Jose Galario, petitioner vs. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) and Ruth P. Piano, respondents, G.R. No. 166797, July 10, 2007

Petitioner contends that the OMB-Mindanao had no basis whatsoever when it ruled that the herein petitioner may be held liable under Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019 when he refused to reinstate private respondent to favor his own interest or to give undue advantage in favor of Bartolome Barte.Petitioner alleges that the OMB-Mindanao arrived at such a sweeping conclusion when not even the private respondent had made the said allegations in her affidavit-complaint or any pleading.Petitioner argues that absent such allegations in the affidavit-complaint, there is simply no basis for the public respondent to declare that the herein petitioner may be held liable for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019, as these allegations are essential to have a finding of probable cause of violation of Section 3(f).

Private respondents affidavit-complaint alleged the violation by petitioner of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, but the Ombudsman, after preliminary investigation, ordered the filing of an information against petitioner for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019 instead.

While the OMB-Mindanao did not find probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, it did find that there was probable cause to file an information against petitioner for violation of Section 3(f) of the same statute.

A violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019 is committed when the following elements[30]exist:a) The offender is a public officer;b) The said officer has neglected or has refused to act without sufficient justification after due demand or request has been made on him;c) Reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without the public officer having acted on the matter pending before him; andd) Such failure to so act is "for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested party, or discriminating against another.

There is no reason for us to disturb the findings of the OMB-Mindanao as aforequoted.We reiterate that this Court has adopted a policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and leaves to the investigating prosecutor (the Ombudsman, in this case) sufficient latitude of discretion, not only in determining what will constitute sufficient evidence that will establish "probable cause" for the filing of information against a supposed offender, but as well as the proper offense to be charged against said offender depending again on the evidence submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation.Squarely in point isAvila v. Sandiganbayan and Ombudsmanwhich stated thus:We find no merit in petitioner's contention that he was deprived of due process because the accusation in the information was for violation of Section 3(e), R. A. 3019, but the crime charged in the letter complaint subject of the preliminary investigation was for direct assault.InEnrile vs. Salazar, we ruled that there is "nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different from what was charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation."[32]

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,Petitioner,v.CYNTHIA E. CABEROY,Respondent, G.R. No. 188066, October 22, 2014FACTS: Caberoy is the principal of Ramon Avancena National High School (RANHS) in Arevalo, Iloilo City. She was charged with Oppression and Violation of Section 3(e) and (f) of R.A. No. 3019 by Angeles O. Tuares for allegedly withholding her salary for the month of June 2002. Caberoy denied the charge against her, alleging among others that the payrolls of June 1 to 15, 2002 and June 16 to 30, 2002 show that Tuares received her salary as shown by her signatures.

In the Decision rendered by the Ombudsman, Caberoy was found guilty of Oppression and was meted out the penalty of dismissal from service.

The Ombudsman found that Tuares was not paid any amount in June 2002 because of her failure to submit her clearance and Performance Appraisal Sheet for Teachers (PAST), while the other teachers received their salaries for the same month.The Ombudsman concluded that Tuares was "singled out by respondent Caberoy as the only one who did not receive any amount from the school on June 2002 because the former failed to submit her clearance and Performance Appraisal Sheet for Teachers (PAST)."The Ombudsman also took into consideration several infractions previously committed by Caberoy, which allegedly displayed her "notorious undesirability as a government officer for withholding teachers' salaries without authority."According to the Ombudsman, Caberoy could not honestly claim that she had not been forewarned by the Ombudsman of the grave consequences of her repeated illegal act.

Caberoy filed a petition forcertiorariwith the Court of Appeals, seeking the reversal of her dismissal from service. The CA granted Caberoy's petition.

ISSUE: Whether Caberoy is guilty of violation of Sec. 3 (f) of RA No. 3019 for allegedly withholding Tuares salary

RULING: NO.The CA ruled that Caberoy's "refusal" to release Tuares' salary was justified and the element of "failure to so act x x x for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested party, or [discrimination] against another" under Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019, is absent.

The complaint filed by Tuares against Caberoy charged the latter with "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence for having ordered the payroll clerk of [RANHS]to cause the exclusion of [her] name in the payroll of June 2002x x x and [in spite of] the fact that [she has already] rendered full service during said days x x x without any justifiable reason and without due process and without any authority under the law."27A perusal of Tuares' allegations shows that her claim pertains to the alleged withholding of her salary for the month of June 2002. Records show, however, that Tuares was actually paid her salary for the month of June 2002. Thus, the vouchers for the payroll period of June 1 to 15, 2002 and June 16 to 30, 2002showed Tuares' name online 11and her signature acknowledging receipt of her salary for such period.

The amounts received and signed for by Tuares correspond essentially to the other amounts she received as salary for the other periods in 2002. On this score, entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business, enjoy the presumption of regularity under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,and absent any evidence presented by Tuares showing the contrary, good faith must be presumed in the preparation and signing of such payrolls.

Whereas on the part of complainant Tuares, this is what really happened: The checks dated July 17 and 25, 2002 were technically for services rendered in June 2002 as corrected by COA but the amounts corresponding to complainant's salary for the whole month of June 2002 was actually received by her only in July 2002 and that in effect means that she did not really receive any amount from the school in June 2002; x x x.

Viewed from the discussion above, it is therefore crystal clear that complainant was singled out by respondent Caberoy as the only one who did not receive any amount from the school on June 2002 because, as established earlier, the former failed to submit her clearance and PAST.Hence, the Court finds that the CA did not commit a reversible error in exonerating Caberoy from the charge against her.