routes of attack and withdrawal,and clearing mines from them.The complex operation, namedClambake, required a half-dozenrehearsals, the last on 1 February.Unlike Operation Wake-up inNovember 1952, which hadsought to take prisoners and gath-er intelligence on the Chinesedefenses, planners designed Clam-bake primarily to kill the enemyand destroy his bunkers andtrenches.

The raid began at first light on 3February, when three platoons oftanks roared toward the enemy-held high ground—Hill 104,Kumgok, and Red Hill—a shortdistance west of the real objective,Ungok. While the armored vehi-cles cut loose with 90mm guns andflamethrowers, the 1st Battalion,

11th Marines, added to the realismof the feint by shelling the appar-ent objective.

Taking advantage of the diver-sion, two reinforced platoons fromCompany A, 1st Battalion, 5thMarines—armed with bangaloretorpedoes to breach barbed wireand flamethrowers, satchel char-ges, and 3.5-inch rocket launchersto destroy heavier fortifications—stormed Hills 31 and 31A. Thetanks taking part in the diversionprotected the left flank of theattacking Marines by crossing afrozen paddy to open fire on thetrenchline connecting Ungok withthe hills to the west. The Chineseblazed away at the Marine tanksthat either protected the flank frombeyond the rice paddy or accom-panied the assault force and suc-

534

ceeded in destroying a flame-throwing M-4 Sherman tank.Supported by air, armor, andartillery, the Marine raiding partyprevailed. Clambake captured noprisoners but accomplished itsmain purpose by collapsingbunkers, trenches, and caves, andkilling perhaps 390 Chinese beforethe attackers withdrew. Marinecasualties totaled 14 killed and 91wounded.

Operation Clambake demon-strated anew the value of planningand rehearsal, the ability of flame-throwing tanks to discourageChinese tank-killer teams armedwith shoulder-fired rocket launch-ers, and the importance of coordi-nating air, artillery, and armor insupport of an infantry assault.Colonel Lewis W. Walt, commander

Department ol Defense Photo (USMC) A169911

Marine fliers batter Hill 67 with high explosives and napalm mass to destroy fortflcations, inflict casualties, and takeon 3 February in support of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines' prisoners. The air strikes were designed to divert enemytwo-reinforced-platoon-raid on the Chinese-held Ungok hill attention from the final objective area.

Officers of the 5th Marines assemble for a photograph dur-ing a lull in the fighting. Pictured in the front row, from left,are: LtCol Oscar F Peatross, LtCol Jonas M. Platt Col LewisW Walt LtCol Edwin B. Wheelei LtCol Robertj Oddy, andLtCol James H. Finch. Second row, Maj Harry L. Sherwood,

of the 5th Marines, believed thatClambake taught his regiment howto forge an effective tank-infantryteam, a weapon he soon em-ployed.

On 25 February, Colonel Walt's5th Marines conducted a raid simi-lar to Operation Clambake, attack-ing Hill 15, where the Chinese hadoverrun Outpost Detroit in earlyOctober. The commander of the 2dBattalion, Lieutenant Colonel OscarF. Peatross, chose Company F,under Captain Harold D. Kurth, Jr.,to execute the attack. After detailedplanning and careful rehearsal, theraid, designated Operation Charlie,kicked off on the morning of the2 5th. Tanks and artillery fired asplanned, but bad weather inter-fered with the scheduled airstrikes. The two assault platoonsreported that the supporting firehad isolated the objective asplanned, but they found that 'the

Maj Robert L. Willisi, Capt Ralph L. Walz, Maj Jack M. Daly,Maj Ross T Dwyer Jr., Maj Robert H. Twisdale, Capt RichardG. Gilmore, and Maj William C. Doty. Third row, Capt

James R. Schoen, Capt Dean W Lindley, Capt James E.Hendiy, and Capt Arthurj Davidson.

National Archives Photo (U5MC) 127-N-A170216

Department of Defense Photo (USMc) A169719

After being examined at the company aid station, a Marine of Company A, 1stBattalion, 5th Marines, who was wounded during the battalion's daylight raidon Ungok is put onto a helicopter for evacuation to a hospital ship for furthertreatment.

535

majority of enemy installationswere relatively undamaged," per-haps because the Chinese bunkerswere so solidly built.

Although the raids that culminat-ed in Operation Charlie were themost ambitious attacks duringFebruary, Chinese troops and theAmerican and South KoreanMarines conducted many smallerprobes. On the night of 12-13February, for example, a Chineseplatoon, supported by mortars andartillery, tested the defenses ofOutpost Hedy on Hill 124. Twonights later, hostile troops stalked apatrol from the 7th Marines that

was attempting to set up anambush and forced it to turn back.On 19 February, artillery and mor-tar fire frustrated a Chinese attackon Combat Outpost 33, manned bySouth Korean Marines.

The Marines, whether Americanor South Korean, exerted pressureof their own. On the night of 13-14February, two platoons of SouthKorean Marines had successfullyraided Hill 240, on the west bankof the Sachon River roughly threemiles upstream from its confluxwith the Imjin. On the morning ofthe 22d, the 5th Marines raided Hill35A, some 1,300 yards southwest

536

of the Ungok hill mass, usingflamethrowers to deadly effect. Onthe following night, a reinforcedplatoon from the 1st Battalion, 7thMarines, supported. by four M-46tanks set out to raid Hill Yoke,southwest of Bunker Hill. Shortlyafter midnight, however, as theraiding party regrouped for thefinal assault, the Chinese struckfrom ambush. Another reinforcedplatoon went to the aid of the first,and the enemy broke off theaction; hut not before the raid onHill Yoke had to be called off,even though the Marines account-ed for perhaps five times their own

The Marine Division and Its Weapons

Between 1 January 1953 and the end of the fight-ing in July, the strength of Marine Corps groundforces hovered between 25,000 and 28,000, fluc-

tuating as casualties occurred, tours of duty or enlist-ments expired, and replacements arrived. In terms oforganization, the 1st Marine Division adhered to a trian-gular concept, with three organic infantry regiments—the 1st, 5th, and 7th Marines—an artilleiy regiment, the11th Marines, and a variety of other combat and supportelements under control of the division or its compo-nents. The combat elements employed tanks, mortars,and other weapons; the support units provided suchspecialized activity as transportation, by truck or amphib-ian tractor, communications, engineering, reconnais-

had seen action in World War II. Riflemen still used thesemi-automatic Ml or, if trained as snipers, the bolt-action M1903 with a telescopic sight. Although designedfor World War I, the Browning Automatic Rifle stillincreased the firepower of the Marines. Officers, or thoseenlisted men assigned to crew-served weapons like mor-tars or machine guns, carried the .45-caliber pistol or thelightweight .30-caliber carbine, which came in both auto-matic and semi-automatic versions.

The standard crew-served infantry weapons had alsohelped fight World War II. The 60mm, 81mm, and 4.2-inch mortars were at best modifications of olderweapons, as were the machine guns, whether heavy .50-caliber weapons, water-cooled .30-caliber guns, or light-weight, air-cooled .30-caliber types. The 3.5-inch rocketlauncher, however, had replaced the 2.36-inch Bazookaof World War II, which had failed to effectively penetratethe armor of the Soviet-built tanks used by the NorthKoreans and Chinese.

Artillery and armor relied heavily on designs used inWorld War II or intended for that conflict. The 11thMarines, aided by a battery of 4.5-inch rockets on multi-ple launchers, provided the division's organic fire sup-port with three battalions of 105mm howitzers and onebattalion of 155mm howitzers. A battalion of tanksadded to the mobile firepower of the division withweapons ranging from rebuilt M-4 Shermans from WorldWar II, some of them mounting a flamethrower as wellas a 105mm gun, to new M-46 Pershings with a 90mmgun.

sance, and cargo handling.On the Jamestown Line, a fourth regiment served with

the 1st Marine Division, the 1st Korean Marine Regiment,which had been organized, trained, and equipped withthe assistance and advice of U. S. Marines. The KoreanMarine regiment, with a maximum strength in 1953 of4,400, had been attached to the 1st Marine Division intime for the Inchon invasion of September 1950, but afterthe Chosin Reservoir fighting, the Korean Marines passedunder the control of the Republic of Korea's Army.During 1951, however, the Korean Marine regiment wasagain attached to the 1st Marine Division and, along withthe 5th Battalion that joined in 1952, remained a part ofthe American division for the rest of the war. The KoreanMarines assigned to the division had their own organicartillery and armor. The 2d Korean Marine Regiment pro-vided troops to man the islands off the east and westcoasts.

The basic infantry weapons of the 1st Marine Division

In short, the 1st Marine Division was using theweapons of World War II to fight the kind of trench war-fare characteristic of World War I.

losses of five killed and 22 wound-ed.

The succession of raids andambushes continued into March.In a restaging of Operation Clam-bake, Company B, 1st Battalion,5th Marines, attacked Hill 31A ofthe Ungok massif on the 19th.Once again, air strikes, andartillery preparations shattered thepre-dawn calm and forced thedefenders to move to positions onthe reverse slope until the attack-ing Marines withdrew. On thesame morning, however, theenemy hit Outposts Esther andHedy and tried unsuccessfully tocrack the Jamestown defenses tothe rear of Hedy, failing despite alavish expenditure of mortar andartillery shells.

lstMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Feb53

Three Marines from Company F 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, who participated inthe raid on Hill 15 (Detroit), display captured enemy weapons and material.The raid was launched during early daylight hours with a smoke screen in anattempt to gain surprise.

During February and March, as night fighting intensified, Battalion, fire their 90mm guns to harass the Chinese andMarine M-46 Patton tanks assigned to Company D, 1st Tank disrupt their movement.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A169267

Improvements in Logistics

During the first three months of1953, the supply of howitzer

537

too quickly. Redesigned bodyarmor began arriving in November1952. The new model protected thegroin as well as the upper body,greatly improving morale as it

reduced casualties still further.Experiments continued in the

use of helicopters as flying packmules to deliver supplies over bro-ken terrain. In February 1953,Lieutenant Colonel John F. Carey'sMarine Helicopter TransportSquadron 161 (HMR-161) carriedOut Operation Haylift II, resupply-ing two front-line regiments, the5th and 7th Marines. This opera-tion, lasting from 23 through 27February, proved more demandingthat Haylift I, conducted inSeptember 1952, which had resup-plied only one regiment. On thefirst day of Haylift II, Carey'ssquadron had to divert helicoptersfrom the 7th Marines to rushammunition to the other regiment,and on the final morning fog dis-rupted the schedule of flights.Nevertheless, Haylift II delivered1.6 million pounds of cargo; fivetimes the total of the earlier opera-tion.

Fighting Intensifies

the five-day experiment to resupply twoFebruay.

ammunition increased, and therestrictions on artillery support, ineffect during the autumn, ceased.The availability of hand grenadesalso improved, but 81mm mortarshells remained in short supply.

Even as the ammunition short-age eased, the Marines had toimpose restrictions on the use ofgasoline and diesel fuel. In January1953, consumption of gasolinedeclined by 17 percent from the

frontline regiments carried out in late

previous month, and diesel fuel byseven percent. Stocks were rapidlyreplenished, however, so that inFebruary consumption returned tonormal.

Refinements in equipment alsoappeared. A thermal boot wornduring the Korean winter of 1952-1953 afforded better protectionagainst cold and dampness thanthe footgear it replaced, but theleather combat boot wore out all

538

When the winter of 1952-1953ended, the deployment of the 1stMarine Division remained essen-tially unchanged, although the uniton the right was now the U.S.Army's 2d Infantry Division ratherthan the British 1st CommonwealthDivision. The American Marineregiments held the right of theline—the 5th and 1st Marines occu-pying the Jamestown positions andthe 7th Marines currently inreserve. Beyond the Panmunjomcorridor, South Korean Marinesdefended the portion that extendedto the north bank of the Han River.On the south bank of the Han, thedivision's amphibian tractor battal-ion and the Kimpo Provisional

Department of Defense Photo (UsMc) A170050

Cargo handling personnel prepare to hook a load of ammunition to a SikorskyHRS-2 helicopter of Marine transport squadron 161 during Operation Haylifi II,

Air Support for the Division

M arine orps aviation continu d to playa riticalrole on the battl field. Lndee I, its value hadincr a d as th Fifth Air For e, which exer­

i 'ed operational control over land-based Marine air­men, 'hifted empha i to targets on or near the front­line, and away from induslrie , transportation links andommand and control facilitie" all of them already

heavily bombed. Taking advantage of this change, Majorneral rnon E. Meg ,who in January 1953 replaced

Major General layton C. J rome in command of the 1 tlarine ircraft Wing, per uaded Major Gen ral GI nn. Barcus, ommander of the fifth Air Force, to aban­

don the practice of dealing directly with Marine aircraftgroups or even squadron and work thr u 'h th wingh adquart 1',. T fa j]itate planning within the 1 '[Marine Air raft ing, Megee revitalized and enlarged hi

-3 ection, which, he conceded, had b come " ome­what ru ty." General M gee at. a replaced the loneMarin Corps liaison officer at the Joint Operations

enter with an element drawn from of th wing's G-3e tion that ould deal more efficiently with reque ts for

air ,'upport.Barcu end r'ed Meg e' plan to xpand the rol f

wing h adqualter , but th Air F rc g neraJ I' rainedc ntr I ov l' clo'e air upp rt, even though it wa a1arine Corp 'pe ialty. Poticy e tabti. hed jointly by the

Army and Air Force, to which the avy a 'ent >d,required that the Joint perations nter, which nowhad a greater Marine pre en e, approve reque ts for thikind f mis'i n. In waging th air war, the JointOperation enter paid stricter attention to reque 'L'i ~ I'

clo e air support, tending to creen carefully the eurgent strik s while assigning Megee's headquartergreater resp n'ibility f I' interdicti n, armed re nnai­sanee, and ther missi n , by day or by night, that hadbeen planned in advance against targets 3,000 yards or

more beyond the main line of resi, rancThe auriou, attirude toward clo, air, upport reflect­

ed th potential danger to friendly troop. inher nt inthe kind of operation, routinely flown by the] st MarineAircraft Wing. Indeed, with a mere ] .... 5 percent of theavailable tactical aircraft, iarine airmen had undertak­en b tween 30 and 40 percent of all the clo:e air sup­port mi'si ns flown for the nited Nations forcesb tween JanualY and t bel' ]9~2. The ana ks,'m of th m within 100 yards of nited ation,tro p:, uld a id ntally cause friendl 'asualties. Thebattlefield it, elf-a 'ucces'ion of similar hills andridges, s parared by draws and intermillent streams,with few b iou landmark ex ept for maj 1'1' s rvoirsor riv rs-eontributed to the po. sibilit of error. Duringth fir t nine momh of]952, Marine pilots figured in18 of 63 incid nt' in whi hair trik s killed or wound­ed friendly troop .

ew report appearing in th nited Stat duringFebruary 19-3 fo u d n the involv m nt of Marineairmen in 28.5 p rc nt of the recent accident allacksthat killed or wounded friendly tro p,. Ignoring thedangerous nature of thes ' trike" which includedalmost all the targets within 100 yards f friendly force ,the press accused the Marines of ar Ie, sne, s a hargethat had no merit. Giv>n the difficulty in pinpointingtargets on the Kor an battl fi ld, eff cti e close air sup­port involved danger to the troops on the ground, espe-ially those manning outpost that W re , urrounded or

uncleI' simultaneous auack from vari u, directions.General fegee, when evaluating a January 1953 :traf­ing run by Marine jel. that killed one Marin andwounded another, con luded that the in idem .ore ult dfrom th inescapable operational hazard in icl nt to lay­ing on a real clo e strike." The same judgm nt appliedto the otherimilar accidents.

Regiment, the latter an improvised"United Nations" force usingarmored amphibian tractors asartillery, manned the defenses inaddition to controlling civilianswithin the regimental sector andregulating river traffic.

Except on the far left of the divi­sion's line, where the Han Riverprovided a natural barrier, a seriesof combat outposts contributed tothe security of the main line ofresistance. From right to left, theprincipal outposts were East Berlin,Berlin, Vegas, Reno, Carson, and

Ava, all manned at the end ofMarch by the 5th Marines. The 1stMarines maintained Corrine,Dagmar, Esther, Ginger, BunkerHill, Hedy, Ingrid, Kate, andMarilyn. Beyond the Pan-munjomcorridor, the South Korean Marinesheld, from right to left, Outposts39, 33, 31, and 51.

As it had during the winter nowending, the 11th Marines providedartillery support for the infantryregiments manning the JamestownLine and its outposts, using the fire­power of three battalions of

539

105mm hOWitzers, a battalion of155mm hOWitzers, and a battery ofmultiple 4.5-inch rocket launchers.One battalion of 105mm howitzerssupported the 5th Marines andanother the 1st Marines. The thirdsuch battalion provided generalsupport of the division and stoodready to reinforce the fires of thebattalion supporting the 5thMarines, which held a critical sec­tor. Both the 155mm howitzers andthe rocket launchers rendered gen­eral support for the division. TheSouth Korean Marines depended

primarily on a battalion of 75mmguns, attached to the 11th Marines.U.S. Army artillery battalions,assigned to I Corps, could reinforcethe fires of the 11th Marines any-where along the line with 155mmhowitzers and 8-inch howitzers. Toprotect the bridges across the ImjinRiver to the rear of the JamestownLine against possible aerial attack,the Marines deployed a provisionalantiaircraft artillery platoon armedwith automatic weapons.

The 1st Marine Division's tankbattalion continued to support thedefenses of the Jamestown Line,mainly with M-46 tanks mounting90mm guns, though the older M-4sarmed with a 105mm howitzer anda flamethrower were available. The

battalion assigned one tank com-pany to support each of the lineregiments and designated a thirdas a forward reserve to reinforcethe main line of resistance orspearhead counterattacks. Thefourth company became the rearreserve, undergoing unit trainingand conducting maintenance forthe entire battalion.

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing,now participating more directly inplanning air strikes, supported thedivision with an array of piston-engine and jet types, fixed-wingmodels and helicopters. Besidesconducting strikes, the wingplaced its helicopters and lightobservation planes at the disposalof the division. Helicopters evacu-

540

ated the wounded and deliveredsupplies, while the light planesflew reconnaissance and liaisonmissions, directed air strikes andadjusted artillery fire.

The coming of spring broughtrain and warmer temperatures thatmelted snow, thawed frozen rivers,and caused flooding. Roadsbecame all but impassible, andtrenches turned into streams ofmud. Water-soaked aging sand-bags, which rotted and split,undermined timbers already weak-ened by sustained Chineseshelling. In March, noncommis-sioned officers from the division'sengineer battalion inspected theJamestown Line and evaluated thecondition of the defenses, deter-

engaged in actual fighting.Although the beer issued toMarines had a lesser alcohol con-tent than that sold to civilians inthe United States, it was welcomeindeed. Those who drank madefriends with those who did not,

mining which bunkers and fightingholes had to be repaired or rebuilt.Marine infantrymen did the actualwork under the supervision of theengineers, using materials man-handled into position by theKorean Service Corps. At the out-

posts or on those portions of themain line of resistance underenemy observation, the work hadto be done at night.

Warmer weather heralded theappearance of a beer ration—twocans per day for each Marine not

and a brisk trade in beer ensued.Spring also brought the certain-

ty that, as soon as weather permit-ted, the Chinese would renew theirattacks on the Jamestown Line andits outposts, duplicating the inten-sity of the fight for the Hook (nowa responsibility of the 2d InfantryDivision) that had raged inOctober 1952. The enemy's cap-ture of key terrain could yieldpolitical advantage as well asimmediate tactical gain. Chinesesuccess might force the Marinesback to the Wyoming or KansasLines, both of them fallback posi-tions, or even open the way toSeoul. Smaller gains could com-bine to exert pressure on theUnited Nations to accept a truceand, if the ceasefire should fail,leave the Chinese in a stronger

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A169051

After loading the 155mm howitzer, artillerymen of the 4th Battalion, 11thMarines, make a final check on the sights. The gunner stands by with lanyardin hand, waiting for the command to fire.

Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 wait in the backgroundto air4ft the crew and their rocket launcher to the rear or anew position.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A346664

A Marine 4.5-inch rocket crew launches a fire missionagainst Communist positions. The launcher could discharge24 rounds in rapid succession. Two helicopters from Marine

541

The Korean Service Corps

squads in different platoons,formed composite units with num­bers and firepower comparable toa reinforced platoon. In addition totheir rifles, Browning automaticrifles, carbines, and pistols, thedefenders usually were reinforced

Depal1menl of Defense Photo (USMC) A16Y'i60

The government of the Repunlic of Korea drafted men alread} reject­ed forervicc in the arm and aSi>igncd them to a labor force, theKorean ,ervi e orp, organized into companies, battalions, and

regiments that arried supplie ,~ d, ammunition, and building materialto combat units and perform d th r n e alY logi tic dutie. Ithoughthe ervi e troops w re a uniform, they W re not issued weapon. n theJamestown Line, a Korean rvi e rp regiment, usually numb ringmore than 5,000 men, upp rt d the c mp nenrs of the 1st MarineDi i ion. Bei>id forming human pack train, the"e Korean laborershelped vacuate Ih ~ " ounded, buried enem dead, and retrieved weaponsabandon d on the battlefield.

After th Marine moved onto the JamestO\\'n Line in the pring or 1952,me 50 member of the Korean ef\'ice orp: helped cut timber for the

can tru tion of bunker along th frontline and for the two fall-ba k posi­tion ,th \J yarning and Kan a" Lines. By Jul ,the Korean' had helped cutand hape ome 3-,000 length" of timber. n c the bunker \yere com­plet d, the Korean ervice Corp carri d n \\ timber , . andbags, barbedwire, and other material" to trengthen them and repair battle damage,along with fa d and ammuniti n. hen manhandling argo, each Koreanlaborer was expected to carry -0 p und a di tance of 10 mile', a hurdenaffixed to an -frame on the porter'i> back. \'er long di 'lance or ruggedterrain, the laborers might adopt a relay y tem, dividing the journe} intomanageable "egments.

Two membel ofthe Korean ervice COIP' work l/nder the sllperl'isioll (ianexplosive orc/nallce di ;posal Marille and tCil/Rht how to remoue e.\plo 'il'e'from bomh. and artillery shell. nee the e.\plo 'il'es were removed. tbe eel e'were disposed of

portions of the Jamestown Lineand some its rear areas fromenemy observers.

Forty or fifty Marines, with twoNavy hospital corpsmen, mannedeach of the combat outposts. TheMarines, often drawn from various

lstMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Ma63

Each spring, protracted periods ofrain and the seasonal thaw turn theearth into a quagmire, impedingmovement even in trenches. Althoughroad conditions became a seriousproblem, frontiline units were keptsupplied.

position to renew the fighting.Certain of the Marine combat

outposts had already demonstratedtheir importance, among themBunker Hill, the site of deadlyfighting during 1952. The list ofcritical outposts also includedReno, Carson, and Vegas, northeastof the Ungok hills, a massif thathad been the objective of a num­ber of Marine raids during the win­ter. The importance of the threeou tposts named for cities inNevada, which the 5th Marinesmanned, derived from their prox­imity to a potential invasion routeleading toward Seoul, a road thatpassed between Carson and theUngok hills. In addition, control ofthe three outposts provided obser­vation of the Chinese main line ofresistance and certain areas imme­diately beyond, while screening

542

to the west and Hill 67 to thenorth.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A170193

Members of the 1st Squad, 1st Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines,wait to be briefed on a night combat patrol involving the setting of an ambush.Since early March, the 1st Battalion had conducted nearly a dozen such patrolsto test the enemy in the Carson-Reno-Vegas area.

with two portable flamethrowersand as many as five light machineguns. One or more forwardobservers adjusted the fire of60mm and 81mm mortars indefense of each outpost.

The three outposts of Carson,Reno, and Vegas differed from oneanother according to their location,the terrain to be defended, and thethreat they faced. Combat OutpostCarson, on the left, guarded alargely barren hilltop where a caveprovided living quarters for theMarines, who manned an ovalperimeter protected by barbedwire and including bunkers, tun-nels, and a main trench with fight-ing holes. Except for the slopenearest the Jamestown Line, wherea deeper entrenchment was beingdug, the main trench on Carsonaveraged five feet deep by two feetwide. Most of the 28 fighting holeshad excellent fields of fire, thoughthe overhead cover on some ofthem had reduced the opening forobservation and firing. Duringdarkness, two listening posts cov-ered the likeliest avenues ofenemy attack, from the Ungok hills

Reno, in the center, was themost vulnerable of the three. It notonly lay closest to Chinese lines,but also occupied a ridge thatforced the defenders into aperimeter vaguely resembling thewishbone of a turkey, open end tothe north. As at Carson, a caveserved as living quarters and mightalso become a last-ditch redoubt. Atunnel provided access to the cavefrom the main trench, which variedfrom five to seven feet deep, butone Marine, Corporal James D.Prewitt, confessed that he hated togo through the entrance. As a boy,he explained: "I had helped dig mybrother out of a collapsed playtunnel, and I was left with a realhorror of such things."

Two Marines at Outpost Reno make their hourly call to the company commandpost. Located more than 1,600 yards from the main line of resistance, the out-post was customarily manned by 40 to 43 Marines.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A170020

543

empty cans into nearby gullies. Atnight, when the tin cans clattered,the source of the noise might beChinese moving close to attackbehind a sudden barrage or mere-ly rats scavenging for food.Members of the Korean ServiceCorps kept Reno supplied and per-formed the unpleasant task, asafter the fighting in October 1952,of burying the Chinese dead, atask repeated whenever artilleryfire disinterred the corpses.Marines from Reno accompaniedthe Korean burial details to protectthem against ambush and also tokeep them at their grisly work.Enemy snipers, as well as mortar

bunkers, relying exclusively onfighting holes in the trenches and,as a last resort, the cave itself.Outpost Reno had limited fields offire in the direction of enemy-heldHill 67, also called Arrowhead Hill,but Outpost Carson, on the left,provided fire support in this area.As a result, the approach thatseemed to pose the greatest dan-ger to Reno's defenders followed aridge extending generally south-ward from Hill 150.

Like the Marines defending theother outposts, those at Renorelied on C-rations and tossed the

and artillery crews, posed a con-tinuing threat, forcing the Marinesto remain under cover during clay-light, insofar as possible. Indeed, asniper alerted by the reflectionfrom a forward observer's fieldglasses, fatally wounded theMarine with a single shot. Becauseof the danger, tension, and dis-comfort, the Marines at Reno nor-mally stayed only for a weekbefore being relieved.

To the south of Reno lay RenoBlock, an L-shapecl trench with asmall bunker at the end of theshorter leg and a machine gunposition at the point where the

544

The Marines at Reno built noCombat Outpost Vegas

March 1953

NOT DRAWN TO SCALE

1 Robbit hole2 Overheoded tighting ho!e3 Fighting hole converted into living qoorters4 Fighting hole not overheeded

MLR 5 Living bonkers6 UVorning bonkor

—•—Coeo

511153

To 810e0

NOT DRAWN TO SCALE

Combat Outpost RenoMarch 1953

1953.

legs joined. At night a reinforcedsquad manned the blocking posi-tion, which served as a listeningpost, helped screen the movementof supplies and reinforcements,and provided a rallying point forrelief columns ambushed byChinese patrols. Perched on a hill-top, Reno Block afforded excellentvisibility, but conversely it couldeasily he seen from Chinese lines.Consequently, as a Marine whoserved there recalled: "We wouldlight a cigarette under cover of acoat or blanket, then when wetook a drag it was with both handscupped to hide the glow," whichcould draw sniper fire. Marinesmanning Reno's east-west trenchcould fire in support of the block-ing position, as could the garrisonat Carson.

To the right of Reno loomedCombat Outpost Vegas, whichattained a height of 175 metersand, as the tallest of the three,afforded the best fields of observa-tion. Barbed wire and a well-con-structed trench encircled the egg-shaped perimeter on Vegas, withits one warming and two livingbunkers. Although the fields of fireon Vegas were less than ideal,handicapped in places by a steeply

pitched slope too irregular forgrazing fire and also by the smallfiring apertures in some of the cov-ered fighting holes, weapons therecould support Reno with long-range fire. By day, Vegas proved amagnet for sniper fire and harass-ment by mortars and artillery, forc-ing the Marines to remain undercover. A tour of duty at Vegas usu-ally lasted three days for infantryand no more than five for artilleryforward observers.

Attack on Carson,Reno, and Vegas

Although the 5th Marines hadbeen active during March—raidingHill 31A in the Ungok hill massand patrolling by night, especiallyin the vicinity of Carson, Reno, andVegas—the Chinese tended toavoid combat. The lull endedabruptly at 1900 on 26 March,when the Chinese shattered thespringtime evening with fire fromsmall arms, machine guns, mortars,and artillery. Almost every Chineseweapon within range raked the leftand center of the sector mannedby the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

Combat Outposts Carson, Reno,

545

and Vegas, each manned by acomposite platoon from the 1stBattalion, 5th Marines, underwenta savage bombardment. An esti-mated 1,200 60mm and 82mmmortar rounds exploded on Carsonwithin roughly 20 minutes, and theshelling continued at the rate ofabout one round every 40 secondsuntil 2200. The Chinese gunnersalso directed counterbattery fire atthe howitzer positions of the 11thMarines, sought to interdict move-ment behind the main line of resis-tance, and tried to sever the tele-phone lines and routes of move-ment between the battalion andthe threatened outposts.

The bombardment of Carson,Reno, and Vegas formed one partof a general shelling of outposts allalong the Jamestown Line. To theright of the 1st Battalion, 5thMarines, the Chinese lashed out atBerlin and East Berlin, manned byMarines of the regiment's 3dBattalion. To the left of the 5thMarines, artillery fire and some-times infantry threatened the Out-posts of the 1st Marines, likeHedy, Bunker Hill, Esther, andDagmar. Chinese troops alsoseemed to be positioning them-selves to attack in the sector of theKorean Marines.

On the night of 26 March, thegeneral bombardment fell mostheavily on Carson, Reno, andVegas, and just 10 minutes afterthe shells began exploding there,some 3,500 soldiers from the358th Regiment, 120th Division, ofthe Chinese 46th Army began con-verging on the three outposts.Taking advantage of the shelling,two platoons advanced from theUngok hills to attack Carson, whileone Chinese company stormedReno and another Vegas. Yetanother company—this one fromArrowhead Hill and nearby Hill29—crossed the road to Seoul toattack Reno from the northwest.

Department of Defense Photo (usMc) A17001 1

The trenchline on Outpost Reno; to the left of the "L" where the trench changesdirection lies Reno Block the site of savage fighting on the night of 26-27 March

Meanwhile, Chinese troops fromHill 190 outflanked Reno on its leftto hit the outpost from the rear,and others advanced from the highground north of Vegas to storm theoutpost head-on.

The fight for Carson, a part ofthe enemy's main effort, pittedChinese numbers, perhaps 20attackers for every defender,against a determined garrison thatcould be readily reinforced fromthe main line of resistance. In thefirst 35 minutes, the attackers pen-etrated the outer trenches atCarson, but the Marines fought theChinese to a standstill in a fiercehand-to-hand struggle. Movingtheir wounded to the shelter of thecentrally located cave, the defend-ers continued to fire from theirfighting holes along the maintrench. As squads from CompaniesC and D of Lieutenant ColonelJonas M. Platt's 1st Battalion, 5thMarines, were moving out to rein-force Carson, the Chinese relaxedthe pressure on that outpost, shift-

ing their attention to Reno andVegas. The attack began to ebb atabout 2135, but mortars andartillery continued to pound theMarines on Carson. The violentthough brief assault, followed bysustained shelling, took a psycho-logical as well as physical tollamong Carson's surviving defend-ers. For example, the outpost com-mander, First Lieutenant Jack F.

Ingalls, who survived unwounded,seemed to have aged 10 years,according to a sergeant who knewhim.

Reno, where the terrain preclud-ed the establishment of a tightperimeter, proved harder to defendthan Carson and, because it wasfarther from the main line of resis-tance, more difficult to reinforce.As at Carson, the Chinese gained ahold on the outer works, but atReno they capitalized on this earlysuccess and forced the Marines tofall back to the cave that anchoredthe position. At 2030, OutpostReno reported by radio that the

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enemy controlled everything out-side the cave, which was collaps-ing under the sustained shelling.According to the message, death,wounds, and the lack of oxygeninside the cave left only sevenMarines able to fight.

Supporting weapons did theirbest to save the doomed outpost.Aided by flares from an aircraftand illuminating rounds, machinegunners on the main line of resis-tance and rocket batteries just tothe rear fired into the Chineseswarming over Reno, while vari-able-time artillery shells burst over-head, showering the attackers withdeadly fragments. Two Marine M-46 tanks, on the Jamestown Linejust behind Reno, joined in withtheir 90mm guns. Radio contactwith the Marines fighting at theoutpost faded, and then failedentirely—never to be restored.

Chinese forces also seemed onthe verge of victory at OutpostVegas. The intensity of the bom-bardment and overwhelming num-bers forced the Marines from theirleast defensible positions. A break-down in communication ham-pered efforts to reinforce Vegas, asChinese artillery fire tore up tele-phone wires leading from the out-posts to the battalion commandpost. Radio had to replace wire.

While the defenders of Vegaswere undergoing attack, the 5thMarines sought to reinforceOutpost Reno, with the 1stBattalion assuming operationalcontrol of those elements of the 2dBattalion involved in the effort. At2015, advance elements of a pla-toon from Company F, 2dBattalion, set out from the mainline of resistance, fought their wayout of an ambush near Hill 47, butwere pinned down short of RenoBlock, which had yet to bemanned that night and had beenoccupied by the Chinese. Thereinforced 3d Platoon, Company

5th Marines Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Mar53

Marines on Vegas huddle in the command post bunker as Chinese mortars andartillery pound the outpost. While Marine artillery responded with protective box-ing and variable-time fires on the outpost and routes of approach, defendinginfantry called down 60mm and 81mm mortar barrages.

A Platoon at Reno Block

The 3d Plaroon, ompany C, 1 't Ballalion-rein­forc d I Y an atta h d machine gun -ection­manned a portion of the Jamestown Line on the

night of 26 [arch 1953. The men of the platoon led bynd Lieutenant Warren C. Ruthazer, were tanding

the usual nighuim al rt when they heard Chine eartill Iy exploding along the combat outpo t line. oonthe bombardment began barr ring th main line of resis­tan e, and Ruthazer summoned his noncommission dofficers to the ommand post where he told them that aChinese atrack on Outpost Reno had driven the d fend­er into th cave there and might soon over; helm them.

Each night, a reinforced ritl squad, 0 - upied RenoBlo k, a Ii t ning po t about 100 yards closer to the mainline of re 'istance than Reno itself. On this evening, how­vel', the hinese bombardment prevented the squad

from moving out. s a result, the garrison intended forReno Block, a reinforced squad from the 1st Platoon of

ompany C, joined fore . ~ ith Lieutenant Ruthazer's 3dPlatoon.

, hortly after 2000, the reinforc d 3d Plato n, and itsadditional squad I' eiv d order' to drive the Chine efr m Outp ·t Reno and bring back th . urvivingMarine . The men of rlle re cue force carri d shov I andentr n hing t 01 to fre 1arine trapped in the cave orin col lap ed tr nche , along with grenade for close-infighting. Ruthazer's platoon started along a trail thate tended ome 1.800 yard, served Reno Block, and ter­minated at Reno. The Marines had to remain close to thetrail because of minefield on both Oanks, thus becom­ing more vuln rable to ambush. They avoided bunchingup dropped to the ground \: hen nee ssalY to escapeenemy fire and then jump d ro their ~ et, ru hing for­ward LImB again forced ro hug the muddy earth. One ofthe many mOltar shell that exploded along the trailburst clo nough to rgeant illiam II. Janzen, thplatoon guide, to pelt him with dirt, and another landeddirectly in front of Private First Class Bobby G. Hatcheras he sprawled for cover along ide the trail, but theround fail I t xplod. During thi ordeal a. he lat I'

recalled, ergeanr Janzen k pt hi sanity, although hisfa e "was buri d in the dirt and mud," by on entratingon repeating the Lord's Prayer.

To reach Reno Block, th fore had ro climb the steephill on whi h the trench and bunker lay. The Marinehad rigged a strong rope alongside the trail t help thh avily lad n troops pull th m Iv s upward. Chinesmortar and artill ry fire had cut the rop , however andth plat n had to claw it! way up th ,I P . Atop thehill, rl1 m n nter d a tren h '0 hallow that at timesth Marine had ro crawl toward th blocking position.

Th Chin concentrat d on the head of the reliefcolumn inst"ad of trying to en ircle it. . ergeam Janzen

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Depanmcn! of Defense Photo (t;•.\le) 1.396'1

At a December 1953 battalion review, MajGen RandolphMeC. Pate, commander of the 1st Marine Dit isiol1, pl'e­sents tbe Navy Cross. tbe natioll's seco1ld highest awardfor mililCIIJ' valOJ~ to Hospital Corp ma1l Paul . Polle)'.

believed that this d ci ion enabled the pl:.1t on to clingto the egm nt of trench. making it the anchor of aragged perimet r. The arrival f aptain Ralph L. Walzand two platoons from hi C mpany F, 2d Banalion 5thMarine, tipped the balance in favor of the Marines, atlea t momentarily. The captain quickly mount d a bayo­net harge, des ribed by Janzen as 'magnificent, heroi ,and ghastly," that overwhelmed the hine e at RenoBlock.

Two corp'men with Rurllazer" platoon. I IospitalmanThird Class Paul . Poll y and Ho 'pitalman Francis C.Hammond, struggled ro care for the in rea ing numb rof ca ualtie at Reno Blo k. Temporarily blinded by dirtthrown in his face by an exploding shell, Polley contin­ued a best he could to tend to the wound d by s nsof touch. Hamm nd, though already wound d, volun­tarily remain d [ehind with Captain alz" farineswh n the plat on from ompany C received orders towithdraw. I [ammond killed when a mortar hell e. plod­ed near him, wa awarded a posthumous Medal oflIonor; Polley lived to re eiv the avy Cr s -.

asualty evacuation team b gan arri ing sholtly aft rth 3d Plato n recei ed orders to disengag . The ur­vivoI' abl t mov about on their own had gathered atthe ba e of the hill, when omeone reponed eeing amachine gunner, Private Fir t Cia Mari Lombardi, half­buried in a ollapsed trench. A final sear h locatedL mbardi who leg had been broken, and hi' com­rade brought him back. Of the 40 Marine in th rein­forced 3d Plat on, fewer than 10 r turned unscathed tothe main lin of resistance.

C, 1st Battalion—led by SecondLieutenant Warren C. Ruthazer—started toward Reno at 2030,together with the squad that hadbeen assigned to Reno Block buthad not yet deployed, and reachedthe enemy-held blocking positiondespite twice coming under long-range fire and twice beingambushed. Two platoons ofCompany F, 2d Battalion, followedin the wake of Ruthazer's men,leaving the Jamestown Line at 2227and advancing toward Reno Blockuntil stopped by fire from theChinese holding the blocking posi-tion. Here these latest reinforce-ments, under Captain Ralph L.

Walz, the commander of CompanyF, found Ruthazer's Marines, the

elements of Company F dispatchedearlier, and a platoon fromCompany D sent to reinforceOutpost Vegas but stopped nearReno Block by Chinese fire.Captain Walz took command of thegroup and launched an attack thatdrove the enemy from the block-ing position.

The cobbled-together force ofMarines clinging to Reno Block,now commanded by CaptainRalph L. Walz of Company F, triedgallantly but unsuccessfully toreach the composite force from the1st Battalion, 5th Marines, thatmanned Outpost Reno when thebattle began. Chinese attacks onthe blocking position continuedwithout respite, forcing the

Marines to beat back three sepa-rate assaults by midnight anddenying them an opportunity tomount a strong attack of their own.While the fighting raged at RenoBlock, the Chinese marshaled rein-forcements of their own behindHills 31 and 31D. Fire from Marineartillery and from tanks Ofl themain line of resistance scatteredone such group as it massed tojoin in attacking Reno, hut theChinese prevailed, killing or cap-turing all the defenders. The sur-vivors consisted of just fiveMarines—among them the outpostcommander, Second LieutenantRufus A. Seymour of Company C,1st Battalion, 5th Marines—and aNavy corpsman. They became

Marines of the 4.2-inch mortar company, 5th Marines were unable to get to the company's mortar positions, so theunload ammunition in support of the assault to retake Marines had to haul the ammunition up by carts.Outpost Vegas. Because of the heavy incoming fire, trucks

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A170437

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prisoners of war and were ulti-mately repatriated.

The Chinese capture of Renofreed one of the companies thathad helped subdue that outpost.The enemy assigned it the missionof delivering a coup de grace toReno Block, but Marine artilleryand tanks firing from the main lineof resistance caught the Chinese asthey moved south and frustratedthe plan. The blocking positionremained in Marine hands, at leasttemporarily.

During the struggle for Reno andReno Block, Outpost Vegas contin-ued to hold out, hut almost fromthe time the Chinese attacked, con-tact with Vegas proved uncertain.To facilitate the restoration of reli-able communications by wire, andif necessary with runners, ColonelWalt, the commander of the 5thMarines, shifted operational controlof the Marines on Vegas, and thoseattempting to reinforce them, fromthe 2d Battalion to the 3d Battalion.Shortly before midnight, contactwith Vegas ended. All the Marinesthere were either killed or cap-tured; the dead included the officerin charge, First Lieutenant KennethE. Taft, Jr.

Initial Counterattacks End

At midnight, after some fivehours of fighting, the Chinese con-trolled Vegas and Reno, althoughCarson remained under Marinecontrol. The Marines trying tobreak through to Vegas or Renohad thus far got no farther thanReno Block, but they kept trying.At 0144, Captain Walz, in com-mand of Company F and in chargeof the composite force at theblocking position, reported that hehad only the equivalent of onereinforced platoon to breakthrough to Reno. Within an hour,Walz had launched three attacks,each one stopped by fire from

mortars and small arms. For nowthe outpost would remain inChinese hands. The attempts toreach Outpost Reno on the nightand early morning of 26-27 Marchresulted in severe Marine casualtiesthat Colonel Walt later estimated asbeing 'as high as 35 percent, withmany dead."

On the early morning of 27March, while the attempts to fightthrough to Outpost Reno wereending in frustration, two platoonsorganized from Companies D, 2dBattalion, and C, 1st Battalion, ofthe 5th Marines advanced towardVegas. They worked their way asclose as 400 yards to the entranceto the outpost's trenches before afresh Chinese assault stoppedthem. This setback forced the 1stMarine Division to commit a partof its reserve.

The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,commanded by Lieutenant ColonelAlexander G. Cereghino and func-tioning as part of the division

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reserve, placed its Company Funder the operational control ofthe 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, forthis new effort to reach Vegas. Theplatoon leading the way advancedto within 200 yards of the outpost,but could only confirm that theenemy had already seized it.Beginning at about 0300, theMarines who had made this earlymorning attempt to break throughto Vegas withdrew to the main lineof resistance, arriving there at 0417.Earlier on the night of the 26th,Colonel Walt had given his 3dBattalion operational control overthe attempts to save Vegas; now heratified the decision by shifting theboundary between the 1st and 3dBattalions some 250 yards to thewest.

The eight-hour fight at Vegasand on its approaches cost theChinese an estimated 600 casual-ties, four times the total of Marineskilled or wounded. UnremittingChinese mortar and artillery fire

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A170429

A Marine gives a wounded buddy a drink while others prepare him for evacua-tion. During the initial attempts to regain control of Outposts Reno and Vegas,both Marine and enemy casualties were heavy; an estimated 600 Chinese hadbeen wounded or killed while Marine losses were placed at more than 150.