Centralization Decentralization

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Journal of EducationalAdministration,Vol. 38 No. 5, 2000, pp. 442-454.# MCB University Press, 0957-8234

Centralization, decentralization,recentralization

Educational reform in ChinaJohn N. Hawkins

University of California, Los Angeles, USA

Keywords China, Centralization, Decentralization, Financial restructuring, Education

Abstract China's educational leaders have long debated the pluses and minuses ofdecentralization of control and resources of China's vast educational enterprise. Duringvarious periods of post-1949 China, the central authorities have devolved control to the provinces,key cities, and rural communes, only to recentralize later usually due to political reforms. In thischapter various stages of the educational reform movement begun in 1985 will be considered andwe will focus on what motivated the reforms in the context of China's unique political culture.Some specific features of educational decentralization will be examined such as finance,curriculum and management. We conclude that while the current leadership appears to becommitted to decentralization, they remain conflicted over the need to maintain control while atthe same time respond creatively to the needs of the new market economy.

IntroductionChina's educational leadership has been struggling with the issue ofcentralization and decentralization almost since the founding of the People'sRepublic in 1949. Terms such as `` walking on two legs'' (combining bothcentralized and decentralized approaches to education) and minban schools(community run schools), once again in vogue, date back several decades(Hawkins, 1973). In the latter years of the commune system, communes andproduction brigades were being urged by provincial authorities to run ruralprimary and junior middle schools independently, raising funds through theirown efforts, and hiring teachers in a competitive manner (Xin, 1984). These earlyefforts to shift authority from central to local levels did not represent, however, anational decentralization policy of the scope we are witnessing today.

Nevertheless, there is a history of experimentation with different levels anddegrees of decentralization, always against the background of a highlycentralized political economy, and often followed by a re-centralization asauthorities retrench fearing loss of control (the paradoxes of state-leddecentralization are convincingly argued in Tatto (1999)). As Hanson (1998)and Bray (1999) correctly note, in general, there are no clear examples ofcompletely decentralized educational systems, but rather one finds mixtures ofcentralization and decentralization. These processes are fluid and in motionand change over time. It is also important to remember that there are differingdefinitions of what constitutes decentralization. Hanson (1998, p. 112) offers auseful general definition that is appropriate for the China case:`` Decentralization is defined as the transfer of decision-making authority,responsibility, and tasks from higher to lower organizational levels or between

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organizations.'' Hanson (1998) and Bray (1999) also note three basic kinds ofdecentralization:

(1) Deconcentration (transfer of tasks and work but not authority).

(2) Delegation (transfer of decision-making authority from higher to lowerlevels, but authority can be withdrawn by the center).

(3) Devolution (transfer of authority to an autonomous unit which can actindependently without permission from the center).

Privatization is another form which, however, is not always decentralized. Aswe shall see, in the case of China, several of these exist at the same time.

In the remainder of this chapter we will examine the various stages of theeducational reform movement begun in 1985, focus on what motivated thereforms in the context of China's unique political culture, explore some specificfeatures (finance, curriculum, management, etc.) of China's efforts todecentralize the precollegiate level, and finally, comment on the strengths andweaknesses of these efforts.

The reform environmentAs the economic reforms of the 1970s began to take hold it was soon discoveredthat the educational system was woefully inadequate to contribute to the neweconomic opportunities. Thus, in May of 1985, the Communist Party of China(CPC) convened a conference to address this issue. Out of these deliberationscame a series of general policy guidelines meant to begin a process ofeducational reform and gradually align the educational system with the newlyemerging marketization of the economy (Reform, 1985). General principlesfocused on linking education to economic reforms, implementing the nine-yearcompulsory educational system, decentralizing finances and management,increasing vocational and technical education, and increasing the number andquality of teachers.

More specifically, it was stated that:

. government control of schools was too rigid and managementinefficient;

. authority should be `` devolved'' to lower levels;

. multiple methods of financing should be sought;

. devolution of authority for the nine-year compulsory system should begradual, based on a regional approach in the order of: coastal cities,developed interior regions and cities, and less developed interior;

. `` the power for administration of elementary education belongs to localauthorities'' (Reform, 1985, p. 9);

. secondary schools will establish tracking, either toward highereducation or vocational-technical education combined with somedevolution of authority and financing;


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. the central level (State Education Commission SEC) will continue tomonitor the process and provide basic guidelines but `` subordinate units''will have more power and bear financial costs (Reform, 1985, p. 20).

These general policies began a process of decentralization but somewhatambiguously continued to stress the `` guiding'' and `` monitoring'' role of thecentral authorities with respect to `` major policies, principles, and generalplans'' (Reform, 1985, p. 9). Also, the exact degree of decentralization at thesubprovincial level was to be determined by centrally administered areas(provincial, autonomous regions, municipalities). A reformed tax system was toallow for more flexibility to apply special surcharges to support the financialbase for schools (Tsui, 1997).

Eight years later it was necessary to restate many of these policies in a moredetailed manner. In March of 1993 after four years of preparation, the `` Programfor China's educational reform and development'' was issued by the StateCouncil (State Education Commission, 1994; Cui, 1993). A six-part, 50-articledocument, this policy statement clearly stated that it was necessary for Chinato shift the focus from being principally concerned with economic developmentand marketization, to human resource development. Despite previous reformsit is noted that China's economy remains backwards, inefficient, andnon-competitive, largely because of the low educational level of China'sworkers, and despite previous educational reforms, problems still remainedwith the institution of the nine-year compulsory educational system, thetracking of secondary students into appropriate fields, the fight againstilliteracy, and the overly centralized management and financial structure ofeducation (State Education Commission, 1994; Cui, 1993). In an effort to clarifythe ambiguity of the 1985 reform document, it is stated more specifically that:

The system to run schools will also witness great changes with the government monopoly tobe broken. While the focus remains on state schools, encouragement will be given to thegradual establishment of community sponsored schools. At present (1993) basic educationmust be achieved mainly through local government schools (Cui, 1993, p. 16).

Non-state operation of schools by groups and individuals (along with overseasdonations) is also to be allowed but only in the context of existing governmentlaws and regulations.

This reform document provides enough space for local levels to take moreresponsibility for basic education both in terms of management and financesbut also clearly states that the `` state'' remains arbiter of rules and regulations,and as the `` state'' is extended to local governments, the primary provider ofbasic education. Nevertheless, the architecture for a less centralized educationalsystem begins to emerge. The different government levels from the central tothe county are encouraged to work together to develop a feasible structure forthe management and financing of precollegiate schooling, with a gradualdeconcentration of authority. What were the principal motives driving thesereforms?


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MotivesIdentifying motives for educational decentralization in China must beconsidered in the context of China's unique political culture and broaderdecentralization in both political and economic realms. China's distinct form ofstate-led growth, what Oi (1995, p. 1132) calls `` local state corporatism'',provides the environment in which educational decentralization must beviewed. China's current transitional status has retained key elements of theMaoist period elements of a Leninist state that has decentralized controland administration to a point that it is now qualitatively different from theearlier Maoist period. While privatization is growing it is not leading thegrowth and change that is occurring. Rather, government at the local level,counties, townships and village enterprises are acting as the real entrepreneursand change agents. Decollectivization and fiscal reform were the two majorincentives to encourage local governments to become entrepreneurial. Thecounty functions somewhat as the corporate headquarters, the township as theregional headquarters, and the villages as companies within the largercorporation. Each is a profit center, fiscally independent and expected tomaximize its performance. The Maoist framework has thus been adapted toaccount for economic liberalization and local decentralization. Unlike otherLeninist states in transition: `` . . . China evolved into a distinctive decentralizedform that, when coupled with proper incentives, allowed its local officialsquickly to play an entrepreneurial role'' (Oi, 1995, p. 1147).

Thus, the broader fiscal and economic reforms of the 1970s led to laterefforts to decentralize education, always within the context of a state that wasconsciously retreating from being the sole provider of social services (Mok,1997). In the educational system, this retreat and shifting of financial andmanagement authority to the local level was most evident first, in highereducation (Hawkins et al., 1999; Mok, 1997). As we will see, the precollegiatelevel followed next but in a much more cautious manner. Motives fordecentralization in education were principally fiscal (Bray, 1999), and as Cheng(1997, p. 393) notes, `` . . . in the case of China, improvement of the quality of themodern school has not been a primary motive for decentralization.''

Yet, while the central state might have retreated from paying all of the costsfor education, there remained a belief that by empowering local authorities withresponsibility for running the schools, they will better be able to serve theirclients, improve educational efficiencies, and respond more rapidly to the newmarket forces being unleashed as a result of economic liberalization (Mok,1997). Thus, it can be said that educational decentralization was part of abroader economic liberalization that was occurring, within a modified Maoist-Leninist system, and was motivated by a desire to disengage the state frombeing the sole provider of educational services. A much hoped for outcomewould be an educational system that would more nimbly respond to economicneeds. It is too early to judge if this will indeed be the case.


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Decentralization in actionThere are diverse aspects to educational decentralization in China. Here we willfocus on two broad areas that are central to the reforms occurring in China:fiscal reforms and management of schools, and the always-sensitive area ofcurriculum reform.

Fiscal and management reformsAs has been noted, fiscal decentralization was one of the key reforms effectingeducational decentralization. As the central government began to reducesubsidies for local schools, educational officials at the county, township andvillage level pursued alternative sources to fund basic education. This resultedin a much more diversified funding structure for education using local taxes,tuition, overseas donations, local fund-raising, income from enterprises, andmodest subsidies to fill in the gaps left by the central government (Mok andWat, 1998). The reform documents specified six methods for fundingprecollegiate education:

(1) Urban and rural educational surcharges levied by local governments.

(2) Contributions from industry and social organizations.

(3) Donated funds from community organizations and individuals.

(4) Tuition fees from students.

(5) Income from school-run enterprises.

(6) Central authorities (State Education Commission, 1994).

At this time it was estimated that roughly 40 percent of precollegiate fundingwas provided from non-governmental sources (State Education Commission,1994, p. 11).

For a period, fiscal decentralization allowed local governments greatdiscretion to set taxes, target surcharges for education and generally managetheir financial affairs. For wealthy regions this worked quite well and thequality of schools and teachers was high. For poorer regions, the opposite wasoften true; disparities began to appear in the system. For a variety of reasons,including issues of equity, the central government, in 1994, began a process ofrecentralization, removing certain tax authority from the local governments(Bahl, 1998). This revealed how fragile China's decentralization processremains. As Bahl notes:

The biggest difference between China and the decentralized systems of the west is theabsence of popular representation. Local councils must be popularly elected and local chiefofficials must be locally appointed for the efficiency gains from decentralization to occur(Bahl, 1998, p. 72).

Local governments now may not set tax rates or borrow for capital projects.This, however, does not mean that the central authorities will get back into thebusiness of completely subsidizing education. Quite the contrary, now localgovernments must be even more creative in finding alternative sources for


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funding schools, which in fact may produce a more genuinely decentralizedsystem. While the localities are not able to set tax rates, they have beenencouraged to set surcharges on top of commercial and industrial taxes, which`` must'' be devoted exclusively to education. Central authorities continue to fundteacher salaries and certain capital projects but these are funds that arecollected at the local level, rerouted to the central government, and thenreallocated back to teachers (a process called `` the center hosts the banquet andthe local foots the bill'') (Cheng, 1997, p. 395).

This blend of central and local governmental financial support along withdonations, fund-raising, enterprise support, and community participationcreates an appearance of more decentralization than may actually be takingplace. The SEC itself has taken pains to defend its position as the primaryfinancial supporter of China's vast educational system: `` It is a mistake to thinkthat most of China's education funding comes from donations'' (Xinhua, 1997a,p. 1). Vice Minister Cheng Zhili states that 74 percent of all educational fundingcomes from state revenues (up from the 40 percent figure cited two years earlier)and while he encourages local levels to seek diversified sources of funding, theamount that is raised in this manner is `` peanuts compared to governmentappropriations for education'' (Xinhua, 1997a, p. 2). He is referring, of course, togovernment at all levels, China's `` state corporatism'', but in this view,government is government, whether it is at the village level or in Beijing. Aswas demonstrated in the 1994 tax recentralization, what has been granted to thelocalities can be quickly withdrawn.

Nevertheless, even a 24 percent level of non-governmental fundingrepresents a significant shift for China's educational establishment (up from 19percent in 1993, China Daily, 1999a). And, although the bulk of the fundingcomes from state sources, the central government's role has been considerablyreduced. With increased fiscal responsibility has come a diversifiedadministrative structure for China's schools. Prior to 1991 there were virtuallyno laws governing education. Now laws and regulations have been drafted atboth the central and local levels:

. 1991 `` Law of compulsory education'' covering 30 provinces,autonomous regions and municipalities.

. 1993 a whole series of laws regarding teachers, the handicapped,community-run schools, vocational and technical education, highereducation, educational finance, fund-raising, and science and technology(State Education Commission, 1994).

Supervision of education, once a matter solely for the central authorities, now isapplied through a hierarchy whereby government agencies above the countylevel, supervise, evaluate, and examine authorities at lower levels. There aremultiple layers of educational supervision:

. The National Educational Supervision Agency operates centrally and ismade up of a Supervisor General, two deputies, and 61 supervisors


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invited from relevant ministries, commissions, provinces, autonomousregions, and municipalities.

. Local governments have corresponding organs at different levels downto the county level. Currently about 97 percent of all cities andprefectures have such agencies as do about 90 percent of the counties(State Education Commission, 1994).

The supervisors are responsible for assuring that the various laws andregulations are followed by local authorities and educators. As for the schoolsthemselves, village government has been given responsibility for runningprimary schools (60 percent of China's primary school cohort resides in over700,000 villages throughout China), and county government has responsibilityfor running secondary schools (Cheng, 1997). This means that they haveresponsibility for finding financing for the schools, for appointment andretention of teachers, and limited authority over the curriculum. Nevertheless,China's central educational authorities, the SEC, continues to help `` guide''decentralization as in the recent effort to establish pilot programs in Shanghai,Tantai, and Dalian to promote `` quality based education'' (China Daily, 1997).Selected schools develop programs to serve as models of quality education forlocal decentralized schools; the SEC thus does not order locally run schools tobehave in a certain manner but rather demonstrates by experimental model(Xinhua, 1995).

While the government or state-run primary and secondary schools, by farthe largest educational sector, have been variously decentralized, a variety ofnon-governmental, or semi-private, precollegiate schools have been allowed toemerge. In 1994 it was estimated that there were more than 40,000 privateschools in China (Kwong, 1996). At the 1992 Fourteenth Congress of the CPCthe principle of `` creating a favorable environment for the emergence of privateeducation'' was endorsed (Mok and Wat, 1998, p. 258). Initially focused onhigher education, by 1993 private schools included basic primary andsecondary education as well as kindergartens. And, as recently as June 1999,Premier Zhu Rongji affirmed that as long as non-state run schools operate inthe context of relevant state laws and regulations they should be encouraged(China Daily, 1999a).

The government still avoids the use of the term `` private'' when discussingthese schools and generally uses the term `` non-state run'' or `` minban'' todescribe what are essentially private schools. Mok (1997) notes that it isdifficult to differentiate precisely between minban (run by citizens) and private.In the former, funds are provided by communities or collectives and in thelatter by individuals or enterprises. The principal distinction between them andgovernment schools, however, is that these private initiatives are basically self-supporting utilizing a variety of funding mechanisms (tuition, overseas Chinesesupport, enterprises, debentures, etc.) and as we shall see, are able to deviatefrom the state curriculum.


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One outcome of the emergence of private schools is that family saving andspending habits are changing. In Guangdong province, for example, it isreported that over the past three years average family educational expenditureshave grown by 12 percent annually (China Daily, 1999b). This is higher thanspending patterns for entertainment and travel. Savings rates are also growingwith funds earmarked for education (China Daily, 1999b).

As in other areas of decentralization, much of the impetus for allowing amore flexible policy toward private education had to do with the fiscal retreatof the state from public education. At a recent conference in Beijing it wasnoted that public schools are not capable of handling all of the educationalneeds of the city, fund cuts had caused problems of educational quality andthere has been an increased public demand for educational alternatives (Tang,1999). It was urged that private schools be accepted on the same level as publicschools, present their graduates with recognized certificates, investors in suchschools should be able to reap a profit and municipal government should assistprivate efforts by providing buildings and facilities creating a kind of`` education industry'' (Tang, 1999, p. 1).

Although private initiatives represent a small percentage of all precollegiateschooling in China, they are particularly important in the rural areas wheregovernment cutbacks have resulted in setbacks for the educational reformefforts initiated in 1985 and 1993. They represent an alternative to the lowquality and high cost of government schools and are playing a significant rolein realizing the nine-year compulsory education policy in rural areas (Lin,1997). At the other end of the spectrum, well-endowed private schools boastingto be schools for `` aristocrats'' and elites and charging high fees or debenturesalso offer high quality alternatives for China's new elites (Mok, 1997). Whilethese efforts clearly represent a significant form of decentralization for China'svast educational system, it is also clear that the central government is carefullywatching and monitoring these developments.

Curriculum reformsControl over the content of schooling is usually one of the last areas that centralauthorities are willing to decentralize. This is as true for centralized, democraticstates such as Japan, as it is for centralized, Leninist states such as China. Thecentral educational authorities in China keep close watch on school leavingqualifications, textbooks, and curriculum and while there is some tolerance fordiversity it is quite limited (Bray, 1999). Much more leeway is allowed in highereducation (Mok and Wat, 1998; Hawkins, 1999). Within the nine-yearcompulsory cycle the SEC maintains central control in core subject areas andareas where they have a particular interest (such as moral-political education)(Hawkins et al., 1999). A statewide curriculum framework was drafted in 1992and implemented in 1993. Most courses are compulsory with some options atthe junior secondary level. While this effort was principally carried out bycentral authorities certain components were developed jointly between central


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and local authorities under the policy that `` local authorities will also undertakesome responsibility'' for curriculum development (State EducationCommission, 1994).

What decentralization has occurred has been in the context of a shift in focusfor precollegiate education, away from the exam centered model, the 100 marksystem of grading and toward what has variously been described as `` qualityeducation'' (Xinhua, 1997a, 1997b). Flexibility to introduce new subjects at thelocal level appear to be limited to aesthetic education programs such as art,music, singing, sports, vocational skills, and of course anything to do withcomputers (Cui, 1999a, 1999b; Xinhua, 1997c). Even so, the SEC sets standardsand provides guidance on how these new subjects should be developed[1]. Andfinally, the newly developed private schools appear to be able to deviate furtherfrom SEC approved curricula but again, primarily in selected areas (computersand foreign languages) (Mok, 1997).

The area of teacher education is another that has experienced limiteddecentralization. Several teacher education institutions have responded to theeducational reforms by altering the methods of preparing teachers, for exampleby introducing the 3 + 1 approach (three years of academic discipline-orientededucation and one year of teacher training) and by developing `` hot'' programsand topics such as accounting, business administration, foreign languages,tourism, and business communication (Shen, 1994). But as one insider noted,`` the Commission of Education has no intention of giving up the independentteacher education system (normal universities, shifandaxue) and believes thatthe latter is still an effective mechanism to train teachers'' (Shen, 1994, p. 68). Itthus appears that while the dominant political-economic climate is movingtoward marketization, and significant progress has been made in educationaldecentralization, the areas of teacher preparation and curriculum control remainrather highly centralized. One result is that prospective teacher applicants aremoving on to other opportunities rather than go into teaching (Shen, 1994).

Strengths and weaknessesAs has been noted above, fiscal decentralization was a prime motive foreducational decentralization. However as Cheng notes, `` The beauties ofdecentralization participation, community involvement, local sensitivity, andall that have occurred in the Chinese reform. However, such benefits oftenoccurred independent of intent'' (Cheng, 1997, p. 396). Even the fiscal elementsof decentralization have been in some cases costly. One major study concludedthat, `` We find that a higher degree of fiscal decentralization of governmentspending is associated with lower provincial economic growth over the past 15years. This is a significant and robust finding'' (Tao and Zou, 1998, p. 221).Variation in provincial resources has a strong effect on the benefits of fiscaldecentralization. Decentralization seems to be working well if the locality isalready doing well economically. Poorer areas are wishing that the state weremore involved. Articles have appeared that call for the county and centralauthorities to pick up more of the cost and management of education which


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would represent a major reversal of decentralization leading to re-centralization(Cheng, 1994, p. 268). The Chinese state appears to be caught between acentralist, corporatist ideology (Leninism) and an economic market movementtoward decentralization, which is dragging other social sectors, such aseducation, along.

This contradiction has been recognized at the very highest levels and amongeducators. No less a personage as Zhu Rongji has stated that there remains acontinuing problem of disengaging the huge government bureaucracy from localmanagement decentralization reforms (Xinhua News China News Agency, 1999).Government cadres continue to meddle in local reforms in efforts to hang on topower. ``Delegating power and conceding profits'' has clearly resulted in someeconomic gains but also has created economic fiefdoms and regional protectionism(Inside Mainland China, 1997, p. 1). CPC cadres are being charged with attemptingto `` recover planned economics style power'' and basically recentralizing power atthe local level (Inside Mainland China, 1997, p. 2). This has resulted in the creationof redundant bureaucracies with numerous laws and regulations that in factinhibit individuals and enterprises seeking to take advantage of the devolution ofpower and authority by Beijing in such areas as education.

Educators have also spoken out on the lack of progress in educationaldecentralization. At a conference held in Beijing by the Chinese People'sConsultative Conference it was noted that the SEC is the ``most conservative of allthe ministries and commissions'' (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1998, p. 2).The SEC is characterized as being backward and rooted in the planned economymode, basically maintaining a monopoly on educational matters.

How much decentralization reforms have contributed to a decline inattainment, literacy and other educational measures is also an area of debate.Some scholars have argued that the fiscal reforms may have had a negativeeffect on educational attainment as measured by enrollments, rural-urbandisparities, and drop-out rates (Bakken, 1988; Pepper, 1990; Lo, 1994). A morerecent quantitative study, however, suggests a more complicated picture (Tsui,1997). Regional disparities indeed exist, `` In the post-Mao era of fiscaldecentralization there has been a strong incentive for local governments toinvest in projects which can quickly earn profits and generate taxrevenues. . .with the result that investment in education has been a lowpriority'' (Tsui, 1997, p. 108). Yet, it does not appear that there has been anoverall decline in enrollments and attendance in primary and lower-secondaryschools. Nor is there any strong evidence to suggest that literacy has sufferedas a result of the reforms although the Chinese government seems concernedabout it (Tsui, 1997; State Education Commission, 1994). Tsui's study presentsa complex picture of the effect of the fiscal and educational decentralization oneducational attainment arguing that one must not deduce regional andinterregional problems for national problems. Nevertheless, he concludes, `` inabsolute terms, there are still many children who cannot go to school forvarious reasons'' (Tsui, 1997, p. 127).


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The rising number of private schools has also been a cause for alarm amongChina's educational leaders. In 1997 the State Council issued a documententitled: `` Stipulations for schools run through the energies of society'' (InsideMainland China, 1998). Unwilling to use the term `` private'' schools, theseschools are now known officially by this rather awkward phrase: `` schools runthrough the energies of society''. Among the problems identified by educationalofficials are that many of these schools are only for the rich, they deviateexcessively from the approved state curriculum, school administrators do notfollow the approved regulations, there is too much emphasis on turning a profitand they follow a `` patriarchal'' management style (i.e. tyrannical) (InsideMainland China, 1998, p. 3). However, the worst problem noted is the agingteaching force. Interviews that were conducted in Jiangsu province and NanjingCity revealed that principals and teachers of private schools are primarilyretired personnel. Most of them were over 60 years old and while older mightmean more experienced it is argued that these teachers are hopelessly out ofdate with respect to teaching methods and new technologies. In one school,when students argued that they `` wanted to get on the net'', the principalobjected saying `` Get on what net? Our school has only a little space. How couldwe build a tennis court?'' (Inside Mainland China, 1998, p. 3).

ConclusionWhat can be said about China's educational reforms and decentralizationeffects? Have they been successful, unsuccessful? Going back to Hanson (1998)and Bray (1999) it seems clear at this stage that China's decentralization fits thegeneral definition of a transfer of authority (particularly financial) and decision-making from higher to lower levels but it is less clear whether this is a completedevolution or more of a delegation of authority. Decentralization in Chinaappears to have characteristics of both. The center keeps close watch on thechanges that have taken place and in a corporatist political economy, with asingle dominant party retaining Maoist and Leninist aspects, it is unlikely thata genuine devolution of authority can take place.

Furthermore, one might question whether it should at this stage in China'sdevelopment. China, unlike other socialist states in transition, has movedcautiously in all of its efforts to disengage the state from various aspects ofChinese society and as a result has avoided some of the catastrophic problemsother nations have faced. Decentralization per se is not necessarily a goodthing. There is a role for central government to play during a transitionalperiod that helps maintain stability and resolve regional inequities. Yet, thereduced visibility and participation of the central state in educational mattershas changed the way local citizens, particularly in the rural areas, view thestate. The very term `` state'' is much more vague now, leading some scholars toconclude that the legitimacy of the state has eroded: `` . . . the state iscontinuously undermining its old foundations of legitimacy. It is alsocontinuously nurturing a new kind of legitimacy which makes decentralizationirreversible'' (Cheng, 1994, p. 267).


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In the long run, this may be true but as was shown in the re-centralization ofthe tax process the state can quickly reassert itself. There is mounting concernin Beijing about the quality of schooling, particularly private schools, and theSEC is defensive about a perception that decentralized education is superior tothe former state-controlled model. They just do not have the financial resourcesany longer to run everything. What is emerging is a complex mix ofprecollegiate schooling opportunities with the state providing `` guidance'', rulesand regulations to the three-tiered system: public-state supported schools,public-community run schools (minban), and variations of private schools.

Thus in a nation as large and disparate as China it is difficult to reach anyspecific conclusions as to what has worked and what has not worked in the currenteducational reform movement. Decentralization seems to be working in someselected areas and not working in others. The central authorities seem conflictedabout how much authority and responsibility they want to devolve to the locallevel, and CPC cadres operating at the local level have created re-centralizedregimes of their own. What does seem clear is that there are both strengths andweaknesses to China's approach to decentralization, and it remains to be seen whatspecific strategies will be used to resolve some of these contradictions.

Note

1. An interesting variant of curricular decentralization is a program initiated by the SEC toencourage primary and middle school teachers to develop innovative teaching soft-wareand send it to the Texbook Department of the SEC for possible inclusion in officiallyapproved curricula (Cui, 1999c).

References and further reading

Bahl, R.W. (1998), `` China: evaluating the impact of intergovernmental fiscal reform'', inBird, R.M. and Vaillancourt, F. (Eds), Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries,Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Bakken, B. (1988), `` Backwards reform in Chinese education'', The Australian Journal of ChineseAffairs, Vol. 19/20, pp. 127-63.

Bray, M. (1999), `` Control of education: issues and tensions in centralization and decentralization'',in Arnove, R.F. and Torres, C.A. (Eds), Comparative Education: The Dialectic of the Globaland the Local, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD.

British Broadcasting Corporation (1998), `` Education commission criticized as too conservative,creativity stifled'', 19 June.

Cheng, K.M. (1994), `` The changing legitimacy in a decentralizing system: the state and educationdevelopment in China'', International Journal of Educational Development, Vol. 14 No. 3,pp. 265-9.

Cheng, K.M. (1997), `` The meaning of decentralization: looking at the case of China'', inCummings, W.K. and McGinn, N.F. (Eds), International Handbook of Education andDevelopment: Preparing Schools, Students and Nations for the Twenty-first Century,Pergamon, New York, NY.

China Daily (1997), `` China: quality oriented education to speed up'', 4 September, pp. 1-3.

China Daily (1999a), `` Education deserves top role'', 21 June, pp. 1-2.

China Daily (1999b), `` Chinese families spend more on child education '', 3 July, pp. 1-2.

Cui, L. (1993), `` New target for educational reform'', Beijing Review, 31 May-6 June, pp. 13-18.

Cui, N. (1999a), `` Guizhou schools try new approaches'', China Daily, 2 June, p. 1.


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Cui, N. (1999b), `` Hunan schools provide example'', China Daily, 3 June, p. 1.

Cui, N. (1999c), `` Software to push education'', China Daily, 15 July, p. 1.

Hanson, M.E. (1998), `` Strategies of educational decentralization: key questions and core issues'',Journal of Educational Administration, Vol. 36 No. 2, pp. 111-28.

Hawkins, J.N. (1973), `` Deschooling society Chinese style: alternative forms of non-formaleducation'', Educational Studies, Fall, pp. 1-10.

Hawkins, J.N. (1999), `` Recent higher education reform in China: problems and prospects'', ESTPConference Proceedings, ESTP Press, Paris.

Hawkins, J.N., Zhou N.Z. and Lee, J. (1999), `` Values education in China'', in Tatto, T., Cummings,W. and Hawkins, J. (Eds), Values Education: A Comparative Study.

Inside Mainland China (1997), `` The role of local party and government agencies after `delegatingpower and conceding profits''', 1 October, pp. 1-3.

Inside Mainland China (1998), `` Problems for private schools'', 1 October, pp. 1-4.

Kwong, J. (1996), `` Introduction'', Chinese Education, Vol. 29 No. 5, pp. 3-6.

Lin, J. (1997), `` Introduction'', Chinese Education, Vol. 30 No. 1, pp. 3-7.

Lo, L.N. (1994), `` The changing educational system: dilemma of disparity'', in Cheng, J. andBrosseau, M. (Eds), China Review 1993, Chinese University Press, Hong Kong.

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