THE ARAB UPRISING

Timo Behr & Mika Aaltola FIIA BRIEFING PAPER 76 • March 2011

76

CAUSES, PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS

• ThepopularuprisingsinEgyptandTunisiahavebeentriggeredbyacombinationofdeterioratinglivingstandardsandgrowinginequality(aneconomicdeficit),alackofpoliticalfreedomsandpublicaccountability(apoliticaldeficit),andthealienationofthedemographicallydominantagecohortsfromthepoliticalorder(adignitydeficit).

• WhilesimilarconditionsexistinanumberofArabcountries,socio-economicindicatorssuggestthattheintensityofthesedeficitsvariesconsiderablyacrosstheArabworld.Asaresult,thenatureandshapeofprotestsacrosstheregionmightdiffer.

• However,protestsacrosstheregionhavealsobeendrivenbyapowerful“contagioneffect”workingonanideationalandemotionallevel.Thiscontagionhasbeenfacilitatedbysatellitebroadcasters,mobilephones,theinternet,andnewsocialmediatoolsthateludegovernmentcontrolandhelpedcreatenewcleavagesandloyalties.

• Theoutcomeofthemassprotestsislikelytovaryinaccordancewiththenatureandlevelofcohesionoftheincumbentregimesandtheirabilitytomaintaintheirmonopolyontheuseofforce.Whileinsomecases thismight leadtoademocratic transition fromthebottomup, inothercases theoutcomemaybemoregradualtop-downreforms,agovernmentcrackdownonprotestorsorevenadisintegrationofthestate.

• Onasystemiclevel,theArabuprisingwillcreateanewpoliticalandeconomicrealityintheMiddleEast and transform the regional balance of power.WhileWestern influence in the regionwillinevitablydeclineasaresult,theArabrevolutionsalsohaveanundeniablepotentialtoenhanceregionalcooperation,reducetheappealofterrorismandhelpbreakthecurrentdeadlockinthepeaceprocess.

THE ARAB UPRISING

Timo Behr

Researcher

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs

FIIA Briefing Paper 76

March 2011

CAUSES, PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs

Mika Aaltola

Programme Director

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs

THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 3

Theoverthrowofautocraticgovernments inEgyptand Tunisia has radically changed the course ofMiddleEasternpolitics.Emboldenedbythepeace-fulmassproteststhatbroughtBenAliandMubarakto theirknees,youngprotestershavetakento thestreetsinmanyArabcapitals,demandingabetterlifeandamoreaccountablegovernment.Demographicsandthepoliticalmomentumseemtobeontheirside.

As the Arab revolution spreads, the internationalcommunity grapples with its causes and conse-quences.AreotherArabregimeslikelytofold?Whatwill replace them? And what will the long-termimpactbe?

The essence of revolution

ThepopularuprisingsthattoppledtheauthoritarianregimesinEgyptandTunisiaandtriggeredthewaveofpro-democracyproteststhatisnowsweepingtheregion are commonly assumed to share the sameroots.Protesters inbothcountriesweremotivatedbya similar setof socio-economicgrievances andpoliticalgoals.Bothuprisingsalsofollowedasimilarcourseofevents,culminatingintheeventualdown-falloftheregime.

Inbothcountries awidespread senseof economicmalaisehasbeendecisiveintheevents.WhilebothEgyptandTunisiaexperiencedaperiodofsolideco-nomicgrowthandhavewonmanylaurelsfortheirmarket-friendly economic reforms, most peopleexperiencedadeclineinlivingstandards.Especiallyamongst the lower and middle income groups, a

combinationoffallingrealwages,highinflationandrisingunemploymenthavewreakedeconomichavoc.Jobcreationtookplaceprimarilyinthelow-skilledandlow-wagesectorsoftheeconomyandhasbeenunabletokeeppacewithdemographicgrowthrates.This left scoresofmiddle-classyouthunemployedand disenchanted with a political and economicorder inwhichpersonal relations trumpedqualifi-cationsandwherecronycapitalismallowed thoseinapositionofpower toamass fabulous riches. Itwasthoselowermiddle-classyouththatformedthenucleusofthesubsequentrevolutions.

Politicalrepressionandalackofbasicfreedomswasanotherimportantimpetusforprotesterstotaketothe streets.WhileTunisianshaveknown few free-domsduringBenAli’stimeinpower,Egyptianssawsomeoftheirfreedomstakenawayfromthemastheregime clamped down on public protests and theindependentmediaandmanipulatedparliamentaryelectionslatelastyear.Policeviolenceandtheabuseofpublicauthorityhavealsobeenaroutinepartofdailylifeinbothcountriesandcorruptionhasbeenendemicateverylevelofsociety,albeitmostvisibleat the top.Allof thiscontributed toawidespreadfeeling of powerlessness and alienation, whichexplainsthecentralthemesof“dignity”and“pride”thatpermeatedthemessagesoftheprotesters.

ProtestersinEgyptwerealsomourningthelackofprinciplesandthe listlessnessof theirgovernmentin the international arena. From being perceivedas theproud leaderofan independentArabworldunderNasser,EgyptunderMubarakhadturnedinto“America’s poodle”, unable to make independent

A woman selling corn in Cairo’s Zabbaleen District. Rising food prices have increased the

cost of living for many Egyptians. Photo: Omar Hikal / Flickr.com.

THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 4

socialmediatoolssuchasFacebookandTwittertocoordinate and disseminate their message. Onceinitiated, peaceful protests quickly snowballed,drawinginothersocialstratabycoalescingaroundthe simple message that “the regime has to go”.Under the pressure of unprecedented and largelypeaceful mass protests, fissures in both regimesbecameaccentuated, leadingtotheeventualoust-ingoftheincumbentleadershipbythearmedforces.While the final outcome of both revolutions stillremainsuncertain,apoliticaltransitiontowardsamoreopenanddemocraticsystemnowseemstobeunderway.

The Arab malady

AsprotestersaretakingtothestreetsfromMoroccotoBahrainandviolenceisengulfingLibyaandYemen,itseemsself-evidentthattherehasbeenapowerfulknock-on effect from the Tunisian and Egyptianevents. In many ways this is unsurprising, giventhatmanyMiddleEasterncountriesarepronetothesamemaladiesthathaveplaguedEgyptandTunisia.Still,theArabworldisfarfrombeingaunitarybloc.Systemsofgovernmentdifferandnotallcountriesshare the same socio-economic grievances. FewArabcountriesarealsoasreligiouslyandethnicallyhomogenousasTunisiaandEgyptandsomeharbourlong-standingsecessionistmovements.Thesediffer-encesarelikelytohaveanimpactonthescaleandshapeoffutureuprisingsthroughouttheregion.

decisions. This mattered less in the 1990s whentheUS seemed invincible. But recently, many inEgyptandtheregionhavebeenemboldenedbytheexampleofamoreindependent-mindedandasser-tiveTurkey,aswellasIsrael’sapparentinabilitytosubdueHamasandHezbollah.Inthelightofthesedevelopments,Mubarak’sunquestioningobediencetotheUSandhiscloseeconomicandsecuritytieswith Israel appeared shameful to many ordinaryEgyptians. Reclaiming Egypt’s lost dignity in theinternationalarenawasthereforeanothermotif inEgypt’srevolutionthatislikelytohavesomeimpactonthefuturedevelopmentofEgyptianforeignpolicy.

Itwasacombinationofthesethreeissues—an“eco-nomicdeficit”, a“freedomdeficit”anda“dignitydeficit”—thatmadetheEgyptianandTunisianupris-ingssocombustibleandallowedthemtospreadlikewildfirethroughoutallsectorsofsociety.Thiswasalsoreflectedinthechantsandslogansoftherevolu-tions,whichdidnotfocusonaspecificpoliticalorreligiousagenda,butratheronwhatprotesterswererallyingagainst:theregime,corruption,highfoodprices,lowwages,neoliberalism,andinternationaltutelage.Focusingonthesethreekeydeficits,ratherthan a concrete and potentially divisive politicalagenda,enabledprotesterstomaintaincohesionandrallymasssupport.

Theoutcomeinbothcaseswasalsostrikinglysimi-lar.Bothuprisingsstartedasspontaneousprotestsorganizedbyurbanlowermiddle-classyouthusing

GDP per capita1 GDP growth2 Unemployment rate3 Population under 25 years4

Poverty rate5

Yemen 2,900 6.2% 35.0% 65.4% 45.2%

Morocco 4,670 3.2% 9.8% 47.7% 15.0%

Syria 4,730 4.0% 8.3% 55.3% 11.9%

Jordan 5,240 3.2% 13.4% 54.3% 14.2%

Egypt 5,860 5.1% 9.7% 52.3% 20.0%

Algeria 8,220 4.1% 9.9% 47.5% 23.0%

Tunisia 8,620 3.4% 14.0% 42.1% 3.8%

Libya 18,720 3.3% n.a. 47.4% 30.0%

Bahrain 23,980 4.1% 15.0% 43.9% n.a.

Saudi Arabia 22,850 3.8% 10.8% 50.8% n.a.

1: GDP per capita 2010 (USD at PPP), Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Data

2: GDP 2010 (% real change p.a.), Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Data

3: Recorded unemployment 2010, Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Data

4: Economist Online, “Mapping the Arab World”, 17 February 2011

5: Percentage of population under poverty line, CIA World Factbook, latest recorded figures

THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 5

Ontheeconomicfront,manycountriesoftheArabworldsharethesamedeficitsexperiencedbyEgyptand Tunisia.Many are low- tomid-income coun-tries with rising unemployment rates that havebeenaffectedbytherecenteconomicdownturnandits impactonexportsandremittances.Risingfoodpricesandhighconsumerpriceinflationhaveerodedliving standards with economic difficulties mostcloselyfeltbyyoungpeoplewholackanyfutureeco-nomicperspective.Marketreformsandprivatizationinanumberofcountries,includingJordan,Morocco,EgyptandTunisia,havebeendeeplyunpopularandhavebeenblamedby thepublic fordeepeningthecurrenteconomicmalaise.

Economic conditions amongst the oil-producingcountries,however,aresomewhatdifferent.Someofthemhavesufferedduringtheeconomiccrisisandasaresultofacollapsinghousingboom,andseveralofthemregisterhighunemploymentrates.Butlivingstandardsaregenerallyhigherandeconomicgriev-ances,wheretheyarise,mainlyconcernthedistri-butionoftheoilwealth.Povertyisoftenlimitedtolargecommunitiesofmigrantworkersortocertainethnicminorities.Risingoilprices,moreover,havemadeiteveneasierforthesecountriestodispenseeconomicbenefitsandside-payments toquellanychallengetotheirinternalstability.Severalofthem,including Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, have alreadyissuedgenerousfinancialhandoutsinabidtofore-stallprotests.

However, as the examples of Libya and Bahrainhaveshown,economicwealthdoesnotnecessarilymatterifcertainsectorsofsocietyfeelthattheyaredeprivedoftheirshareofthepieorharbourothergrievances.Similarly,whileabsolute levelsofpov-ertyare important, inequalityanda lackofoppor-tunitiesmatterevenmore.Theexistenceofalargelowermiddleclassthathasnowayofadvancingitsambitionshasplayed an important role inTunisiaandEgypt.ThisexplainswhyTunisia,acountrywithoneofthelowestpovertyratesintheregion,wasthefirsttotaketothestreets.Buttheabsenceofsuchamiddleclasshasnotnecessarilydoomeddemonstra-tions,asseemsevidentinYemen.

Whenitcomestothe freedomdeficit,somediffer-encesarealsoapparent.Althoughfreeandfairelec-tions remain a pipedream throughout the region,differences in thequalityofpublic administration,mediafreedomorlevelsofcorruptionremainlarge.Countries like Jordan and Morocco, for example,canboastconsiderablyhigherratingsindemocracysurveysthansomeoftheirneighbours.Bothorgan-izerelativelyopenparliamentaryelectionsandallowthe participation of some opposition groups andIslamist parties, but discriminate against others.Similarly,thedirectionofdevelopmentshasdiffered.Whilesome,likeBahrainandKuwait,havegraduallyincreasedthespacefordemocraticparticipationandadopted reformagendas, others, like Egypt underMubarak,haverolledbackpreviousreformsor,likeSaudiArabia,havemadenoattempttoopenupatall.

Democracy (ranking)1 Corruption (ranking)2

Press freedom (rating)3

HDI (ranking)4

Morocco 116 82 66 113

Jordan 117 50 63 82

Bahrain 122 43 71 39

Algeria 125 92 64 84

Egypt 138 115 60 101

Tunisia 144 64 85 81

Yemen 146 144 80 133

Syria 152 150 83 111

Libya 158 130 94 53

Saudi Arabia 160 83 83 55

1: Democracy Index 2010, Economist Intelligence Unit

2: Corruption Perception Index 2008, Transparency International

3: Freedom of the Press report 2010, Freedom House. The level of press freedom is scored on a scale from 0 (most free) to 100 (least free).

4: Human Development Index 2010, UNDP

THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 6

Other social indicators also represent a mixedpicture.Levelsofpublicadministrationorcorrup-tioninBahrainandJordanareafarcryfromthoseinotherpartsoftheregionandareoftenclosertothose of southern European countries than otherpartsof theArabworld.Press freedomhasvariedwidely,withEgyptbeingendowedwithoneofthemostopenmediaenvironments intheArabworld,whileTunisiausedtohaveoneof themostrestric-tive.Finally,theUN’shumandevelopmentindex—abroadmeasurefortheoverallqualityofhumanlifeanddevelopment—varies considerably throughouttheregion.

Perhaps themost difficult to fathom is the wide-spread feeling of lost dignity andwounded pridethathasbeenacommonthemeamongstprotesters.Much of this feeling seems to have derived frombeingpartofasocietythatleftlittlespaceforindi-vidualdevelopmentandexpressionandisthereforea consequence of the above-mentioned economicandpoliticaldeficits.But, tosomeextent,protest-ers have also been disillusioned with the currentinternationalorderandtheroletheircountrieshaveplayedinthisorder.

Opinion polls regularly register the considerabledisapprovalArabsfeeltowardsforeigninterferenceandinternationaltutelage.ManycondemntheclosediplomatictiesbetweentheirgovernmentsandtheUnitedStates,andwhatappearstothemtobetheirgovernment’s silent complicity in the suffering ofthePalestinians.Inthepast,themostpopularpublicfiguresintheArabworldhaveoftenbeenindividualleaders that defied the international community,such as Hezbollah’s Hassan Nassrallah. Evidencefrom the Wikileaks documents and the Palestinepapers have further tarnished some governmentsandfuelledpublicanger.Ontheotherhand,regimesinSyriaandIranhavebeenabletobenefitfromtheiruncompromisingstancetowardsIsraelandtoquellpublicprotestsbyallegingforeigninvolvementandemphasizingtheirownrevolutionarycredentials.

Finally,thepent-upenergiesoftheyouthbulgearepalpableeverywhereacrosstheregion.Closetohalfof the Arabworld’s population is under 25 yearsofage. In thepast, thismassofyoungpeoplewasassumedtobepartofalostgenerationraisedundersqualidconditionsandnurturedonadietofreligiousradicalism and totalitarianism. Most analysts haddiscountedthemasapoliticalforce.However,itis

theirfrustrationsthataredrivingtherevolutionaryprocess. Technologically versatile and internation-ally connected, revolutionary ideas have proventobemostcontagiousamongstthisgeneration.Asaresult,thechants,rapsongsandsymbolismthathavebeenpartoftheuprisingsinTunisiaandEgypthavenowbecomepartoftheimagesandtropesofall the Arab revolutions. While underlying socio-economic indicators therefore differ considerablythroughout the region, it seems to have been theshareddemographicrealitiesthatmadetherevoltsocontagious.

Understanding contagion

Besides taking into account the aforementionedcountry-specificfactors,itisnecessarytoexaminehowtheinitialeventsinTunisiafedsimilarpoliticaldisturbances inEgypt andbeyond.This contagionofeventsshedslightonthesystemicinternationalcharacteristicsoftheArabuprising.

Generally speaking, the term ‘contagion’ refers tothe epidemic-like spread of demonstrations anddisturbances that eludes any intentional effortsbytheregimestocontroltheirintensity,scope,ordirection.This type of contagious process is char-acterized by rapid transmission.The spread fromTunisia onwards happened in a quick and intenseseries of events. Hence, political disturbances inTunisiasparkedinternaldisarrayelsewhere.Similarcontagionshavehappenedbefore,asinthecaseofaseriesofupheavalsandrevolutionsinEasternEuropeattheendoftheColdWar.

Thecontagionofpoliticaldisturbancescanbeunder-stoodintermsofalearningprocess.Often,learningis considered to be a conscious cognitive process.Therefore,muchemphasisisplacedonthespreadofideas,information,andknowhowasthespearheadofcontagion.IntheinitialcasesofTunisiaandEgypt,itwasvitallyimportantfortheprotesterstopassoninformationonhowtoorganizelarge-scaledemon-strationsandactsofcivicdisobedience.Fromthisperspective,channelsofinformationquicklyturnedintochannelsofcontagion.

As a result, theEgyptian authoritieswere activelytryingtoclampdownonthemediaandweretryingtocontrolthepublicperceptionbypointingoutthe‘dangers’offoreignbroadcasterslikeAlJazeera.Their

THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 7

mainconcernwasthatopeninformationconcerningthewidespreadpoliticaldisturbanceswouldincitefurthertroublesfortheEgyptianregime.

Manyof the theories in the literature, suchas the‘CNNeffect’,supporttheviewthatoneofthecentralfactorsinthespill-overofpoliticalviolenceacrossborders is access to themedia. It seemsclear thattheadventoftheinformationrevolutionandofnewcommunication channels outsideof governmentalcontrolhave influenced thenature, intensity, andspeedofthecontagioneffect.Itisalsoveryimpor-tant tonote thatsuchcritical informationspreadsevenmoreeasilyintheageofmobilephonesandtheinternet. Social network sites such as Twitter andFacebookfurtherenabledtheepidemic-likespreadof information concerningwhere,when and howonecanparticipateinpoliticaldemonstrationsandagitation.Thus,thesedevelopmentshavemadecon-troloftheinformationflowsincreasinglydifficultfortheregimesoftheregion.

But new technologies also make additional toolsavailabletogovernments.TheEgyptiangovernmentwasabletoshutdownmuchoftheinternettrafficandmobile telecommunications in the country. Itwas also able to force telecom providers such asVodafonetosendSMSmessagesthatsupportedthegovernment’s official line. The government alsodetainedbloggers.Ultimately,theseeffortsprovedfutileandtooclumsytohaltthespreadofinforma-tion.Infact,theymerelyservedtofuelgeneralanti-regimeattitudesandcausedfunctionalproblemsforsomesectorsoftheEgyptianeconomy.

Moreover, the contagion effect is based on lesscognitive and conscious processes than the dis-seminationof informationandknowhow.Inotherwords,researchintothecontagioneffectalsomakesconstant references to characteristically moreunconscious and habitual social learning that isprimarilynon-cognitiveandnon-technical.Insteadof constituting technical knowhow, these rapidcontagiouslearningprocessesarebasedonemotionsandsentiments.Thebuzzfeltduringthespreadofdemonstrations is in itself intoxicatinganddeeplyepidemic.Inthisway,contagionintheMiddleEastisbasedonpeoplebecomingmotivatedandinspiredtojoindemonstrationsandotherpoliticalmobiliza-tions.Besidesteachingpeoplehowtoorganizepro-tests,contagionpromptssudden joltsofcollectivemovementsandsharedemotions.

Suchpulsesofstimulationcharacterizethecrucialemotive aspect of contagion,whichmight be bet-ter understood in terms of broad yet subtle sub-conscious persuasion. It consists of appeal at thelevelofalluring,emergingcollectiveidentitiesandseductivegroupdynamics,whichspreadbyexampleandthroughhighlyvisiblespectaclesandpurebuzz.Forexample,theimagesofcelebratingEgyptiansinCairo’sTahrirSquarewereaverypowerfulmotivat-ingfactorforthespreadandintensityoftheprotestmovement. Such collective scenes can be veryintoxicatingandproduceasenseofeventsgravitat-ingtowardsa‘newnormal’.Contagioncanthereforeheightentheawarenessofemergingidentities—suchas‘theyoungprotester’—andleadtoarapidshiftinloyaltiesawayfromthe‘oldregime’.

Egyptian photographers protesting. In recent years the Mubarak regime has cracked down

on independent media. Photo: Hossam el-Hamalawy / Flickr.com.

THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 8

The contagion conducive to intensifying politicaldisturbancescantaketheformofthetransmissionofnew interpretative frames.Thesespreadingandintensifyingframes—suchasMubarakhastoresignand, subsequently, the implication that thewholeregimehastogo—wereconveyedbytheregularyetgraduallyswellingmassdemonstrations–forexam-plebymaintainingaregulardemonstrationinTahrirSquare,sustainingcordialrelationswiththearmy,fighting the regime supporters andpolice, and, intheend,surroundingtheStateTVandmarchingtothePresidentialPalace.

Contagionthereforeinvolvesshiftingidentitiesandchangingloyaltypatterns.Thesetectonictransitionsbringtotheforenewmovementsandpartieswhichaltertheexistingpoliticalcontext.Itcanbearguedthatcontagionismorelikelyiftherearepre-existinginternalcleavagesandfactions.Thesedormantdivi-sionscanbecomeconducivetocontagion.Itshouldbe noted that this spread pattern can lead to aninternalviolentconflictinsteadofamoreclear-cutpopularuprising.Manyoftheregimesintheregionhave ruthlesslymaintained some societal balancebetween a number of ethnic or religious groups.Someofthesegroupsaremoreeasilyincitedtowardsregimechange,whileothershaveavestedinterestinsupportingtheregime.

Such divisive processes have been in evidence inLibya. InTunisia andEgypt, a crucial change tookplacewhen strong economic growthbrought intobeingayoungurbanlower-middleclass.Thisnewsocioeconomicstratumhaddevelopedamodernistoutlookfosteredbystronginternetskills.Thesepeo-plewerehighlyconnectedandthereforerelatively

independentofthestatemediasystem.Youngpro-testorswereactivatedandprovokedbytheeventsin Tunisia and motivated by uniquely Egyptianfactors.Byparticipatinginthemassprotests,theyalsodevelopedanewsenseofbelonging inandtoEgypt.However, itshouldbenotedthatthepoliti-cal upheavals in the two countries have also beenmarkedbyaspreadingsenseofanimosity.Thishasfoundexpressioninthesymbolsofthepastregime.Theresulting‘purging’processescanleadtoviolenceandopenupdeepersocietalconflicts.

Tomorrow’s Middle East

Despite the unpredictability of the current situa-tion,itisclearthattheMiddleEastisexperiencingadeeptransformationonseverallevels.ThereisnodoubtthattheArabrevolutionsweepingtheregionwill create a newpolitical reality inmanyMiddleEasterncountries.Buttheoutcomeislikelytodiffer.WhilesomeArabstatesmightbe jolted intoanewand fragiledemocratic reality,otherswillwitnessamoregradual transitionordodgethedemocracytrendaltogether.

Muchoftheoutcomeofthistransitionwilldependon the nature and cohesion of the incumbentregimesandtheirabilitytomaintaintheirmonopolyon the use of force. At this stage, Arab Republicswith an uncertain line of succession appearmorevulnerable toregimechangethanhereditarymon-archies.Inthosecountriesinwhichthemilitaryisdeeplyentrenchedinthegovernment—likeAlgeriaandSyria—changeseemsevenlesslikelyandwouldrequireaviolentconfrontation.

A protester with the picture of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s

President from 1956 to 1970 and a hero of Arab nationalism.

Many Egyptians despised Mubarak’s close ties with the US

and Israel. Photo: Floris van Cauwelaert / Flickr.com.

THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 9

Asaresult,apatchworkofdifferentsystemsofgov-ernment—somemoredemocratic,someless—seemsthemost likely long-termoutcomeof the currentuprising. In themeantime, anduntil thedusthassettled,theMiddleEastwillexperienceafairamountof uncertainty and unrest which, in some cases,might escalate into civil war-like confrontations.Whilethissituationwillrequiremuchattentionandassistance from the international community, thelatterwillremainrelativelypowerlessindetermin-ingtheoutcomeofthistransformation.

Lessobviously,butequally important,willbe theimpact that the Arab revolutionwill have on theeconomicorderof theMiddleEast.There ismuchevidencetosuggestthatatleastinTunisiaandEgypttheuprisingswere asmucha reaction todecadesofpolitical repression as a revolt against thekindofcronycapitalismthatdevelopedundertheguiseofmarket reforms and privatization programmesthatwere sanctioned and rewarded by the inter-national financial institutions. The continuity oflabourunrests inpost-revolutionary states seemsto be an indication of this and represents a chal-lengetothefutureeconomicorder.Anyattemptatreplacingcurrentformsofcronycapitalismwithafreshdoseofneoliberalreformsislikelytoevokeastrongpublicreaction.AreturntothewaysofArabSocialism,ontheotherhand,wouldbetoxicfortheweakenedMiddleEasterneconomies.Amiddlepathwillbehardtoforgeincountriesthatdonotdrawamajorityof their receipts fromthehydrocarboneconomy. But an extended economic depressionmightwellposeathreattothefragilefloweringofArabdemocracy.

Finally,theArabrevolution is likelytochangetheregional balance of power decisively. The recentjuxtaposition of a US-led “axis of moderation”against an Iran-led“axisof resistance” isunlikelyto endure the current upheaval. Public pressurefor a more independent international role and arevival of Pan-Arab cooperation is likely to fun-damentally reorient the foreignpolicies ofMiddleEastern countries regardless of their current formofgovernment.AreturntoArabnationalismindeedseemsaplausibleconsequencegiventherevolution’sunderlyingthemesofnationalprideanddignity.ArehabilitationofpoliticalIslamislikelytobeanotherconsequenceof the revolutionasparties likeTuni-sia’sal-NahdaandEgypt’sMuslimBrothersjointhepoliticalprocess.

This transformation could skew the regional bal-anceinfavourofIran—shoulditindeedescapethecrisis unscathed—and present a potential threattoIsrael,whichmightfinditselfmoreisolatedasaconsequence. While the Arab-Israeli conflict hasplayedaperipheralroleintheArabuprisingsofar,any renewed confrontation will present a toughchallenge to the aspiring democracies and hasthe potential to radicalize their agenda. A recon-figurationoftheArabsystemcouldalsoprecipitateareturntothe“ArabColdWar”bypittinganallianceof post-revolutionary states against the conserva-tiveGulfmonarchieseagertofendoffanythreatofcontagion.SaudiArabia,forexample,mightfeeltheneed to intervene inYemenorBahrain,while theprolongeddestabilizationofLibyamightdrawinitsneighbours.Althoughthereisnoshortageofpossi-blehorrorscenarios,theArabrevolutionsalsohaveanundeniablepotential to lessen regional tension,

A boy waits in line for food at the Mazraq refugee camp in Hajjah province, Yemen. Photo: Paul Stephens / Irin News.

THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 10

boostcooperationandhelpbreakthedeadlockinthepeaceprocess.

Ingeopolitical terms,theArabrevolutionsare fur-therconfirmationthatafundamentalreshufflingoftheinternationalorderisunderway.Intentionalornot,theArabuprisingis likelytoheraldanendtoWestern hegemony over theMiddle East, as post-revolutionarystatesarebeginningtochartamoreindependentcourseininternationalaffairs.ThemythoftheWestasageneratorofnewpoliticaltrendsthataresubsequentlytransferredtoitsperipheryhasnotbeenlostonthesestates.Indeed,thereismountingevidencethatthecontagionmightnotbeconfinedtotheMiddleEast,asChinaattemptstoquellitsownJasmineRevolution,andnotionsofpopulardemoc-racyarebecomingmorewidelydebatedintheWest.Suchramificationsbearallthehallmarksofamoredecentralized andmultipolarworld. In this sense,the Arab uprising may well constitute the birthpangsofapoliticalorderthatextendsfarbeyondthebordersoftheMiddleEast.

Timo Behr & Mika Aaltola

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs

Kruunuvuorenkatu 4

FI-00160 Helsinki

tel. +358 9 432 7000

fax. +358 9 432 7799

www.fiia.fi

ISBN 978-951-769-297-7

ISSN 1795-8059

Cover photo: Jonathan Rashad / Flickr.com

Layout: Juha Mäkinen

Language editing: Lynn Nikkanen