CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW

CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY INSTITUTE

University of San Diego School of Law 5998 Alcalá Park San Diego, CA 92110-2492 P: (619) 260-4806 / F: (619) 260-4753

1107 Ninth Street, Suite 880 Sacramento, CA 95814 / P: (916) 844-5646

1023 15th Street NW, Suite 401 Washington DC, 20005 / P: (917) 371-5191

www.cpil.org / www.caichildlaw.org

COMMENTS OF THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW

SUNSET HEARING OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE ATHLETIC COMMISSION

Senate Committee on Business, Professions and Economic Development

Assembly Business and Professions Committee

Assembly Committee on Arts, Entertainment, Sports, Tourism and Internet Media

March 18, 2015

The Center for Public Interest Law (CPIL) has monitored the State Athletic Commission

for 35 years, sending law students to meetings, sponsoring relevant legislation, and participating

in Commission rulemaking. I served on the Commission from 1976 to 1981, serving as Chair for

four of those five years. I was a draftsman and sponsor of the legislation and initial rules setting

up the boxer pension system. This program offers some retirement benefits to boxers who perform

for enough years and matches to vest. It also allows them to take some benefits prior to retirement

age to enable them to retrain for other employment, given the limited number of years to a boxing

career. And it provides for some disability help if that is an issue. California is the only state --

indeed, the only jurisdiction in the world -- with such a benefit in this sport.

The Commission was in deep distress in 2010-11, with budget and other problems detailed

in a Bureau of State Audits report released in March 2013 entitled State Athletic Commission: Its

Ongoing Administrative Struggles Call Its Future into Question. In the two years since that

publication, the Commission’s new Executive Officer has made remarkable and laudable progress

on many fronts, including budgetary, staffing, enforcement, and policy. The Commission has been

thoughtful and supportive of his efforts. It has also complied with the open meeting and other

“sunshine statutes” to assure proper transparency. In general, your staff’s background paper

prepared for this sunset review hearing by these Honorable Committees effectively captures recent

events and progress.

CPIL has four points to make relevant to these proceedings and to imminent actions

appropriate for the Legislature and the Commission:

1. Commission Composition. The critically important and recent U.S. Supreme Court

decision in North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC (February 25, 2015) now

renders the composition of many, if not most, of our state’s regulatory agencies untenable.

The Court held that state occupational licensing boards composed in majority of “active

market participants” are not entitled to claim state action immunity for their

anticompetitive acts. The decision is unambiguous and the holding is clear and not

avoidable – although there has been no relevant response as to any such agency to date.

Lacking radical restructuring, such boards are not entitled to “state action immunity” vis-

à-vis federal antitrust liability. And much of what every California agency does constitutes

a per se violation of that statutory regime, for example, the very act of limiting the supply

of competitors through a licensing requirement. Our state and nation has yet to

comprehend the stark new reality posed by this decision – one which CPIL has sought for

all of its existence and intended to stop the corruptive delegation of state power to persons

with an inherent conflict of interest. Fortunately, the Athletic Commission is one of the

few agencies that avoids this now fatal flaw. We do not believe that the physician specified

members “participate” in the relevant field competitively to a sufficient degree to pose an

issue, nor do their numbers create a likely problem in voting or otherwise deciding a matter.

But we would caution against the notion presented by Issue #3 that current Commission

licensees be appointed to the Commission.

2. Youth Pankration. We are concerned about head blows or other possible disabling

activity affecting children. In this area, the Commission has delegated safety

administration to the United States Fight League (USFL). But it has done so only on

condition that its safety standards equal or exceed those of the Commission. We note,

consistent with the discussion above, that the Commission may not delegate final authority

for any decision involving activity within its jurisdiction to any person or group with a

current, vested economic stake in the enterprise. It cannot be so composed itself, and -- a

fortiori -- cannot delegate decisionmaking to another authority that is similarly defective.

That is the clear message of the North Carolina case mentioned above. The decisionmaker

may not be composed such that any vote is controlled by those participating in the industry

with a financial stake. It might be argued that a delegation that is confined to a technical

safety determination might not have an anticompetitive nature. But such determinations

often decide who competes and how. Accordingly, the Commission needs to review each

such delegation and determine whether it should either be rescinded or -- as may be more

realistic -- it (the Commission) become involved in the review of any anticompetitive

decision as a neutral body properly representing the body politic, or that it appoint some

person to do so who does not have an economic stake in the involved enterprise. This

comment is not made out of some aspirational hope or theory, it is now absolutely required

as a matter of law. To fail to comply risks the full remedies of the federal Sherman and

Clayton Acts, including treble damage liability – not a helpful result given the

Commission’s and the state’s budgets.

3. Pension System. The background paper makes the same error here that was committed

by the previous audit report, noting the small benefits paid out to date and then making a

non sequitur recommendation that the pension plan be radically restructured. Those

comments fail to consider that benefits are not paid until many years after vesting. Most

boxers who have accrued benefits have still not reached eligible retirement age. In

addition, they do not seem to factor in properly benefits that have been conferred prior to

retirement age for disability or retraining for other employment – an allowance approved

by this Legislature some years ago in amending the Boxing Act. Of course, the payouts to

date total a relatively small amount. But that is not the proper calculation. The issue is,

how many have received help from their accounts for needed preretirement help, and how

many have vested and are due to receive how much?

However, CPIL concedes that the pension program needs adjustment.

Improvement has started with the important reform in the Commission’s new rule allowing

unclaimed monies to be returned to the overall pool for vested beneficiaries. That return

was welcome given the rather small benefits typically accruing. The pension pool amount

should be larger anyway (see discussion below). But this minor supplement was

precipitated by the strange “disappearance” of many boxers years after they vest and leave

boxing. The proper solution to this problem is not to merely make certain that other vested

boxers benefit from the boxer pension plan, but that we find those boxers or somehow track

them so they may receive their earned and due benefit. We believe that the Executive

Officer knows of this problem and is working to improve such tracking. With the evolution

over the past decade of the Internet, and the fact that we are attempting to contact persons

in order to give them funds due them, it should be a viable effort.

In addition, the Commission should examine the longevity of the careers of MMA

and other licensees not subject to the pension plan to evaluate their appropriate inclusion.

If a critical mass in number are committed to the enterprise for more than three to five

years, their inclusion should be entertained. And the contributory structure applicable to

boxing should also then be fully implemented in a similar manner.

4. Revenue and Tribal Events. Notwithstanding the progress made over the past several

years and the superlative performance of the current Executive Officer, which we openly

acknowledge, many of our historical problems with the Commission remain unresolved.

In our previous sunset testimony proffered 11 years ago pertaining to the Commission, we

made numerous points that still, regrettably, apply. Of those objections and suggestions,

those pertaining to revenue and tribal lands events within the Commission’s jurisdiction

are paramount. We attach hereto that presentation and its four still-relevant exhibits.

Briefly, to reiterate: Promoters of events sited on tribal lands are not paying into

the pension plan; if they were, the pension plan should be producing much more revenue

than is currently in the Fund, perhaps two to three times the current amount. Those benefits

will be needed as more and more boxers vest and reach eligible age. And contrary to the

implication in the current background paper and most recent audit, there are large numbers

of boxers who have fought for a number of years, vested, and properly receive a benefit.

Indeed, if you were to poll the audience providing the funds for the promoters, the

Commission, and the pension plan, it is the last that would receive the most support. Few

fans wish to see boxers who give their all to suffer the indignities of extreme poverty in old

age. And they are not organized as are other athletes and are traditionally subject to

coercive manipulation by promoters and managers.

Events sited on tribal lands should have the same regulatory structure, and public

and pension payments, as any other fight. We understand the tendency to worry about

other jurisdictions and the regrettable reduction to the “lowest common denominator” of

regulation and welfare, be it choosing Oklahoma or Atlantic City for a fight. But

California has a viable market, with a large population base for a live audience, and for

televised events. And the casinos want boxing onsite for obvious reasons, gambling and

otherwise. Subjecting them to the same regime as the non-Native promoters is equitable

and fair. The fact that some traditional promoters have moved into partnerships with tribes

hardly changes the formulation, even if they now support essential exemption or favoritism

because they may partake of it also.

The fact is, these events involve matches between persons who are not tribal

fighters. The tribe is not the primary audience. It is simply an evasion of state jurisdiction

in a most cynical manner. And it is hardly an affront to any tribe to not allow it to be the

situs for health and safety evasion – particularly applicable to nobody in their tribal domain.

Appendix B in the attached testimony from the 2004 sunset review of the Commission

outlines the precedents and legal case making clear that the tribes are legally entitled to

none of the regulatory and contributory exemptions that they now receive. Even the sale

of tobacco on tribal lands without payment of taxes is prohibited, and it is difficult to

imagine any product or function more legitimately associated with Native Americans than

tobacco. But the sales were not to Native Americans and it was not permitted to create an

oasis of tax exemption. And the payors in their boxing matches are similarly not dominated

by Native American fans or gamblers.

This Legislature should make clear that the jurisdiction and obligation of the

Commission’s regulatory structure and finances include, without unwarranted favoritism,

the events on tribal lands. And the Commission should be counting any rounds so fought

as qualifying for pension vesting, and concomitantly, for equivalent contribution applicable

to other events. It should also be examining that assessment rate for appropriate increase.

The goal should be no less than a doubling of the current pension fund to assure meaningful

payments for those who often have no other source of disability or retirement benefits.

Robert C. Fellmeth, Price Professor of Public Interest Law, University of San Diego School of

Law

Center for Public Interest Law Children’s Advocacy Institute

5998 Alcalá Park, San Diego, California 92110-2492 • 619/260-4806 • Fax 619/260-4753926 J Street, Suite 709, Sacramento, California 95814 • 916/444-3875 • Fax 916/444-6611

CPIL website: www.cpil.org • CAI website: www.caichildlaw.org

Reply to: : San Diego Office 9 Sacramento Office

JOINT LEGISLATIVE SUNSET REVIEW COMMITTEEJanuary 6, 2004

Outline of Testimony ofPROFESSOR ROBERT C. FELLMETH,

Executive Director, Center for Public Interest Law (CPIL)

on theCALIFORNIA STATE ATHLETIC COMMISSION

BOXER PENSION PLAN PERFORMANCE

I. Interest in Athletic Commission and Boxer Pension Plan

A. Commission monitored by Center for Public Interest Law; reported in CPIL’sCALIFORNIA REGULATORY LAW REPORTER since 1980

B. Chair/member of the Athletic Commission 1976-81

C. Sponsor/drafter of the bill creating the Boxers’ Pension Plan / involved inamendments to the plan from 1986 to the present

II. California Boxers’ Pension Plan Legislative Requirements

A. Bus. & Prof. Code § 18880 — Purpose: “The Legislature finds and declares thatprofessional boxers...do not retain their earnings, and are often injured ordestitute...[T]his article is to serve a public purpose...for such a needy group to insurea modicum of financial security....”

Note: The commission’s regulations implementing the Pension Plan require boxersto participate in a substantial number of scheduled rounds to “vest” for later benefits.4 CCR § 405. The Plan does not cover those who box briefly or for several years,but the 10–20% of boxers who spend substantial time training and boxingprofessionally in California and who often do not have alternative pension plans(many do not even have substantial Social Security contributions). For everychampion enjoying a large purse, ten or more contenders — after investing from fiveto twenty years in the sport — fail to achieve substantial purse revenue. This is thelimited group of boxers intended for coverage.

Note that West’s Codes includes a typographical error, stating that the period is from July1

1, 1981. The agreement upon enactment of AB 2560 (1996) was to take the three fiscal year periodprior to 1994 as the benchmark (July 1, 1991 to June 30 1992), and the next two such fiscal years,with the total for fiscal year 1993-94 as calculated by December of 1994. The amounts may notdiffer significantly, but the error should be corrected.

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B. Bus. & Prof. Code § 18881(b) — Minimum Revenue Requirement: “TheCommission shall...establish the method [for financing]...sufficient to finance thepension plan. For purposes of this section, the term ‘sufficient’ means that the annualcontributions shall be calculated to achieve no less than the average level of annualaggregate pension plan contributions from all sources from July 1, 1991 through1

December 31, 1994, and adjusted thereafter to reflect changes in the Consumer PriceIndex for California....”

Note: The pension plan was originally financed from a percentage of the pursecontribution from promoter, manager, and boxer, and was a “defined benefit” plan,promising a stated minimum monthly sum to retirees. In 1996, the plan was changedto a “defined contribution” plan — with financing shifted to a gate tax add-on,currently at 88 cents per ticket. 4 CCR § 403(a). However, it is not a pure “definedcontribution” plan, because to prevent the slashing of meaningful benefits, theLegislature required that gross revenue per annum not decline vis-a-vis the averageof the preceding three years, which were in excess of $100,000 per annum, adjustedfrom 1996 by the CPI. Hence, the plan has a legislatively mandated floor ofcontributions.

C. Bus. & Prof. Code § 18881(c) — Plan Must Be Actuarially Sound: “Any pensionplan established by the commission shall be actuarially sound.”

Note: Because boxers commonly stop boxing prior to age 45 and may accrueretirement benefits after that cessation if gainfully employed, the commission allowsspecial early withdrawal if paid to and for vocational training or for similarextraordinary circumstances. 4 CCR § 406(f). Such withdrawals will reduce sucha boxer’s retirement benefit substantially.

D. Bus. & Prof. Code § 18882(b) — Contributions in Separate Fund: “Allcontributions to finance the pension plan shall be deposited in the State Treasury andcredited to the Boxers’ Pension Fund, which is hereby created....[A]ll moneys in the[Fund] are...to be used exclusively for the purposes and administration of the pensionplan.”

E. Bus & Prof. Code § 18882(d) — Commission Control: “The commission hasexclusive control of all funds in the Boxers’ Pension Fund.”

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III. Status/Problems/Commission Failures

A. Failure to Comply with Minimum Revenue Required

Exhibit A includes the revenue data revealed by the commission in its Sunset Reportprepared for this proceeding. The data are alarming. The total revenue to the Fund from events isindicated at: $101,263 for fiscal 1996, with the next three fiscal years at $31,288, $63,260, and$80,671, respectively. The projections for 2002–03 and 2003–04 are for $89,353 each year. Noneof these numbers complies with the minimum required by law as noted above — which requires inexcess of $100,000 per annum, and increasing by the CPI. The commission is at least $200,000, andperhaps $300,000, short of the minimum required since fiscal 1996, and is obligated to make up theshortfall as soon as possible. There is no sign that any attempt to do so has occurred or is inprospect. The statute delegates to the commission the means to raise required funds, giving it broadlatitude. But it requires that the minimum sum be raised. That is not happening.

Exacerbating this problem are two related dynamics noted below: (1) the loss of almost one-third of the corpus of the Fund in the investment instrument selected by the commission, and (2) theabsorption of virtually all of the deficient revenues listed above into the commission’s own operatingbudget as dubious “administrative expenses.”

The commission’s failure to collect revenue for the Pension Plan, and well as for its ownoperations, is exacerbated by two collection failures: (1) revenue from closed circuit or pay-per-viewboxing events to the extent they are California-implicated, and (2) promoter evasion of pensioncontribution where choosing a situs on an Indian reservation within California.

B. Promoter Evasion Via Tribal Reservation Situs

An increasing number of boxing events have been located on Indian reservations, where thegambling milieu can enhance boxing attendance and interest. During the last five years, 20–40%of all events have been so located. The commission has participated in these events, providing areferee, judges, and related officials, essentially sanctioning the matches, and taking a $1,500 lumpsum fee. The commission does not collect the required 88 cents-per-ticket gate fee in these events.

These are not Native American events. Native Americans are not participants — most oftenthey are California-licensed boxers. The audience is not predominantly Native American. And non-Native American promoters, managers, and matchmakers predominate as well. The law is wellsettled that reservations cannot be used as “safe havens” from taxes, and more assuredly not fromfees that are normally charged to provide for the health and safety of non-Native Americanparticipants. The courts have now clearly held that even taxes properly due may not be evadedbecause of the placement of a product or service within reservation territory. The case for fees isstronger. Exhibit B includes brief points and authorities citing extant law on the subject. However,the commission has failed to assess pension fees for reservation-located fights, and has not allocatedany of the $1,500 flat fee it collects for its operational expenses for the Pension Fund.

Pension Fund monies are properly invested only in safe instruments that properly lack high2

volatility. The commission has the authority under current law to select the investment vehicle.

JLSRC Background Paper on Athletic Commission for Jan. 6, 2004 Hearing, Question #23

at 3.

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C. Alarming Totals: Down to $2.8 Million Corpus

According to JLSRC staff, the value of the Boxers’ Pension Fund was (a likely inadequate)$3.39 million in January 2000. It declined to $2.6 million by January 2003, while invested bycommission decision in what may have been overly volatile Investment Fund selections. Data2

supplied by the Commission to CPIL on January 5, 2004 indicates that JLSRC staff’s informationis understated. The value of the Fund in January 2000 was not $3.39 million, but $3.82 million. Themost recent reported total for January 2003 was $2.8 million; see Exhibit D. Importantly, the almost30% decline is not offset with new revenue due to administrative takings discussed below. Nor isit offset by the deficiency in revenue below the required amount under applicable law – a deficiencyof more than $300,000 in just the last five years.

D. Commission “Expense” Takings From Fund

Your staff’s Sunset Report on the Athletic Commission cites a recent audit and writes thatthe “[audit] Office noted the commission expends a relatively large amount of the Pension Fund onstaff time and administration costs. The Pension Fund supports a half-time staff services analystposition and during the past five fiscal years, 74% to 92% of the Pension Fund’s operating expenseswere related to consultant or attorney fees.”3

It is unclear why the small number of retired boxers, the tendering of the Fund to Wachoviaor elsewhere, or the collection of 88 cents per ticket would occupy a half-time position. It is alsounclear why the consistent attorney or consultant fees are required, especially when such expensesdo not seem to allow the commission to promptly produce basic actuarial data requested by CPILconcerning the Plan, as discussed below.

Most alarmingly, “administrative expenses” progressed from fiscal 1999 to fiscal 2002 asfollows: $64,000, $62,000, $68,000, and $79,000; and the commission projects them at $89,000 inthe current year and $91,000 for fiscal 2004-05. Meanwhile, total revenue into the Fundapproximates these amounts, some years exceeding that amount and with revenues exceedingoperating expenses by but $7,000 (as projected for the current fiscal year). In other words, thecommission appears to be taking all contributions and even interest from the Fund for its“administrative expenses.” The documents recently delivered to CPIL by the Athletic Commission(discussed below) reveal total expenses charged against the Fund at $15,212 in 1996 — a reasonablesum. On what basis is it increased fivefold from that level? Note that the major change in thesystem post-1996 is the change from contributions from promoters, managers and boxers to a simplegate fee. That change removes from the system any requirement to refund to boxers their

See Exhibit A. Note that such low interest normally corresponds to extremely low beta4

value (secure, less volatile) investments. How can the commission combine both interest below 3%and a capital loss of 30% over three years? Is this prudent Fund management?

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contributions when they do not vest. CPIL supported that change as adding more money to theboxers who most need it — those who do vest. But the point is that this change means theCommission need no longer track such contributions, making its administrative task much easier.It simply collects the gate tax, invests it, monitors it, and handles those who retire or seek earlywithdrawal — which to date includes very few persons. Accordingly, administrative expensesshould be declining, not increasing.

The commission is under pressure not to take from the general fund for its operatingexpenses. But it has alternatives to taking virtually all Pension Fund revenue as “administrativeexpenses” (see Exhibit A, and discussion above).

E. Lack of Fund Corpus or Actuarial Data

The commission’s Sunset Report concerning the Pension Plan ominously includes virtuallyno data aside from the administrative expense numbers of Exhibit A. In fact, the summaryinformation therein is virtually all of the data reported to this Legislature about the Pension Plan.

How many boxers have vested or are vesting? What are their ages? What is the projectedbenefit they will receive upon final retirement at age 50, 55, 60, 65? How many have applied for theearly (vocational, medical, etc.) benefits? How many have been approved/disapproved? What valueis available to such an applicant at various vested levels? Are rounds in reservation sites beingcounted for vesting purposes?

Other questions shout from the figures in Exhibit A: Why is only $3,267 projected as“income” from the Fund’s investments in 2002–03? If interest has never been above 4% of thecorpus, and appears to be below 2%, why has such low interest combined with such a harsh capitalloss in Fund value?4

The commission’s report does not provide the Fund’s corpus value and trend, especially inrelation to actuarial demands and projections. Exhibit C includes the last of three letters from CPILseeking the answers to some of these questions over the last several months, and citing the relevantprovisions of law. After months of waiting, the information was recently promised to us on the eveof these hearings, but it is required to be compiled as a matter of course and should be immediatelyavailable, particularly given recordkeeping requirements and the “consultant” pension expenses paidannually by the commission (as discussed above).

On January 5, 2004, the commission finally responded to CPIL’s third (and final pre-litigation) letter seeking the relevant data. The California Public Records Act provides for disclosurewithin ten days; these documents were not received until almost three months from their original

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request in October. They do not provide all of the information requested, which raises additionalquestions about what the commission does and does not know about the Fund. Exhibit D includesthe important balance sheet pages produced. The new documents confirm the legitimacy of theconcerns discussed above, and raise the following additional questions:

1. Why does a count of pension money contributed event by event consistently totalsubstantially less than the monies reported by the commission as revenue received from events forthe Plan?

2. This Fund — which has declined to $2.8 million — must cover 49 boxers who havealready fully vested, and another 844 who may vest. How many of them are likely to vest? Why hasthis number changed so much from 2000? What are the ages of those who have fully vested? Ofthose who may vest? When will how many reach retirement age for pension benefits? How muchwill that benefit be under current Fund levels?

The second question above is critical. The reason this Legislature insisted on the contributionfloor from events (no decline in contribution amount per annum, but an increase with the CPI) wasto make certain that promised benefits are not reneged upon in shifting to a defined contributionplan. The benefits promised in the initial plan would serve as a floor. The facts infer that thispromise has been broken. The Fund has not grown nearly as much as the number of boxers whohave vested or will vest since the 1996 shift. So the amount reserved for each is necessarily smaller.It is to be as large or larger, not smaller.

Of all of the promises made by California — or by any regulator or employer, none is sosteeped in fiduciary duty as a pension promise. It is so sacrosanct — even within the universe offiduciary duties — that the pension promise performance made to state employees is included in thestate Constitution. And it is a kind of fiduciary duty that may even reach the individual membersof the commission — although normally and otherwise entitled to full immunity.

IV. Legislative Remedies

The Legislature should in 2004, by statute or otherwise:

A. Require the Bureau of State Audits to audit the commission’s administration ofthe Boxers’ Pension Plan. The cost of the audit should not be borne by the Plan.The audit must be conducted independently, outside the Department of ConsumerAffairs, and should address those issues raised above, including an actuarial estimateof benefits received at varying Fund levels.

B. Impose immediate special fees to begin the process of meeting the promisedminimum contribution level, including imposition of an immediate $1 per ticketpension fee.

Recent litigation has undermined the commission’s ability to collect such fees. In U.S.5

Satellite Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Lynch, 41 F.Supp.2d 1113 (E.D. Cal., March 12, 1999), a federaldistrict court held that the “first amendment rights” of promoters to show a boxing contest (pay perview) preclude such state assessment of fees. This flawed decision is based on the Legislature’salleged failure to draw any connection between the fee and any state interest, a deficiency theLegislature can correct by “narrowly tailoring” the fee to legitimate state purposes as that courtwould require. Note that appellate review was not sought by the Attorney General. If review of thisquestion does occur, a state interest that is articulated is unlikely to be voided at the appellate level,particularly based on the “first amendment” right to display persons engaged in a boxing match. Norwould a consumer begrudge a fee for the pension benefits of boxers, including those licensed in thestate of residency of the consumer.

If the pension plan is in jeopardy, the commission has failed in an important obligation.6

Part of its problem allegedly derives from its own costs. Accordingly, the sunset process mayterminate the current more expensive seven-member commission and executive officer en toto. Thecommission as an entity is constitutionally specified, but its composition, number, qualifications, andall other details are within the province of the Legislature.

One member would be appointed by the Governor, and two by the Legislature.7

All three would be “public” members — without economic connection to boxing revenue.8

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C. Clearly authorize assessment of fees for boxing regulation and for the pensionplan on pay-per-view and closed circuit events, with legislative findings that willestablish the connection between those assessments and important legislativepurposes.5

D. Require commission collection of pension contributions from promoters usingCalifornia-located reservations as contest sites; require back assessment ofpromoters holding such events; and require the Attorney General to litigate for suchcollection if necessary.

E. Limit commission expenses/takings from the Pension Fund to 10% of PensionRevenue from the previous year.

F. Reconstitute the commission to a less expensive body of three persons, including6 7

one member with expertise in head trauma and one member with expertise in pensionsystems/management.8

G. Correct the technical error in Bus. & Prof. Code § 18881(b) (should read July 1,1991, not 1981).

Exhibits to Testimony of Professor Robert C. Fellmeth

Exhibit A: Financial Documents Pertaining to the Boxer Pension System Produced by the Athletic Commission in its Sunset Report.

Exhibit B: Legal Memorandum Concerning the Assessment of Pension FeesFor Boxing Contests Held on Tribal Lands

Exhibit C: Third Letter to the Commission Requesting Pension Fund Documentsand Data

Exhibit D: Boxers’ Pension Fund Balance Sheets Produced by CommissionOn January 5, 2004.