8/10/2019 Cases Voidable Marriage

1/24

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA,Complainant,

A. M. No. MTJ-92-706

March 29, 1995-versus-

JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.,Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila,

Respondent.D E C I S I O NQUIASON, J.:This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for gross immorality and appearance of

impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of theMetropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.

Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who areliving together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, MetroManila. He stays in said house which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is inManila.In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondentsleeping on his [complainant's] bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboythat respondent had been co-habiting with De Castro. Complainant did not botherto wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving instructions to hishouseboy to take care of his children.cralawThereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and evenalienated the affection of his children from him. Complainant claims thatrespondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, asappearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities.Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992,after he had a heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's office.cralaw

For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castroand that the filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's claimon the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed b y De Castro.cralawRespondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he waseven a witness to the withdrawal of the complaint for grave slander filed by DeCastro against complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro whocalled the police to arrest complainant.cRespondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admitshaving five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went througha marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, thesame was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request ofthe parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony withher in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license.Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his careand custody as a single parent.cRespondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles,California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legalintents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized

without a license.cralawUnder the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of aprevious marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article40 of said Code provides:The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes ofremarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previousmarriage void.Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does notapply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was

governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage tookplace in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of theFamily Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage.Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactiveeffect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights inaccordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true withArticle 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vestedright that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.cralawThe fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not

preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactiveapplication of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who mayfeel that he is adversely affected [Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229

(1968)]. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, norarise from, procedural laws [Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA674 (1965)].cralawRespondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockeryof the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with awoman, who beget him five children.Respondent passed the bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practiceof law in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies withOngkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license.Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before one canget married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his firstmarriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure tosecure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and

bad faith.cralawIt is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness formembership in the legal profession. While the deceit employed by respondentexisted prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral andillegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already

in the judiciary.cralawThe Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of awhiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his pe rformance of his judicialduties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality ofmorality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to

promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, mustbehave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and inhis everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked.

No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of anindividual than a seat in the judiciary [Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690(1994)].cralawWHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of allleave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch,instrumentality, or agency of the government, including government-owned andcontrolled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.cralawSO ORDERED[G. R. No. 183622 : February 08, 2012]

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, PETITIONER, VS.LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, RESPONDENT.

R E S O L U T I O N

SERENO, J.:Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)Decision[1]and Resolution[2]regarding the issuance of letters of administration ofthe intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.cralaw

The facts are as follows:

Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly oa divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contsecond marriage with petitioner herein.

On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.

Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial (RTC) of Dagupan City a Petition for the issuance of letters of administraher appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. The cdocketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.

On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent LoCatalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed

petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232.

The two cases were subsequently consolidated.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground opendentia, considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estatealready pending.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters ofadministration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respalleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed a gainst petitioner before54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No.

Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that p

contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.

On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy. [3]The triruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage behim and petitioner was not valid.

Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pendaction with the trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor againsdeceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a prejudiciquestion in determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never bmarried to Eusebio Bristol.

On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissPetition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner an

that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 269RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was vsubsisting when she married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned futhat her acquittal in the previous bigamy ca se was fatal to her cause. Thutrial court held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file a pfor the issuance of letters of administration. [4]

After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitionerthe matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, al

8/10/2019 Cases Voidable Marriage

2/24

grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for theissuance of letters of administration.

Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent shouldhave been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, whilea petition for letters of administration may have been filed by an "uninterested

person," the defect was cured by the appearance of a real party-in-interest. Thus,she insisted that, to determine who has a better right to administer the decedent's

properties, the RTC should have first required the parties to present their evidencebefore it ruled on the matter.

On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held thatpetitioner undertook the wrong remedy. She should have instead filed a petition

for review rather than a petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition forCertiorari was filed within the fifteen-day reglementary period for filing a petitionfor review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed the Petition and continued todecide on the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For litis

pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identityof the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b)identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on thesame acts, and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgmentwhich may be rendered in on e would, regardless of which party is successful,amount to res judicatain the other. A petition for letters of administration is aspecial proceeding. A special proceeding is an application or proceeding toestablish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. And, in contrast to anordinary civil action, a special proceeding involves no defendant or respondent.The only party in this kind of proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant.Considering its nature, a subsequent petition for letters of administration canhardly be barred by a similar pending petition involving the estate of the samedecedent unless both petitions are filed by the same person. In the case at b ar, the

petitioner was not a party to the petition filed by the private respondent, in thesame manner that the latter was not made a party to the petition filed by theformer. The first element of litis pendentiais wanting. The contention of the

petitioner must perforce fail.

Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory theprovision of the Rules requiring a petitioner for letters of administration to be an"interested party," inasmuch as any person, for that matter, regardless of whetherhe has valid interest in the estate sought to be administered, could be appointed asadministrator for as long as he files his petition ahead of any other person, inderogation of the rights of those specifically mentioned in the order of preferencein the appointment of administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised Rulesof Court, which provides:xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters ofadministration. As a spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred toadminister the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a marriage certificate, like

any other public document, is onlyprima facieevidence of the facts statedtherein. The fact that the petitioner had been charged with bigamy and wasacquitted has not been disputed by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegalmarriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before thefirst marriage has been dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared

presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in a proper proceedings. Thededuction of the trial court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the said case

negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with Orlando B. Catalan has

not been disproved by her. There was not even an attempt from the

petitioner to deny the findings of the trial court.There is therefore no basis forus to make a contrary finding. Thus, not being an interested party and a strangerto the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters ofadministration by the trial court is in place.xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSEDfor lack ofmerit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[5](Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision. [6] She alleged that thereasoning of the CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was

acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still holding that her marriage withOrlando was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the crime of bigamy, themarriage enjoys the presumption of validity.

On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.

Hence, this Petition.

At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciatethe finding of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was nevermarried to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial courtconcluded that, because petitionerwas acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existedand was valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistenceof the marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that

petitioner was not an interested party in the estate of Orlando.

Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No.2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity,

our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreignnationality. This doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v.Romillo, Jr.[7]wherein we said:It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the CivilCode, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolutedivorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy andmorality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may berecognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their

national law.In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondentfrom the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce

dissolves the marriage.xxx

We reiterated this principle inLlorente v. Court of Appeals,[8]to wit:In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principleembodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered

by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to ourconcept of public policy and morality. In the same case , the Court ruled thataliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their

national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that

once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he

obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dornwould become

applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from

him.

InPilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent

in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as

respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civ

on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals mreversed.We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente frfirst wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a macomity.xxx

Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enuin Garcia v. Recio,[9]to wit:Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is give

presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented andin evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decreeitself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.Tdecree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body otribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or docmay be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by eitherofficial publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legcustody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, suchmust be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign cin which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to beauthentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearancesufficient;compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence musdemonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibonly to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to

petitioner's qualification.Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accordeby the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the ddecree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Austral

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code inecessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws aacquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a

Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former stateattires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondenhis allegiance to the Philippines and thevinculum juristhat had tied him tPhilippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falpetitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign juHe contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce dand was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had livedworked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divois allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial noforeign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

8/10/2019 Cases Voidable Marriage

3/24

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the "party who allegesthe existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an

action."In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material

allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and

defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their

answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense

raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law

validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice

of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged andproved.Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges aresupposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial

notice must be exercised w ith caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the

subject should be resolved in the negative.(Emphasis supplied)

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity ofOrlando's divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between

petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to thetrial courtfor further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.

Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage,she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over theestate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to respondent, who isundisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec.6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.

This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,[10]in which we said:Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedlyobtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would

have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition asFelicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there isinsufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry

Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of

the U.S.A.In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines forpleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentationsolely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity anddue execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writingor document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country byeither (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officerhaving legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the properdiplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in theforeign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of hisoffice.

With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized inCalifornia, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the

annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show thattheir marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia,however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must bealleged and proved.cralaw

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further

reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the

marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of thedivorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administrationover the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

WHEREFORE,premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLYGRANTED. The Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. Letthis case be REMANDEDtoBranch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos,Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998.]

FE D. QUITA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA

DANDAN, * respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in thePhilippines on 18 May 1941. They were n ot however blessed with children.Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturofor divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce

proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to

live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereaftershe married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship alsoended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certainWernimont.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino JavierInciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuanceof letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of thePhilippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to asBlandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, andClaro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan,named in the petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petitionand prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which wasresolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty.Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors(Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and

Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of thedeceased Arturo, intervened.

On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of thedecedent and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23October 1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children andRuperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial courtrequired the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten(10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the

issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resoluThe prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being subm

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao 1 which held that "a foreignbetween Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the pCivil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this

jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo.Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until theof Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlemconjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval. 3 On the other hand, that there was no showing that marriage existed between private respondArturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had beenacknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperfound that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987 4 only petitand Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equadjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two inheirs. 5

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allpresent proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as hislegitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimatehad been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1

partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with thexception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of RPadlan, and petitioner to the other half. 7 Private respondent was not declheir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that shArturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void sinwas celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner

In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigneof the errors allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that

was decided without a hearing; in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the RuleCourt, which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to weach person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and das in ordinary cases.

Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 No1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 8 On 18 Apridenied reconsideration. 9

Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings?Petitioner insists that there is no need because, first, no legal or factual isobtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or asrespective shares in the intestate estate of the decedent; and, second, the ito who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of thedecedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition base

established facts and admissions of the parties.

We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent coclear: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful hthe deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person ientitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in orcases.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the

8/10/2019 Cases Voidable Marriage

4/24

Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that theyhave been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes themas heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. Butcontroversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. Thetrial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during thescheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration ofheirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission ofthe records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receiptthereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration ofheirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.

We note that in her comment to petitioners motion private respondent raised,among others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit fromthe decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in facthad twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. 11 Tothis, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legallymarried to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. 12 Reading between the lines,the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of herdivorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct ahearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain thetruth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidenceas well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence.Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merelyapplying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.

Then in private respondents motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lowercourts decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in thelight of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorcesabroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are validaccording to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set forhearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue

on her citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private respondents prayer fora hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitionerand Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." 16 Itmaintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California,U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding ontheir citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial courtwas not supplied with a basis to determine petitioners citizenship at the time oftheir divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizenwhen their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked themateriality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen atthe time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner couldvery well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioners citizenship; 17 itdid not merit enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In the present

proceeding, petitioners citizenship is brought anew to the fore byprivateRespondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript ofstenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution

of the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of newowners duplicate copy thereof before another trial court. When a sked whethershe was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954. 19Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in thesame year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erasethe uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issuerequiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondentappellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court forfurther proceedings.cralawnad

We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial courtshould be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as hissurviving spouse. Private respondents claim to heirship was already resolved bythe trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the priormarriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamousmarriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the CivilCode. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him asthis status presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20

As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to bedeclared in contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forumshopping, 21 the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions mustinvolve the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. Theremust also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. 22 The present

petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filedbefore the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owners duplicatecopies of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously,there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court ofAppeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further

proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D.Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of theappellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half () of the nethereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel,Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, insteadof Arturos brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court howeveremphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited tothe hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and todismiss the present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.cha

G. R. No. 150758 - February 18, 2004VERONICO TENEBRO,petitionervs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,Respondent.D E C I S I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicialdeclaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of

psychological incapacity, on an individuals criminal liability for bigamy. We holdthat the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of

psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of themarriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, anindividual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence

of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding thesubsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground ofpsychological incapacity.Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with privatecomplainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by JudgeAlfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro andAncajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter partof 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married toa certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a

photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. 1On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this onecertain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Triaof Cebu City, Branch 15.2When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, sverified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitionhandwritten letter,3Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebindeed her husband.Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. 4TheInformation,5which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, readsThat on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippineswithin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused,

been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and witsaid marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA ANwhich second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essentialrequisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.CONTRARY TO LAW.When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". 6During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes fro1988, with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he andVillareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that n o marriageceremony took place to solemnize their union.7He alleged that he signedmarriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his officconnection with his work as a seaman.8He further testified that he reques

brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was anymarriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of samarriage.9On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branrendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt o

crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenhim to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimeight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. 10On appeCourt of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners motireconsideration was denied for lack of merit.Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of erroI. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, ANERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL WHEN IT AFFIRMEDDECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING TACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NONEXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OFEVIDENCE.II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic)CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIABETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BDECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGALAND EFFECT.11After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason

disturb the assailed judgment.Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime oBigamy are:(1) that the offender has been legally married;(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead accorthe Civil Code;(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

8/10/2019 Cases Voidable Marriage

5/24

(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites forvalidity.12Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1)denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that thedeclaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychologicalincapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks theessential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriagewas celebrated.13Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of thecrime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal. 14Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to

prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes.Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriagecontract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, asseen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. JulietoTorres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the CivilRegistrar of Manila;15and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajasdated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legallymarried.16To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) acertification issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995; 17and(2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Ma nila, dated February 3,1997.18Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have norecord of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B.Villareyes on November 10, 1986.To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail themarriage contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establishthe existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and theRules of Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all.Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Courtreads as follows:Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When theoriginal of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a

public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the publicofficer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a publicofficer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. Themarriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between

petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded thefull faith and credence given to public documents.Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the

National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City CivilRegistry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neitherdocument attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated betweenVeronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, thedocuments merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of sucha marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite differentfrom documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or

documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro andVillareyes.The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence asto the existence of the marriage between Tenebro a nd Villareyes, which should begiven greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of anyrecord of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely norequirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civilregistrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact thatno record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all

requisites for its validity are present.19There is no evidence presented by thedefense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyeslacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of theaccused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajastestimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage,and petitioners own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the firstmarriage had all the requisites for validity.Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existenceof the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such

purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued bythe National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are datedOctober 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore,are dated after the accuseds marriage to his second wife, private respondent in thiscase.As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the

prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent

judicial declaration20of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground ofpsychological incapacity.Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date ofthe celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since hismarriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of

bigamy was not committed.21This argument is not impressed with merit.Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the secondmarriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of theFamily Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity ofthe second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely nomoment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of

petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would benull and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacityor incapacity.22Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a validmarriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se anargument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract asecond or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legallydissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead bymeans of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of thelaw, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act ofcontracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a validmarriage.Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10,1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy hadalready been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason fordistinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely becauseit is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null andvoid on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminalliability for bigamy is concerned. The States penal laws protecting the institution

of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contractbetween spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate disregard of the permanentcharacter of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedlydone.Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of

psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajaslacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of amarriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of thecontracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the

solemnizing officer)23and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, mlicense, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare theagreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at lewitnesses).24Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of tof eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioneArticles 3725and 3826may contract marriage.27In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marrwere satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years oand they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required lice

before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu Cthe presence of at least two witnesses.Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the groun

psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the mainsofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significantthat said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is thatconceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriageconsidered legitimate.28There is therefore a recognition written into the lthat such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legalconsequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liab

bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamcompletely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that eamarital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the conseqof contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless womthe promise of futurity and commitment.As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigam

present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitionercontracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Awere both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determinationaccuseds guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused da deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characterwhich is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate patteflouting the foundation of the States basic social institution, the States crilaws on bigamy step in.Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty focrime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years an(1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigaticircumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum tetaken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional whiduration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the CoAppeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced

petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day ofmayor, as maximum.WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for revieDENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy a

sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and twmonths of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009VICTORIA S. JARILLO,Petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.D E C I S I O N

8/10/2019 Cases Voidable Marriage

6/24

DEL CASTILLO, J.:This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules ofCourt, praying that the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21,2003, and its Resolution2dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional TrialCourt (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information inCriminal Case No. 00-08-11:INFORMATIONThe undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO ofthe crime of BIGAMY, committed as follows:That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-namedaccused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage withRafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved,did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a secondmarriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discoveredon January 12, 1999.Contrary to law.On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter,trial proceeded.The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized b y the CA, are as follows.On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civilwedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then MunicipalMayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSNdated November 17, 2000).On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage ina church wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City,Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union,appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R,R-1).Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage withEmmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, beforethen Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1,

pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew ina church wedding in Manila (Exh. E).In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 forannulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional TrialCourt of Pasay City x x x.x x x xParenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000,

before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, fordeclaration of nullity of their marriage.On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive

portion of which states:WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accusedVictoria Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime ofBIGAMY.

Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penaltyof SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS ofprision mayor, as maximum.This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as thenullity of accuseds bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children andtheir property. This aspect is being determined by the Regional Trial Court ofManila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.Costs against the accused.

The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in thatassailed Order dated 2 August 2001.3For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages toAlocillo were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to acertain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) hermarriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriagelicense; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage toAlocillo as far back as 1978.On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decisiondated July 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when shecontracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriageto Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This beingso, the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at thetime of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of sufficientevidence, petitioners contentions that her marriages were celebrated without amarriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as1978.In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision datedMarch 28, 2003, declaring petitioners 1974 and1975 marriages to Alocillo nulland void ab initio on the ground of Alocillos psychological incapacity. Saiddecision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion forreconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for thereversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA,citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,4denied reconsideration and ruled that "[t]hesubsequent declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground of

psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of themarriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the saidmarriage is not without legal consequences, among which is incurring criminalliability for bigamy."5Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules ofCourt where petitioner alleges that:V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR INPROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASEWHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR INAFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OFBIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWOMARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BYFINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

NOT CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OFMARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEENEMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HADALREADY PRESCRIBED.V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLOAND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.

V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR INNOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUSPENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THEINDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed

jointly. It is true that right after the presentation of the prosecution evidence,petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendencyof the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioners marriages to Alocillo,which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also

asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC dmotion for suspension, while the CA struck do wn her arguments. In MarBobis v. Bobis,6the Court categorically stated that:x x x as ruled inLandicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriagethe judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of

prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be son the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. x xx x x xx x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the fimarriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contrasecond marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decisiocivil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered intsecond marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decisicivil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It istherefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x7The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,8where itthus:The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage waimmaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had alreaconsummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the proof bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition this previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prquestion in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [pcomplainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocguilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the c

bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the smarriage is contracted.Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shaldeemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this casif petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was vinitio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting the first marriage was annulled.9For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioneconviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judideclaration of nullity of petitioners two marriages to Alocillo c annot beconsidered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitionecontracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicideclared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated bthe time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioners marriage tAlocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of com

jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicialdeclaration of the nullity of petitioners marriage to Uy make any differeheld in Tenebro, "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not pargument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plainof [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that

provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent mduring the subsistence of a valid marriage. "11Petitioners defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prmayor, which is classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive pArticle 90 thereof provides that "[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive pshall prescribe in fifteen years," while Article 91 states that "[t]he period

prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is dby the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x x ."

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt1

8/10/2019 Cases Voidable Marriage

7/24

Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978;hence, prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises afact as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accusedis obliged to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing toestablish the same, it remains self-serving.12Thus, for petitioners defense of

prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence that asearly as the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failedto present sufficient evidence to support her allegation. Petitioners testimony thather own mother told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillodoes not inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating evidence.The trial court correctly observed that:x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother the person who allegedlyactually told Uy about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious thatwithout the confirmatory testimony of her mother, the attribution of the latter ofany act which she allegedly did is hearsay .13As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,14"the prescriptive period for the crimeof bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime wasdiscovered by the offended party, th e authorities or their [agents]," as opposed to

being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage.15Sincepetitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of prescription began torun as of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual. 1avvphi1Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penaltyunder the Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the ac cused shall be sentenced toan indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, inview of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under theRevised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the

penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without firstconsidering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of thecrime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sounddiscretion of the court to determine the minimum penalty, as long as it isanywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the

periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances areconsidered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminatesentence.16Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is

proper. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty forbigamy is prision mayor. The penalty next lower is prision correccional, whichranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six yearsimposed by the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the duration of

prision correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstancesproven in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor should be imposed inits medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trialcourt correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioners marriage toAlocillo has after all been declared by final judgment17to be void ab initio onaccount of the latters psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitionerwas subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the

penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner should be sentenced tosuffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4)months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 dayof prision mayor, as maximum.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. TheDecision of the Court of Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution datedJuly 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMEDin all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ofimprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision

correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, asmaximum.SO ORDERED.[G.R. No. L-53703. August 19, 1986.]

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V.

SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations

Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, Respondents.

Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for Petitioner.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for Pri vate Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY RELATIONS; VOID MARRIAGE; EVIDENCETHAT PRIOR MARRIAGE WAS VITIATED BY FORCE; NEED NOT BEINTRODUCED.There is not need for petitioner to prove that her firstmarriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assumingthis to do so, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85, CivilCode), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made,it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to herfirst husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, CivilCode).

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE ABOUT THE EXISTING PRIOR MARRIAGE OFFIRST SPOUSE; NEED NOT BE INTRODUCED.There is likewise no needof introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband atthe time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needsaccording to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intentsand purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time shecontracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, themarriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.

D E C I S I O N

PARAS, J.:

In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile andDomestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel(plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebratedon July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati,Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, anddefendant therein) on the ground of Lilias previous existing marriage to one

Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 atour Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existenceof said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, sheand the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to entersaid marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both

parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exertedagainst both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable?Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court foran opportunity to present evidence

(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her anfirst husband; and

(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already mto someone else.

Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the of force exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agrupon. Hence, the present petition for certiorariassailing the following Orthe respondent Judge

(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled tthe case for resolution based on "agreed facts;" and

(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioners motion to allow present evidence in her favor.

We find the petition devoid of merit.

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiateforce committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the mwill not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that whemarried respondent she was still validly married to her first husband,consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing priormarriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for thenmarriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declarasuch fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regardedmarried woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent KHeinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent woregarded VOID under the law.

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, anOrders complained of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 181089 : October 22, 2012MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAS,Complainant, v.LOURDESTAJOLOSA CIPRIANO,Respondent.D E C I S I O NPERALTA, J.:For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annOrder1rlldated September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTCPedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 49 90-SPL which

dismissed the lnformation for Bigamy filed against respondent Lourdes TCipriano. Also assailed is the RTC Resolution2rlldated January 2, 20denying the motion for reconsideration.On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in LezoAklan.3rllOn January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marespondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro,Laguna.4rllIn 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, B256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the grthe latters psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Fam

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt17http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2012octoberdecisions.php?id=640#fnt1http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2012octoberdecisions.php?id=640#fnt1http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2012octoberdecisions.php?id=640#fnt1http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2012octoberdecisions.php?id=640#fnt2http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2012octoberdecisions.php?id=640#fnt2http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2012octoberdecisions.php?id=640#fnt2http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2012octoberdecisions.php?id=640#fnt3http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2012octoberdecisions.php?id=640#fnt3http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2012octoberdecisions.php?id=640#fnt3http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2012octoberdecisions.php?id=640#fnt4http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2012octoberdecisions.php?id=640#fnt4http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2012octoberdecisions.php?id=640#fnt4http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2012octoberdecisions.php?id=640#fnt4http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2012octoberdecisions.php?id=640#fnt3http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2012octoberdecisions.php?id=640#fnt2http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2012octoberdecisions.php?id=640#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_164435_2009.html#fnt12

8/10/2019 Cases Voidable Marriage

8/24

Code, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTCof Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an Amended Decision5rlldeclaring themarriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became finaland executory on October 13, 2003.6rllOn May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montaz, Silverios daughter fromthe first marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, aComplaint7rllfor Bigamy against respondent, which was docketed asCriminal Case No. 41972. Attached to the complaint was anAffidavit8rll(Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated August 23, 2004,thumb-marked and signed by Silverio,9rllwhich alleged, among others, thatrespondent failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates. On

November 17, 2004, an Information10rllfor Bigamy was filed againstrespondent with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case wasdocketed as Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL. The Information

reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryThat on or about January 24 , 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province ofLaguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the saidaccused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a secondor subsequent marriage with one SILVERIO CIPRIANO VINALON while herfirst marriage with SOCRATES FLORES has not been judicially dissolved by

proper judicial authorities.11rllOn July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed aMotion to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the CriminalComplaint)12rllalleging that her marriage with Socrates had already beendeclared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of priorto her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic element of thecrime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimedthat since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy had already

prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment13rllarguing that the crime ofbigamy had already been consummated when respondent filed her petition fordeclaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of contracting a secondmarriage which appears to be valid, while the first marriage is still subsisting andhas not yet been annulled or declared void by the court.In its Order14rlldated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It foundrespondent's argument that with the declaration of nullity of her first marriage,there was no more first marriage to speak of and thus the element of two validmarriages in bigamy was absent, to have been laid to rest by our ruling inMercado v. Tan15rllwhere we held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryIn the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yetno judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted thePetition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed aletter-complaint charging him with bigamy. For contracting a second marriagewhile the first is still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article349 of the Revised Penal Code.That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the firstmarriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated bythen. x x x16rllAs to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the RTC foundthat while the second marriage indeed took place in 1983, or more than the 15-year prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy, the commission of the crime wasonly discovered on November 17, 2004, which should be the reckoning period,hence, prescription has not yet set in.Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration17rllclaiming that the Mercadoruling was not applicable, since respondent contracted her first marriage in 1976,i.e., before the Family Code; that the petition for annulment was granted and

became final before the criminal complaint for bigamy was filed; and, that Article40 of the Family Code cannot be given any retroactive effect because this will

impair her right to remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity of acompletely void prior marriage.On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order,18rllthe dispositive

portion of which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryWherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside. Let a newone be entered quashing the information. Accordingly, let the instant case beDISMISSED.rllbrrSO ORDERED.In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a secondmarriage on January 24, 1983, i.e., before the effectivity of the Family Code, theexisting law did not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition

precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before theFamily Code was ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior judicial declarationof absolute nullity of the first marriage. The RTC found that both marriages of

respondent took place before the effectivity of the Family Code, thus, consideringthe unsettled state of jurisprudence on the need for a prior declaration of absolutenullity of marriage before commencing a second marriage and the principle thatlaws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the accused, it declared that theabsence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not prejudice the accused whosesecond marriage was declared once and for all valid with the annulment of herfirst marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, butopposed by respondent. In a Resolution dated January 2, 2008, the RTC deniedthe same ruling, among others, that the judicial declaration of nullity ofrespondent's marriage is tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation thatsaid marriage never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in contracting asecond marriage cannot be considered criminal.Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising thefollowing issues:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryI. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of theFamily Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy on the ground of

psychological incapacity is a valid defense for a charge of bigamy for enteringinto a second marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the

pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to th eenactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diyregarding the necessity of securing a declaration of nullity of the first marriage

before entering a second marriage ambivalent, such that a person was allowed toenter a subsequent marriage without the annulment of the first without incurringcriminal liability.19rllPreliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's dismissal of theInformation for bigamy was filed by private complainant and not by the Office ofthe Solicitor General (OSG) which should represent the government in all judicial

proceedings filed before us.20rllNotwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had done in thepast. In Antone v. Beronilla,21rllthe offended party (private complainant)questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA) the RTC's dismissal of theInformation for bigamy filed against her husband, and the CA dismissed the

petition on the ground, among others, that the petition should have been filed inbehalf of the People of the Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel inall appealed criminal cases. In a petition filed with us, we said that we had givendue course to a number of actions even when the respective interests of thegovernment were not properly represented by the