CENTRAL EUROPEAN FUTURES - Visegrad Insight · Central Europe Spring 2.0 Younger Central Europeans launch a movement creating a new political class and new politics. page 12 Security

FOLLOW US @V ISEGRADINS IGHT

www.visegradinsight.eu

special edition 1 (12) | 2018

ISSN 2084-8250 | GBP€4.99 | EURO€6.00 | PLN 16.00

Five Scenarios for 2025in cooperation with

CENTRAL EUROPEAN FUTURES

Visegrad Insight is published by the

Res Publica Foundation.

This special edition has been prepared

in cooperation with the German Marshall Fund

of the United States.

READ MORE AT cefutures.visegradinsight.eu

Over the past several years, it has become ever more apparent that the post-Cold War era of democratic reform, socio-economic development and Western integration in Central Europe is coming to an end.

Instead, illiberal politics is hollowing out both the bedrock of these democracies and their rule of law. Resurgent nationalism is putting the region at odds with its neighbours in Europe. The economic model that has long driven regional development now finds itself challenged by developing technologies and changing demographics.

The European Union and NATO - the two key international anchors of Central Europe - are facing uncertain futures. Geopolitics is returning to the region with Russian aggres-siveness, Western reluctance and Chinese advances posing serious security risks. In short, the historical path that the region has taken for the last quarter of a century is being called into question, risking the unprecedented levels of democracy, prosperity, stability and security that Central Europe has achieved.

DR. JOERG FORBRIG Senior Transatlantic Fellow, Central and Eastern Europe The German Marshall Fund

of the United States

WOJCIECH PRZYBYLSKI Editor-in-chief, Visegrad Insight

Central Europe at a historic juncture

IN

YEARS

2 VISEGRAD INSIGHT SPECIAL EDITION 1 (12) | 2018

It is against this background of rising uncertainty that Visegrad/Insight and the German Marshall Fund of the United States launched an initiative to chart possible trajectories for the region. Titled “Central Europe 2025”, this scenario-building exercise aimed at mapping out key political, socio-economic and international trends in order to identify potential triggers, isolate concrete risks and offer policy recommendations to key stakeholders in the region and abroad.

For this purpose, a diverse group of Central European experts from academia, think tanks, business, the media and politics combined their knowledge and experience to examine the circumstances and challenges likely confronting Central Europe in the coming years.

In order to manage the complexity of the task and to arrive at practical recommendations, several general parameters guided this intellectual exercise. Firstly, the timeframe was limited to seven years. Though comparably short, this horizon will see several key regional and global trends unfold their full impact – in such areas as politics, the economy, tech-nology, society and security. Of equal importance, the coming years will be dotted with many notable events – from the selection of new EU leadership and budget negotiations to regional and EU elections, including determinations on American and Russian presi-dencies – all of which can potentially represent major turning points for the area.

Secondly, the geographical scope of this exercise was limited to Czechia, Hungary, Po-land and Slovakia. Though historically, culturally and politically, Central Europe covers a much larger region, the Visegrad quartet has clearly become its main political exponent and voice.

Thirdly, the ambition of this exercise was not to forecast specific events and their se-quence. Instead, it worked to identify and detail central dynamics that can remake Central Europe. The key criteria applied to these dynamics and the resulting scenarios were nei-ther their general desirability nor consensus among the participants; what mattered was exclusively their analytical soundness, plausibility and distinctiveness.

The notion of an ideal Central Europe did hover over this exercise: a region that is demo-cratic and respectful of citizen rights, that is economically thriving and provides its people with growing prosperity, that is fully integrated with the broader community of European nations and that is at peace with itself and its neighbours. It is this ideal that all scenarios from this exercise compare to, whether as lasting departures from or possible returns to.

This report initially lays out five major scenarios that could conceivably unfold in Central Europe over the coming years, which can potentially lead to the spreading of Central European political trends to the rest of the EU, the fragmentation of the region into EU exiteers and remainers, a returning to the European project as dictated by external threats or demanded by the next generation of Central Europeans, or the emergence of a new security vacuum in this part of Europe.

Following these possible trajectories, an overview of key trends and triggers is provided that not only shaped the individual scenarios but also offer important points of inter-vention from within Central European politics and societies as well as outside. These tendencies then lead to a number of concrete policy recommendations that are provided in the final part of this report.

This publication is for all those whose work requires a better understanding of the re-gion. In these uncertain times, we all depend more and more on strategic decisions and trajectories; therefore, we hope to engage readers in public discussions and feedback dur-ing a series of debates launched alongside this report as well as in an online forum at cefutures.visegradinsight.eu.

3


Triumph of Illiberalism

The sovereigntist and illiberal trend that is par-ticularly pronounced in Central European politics

becomes mainstream across the EU.

page 6

Five Scenarios for 2025

Central Europe Fractured

Europe regains momentum but the four Central European countries choose different paths

and split the region.

page 8Shotgun Wedding

Under external pressures, the EU – including Central Europe – becomes more integrated than ever.

page 10

12 3


Central Europe Spring 2.0Younger Central Europeans launch a movement creating a new political class and new politics.

page 12

Security VacuumThe transatlantic security system that has provided Central Europe’s stability collapses followed by divergent national strategies of survival.

page 14

Global Trends, Amplified in Central Europe page 16

Tipping Points in Central Europe’s Future page 18

Policy Recommendations Which (Central) Europe in 2025? page 20

1 4

5 5


The sovereigntist and illiberal trend that is particularly pronounced in Central European politics becomes mainstream across the EU. European norms of democracy and rule of law are hollowed out in more and more EU member states, while their further political integration as a bloc is first halted and then gradually reversed. As a result, the European project degrades until it constitutes little more than a free trade zone among what are, essentially, only nominal democracies.

S C E N A R I O

1

Triumph of Illiberalism


Central Europe successfully spear-heads a form of politics that is sovereigntist and nationalist on the outside while being pater-

nalistic, majoritarian and anti-democratic from within. It manifests itself in an ag-gressive questioning of EU institutions, an open rejection of the EU’s policies from the eurozone to migration, and in flagrant violations of European standards of democracy and the rule of law. With Hungary and Poland as the forerunners, this form of power-politics systematical-ly expands its reach over ever more are-as of political, economic and social life, whether by curbing the space for civic organisations, subordinating courts and sub-national authorities, or expanding governmental control over key media and businesses.

Neither the democratic, pro-Euro-pean (including national and continen-tal) forces nor the EU itself are able to stem this degradation of democracy in Central Europe. The former, while resting on the pro-European sentiments among many citizens, fails to unite, mobilise and challenge the illiberal powers-that-be. Likewise, the Union is unable to provide any real correctives. Its infringement procedures against member states that depart from democratic and rule of law standards are blunted by the EU’s own political complacency and opportunism, by the increased sophistication of Central European governments to bypass existing norms and by their mutual support – such as vetoes – against punitive measures at the EU level.

On the economic front, Central European growth rates continue to out-perform those of the rest of Europe (illib-eral governments notwithstanding), and the region remains a darling for investors, benefits from its comparably lower labour costs and avails itself – not least after years of EU co-funding – of an ever improving infrastructure. What is more, it opens up more readily to investment partnerships with non-EU and less-than-democratic states, from China to Turkey and from Russia to the Gulf. In so doing, the Central European countries compensate for the decrease in EU subsidies and cement the illiberal political status quo through au-thoritarian alliances beyond Europe.

Seemingly successful in both poli-tics and the economy, this illiberal model changes European politics at large. One effect is that the style of politics first im-plemented in Budapest and Warsaw will find willing followers in other EU capi-tals. In Central Europe especially but in-creasingly also in the West, the appeal of a strong state that asserts itself against in-terference brings to power governments that are ready to compromise their coun-tries’ earlier commitments to democracy and European integration. This will, by 2020, provide them with a critical mass and veto power in the European Council.

Another effect is the improved sys-tematic cooperation of EU-sceptic and illiberal strands across Europe. Given their success at home, Hungary’s Fidesz and Poland’s PiS (Law and Justice) parties become the ideological nucleus of a new Europe-wide party that gathers togeth-er the hitherto scattered sovereigntists and nationalists. With a strong showing in the 2019 elections to the European Parliament, and through realignments in the following years, this new bloc becomes the largest parliamentary group, dominat-ing and effectively neutering what should be the heart and defender of European democracy.

On the institutional side, this sei-zure of the Council and Parliament allows Europe’s illiberals to paralyse these two central EU institutions and places pressure on a third, the European Commission. This reduces the ability of the EU overall to safeguard democracy within EU member states and to create integration and unity among them.

This is accompanied, on the pol-icy side, by an increasing ability of sov-ereigntists and illiberals to shape the European political agenda and discourse. They pressure the European political establishment, whether centre-left or centre-right, to adopt harder-line posi-tions as is already happening in Europe regarding refugee, migration and border policies. Given, among other factors, the unresolved and deepening refugee, eurozone and security crises in the EU, these illiberal leaders are successful in promoting their radically alternative projects among growing segments of the European populace.

This puts the entire European pro-ject, and the moderate political forces underwriting it, on the defensive. The first response will be to switch to a pres-ervationist mode. Bold designs to further European integration will be dropped, fix-es to the manifest political deficits of the EU will remain piecemeal and the bloc will continue to muddle through its multiple crises. However, this will neither appease sovereigntist and illiberal appetites nor reduce the public appeal of nationalist al-ternatives to a seemingly failing European project.

Instead, an ever greater array of EU policies face sovereigntist claims for repa-triation of competencies to the member states. Migration controls are established nationally as are energy strategies; non-eu-rozone countries make their opt-outs per-manent; the modest common foreign and security policy gives way to exclusively bilateral external relations.

In the same vein, illiberals permit less EU criticism, let alone any interference, as they recast their national, political, eco-nomic and public lives. This downward spiral is basically unstoppable as, whenev-er there is controversy, sovereigntists and illiberals threaten to leave the EU altogeth-er. That threat will be particularly power-ful if a soft landing of the United Kingdom shows Brexit to be a feasible and favoura-ble example to follow.

This dynamic steadily hollows out European integration and strips it of most of its attributes. The end result is an EU that is little more than an elaborate free trade zone, with a subset of members that retain a common currency. Democracy and the rule of law may survive in the bloc’s north and west, while Central Europe slides into neo-authoritarianism that is only thinly veiled by democratic procedures. Ironically, this new format of a Europe of sovereign and not necessari-ly democratic nations swiftly expands to include the Western Balkans, it sees po-litical relations improve with both Russia and Turkey, and it becomes ever more dependent on China for both trade and investment. Yet, the erstwhile European project of deep integration among demo-cratic nations is over.

7


The sovereigntist and illiberal trend that is so strong in Central Europe fails to gain traction across the continent. While this trend remains confined to the region, it produces an array of po-litical regimes from an effectively authoritarian and nationalist variety in Hungary to a mixture of democratic paternalism and patriotism elsewhere. Meanwhile the EU, led by a core of older members, overcomes the bloc’s protracted malaise and enforces democratic and rule of law standards. Central European states must choose their place within, or outside, the European project. The four states opt for four very different futures, spelling the end of Central Europe as a coherent political region.

S C E N A R I O

2

Central Europe Fractured


Led by a reinvigorated Franco-Ger-man tandem, the EU gradually finds a way out of the crises that have nearly wrecked the bloc over

refugees and migration, the eurozone, and domestic and regional security. With EU stabilisation and even progress be-coming increasingly obvious from 2020 onwards, the Europe-wide political pen-dulum starts to swing again.

However, nationalist impulses re-main comparably stronger in Central Europe given a confluence of two fac-tors. Many citizens remain regretful of the sweeping transformation they had to endure after 1989, and they harbour grievances over having been colonised by Western capital, culture and politics. An imbalanced political landscape pro-vides nationalist and populist forces with a competitive advantage, not least after having been in government and cement-ed their political, business and media control over many years.

This specific political culture con-tinues to set apart Central Europe from the remainder of the EU. This contrast will become more frequent and harsh, whether in the forms of a multi-speed integration or EU sanctions over illiberal regresses. Rather than finding a regional answer, each country of Central Europe is likely to produce its own solution.

Poland is the earliest to seek such an answer. Its parliamentary and presiden-tial elections in 2019-20 centres around the EU vs. Poland dichotomy, through which the nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) government tries to defend its pow-er amid a strongly pro-European society. PiS wins the election but fails to defend its absolute majority, forcing it to govern in coalition with a moderate and pro-EU ally. The subsequent presidential election propels into office a clearly pro-European and politically independent head of state, who further limits PiS’ leeway.

This domestic opening meets with a new EU approach that leaves behind past disputes and appreciates the critical position that Poland holds for the cohe-sion, economy and security of Europe. In an effort to bolster the more moderate political leadership in Warsaw, Brussels agrees to a substantial package of ben-efits. Poland is guaranteed to remain a large net recipient of EU funds under the

bloc’s next multiannual budget as well as a new European Security Initiative, which includes major investments in Poland as the key state on the EU’s Eastern flank. Poland’s political role will be upgraded, portraying and treating the country as a crucial member of core Europe despite its non-adoption of the euro.

In contrast, Hungary – Poland’s erstwhile illiberal peer – finds itself in increasing political isolation. Abroad, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has to bury his ambitions to become the Europe-wide leader of a sovereigntist and illiber-al revolution. His Fidesz is finally ejected from the European Peoples’ Party, and his once-thriving relations with national conservatives across Europe wither. At home, his political grip over the country is becoming tenuous. Economic stagna-tion sets in, resulting in part from the drastically reduced EU transfers which were a response to Orbán’s neo-author-itarian rule. The far right, which Orbán set out to contain, raises its head ever more aggressively. The regime’s only life-line both politically and economically are alliances with China and Russia that are growing closer by the day.

In this situation, Orbán decides to tie his survival to a referendum on Hungary’s EU membership, which is held to coincide with the 2022 parliamentary elections. A massive government-funded anti-EU campaign precedes the referen-dum, pro-European voices are greatly disadvantaged in the run-up to the poll and Hungarian voters abroad are system-atically excluded from the ballot. As a re-sult, a slight majority supports Hungary’s exit from the bloc. As a lesson from the United Kingdom’s no-deal disaster a few years earlier, Budapest determines that its best option is a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement along the lines of those concluded with Eastern Partnership countries. By 2025, Hungary leaves the EU after being a member for a little less than a quarter century.

The other Central European state where a referendum on EU membership is a real possibility is Czechia. The coun-try’s populace has long been lukewarm about EU membership, with support levels far below those of its neighbours. Euroscepticism gains stronger political representation than ever before, with

the country’s leadership and two fringe parliamentary groups openly question-ing Czech membership in the EU. Public sentiment and political pressures lead, after a period of protracted government instability, to a referendum being called and taking place in 2020.

A heated campaign effectively pits aggressive identity politics against the strong economic benefits that Czechia enjoys from EU membership. When the final tally shows a narrow victory for the Czexit camp, the country’s famed prag-matism gains the upper hand. A compro-mise is agreed that has Czechia leaving the EU but staying in the single market. Modelled on Switzerland, this arrange-ment satisfies both nationalist Czexiteers and market-oriented Czemainers, and is least disruptive toward the remainder of the EU that fully surrounds Czechia.

Slovakia, finally, remains at the core of European integration. Although it continues to see political assaults on lib-eral democracy, the rule of law and EU membership, Slovak resilience to these temptations exceeds that of its Central European neighbours. Slovakia also benefits from the political uncertainty over the EU membership of Czechia and Hungary, providing for a more stable, and thus more favourable, location for private investment and EU funds. Politically and economically, the smallest among the Central European states has the clearest perspective.

These divergent paths, by 2025, tear Central Europe apart. Alliances diverge again between European and non-Eu-ropean powers, and bilateral disputes are bound to return. Economic growth is contrasted with stagnation, occurring just across the border. In short, the region sinks back into some of its old ills, though hopefully not the worst.

9


Increasingly dangerous external threats force a substantial deepening of EU integration. A series of crises creates an EU-wide consensus that the multiple challenges of globalised finance and technology, swelling migration flows, accelerating climate change and an increasingly insecure neighborhood can only be weathered through European unity and protectionism. The resulting integration is driven mostly by the eurozone and initially re-sisted by Central Europe, given the EU scepticism of its illiberal governments. But when a fresh round of economic and security troubles around 2020 affect the region, Western bailouts help it to recover. Popular sentiment swings in favour of full EU integration, and the politics of the day – if somewhat grudgingly – discard its nationalist course. By 2025, the entire EU is more integrated than ever.

S C E N A R I O

3

Shotgun Wedding


The European project, from its very origins through successive rounds of broadening and deepening rela-tions, was born out of crises. Their

latest iteration, between 2008 and 2018, was the triple challenge that nearly bank-rupted the eurozone, severely strained social and political cohesion with the influx of millions of refugees and almost surrendered European security to Rus-sian aggression. When under President Trump’s tenure, Europe’s key ally ceases to be a reliable trade partner and security provider, it finally dawns on EU leaders that they are in the greatest peril since 1945. And remarkably, they once again muster the political will to respond to an existential challenge with deeper integration.

In close succession in 2018-2020, the EU launches a number of key initia-tives to address its worst vulnerabilities. Eurozone governance is finally over-hauled and both fiscal restraint national-ly and EU-wide solidarity are instituted. Refugee pressures from the South are reigned in through massive reinforce-ments of EU external borders, joint man-agement of refugee entry and distribution across the EU, and more effective conflict management and development aid to countries of origin. European security is strengthened through an EU defence initiative that bolsters the necessary ca-pabilities, logistics and intelligence, sig-nificantly adding to NATO’s capacities in the region.

In related efforts, a fully-fledged EU energy union diversifies sources and types of energy supplies and invests in a close-knit energy infrastructure, while a cyber security pact safeguards European vulnerabilities to digital attacks. Finally, the EU completes its single digital mar-ket, launches sizable systematic invest-ment programmes into new technologies across the continent and adopts legisla-tion to protect its strategic industries from non-EU capital, takeovers and espi-onage. As a result, the European project, seemingly in unstoppable decline just a few years earlier, surges back to life.

This initial revival has mixed effects for Central Europe. The EU has priori-tised political unity to achieve this pro-gress and refrained from political, legal

and financial punishments in response to the digressions on democracy and the rule of law, though it continues to voice criticism. In this agree-to-disagree deal, whereby Central Europe agrees to not block reforms and integration steps that it is not forced to be party to (including not having to share asylum contingents), Central Europe becomes the new periph-ery of the EU, and its political weight in the Union is greatly reduced.

Such is the situation of Central Europe when a series of new crises hits the region and the EU overall. The first of these is the next aggressive push by Russia against its neighbours Belarus and Ukraine in early 2019. Unhappy with the political middle ground that Alexander Lukashenko, the Belarusian autocrat, has steered between Russia and the West, the Kremlin stages a coup d’etat, installs a pro-Moscow government and establishes a strong military presence in Belarus. In Ukraine, presidential and parliamentary elections broadly confirm the reform process and European orien-tation of the country, prodding Russia to launch a military offensive from the North, East, and South in the winter of 2019. Ukrainian gas transits to the EU are interrupted and a million refugees set off from war-torn regions to seek safety in Central Europe. Moscow then unleashes a massive disinformation campaign that blames the West for the regional turmoil and conducts cyber attacks against Polish government servers.

Past and present political disagree-ments notwithstanding, the EU swiftly comes to the aid of its Central European members in this grave situation. In co-ordination with NATO, it retaliates with cyber strikes against Russian targets and provides technological support to restore functionality to the damaged Polish sys-tems. It also furnishes emergency gas sup-plies from Western European reserves and lends resources, equipment and personnel to Central European states to manage the Ukrainian refugees, many of whom are eventually redistributed to other EU coun-tries. This major act of EU solidarity helps Central Europe, by the summer of 2020, to regain control and stability.

Yet the region has barely recovered from this shock when trouble emerges on

the economic front. Triggered by fresh trade disputes between the U.S., China and the EU, a global recession sets in. While its effects are moderate in much of the eurozone, Central Europe with its reliance on manufacturing sees a strong downturn. Unemployment shoots up as does the demand for social welfare. A sizeable portion of the labour force, es-pecially younger and the more-skilled, moves elsewhere in the EU, further re-ducing tax revenues. Real estate markets break down, mortgage payments fail in large numbers and domestic banks come under pressure.

The EU decides to step in with a large bailout package; in return, the EU expects Budapest, Warsaw and Prague to make good on their original – but long postponed – commitment and to intro-duce the euro by 2025.

Having come close to the brink sev-eral times in 2020-2021, and having felt strong EU solidarity in each case, Central European populations undergo a strong pro-European shift. Past misgivings over distant Brussels-based institutions, Western capital or migration notwith-standing, Central Europeans rational-ly conclude that the EU provides them with the best-possible shield from the ever-greater turbulence shaking up glob-al politics, markets and security. Their regional politicians quickly sense this mood change and decide the adoption of an EU-friendly course to be politically ex-pedient. Within years of Central Europe’s gravest crisis in decades, the region fully returns to the European project.

11


S C E N A R I O

4

Central Europe Spring 2.0

Central Europe sees the emergence of a generational dynamic, in which post-1989 cohorts increasingly challenge the paradigms of the incumbent political class of 1989. More than previous generations, younger Central Europeans acknowledge that the current politics and policies are inadequate in the face of accelerating digitalisation, changing economies, rising political extremism, persistent social injustice and global threats to peace and prosperi-ty. Originating in Poland, a broader political movement emerges from hitherto disparate protests against government-level corruption, state infringement of individual rights, failed social and education policies and official Euroscepticism, eventually sweeping a new set of political actors into power. The result is a self-confident, forward-looking and pro-integration-ist Central Europe.


Nearly three decades since it be-gan, the post-1989 transforma-tion of the politics, economies and societies of Central Europe

has become surprisingly controversial. Despite enormous progress towards con-vergence with Western Europe and full in-tegration with the EU and NATO, Central Europeans have a growing doubt in the path taken. This backward-looking debate and the sentiments it transports resonates with many - especially older - Central Eu-ropeans, and they are skilfully utilised by the, equally older, regional political class.

Younger Central Europeans, how-ever, are already the products and ben-eficiaries of an integrated Europe, with their personal experiences, education, work and personal contacts criss-cross-ing the continent. They are far from idealising or condemning Western European ways but are realistic in ac-knowledging the strengths and failures of others as well as themselves.

They are witness to the ground-breaking changes that digital technologies will bring to their pro-fessional and personal lives, and they are sensitive to both opportunities and threats of digitalisation. Many of them also take a renewed interest in the social and regional inequalities that, as high-lighted by political populists, threaten to tear apart societies in Central Europe just as they do further west. It is with these different coordinates in mind that the younger generations in the region demand answers about their personal futures, the impending condition of their society and economy, and the position of their country in Europe.

As a result, Central Europe is al-ready on a generational collision course; where the young want to see policies that make their countries fit for the fu-ture while the politicians of the older generation attempt to maintain the sta-tus quo. Though some variations across Central Europe exist, the current gov-ernments curb the rights of their citi-zens and marginalise their countries in the EU, underinvest in education and research, neglect the potential of digital-isation and new business models, pillage social welfare systems and are reluctant to forcefully counter corruption.

Before this momentum fully ma-terialises, tensions in Central Europe heighten further. In domestic politics, the next election cycle in 2019-2022 remains dominated by the mix of populism, pater-nalism and nationalism that mobilises the middle-aged and older electorates and outnumbers the younger vote. Within the EU, this continued backward-looking politics of Central Europe is further side-lined, with funding for critical invest-ments, regional development and social cohesion being drastically reduced.

Economically, the gap between Central Europe and the more advanced nations of the EU widens again, and growth rates in the region, dependent as they are on more traditional manufactur-ing and services, drop below those coun-tries progressively embracing a more digital and knowledge-based economic model. This will also drain resources for education, innovation and welfare sys-tems in Central Europe that have long been in a precarious state. In sum, the full failure of the development model of the past decade of Central European politics cannot be overlooked any longer.

In this situation, an economic reces-sion or major corruption scandal blows the hitherto Central European politics to pieces. The epicentre of this political earthquake is found in Poland, the re-gion’s traditional trendsetter. Perhaps more than other Central Europeans, and after millions of Poles have been working across the EU for years, Polish society supports EU membership and is sensi-tive to being side-lined. Polish politics, strong-handed and -worded as it may be, is much weaker than its regional peers in its control over the business and media sectors. The Polish central government faces a unique set of self-confident, re-sourceful and decentralised regions that pose significant counterpoints. Polish civil society is, despite government pressures, one of the best-organised in Europe.

Thus, Poland provides a favourable environment for political mobilisation and innovation. A series of corruption scandals at Polish technology hubs and funds for digital entrepreneurship pro-vide the spark for young, tech-savvy and business-oriented Poles to mobilise

across Poland. Their protest, both on- and offline, quickly draws the support from business, civil society, civil rights advocates and independent journalists, who add their demands to the growing list of complaints. This movement claims to give a political voice to Poland’s dis-enfranchised younger generations, to prepare an alternative political leader-ship, and to focus on the triangle of new technologies, social justice and European integration.

The spectacular success of this movement in Poland, not least after win-ning snap elections and forming a new government, sparks similar incarnations in Czechia, Hungary and the Slovak Republic, setting into motion a series of developments. First, it returns politics from a mere preservation of power to ac-tual policy-making for the development of Central Europe. Second, through a thorough investigation of past corrup-tion, it ends the effective state capture by powerful business interests. Third, it ends the stranglehold of politics on regional media and civil society. Finally, and as a result, it reaffirms the region’s commit-ment to full European integration. And in so doing, this political emancipation of young Central Europeans will make good on the “Return to Europe” that their parents demanded nearly three decades before.

13


S C E N A R I O

5

Security Vacuum

The transatlantic security system that has provided stability to Central Europe and the EU overall collapses. Hollowed out by a U.S. retreat from Europe, weakened by Europe’s reluc-tance to invest in the continent’s political cohesion and collective security and challenged by a Russian military build-up and hybrid warfare, NATO and the EU eventually fail on their commitments to collectively defend their members. The entire eastern flank of the bloc is thrown into acute insecurity. Central Europe becomes further alienated from its western European partners and seeks to bolster its security through bilateral arrangements with various external powers. Its domestic political and social life becomes securitised and intra-regional conflicts propagate.



The transatlantic and collective security umbrella – which has al-lowed European nations, including those of Central Europe, to build

sustainable democracies at home and in-creased cooperation across much of the continent – is under serious assault from several sides.

NATO’s new sense of purpose and determination that followed the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 turns out to be short-lived; toward the end of the 2010s, the transatlantic rift, inner-Eu-ropean tensions and Russian geopolitical ambitions resurface more strongly than ever before.

On the transatlantic level, the on-going and difficult-to-mitigate trade disputes have embittered the U.S. do-mestic opinion of Europe. This coupled with many EU countries still failing to meet the NATO defence spending re-quirements, and the once quiet voices in Washington calling for a more isolation-ist security policy start to gain traction. Exacerbating the situation further, the U.S. re-engagement with Russia is ac-celerating. This rapprochement revolves around a new “Grand Bargain” that limits U.S. security commitments to Europe and foresees NATO’s restraint on its Eastern flank in exchange for Russian co-opera-tion elsewhere in the world. In the end, the U.S. practically ceases to be an actor in European security by 2021.

Within Europe, similar transfor-mations are gathering speed. The illib-eral course taken by Central European governments prompts punitive action by the EU and, even more importantly, discredits the historic eastward enlarge-ment of the EU and NATO. Individual EU governments, from Austria to France and from Germany to Italy re-engage with Russia bilaterally. The first victim of deteriorating cohesion in Europe are EU sanctions against Russia whose ex-tension fails in 2019. In the following year, a NATO summit fails after several Western European nations led by France and Germany demand an amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty that conditions NATO membership to a clear commit-ment to democracy, human rights and the rule of law. And in 2021, the U.S., the U.K. and several EU nations includ-ing France, Germany and Italy end, for different reasons, their participation in NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence. This series of political implosions effec-

tively dismantles the European security system.

Russia, the geopolitical winner from this dynamic, doubles down its ef-forts to widen political divisions among Europeans and across the Atlantic through a variety of means. The biggest losers of this decline in European security will be the countries of Central Europe. As they observe the waning of guaran-tees and support by Western partners, they develop a range of coping strate-gies, some more country-specific, others region-wide.

Poland initially pursues a dual strat-egy, followed by a third. Bilaterally, it seeks to maximise the U.S. military presence on its territory while, regionally, it co-spon-sors initiatives including meetings with member states of NATO’s Eastern flank and the Three Seas Initiative. When nei-ther strategy yields serious results and as Poland is increasingly isolated in the EU, Warsaw sets its eyes on Beijing. It pro-actively opens up the country to Chinese investment in infrastructure, agriculture, energy and technology, hoping that this new cooperation will give it a strong ally against Russia. In effect, Poland hopes for China to step in where NATO is paralysed.

Hungary, in contrast, takes the op-posite direction. Budapest seeks to cap-italise on the ideological proximity that has long emerged between the Orbán and Putin regimes, and it willingly offers itself to Moscow as a political Trojan Horse in the EU and NATO. In exchange, Hungary demands preferential energy deals, the in-flow of Russian capital, privileged access to the Russian and Eurasian Economic Union markets, and political support in dealing with neighbouring countries where large Hungarian minorities reside.

Czechia and, eventually, Slovakia respond to the diminishing European security situation in yet another way: retreat. Neither country has ever been overly enthusiastic about NATO mem-bership, and this sentiment is first seized upon in the Czech political arena. When yet another government crisis can only be resolved with the help of the communist party, the latter demands a referendum on NATO membership. Coinciding with the parliamentary election in 2021, the vote narrowly supports an exit from the Alliance. This decision by its erstwhile federation partner prompts a similar in-itiative in Slovakia, and a 2022 referen-

dum results in an even clearer backing for leaving NATO.

Yet these shifts away from reliance on Western partners for security else-where are only one aspect of Central European coping strategies. The volatil-ity of European and regional situations prompts a far-reaching securitisation of politics and societies. Regional govern-ments impress upon their societies the ever-growing threats facing their coun-tries, which, they argue, requires both the strong hand of the state and a patriotic sense of duty among all citizens. One re-sult is the systematic tightening of gov-ernment control over political processes and state administration, media and busi-ness, education and civil society; another is that the societies sink into a siege men-tality. This political and social securitisa-tion effectively reinforces the illiberal and authoritarian tendencies already at work.

Finally, the relationships be-tween Western Europe and the Central European countries are strained to the point of alienation. The region’s sense of betrayal by the West, its turn to a mul-ti-vector foreign and security policy and further damage to democracy and the rule of law at home only deepens the marginalisation of Central Europe.

The end result of this overall dynam-ic is not unlike the Central Europe be-tween the two World Wars. One hundred years on, an old-new Zwischeneuropa emerges; one that is marked by weak multilateral institutions, failing Western assurances for the region, a dependency on external powers, resurgent authoritar-ianism and intra-regional conflict.

15

GLOBAL TRENDS, AMPLIFIED IN CENTRAL EUROPE



These five scenarios are driven by a number of global trends that are changing the democratic politics and societies the world over. For reasons of history, size and geography, and given their still-recent political, economic and social trans-formation, many of these trends are particularly amplified and impactful in the countries of Cen-tral Europe. This makes the region a harbinger

of developments that, for their own sake, democracies further West must acknowledge and address more fully and urgently than is currently the practice.

END OF LIBERAL CERTAINTYAfter several decades of having a broadly understood liberal consensus, which reached its climax in the 1990s, a global, illiberal trend is on the rise. The weakening of the liberal international order and the accession of neo-authoritarian regimes are alarming global occurrences, but the tendency in Central-European countries - previously champions of the transition to democracy - is particularly disquieting, and these nations are at risk of becoming the prodigal sons of liberalism. In many instances, these shifts are being buttressed by savvy communication strategies, with powerful counter narratives challenging the liberal and democratic paradigm. Illiberal pol-itics has surfaced in nearly every established democracy, but it has been particularly impactful where institutional arrange-ments are still shaky as in Central Europe.

Adding to this is a broader transformation of dem-ocratic politics, which is testing the institutional order of our societies. The sheer volume and diversity of voters in the political systems alone is a persistent challenge that is mag-nified by technological and cultural shifts like the expansion of the Internet, the fading of post-war memory, social polari-sation, tribalism, and the weakening of social trust and social capital. As a result, party systems have come under strain, calls have been growing for referenda and more direct de-mocracy, and the multi-level governance structure has been questioned.

Meanwhile, one of the key anchors for European de-mocracies, the EU, has been suffering from a succession of unrelenting crises for over a decade. Starting with the financial crisis of 2008 through the Russian-induced security crisis (since 2014) to the refugee crisis beginning in 2015, the EU has been in emergency response mode. Neither has it been able to fully resolve any of these challenges nor has there been much political and institutional capacity for a more forward-leaning agenda of advancing the European project. As a result, the legitimacy and attractiveness of the EU has suffered and support among the European popula-tions has diminished.

Along with the standing of the EU, other Western in-stitutions - and global multilateralism overall - has weak-ened. Already under pressure from illiberal and sovereigntist politics, growing calls for protectionism, and the geopolitical ambitions of Russia as well as other autocracies, multilat-eral institutions, processes and forums have now been met with additional disdain from the new U.S. administration. Whether it be NATO, the UN or the WTO, none of the tradi-tional institutional formats used to ensure European security, global trade and cooperation or, more directly, conflict-man-agement have remained unscathed.

Economically speaking, Central Europe seems to offer a brighter picture, with generally robust growth, development and lower rates of income equality. While this is a snapshot of the region, trends have been indicating a growing disparity of power and wealth, and even more worrisome is the increas-ing oligarchisation. One key deficit is the distribution of EU funds which primarily serves, as in Hungary, to cement the powers-that-be rather than the sustainable development of the country. Another element that is emerging is state capitalism; a situation where big state-owned companies are pursuing a successful model of expansionism in which economic interests are intertwined with political objectives. A side effect of this is the new economic protectionism in otherwise free-mar-ket economies. Finally, the region’s place in global production chains renders it particularly vulnerable to economic shocks and changes as well as the strong social and political reper-cussions associated.

FUTURE DISRUPTEDEqually mixed has been the impact of technological advance-ments, and the digital revolution in particular, on Central Eu-rope. While digitalisation offers unprecedented options for democratic oversight over the institutions of power and a vast promise of economic prosperity, it also increases inequalities through uneven social access to new technologies, and it fa-cilitates state surveillance of citizens to a hitherto unknown extent.

What is more, technology exposes democracy to mass-scale manipulation. While the concept of “fake news” is hardly new, digital technologies and social media now facilitate un-precedented levels of disinformation. The confidence of the citizenry in quality media and political institutions is being systematically eroded, and a polarisation among these citizens is being fuelled by disinformation. The arrival of the post-truth era, or the seeming relativity of all facts, undermines the co-hesion of democratic societies and the ability to govern effec-tively by elected leaders.

Another trend, long believed to have been left behind but recently returning with a vengeance, are disputes over borders and territories. The Russian annexation of Crimea may have put a spotlight on this old-new challenge but frozen conflicts elsewhere in the post-Soviet space, China’s creation of artificial islands beyond its waters, or the flaring-up of bor-der issues in the former Yugoslavia all testify to a broader ten-dency. It remains to be seen whether Central Europe - a region with numerous, historical border configurations - will prove immune to this trend.

No less a revival is the recent surge of isolationism and nativism that, as a response to globalisation, has propelled right-wing populists and extremists to political prominence. Not only in Central Europe but increasingly also in the old-er democracies of the West - from the U.K. and the U.S. to Italy and Germany - political rhetoric and agendas are being reshaped in the direction of closed societies and protection-ism. This includes, typically framed as a response to the threat of terrorism, a significant securitisation of the political and public discourse. The key staples of liberal democracy, such as privacy, personal freedoms and civil rights, are at an ev-er-greater risk of being sacrificed as public fears drive govern-ment policies at home and abroad.

17

DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURESAn important social trend is the demographic shifts and their impact on democracy in Central Europe. One dimension is the very ageing of societies and its profound impact on both the welfare systems and the labour markets, with increasing burdens on the former while gradually jeopardising social peace and shortages in the latter by limiting the prospects for continued economic growth. Another aspect is a generational conflict that is looming on the horizon. This clash-in-the-mak-ing evolves around the status quo orientation of contemporary politics, which primarily benefits the older generation and be-trays the future of the younger populations. Yet another layer of demographic change is the increased mobility within the EU. It is not only the persistent economic gap but also the political rift between Central Europe and the rest of the EU that is causing a net outflow of citizens from the region; those leaving are typically younger, well-educated and politically more moderate.

One avenue of mitigating at least some of these demo-graphic effects in Central Europe has been to facilitate la-bour migration from Eastern neighbours, especially Ukraine. However, migration from further afield, such as Asia or Africa, to Central Europe is much more politically and socially sen-sitive as the region’s reaction to the 2015 refugee crisis has demonstrated. Such intercontinental migration pressures will only increase in the years and decades to come. Pull forces of labour shortages and comparative wealth in Central Europe, combine with push factors such as violent conflicts and climate change affecting major parts of the world. Though flows of people into Europe will predictably increase, it re-mains unclear how Central Europe will position itself on mi-gration in the long run.

Yet, refugees and migration are only two of the conse-quences of wars and conflicts that seem to be moving ever closer to the frontiers of the EU. Whether to the south or the east, humanitarian disasters, state failures, organised crime and disruptions of energy and trade flows will be just as det-rimental to the old continent, including Central Europe, as the migration crisis. Tackling these issues will require strategies that go beyond a better protection of EU borders, which re-gional politicians have called for time and again.

More than ever before, it would seem, these global trends require a strong community of Western democracies, their leadership, multilateral institutions and economic clout with an overarching emphasis on liberal values and the rule of law. Yet precisely in this critical situation, the West is more divid-ed and uncertain of its role in the world than ever. The U.S. is facing strong internal pressures to rethink and possibly reduce their role in global affairs, while the EU has yet to muster the political will and coherence to become a powerful player in world politics. This provides openings that non-European autocracies are more than willing to exploit ideologically, politically, economically and militarily. This growing foot-print of powers such as Russia and China, and their open chal-lenge to traditional Western institutions, values and narratives has become impossible to ignore in Central Europe.

These global trends will push and pull on the region shaping many developments. However, this does not mean the region has a clear tra-jectory as these tendencies do not function in a linear manner. Instead, some of them will be more impactful in Central Europe than others, there will be those mutually reinforcing and those neutralising one another. To complicate

dynamics even further, specific events and actions, policies and personalities will tip dynamics in one or another direc-tion. Such tipping points, both foreseeable and more opaque, include the following.

First and perhaps foremost, developments in Central Europe will hinge on the EU’s responses to illiberalism in the region and beyond. Broadly speaking, three replies are plausible. Continued opportunism, whether driven by hopes of reigning in illiberal politics through inclusion or fuelled by economic arguments, is one option. Punitive action, from naming and shaming to loss of EU voting rights to cuts in EU funding to side-lining illiberal governments in future EU poli-cies and institutions, is another. A mixed option may combine vocal EU condemnation of illiberal politics, restraint on polit-ical and financial sanctions, and a systematic outreach to pro-EU publics in Central Europe. Each of these EU approaches is conducive to very different scenarios in Central Europe.

No less importantly, the course and outcome of Brexit will be key for Central European dynamics. Though increas-

TIPPING POINTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE’S FUTURE



ingly unlikely, a mutually satisfactory and soft arrangement between the EU and the U.K. will be a strong impulse for EU sceptics in Central Europe. In turn, a hard Brexit that inflicts clear losses on British politics, its economy and standing in the world will certainly mute exit temptations in the region. Either of these directions may yet be reinforced by a second referendum on British membership in the EU.

Related to both is the broader question of relaunching the European project. On the one hand, the EU will have to demonstrate convincingly that it has adjusted its policies and institutions to prevent a return of the eurozone and refugee crises. On the other hand, the bloc needs to make visible strides to advance on, among others, the digital economy and European security, areas where Europe has fallen behind glob-al competitors. EU success or failure in some or all of these areas is likely to either restore, or further damage, the attrac-tiveness and legitimacy of the bloc among Central Europeans.

Thus, a new and chaotic mass influx of refugees from the south will only renew Central European fears of an “inva-sion” and lend itself to politicisation at home and in Europe. By contrast, possible refugee pressures from the east, as a result of further Russian aggression against neighbouring nations, may well change Central European attitudes on this issue, especially if met with effective EU policies and solidarity. Similarly, this would hold true in case of an economic reces-sion. If relatively spared, the political status quo in Central European will remain intact. If, however, its impact is severe in the region, its political fallout can evolve in a number of directions. Impressions of being left alone or neglected by the EU will fuel political and anti-EU radicalisation, while an ex-perience of swift and effective support assistance will bolster support for the bloc.

In a similar vein, another security crisis provoked by Russia will put Western solidarity and cohesion, and with it Central Europe’s broader political positioning, to the test. Whether directed against Ukraine or another neighbour, or unfolding in the broader Baltic or Black Sea area, a common and effective response by NATO and the EU is not a given. Any wavering or open splintering on the part of the collective West cannot but drive Central Europe further from both institutions and their values. By contrast, a serious investment into the broader security of its Eastern-most members, including the four Central European countries, by both European and trans-atlantic structures will not only reduce their external vulnera-bility but also help to reign in domestic political developments.

Closely related is the possible withdrawal of the US from European security. In this case, NATO will inevitably collapse without being replaced even approximately by an EU-led alternative. The effects of such a development will be most strongly felt in Central Europe. In the absence of credible security support from the EU neighbours, the countries of the region will become further alienated from the bloc and seek bilateral arrangements with non-EU powers and partners, even at the price of reduced sovereignty.

While these factors are all external to Central Europe, internal developments also offer possible triggers. Most im-portantly, elections are likely to have an impact far beyond individual countries of the region, and will set Central Europe on one or another trajectory.

In addition, ballots elsewhere will have ripple effects. These include the U.S. and its presidential elections in 2020

and 2024, Russia that will have to confirm its current leader or find a successor in 2024, and Ukraine where elections are scheduled for 2019 and again four years later.

Given the strong personalisation of Central European politics, the death of a key political leader would set in mo-tion unpredictable domestic and regional dynamics. Much the same applies to a leadership or even regime change in Russia, just as previous geopolitical re-orientations in Moscow have opened or closed development options in Central Europe.

Finally, there are always wild cards, or fully unpredictable events. A major natural disaster or public emergency in this part of Europe - whether it is a drought, flood, epidemic or in-dustrial accident - may well put regional politics and societies before extreme decisions. A major breakdown of the world trade or financial system, however induced, would shake the foundations of Central European economies, open and glo-balised as they are.

Seemingly faraway developments, too, may have direct effects on Central Europe. A major war involving the U.S. and China will present the region with political dilemmas, economic fallout or worse. A geopolitical re-orientation of Turkey, away from the NATO and towards non-European powers such as Russia, would provide a blueprint to some leaders and constituencies in Central Europe.

More positively, technological breakthroughs are con-ceivable in the digital arena, the energy field or production and transport modes that may work to the region’s advantage and usher in a next economic development cycle, with profound social and political effects.

The regular calendar of elections in Central Europe is as follows:

presidential elections parliamentary elections

CZ 2023 2021 and 2025

HU 2022 2022

SK 2019 and 2024 2020 and 2024

PL 2020 and 2025 2019 and 2023

EU 2019 and 2024

President of the Council, the Parliament and the Commission

19



The scenarios outlined in this report paint the near- to mid-future of Central Europe in stark colours. Some of them are desirable while others are disastrous. All of these trajectories are plau-sible, yet none of them are inevitable. Instead, which of these scenarios eventually prevails in Central Europe will depend on policy interven-tions by domestic, regional and international

stakeholders alike. The European and transatlantic commu-nity can and must carefully consider its responses to Central European dynamics so as to mitigate any destructive trends and accelerate those that work for the good of the region and Europe overall.

TAKING CENTRAL EUROPE SERIOUSLYThe fate of Central Europe is closely intertwined with that of Europe as well as the transatlantic community. While most of the trends active in the region have broader, even global, dimensions, they often impact Central Europe earlier and with particular force. Whether positive or negative, the scenario that eventually materialises here will presage the future of Europe.

For this reason, Central Europe and its Western neighbours need to break free from the considerable al-ienation and silence that has dominated the last few years. Europe needs to invest in better understanding of re-gional dynamics, politics and societal sentiments among broader European decision-makers, opinion-leaders and populations. Central European concerns and constituen-cies, whether supportive or critical of the European project and individual policies, must feel that they are being heard across the EU rather than being sidelined or even castigated by the bloc.

In turn, regional decisions and debates need a more ro-bust European dimension. All too often, it seems, Central Europeans treat the EU – and to a lesser extent NATO – as if these organisations were external to their countries and region. Instead, a much stronger sense of membership and identity should be fostered by policy-makers and govern-ment officials. Central Europe also has a responsibility for the future of the European and transatlantic community, and its actions will shape these relationships for better or worse.

REINVIGORATING THE EUROPEAN PROJECTAs the scenarios outlined in this report should have demon-strated, Central Europe’s prosperity, stability and security – and its democracy and rule of law – are best-served by the

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONSWhich (Central) Europe in 2025?

21

region’s full integration with European and transatlantic struc-tures. The European Union is in particularly urgent need of re-establishing its legitimacy and effectiveness, lest the gulf between Central European and other member states will wid-en even further.

One area of particular importance will have to be a clear and principled stance by EU institutions on the rule of law in individual member states. The illiberal momentum of Central European governments is potentially contagious. EU counter-measures are imperative to stem this illiberal drift which comes with a constant risk of decomposition of the European project. Permanent, regular and transpar-ent monitoring and analysis of illiberal policies are neces-sary. Infringement procedures pursued by the European Commission must have clear support from member states, and Commission action should be buttressed by statements from the European Council.

Another field for EU action relates to the long-term integration model of the bloc. Multi-speed integration as realised to date has failed, as demonstrated by Brexit, and needs to be phased out. For Central Europe, this primarily implies a swift accession of Czechia, Hungary and Poland to the eurozone. In turn, an EU that allows for any continued cherry-picking by individual members not only reduces its own overall strength and coherence but also cultivates the sovereigntist pockets that will always be tempted to undo European integration. Highlighting the success of eurozone members, especially their economic performance, can go a far way to increase confidence in the common currency. Such positive messaging should target the populace in the remaining non-eurozone countries in Central Europe. Highlighting examples such as Latvia and Slovakia, ag-ile economies that adopted the euro amidst an economic crisis, can help to quell the anxieties of their Eurosceptic neighbours.

NEW GROUPS, NEW MEMBERSThe EU should also actively support geographical and the-matic platforms that bring together groups of member states. A lesson from Central Europe is that single-issue orien-tation, as with the Visegrad group and its position on refugees, is highly divisive and destructive. To avoid such pitfalls, coun-try groupings should be encouraged that address a broader set of policy issues of relevance for a subset of EU members. In Central Europe, such policy issues include energy, infrastruc-ture and education, among others.

An important driver of European integration has always been enlargement, as illustrated not least by Central Europe. EU enlargement must be kept on track in the Western Balkans and European perspectives should be provided to Eastern neighbours, both regions adjacent to Central Europe. As a lesson from the current illiberal tendencies and demo-cratic backsliding among some of its newer members, the EU will need to develop mechanisms that extend political con-ditionality beyond the accession process and ensure leverage over new entrants.

The EU will need to find ways of addressing resurgent nationalism, or at least those expressions of it that are openly hostile to European integration and democracy. One element should be a more inclusive role for national parliaments in the legislative process of the European Parliament.

REAPPRAISAL OF EUROPEAN SECURITYA key dimension for the success or failure of European inte-gration, and for the future of Central Europe within this pro-ject, is security. Recent years have seen a triple challenge on European security: Russia openly violating existing rules and arrangements; Europe remaining reluctant and unable to pro-vide for its own security; and the United States questioning its traditional role as Europe’s security guarantor. In response, a serious re-reappraisal and strengthening of European secu-rity is urgently needed.

First and foremost, NATO remains the central actor for preserving a secure Europe. Political leadership, in Central Europe as well as among the remainder of the alliance, must clearly and without conditionality manifest their resolute commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Alliance in general. Individual NATO members must demon-strate this commitment through meeting defence spending targets, including investments in materiel and personnel as well as facilitating a permanent military presence on NATO’s Eastern flank.

An important area for additional NATO engagement in Central Europe could be information campaigns and reg-ular trainings to prepare the general public for crisis and emergency situations, including military, cyber and natu-ral disasters. With the help of NATO and individual mem-ber states, contingency plans for such security situations in Central Europe should be drafted and made public to im-prove preparedness for fast-tracking relief to the population and, as a result, to increase the sense of security among the civilians.

NATO and individual members should continue to support Ukraine, a key neighbour of Central Europe and the alliance alike, with training, equipment, information and in-stitution-building. Meanwhile NATO mediation and politi-cal pressure should be stepped up wherever a bilateral issue involving an alliance member threatens to block cooperation and integration of non-NATO neighbours, as was the case with the Hungarian obstruction towards Ukraine.

THE EU SHARING NATO’S BURDENIn parallel and closely coordinated with NATO, the EU must finally make real progress on defence and security. One el-ement is the further expansion of EU multinational forces and battlegroups in Central Europe, another is EU investment in critical infrastructure required for military logistics and civilian relief in Central Europe.

PESCO, the EU’s new framework for defence coop-eration, must advance swiftly. Besides infrastructure, a considerable portion of EU funds should be set aside for the cooperation of European defence industries and their tech-nological modernisation. Investment decisions, whether in infrastructure or industry, should be clearly guided by secu-rity threats rather than EU parity and cohesion, and a signif-icant portion of resources must be channelled into Central Europe, one of the most vulnerable and exposed regions of the EU.

EU solidarity in the security field should also be bolstered institutionally in the EU Treaty. Having remained rather un-known to the public and fuzzy in its provisions, the relevant Article 42.7 should be turned more fully into an EU equiv-alent of NATO’s Article 5. In terms of procedures, substance



and necessary responses by EU countries to an aggression against one of the member states, this treaty provision requires far more political backing and public acknowledgement.

Finally, EU action is needed on crisis prevention and civil protection. The 2015 migration crisis has clearly demon-strated deficits in the EU’s Crisis Response System, which needs adjustment to better avert external challenges to EU security and, ultimately, political solidarity. Meanwhile the EU Civil Protection Mechanism should increase its capac-ity to respond to natural and man-made disasters. Besides resources, EU-wide cross-border trainings and coordination of crisis management systems is urgently needed.

BLUNTING SHARP POWERSIn Central Europe as well as in Western democracies, devel-opments over the past few years have revealed a vulnerability to external influence by non-democratic regimes that is often described as sharp power. The openness of societies, politics, markets and media is the strength and defining characteristic of liberal democracies. However, authoritarian powers, espe-cially Russia and China, have become skillful and brazen in interfering with Western democracies, with the aim of ma-nipulating public opinion and political decisions to their own advantage. Central Europe finds itself at the forefront of this new challenge, to which it needs to quickly develop better resilience.

Russia has long politicised its substantial energy supplies to Europe. Full independence from Russian energy supplies is neither realistic nor desirable, but a concerted European effort to establish energy solidarity and diversity has been slow in the making. Not least for Central Europe, a region traditionally dependent on Russia for energy supplies, the EU must stay committed to the common energy policy principles and support diversification efforts.

Another field of increased hostile activity is the cyber arena. Critical EU infrastructure requires better protection from cyber attacks. Public utilities and commercial provid-ers, whether of water or electricity, can be incentivised with EU funds to upgrade their systems. Contingency plans and mechanisms need to be established for swift relief and sol-idarity among EU members. Populations need to be better informed and prepared for such disruptions of vital supplies, and emergency services need modernisation and training to handle large-scale emergencies.

Finally, a broad range of sharp power tools at the dis-posal of the world’s autocrats needs better monitoring by EU member states and institutions. Covert and overt support for radical political groups, cultural diplomacy and ties with diasporas, Russian or Chinese media outlets and disinforma-tion campaigns, funding for NGOs and individuals need to be screened much more systematically than to date. The EU needs an effective monitoring network and a system of re-sponses. Furthermore, the EU and U.S. need to offer appeal-ing alternatives if they want to limit Chinese and Russian investments in Europe.

CIVIL SOCIETY AT RISKPolitical developments in Central Europe in recent years have fundamentally altered the once-healthy and more-bal-anced relationship between the state and civil society. The state has grown more suspicious of and worked to subdue

citizens, media, interest and advocacy groups, weakening societal checks on state and political power. A recovery of civil society, and of its relations with the state, is immediately required.

First and foremost, external support for civil society in Central Europe must be strenghtened. Just as they did prior to the region’s EU accession, political conditionali-ty, cross-border cooperation and material assistance will be needed from the EU, individual member states and non-gov-ernmental partners.

Of no less importance is the creation of an ambitious new effort at civic and European education. Such programmes were part of high school education in Central Europe prior to EU accession, and they can and should be re-established to foster better understanding of, and commitment to, the European project among Central Europe’s youngest citizens.

Substantial investments are also necessary in the me-dia field. Financial, legal and technical assistance for investi-gative journalists and editorial teams should be expanded. An increase of transnational conduits would be substantial to pro-vide quality information on regional developments, not least to improve awareness of positive and negative trends among neighbouring societies in Central Europe.

Finally, a much stronger engagement with the sub-na-tional, regional and local levels of Central European so-cieties is needed. Decentralisation has created a host of decision-makers, stakeholders and interlocutors beyond cap-ital cities that can provide for important democratic coun-ter-weights to national governments and institutions.

BECOMING A DIGITAL SUPER-POWERCutting across the many challenges facing Central Europe, and Western democracies at large, is the technological change and, in particular, the transition to digital societies. High hopes accompanied the early phase of digitalisation but have since given way to serious concerns as to how new technologies will impact democracy, security, prosperity and the social fabric. Whether the opportunities or threats of digitalisation prevail in Central Europe will be one of the key questions of the com-ing years.

The EU should aggressively pursue its innovation, research & development as well as the digital single mar-ket policies. Digital policy should be clearly manifested by EU governments and institutions as the number one priority across all policy areas from security to local development.

In order to increase accountability as well as societal trust in the upcoming digital transformation, private inves-tors and public funds related to innovation and digitalisa-tion should be monitored and ranked for their efficiency as well as transparency to check for potential corruption mechanisms.

Finally, the best practical solutions answering disinfor-mation and cyberthreats developed by specialists in the re-gion should be selected as universal solutions and developed with the help of EU-funds and consortia (e.g. in the frame-work of Horizon2020) to aid in their safeguarding of the EU’s digitalisation.

23

This publication is a result of a joint effort of the Visegrad/Insight and the German Marshall Fund of the United States to chart possible trajectories for the region. Participants of the preparatory workshops included:

Piotr Arak - Polish Economic Institute, Michal Baranowski - German Marshall Fund of the U.S., Marcin Buzanski - Facilitator, Dobromir Ciaś - Edge NPD, Galan Dall - Visegrad Insight, Res Publica Foundation, Vít Dostál - Association for International

Affairs (AMO), Martin Ehl - Hospodarske Noviny, Botond Feledy - Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy, Joerg Forbrig - German Marshall Fund of the U.S., Agnieszka Gmys-Wiktor - National Endowement for Democracy,

Daniel Hegedűs - rethink.CEE fellow, GMF, Alina Inayeh - German Marshall Fund of the U.S., Magda Jakubowska - Visegrad Insight, Res Publica Foundation, Balazs Jarábik - Carnegie Europe, Irena Kalhousová - Forum 2000, Péter Krekó - Political

Capital, Hana Lešenarová - Deutsche Bank, Miriam Lexmann - International Republican Institute, Łukasz Lipiński - Polityka.pl, Anastasiya Matchanka - German Marshall Fund of the U.S., Błażej Moder - Civil Development Forum, Andrej Nosko,

Bartek Nowak - .Nowoczesna, Veronika Pistyur - Bridge Budapest, Dorota Poznańska, Wojciech Przybylski - Visegrad Insight, Res Publica Foundation, András Rácz - Pazmany Peter Catholic University, Tomáš Strážay - Slovak Foreign Policy Association

(SFPA), Anna Visvizi, Jakub Wiśniewski - Globsec and Zuzanna Ziomecka - NewsMavens.

editor-in-chief

Wojciech Przybylski (Res Publica, PL)twitter: @WPrzybylskieditor of the special edition

Joerg Forbrig (GMF, DE)twitter: @JoergForbrig

director of operations

Magda Jakubowska (Res Publica, PL)[email protected]

+ 48 694 40 19 80managing editor

Galan Dall (Res Publica, USA)[email protected]

editorial director gmf

Rachel Tausendfreund (GMF, DE)senior associate

Marcin Zaborowski (Res Publica, PL)twitter: @MaZaborowski

associate

Anna Wójcik (Res Publica, PL)twitter: @AnnaWojcik

economy section editor

Martin Ehl (Hospodářské noviny, CZ)twitter: @MartinCZV4EU

intelligent mind editors

Éva Karádi (HU)Marta Šimečková (SK)

books editor

Julia Sherwood (SK)contributing editors

Juraj Čorba (SK)Katarína Kucbelová (SK)

graphic design

illustrations and the cover

Paweł Kuczyński

circulation: 3,000

Masthead

Visegrad Insight is published by the

Res Publica Foundation.

This special edition has been prepared

in cooperation with the German Marshall Fund

of the United States.

READ MORE AT cefutures.visegradinsight.eu

FOLLOW US @V ISEGRADINS IGHT

www.visegradinsight.eu

special edition 1 (12) | 2018

ISSN 2084-8250 | GBP€4.99 | EURO€6.00 | PLN 16.00

Five Scenarios for 2025in cooperation with


Documents

CENTRAL EUROPEAN FUTURES - Visegrad Insight · Central Europe Spring 2.0 Younger Central Europeans launch a movement creating a new political class and new politics. page 12 Security