Casimiro vs CA

8/23/2019 Casimiro vs CA

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[G.R. No. 136911. February 11, 2003]SPOUSES LEON CASIMIRO and PILAR PASCUAL, doing business under thename and style CASIMIRO VILLAGE SUBDIVISION, substituted by their heirs: EMILIO, TEOFILO and GABRIEL,all surnamed CASIMIRO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, former Thirteenth Division, NILDA A. PAULIN,MANOLITO A. PAULIN, SUSAN P. MARTIN, SYLVIA P. FARRES, CYNTHIA P. LAZATIN, CELESTINO P. PAULIN

and UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CORPORATION, respondents. R E S O L U T I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J .:

This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, seeking to set aside our Decision dated July 3,2002, which affirmed the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 16165.

The facts as set forth in the Decision are as follows:

Respondents were the registered owners of a 25,000 square meter parcel of land situated in Pamplona, Las Pias City, covered by

Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-74375. Adjoining their property on the northern side was petitioners land, covered by Original

Certificate of Title No. 5975.

Sometime in 1979, during a relocation survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Emilio Paz at the instance of respondents, it was

discovered that the Casimiro Village Subdivision, owned by petitioners, encroached by 3,110 square meters into respondents

land. Respondents notified petitioners and demanded that they desist from making further development in the area. Subsequently, on

March 13, 1980, respondents demanded that petitioners remove all constructions in the area.

Failing in their efforts to regain possession of the disputed premises, respondents filed with the Court of First Instance of Pasay City

an action for recovery of possession with damages against petitioners and the latters lot buyers, docketed as Civ il Case No. LP-8840-

P. Respondents alleged that 3,110 square meters of their property, which has a market value of P640,000.00, computed at the then

prevailing price of P200.00 per square meter, have been encroached upon and fenced in by petitioners as part of the Casimiro Village

Subdivision, and subdivided and sold to lot buyers. In support of their contention, respondents presented the geodetic engineer who

conducted the actual ground relocation survey.

In their defense, petitioners denied that there was an encroachment in respondents land. They presented Geodetic Engineers Lino C.

Reyes and Felipe Venezuela from the Bureau of Lands. Meanwhile, defendant-lot buyers interposed a cross-claim against petitioners

spouses Casimiro, averring that they were innocent purchasers in good faith and for value of their respective lots.

On December 29, 1982, the Court of First Instance, Branch XXVIII, Pasay City, rendered a decision in favor of respondents, the

dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Casimiros sentencing the latter to pay

the former the sum of P640,000.00 with interest thereon at the legal rate from March 13, 1980 until the same is fully paid and to pay

attorneys fees equivalent to 25% of the total amount due and the costs. On the cross-claim, cross defendants Casimiros are ordered to

pay cross plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees.

SO ORDERED.

Ruling on petitioners motion for reconsideration, the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch CXI, set aside its earlier decision,

and held that the report of the engineers from the Bureau of Lands were more credible and accurate, and enjoy the presumption of

regularity and accuracy.

On July 15, 1987, respondents moved for reconsideration of the above Order, but the same was denied on January 19, 1988.

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals on the sole question of the proper location of the common boundary separating the

adjoining lots of petitioners and respondents. The Court of Appeals ordered that a relocation survey be conducted by a team of

surveyors composed of a surveyor designated by the respondents, a surveyor designated by the petitioners, and a third member-


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surveyor chosen by the said two surveyors. Petitioners designated Engr. Nicolas Bernardo, while respondents designated Engr.

Manuel P. Lopez. Upon agreement of the parties that the third member shall be from the Land Registration Commission, Engr. Felino

Cortez, Chief, Ordinary and Cadastral Division, Land Registration Commission, was designated third member and chairman of the

relocation survey.

Petitioners complained of irregularities in the conduct of the relocation survey, namely, (a) the actual field work was conducted by a

separate survey team composed of employees of the LRC without the knowledge and presence of Engr. Bernardo; (b) the relocation

plan and computations were done without consultation and coordination among the members of the survey team; and (c) the relocationplan that was prepared by Engr. Cortez did not conform to the verification plan earlier approved by the Bureau of Lands in January

1982.

However, the Court of Appeals found nothing irregular in the conduct of the relocation survey. Petitioners representative, Engr.

Bernardo, admitted that he was furnished copies of the field notes and data gathered by the LRA team, but did not enter any objection

thereto. If at all, Engr. Bernardos exclusion from the actual field work was rectified by the opportunity given h im to comment on the

final report prepared by Engr. Cortez, which Engr. Bernardo did not do.

After the survey, the Court of Appeals found that the final relocation survey report yielded the indisputable and inevitable

conclusion that petitioners encroached on a portion of the respondents property comprising an area of 3,235 square meters. On

November 11, 1996, a judgment was rendered as follows:

The foregoing considered, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the order of the trial court dated June 25 1987 and REINSTATEthe decision dated December 29, 1982 as prayed for by the Appellants [spouses Paulin].

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition for review.[1]

In denying the petition for review, we upheld the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, citing the rule that we arenot a trier of facts,

[2]and that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantial evidence, are

conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court .[3]

In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners argue that this case falls within the exceptions when review of thefactual findings of the Court of Appeals is proper. According to them, the findings of fact of the appellate court were

contrary to those of the trial court. Moreover, it was alleged that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of theCourt of Appeals when it approved the Report of the Relocation Survey Team without the signature of petitionersrepresentative therein, Engr. Nicolas Bernardo. Likewise, the inference of the Court of Appeals as to the conclusivenessof the survey report was manifestly mistaken because the same were arrived at without the participation and conformity ofEngr. Bernardo. Finally, the assailed Decision was based on the assumption that Engr. Bernardo was furnished copies othe field notes and data gathered by the team of surveyors.

In their Comment, respondents countered that this Court is not tasked with the duty to review findings of fact; that thefindings of fact of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court are not contrary to each other; and that the Court ofAppeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

[4]

Considering the seriousness of the allegation of irregularity in the manner of the resurvey, we resolved to take asecond look at the evidence on record of this case, particularly those before the Court of Appeals pertaining to thecomposition of the resurvey team and the conduct of the resurvey field work.

As narrated above, the Court of Appeals, upon agreement of both parties, ordered that a relocation survey on thequestioned properties be conducted by a team of surveyors. The Court of Appeals Resolution reads:

Finding the proposal well-taken as the only issue in this controversy is the correctness of the relocation survey to determine the true

location of the common boundary between the lot of the plaintiffs and the lot of the defendants, the Court pursuant to Section 9 (3) of

B.P. 129, hereby directs that a relocation survey of the strip of land in question in this case, be conducted by a team of surveyors

composed of (1) a surveyor designated by the appellants, (2) a surveyor designated by the appellees and (3) a surveyor to be chosen by

the said two surveyors. The resurvey shall be conducted in the presence of both parties or their authorized representatives. In view of

the manifestation of defendants-appellees that they are willing to advance the cost of said relocation survey, reimbursable to them

contingently as part of the costs of this action, should they win, the costs of such relocation survey shall be advanced by the

defendants appellees.[5]
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Subsequently, the Court of Appeals designated the following as members of the survey team:

(1) Engr. Manuel P. Lopez (for respondents);

(2) Engr. Nicolas R. Bernardo (for petitioners);

(3) Engr. Felino M. Cortez of the Land Registration Commission.[6]

On July 10, 1992, Engr. Cortez submitted a report stating, among others, that the members of the resurvey team

have agreed that the actual field work will be undertaken by five technical personnel, three of whom shall come from theLand Registration Authority and the remaining two shall be Engrs. Lopez and Bernardo or their respectiverepresentatives.

[7]

By February 9, 1993, the field work had already been completed, pursuant to the Report of Engr. Cortez to the Courtof Appeals.

[8] On May 10, 1993, petitioners filed a Motion to Require Engineer Cortez to Comply with the Terms and

Conditions of this Honorable Courts Resolution of March 21, 1990,[9]

wherein they complained that the actual survey fieldwork was done without the knowledge and presence of their representative, Engr. Bernardo, in contravention of theappellate courts directive that the resurvey shall be conducted in the presence of both parties or their authorizedrepresentatives.

Subsequently, Engr. Cortez submitted his Report which states that the actual field work was undertaken by a surveyteam created by the Administrator of the LRA composed of Engrs. Cortez, Ildefonso Padigos, Jr., Porfirio Encisa, Jr., andAlexander Montemayor. The team found that petitioners property encroached on respondents property by 3,235 square

meters. The Report was signed by Engrs. Cortez and Lopez. Engr. Bernardo did not sign above his typewritten name.[10]

Engr. Bernardo filed a Comment, setting forth the alleged irregularities in the relocation survey. According to him, henever received notice of the time and exact date of the field survey, as agreed upon by the team; that the designation ofthe LRA engineers who undertook the field work was not authorized by the court; and that the official survey teamappointed by the Court of Appeals never met to perform the survey.

[11]

On January 17, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion to require the chairman of the re locationsurvey team to comply with the resolution of the court dated March 20, 1990 .

[12] Subsequently, it rendered judgment in

favor of respondents, finding that the Report submitted by the Relocation Survey Team was arrived at after a careful anddeliberate process of survey, computation and assessment of its technical findings. Hence, it sustained the finding thapetitioners property encroached on respondents property by 3,235 square meters.

[13]

The reason for the requirement of representation of both parties in the resurvey team is to ensure that the interests of

both sides are protected. If this requirement is breached, then serious prejudice can result. This is especially true in thiscase where the purpose of the resurvey is to determine the boundaries of the parties adjacent lots. The placing oboundary lines and demarcation points on the soil must be precise, and the smallest error in alignment may result in theloss of a large portion of ones property. Hence, it is crucial that each party must have a representative present to ensurethat the fixing of the metes and bounds on the soil is accurately performed.

Indeed, the requirement of notice and representation in the proceedings is an essential part of due process oflaw. In Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

[14]we held:

Respondent DAR, on the other hand, avers that surveys on the land covered by the four titles were conducted in 1989, and that

petitioner, as landowner, was not denied participation therein. The results of the survey and the land valuation summary report,

however, do not indicate whether notices to attend the same were actually sent to and received by petitioner or its duly authorized

representative. To reiterate, Executive Order No. 229 does not lay down the operating procedure, much less the notice requirements,

before the VOS is accepted by respondent DAR. Notice to the landowner, however, cannot be dispensed with. It is part of

administrative due processand is an essential requisite to enable the landowner himself to exercise, at the very least, his right ofretention guaranteed under the CARL. (emphasis ours)[15]

Poring over the records of the Court of Appeals regarding the resurvey of the subject properties, it appears that theactual field work was performed by engineers from LRA, without the representatives of petitioners and respondents beingpresent. There was no clear showing that notices of the field work were sent to petitioners and respondents. Worse, theactual field work was undertaken by only four engineers, all of whom were designated from the LRA. This is in violation othe agreement of the parties that the actual field work should be done by five technical personnel, three of whom shalcome from the Land Registration Authority and the remaining two shall be Engrs. Lopez and Bernardo or their respectiverepresentatives.

[16]
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As stated above, the representatives of petitioners and respondents were not notified of and thus failed to participatein the survey. This is evident from the Report submitted by Engr. Cortez himself, stating that the actual field work wasundertaken by a survey team created by the Administrator of the LRA composed of Engrs. Cortez, Ildefonso Padigos, Jr.,Porfirio Encisa, Jr., and Alexander Montemayor.

[17] It is clear that Engrs. Lopez and Bernardo were not present at the field

survey.

The failure of Engr. Cortez, as chairman of the resurvey team, to notify Engr. Bernardo of the actual field work toenable him to participate therein constituted as serious violation of petitioners right to due process, especially considering

that it resulted in a deprivation of their property to the extent of 3,235 square meters. The actual survey proceedingsmust, therefore, be conducted anew, ensuring this time that the interests of both parties are adequately protected. Hencethis case must be remanded to the Court of Appeals for the retaking of the survey of the boundaries on the partiesrespective properties.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Decision dated July 3, 2002 in G.R. No. 136911 is SET ASIDE. Theinstant petition is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, which is ordered to forthwith cause the resurvey the boundaries onthe parties respective properties by the team of surveyors agreed upon by the parties, and thereafter to decide the caseaccordingly.

SO ORDERED.
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[G.R. No. 143540. April 11, 2003]

JOEL G. MIRANDA, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO C. CARREON, MILAGROS B. CASCO, ELSIE S. ESTARES, JULIUS NMALLARI, ELINORA A. DANAO, JOVELYN G. RETAMAL, MARIFE S. ALMAZAN, JONALD R. DALMACIO,JENNIFER C. PLAZA, RIZALDY B. AGGABAO, VILMA T. VENTURA, BENEDICT B. PANGANIBAN, JOSE L.GOMBIO, MELCHOR E. SORIANO, ZARINA C. PANGANIBAN, EMELITA D. TAUYA, EVANGELINE ASICAM, MATABAI AQUARIOUS Q. CULANG, MELVIN L. GARCIA, JOHNNY N. YU, JR., LOIDA J.PURUGGANAN, EDUARDO S. VALENCIA, EDITHA A. REGLOS, HENRY P. MAPALAD, RAMIL C. GALANG

JUSTINA M. MACASO, MARTHA B. ALLAM, and ARSENIA A. CATAINA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J .:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1]

assailing the Decision[2]

dated May 21, 1999 and the Resolution datedJune 5, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36997.

In the early part of 1988, Vice Mayor Amelita Navarro, while serving as Acting Mayor of the City of Santiago becauseof the suspension of Mayor Jose Miranda, appointed the above-named respondents to various positions in the citygovernment. Their appointments were with permanent status and based on the evaluation made by the City PersonneSelection and Promotion Board (PSPB) created pursuant to Republic Act No. 7160.

[3]The Civil Service Commission

(CSC) approved the appointments.

When Mayor Jose Miranda reassumed his post on March 5, 1998 after his suspension, he considered thecomposition of the PSPB irregular since the majority party, to which he belongs, was not properly represented.

[4]He then

formed a three-man special performance audit team composed of Roberto C. Bayaua, Antonio AL. Martinez and AntonioL. Santos, to conduct a personnel evaluation audit of those who were previously screened by the PSPB and those onprobation. After conducting the evaluation, the audit team submitted to him a report dated June 8, 1998 stating that therespondents were found wanting in (their) performance.

On June 10, 1998, or three months after Mayor Miranda reassumed his post, he issued an order terminatingrespondents services effective June 15, 1998 because they performed poorly during the probationary period.

Respondents appealed to the CSC, contending that being employees on probation,[5]

they can be dismissed from theservice on the ground of poor performance only after their probationary period of six months, not after three (3months. They also denied that an evaluation on their performance was conducted, hence, their dismissal from the serviceviolated their right to due process.

On October 19, 1998, the CSC issued Resolution No. 982717 reversing the order of Mayor Miranda and orderingthat respondents be reinstated to their former positions with payment of backwages, thus:

x x x

Granting that the complainant-employees (now respondents) indeed rated poorly, the question that remains is whether they can be

terminated from the service on that ground.

x x x

x x x, at the time of their termination the complainants have not finished the six (6) months probationary period. x x x, they may be

terminated even before the expiration of the probationary period pursuant to Section 26, par. 1, Chapter 5, Book V, Title I-A of theRevised Administrative Code of 1987. Said Section provides:

All such persons (appointees who meet all the requirements of the position) must serve a probationary period of six months

following their original appointment and shall undergo a thorough character investigation in order to acquire a permanent civil service

status. A probationer may be dropped from the service for unsatisfactory conduct or for want of capacity anytime before the

expiration of the probationary period: Provided, that such action is appealable to the Commission.

It is, however, clear from the foregoing quoted provision that an employee on probation status may be terminated only for

unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity. In this case, the services of the complainants were terminated on the ground of poor

performance x x x. Although poor performance may come near the concept of want of capacity, the latter, as held by this

Commission, implies opportunity on the part of the head of office to observe the performance and demeanor of the employee
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concerned(Charito Pandes, CSC Resolution No. 965592). At this point, considering that Mayor Jose Miranda reassumed his

post only on March 5, 1998 after serving his suspension, it is quite improbable that he can already gauge the performance of

the complainants through the mere lapse of three months considering that the date of the letter of termination is June 10, 1998

and its effectivity date June 15, 1998.[6](emphasis supplied)

Meanwhile, the COMELEC disqualified Mayor Jose Miranda as a mayoralty candidate in the 1998 Mayelections. His son Joel G. Miranda, herein petitioner, substituted for him and was proclaimed Mayor of Santiago City. He

then filed a motion for reconsideration of the CSC Resolution No. 982717 (in favor of respondents) but it was denied in theCSC Resolution No. 990557 dated March 3, 1999.

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No36997. On May 21, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming in toto the CSC Resolution No982717. Forthwith, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but before it could be resolved by the Court of Appealsseveral events supervened. This Court, in G.R. No. 136351, Joel G. Miranda vs. Antonio M. Abaya and the COMELEC,set aside the proclamation of petitioner as Mayor of Santiago City for lack of a certificate of candidacy and declared ViceMayor Amelita Navarro as City Mayor by operation of law.

[7]

On December 20, 1999, Mayor Navarro filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion to Withdraw the Motion forReconsideration (previously submitted by former Mayor Joel G. Miranda).

On June 5, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of its Decision.

On June 11, 2000, the Court of Appeals granted Mayor Navarros Motion to Withdraw the Motion forReconsideration. In effect, the CSC Resolution reinstating respondents to their positions stays.

In this petition, petitioner Joel G. Miranda contends that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the CSC Resolutiondeclaring that the termination of respondents services is illegal and ordering their reinstatement to their former positionswith payment of backwages.

In their comment, respondents claim that since petitioner ceased to be Mayor of Santiago City, he has no legapersonality to file the instant petition and, therefore, the same should be dismissed. They insist that they were not actuallyevaluated on their performance. But assuming there was indeed such an evaluation, it should have been done by theiimmediate supervisors, not by those appointed by former Mayor Jose Miranda.

In his reply, petitioner contends that as a taxpayer, he has a legal interest in the case at bar, hence, can lawfully filethis petition.

Section 17, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

Sec. 17.Death or separation of a party who is a publicofficer. When a public officer is a party in an action in his official

capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or

against his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such time as may be granted by the Court, it is

satisfactorily shown by any party that there is substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and the successor adopts or continues

or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor.

It is clear from the above Rule that when petitioner ceased to be mayor of Santiago City, the action may be continuedand maintained by his successor, Mayor Amelita Navarro, if there is substantial need to do so.

Mayor Navarro, however, found no substantial need to continue and maintain the action of her predecessor in light ofthe CSC Resolution declaring that respondents services were illegally terminated by former Mayor Jose Miranda. In fact

she filed with the Court of Appeals aMotion to Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration (lodged by petitioner). Shelikewise reinstated all the respondents to their respective positions and approved the payment of their salaries.

Petitioner insists though that as a taxpayer, he is a real party-in-interest and, therefore, should continue andmaintain this suit. Such contention is misplaced. Section 2, Rule 3 of the same Rules provides:

Section 2.Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the

suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be

prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (emphasis supplied)

Even as a taxpayer, petitioner does not stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit. Not everyaction filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government.

[8]It bears stressing
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that a taxpayers suit refers to a case where the act complained ofdirectly involves the illegal disbursement of publicfunds from taxation.

[9]The issue in this case is whether respondents services were illegally terminated. Clearly, it does

not involve the illegal disbursement of public funds, hence, petitioners action cannot be considered a taxpayers suit.

At any rate, to put to rest the controversy at hand, we shall resolve the issue of whether respondents services wereillegally terminated by former Mayor Jose Miranda.

The 1987 Constitution provides that no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or

suspended except for cause provided by law.[10]

Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a government officeror employee may be removed from the service on two (2) grounds: (1) unsatisfactory conduct and (2) want ofcapacity. While the Code does not define and delineate the concepts of these two grounds, however, the Civil ServiceLaw (Presidential Decree No. 807, as amended) provides specific grounds for dismissing a government officer oremployee from the service. Among these grounds are inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of officiaduties. In the case at bar, respondents were dismissed on the ground ofpoor performance. Poor performance fallswithin the concept of inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties which, as earlier mentioned, aregrounds for dismissing a government official or employee from the service.

But inefficiency or incompetence can only be determined after the passage of sufficient time, hence, the probationaryperiod of six (6) months for the respondents. Indeed, to be able to gauge whether a subordinate is inefficient orincompetent requires enough time on the part of his immediate superior within which to observe his performance. Thiscondition, however, was not observed in this case. As aptly stated by the CSC, it is quite improbable that Mayor JoseMiranda could finally determine the performance of respondents for only the first three months of the probationary period.

Not only that, we find merit in respondents claim that they were denied due process. They cited Item 2.2 (b), SectionVI of the Omnibus Guidelines on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, Seriesof 1993, as amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 1994) which provides:

2.2. Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance

x x xb. An official or employee who, for one evaluation period, is rated poor in performance, may be dropped from the rolls afterdue notice. Due notice shall mean that the officer or employee is informed in writing of the status of his performance not later

than the fourth month of that rating period with sufficient warning that failure to improve his performance within the

remaining period of the semester shall warrant his separation from the service. Such notice shall also contain sufficient

information which shall enable the employee to prepare an explanation.[11](emphasis supplied)

Respondents vehemently assert that they were never notified in writing regarding the status of their performanceneither were they warned that they will be dismissed from the service should they fail to improve theirperformance. Significantly, petitioner did not refute respondents assertion. The records show that what respondentsreceived was only the termination order from Mayor Jose Miranda. Obviously, respondents right to due process wasviolated.

Moreover, respondents contend that the only reason behind their arbitrary dismissal was Mayor Jose Mirandasperception that they were not loyal to him, being appointees of then Acting Mayor Navarro. This contention appears to betrue considering that all those who were accepted and screened by the PSPB during the incumbency of Acting MayorNavarro were rated to have performed poorly by an audit team whose three members were personally picked by MayorJose Miranda.

The Constitution has envisioned the civil service to be a career service based on merit and rewards system that willtruly be accountable and responsive to the people and deserving of their trust and support .

[12]These noble objectives wil

be frustrated if the tenure of its members is subject to the whim of partisan politics. A civil servant who lives in ceaselessfear of being capriciously removed from office every time a new political figure assumes power will strive to do anythingthat pleases the latter. In this way, he will hardly develop efficiency, accountability and a sense of loyalty to the publicservice. Such a climate will only breed opportunistic, inefficient and irresponsible civil servants to the detriment of thepublic. This should not be countenanced.

In fine, we hold that petitioner, not being a real party in interest, has no legal personality to file this petition. Besideshis motion for reconsideration was validly withdrawn by the incumbent Mayor. Even assuming he is a real party in interest,we see no reason to disturb the findings of both the CSC and the Court of Appeals. The reinstatement of respondentswho, unfortunately, were victims of political bickerings, is in order.

WHEREFORE, thepetition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated May 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 36997 is AFFIRMED.Treble costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 109920 August 31, 2000

CEFERINO A. SORIANO, petitioner,vs.HON. ADORACION C. ANGELES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Caloocan City, Regional Trial Court,Branch CXXI, and RUEL GARCIA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA,J .:

This is a petition forcertiorarito annul the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, Caloocan City, onMarch 15, 1993 in Criminal Case No. C-40740 which acquitted private respondent Ruel Garcia of direct assault.

The prosecutions evidence was as follows: Private respondent Ruel Garcia and his uncle, Pedro Garcia, were membersof the Caloocan police. Shortly after midnight on November 7, 1991, they barged into the barangay hall of Barangay 56,Zone 5 in Caloocan City, looking for petitioner Ceferino A. Soriano, the barangay captain. Private respondent gavepetitioner fist blows on the face four times with his left hand, while he poked a gun at him with his right hand, at the sametime cursing him, "Putang ina mo cabeza" ("You son of a bitch chief"). Although there were four barangay tanods (ManuelMontoya, Arturo del Rosario, Ramiro Samson, and Francisco Raton) in the barangay hall, they could not come to the aidof petitioner because they were held at bay by Pedro Garcia. The Garcias then left with their companions who had beenwaiting outside the hall. Petitioner was treated for his injuries in the hospital.

Private respondent denied petitioners allegations. He testified that he went to the barangay hall in the evening ofNovember 6, 1991 because his younger brother had been reportedly arrested and beaten up by petitioner. (It appears thatthe younger Garcia was involved in a brawl with Dennis Mones and a certain Ocampo. They were arrested and taken tothe barangay hall. One of the boys, who was apparently drunk, vomitted while their names were recorded. Petitioner,therefore, ordered the three boys to be taken to the Ospital ng Kalookan for a check-up.) As private respondent sawpetitioner near the door of the barangay hall, he asked for the whereabouts of his brother and the reason for the lattersarrest. Apparently thinking that private respondent was trying to intervene in the case he was investigating, petitionerangrily told private respondent to lay off:"Walang pulis pulis dito" ("Your being a policeman doesnt pull strings here").When private respondent insisted on going inside the barangay hall, petitioner blocked him and then pushed him on thechest. Private respondent also pushed petitioner, causing him to fall on a pile of nightsticks and injure himself. All the timeprivate respondent claimed he had his gun tucked at his waist. Private respondent s uncle, Pedro Garcia, then arrived andtook him home.

In acquitting private respondent, respondent Judge Adoracion C. Angeles found it incredible that petitioner did not resistor even say anything when private respondent allegedly assaulted him and that none of the four barangay tanods whowere near him came to his aid. She thought that if petitioner had indeed been attacked, he would have suffered moreserious injuries than a contusion on the forehead, erythema on the chest, and a lacerated wound on the lower lip.Respondent judge also excluded from the evidence the testimonies of petitioner and barangay tanodManuel Montoya onthe ground that their testimonies had not been formally offered in evidence as required by Rule 132, 34 to 35 of theRevised Rules on Evidence.

Hence this petition forcertiorari. Petitioner alleges that the decision is void because it was not rendered by an impartial

tribunal. He contends that respondent judge was "hell-bent on saving the private respondent from conviction and had pre-judged the case" as shown by the fact that (1) on August 26, 1992, before private respondents arraignment, she calledthe parties and their counsels to her chambers and urged them to settle the case, and, when petitioner refused, she didnot set the case for hearing until after three weeks allegedly to provide a "cooling off" period; (2) that at the initial trial onSeptember 15 and 16, 1992, respondent judge again called on the parties to settle the case. Petitioner alleges that, whilerespondent judge stated in her order of September 15, 1992 cancelling the hearing on that date that this was done toenable Atty. Maria Lelibet Sampaga to study the case as she had been appointed as private respondents counsel only onthat day, the same was actually a pretext, the real reason being to give private respondent another opportunity topersuade petitioner to settle the case. The records in fact show that Atty. Sampaga had been private respondentscounsel at the arraignment on August 26, 1992; (3) that respondent judge excluded the testimonies of petitioner and hiswitness, Manuel Montoya, for failure of the prosecution to offer formally the same when the transcript of stenographicnotes shows this was not so and that, at any rate, the defense waived the objection based on this ground by cross-examining petitioner and Montoya; and (4) that respondent judge failed to find private respondent guilty despite the


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testimonies of three eyewitnesses (barangay tanods Montoya, del Rosario, and Samson). Petitioner therefore prays that amistrial be declared and that the case be ordered retried before another judge.

On the other hand, private respondent Ruel Garcia contends that, if at the outset, petitioner doubted respondent judgesimpartiality, he should have sought her inhibition right then and there; that it was not true respondent judge called theparties to her chambers on August 26, 1992 as only the arraignment took place on that day; that at said arraignment, hiscounsel, Atty. Emilio Bermas, was absent for which reason respondent judge designated Atty. Maria Lelibet S. Sampaga

to assist him; that the schedule of the trial (September 15, 16, and 21, 1992) was not fixed by respondent judge but by theclerk in charge of the matter, taking into account the schedule of the other cases assigned to the court; that it was only onthe first day of trial on September 15, 1992 that respondent judge first talked to the parties, and, upon learning that bothwere public officers, thought it proper to ask them if they were not willing to settle their dispute, and seeing the parties andtheir counsels to be receptive, she invited them to her chambers; that as petitioner later appeared to have secondthoughts and, on the other hand, as Atty. Sampaga needed time to prepare for trial, respondent judge postponed the trialto the next day, September 16, 1992; that on September 16, 1992, respondent judge again called the parties to herchambers to see if they had come to any agreement, but as she was told by petitioner that "for him to withdraw hiscomplaint against the private respondent, he must have to transfer his residence first," thus implying that he wished thecase against private respondent to continue, respondent judge proceeded with the trial that morning.

Private respondent contends that the instant petition does not have the consent and conformity of the public prosecutorbut was instead filed by the private prosecutor who does not have the requisite legal personality to question the decision

acquitting him.

Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that this petition should be dismissed:

A perusal of the judgment of the trial court showed that the parties were heard conformably to the norms of due process,evidence was presented by both parties and duly considered, their arguments were studied, analyzed, and assessed, andjudgment was rendered in which findings of facts and conclusions of law were set forth. These conclusions of fact or lawcannot in any sense be characterized as outrageously wrong or manifestly mistaken or whimsically or capriciously arrivedat. The worst that may perhaps be said of them is that they are fairly debatable and may even be possibly erroneous. Butthey cannot be declared to have been made with grave abuse of discretion ( Bustamante vs. NLRC, 195 SCRA 1991).Clearly, there was no mistrial in this case which would warrant the nullity of the assailed judgment.

1

The preliminary issue in this case is whether the petition should be dismissed outright because it was filed without the

intervention of the OSG as counsel for the prosecution.

This question is not a novel one. In the case ofPeople v. Santiago,2this Court held:

The question as to whether or not U.P., as the private offended party, can file this special civil action for certiorariquestioning the validity of said decision of the trial court should be answered in the affirmative.

It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or theprivate offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainants role is limitedto that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeatherefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the SolicitorGeneral may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take

such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of theaccused.

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trialcourt committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rulesstate that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and theprivate offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file suchspecial civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing,complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted inname of said complainant.

3

The above ruling has been reiterated in De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals4and Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc.,

5in which

the legal personality of private complainant to file a special civil action of certiorariquestioning the dismissal by the trial
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court of a criminal case has been upheld subject to the limitation that the accuseds right to double jeopardy is notviolated.

6As explained by the Court in People v. Court of Appeals:

77

A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process is void, does not exist in legal contemplation,and, thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal. However, where the petition demonstrates mere errors in judgment notamounting to grave abuse of discretion or deprivation of due process, the writ ofcertioraricannot issue. A review of thealleged errors of judgment cannot be made without trampling upon the right of the accused against double jeopardy.

8

In short, petitioner must establish that the judgment of acquittal resulted from a mistrial so as not to place privaterespondent, as accused, in double jeopardy.

In only one case has the Court categorically declared a mistrial, and that is the case of Galman v.Sandiganbayan.

9Petitioner would have the Court draw parallelisms between this case and Galman where the Court

nullified the judgment of acquittal of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of thePhilippines v. General Luther Custodio, et al."

This cases is, however, a far cry from Galman. There, it was shown that evidence was suppressed in order to justify theacquittal of the accused. This Court held that "the secret Malacaang conference at which the authoritarian Presidentcalled together the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan [Manuel Pamaran] and Tanodbayan [Bernardo] Fernandezand the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan [Manuel] Herrera and told them how to handle and rig

(moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings to assure the pre-determined ignominious finaloutcome are without parallel and precedentin our annals and jurisprudence."

10

In contrast, petitioner does not allege any such irregularity in the trial of private respondent. He simply claims thatrespondent judges bias and partiality denied the prosecution a fair and impartial trial. Why respondent judge was biasedfor the defense petitioner does not say. It is noteworthy that petitioner does not even dispute private respondentsallegation that respondent judge was not personally acquainted with him until she heard the criminal case against him.

It is pertinent at this point to cite certain principles laid down by the Court regarding the disqualification of a judge for lackof the objectivity that due process requires. It is settled that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties isnot enough; there should be evidence to prove the charge.

11Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, especially weighed

against a judges sacred allegation under oath of office to administer justice without respect to any person and do equalright to the poor and the rich.

12There must be a showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source

resulting in an opinion in the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case .13

The arguments which petitioner advances by way of proof of respondents judges alleged bias are not persuasive.

Respondent judges efforts to have the parties arrive at an amicable settlement is not evidence of partiality for privaterespondent. She could have been motivated by factors other than a desire to clear private respondent of criminalliability, i.e.,the clearing of her court docket or, as pointed out by the OSG in its comment ,

14in setting a good example

considering that petitioner and private respondent were neighbors occupying public offices charged with the maintenanceof peace and order in the community.

As for the allegation that the trial was not held until after three weeks to give private respondent more time to persuadepetitioner to amicably settle the case, it has been shown that it was not respondent judge but court personnel in charge of

scheduling cases who assigned the dates of trial taking into account the court calendar. The cancellation of theSeptember 15, 1992 hearing, on the other hand, was made to give private respondents counsel, Atty. Maria LelibetSampaga, time to study the case and prepare for trial. Although Atty. Sampaga had once appeared in behalf of privaterespondent, it was for the purpose of assisting the latter at the arraignment because the regular counsel was absent. Asnew counsel, Atty. Sampaga needed to study the case. A postponement to the next day, September 16, 1992, was not anunreasonable request. Indeed, this did not involve resetting the case since September 16, 1992 had been originallydesignated as one of the initial trial dates.

Nor is there any showing that respondent judge decided the criminal case on grounds other than its merits. A reading ofher decision acquitting private respondent shows that the same was made on the basis of her evaluation of the evidenceof the prosecution and of the defense. Because of the conflicting versions of the parties as to what really happened, herdecision was necessarily based on her appreciation of the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution and the defense.
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True, petitioner is correct in his argument that respondent judge mistakenly excluded from the evidence his testimony aswell as that of prosecution witness Manuel Montoya on the ground that the same had not been formally offered at the timethey were called to the witness stand. For the fact was that petitioner and Montoya had been cross-examined at length bythe defense and, therefore, the latter had waived objection to the failure of the prosecution to make an offer of theevidence.

15It has been held in Go v. Court of Appeals,

16however, that divergence of opinion between the trial judge and

a partys counsel as to the admissibility of evidence is not proof of bias or partiality. Besides, though respondent judgestated in her decision that the testimonies of petitioner and Montoya "cannot be considered by this Court as constituting

part of the evidence for the prosecution," her decision shows that she actually considered the testimonies in piecingtogether the prosecutions version of the events and in evaluating the evidence in the case. The testimonies of petitionerand Montoya were after all referred to by the other witnesses for the prosecution, namely, del Rosario and Samson. Thusrespondent judges decision reads in pertinent part:

The allegation of the private complainant that he neither resisted the punches of the accused nor said anything to thelatter is quite hard to believe. No rational man would allow another to hurt him without offering any form of resistance, forhe is instinctively concerned [with] his self-preservation. It is more in consonance with human nature that when one ishurt, especially if the feeling of innocence is within him, to immediately retaliate to an unjust act.

Another equally unbelievable allegation is that the four barangay tanods just stood and watched their barangay captainwhile he was being mauled. There were four of them inside the hall yet no one even dared to defend herein privatecomplainant or stop herein accused. If they could not do it for their barangay captain and inside their hall, how can they be

expected to protect the residents of their barangay outside their hall?

Furthermore, if herein private complainant was indeed mauled, he should have suffered a lot more serious injuries than healleged[ly] incurred. Considering their allegation that the barangay tanods were guarded at the point of a gun by PedroGarcia, herein accused thus had all the time and opportunity to inflict on the private complainant as many serious injuriesas he could. But the results of the medical examination belie this point.

Well-settled is the rule that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of thedefense (People vs. Dennis Mendoza, 203 SCRA 148, G.R. No. 85176, October 21, 1991). After a thorough examinationof the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution, the latter failed to fulfill the test of moral certainty and establishsuch degree of proof necessary to support conviction. "If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of one ormore explanations, one of which is consistent with innocence and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidencedoes not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The constitutional presumption of

innocence stands until overthrown by strong and convincing evidence, one of which will prove guilt beyond reasonabledoubt" (People vs. Gina Sahagun, 182 SCRA 91, G.R. No. 62024, February 12, 1990).

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are merely unfounded accusations insufficient to gain conviction. In the caseofPeople vs. Guinto, 184 SCRA 287, G.R. 88400, April 6, 1990, the Supreme Court held: "Accusation is not synonymouswith guilt. The accused is protected by the constitutional presumption of innocence which the prosecution must overcomewith contrary proof beyond reasonable doubt. Even if the defense is weak, the case against the accused must fail if theprosecution is even weaker. . . . If the prosecution has not sufficiently established the guilt of the accused, he has a rightto be acquitted and released even if he presents naught a shred of evidence. "

17

That respondent judge believed the evidence of the defense more than that of the prosecution does not indicate that shewas biased. She must have simply found the defense witnesses to be more credible .

18

Indeed, no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of factsand evidence. A writ ofcertioraricannot be used to correct a lower tribunals evaluation of the evidence and factualfindings. Thus, in People v. Court of Appeals,

19the Court dismissed a petition forcertiorarifiled by the prosecution from a

decision of the Court of Appeals reversing that of the trial court and acquitting the accused of homicide and seriousphysical injuries on the ground that he acted in self-defense. The Court held:

To show grave abuse of discretion, herein petitioner contends that Respondent Court of Appeals committed manifest biasand partiality in rendering the assailed Decision. It claims that Respondent Court ignored and discarded "uncontrovertedphysical evidence" which the trial judge had relied upon. Furthermore, it allegedly erred in finding that he had "base[d] hisdecision on the testimony of witnesses whose demeanor he did not personally witness." In addition, it supposedly harpedon insignificant inconsistencies in the testimonies of some prosecution witnesses, while unquestioningly accepting theprivate respondents claim of self-defense.
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Finally, the solicitor general maintains that the assailed Decision (1) failed to discuss the effect of Maquilings escape fromconfinement during the pendency of the case; (2) shifted the burden of proof on the prosecution to prove Maquilings guilt,although he admitted killing the victim in self-defense; (3) ignored the physical evidence particularly the downwardtrajectory of the bullets that had hit the two victims, thereby showing that private respondent was still standing when heshot them; and the shotgun wound sustained by private respondent, which disabled him and rendered him incapable ofshooting the victims.

It is quite obvious from the foregoing allegations that petitioner imputed grave abuse of discretion to Respondent Courtbecause of the latters supposed misappreciation and wrongful assessment offactual evidence. However, as earlierstressed, the present recourse is a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65. It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a reviewof facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy ofcertiorari; which is extra ordinem beyond theambit of appeal. Stated elsewise, factual matters cannot normally be inquired into by the Supreme Court ina certiorariproceeding. This Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assessand weigh them again, in order to ascertain if the trial and the appellate courts were correct in according superior credit tothis or that piece of evidence of one party or the other.

The mere fact that a court erroneously decides a case does not necessarily deprive it of jurisdiction. 1wphi1 Thus,assuming arguendo that a court commits a mistake in its judgment, the error does not vitiate the decision, considering thatit has jurisdiction over the case.

An examination of the 65-page Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals shows no patent and gross error amounting tograve abuse of discretion. Neither does it show an arbitrary or despotic exercise of power arising from passion or hostility.. . .

20

Finally, petitioners claim that respondent judge was biased is belied by his failure to move for respondent judgesinhibition. Petitioners claim that he did not do so because of his "belief and desire for said respondent judge to finallyreturn to her normal sense of fairness" is a feeble excuse. His failure to file such motion stands as one more starkdifference between this case and Galman since the private prosecutors in the latter case lost no time in seeking thedisqualification of the members of the Sandiganbayan on grounds of manifest bias and partiality for the defense.

21

WHEREFORE, the petition forcertiorariis DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
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[G.R. Nos. 132484-85. November 15, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GEORGE DE LEON (acquitted), JULLIVER DELEON, accused,

JULLIVER DE LEON, accused-appellant.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA,J .:

Before us on appeal is the decision[1]dated November 6, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro ManilaBranch 72, in Criminal Case No. 17806-MN finding appellant Julliver de Leon guilty of violation of Section 16, Article III ofRA 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and sentencing him to suffer the penaltyofreclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000).

Initially, appellant Julliver de Leon was arrested and charged [2]together with his father, co-accused George de Leonwith the crime of illegal sale of regulated drugs in violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, in anInformation that read:

That on or about the 19th day of March 1997, in Malabon Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the

above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another, being private persons and without authority

of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver in consideration of the amount of P10,000.00 to a

poseur buyer white crystalline substance contained in two (2) separate sealed transparent plastic bag each with markings BB/AGN-

97/A and BB/AGH-97/B with a total net weight of5.1846 gram and 5.5693 gram respectively, which substance when subjected to

chemistry examination gave positive results for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu which are regulated

drugs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

They were also charged[4]with illegal possession of regulated drugs, in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425as amended, in an Information that read:

That on or about the 19th day of March 1997, in Malabon Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the

above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, being private persons and without authority of

law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control white crystalline substance

contained in four (4) separate transparent plastic bags marked R-MPM-1, R-MPM-2, R-MPM-3 and R-MPM-4 with a total

net weight of 48.70 gram, 99.40 gram, 94.40 gram and 4.7556 grams respectively, which substance when subjected to chemistry

examination gave positive results for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu which are regulated drugs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]

Upon arraignment on May 28, 1997, both accused pleaded not guilty to both charges and the trial ensued.

The evidence of the prosecution showed that, after a month of surveillance on a person named Jojie, who turned outto be accused George de Leon, for illegal drug trafficking, the Drugs Enforcement Group of the Malabon Police Stationdecided to conduct a buy-bust operation on the said accused.

Prosecution witness Ronald Ticlao, the police-aide who acted as the poseur-buyer for the operation, testified that,prior to the operation, he received ten pieces of marked one thousand peso bills which were photocopied. The serianumbers of the bills were also entered in the dispatch book. He was accompanied by a confidential informer named NoraBoysillo to transact with accused George de Leon. In going to the designated place of operation, he and Nora boarded atricycle and alighted in front of accused de Leons residence along Kaunlaran St., Muzon, Malabon, Metro Manila.[6]

Upon entering the compound, Nora Boysillo introduced Ticlao to accused George de Leon. George asked how muchmoney they had with them and the quantity of drugs that they wanted to buy. Ticlao answered that he wanted topurchase dalawang bulto. George then asked for the money and Nora Boysillo gave him the ten pieces of marked onethousand peso bills. After counting the money, George called his son, herein appellant Julliver Baye de Leon. When
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the appellant came out of the house, George told him to give the desired quantity of shabu to Ticlao and Boysillo. Georgethereafter handed the money to the appellant and then left the compound, telling Ticlao and Boysillo that the appellantwould handle the transaction. Herein appellant then entered the house from which George came out. When he emergedfrom the said house, he was holding a yellowish envelope. He took two plastic sachets from the said envelope andhanded them to Boysillo. Ticlao took one of the sachets and examined its contents. After verifying that what was given tohim was shabu, Ticlao gave the pre-arranged signal to the policemen who were then observing the proceedings fromoutside the compound. Then, Ticlao and Boysillo left, and the police operatives met them as they were leaving the

compound.[7]

After the pre-arranged signal was given, police officers Alberto Nepomuceno, Rogelio Libuton, Rojas, Cruz, Maalac

and Borda entered the compound to arrest appellant Julliver de Leon. On seeing them, the appellant ran inside hisfathers house. Libuton followed the appellant and saw him throw a yellowish envelope inside the bedroom where heentered and hid. Libuton picked up the envelope, looked inside and found four transparent plastic sachetscontaining shabu. He turned over the envelope to police officer Melvin Maalac. He and Maalac affixed their signaturesand the date of recovery on the envelope. They also marked the four sachets inside the said envelope.

During the trial, Ticlao identified the two accused, the buy-bust shabu, the confiscated shabu, the pertinent entries inthe police blotter containing the serial numbers of the marked money bills, the yellowish envelope from which Baye tookthe buy-bust shabu and the markings thereon.[8]

SPO 1 Rogelio Libuton also identified their signatures and the date they wrote on the envelope, and their markingson the sachets, as the exact markings they made during the operation. They identified the marked bills as the same billsused during the operation; they were the same bills whose serial numbers were entered in the dispatch book andphotocopied.[9]

SPO 1 Alberto Nepomuceno and SPO 1 Rogelio Libuton corroborated the testimony of Ticlao. Furthermore, theytestified that, in going to the place of operation, they used a Tamaraw FX vehicle, an owner-type jeep and a tricycle inwhich Ticlao and Boysillo rode. When George left the compound while the transaction was taking place, Nepomucenoordered police officers Querubin and Agustin to follow George.[10]

SPO1 Benjamin Querubin testified that he and SPO2 Agustin followed accused George de Leon right after he leftTiclao and Boysillo in the middle of the negotiation. Later on, Querubin received a radio message from SPO 1Nepomuceno ordering him to arrest accused George de Leon who was by then having a drinking session with his friendsabout 200 meters from his house.[11]

The buy-bust white crystalline substance[12]and the confiscated white crystalline substance [13]were sent to a

forensic chemist for laboratory examination[14]and were found to be the regulated drug[15]known as shabu.

For their defense, accused George and herein appellant denied that an entrapment operation took place.

Defense witness Geoffrey Santos, a tricycle driver plying the Concepcion-Muzon route, testified that, between twoand three oclock in the afternoon of March 19, 1997, three men whom he discovered later were policemen boarded histricycle and directed him to go to Kaunlaran Street with two other tricycles. The tricycles unloaded the passengers in fronof the gate of the residence of the accused. They entered the gate then drew their firearms. He denied seeing anyfemale who accompanied the policemen nor seeing a Tamaraw FX vehicle along the street .[16]

Defense witnesses Helen Navarro and Vicente Martin, neighbors of the accused, corroborated the testimony ofSantos. Martin added that he knew the persons who boarded the tricycles were police officers because he recognizedMaalac and Nepomuceno as police officers. He did not see Ronald Ticlao, any female companion or a Tamaraw FXvehicle purportedly used by the police officers.[17]

Herein appellant Julliver de Leon narrated before the court that, in the afternoon of March 19, 1997, he and his wifewere in his house when police officers Borda and Libuton suddenly entered. He woke up when a gun was poked ahim. When he asked why the policemen were there, herein appellant was immediately handcuffed and brought to thesala. The police operatives searched his house but found nothing illegal. He saw Maalac in a radio conversation withanother person outside the house. He heard the person on the other end say, Bok, positive nakuha na namin ang ama.Maalac replied, Kuha na rin ang anak. In turn, the person at the other end asked, Bakit pa kinuha nyo yan. Sakit langng ulo iyan. Maalac answered, Kasubuan na, marami ng tao dito. From his house, he was brought to the PagamutangBayan ng Malabon and thereafter to the Drugs Enforcement Group Headquarters of the Malabon Police Station.[18]

Accused George de Leon testified on how the police operatives arrested him. At about the same time that the policeoperatives entered and searched appellant Julliver de Leons house, George, since late morning of the same day, washaving a drinking spree with his friends along Kaunlaran Street in front of a house of a certain Aguila 200 meters awayfrom his own house and the house of the appellant. Police officers Benjamin Querubin, Cruz and Agustin arrived and told
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him that Captain Ona, whom he used to work for as a personal driver, was looking for him. When he replied that CaptainOna was attending a town fiesta in Batangas, they said that it was actually the Chief of Police who was looking for him. Afirst, he refused to go but went with them after they threatened him.

They brought him to the Barangay Hall of Muzon, Malabon, Metro Manila, then to the Pagamutang Bayan ngMalabon and later to the DEG headquarters where the two accused met each other. There, SPO1 Nepomuceno toldGeorge that they arrested Nora Boysillo, a courier of a known big-time drug pusher named Biyo Nuez, also known asBiyo Kalabaw. Being Nuezkumpadre, he was asked to reveal the whereabouts of Nuez or at least to contact the

latter by cellphone to determine where he was. He felt that acceding to Nepomucenos request would endanger his familyso he declined to divulge any information about Nuez.[19]As a result of his refusal to cooperate with his interrogators, heand his son were arrested and criminal charges were filed against them.

George alleged that he could not have transacted with Ticlao as he knew him to be a police aide when he was stillthe personal driver of Captain Ona. He said Ticlao and Boysillo testified against him due to his refusal to cooperate withthe police concerning the whereabouts of Biyo Nuez. At the headquarters, Ticlao and Boysillo asked him to cooperatewith the police operatives but he refused.[20]

Several weeks after the incident, on April 27, 1997, Ritzie de Leon, appellant Julliver de Leons wife, filed separatecomplaint-affidavits before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Malabon against the raiding DEG police operatives forviolation of domicile. However, the investigating prosecutor of the said complaint-affidavits, who happened to be the triaprosecutor of the subject criminal cases, dismissed the same.[21]

On November 6, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

a) In Criminal Case No. 17805-MN for Drug Pushing (Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A.7659): acquitting both accused, George de Leon and Julliver de Leon, on the ground of reasonabledoubt;

b) In Criminal Case No. 17806-MN for Illegal Possession ofShabu (Section 16, Art. III, R.A. 6425, as amendedby R.A. 7659): acquitting accused George de Leononlyon the ground of reasonable doubt.Accused Julliver de Leon is thereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to theprison term ofReclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P5,000,000.00.

Accused Julliver de Leon, being a detention prisoner, he shall be credited in full the period of detention he had already undergone inconnection with these cases if he signed the written agreement allowing him to be treated while still a detention prisoner under the

same rules governing prisoners already serving sentence by virtue of final judgments. Otherwise, he shall only be credited with 4/5

thereof.

Theshabu subject matter of these cases are hereby forfeited in favor of the government.

SO ORDERED.[22]

In acquitting George de Leon of illegal possession of regulated drugs and both George de Leon and appellant Julliverde Leon of illegal sale of regulated drugs, the trial court wrote:

The Court cannot help noting at once the fact that George was arrested in a place at least 200 meters away from where the policeclaimed he transacted with them for the sale of P10,000.00 worth ofshabu (T.S.N. Oct. 1, 1997, page 10) and that when he was

arrested he was actually in a drinking spree with several persons who claimed he never left the place since they started drinking up to

the time of his arrest, with nothing having been found in his possession that will connect him to either possession of illegal drugs or to

the claimed buy-bust transaction.

Also noted by the Court is the failure of the police to immediately pick him up and place him under arrest as soon as they have seen

the signal from Ticlao that the buy-bust operation yielded positive results.

According to Ticlao, it did not take long for him, after George told them that Julliver will take care of everything, meaning, the

delivery ofshabu for which they gave George P10,000.00 to give the positive signal. Nepomuceno and the other police officers acting

as back-ups for Ticlao and Boysillo allegedly saw the signal at once and they immediately pounced on Julliver. They di

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Casimiro vs CA