10; Rollo, pp. 8-12.]

This contention is untenable. What render these documents without legal effect are the patent irregularities found on their faces. That petitioner may not have any responsibility for such irregularity is immaterial. In any case, as the corporate officer in charge of the purchase of the lumber, petitioner should have noticed such obvious irregularities, and he should have taken steps to have them corrected. He cannot now feign ignorance and assert that, as far as he is concerned, the documents are regular and complete.21 [Id., pp. 8-10; Id., pp. 10-12.]

The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the presumption that the CTOs were regularly executed by the DENR officials concerned. The presumption invoked by petitioner applies only when the public documents are, on their faces, regular and properly accomplished.22 [See Veloso v. Sandiganbayan, 187 SCRA 504 (1990).]

Second. The penalty imposed should be modified. Art. 309 of the Revised Penal Code, made applicable to the offense by P.D. No. 705, 68, provides:ART. 309. Penalties.- Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by: 1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than P12,000 pesos but does not exceed P22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. . . .As the lumber involved in this case is worth P488,334.45, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,23 [People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 (1994).] the penalty to be imposed should be six (6) years of prision correccional to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 31, 1997, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 136142Oct 24, 2000PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFONSO DATOR and BENITO GENOL, accused (Acquitted) / PASTOR TELEN, accused-appellant.D E C I S I O NDE LEON, JR., J.:Before us on appeal is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 1733 convicting the appellant of the crime of violation of Presidential Decree No. 705.

Pastor Telen and his co-accused, Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol, were charged with the crime of violation of Section 68[2] of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code,[3] in an Information that reads:That on or about the 29th day of October, 1993 at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, in barangay Laboon, municipality of Maasin, province of Southern Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with intent of gain, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess 1,560.16 board feet of assorted lumber flitches valued at TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (23,500.00), Philippine Currency, without any legal document as required under existing forest laws and regulations from proper government authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the government.CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon being arraigned on May 27, 1994, Pastor Telen and his co-accused, Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol, assisted by counsel, separately entered the plea of Not guilty to the charge in the Information. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

It appears that on October 29, 1993, Police Station Commander Alejandro Rojas of Maasin, Southern Leyte, and SPO1 Necitas Bacala, were on board a police patrol vehicle heading towards Barangay San Rafael, Maasin, Southern Leyte. Upon reaching Barangay Laboon of the same municipality, they noticed a Isuzu cargo truck loaded with pieces of lumber bound toward the town proper of Maasin. Suspicious that the cargo was illegally cut pieces of lumber, Police Station Commander Rojas maneuvered their police vehicle and gave chase.[4]

Upon catching up with the Isuzu cargo truck in Barangay Soro-soro, Maasin, Southern Leyte, they ordered the driver, accused Benito Genol, to pull over. Benito Genol was left alone in the truck after his companions hurriedly left. When asked if he had the required documents for the proper transport of the pieces of lumber, Genol answered in the negative. Genol informed the police authorities that the pieces of lumber were owned by herein appellant, Pastor Telen, while the Isuzu cargo truck bearing Plate No. HAF 628 was registered in the name of Southern Leyte Farmers Agro-Industrial Cooperative, Inc. (SLEFAICO) which is a local cooperative. Consequently, Police Officers Rojas and Bacala directed Benito Genol to proceed to the Maasin Police Station, Maasin, Southern Leyte for further investigation.[5]

On November 5, 1993, Forest Ranger Romeo Galola was fetched from his office at the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Maasin, Southern Leyte by SPO1 Necitas Bacala to inspect the pieces of lumber that were confiscated on October 29, 1993 in Soro-soro, Maasin, Southern Leyte from Pastor Telen. Galola and his immediate supervisor, Sulpicio Saguing, found that the cargo consisted of forty-one (41) pieces of Dita lumber and ten (10) pieces of Antipolo lumber of different dimensions with a total volume of 1,560.16 board feet.[6]

Subsequently, SPO1 Bacala issued a seizure receipt[7] covering the fifty-one (51) pieces of confiscated Dita and Antipolo lumber and one (1) unit of Isuzu cargo truck with Plate No. HAF 628. The confiscated pieces of lumber and the cargo truck were turned over to SPO3 Daniel Lasala, PNP Property Custodian, Maasin, Southern Leyte who, in turn, officially transferred custody of the same to the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte.[8]

The defense denied any liability for the crime charged in the Information. Pastor Telen, a utility worker at the Integrated Provincial Health Office, Southern Leyte for nineteen (19) years, testified that he needed lumber to be used in renovating the house of his grandparents in Barangay Abgao, Maasin, Southern Leyte where he maintained residence. Knowing that it was prohibited by law to cut trees without appropriate permit from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Telen sought the assistance of a certain Lando dela Pena who was an employee at the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte. Dela Pena accompanied Telen to the office of a certain Boy Leonor, who was the Officer in Charge of CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte. Leonor did not approve of the plan of Telen to cut teak or hard lumber from his (Telen) mothers track of land in Tabunan, San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte. However, Leonor allegedly allowed Telen to cut the aging Dita trees only. According to Telen, Leonor assured him that a written permit was not anymore necessary before he could cut the Dita trees, which are considered soft lumber, from the private land of his mother, provided the same would be used exclusively for the renovation of his house and that he shall plant trees as replacement thereof, which he did by planting Gemelina seedlings.[9]

On September 15, 1993, Telen requested his cousin, Vicente Sabalo, to hire for him a cargo truck in order to haul the sawn lumber from the land of his mother in Tabunan, San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte. His cousin obliged after Telen assured him that he had already secured verbal permission from Boy Leonor, Officer in Charge of CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte, before cutting the said lumber.[10]

After having been informed by Vicente Sabalo on October 29, 1993 at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon that a cargo truck was available for hire, Telen instructed his cousin to personally supervise the hauling of the sawn lumber for him inasmuch as he was busy with his work in the office. At around 7:00 oclock in the evening, Telen learned from his daughter that the sawn lumber were confiscated by the police in Barangay Soro-soro, Maasin, Southern Leyte.[11]

Upon arrival in Barangay Soro-Soro, Telen was accosted by Police Station Commander Alejandro Rojas who demanded from him DENR permit for the sawn lumber. After confirming ownership of the sawn lumber, Telen explained to Rojas that he had already secured verbal permission from Boy Leonor to cut Dita trees, which are considered soft lumber, to be used in the renovation of his house and that he had already replaced the sawn Dita trees with Gemelina seedlings, but to no avail. Rojas ordered that the pieces of lumber and the Isuzu cargo truck be impounded at the municipal building of Maasin, Southern Leyte for failure of Telen to produce the required permit from the DENR.[12]

Pastor Telen appeared before Bert Pesidas, CENRO hearing officer, in Maasin, Southern Leyte for investigation in connection with the confiscated pieces of lumber. Telen had tried to contact Officer-in-Charge Boy Leonor of the CENRO Maasin, Southern Leyte after the confiscation of the sawn lumber on October 29, 1993 and even during the investigation conducted by the CENRO hearing officer for three (3) times but to no avail, for the reason that Boy Leonor was assigned at a reforestation site in Danao, Cebu province.[13]

Alfonso Dator, was the accounting manager of SLEFAICO, Inc., a local cooperative engaged in buying and selling abaca fibers. Dator testified that on October 29, 1993 at 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, a certain Vicente Sabalo, accompanied by their company driver, Benito Genol, proposed to hire the Isuzu cargo truck owned by SLEFAICO, Inc. to haul pieces of coconut lumber from Barangay San Jose to Barangay Soro-soro in Maasin, Southern Leyte. He readily acceded to the proposal inasmuch as the owner of the alleged coconut lumber, according to Sabalo, was Pastor Telen, who is a long time friend and former officemate at the provincial office of the Department of Health. Besides, the fee to be earned from the hauling services meant additional income for the cooperative.[14]

At about 6:00 oclock in the evening of the same day, Dator met the Isuzu cargo truck of SLEFAICO, Inc. at the Canturing bridge in Maasin, Southern Leyte, being escorted by a police patrol vehicle, heading towards the municipal town proper. At the municipal hall building of Maasin, he learned that the Isuzu truck was apprehended by the police for the reason that it contained a cargo of Dita and Antipolo lumber without the required permit from the DENR. He explained to the police authorities that the Isuzu cargo truck was hired merely to transport coconut lumber, however, it was impounded at the municipal building just the same.[15] Due to the incident Dator lost his job as accounting manager in SLEFAICO, Inc.[16]

For his defense, Benito Genol testified that he was employed by the SLEFAICO, Inc. as driver of its Isuzu cargo truck. Aside from transporting abaca fibers, the Isuzu cargo truck was also available for hire.[17]

While Genol was having the two tires of the Isuzu cargo truck vulcanized on October 29, 1993 in Barangay Mantahan, Maasin, Southern Leyte, Vicente Sabalo approached him and offered to hire the services of the cargo truck. Genol accompanied Sabalo to the residence of the accounting manager of SLEFAICO, Inc., Alfonso Dator, which was nearby, and the latter agreed to the proposal of Sabalo to hire the Isuzu cargo truck to haul pieces of coconut lumber from San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte, for a fee.[18]

At 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, Genol, Sabalo and a son of Alfonso Dator, proceeded to San Jose after fetching about six (6) haulers along the way in Barangay Soro-soro. Upon arrival in San Jose, Genol remained behind the steering wheel to take a rest. He was unmindful of the actual nature of the lumber that were being loaded. After the loading, Genol was instructed to proceed to Barangay Soro-soro in front of the lumberyard of a certain Jimmy Go. Before the lumber could be unloaded at 8:00 oclock in the evening Genol was approached by Police Station Commander Alejandro Rojas who demanded DENR permit for the lumber. The pieces of lumber were confiscated by Rojas after Genol failed to produce the required permit from the DENR office.[19]

Vicente Sabalo corroborated the testimonies of the three (3) accused in this case. He testified in substance that he was requested by his cousin, Pastor Telen, to engage the services of a cargo truck to transport sawn pieces of lumber from San Jose to be used in the renovation of his house in Abgao, Maasin, Southern Leyte; that he approached Benito Genol and offered to hire the services of the Isuzu cargo truck that he was driving; that both of them asked the permission of Alfonso Dator who readily acceded to the proposal for a fee of P500.00;[20] that he saw Genol remained behind the steering wheel as the loading of the lumber was going on in San Jose; and that the lumber and the Isuzu cargo truck were confiscated in Barangay Soro-soro for failure of his cousin, Pastor Telen, to show to Police Station Commander Alejandro Rojas any written permit from the DENR for the subject lumber.[21]

After analyzing the evidence, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:1. CONVICTING the accused PASTOR TELEN beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged and there being no modifying circumstances, and with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable, the herein accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties provided by law, which is two (2) degrees higher than PRISION MAYOR maximum, the authorized penalty similar to Qualified Theft, and to pay the costs. His bail for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and he shall be committed to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila thru the Abuyog Regional Prisons, Abuyog, Leyte via the Provincial Warden, Maasin, Southern Leyte;2. ACQUITTING co-accused Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol on reasonable doubt for insufficiency of evidence; and cancelling their bail;3. CONFISCATING and SEIZING the 1,560.16 board feet of illegal lumber worth P23,500.00 and ORDERING the CENRO Maasin, Southern Leyte to sell the lumber at public auction under proper permission from the Court, with the proceeds thereof turned over to the National Government thru the National Treasury under proper receipt, and to REPORT the fact of sale to this Court duly covered by documents of sale and other receipts by evidencing the sale within five (5) days from the consummation of sale; and4. DIRECTING the CENRO authorities to coordinate with its Regional Office for immediate administrative proceedings and determination of any administrative liability of the truck owner, SLEFAICO Inc. if any, otherwise, to release the truck to its owner.SO ORDERED.

In his appeal Pastor Telen interpose the following assignments of error:I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 68, P. D. 705, AS AMENDED, BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND FOR BEING NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH DENR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 79, SERIES OF 1990.II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA FOR THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SEC. 68, P. D. 705, AS AMENDED, IT BEING A PATENTLY ERRONEOUS PENALTY NOT WARRANTED BY ANY PROVISION OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE OR JURISPRUDENCE.III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE VALUE OF THE CONFISCATED LUMBER IS P23,500.00 FOR NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH VALUE WAS ESTABLISHED DURING THE TRIAL.

The appeal is not impressed with merit.

It is not disputed that appellant Pastor Telen is the owner of the fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Antipolo and Dita lumber with a total volume of 1,560.16 board feet. He alleged that the pieces of lumber were cut from the track of land belonging to his mother in San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte which he intended to use in the renovation of his house in Barangay Abgao of the same municipality. After having been confiscated by the police, while in transit, in Barangay Soro-soro, appellant Telen failed to produce before the authorities the required legal documents from the DENR pertaining to the said pieces of lumber.

The fact of possession by the appellant of the subject fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Antipolo and Dita lumber, as well as his subsequent failure to produce the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations constitute criminal liability for violation of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.[22] Section 68 of the code provides:Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License.-Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.


Appellant Telen contends that he secured verbal permission from Boy Leonor, Officer-in-Charge of the DENR-CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte before cutting the lumber, and that the latter purportedly assured him that written permit was not anymore necessary before cutting soft lumber, such as the Antipolo and Dita trees in this case, from a private track of land, to be used in renovating appellants house, provided that he would plant trees as replacements thereof, which he already did. It must be underscored that the appellant stands charged with the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, a special statutory law, and which crime is considered mala prohibita. In the prosecution for crimes that are considered mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law has been violated.[23] The motive or intention underlying the act of the appellant is immaterial for the reason that his mere possession of the confiscated pieces of lumber without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations gave rise to his criminal liability.

In any case, the mere allegation of the appellant regarding the verbal permission given by Boy Leonor, Officer in Charge of DENR-CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte, is not sufficient to overturn the established fact that he had no legal documents to support valid possession of the confiscated pieces of lumber. It does not appear from the record of this case that appellant exerted any effort during the trial to avail of the testimony of Boy Leonor to corroborate his allegation. Absent such corroborative evidence, the trial court did not commit an error in disregarding the bare testimony of the appellant on this point which is, at best, self-serving.[24]

The appellant cannot validly take refuge under the pertinent provision of DENR Administrative Order No. 79, Series of 1990[25] which prescribes rules on the deregulation of the harvesting, transporting and sale of firewood, pulpwood or timber planted in private lands. Appellant submits that under the said DENR Administrative Order No. 79, no permit is required in the cutting of planted trees within titled lands except Benguet pine and premium species listed under DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987, namely: narra, molave, dao, kamagong, ipil, acacia, akle, apanit, banuyo, batikuling, betis, bolong-eta, kalantas, lanete, lumbayao, sangilo, supa, teak, tindalo and manggis.

Concededly, the varieties of lumber for which the appellant is being held liable for illegal possession do not belong to the premium species enumerated under DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987. However, under the same DENR administrative order, a certification from the CENRO concerned to the effect that the forest products came from a titled land or tax declared alienable and disposable land must still be secured to accompany the shipment. This the appellant failed to do, thus, he is criminally liable under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 necessitating prior acquisition of permit and legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations. The pertinent portion of DENR Administrative Order No. 79, Series of 1990, is quoted hereunder, to wit:In line with the National Reforestation Program and in order to promote the planting of trees by owners of private lands and give incentives to the tree farmers, Ministry Administrative Order No. 4 dated January 19, 1987 which lifted the restriction in the harvesting, transporting and sale of firewood, pulpwood or timber produced from Ipil-Ipil (leucaenia spp) and Falcate (Albizzia falcataria) is hereby amended to include all other tree species planted in private lands except BENGUET PINE and premium hardwood species. Henceforth, no permit is required in the cutting of planted trees within the titled lands or tax declared A and D lands with corresponding application for patent or acquired through court proceedings, except BENGUET PINE and premium species listed under DENR Administrative Order No 78, Series of 1987, provided, that a certification of the CENRO concerned to the effect that the forest products came from a titled land or tax declared alienable and disposable land is issued accompanying the shipment.

Appellant Telen next contends that proof of value of the confiscated pieces of lumber is indispensable, it being the basis for the computation of the penalty prescribed in Article 309 in relation to Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code; and that in the absence of any evidence on record to prove the allegation in the Information that the confiscated pieces of lumber have an equivalent value of P23,500.00 there can be no basis for the penalty to be imposed and hence, he should be acquitted.

The appellants contention is untenable. It is a basic rule in criminal law that penalty is not an element of the offense. Consequently, the failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence in support of its allegation in the Information with respect to the value of the confiscated pieces of lumber is not necessarily fatal to its case. This Court notes that the estimated value of the confiscated pieces of lumber, as appearing in the official transmittal letter[26] of the DENR-CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte addressed to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of the same province, is P23,500.00 which is alleged in the Information. However, the said transmittal letter cannot serve as evidence or as a valid basis for the estimated value of the confiscated pieces of lumber for purposes of computing the proper penalty to be imposed on the appellant considering that it is hearsay and it was not formally offered in evidence contrary to Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In the case of People vs. Elizaga,[27] the accused-appellant therein was convicted of the crimes of homicide and theft, and the value of the bag and its contents that were taken by the accused-appellant from the victim was estimated by the prosecution witness to be P500.00. In the absence of a conclusive or definite proof relative to their value, this Court fixed the value of the bag and its contents at P100.00 based on the attendant circumstances of the case. More pertinently, in the case of People vs. Reyes,[28] this Court held that if there is no available evidence to prove the value of the stolen property or that the prosecution failed to prove it, the corresponding penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant should be the minimum penalty corresponding to theft involving the value of P5.00.

In the case at bench, the confiscated fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Dita and Antipolo lumber were classified by the CENRO officials as soft, and therefore not premium quality lumber. It may also be noted that the said pieces of lumber were cut by the appellant, a mere janitor in a public hospital, from the land owned by his mother, not for commercial purposes but to be utilized in the renovation of his house. It does not appear that appellant Telen had been convicted nor was he an accused in any other pending criminal case involving violation of any of the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code (P.D. No. 705, as amended). In view of the attendant circumstances of this case, and in the interest of justice, the basis for the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be the minimum amount under Article 309 paragraph (6) of the Revised Penal Code which carries the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods for simple theft.

Considering that the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the said decree, the imposable penalty on the appellant shall be increased by two degrees, that is, from arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods to prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods.[29] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[30] the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 1733 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant Pastor Telen is sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161798Oct 20, 2004PICOP RESOURCES, INC., Petitioner, Versus HON. AUGUSTUS L. CALO, Presiding Judge, RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 5, Butuan City, HON. VICTOR A. TOMANENG, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 5, Butuan City, EDUARDO CASIA, / ROGELIO CASTILLO, ULDARICO CASINGINAN, ELADIO GALANO, CATALINO VIRTUDAZO, RICARDO BALAD-ON, JOEL VILLAREAL, TIBURCIO IMPUERTO, HILARIO FERNANDEZ, ANDREA VASQUEZ, SPOUSES REMELITO CODERA and MARILYN RANOSO-CODERA, and FLORIO JOSAFAT, JR., for himself and in representation by way of a class suit the Members of the UNIFIED FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF BISLIG (UFAB), Respondents., R E S O L U T I O NTinga, J.:Petitioner PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) owns and operates a multi-billion peso pulp and paper manufacturing facility in Bislig City, Agusan del Norte. It holds government-issued Pulpwood and Timber License Agreement (PTLA) No. 47 and Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) No. 35 which gave petitioner the exclusive right to co-manage and develop with the State almost 130,000 hectares of forest land within the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through its officers, rendered three Memoranda, dated August 22, 1997,[1] February 16, 2001,[2] and April 6, 2001,[3] by virtue of which petitioner was designated a DENR depository and custodian for apprehended forest products and conveyances within its concession. On May 25, 2001, the Office of the CENRO-Bislig and petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) containing Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of Private Tree Plantation.[4] The MOA provided, among others, that field validation/verification of applications for Certificates of Private Tree Ownership (CTPOs) shall be conducted jointly by the DENR, the local government unit concerned, and petitioner. Pursuant to these Memoranda, petitioners security personnel were deputized as DENR officers to apprehend and seize the tools, equipment and conveyance used in the commission of illegal logging and the forest products removed and possessed by the offenders.

In the course of the enforcement of the aforesaid Memoranda, petitioner PICOP, through its security personnel, had on numerous occasions apprehended within its concession and tree plantation area, violators who loaded the illegally cut trees in trucks and other forms of conveyance, such as carabaos, for transport out of the plantation area. These illegally cut forest products and conveyances were kept in PICOPs impounding area.

On June 18, 2001, private respondents Eduardo Casia, Rogelio Castillo, Uldarico Casinginan, Eladio Galano, Catalino Virtudazo, Ricardo Balad-on, Joel Villareal, Tiburcio Impuerto, Hilario Fernandez, Andrea Vasquez, Spouses Remelito Codera and Marilyn Ranoso-Codera, and Florio Josafat, Jr., for himself and in representation, by way of a class suit, of the members of the UNITED FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF BISLIG (UFAB), filed a complaint for damages and injunction with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary mandatory injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, Agusan del Norte and Butuan City against the DENR Regional Office XIII (CARAGA) and/or its Regional Executive Director Elias C. Seraspi, Jr., Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) of Surigao del Sur, Agusan del Norte and Butuan City and/or their respective PENR Officers, Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO) of San Francisco, Bunawan, Lianga and Bislig and/or their respective CENR Officers, and herein petitioner PICOP/Wilfredo D. Fuentes.[5]

Private respondents-complainants were some of those apprehended by PICOPS security officers transporting without any permit several hundred cubic meters of falcata logs allegedly grown in petitioners plantation. The logs, trucks and other forms of conveyance on which they were carried were confiscated and kept in petitioners impounding area. Private respondents alleged in their complaint that the Memoranda dated August 22, 1997, February 16, 2001 and April 6, 2001 and the MOA dated May 25, 2001 were illegal for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. They sought to have the Memoranda declared null and void for this reason and also sought to restrain the DENR and all those acting for and in their behalf, including herein petitioner, from enforcing or implementing said Memoranda.

On September 21, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision.[6] With regard to private respondents allegation that the aforesaid Memoranda were illegally issued, the trial court disregarded the claim and sustained the validity of the Memoranda. The Memoranda were issuances of a duly-authorized government agency in the normal and regular course of its duty to enforce forestry laws and procedures. The RTC added that the application for the writ of preliminary injunction was the wrong remedy to assail the legality of the Memoranda, such an action being merely a collateral attack. Private respondents should instead have filed a petition to declare the Memoranda null and void. However, the trial court granted private respondents prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. It noted that administrative or criminal cases had been filed against private respondents involving the apprehended conveyances. The RTC ordered RED Elias R. Seraspio, Jr. to recall, withdraw and abrogate the enforcement of the assailed Memorandum dated February 16, 2001 and commanded all those acting pursuant to said Memorandum to refrain and desist from implementing the Memorandum. Petitioner was also ordered to release the confiscated falcata logs and vehicles to the owners thereof, or to the CENRO-Bislig or the Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur, where the administrative and criminal proceedings were ongoing.[7] Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied for lack of merit on October 17, 2001.[8]

On January 21, 2002, DENR-Region XIII RED Benjamin T. Tumaliuan issued a Memorandum revoking the February 16, 2001 Memorandum issued by former OIC-RED Constancio A. Paye, Jr.[9]

On April 29, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for is

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