G.R. No. 75028 November 8, 1991PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.PIOQUINTO DE JOYA y CRUZ,defendant-appellant.FELICIANO,J.:pIn an Information dated 5 May 1978, appellant Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz was charged before the Regional Trial Court, 3rd Judicial Region, Branch 14, Malolos, Bulacan with the crime of robbery with homicide committed as follows:That on or about the 31st day of January, 1978, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of (sic) gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner and, by means of violence and intimidation, take, carry and cart away two (2) rings, one (1) necklace, one (1) piece of earring, belonging to Arnedo Valencia y Angeles and Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac, to their damage and prejudice in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P550.00); and that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling him to take the said properties, the accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with treachery, evident premeditation and great advantage of superior strength, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac by stabbing and hitting the latter on her neck and other parts of her body with pointed instrument causing injuries which directly caused the death of the said Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac.That in the commission of the offense, the following aggravating circumstances were present (1) abuse of superior strength; (2) committed in the dwelling of the offended party; (3) disregard of age and sex; (4) abuse of confidence.Contrary to law.1At arraignment, appellant De Joya pleaded not guilty. After trial, the courta quorendered a decision dated 16 May 1986 convicting De Joya of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, committed with the aggravating circumstances of: abuse of superior strength, old age, disregard of sex the victim a woman 88 years old, the crime was committed in the dwelling of the victim. The accused being 72 years old death penalty cannot be imposed against him as provided in Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.The Court therefore, sentences the accused to LIFE IMPRISONMENT; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P20,000.00 and to pay damages in the amount of P550.00.The bond of the accused is ordered cancelled and the accused to be confined immediately in the National Penitentiary pending review of his case by the Supreme Court.The Clerk of Court is ordered to immediately forward the record of this case to the Supreme Court for review.SO ORDERED.2In this appeal, appellant raises a number of issues all of which, however, amount to one basic assertion: that the lower court erred in concluding that appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.The facts have been summarized in the brief of the Solicitor General in the following manner:

The spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia, together with their ten (10) year old son Alvin Valencia and Herminia Valencia's 88-year old mother, Eulalia Diamse, are residents of Balagtas St., Baliuag, Bulacan. (TSN, June 11, 1981, p. 2). Both spouses are teachers by profession.Arnedo Valencia teaches at the Tiaong Elementary School at Barrio Tiaong, Baliuag, Bulacan whereas Herminia Valencia teaches in an intermediate school at Baliuag, Bulacan. (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 7).In the afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia Salac-Valencia left for school to teach. Her mother Eulalia Diamse was then [sitting] at their sofa watching the television set. (TSN, October 12, 1978, p. 3).Her Son Alvin likewise left for school at 1:00 o'clock. And at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, his classes were dismissed and he proceeded home. (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 8).At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, the spouses Valencia's neighbor by the name of Gloria Capulong, together with a friend, went out of the former's house to visit a friend. While at her yard, Gloria Capulong looked back to the direction of the Valencia's house. She noticed appellant Pioquinto de Joya standing and holding a bicycle at the yard of the Valencia's. (TSN, June 11, 1981, pp. 2-4).When Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia Diamse lying down prostrate and drenched with her own blood. He immediately threw his bag and ran towards her. He then held her hands and asked her: "Apo, Apo, what happened?". (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 10).. . . [Eulalia Diamse held his hand and after which said: "Si Paqui". After saying these words, she let go of Alvin's hand and passed away. (TSN,Ibid., pp. 14 and 17).Alvin then called for his Nana Edeng and told her to see his lola because she was drenched with her own blood. His Nana Edeng told him to immediately see his mother Herminia Salac-Valencia to inform her of what happened. (TSN,Id).Upon seeing her mother, Alvin told her: "Mommy, Mommy, apo is drenched in her own blood." (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 20).Herminia immediately ran outside the school, flagged down a tricycle and went home. Alvin followed, riding his bicycle (TSN,Id., p. 21). When she reached their house, she found her mother lying prostrate in her own blood at their sala in front of the television. Her mother's hands were stretched open and her feet were wide apart. Blood was oozing out of her mother's ears. She then embraced her mother and placed her on the sofa. She asked Alvin and the tricycle driver to call Dr. Delfin Tolentino. (TSN, October 12,1978, pp. 25-26).Dr. Tolentino arrived at around 4:00 o'clock that same afternoon and examined the body of Eulalia Diamse. Said doctor declared that said Eulalia Diamse had a heart attack which caused her death. When asked by Herminia Valencia why her mother's ears were punctured, no reply was given by said doctor. Herminia requested for a death certificate, but Dr. Tolentino did not issue one and instead immediately left. (TSN,Ibid., pp. 27-29).Herminia found out that the two (2) gold rings worn by her mother were missing. The right earring of her mother was likewise missing. All of these were valued [at] P300.00 (TSN,Id., p. 15).That same afternoon, Herminia saw the room of the groundfloor ransacked. The contents of the wardrobe closet (aparador) were taken out. Its secret compartment/box was missing. And the lock of the aparador was destroyed. (TSN, October 12, 1978, pp. 15-17).When she went upstairs after putting her mother on a bed at the ground floor, she found the two (2) rooms thereat in disarray. She then caused the rooms and things photographed by a certain Ricardo Ileto (Exhibits "A" to "A-11"; TSN, October 12, 1978, p. 17).Later, Herminia went to Dr. Adela Cruz and pleaded [with] said doctor to issue a death certificate so that her mother could be embalmed. (TSN,Id., pp. 33-34).On the same night, Herminia found a beach walk step-in (Exhibit "B") by the side of the cabinet near the door of their room downstairs, more or less one meter from where the victim was lying prostrate. (TSN, October 12,1978, pp. 24-25).Herminia was able to recognize the said step-in because of its color and size, as the other half of the pair she bought for her husband Arnedo but which she gave to Socorro de Joya, the wife of herein appellant, before Christmas of 1977 when she saw the old and wornout pair of slippers of the latter. (TSN,Ibid.).Appellant Pioquinto de Joya visited the wake only once. During the second day of the four-day wake, Herminia saw herein appellant Pioquinto de Joya enter the kitchen and peep under the cabinet of the (Valencia's) house. (TSN,Id.).On February 3, 1978, a post-mortem examination was conducted by Dr. Romulo Madrid, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation. Per examination, the cause of the death arrived by Dr. Madrid was "shock, secondary to punctured wound neck" (Exhibit "D-1") situated at the right side of the neck, just below the right ear wherein it went out thru and thru, opposite, almost in the same location, from one side of the neck to the opposite side. (Exhibit "D-2").In its decision, the trial court became quite clear as to the factors which led to the judgment of conviction against appellant. These factors, as set out in the decision of the trial court, were the following:In the case at bar, the prosecution relied heavily on the circumstances surrounding the death of the victim as testified to by the witnesses and proven during the trial, also the dying statement of the deceased, which are: Herminia testified that two weeks before the incident the accused and the deceased quarreled over a bicycle which the former took from their house without the consent of the latter; that Exhibit "B" (step-in beach walk type) which was found near the cabinet one meter away from the body of the victim was identified by Herminia as the step-in that she gave to the wife of the accused and which she saw accused wearing on January 29, 1978 when she visited them in their house; the testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of January 31, 1978 at around 3:00 p.m. in the yard of Herminia standing and holding a bicycle; the accused admitted, although his wife is the sister of the husband of Herminia he never visited the deceased during the four days that it was lying in state without any justifiable reason and contrary to the ordinary experience of man; last but most convincing is the dying statement of the deceased when her grandson Alvin asked her "Apo, Apo, what happened?" and she answered, "Si Paki", then she expired. When Alvin was asked during his testimony who is this Paki, he identified the accused. The accused during his testimony never denied that he is called Paki.The foregoing circumstances established during the trial plus the dying statement of the deceased leads only to one fair and reasonable conclusion, that the accused is the author of the crime.Analyzing the above portion of the decision, the elements taken into account by the court in convicting appellant De Joya of robbery with homicide may be listed as follows:1. The dying statement made by the deceased victim to her grandson Alvin Valencia a 10-year old boy: "Si Paqui";2. The quarrel, which, according to Herminia Valencia, daughter of the deceased victim, took place two weeks before the robbery and homicide, between the appellant and the deceased over the use of a bicycle which appellant allegedly took from the Valencia's house without the consent of the victim;3. The rubber slipper, one of a pair, ("step-in beach walk type") which according to Herminia, she found near a cabinet in their house one (1) meter away from the body of the victim, and which Herminia identified as one of the pair that she had given to the wife of the accused the previous Christmas Season;

4. Accused was seen by one Gloria Capulong around 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon of 31 January 1978 in the yard of the Valencias, standing and holding a bicycle and doing nothing;5. The statement of appellant that he did not visit the deceased during the four-day wake.We turn first to the dying statement made by the victim when the 10-year old Alvin Valencia asked his grandmother who was sprawled on the floor of their house drenched with blood: "Apo, Apo, whathappened?" The deceased victim said: "Si Paqui". After uttering those two words, she expired. It is not disputed that "Paqui" is the nickname of appellant Pioquinto de Joya. It must be noted at once, however, that the words "SiPaqui" do not constitute by themselves a sensible sentence. Those two words could have been intended to designate either (a) the subject of a sentence or (b) the object of a verb. If they had been intended to designate the subject, we must note that no predicate was uttered by the deceased. If they were designed to designate the object of a verb, we must note once more that no verb was used by the deceased. The phrase "Si Paqui" must, moreover, be related to the question asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo, whathappened?" Alvin's question was not: "Apo, Apo, whodid this to you?"It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that constituted theres gestaeof the subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact.3The doctrine of completeness has also been expressed in the following terms in Prof. Wigmore's classic work:The application of the doctrine of completeness is here peculiar.The statement as offered must not be merely apart of the whole as it was expressed by the declarant; it must be complete as far it goes.But it is immaterial how much of the whole affair of the death is related, provided the statement includes all that the declarant wished or intended to include in it. Thus,if an interruption (by death or by an intruder) cuts short a statement which thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person wished to make, the fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the whole might be of a very different effect from that of the fragment;yet if the dying person finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told only a portion of what he might have been able to tell.4(Emphasis supplied)The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by death or other circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified by the statements which he was prevented from making. That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are received.5It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete. In other words, the deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The trial court simplyassumedthat by uttering the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name the person who had thrust some sharp instrument through and through her neck just below her ears.But Eulalia herself did not say soand we cannot speculate what the rest of her communication might have been had death not interrupted her. We are unable to regard the dying statement as a dying declaration naming the appellant as the doer of the bloody deed.The other elements taken into account by the trial court are purely circumstantial in nature. When these circumstances are examined one by one, none of them can be said to lead clearly and necessarily to the conclusion that appellant had robbed and killed the deceased Eulalia Diamse. The quarrel over the use of the bicycle which was supposed to have taken place two weeks before Eulalia's death does not, in our view, constitute adequate proof of a motive capable of moving a person to slay another in such a violent and gory manner. Failure to prove a credible motive where no identification was shown at all, certainly weakens the case of the prosecution.

The testimony of Herminia Valencia about the single slipper that she found near or under the cabinet in the living room where Eulalia Diamse was slain, can scarcely be regarded as conclusive evidence that such slipper was indeed one of the very same pair of slippers that she had given to appellant's wife, who was also the sister of Herminia's husband. Rubber or beach, walk slippers are made in such quantities by multiple manufacturers that there must have been dozens if not hundreds of slippers of the same color, shape and size as the pair that Herminia gave to appellant's wife. And even if conclusive identification of the slippers had been offered, and it is assumed that appellant (rather than his wife) had worn those very slippers on that fatal afternoon, still the presence of that singular slipper did not clearly and directly connect the appellant to the robbery or the slaying. At most, under that assumption, the presence of that slipper in the house of the Valencias showed that the accused had gone to the house of the Valencias and there mislaid that slipper. We note in this connection, that appellant himself had testified that he did enter the house of the Valencias that afternoon, butafterthe killing of Eulalia Diamse had been perpetrated, and there had found many persons in the house viewing the body.The testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of 31 January 1978around3:00 p.m. in the yard of the Valencias, standing and holding a bicycleand doing nothingis, by itself, not proof of any act or circumstance that would show that appellant had perpetrated the slaying or the robbery. The behaviour of the appellant, as testified to by Gloria Capulong, offers no basis for supposing that appellant, himself 72 years of age, had just slain an 88-year old woman by skewering her through the neck and had ransacked both floors of the Valencia house.Appellant's failure to present himself to pay his respects to the deceased or her immediate family during the four-day wake, does not give rise to any inference that appellant was the slayer of Eulalia Diamse. Appellant had explained that he had been busily at work, sewing and carrying on his trade as a tailor. Appellant, as already noted, had dropped in the Valencias' house in the afternoon Eulalia Diamse was killed and had viewed the body (before it was lying in state) along with several other persons. His reluctance or inability to participate in the formal wake is not necessarily a sign of guilt. We are unable to agree with the trial judge that such behaviour was "contrary to the ordinary experience of man" although respect for the dead is a common cultural trait of the Filipinos.In the Solicitor-General's brief, it is casually contended that the circumstantial evidence against appellant included: "the attempt on the part of appellant Pioquinto de Joya through his counsel to settle the case amicably."6We have examined the testimony that the Solicitor General pointed to in referring to a supposed attempt to settle the criminal charge amicably. That testimony, given by Arnedo Valencia, son-in-law of the deceased Eulalia Diamse and brother-in-law of appellant Pioquinto de Joya, was as follows:Q You also testified that before the release of the accused from the municipal jail, you had a conversation with him, is that right?

A Yes, air.Q What was this conversation about?A He called for me and took me to his counsel Atty. Aguilar and according to him if only Atty. Aguilar can talk with me, everything will be settled.Q Have you seen and talked to this Atty. Aguilar?A Yes, I went with him to Manila, sir.Q When was this?A The time he was fetched out of jail.Q You are referring to the municipal jail?A Yes, sir.Q What did you and Atty. Aguilar discuss when you finally was able to see Atty. Aguilar?A When I went there, I was introduced to Atty. Aguilar and Atty. Aguilar asked me as to what I liked to happen.Q What did you say?A I said if it will be settled, well and good.Q Anything else that transpired?A He even told me if I might be able to convince both my wife and her sisters.Q Did he tell you he can settle this?A He was very certain that he can settle this,the very reason why he told me because I was very certain as to what happened.Q Was the accused Pioquinto de Joya present when you were discussing this with his lawyer?A Yes, sirQ He heard what his, lawyer was telling you?A It is possiblebecause he is only one or two meters distance away.Q Did the accused say anything?A None, sir.(Emphasis supplied)

We find the above testimony quite impalpable and inconclusive so far as a supposed attempt of appellant, through his counsel, to offer a compromise on the criminal charge is concerned. We are aware of the provision of Section 24 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides thatSec. 24. Offer to compromise not admission. An offer of compromise is not an admission that anything is due, and is not admissible in evidence against the person making the offer.However, in criminal cases which are not allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. (Emphasis supplied)We do not, however, feel justified in concluding from the above testimony from a member of the (extended) family of the deceased victim that "an offer of compromise" had been made "by the accused" nor that "an implied admission of guilt" on the part of the appellant may be reasonably inferred in the instant case. The trial court itself made no mention of any attempt on the part of appellant to settle the criminal case amicably through the defense counsel; we must assume that the trial court either did not believe that appellant had tried to compromise the criminal case or considered that appellant could not fairly be deemed to have impliedly admitted that he had indeed robbed and killed Eulalia Diamse. A much higher level of explicitness and specific detail is necessary to justify a conclusion that an accused had impliedly admitted his guilt of a crime as serious as robbery with homicide.The totality of the case made out against appellant De Joya thus consists of an incomplete, aborted, dying declaration and a number of circumstances which, singly or collectively, do not necessarily give rise to a compelling inference that appellant had indeed robbed and slain Eulalia Diamse. We consider, after prolonged scrutiny, that the sum total of the evidence in the instant case is insufficient to induce that moral certainty of guilt which characterizes proof beyond reasonable doubt. The conscience of the Court remains uneasy and unsettled after considering the nature and speculative character of the evidence supporting the judgment of conviction.The Court must, accordingly, hold as it hereby holds that appellant's guilt of the crime of robbery and homicide was not shown beyond reasonable doubt.ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 16 May 1986 is hereby REVERSED and appellant Pioquinto de Joya is hereby ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-45470 February 28, 1985THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.GREGORIO LAQUINON, alias "JOLLY",defendant-appellant.CONCEPCION, JR.,J.:Accused Gregorio Laquinon was charged with the crime of murder in the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur for the killing of Pablo Remonde, coated as follows:That on or about November 13, 1972, in the Municipality of Hagonoy, Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with treachery and evident premeditation, armed with a gun and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one Pablo Remonde with said weapon, inflicting upon the latter wounds which caused his death.After the trial, the lower court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him as follows:IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and imposes upon him the penalty ofreclusion perpetua(Art. 248, Revised Penal Code); to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P 12,000.00 and to pay the costs.From the foregoing judgment, accused Gregorio Laquinon interposed the present appeal.The People's version of the case is as follows:On November 13, 1972, at about 11:30 o'clock in the evening, Samama Buat, barrio captain of Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur, was at his residence in barrio Clib. In a short while he heard gunshots coming from the bank of a river some three hundred meters to the south of his house (pp. 4-6, tsn, Dec. 8, 1975). Then, his brother, Leocario Buat, arrived and told him that a man was shouting for help at the bank of the river. Samama Buat told his brother to call the barrio councilman. Thereafter, he proceeded to the place where the unidentified man was. His brother, Leocario and the barrio councilman also arrived there. Samama Buat found the man lying on the sand and asked who he was. The man answered, "I am Pablo Remonde" (pp 7-10,Id.). Remonde's two hands were tied on his back. He was lying face down (p. 10, Id).Samama Buat then took the "ante mortem" statement of Pablo Remonde. He asked him who he was to which he answered that he was Pablo Remonde. Samama Buat asked "who shot you" and Remonde said that it was Gregorio Laquinon. He asked Pablo Remonde whether from the gunshot wounds he suffered he would survive to which the victim answered "I do not know" (pp. 11, 19, 21,Id.; see also Exh. A, Folder of Exhibits). After that, barrio captain Buat went to the municipality of Hagonoy and reported to Vice Mayor Antonio Biran the shooting of Pablo Remonde. Vice Mayor Biran went to the scene of the incident and asked the victim who shot him to which the latter answered that he was shot by Gregorio Laquinon (pp. 21 A to 23, tsn, Dec. 8, 1975). Pablo Remonde was placed on a jeep of the Vice Mayor and brought to the hospital (p. 23, Id,). Pablo Remonde was admitted to the Canos Hospital in Digos, Davao del Sur where he was attended to by Dr. Alfonso Llanos. Dr. Llanos performed an operation on the victim from whose body a slug was recovered (pp. 15-16, tsn, Jan. 26, 1976; Exh. B). Pablo Remonde died in the hospital on November 16, 1972 because of bullet wounds (pp. 17-20, tsn, Jan. 26, 1976; see also clinical chart. Exh. C, Folder of Exhibits).The accused Gregorio Laquinon denied having killed the deceased. The trial court summarized his defense, as follows:

In his defense, the accused declared that he was a KM member; that he was ordered by one Noli Cabardo, then their CO, to fetch Pablo Remonde; he requested one Cristino Nerosa to go with him, and matter of factly, they brought Remonde to the place where said CO Cabardo with ten companions, was waiting at the riverbank; that before reaching the place, Nerosa separated from him and he alone brought Remonde to Cabardo. There Cabardo confronted Remonde why, having been commanded to buy some provisions in Matanao, he (Remonde) never returned; to which Remonde answered that he spent the money 'in drinking and gambling;when uponCabardo got mad and as Remonde attempted to escape, he (witness) heard a shot which must have been fired by Cabardo as he was holding a .38 Cal. revolver; that he (witness) also had that evening a Cal. 22paltik; that after the shot he saw Remonde sprawled on the ground, and then Cabardo ordered them to go to the mountain as in fact they did; that two days later during the day, their mountain camp was raided by the PC and Cabardo and two others were killed while he (witness) was able to escape and went to Magpet, North Cotabato, and engaged in farming therein with his relatives; but believing that as a KM member he 'cmmitted something,' he surrendered to the Davao PC Barracks in May, 1975 (Exhibit '2'), where up to now he is being confined.The accused-appellant prays for the reversal of the appealed judgment on the ground that the lower court erred in finding him guilty of the crime charged on the basis of the statement attributed to the deceased Pablo Remonde which reads:

Q State your name and other personal circumstances.A Pablo Remonde y Saballa, 24 years old, laborer and resident of Pob. this mun.Q Who shot you?A Mr. Laquinon, a person who ran for councilor before the ticket of Liberal last local election and son of Suelo Maravllias whose name I don't know.Q Why you were shot by said persons above?A They are suspecting me that I'm an informer of Vice Mayor Viran regarding KM .Q Do you think you'll die with your wound?A I don't know sir.

The accused-appellant argues that the foregoing statement is inadmissible in evidence as an ante-mortem declaration because it was not executed under a consciousness of an impending death; and that the deceased was not a competent witness.The fact that the deceased had named the son of Suelo Maravillas who turned out as Cristino Nerosa as one of those who shot him in his dying declaration does not make the deceased an incompetent witness. Nor does it render said dying declaration incredible of belief. The testimony of the accused that he and Nerosa separated and that he alone brought the deceased to Noli Cabardo is not corroborated. It may be that Nerosa was with the accused when the latter shot the deceased, as stated in the dying declaration, but that the accused testified that Nerosa was not with him when he brought the deceased to Noli Cabardo in order to free Nerosa from criminal liability.Nor does the testimony of Barrio Captain Samama Buat that the place was dark and that the victim had told him that he was shot by members of the KM make the deceased an incompetent witness. On the contrary, it strengthens the statement of the deceased since the accused is a member of the KM.But the dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himselfin extremist,"at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule."1It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made immediately after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused.On the whole, We are satisfied with the findings of the trial court that the accused was responsible for the killing of Pablo Remonde. We cite with approval the following observations of the trial court:Indeed, the Court cannot believe that CO Cabardo did the killing as related by the accused for the following reasons:First, when the deceased was allegedly delivered to CO Cabardo, he was already hand-tied at his back, that the place of the shooting was "covered by thick bushes and beside the river", and that CO Cabardo was with ten men excluding the accused; under these circumstances, it is hard to believe that the deceased, with all those overwhelming handicap, would attempt to flee.Second, if the deceased truly tried to flee, the logical thing he would do would beto flee away from and not towards Cabardo; in doing the former he would turn to his right or to his left or towards his back; if he fled to his left or right, or towards his back, he would be exposing one side of his body, or his back, and when fired upon in that position he would have been hit on one side of the body or at his back. The evidence as testified to by Dr. Llanos however, shows that the deceased had onlyone wounda gunshot wound,in the abdomen;this shows he was fired upon frontally, the bullet going through and through the intestines and lodged, presumably in the bony portions of his back, that is why the slug (Exhibit "B") was recovered. The accused's version, therefore, that the deceased tried to flee is hard to believe for being against the physical facts.Now, if the accused is innocent, why should he relate such an incredible version?Oh what a tangled web they weave when first day practice to deceive.With these observations, the Court cannot believe that the accused really delivered the deceased to CO Cabardo and that it was Cabardo who shot him. As testified to by him, their mountain camp was raided by the PC two days after the incident, as a result of which raid Cabardo and two of their companions were killed. The accused himself was able to escape, went to hide in a relative's farm in faraway Magpet, North Cotabato, did farming there until one day in May, 1975, repentant that, as a KM member, he had "committed something", he finally surrendered to the PC Barracks in Davao City. Cabardo, may he rest in peace, having gone to the other world, and can no longer speak in his behalf, it is not unlikely that the accused conceived of this outlandish defense by pointing to CO Cabardo, to free himself from responsibility.Most important to remember on this point is that at the time the deceased grade his "dying" statement, Cabardo was still alive; that per the accused himself, he had no previous differences with the deceased or with the barrio captain; and that from the prosecution witness Bo. Capt. Buat when he took the statement of the deceased, the deceased was feeling strong, surely, under such circumstances it is hard to believe that the deceased would name the accused with whom he had no quarrel and Nerosa as his killers if that was really not the truth.Accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery. The victim was apparently shot while his two hands were tied at his back. Accused, in shooting the victim, obviously employed means or force in the execution of the offense which tended directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.WHEREFORE, with the modification that the indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the deceased is increased to P30,000.00, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED. With costs against the appellant.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-29365 March 25, 1983THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.TEODORO ALCOBER GUERON and EMILIO MAGNO, defendants, TEODORO ALCOBER GUERON,defendant-appellant,ABAD SANTOS,J.:In the Court of First Instance of Samar (now Regional Trial Court), an information for "double murder" was filed against TEODORO ALCOBER GUERON and EMILIO MAGNO, Docketed as Criminal Case No. 6996, the information reads:That on or about the 7th day of October, 1964, in the Municipality of Sta. Rita, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another with one Jesus Magno alias Osing, who is still at large, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation, armed with guns and at night time, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Bonifacio Dayoc and Dalmacio Batica with said guns which the accused had conveniently provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon said Bonifacio Dayoc and Dalmacio Batica several wounds on the different parts of their bodies which wounds caused their death.The trial court rendered the following judgment:THEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding and declaring the defendants Teodoro Alcober Gueron and Emilio Magno guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of double murder as charged, with one aggravating and no mitigating circumstance attending; and convicts each one of them to RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties, indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Bonifacio Dayoc ten thousand pesos, and those of Dalmacio Batica also ten thousand pesos, and pay the costs.Only Teodoro Alcober Gueron appealed. Pending appeal he has been confined at the New Bilibid Prisons.The People's version of the facts is as follows:On August 9, 1964, the spouses Bonifacio Dayoc and Purificacion Comillor were in barrio Cabacungan, Sta. Rita, Samar, to witness the cockfight and to buy salted fish (pp. 65, 66, t.s.n., Rojas). There, Bonifacio met Emilio Magno, who was from Burauen, Leyte, and was told that he was going to organize a 'gang' composed of youngsters from Bagolibas, Cabacungan, Pagsulhugan and Crossing (p. 66, t.s.n., Rojas). Bonifacio replied that Emilio was just a newcomer in the place and a member of his family had just died and yet he was stirring up trouble (p. 66, t.s.n., Rojas). Emilio retorted, 'I know you are Borenes (p. 66, t.s.n., Rojas). 'I am not Borenes, but I am Bonifacio. Don't call me Borenes,' answered Bonifacio (P. 66, t.s.n., Rojas). Emilio rejoined. 'Let us know each other,' and extended his hand to shake Bonifacio's as he repeated,' Let us know each other, Borenes' (p. 66, t.s.n., Rojas). Bonifacio reiterated, 'I am not Boranes, I am Bonifacio' and said, 'Let us consume the whole tuba' (p. 66, t.s.n., Rojas). After finishing his drink, Bonifacio struck Emilio with his glass hitting him on the face (p. 66, t.s.n., Rojas). Then he went up the table and kicked Emilio on the head who thus fell flat on the face (p. 66, t.s.n., Rojas). Bonifacio ordered Emilio to get up and fight, but the latter did not; instead, he ran home and got a bolo (p. 66, t.s.n., Rojas). Bonifacio in turn got his own (p. 66, t.s.n., Rojas). Emilio struck Bonifacio but did not hit him; Bonifacio retaliated (p. 67, t.s.n., Rojas). Then Emilio ran home and did not leave his house anymore (p. 67, t.s.n., Rojas). Because Emilio refused to come down, Bonifacio went home with his wife (p. 67, t.s.n., Rojas).In the morning of October 7, 1964, Teodoro Gueron came to the house of Bonifacio Dayoc to sell him coconuts and to borrow P 60 from him (p. 67, t.s.n., Rojas). Because Bonifacio had not yet received his salary, he told Teodoro to meet him in the evening at sitio Crossing as he might be able to get his pay from Almendras Enterprises, where he was working, and give him the money (p. 68, t.s.n., Rojas).

The next morning, somebody informed Bonifacio's wife that her husband (Bonifacio) was dead on the road (p. 68, t.s.n.,Rojas). When she went to the place to verify, she found him lying lifeless (p. 68, t.s.n., Rojas). Upon inquiring from his companion what happened to both of them, Dalmacio Batica told her they were shot by Teodoro Gueron, Jesus Magno and Emilio Magno the night before (p. 68, t.s.n., Rojas).At about 9:30 o'clock in the evening of October 7, 1964, while Antonio Beron, who was employed as scaler at the logging camp of F.M. Cojuanco Enterprises in Guintigian was afoot on the way home to barrio Bagolibas, Santa Rita, Samar, he heard two gun reports after reaching sitio Crossing (pp. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, t.s.n., Rojas). He continued walking, wondering whether somebody was hunting (p. 31, t.s.n., Rojas). A little later, he met two persons walking hurriedly, whom he recognized to be Teodoro Gueron, and Jesus Magno, when he focused his flashlight at them the former trying to conceal something, (pp. 31, 34, 35, 36, 37. t.s.n., Rojas; Exhibit F, p. 51, rec.). Teodoro Gueron was a former employee of the logging company where he worked, and Jesus Magno was his friend (pp. 31, 37, t.s.n., Rojas). When he asked where they came from, neither of them answered him but kept on walking hurriedly (p. 32, t.s.n., Rojas; Exhibit F, p. 51, rec.) Early next morning, Beron's mother-in-law Valentina Ronda, told him two persons had been shot near Bagolibas, Sta. Rita, Samar and when he asked who they were, she answered it was Bonifacio Dayoc and Dalmacio Batica (p. 33, t.s.n., Rojas). After a hurried breakfast, Beron repaired to the place and found Bonifacio dead being covered with a piece of cloth by his wife (p. 33, t.s.n., Rojas). When he inquired about Dalmacio, he was told he was at his house where he was lying wounded (p. 33, t.s.n., Rojas).In the evening of October 7, 1964, after her husband, Jesus Q. Batica, Sr., a teacher in barrio Bagolibas, Sta. Rita, Samar, had returned home from school where he prepared the questions to be given during an examination, his wife, Eustaquia A. Batica, also a teacher in the same school, heard the barking of dogs in front of their house (pp. 5, 6, 18, 19, t.s.n., Rojas). When she opened the window and focused a flashlight toward the road, Eustaquia saw Emilio Magno, whom she knew since about a year before because he used to pass by in going to sitio Crossing, wearing a red shirt, black pants and a hat, and carrying a gun in his right hand running (pp. 19, 21, 24, 25, t.s.n.,). At once, she closed the window because she became afraid when she saw the gun (p. 19, t.s.n., Rojas). While already in bed, Eustaquia told her husband that she saw Emilio Magno pass by with a gun and that while he was away she heard two gun reports, faintly coming from the junction of the town of Basey, but her husband told her not to mind it (p. 6, 7, 12, 20, t.s.n., Rojas). 'Then they thought of his son and her stepson Dalmacio Batica, whose house was about 30 meters away from theirs, if he was at home, and surmised that he was out because they could not hear him coughing (pp. 7, 20, t.s.n., Rojas). Afterwards both fell asleep (pp. 7, 21, t.s.n., Rojas).Early in the morning of the next day, October 8, 1964, while the spouses Bernardo Rama and Pacita Rama were on the way to the farm owned by Jesus Batica, Sr., to plant rice, they found his son Dalmacio on the side of the highway lying on his left side, wounded and bleeding (pp. 46, 47, 59, 60, 61, t.s.n., Rojas). When Bernardo asked what happened to him, Dalmacio replied that he and Bonifacio Dayoc were shot the night before by Teodoro Gueron, Emilio Magno and Jesus Magno (pp. 48, 49, 60, t.s.n., Rojas). Bernardo saw Bonifacio about 25 meters away already dead and bathed in his own blood (pp. 50, 51, t.s.n., Rojas). Dalmacio then requested the spouses to inform his father of what had befallen him (pp. 47, 62. t.s.n., Rojas).The spouses Jesus Batica, Sr. and Eustaquia A. Batica had just awakened when Bernardo and his wife arrived at their house telling them that Dalmacio was in the farm; that he told Bernardo and his wife to inform them that he was shot by Teodoro Gueron, Jesus Magno and Emilio Magno; that he could not walk by himself alone, hence he should be fetched; and that Bonifacio Dayoc was in the same place (pp, 8, 12, 21, 51, 59, 62, 64, t.s.n., Rojas).Jesus Sr. lost no time in ordering his son, Jesus, Jr. to get a hammock and, together with him, Romeo Badaa, Jesus Yerro, Dominador Armada, Francisco Yerro, a rural policeman and other, repaired to the place where Dalmacio was (pp. 8, 22, t.s.n. Rojas). After placing him on the hammock. they brought him to his (Dalmacio's house where his brother Jesus, Jr., the barrio captain, took his statement in writing, which was recorded by his own father, Jesus, Sr. in the typewriter (pp 9, 10, 22, 23, 62, 63, t.s.n., Rojas; Exhibits A, A-1 pp. 3, 47, rec.), as follows:

Q What happened to you?A Teddy (Teodoro Alcober), Osing (Jesus Magno) and his brother Eming (Emilio Magno) shot me.Q Who was with you when you were shot at?A Boning (Bonifacio Dayoc).Q What was your position when you were together?A We were breast to breast. I was at his right side.Q Where was the one who shot you?A Above the road at the throught cut at the avocado plantation.Q How far to you?A More or less five Brazas.Q Do you know that Boning is dead?A No.Q Did you notice if Boning was hit when you were fired at?A I did not.Q Why did you know the one who shot you?A Because when we were flashlighted at I focused my flashlight atthem.Q What happened to your flashlight?A I did not know the moment I was hit on my thighs.Q Where else were you hit?A At my left arm and at my back.Q Why were you there at our rice plantation?A Because I managed to crawl slowly.Q Why did you not go home?A I could not resist due to my wounds.Q Do you have personal grudges with those who shot you?A None.Q On what side were the ones who shot you?A On our left side, near our avocado plantation.Q What time were you shot?A About 10:00 o'clock in the evening, October 7, 1964.Q Where did you come from?A From Crossing at Madi Tarcing.Q What did you do in your Madi Tarcing?A I paid my debt.Q You only reached Crossing?A No.Q Where else did you go?A We went to Landing, drew our salary with Boning.Q What time did you go to Landing?A About 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, October 7, 1964.Q Do you have any grudge with those persons who shot you?A None.Q Did you quarrel with them? during your trip?A None.Q You and Boning, did you not quarrel?A None.Q Will you die of your wounds?A I cannot ascertain.Q What do you feel of your wounds?A I feel weak and I am thirsty.Q Can you sign these, your answers?A Yes, sir." (Exhibit A-1, p. 47, rec.)

Afterwards they brought him to the provincial hospital in Tacloban, where he expired at 9:20 o'clock in the morning of the next day, October 8, 1964 (Exhibit D, p. 19; rec.; Exhibit E-I, p. 50, rec.). Cause of death was toxemia and shock due to multiple gunshot wounds (Exhibits D, D-1, p. 19, rec.)According to the autopsy report, the cause of Bonifacio Dayoc's death was severe internal hemorrhage due to the injury of the right auricle of the heart (Exhibits B, B-1, pp. 15, 16, rec.; Exhibit C, p. 15, rec.). (Brief, pp. 2- 9.)The appellant claims that:I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE AFFIDAVIT OF DALMACIO BATICA AS PART OF THERES GESTAE.II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RESOLVING DOUBTS AGAINST THE ACCUSED.III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF NIGHT TIME AGAINST THE ACCUSED.None of the witnesses for the prosecution actually saw Gueron and Magno in the act of shooting Dayoc and Batica. The testimonial evidence in respect of the shooting is purely circumstantial with the exception of Exhibit A the affidavit of the deceased Dalmacio Batica-which has been reproduced above.In appreciating Exhibit A, the trial court said:It is indeed clear that the statements contained in Exhibits "A", having been given by the victim soon after the incident, at the time when he had not yet the least chance of twisting the truth, especially at the critical condition in which he was then found, informing and describing the manner of assault and naming the assailants, were the facts of the incident. Exhibit "A", therefore, shall be, as it is hereby admitted as part of the declaration of Jesus Batica, Sr., and the statements therein contained as part of theres gestae,and valid as proof.The appellant now claims that it was error for the trial court to regard Exhibit A as part of theres gestae.We do not agree.The hearsay rule excludes evidence that cannot be tested by cross- examination. Exhibit A would normally be classified as hearsay because the one who executed it could not be cross-examined on it during the trial; he was dead. But there are exceptions to the hearsay rule. One of them is that provided in Sec. 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, as follows:Sec. 36. Part of the res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as a part of theres gestae.So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as a part of theres gestae.Bearing in mind the circumstances narrated above under which Exhibit A was executed, there can be no doubt that it is admissible in evidence as part of theres gestae.(People vs. Portento, 48 Phil. 971 [1924]; People vs. Reyes, 52 Phil. 538 [1928]; People vs. Quianzon, 62 Phil. 162 [1935]; People vs. Reyes, 82 Phil. 563 [1949]; People vs. Mascarias, 94 Phil. 293 [1954].)Another exception to the hearsay rule is the dying declaration. Sec. 31 of Rule 130 provides:Sec. 31. Dying Declaration. The declaration of a dying person made under a consciousness of an impending death, may be received in a criminal case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

Exhibit A is admissible in evidence as an ante-mortem declaration considering that it was made under consciousness of impending death; the declarant died the next day from the gunshot wounds he sustained. (People vs. Mascarinas, 94 Phil. 293 [1954]; People vs. de Ananias, 96 Phil. 979 [1955]; Cruz vs. People, 71 Phil. 350 [1941]; People vs. Alfaro, 83 Phil. 85 [1949].)The second assignment of error is but a consequence of the first and does not have to be discussed.The trial court said that "The assault was with treachery which qualified the killing as double murder, as the means employed by the assailants, with the use of firearm, insured the execution of the assault without risk to themselves from the defense which the victims could have made. In the commission, the presence of the aggravating circumstance of night time is evident, the offenders having taken advantage of the darkness to commit it with greater facility and/or impunity. "The appellant questions the appreciation of nocturnity. We agree for nocturnity is absorbed byalevosia(People vs. Pardo, 79 Phil. 568 [1947]; People vs. Balagtas, 68 Phil. 675 [1939]; People vs. Ballocanag, 83 Phil. 569 [1949]; People vs. Pengzon, 44 Phil. 224 [1922]; U.S. vs. Buncad, 25 Phil. 530 [1913]; People vs. Alfaro, 83 Phil. 85 [1949]; U.S. vs. Empeinado, 9 Phil. 613 [1908]; People vs. Enot, L-17530, Oct. 30,1962, 6 SCRA 325).Two murders were committed which means there must be a penalty for each murder. Absent aggravating and mitigating circumstances the appropriate penalty isreclusion perpetuafor each murder. Moreover, the civil indemnity should be P 12,000.00 for each death,WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court convicting the, appellant is affirmed but modified in that he shall suffer the penalty of two (2) reclusion perpetua and indemnify the heirs of the two deceased in the amount of Twelve Thousand (P12,000.00) Pesos each. Costs against the appellant.SO ORDERED,

G.R. No. L-31782 December 14, 1979THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.TEODORO LANZA,defendant-appellant.Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, Criminal Case No. 4626, finding appellant Teodoro Lanza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetuawith the accessories of the law; to indemnify the lawful heirs of the deceased in the sum of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to pay the widow of said deceased the sum of P2,000.00 as moral damages and P500.00 as hospital and burial expenses; and to pay the costs.In a complaint filed by the Acting Chief of Police of Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte, dated October 10, 1966, appellant Teodoro Lanza was charged with the crime of Murder, as follows:That on or during the 8th day of October, 1966, at around 1:00 A.M. at the Poblacion, Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte, Philippines and within the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a knife, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and wound therewith one LEONARDO ZAMORAS at the back and as a result of which the said Leonardo Zamoras died a few days later.ALL CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation and the generic aggravating circumstance of nighttime. (CFI Record, p. 1).Thereafter, or on February 8, 1967, the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Norte filed the corresponding Information against herein appellant, who was subsequently arraigned on May 2, 1967. He entered a plea of not guilty.The prosecution's primary evidence against herein appellant is theante mortemstatement of the victim (Exhibit "A"), taken by Cpl. Fortunato Salaveria on October 8, 1966 at the North General Clinic of Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte, which reads as follows:

Q. What is your name?A. Leonardo Zamoras, 34 years old, married and a resident of Galas, Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte.Q. What happened to you?A. I was stabbed.Q. Who stabbed you?A. I was stabbed by a person who followed me from the Municipal Building.Q. In what particular place were you stabbed?A. At the Shell gasoline station.Q. Do you know the person who stabbed you?A. I can recognize him by face.

Q. If I present the person to you can you recognize him? I am presenting to you Teodoro Lanza is he the very person who stabbed you last night, October 7, 1966?A. Yes, sir.Q. Did you have any misunderstanding prior to the incident?A. None, sir.Q. What must have been the motive of stabbing you, then?A. I believe he resented (it) when I accidentally stepped on the shoulder of his wife who happened to be lying on the concrete floor of the Municipal Building.Q. How many times did he stab you?A. Only once.

Q. Do you think you will survive as a result of your wounds?

A. It all depends. (CFI Record, pp.166-168).

Fortunato Salaveria, Police Sergeant of the Dipolog Police Force, testified that at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning of October 8, 1966, he was ordered by the Acting Chief of Police, Ciriaco Gonzales, to take theante mortemstatement of one Leonardo Zamoras, who had been -,tabbed and was then at the North General Clinic at Torno, Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte. Upon arrival at the aforesaid clinic, he found Leonardo Zamoras in critical condition. He then took theante mortemstatement of Leonardo Zamoras (Exhibits "A", "A-1 " and "A-2") by writing in longhand the questions and answers of the victim. This was done in the presence of several persons, including Jose Zamoras, brother of the victim. Afterwards, Leonardo Zamoras affixed his left and right thumbmarks on theante mortemstatement. He affirmed that all the answers therein were gived by Leonardo Zamoras. P.G. Sales, a nurse at the clinic signed the statement as a witness to its execution (Exhibit "A-8").Salaveria further testified that while taking the victim's statement, he called up the Chief of Police and requested him to bring the accused to the clinic for Identification by the victim; that at that time Teodoro Lanza was already being detained at the municipal jail of Dipolog as a suspect in the stabbing; that when appellant was brought infront of the victim, the latter Identified him as the very same person who stabbed him.On cross examination, this witness stated that when he arrived at the clinic, the victim was still alive and lying in bed, with his eyes closed; that he called the victim by name, Identified himself and when the latter agreed, he took the statement iii the presence of several relatives of the victim.Basilia Luna Vda, de Zamoras, widow of the victim, testified for the prosecution, stating that in the morning of October 8, 1966, while she was in her house, she was informed by her brother-in-law, Artemio Zamoras, that her husband was at the North general Clinic. When she went to the clinic, she found her husband lying on the bed. He was feverish and his clothes were bloody and he had a wound on the back. She likewise Identified the shirt worn by her husband on the night of the incident, showing the hole (Exhibit "C") allegedly caused by the stab wound.Jose Zamoras, brother of the deceased, corroborated policeman, Salaveria's testimony, stating that he stayed in the North General Clinic until the following day and was present when Cpl. Salaveria took theante mortemstatement of his brother; that while the statement was being taken, he was about one-half meter from Cpl. Salaveria and Leonardo Zamoras; that when asked who stabbed him, Leonardo Zamoras pointed to Teodoro Lanza, who was present; that at that time, the condition of his brother was "not so serious"; that theante mortemstatement was taken at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning of October 8, 1966, and his brother died on October 9, 1966, at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon.When asked whether his brother was asked each of the questions appearing on theante mortemstatement and whether his brother answered the same, this witness replied in the affirmative.On cross examination, he stated that his brother could not talk from 1:00 o'clock dawn until he was given dextrose that morning; that at around 9:00 o'clock his brother could already talk a little; and that when their sister, Elma Zamoras, inquired as to who was responsible for his wound, he answered that it was a man who had followed him from the municipal building.Dr. Jose Noriega, the surgeon who attended to the victim, testified that the latter was in a state of shock when admitted to the hospital at about 1:40 a.m. on October 8, 1966; that the victim was able to say that he was stabbed and to indicate the painful part of his body, but thereafter he remained incoherent until his condition was gradually improved by blood transfusion and the administration of medical remedies; that his blood pressure was revived and returned to normal only at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day; that because of such improvement he was immediately operated upon;

that in the course of the four-hour operation, it was found that there were fatal injuries on the left kidney and fatal injuries on the great vessels of the mesentery; that the victim died twenty four hours after surgery due to secondary hemorrhage or cerebral embolism; and that he issued a certificate as to the cause of death of Leonardo Zamoras.Ciriaco D. Gonzales, Acting Chief of Police of Dipolog, confirmed the fact that although appellant denied having stabbed Leonardo Zamoras, he nevertheless admitted to him that he followed the victim along Rizal Avenue when his wife complained to him that the victim had stepped on her while she was lying on the floor of the municipal building. Appellant, however, explained that he was not able to overtake the deceased.He further testified that shortly before 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of October 8,1966, Cpl. Salaveria informed him by telephone that the victim was conscious and could talk. Consequently, he brought the accused to the clinic for Identification by the victim. When they arrived in the hospital there were several civilians. He also saw Cpl. Salaveria, Cpl. Calibo and Pat. Limbaga in the premises. He declared that the victim recognized him. When he asked the victim whether he could Identify his assailant, the latter answered in the affirmative. He then brought the appellant inside the room, and in the presence of all the people present the victim pointed to the appellant as the person who had stabbed him. This witness likewise confirmed that Cpl. Salaveria asked the questions and the victim, Leonardo Zamoras, gave the answers appearing in theante mortemstatement, and that they both spoke in Cebuano, which was translated into the English language by Cpl. Salaveria. Further, he attested to the fact that the thumbmarks appearing on the statement were those of Leonardo Zamoras, and that he was present when the same were affixed.Vicente Limbaga, formerly municipal policeman of Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte, testified that he served in such capacity up to October 21, 1967; that at about 1:30 in the early morning of October 9, 1966, Leonardo Zamoras arrived at the municipal building where he was detailed as guard and reported to him about the disappearance of his Leonardo Zamoras') car; that after making such report, Leonardo Zamoras went down to the ground floor of the municipal building; that not long after, he heard a commotion and immediately went downstairs and found many people lying on the floor of the municipal building because it was the town fiesta of Dipolog; that when he inquired what was the cause of the commotion one Luisa, the wife of Teodoro Lanza, told him that a certain short and stocky man passed by and stepped on her foot while she was lying on the floor, and he tried to hold her shoulder and signalled her to go to a room with him and thus caused the commotion. When he asked her why she did not report the matter to him so the person could be investigated, she answered: 'Well, anyway, all would be known latter because my husband followed him. Not long after, Teodoro Lanza returned and he observed that Lanza appeared restless, kept moving from one place to another, continued whispering something to Ms wife, could not sleep and repeatedly went to the comfort room. Afterwards, he received a report that Leonardo Zamoras had been stabbed near the Shell gasoline station. Suspecting that Teodoro Lanza had something to do with the stabbing, he took Lanza into his office. He recorded the incident in the police blotter and conducted an investigation of the accused. The accused was again investigated by the Acting Chief of Police.The defense presented in evidence the testimonies of Pat. Edgardo Maginsay and accused Teodoro Lanza, as well as various documentary evidence.Pat. Edgardo Maginsay of the Dipolog Police Force testified that since February 1966, he has been the custodian of the police blotter of the Dipolog Police Force; that he was the one who recorded the entries in the police blotter for October 8, 1966; that said entries were made from the records of the night blotter, which was in the care of the building guard; and that therefore, the entries in the night blotter and of the police blotter are the same.Appellant Teodoro Lanza alleged that on the night in question he was sleeping, together with his family, inside the municipal building of Dipolog, his livelihood being that of a "feriante" and he was there to maintain the shooting gallery and some gambling devices inside the plaza where the "feria" was being held. He declared that after midnight, he was awakened by two policemen and brought to the office of the Chief of Police where he was asked whether he had gone out of the building or not.

When he replied that he had not, he was brought and confined inside the municipal jail. Later the following morning he was investigated by the police sergeant after which he was brought to the hospital by the Chief of Police and one Pat. Centino. He was taken inside the operating room, presented before a wounded man for Identification, but the latter, whose eyes were closed, could not Identify him. After staying inside the operating room for half an hour, he was returned to the municipal building.In his brief, appellant stated that he allegedante mortemstatement could not have been given by the victim as he was not in a position at the time of the alleged confrontation either to talk to the investigators or to Identify his alleged assailant, and assuming that theante mortemstatement is genuine, the same is inadmissible as evidence of a dying declaration because at the time of its execution, the victim had expectations or hopes of recovery. Appellant makes capital of the testimony of Dr. Jose Noriega that from 8:00 o'clock in the morning to 12:00 noon of October 8, 1966, the victim was still bleeding and in a state of shock; the declaration of the widow, Basilia Luna Vda. de Zamoras, that her husband could not talk to her while he was on the hospital bed; and the statement of Jose Zamoras that upon seeing his brother he called his name but the latter did not answer.These arguments are not supported by the record. Counsel for the appellant cited portions of testimonies out of context of the entire declarations. Thus, while Dr. Jose Noriega admitted that the witness was "semi-conscious" at the time of his admission, he was positive that the victim was able to tell him that he was stabbed. He even complained of pain on the abdomen. He likewise stated that the condition of the victim improved to such a degree that he was strong enough after the blood transfusion to be operated on at around noontime of the same day.1As testified to by the other witness, he was able to talk by mid-morning. Thus, his brother, Jose Zamoras, testified that he was able to talk intelligently some hours before the operation, although in the beginning he could not. He testified on cross examination as follows:

Q Up to 9:00 o'clock of the same day, October 8, the same condition could not still talk?A. He could talk already but not yet clear.Q. Do you mean to say he will just murmur?A. Yes, sir.xxx xxx xxxQ. At 9:30 o'clock, October 8, 1966, what happened right in the bedroom of the deceased?A. Leonardo Zamoras was still lying in bed but could talk.Q. Do you mean to say he could just talk by himself, nobody asking?A. No, after he was asked.Q. How do you know that at 9:30 o'clock, October 8, 1966, he talked?A. Because we asked him some questions.Q. Who asked the deceased some questions?A. My sister, Elma Zamoras.Q. What was the statement (sic) asked?A. My sister inquired as to who was the person responsiblefor his wound.Q. What was his answer?A. He answered that (it was) the man following him from the municipal building.Q. There was no name mentioned?A. No name mentioned.Q. And that was in a harsh voice?A. In a natural voice.2

Likewise, the testimony of the widow, Basilia Luna Vda. de Zamoras to the effect that her husband did not talk to her on October 8, 1966, does not necessarily preclude the possibility that at some other time that day the deceased was able to reveal to the police investigators the Identity of his assailant. In fact, this witness stated on cross examination that on October 8, 1966, her husband could talk to other persons.3In addition, it will be recalled that when theante mortemstatement was taken by Cpl. Salaveria, there were several persons present, including relatives of the victim, as well as the Acting Chief of Police who brought appellant from the jail to the bedside of the victim. These police officers positively declared chat they were present when the victim pointed to appellant as his assailant. No possible motive has been advanced why these witnesses should falsely incriminate the appellant.The next question that arises centers on the admissibility of theante mortemstatement as a dying declaration so as to constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. Anante mortemstatement is a declaration made by a victim of a homicide while about to die, and without any hope of recovery, concerning the facts and circumstances under which the fatal injury was inflicted and offered in evidence at the trial of the person charged with having caused the death of the declarant.4In order that a dying declaration may be admissible in evidence, four (4) requisites must concur, to wit: (1) it must concern the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (2) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death; (3) the declarant was competent as a witness at the time the same was executed; and (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the declarant was the victim.5It is imperative, for a dying declaration to be admissible, that the same had been made under a consciousness of impending death.6This is so because dying declarations, made when the declarant had no more hope of recovery, are admissible by reason of necessity and trustworthiness. Necessity because the declarant's death renders impossible his taking the witness stand, and it often happens that there is no other satisfactory evidence as to the cause of his death; and trustworthiness because the declaration is made in extremity and every motive of falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth. "A situation so solemn and so awful as to be considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath in a court of justice."7The fact that death of the declarant did indeed occur shortly after the declaration was made is not sufficient to render the declaration admissible, absent the requisite proof that the victim was under the consciousness of impending death at the time the declaration was made, and he had no more hope of recovery. A belief in the mind of the declaration, at the time the declarations are made, that death is near is indispensable to the admission of such statements as dying declarations. Where the text of the declaration shows that the deceased himself was in doubt as to whether he would die or not, the dying declaration is not admissible.8In the instant case, the victim, when asked whether he believed he was going to die as a result of his injuries, replied: "It all depends." Also, it appears from the records that his condition had progressively improved from the time he was admitted to the time the statement was taken by the police so much so that a short time thereafter he was considered strong enough to undergo an operation. Under these circumstances, it can be concluded that the deceased was, himself, hesitant to accept the fact of his impending death and entertained hopes of recovery, obviously depending on the result of the scheduled operation and further medical treatment.Notwithstanding the fact, however, that the victim's statement may not be admitted as a dying declaration, it is nevertheless admissible as part of theres gestaeagainst herein appellant. InPeople v. Tumalip,9this Court held that the positive Identification of the accused by the victim, made a few hours after he had been shot and while suffering from the agonies of his injuries, although not anante mortemdeclaration, may, however, be considered as part of theres gestae, for it was made almost immediately after the startling occurrence.

It is well-settled that as an exception to the hearsay rule, such evidence must comply with these requisites, an occurrence both startling and unusual in character and an utterance made before the declarant could have any opportunity for falsification or distortion, one moreover limited to such event as the immediate attending circumstances.10Briefly stated, the spontaneous declaration must have been made while the nervous excitement caused by the startling occurrence was still working on the declarant's mind. This may be a short time after the incident or some hours later, as long as the influence of the startling occurrence still persists. What is important is that the declarant must have had no opportunity to devise or contrive anything contrary to the real facts that occurred. What the law distrusts is not after speech but after thought.11There are no limits of time within which theres gestaecan be arbitrarily confined. These limits vary in fact with each particular case. The acts or declarations are not required to be contemporaneous with the primary fact, but they must be so connected with it as to make the act or declaration and the main fact practically inseparable, or be generated by an excited feeling which extends, without break or let down, from the moment of the event they illustrate. In other words, if the acts or declarations sprang out of the principal transaction, tend to explain it, were voluntary and spontaneous, and were made at a time so near it as to preclude the Idea of deliberate design, they may be regarded as contemporaneous in point of time, and are admissible.12The element of time is, therefore, not controlling, but merely of importance, on the question of spontancity.13The general rule is that where declarations are unconsciously associated with and related to the homicidal deed even though separated from it by a short time, they are evidence of the character of the deed and a part of theres gestae. No inflexible rule as to the length of the interval between the act of killing and the act of declaration of the person killed can be formulated; in such matter, the facts of each case stand alone and must speak for themselves.14From the circumstances of the case, the victim could not have had time to concoct or devise a story different from what actually transpired, and his narration, at the first opportunity, of the incident and his Identification of his assailant must be considered as part of the starling occurrence, the influence of which was still working on his mind. Moreover, it is significant that the victim did not name a specific person, as his assailant was a person not familiar to him, but merely described him as the one who followed him from the municipal building after an altercation which arose when he (victim) accidentally stepped on appellant's wife while she lay on the floor of the municipal building. Appellant has failed to advance any reason or motive why the victim, who did not know him prior to the incident, would Identify him as the perpetrator of the offense if this were not true. It must be recalled that there were many persons sleeping in the municipal building and yet he was singled out by the police, as a consequence of the series of events that transpired, starting from the commotion that ensued when the victim accidentally stepped on appellant's wife and appellant's suspicious actuations after he returned to the municipal building. It was shortly after appellant's return that the police received information of the stabbing of the victim.The lower court found that the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, offset by the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, hence it imposed upon the herein appellant the penalty ofreclusion perpetua,among others. We find no proof that evident premeditation and treachery accompanied the commission of the crime.Evident premeditation could not have existed because immediately after the commotion caused by the accidental stepping on his wife, the appellant followed the victim and stabbed him. As the trial court observed, the Shell gasoline station where the victim was stabbed was "not far from the municipal building",15and, in the few minutes it took to follow and overtake the victim, the appellant could not have had sufficient opportunity to meditate upon and determine the killing. lt is settled that where a previous incident preceded the assault, evident premeditation is not present.16and that in the absence of reflection and persistence of criminal intent, said circumstance cannot be appreciated.17Similarly, treachery cannot be appreciated against the herein accused because there is no showing whatsoever that the mode of attack employed by him was calculated to insure the commission of the crime without risk to himself, arising from any defense that the victim may put up. As a matter of fact, the mode of attack is not known at all, there being no eyewitness to the stabbing incident.18Treachery must be shown by convincing evidence,19and the same degree of proof to dispel reasonable doubt is required before any conclusion may be reached respecting its attendance, whether as a qualifying or an aggravating circumstance, in a criminal case.20Moreover, consistent with the finding that the killing was not premeditated, there can be no treachery in the instant case because the decision to attack was arrived at on the spur of the moment.21In addition, the factual circumstances obtaining in the case indicate that the victim knew that he was being followed from the municipal building. Thus, he was able to state in theante mortemstatement that the person who stabbed him was the one who had followed him from the municipal building. This being the case, and considering that he was well aware of the previous altercation between them, the victim must have been on his guard and aware that the appellant meant him harm.Considering the foregoing, We hold that due to the absence of any qualifying circumstance, the crime committed is not murder but homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, unattended by any aggravating or litigating circumstance.We are not convinced that passion and obfuscation Should be appreciated in favor of herein appellant so as to mitigate his criminal liability. The accidental stepping by the victim on appellant's wife was insufficient cause for passion or obfuscation to so affect appellant's reason that he commits a vicious crime as a result thereof. In order for such mitigating circumstance to be appreciated, it is necessary to establish the existence of an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind that the culprit is precluded from a sober realization of the wrongfullness of the course of action about to be taken.22WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified; appellant Teodoro Lanza is hereby found guilty of the crime of Homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY ofprision mayor, as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS ofreclusion temporalas maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law. The awards of P2,000.00 as civil indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment, P2,000.00 as moral damages and P500.00 as hospital and burial expenses are hereby affirmed.SO ORDERED.Barredo, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-24546 February 22, 1968THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.ISAIAS MACALISANG,accused-appellant.SANCHEZ,J.: The charge is murder. The judgment below sentenced appellant to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000.00, and to pay the costs. Following are the facts: In the morning of November 14, 1949, two bloody incidents occurred in the town of Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental. About 9:00 o'clock in the morning of that day, Victoriano Simbajon, defeated candidate for Mayor of Sinacaban, approached incumbent Mayor Sofronio Avancea, his opponent and the victor, near the municipal building. Victoriano Simbajon who was then accompanied by his son, Panfilo, and his son-in-law, Arturo Yap while still at a distance, raised his hands apparently to signify that he accepted defeat, invited the Mayor to ride with him in his jeep in going to a wedding party to which both were invited. Mayor Avancea politely declined. Simbajon and his party left, went down the slope leading to the national highway. Sometime later, Avancea followed by the Chief of Police, herein appellant Isaias Macalisang, and Patrolman Liborio Dominguez left on foot, followed the same route. As they approached the highway, Simbajon then standing near the house of one Isabelo Plaza again offered his jeep to Avancea. The latter again declined, stated that he would take the jeep of the municipal health officer. Immediately thereafter, there was a burst of gunfire in rapid succession. Mayor Avancea was mortally wounded; his two companions critically wounded. Parenthetically, for these crimes, Victoriano Simbajon, Feliciano Simbajon, Panfilo Simbajon and Bonifacio Simbajon, in separate cases jointly tried, were prosecuted for (1) the murder of Mayor Avancea, (2) the frustrated murder of herein appellant Isaias Macalisang, and (3) the frustrated murder of Patrolman Liborio Dominguez. They were all convicted below. For the crime of murder, they were all sentenced toreclusion perpetua, and for the two other crimes, they were separately given prison terms by the trial court. Bonifacio Simbajon did not appeal. The judgment as to the rest was affirmed by this Court on September 30, 1965 (G.R. No. L-18073-75), with a slight modification as to the penalty for the frustrated murders. Minutes after the incident heretofore described, Fr. William Bourke, the town parish priest, who heard the shots, came upon the scene of the crime together with his houseboy, Benjamin Lopez, in the former's jeep. He administered the last sacraments. Appellant Isaias Macalisang was lifted by Benjamin Lopez and placed in the front seat of the jeep between him and Fr. Bourke, who was at the wheel. They proceeded to Ozamis City. While the jeep was negotiating a curve in Barrio Casoy of Sinacaban, appellant Macalisang pointed his gun at Francisco Dano, who was at the curb of the road by the mountainside, and fired. Francisco Dano was hit. The bullet entered his back at the right of the mid-spinal line; it came out thru the right chest. He shouted to his wife: "Help help, Day, I am hit by the gun. Help, I will die." Francisco Dano's wife, Perfecta, rushed to his side and found that he was bleeding in front and in the back of his body. She asked Dano who shot him. Dano's reply: "Chief Isaias Macalisang." Brought to Ozamis City, Dano expired on the same day. Came the present prosecution for murder with the result noted at the start of this opinion. 1. That it was appellant Macalisang who fired the shot which killed Dano, we do not doubt. Upon hearing the shot, Fr. Bourke saw the gun held by appellant still pointed at the side of the road. Benjamin Lopez testified that he first noticed the deceased Dano some forty meters away; that as they were getting closer to Dano, appellant took his gun from his lap, pointed it the former, fired once; that he grabbed the gun from Macalisang; that thereafter, they proceeded to Ozamis City; and that there, Fr. Bourke took the gun from him and surrendered it to the Philippine Constabulary. And then, there is the testimony of Perfecta vda. de Dano that when she approached her husband, the latter told her that it was Chief Macalisang who shot him. This is in the nature of a dying declaration. At that time, Dano felt that he was at the point of death. Indeed, he was in a very serious condition. In fact, he died on the same day.1 2. But appellant pleads that he was unconscious or under shock at the time the act was committed. The factual support for this is that in the earlier incident, he received gunshot wounds "from the point of my penis hitting my . . . (gonads) to my lap"; that his left leg was broken; that he fell into the canal. He further relates that from then on, he lost consciousness until he was already treated at the Medina Hospital in Ozamis City. As prop for his testimony, he presented Dr. Rico Medina, his attending physician. The doctor's version is that appellant was in a very serious condition when brought to the hospital because of the bullet wound he suffered at the tip of the penis that pierced the right lateral portion of the scrotum, the bullet wound on the lower, right extremity, and loss of blood. According to the doctor, these injuries would cause momentary unconsciousness for a length of time depending upon the resistance of the patient. Appellant is robust. In this case, the doctor opines that "there is very big probability" that Macalisang "during the time of the accident was unconscious." He stressed, however, that it was possible that Macalisang could "recover consciousness after 10 minutes," could have recognized persons, and could have been in full control of the upper extremities which were not affected at all by the wounds. Appellant's testimony falls far short of convincing us, as it did not convince the lower court, that he did not deliberately fire at Dano. He was, indeed, conscious at that time. When placed on the jeep, he took the precaution of placing his service revolver on his lap. Lopez saw him take that gun and fire at Dano. The priest, upon hearing the shot, saw appellant with the gun still pointed at the side of the road. The version of Captain Benjamin Rafols, who interviewed appellant in the hospital furnishes the clincher. Appellant admitted to the captain, "I was the one who shot Mr. Dano." This statement is definite, although the captain stated that Macalisang was confused as to the shooting incident that occurred earlier in the morning. And then, the doctor affirmed that it was possible that appellant could have regained consciousness after 10 minutes. Between the time appellant was hit by gunfire to the time the priest in his jeep came by, the evidence is that about 10 to 15 minutes transpired. A criminal act is presumed to be voluntary. We cannot seize upon speculation or guesswork to overturn this presumption. At any rate, between the self-serving version of appellant and the indecisive testimony of his doctor, on the one hand, and the positive assertion of Fr. Bourke, witness Lopez and Capt. Rafols, on the other, the choice is clear. Fact prevails over assumption. Absent an aboveboard explanation, the shooting must be declared voluntary and punishable.1wph1.t 3. Treachery, according to the decision below, qualifies the crime as murder. Appellant's assertion to the contrary is not to be slightly taken. It deserves serious consideration. Jurisprudence has it that the mere location of the bullet wound at the back as is the case here by itself, does not prove treachery.2Neither will suddenness of the attack alone.3Even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was sudden and the victim's position accidental, no treachery attaches to the killing.4 The question of treachery perhaps may not be thoroughly understood except in the peculiar setting of this case. Appellant knew that Dano was the chief adviser of the defeated candidate for Mayor, Victoriano Simbajon. Dano delivered speeches against Mayor Sofronio Avancea and wrote leaflets attacking the latter. Chief of Police Macalisang, in turn, was a supporter of the deceased Mayor Avancea. After Macalisang was wounded, he did not go in search of Dano. It just so happened that on his way to Ozamis City, he saw Dano on the road. Appellant was in arunningjeep; the victim standing at the side of the road. It was an impulse of the moment that led to the attack which caused death. The resulting crime is not murder qualified by treachery. Because, it does not appear that "the method of assault adopted by the aggressorwas deliberately chosenwith a special view to the accomplishment of the act without risk to the assailant from any defense that the party assailed may make."5 With treachery eliminated, the crime thus committed is homicide. The amended information charged that appellant is a recidivist. He was really convicted of serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries on September 4, 1941.6Therefore, the homicide herein committed is attended by one aggravating circumstance, with none in mitigation. The penalty should bereclusion temporalin the maximum period. We, accordingly, modify the judgment appealed from,7and sentence defendant for the crime of homicide to suffer imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Francisco Dano in the sum of P6,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, but with the accessories of the law, and to pay the costs. So ordered.Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.1wph1.t

G.R. No. L-31961 January 9, 1979 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.FLORENCIO ODENCIO and GUIAMELON MAMA,accused-appellants.Florencio Odencio and Guiamelon Mama appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of North Cotabato, finding them guilty of two separate crimes of murder, sentencing each of them to tworeclusion perpetuas, and ordering them to pay P12,000 to the heirs of Prowa Talib and P12,000 to the heirs of Kadir Oranen (Criminal Case No. 5276).According to the prosecution, at about seven o'clock in the evening of June 29, 1968, while Prowa Talib (Palua Talib), a forty-year old farmer, was in the yard of his house located at Barrio Simsiman, Pigcawayan, North Cotabato, handing a pot of rice to his wife, Setie Mamalintao, who was near the stairs, he was felled down by a volley of shots.Setie rushed to the aid of her husband. When she looked in the direction where the gunshots emanated, she saw Guiamelon Mama holding a gun near a coconut tree around sixbrazasaway. Then, she heard another volley of shots. She saw Florencio Odencio (Poren), also holding a gun near another coconut tree around ten meters away in the yard of the house of her neighbor, Daongan Karaing. She noticed that Kadir Oranen, who was nearby, had fallen to the ground around three arms' length from Daongan's house. Kadir died instantly.Setie had known for a long time Florencio and Guiamelon who were friends and neighbors also residing in Barrio Simsiman. Setie and Guiamelon had cultivated adjacent farmlands.While Setie was comforting her husband, he allegedly told her that he was going to die. He directed her to remember what had happened to him and that they had seen Guiamelon Mama and Poren armed with guns. Prior to that shooting incident, Prowa Talib had reported to the barrio captain that Florencio Odencio had stolen his lumber.The two assailants fled westward. At the time the incident occurred, Japal Rongot was on his way to Talib's house. He encountered Guiamelon and Joseph Odencio with both of whom he was well acquainted. He asked Guiamelon why there were gunshots but the latter did not make any reply. Upon reaching Talib's house, Rongot saw Setie crying and holding Talib on her lap. Setie told him that Talib was shot by Guiamelon and she pointed to him Oranen's corpse which was about two arms' length from Talib.Ngelam Towa (Nilan Tuwa), another neighbor and the uncle of Setie heard, the gunshots on the occasion in question. He hastened to Talib's house. Setie told him that Guiamelon Mama had shot Talib. She advised her uncle not to use his flashlight because Guiamelon was still in the vicinity. Setie also told Towa that Florencio Odencio had shot Oranen. Towa left Talib's house in order to get assistance from his father-in-law. While crossing the trail his flashlight focussed on Florencio Odencio with two companions leaving the scene of the crime.Policemen arrived at Talib's house. Setie informed them that Guiamelon was the gunwielder. They brought Talib to a medical clinic where he was interrogated by Patrolman Joaquin Saada Ta