Casualty Investigation Report

8/3/2019 Casualty Investigation Report

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16th June 2006

File No. 26206

This Report has been presented without prejudice and with the exercise of due care and diligence. In accepting this report of Certificate, it is

agreed that the extent of the obligation of this firm with respect thereto is limited to furnishing a Surveyor believed to be competent, and in

making this Report or Certificate, the Surveyor is acting on behalf of the person requesting the same, and no liability shall attach to this

Firm for the accuracy, errors and omissions thereof.

CASUALTY INVESTIGATION

REPORT( Investigation of Death @ Sea )

M.v. “ NYK SPRINGTIDE ”

Voyage :- 32E17

YIT Terminal @ Los Angeles, California

12th May to 7 th June 2006



Ship Particulars

1.1 General Data

Name: M.v. NYK Springtide

Owners: Ulala Maritime S.A. Panama, R.P.

IMO Number: 9017044

Port of Registry: Panama

Call Sign: H O C Z

Type of Ship: Container Carrier (Capacity: 3054 TEU)

Deadweight Tonnage: 39404 (MT)

Length overall: 253.38 m

Breadth (Moulded): 21.20 m

Extreme Draft: 11.50 m

Means of Propulsion: Diesel

Engine Power: 45,000 PS

Service Speed: 23.4 knots

Delivery: 30 June 1992

Radio: SAT “F” 764118236, SAT “C” 435312610

Electronic Positioning: GPS



2 Documents To Be Produced

a) Statement of Master;

b) Statement of Chief Officer;

c) Copies of Official Log Book pages

d) Copies of Deck Log Book pages (3 May, 3 May Retard Day, 4 May);

e) Copy of Master’s Night Orders from 5/3/06;

f) Copy of Panama Seaman’s Document for Jai Kumar Shah;

g) Copy of Master’s Certificate for Capt. Peter Damian Misquitta;

h) Copy of Ship Registry & most recent Tax Payments to Panama

Maritime Authority;

i) Marine Note of Protest;

j) Crew List & Ship’s Particulars;

k) Copies of Nautical Chart 4522 used during incident;

l) Copies of four (4) pages of parallel search pattern;m) Copies of weather and position log pages;

n) Weather Charts received on the vessel;

o) Weather Reports received on the vessel;

p) GMDSS Radio Log Summary;

q) Daily Record Summary of all communications;

r) Copy of Distress messages sent via GMDSS;

s) Copy of list of satellite phone call records; &

t) Copy of Heavy Weather Navigation Checklist.

3 Particulars of Voyage

The NYK Springtide was on an eastbound transpacific passage between the port of

Sendai, China, and Los Angeles, CA on Voyage 32E17, and nearing the

International Dateline at the time of the incident. The date at which Cadet Shah

was last seen was May 3rd

2006. In the morning when he was discovered missing,

was again May 3rd

in what is sometimes knows as Dateline Day or Repeated Day.

The Master reports that the vessel sailed from the port of Sendai with a full load of

containers, and a GM of 0.97m.

4 Particulars of Personnel Involved in Incident

Master: Capt. Peter D. Misquitta

Chief Officer: Mr. Vikram Yadav

Third Officer: Mr. Ankush Chowdhury

Bosun: Mr. Rodolfo E. Rosal

FMA: Mr. Eljube T. Lunggakit



5 Particulars of Sea State, Weather and Tide

During the night of the incident, the vessel was passing to the south of a low

pressure system which was moving to the NNE. The proximity of the low pressure

center was causing strong winds from the SSE which moved to the South during

the night. Seas were described in the log book as “high sea and swell.” During the

night in which Cadet Shah went missing, and the following day when the search

started the visibility was at least two miles at all times. The logbook describes

conditions as follows:

Time Wind Force Swell

2100 SSE 7 S 3 m

2200 SSE 7 S 3 m

2300 SSE 7 S 3 m

Midnight SSE 7 S 3 m0100 S’ly 8 S 3 m Retard Day

0200 S’ly 8 S 3 m

0300 S’ly 8 S 3 m

0400 S’ly 7 S 3 m

0500 SSW 7 S 3 m

0600 SSW 7 S 3 m

0700 S 7 S 3 m

0800 S 7 S 3 m

0900 S 7 S 3 m1000 S 7 S 3/4 m

1100 S 7 S 3 m

Noon S 7 S 3 m

1300 SW 7 S 4 m

1400 SW 6 S 4 m

1500 SW 6 S 4 m

1600 SW 6 S 4 m

1700 SW 5 S 4 m

1800 WSW 6 S 4 m

1900 WSW 5 S 4 m

Following this time darkness set in. Wind and sea conditions remained similar

through the next night and day with the wind gradually coming around to the West.



6.1 Type of Incident

Marine Casualty: the death of a person that is caused by, or in connection with, the

operations of a ship.

6.2 Date, Time and Place of Incident

The incident (apparent loss of a person over the side) took place at sometime

between the hours of 03/1000Z (when Mr. Shah was last seen) and 03/2030Z

(when it was discovered that he was missing).

6.3 Details of Incident and of the Events Leading Up To It and Following It

During the last day that Cadet Jai Shah was seen on the vessel, he worked (under

the direction of the Chief Officer) with the Bosun cleaning in cargo hold bilges.Following that work he was assigned by the Chief Officer to monitor the ballasting

of a tank in the Ballast Control Room as the tank filled by gravity. He reportedly

stopped the operations below the tank top level. He reportedly informed the Chief

Officer (via ships telephone to the Bridge) when this was completed at

approximately 03/1730 LT (03/0630Z). He was told by the Chief Officer to “knock

off” and get dinner. He was told to start work again in approximately two hours

(1940) to make a fire round of the interior areas of the ship.

Following his fire round, Cadet Shah reportedly came to the Bridge to make atelephone call to India. This happened at approximately 2045 (LT). During this

time period, ships clocks were being moved forward 20 minutes per watch. The

Third Officer was on the Bridge at this time. Another Crewmember was using the

phone at the time. Cadet Shah reportedly told the Third Officer that he would go

below for a few minutes and come back when the phone was free.

Cadet Shah reportedly came back to the Bridge and made his phone call to a family

friend in India. The ships phone records show that this call was made at 03/2136Z.

This would have been at approximately 03/2100 LT. The Third Officer reports that

he did not overhear any noticeably loud or stressed conversation during the phonecall. He reported that Cadet Shah came onto the Bridge (from behind the blackout

curtain) and wished the Third Officer a good night. When the Third Officer

returned good night wishes, Cadet Shah left the Bridge. According to internal

interviews with all crewmembers by the Master and Chief Officer (and confirmed

by the Investigator), that was the last time that anyone on the ship saw Cadet Jai

Kumar Shah.



During the night, the records do not indicate any incidents. The Chief Officer

reports that all crewmembers (including Cadet Shah) were warned about heavy

weather, and told not to go out on deck. There is a notation in the deck logbook

that “Checklist for navigating in heavy weather completed with rough seas and

swell.” A copy of this checklist is included in this report. It is noteworthy that

there is no requirement for the posting of signs on all internal doors warning

about not going on deck during heavy weather.

On the following morning, the first official notice of Cadet Shah being missing is

in the statement of the Chief Officer. He states that he was informed at 0815 hours

by the Bosun that the Cadet had not reported for work. The Bosun stated that he

had called the cabin of the Cadet (10-15 rings) with no reply. The Chief Officer

then went to the cabin. He found the door open, went inside, but did not find the

Cadet there.

The Chief Officer then went to ask the crew directly if they had seen the Cadet. At0830 the Chief Officer informed the Bridge (and the Master) that the Cadet was

missing. At that time, a search was begun with the Chief Officer, Bosun and deck

gang. When the Cadet was not found at 0900 the General Alarm was raised, the

crew mustered, and a head count showed the Cadet as still missing. A full-scale

intensive search of the vessel from bow to stern was then launched with all hands.

This was the first of four such searches during that day. At 1028 the vessel was

turned to a reciprocal course to head back towards the last position when the cadet

had been seen.

The ocean search for the missing Cadet Jai Kumar Shah took place over the next

33 hours. Communications took place with Company officials, and with the USCG

providing SAR assistance. The details of the ocean search follow with times in

UTC:

• 03/2110 Phoned NYK Cell Manager Mr. Chadha to inform of the incident

• 03/2200 Completed physical search of vessel

• 03/2226 Received call from Capt. Nakaya of NYK who told to reverse

course

• 03/2228 Reversed to reciprocal course to return to last known position

• 03/2230-2400 Conducted a second search of vessel for missing Cadet

• 04/0100 Commenced third search of vessel for missing cadet

• 04/0100 Received phone call from Mr. Richards of USCG RCC Honolulu.

Informed that 2 aircraft had been dispatched (from Honolulu and Alaska)

• 04/0155 Informed by RCC Honolulu that C-130 aircraft would search the

area starting around 04/0600



• 04/0500 Received call from NYK Captains A Singh and Joshi asking for

telephone numbers for cadet.

• 04/0518 Informed by RCC Honolulu (Lt. Taylor) that SAR aircraft would be

over the area and stay on site for approximately one hour

• 04/0600 Commenced fourth physical search of the vessel

• 04/0730 Darkness setting in. Search suspended. Proceeded to position of last

sighting to resume search at daybreak

• 04/0900 Informed passing vessel MV TANGO of missing crewmember and

asked to keep sharp lookout

• 04/1015 Informed by RCC Honolulu that due to fuel constraints, aircraft

were returning to their home stations

• 04/1740 Resumed search for missing cadet in position 38-333.5N 171 38.9E

in parallel search pattern

• 05/0145 Informed by USCG RCC Honolulu that they were suspending

search

• 05/0730 As darkness fell, suspended the search for missing crewmember

Cadet Jai Kumar Shah, and resumed voyage to Los Angeles, CA

6.4 Details of the Performance of Relevant Equipment

There is no evidence of any equipment failures relevant to the incident. However,

it will be noted in another section of this report that a chain link rail was not in

place over the port bunker rail (located just aft of the Accommodation House), andthe chain over the starboard bunker rail did not have proper tension, and added

little height to the rail at that position.

6.5 Persons on Bridge

During the time period in which the incident apparently took place, the Bridge was

manned by a Watch Officer (3rd

Officer, 2nd

Officer and Chief Officer) and a

lookout.

6.6 Persons in Engine Room

During the time period in which the incident apparently took place, the engine

room was in UMS condition and unmanned. Security rounds were made

periodically of the area, but Cadet Shah was not seen in the Engine Room.



6.7 Whereabouts of the Master

The Master was not on the Bridge when Cadet Jai Shah was last seen. He later

came to the Bridge to write Master’s Night Orders at 2300 LT, and then retired to

his quarters for the remainder of the evening. The Master was notified that Mr.

Shah was missing at approximately 03/0830 LT after he failed to report to the

Chief Officer.

6.8 Extracts from all Relevant Documents

The documents which were required to be produced are listed in Section 2 of this

report. Where the contents of these documents are deemed relevant, quotations are

inserted at points where they are relevant.

6.9 Details of Communications Made Between Vessel and Radio Stations

The details of all communications between the vessel and radio stations are noted

in the “details of the incident” section of this report. Copies of radio logbook

entries and other documents are attached.

6.10 Details of Any Injuries/Fatalities

There were no injuries noted as a result of this casualty. As to fatalities, the subject

of this report is the status of the missing crewmember, Cadet Jai Kumar Shah. Mr.

Shah is missing and believed to be deceased.

7 Assistance After the Incident

The Master received assistance after the discovery of the missing crewmember

from the following:

• Mr. Chadha – NYK Shipmanagement Cell Manager

• Capt. Nakhaya – NYK Shipmanagement Casualty Response Center

• Mr. Richards - USCG RCC Honolulu (for SAR advice)

• Lt. Taylor – USCG RCC Honolulu (arranging for dispatch of two rescue

aircraft)

• Passing vessel M.V. EVER ULTRA

• Passing vessel M.V. TANGO (LAPN-5)

• Capt. Anuraj Singh – NYK Shipmanagement

• Capt. Joshi – NYK Shipmanagement



• LES Santa Paula (land radio station)

• CAMSPAC Station (MF/HF DSC Urgency Messages)

• AMVER positions reported

8 Authentication of Documents

All of the documents listed in this report, and attached to the report were reviewed

by the investigating officer with the Master of the NYK Springtide. Captain Peter

Damian Misquitta verified the copies as having been directly copied from various

ship records. The investigating officer reviewed the chart which was in use at the

time of the incident, and also reviewed the original copies of many of the

documents to ensure their authenticity.

9 Interviews (Crew or Witness)

Master: Capt. Peter D. Misquitta

Chief Officer: Mr. Vikram YadavThird Officer: Mr. Ankush Chowdhury

Bosun: Mr. Rodolfo E. Rosal

FMA: Mr. Eljube T. Lunggakit

10 Analysis and Conclusions

10.1 Human Element

10.1.1 People Factors

Cadet Jai Kumar Shah was reportedly on his first ship after graduating from

maritime college. He had been on the ship for almost 5 months before the incident.

It is noted that the Chief Officer apparently took great care not to assign Mr. Shah

to any hazardous areas of work, and duly noted his relative lack of experience. All

persons interviewed indicate that they find it difficult to believe that Cadet Shah

would venture outside of the Accommodations House in a storm.

An email from the brother of Cadet Shah indicates that the he was looking forward

with great anticipation seeing his brother again after more than a year apart. There

is no other indication of any suicidal impulses by Cadet Shah.

Several interviews indicate that Mr. Shah was well-liked by the crew. It is

noteworthy that the person who is presumed to be the best friend of Cadet Shah on

board (FMA Eljube Lunggakit) shared memories of the two friends singing songs

from their respective countries. There is no indication of any likelihood of foul

play.

10.1.2 Organization on Board



It appears that Cadet Shah was well-supervised on board by the Chief Officer and

persons assigned by the Chief Officer. While cadets often are well-supervised

during their working hours, they are normally left alone to work, study and sleep in

their individual cabins during off-duty hours.

10.1.3 Working and Living Conditions

As noted, the deck cadet on the NYK Springtide is assigned to a single cabin on D

Deck. The cabin was found to be clean, with no indications of any unusual

activities. It is noted that when the Investigator looked at the cabin, it had already

been inspected by USCG officials. It is believed that the USCG investigators left

the room in a somewhat messy condition.

The national makeup of the crew was typical for this NYK Shipmanagement with

officers coming from India, and ratings/junior officers from the Philippines. Thereis no indication of any racial tension or other issues on the ship.

10.1.4 Ship Factors

While the ship obviously is operating well, and in most respects has no apparent

problems, the following issues were noted by the Investigator:

• The chain over the top of the rounded bunker station rail on the Starboard

side was sagging, and provided little extra protection from falling over-the-side from the main deck. The top rounded rail is approximately 25-30 cm

lower than the top rail around the remainder of the Main Deck.

• The chain over the top of the Port Bunker rail was missing, and was

reportedly not in place at the time of the incident.

• The ship does not routinely place signs on the inside of doors leading out of

the ship during heavy weather.

Recommendations to address these issues will be provided in the following section

of this report.

10.1.5 Shore Side Management

It is noted that the “Heavy Weather Navigation Checklist” which apparently came

from the Company ISM Manual does not contain a requirement for placing signs

on interior doors warning not to go out on deck during heavy weather.

10.1.6 External, Influences and Environment



The strong winds and large seas during the time that Cadet Shah went missing

made it extremely unlikely that Cadet Shah would be found if not one actually saw

him go over the side. It is virtually certain that the only other person outside during

this time period would have been the lookout on the Bridge wing. The fact that the

wing is 20 meters above the main deck and 30 meters above the ocean; combined

with the noise of the wind would make it virtually impossible for any outcry from a

person going over the side would be heard on the ship.

11 Recommendations

It is apparent that all crewmembers on the NYK Springtide are devastated from the

loss of a friend and fellow crewmember. It is also apparent that Cadet Shah was

well-supervised during his working hours on the ship. There is no reasonable way

that any crewmember (even a young and inexperienced one such as Cadet Shah)

can be watched and supervised 24 hours a day. However, it is the opinion of the

Investigator that the two Ship Factors noted in the previous section should be

addressed. His recommendations follows:

• Chain rails over the rounded bunker rail should always be replaced before a

vessel leaves port. These chains should be stretched tightly over this space

so that the effect is to have a rail at the same height as the rest of the railing

on the main deck.

The Company should institute a requirement that all interior doors which lead to

the outside (at all decks) should have warning signs placed on them during periods

of heavy weather. The placement of these warning signs should be a requirement

of the “Heavy Weather Navigation Checklist.”

Summary

Casualty Investigation of M/V NYK Springtide

The container vessel M/V Springtide suffered the loss and presumed death at sea of

a crewmember during the evening of May 3rd

, 2006. May 3rd

was a repeated day on

the vessel as it transited Eastbound across the Pacific and the International DateLine. The vessel was enroute from Sendai, China to Los Angeles, CA on Voyage

32E17 and approaching the International Date Line at position 38 42.0N 176 26.0E

at 0830 LT (03/2030Z) when it was discovered that Cadet Jai Kumar Shah had not

reported for duty.

After an unsuccessful physical search of the vessel and consultation with Company

and other officials, at 1028 LT (03/2228Z) the Master ordered the ship to be turned



around to go back over the course traveled during the previous night and begin an

ocean search of the waters traveled. A total of four complete physical searches of

the entire vessel were conducted over the course of the day. The ocean search of

the waters traveled, and a parallel ocean search under the direction of the USCG

Search and Rescue (SAR) unit was conducted until searching was abandoned as

darkness fell on the second search day on 4 May 2006 at 1930 LT (05/0730Z).

Interviews with the Master and a number of crewmembers indicate that the last

time anyone saw Cadet Shah on the ship was at approximately 02/2100 LT

(03/2140Z) on the bridge where he had made a ship-to-shore phone call to a friend

in India. Thus, there was a period of more than 11 hours in which his whereabouts

were unknown.

The vessel was in relatively heavy weather during the night of the disappearance,

with winds from the SE at force 7 increasing to force 8 from the south during the

night. A log book entry during the 00-04 watch indicates that the vessel completedthe checklist for maneuvering in heavy weather. There are no other log book

entries as to heavy weather procedures; however the Master and Chief Officer

indicate that verbal warnings were given to crewmembers not to go on deck during

the night. The ship apparently does not use warning signs on the doors to attempt

to prevent anyone from going out on deck.

During the investigation, we reviewed all relevant documents, charts, and records,

and conducted a thorough inspection of the ship from the Navigation Bridge

(where Mr. Shah was last seen), to Mr. Shah’s cabin, inside and around the outsideof the Accommodation House of the vessel, around the Main Deck, and through

the entire system of port and starboard tunnels. We also conducted interviews with

the Master, Chief Officer, 3rd

Officer, Bosun, and the FMA (Fitter Assistant) who

was known to be the best friend of Mr. Shah on board.

There are four possible conclusions to draw from a person missing on a ship at sea:

• The person committed suicide (planned or unplanned)

• The person was the victim of foul play

• The person was hidden away on board, not found, and managed to leave the

ship un-noticed when it reached port

• The person met with an accident while out on deck and was washed (or fell)

over the side

It is the conclusion of this investigation that Mr. Shah is missing and presumed

deceased. The most likely occurrence of the four possibilities listed above is that

Cadet Jai Kumar Shah mistakenly went out on deck and accidentally went over the

side where he perished.



During the time period when the whereabouts of Mr. Shah became unknown, the

deck officer on the bridge was operating inside the wheelhouse. The lookout was

on the wing of the bridge, but due to the noise of the wind and the distance above

the water, the chances of the lookout hearing any shout from a person going over

the side would be highly unlikely. The exact cause which led Mr. Shah to leave his

cabin at night to go out onto a dark and windy deck in the dark will likely never be

known.

The temperature of the water at the time is this incident was listed in the ship

logbook as 15 degrees Celsius. All of the survival gear on the ship was reported to

be in place by the Master and ships officers. Given this situation, the amount of

time that a person could be expected to survive in the sea would certainly be less

than 2 hours, and would likely be measured in minutes. The sea was also quite

rough during this time period.

The Master conducted a search of the waters where Mr. Shah could most likely beexpected to be found for approximately 33 hours, and with consultation with SAR

officials, it appears to have been a reasonable decision to abandon the ocean

search, and reach the inescapable conclusion that Mr. Jai Kumar Shah had perished

at sea.

USED ABBREVIATIONS

AIS Automatic Information System

ARPA Automatic Radar Plotting Aid

COG Course Over Ground

GPS Global Positioning System

IMO International Maritime Organization

ISM International Safety Management (Code)

OOW Officer on Watch

SAR Search and Rescue

SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea

UTC Universal Coordinated Time (also known as Z)



FOREWORD

The Panama Maritime Authority Directorate General of Merchant Marine,

Department of Navigation and Maritime Safety appointed the firm of K Fitter &

Associates to investigate the accident on May 12, 2006. The on-board investigation

took place on the vessel NYK Springtide at the YIT Terminal in Los Angeles CA

beginning at 1100 hours (LT) 5/12/2006.

Panama Maritime investigation authorities acted in accordance to the IMO

Resolution A.849(20) concerning accident investigation as the leading party of the

investigation.

Capt. Allan R. Breese representing K Fitter & Associates to conduct the on-board

investigation. All interviews, inspections and other actions by Capt. Breese took

place in the presence of Mr. Anuraj Singh (Senior Personnel Manager Crewing

Department), Mr. Erich P. Wise (an attorney representing the Company), and

either the Master or Chief Officer. At the insistence of Company officials the brother of the missing Cadet and his fiancé were also present.

Statements Concerning the Investigation Report

In accordance with IMO Resolution A.849(20) concerning investigations of marine

casualties and incidents, this report is submitted to the Panama Maritime Authority

Directorate General of Merchant Marine. The statements from the Master and

Chief Officer have been noticed in this text. All received statements, documents

and records are attached.

Issued without prejudice,

CAPT. KHUSH FITTER

K .P. Fitter & Associates, Inc.

California U.S.A. Office

KPF-LB/ KPF-CAPT. ALLAN BREESE-LB



ATTACHMENTS

Attached to this report and made part of hereto are the

following:

Photographs;

Resume of the Investigator;

Statement of Master;

Statement of Chief Officer;

Copies of Official Log Book pages;

Copies of Deck Log Book pages; (3 May, 3 May Retard Day, 4 May);

Copy of Master’s Night Orders from 5/3/06;

Copy of Panama Seaman’s Document for Jai Kumar Shah;

Copy of Master’s Certificate for Capt. Peter Damian Misquitta;

Copy of Ship Registry & most recent Tax Payments to Panama

Maritime Authority;

Marine Note of Protest;

Crew List & Ship’s Particulars;

Copies of Nautical Chart 4522 used during incident;

Copies of four (4) pages of parallel search pattern;

Copies of weather and position log pages;

Weather Charts received on the vessel;

Weather Reports received on the vessel;

GMDSS Radio Log Summary;

Daily Record Summary of all communications;

Copy of Distress messages sent via GMDSS;

Copy of list of satellite phone call records; &

Copy of Heavy Weather Navigation Checklist.



PHOTOGRAPHS

M.v. NYK Springtide

Voyage No :- 32E17

Vessel Alongside YIT Terminal @ Los Angeles - California.



PHOTO 1: Stateroom of Cadet Jai Kumar Shah (5/12/06)

PHOTO 2: Desk of Cadet Jai Kumar Shah



PHOTO 3: Notebook Found In Room of Cadet Jai Kumar Shah

( Only Routine Note From Cadet Studies Found )

PHOTO 4: Last Page of Notes Found in Notebook



PHOTO 5: Email From Brother: Sharn Kumar Shah

Asking About Next Meeting Date



PHOTO 6: Mobile Phone Found in Cabin

PHOTO 7: Cash Found in Cabin Desk Drawer



PHOTO 8: Wallet Found in Desk Drawer

PHOTO 9: Cash Found in Wallet



PHOTO 10: Lifejacket/PFD Found in Cabin

PHOTO 11: Cadet Cabin is Close to Door to Outside Ladderway



PHOTO 12: Satellite Phone on Bridge Last Place Where

the Cadet was Seen

PHOTO 13: Starboard Ladderwell and Window of Cadet

Stateroom at Bottom of Photo



PHOTO 14: Starboard Ladderwell as Seen From Main Deck Below

PHOTO 15: Chain Over Starboard Bunker Station Does Not

Stretch Tightly Across Opening



PHOTO 16: Bunker Station Rail on Port Side Does Not Have a

Chain Stretched Across top to Provide Protection from Accidental Fall

PHOTO 17: Vessel @ Dock Demonstrates the Height on the Main

Deck Area Above the Water. The Height of the Bridge Wing

Above the Water Estimated More Than 30 Meters



ATTACHMENTS


following:

Resume

of the

Investigator



Resume of the Investigator

Name: Captain Allan R. Breese

Career Summary

During his time as a deck officer and ship master, Capt. Breese transited every ocean in

the world, making port calls in Asia, Africa, Europe and North America. His primaryfocus was in the Pacific Basin, with dozens of trans-Pacific crossings. His time as Master

was spent on large containerships, but he has also sailed as a deck officer on CrudeCarriers, Product Carriers, Bulk Carriers, Break Bulk ships, and Passenger Vessels out of

all major ports on the U.S. West Coast and to Japan, Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines, andSingapore. As Master he made more than 100 transits of the treacherous Straits of

Malacca.

As a safety, quality, environmental and security auditor of merchant ships, Capt. Breese

has evaluated the working practices of seafarers from around the world. He has

participated in dozens of ride-along audits where he has been able to consult and advisecaptains, mates and engineers on the latest and best practices of seafarers. His primary

focus has been on bridge-team management, and operation of an effective bridge. He hasevaluated maintenance programs, including computerized preventive maintenance

programs, and has evaluated the operation of cargo, ballast, and stability systems on all of

the ships he has visited. He has also trained hundreds of mariners in the principles of safety and quality operations, and the use of management systems to improve shipboard

life.

Management of projects has been his focus for the past 4 years. His recent work includesa security gap analysis for the country of Jordan, and the development of security

processes for Exxon Mobil for their FPSO fleet. He is a certified lead auditor in ISM, ISO

9001 and ISO 14001, and has developed safety management systems for maritimeterminals and ships. He has extensive experience with Oil Spill Cleanup exercises and

plans, have my 40 hours hazmat certification, and fully trained in ICS.

Capt. Breese has a bachelor’s degree in Broadcast Journalism. This has assisted him in

his writing, training, and his ability to speak in front of large groups. Capt. Breese is

married, with two grown children. He lives with his wife in Fountain Valley, California.



Investigator/ Assessor

Captain Breese was a Subject Matter Expert as part of a team that developed a Port

Security Assessment Tool for the USCG shortly after 9/11/2001. Following development

of the tool, he participated in security assessments at the ports of Philadelphia, SanDiego, and Portland, OR.

Capt. Breese has conducted safety and security assessments on ships and at facilitiesaround the world. Capt. Breese developed methodology for vulnerability and risk

assessments of U.S. flag and international vessels, as well as ports and port facilities. He

either led teams, or participated in investigations and audits for the following:

• Matson Navigation vessels

• Matson Navigation Hawaii Port Facilities

• Alaska Tankers Fleet

• Louis Dreyfus fleet vessels• Offshore Marine Service Association vessels (more than 200)

• Exxon Mobile’s Kizomba A FPSO

• Port of Gothenburg

• Port of Aqaba, Jordan

• Ports of Oman

• Ports of Nigeria

• Victoria Ship Management vessels

• Penn Terminals, Philadelphia, PA

• Chemoil Terminals, Long Beach, CA

Capt. Breese has conducted dozens of audits of port, port facility, and vessel security

plans around the world, and has trained more than a thousand persons to becomeSSO/VSO, CSO, and PFSO under the requirements of the IPSPS Code.

Representative: K . P. Fitter & Associates, Inc



ATTACHMENTS


following:

Statement of Master;

&

Statement of Chief Officer;













ATTACHMENTS


following:

Copies of

Official Log Book

pages;

















ATTACHMENTS


following:

Copies of

Deck Log Book

pages;( 3 May, 3 May Retard Day, 4 May );















ATTACHMENTS


following:

Copy 0f Master’s

Night Orders

5/3/06;





ATTACHMENTS


following:

Copy of Panama Seaman’s Document for

Jai Kumar Shah;

&

Copy of Master’s Certificate for

Capt. Peter Damian Misquitta;









ATTACHMENTS


following:

Copy of Ship Registry

&

most recent Tax Payments to

Panama Maritime Authority;







ATTACHMENTS


following:

Marine

Note of Protest;





ATTACHMENTS


following:

Crew List

&

Ship’s Particulars;









ATTACHMENTS


following:

Copies of Nautical Chart 4522 used during

incident;

Copies of four (4) pages of parallel search

pattern;

Copies of weather and position log pages;

&

Weather Charts received on the vessel;

























ATTACHMENTS


following:

Weather Reports received

on the vessel;

&

GMDSS Radio Log

Summary;



































ATTACHMENTS


following:

Daily Record Summary

of all communications;

&

Copy of Distress messages

sent via GMDSS;













ATTACHMENTS


following:

Copy of list

of satellite phone call

records;







ATTACHMENTS


following:

Copy of

Heavy Weather

Navigation Checklist.

