1

“Parliamentarization” of CFSP – a wishful thinking or a rational choice.1

Introduction

Between international organizations and parliaments there has never been

love either at first or at second sight.2 In this sense the European Union (EU) is no

different. But love is not compulsory for a political system working successfully

and effectively. However, the post-Lisbon EU foreign policy can hardly be called a

success with the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) being an example of

rather opposite. The circle of war, instability, radicalization and humanitarian

disaster around the EU is so much different from ENP initial goal of prosperous

neighbours, sharing the common values of human rights, democracy and the rule

of law.

Certainly, it was a combination of flaws, which led to the frustrating result,

requiring a closer look at all components of the EU external relations. From this

perspective institutional framework must be no exception, moreover in the context

of it being a major target for the Lisbon transformations aimed at ensuring that

Europe “speaks in one voice” in its international relations. This article provides an

insight into the institutional system of the EU external relations. It focuses on the

current institutional role of the European Parliament (EP) within the Common

Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and in a wider context of EU foreign policy.

The article argues that the current intergovernmental set-up of the CFSP is one of

the key reasons for EU international under-performance. In this context the article

discusses potential benefits of “parlimentarization” of this policy area, implying

under this term EP’s involvement into the entire policy cycle, including

preparation and formation of CFSP as well as supervision over its

implementation.3

This article argues that the “parliamentarization” of CFSP provides a practical

and comprehensive solution to a number of diverse problems that EU has

encountered recently. Besides considerable reinforcement of the EU foundations

by connecting CFSP with a grand theory of democratic legitimacy, this process

enhances transparency, coherence and effectiveness of the policy formation

process as well as the accountability of the executives involved in this policy area. 1 Moskalenko Oleksandr, PhD candidate University of Turku (Finland), olmymo@utu.fi

2 J. Wouters & K. Raube, Europe's Common Security and Defence Policy: The Case for Inter-Parliamentary

Scrutiny, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies Working Paper No. 90, 2012, p. 8 3 Jü. Mittag &, W. Wessels, The Parliamentary Dimension of CFSP/ESDP. Options for the European Convention.

Study submitted for the European Parliament Directorate-General for Research under Contract No IV/2002/01/01

Final report”, p. 17.

2

Separately should be stressed its potential in terms of facilitating the formation of

genuinely common European policy based on the values declared by the Lisbon

treaty.

The article consists of five sections accompanied by introduction and

conclusion. Section I provides the background of the research with the analysis of

specific features of EU foreign policy as well as the current legal framework of

EP’s involvement in the EU external relations. Section II studies the existing

problems of CFSP, which are mostly associated with the intergovernmental mode

of its formation. Section III scrutinizes theoretical reasoning for EP’s deeper

involvement into policy formation process, concentrating on the arguments of

“democratic deficit” and “democratic legitimacy” with further extrapolating this

reasoning to the unique EU political environment. Section IV moves from theory

to practical challenges and analyses the potential, which “parliamentarization” has

in the context of meeting those challenges. Section V concentrates on the final

stage of the policy cycle providing the study of potential benefits of EP’s enhanced

role for the control over policy implementation process, which includes EP’s

relations with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and

Security Policy (“HR”), the European External Action Service (EEAS) and heads

of EU delegations.

I. Asymmetric policy area and split competences.

This section provides the background of the study examining specific features

of the EU as an international actor and the legal framework of EP’s involvement

into its foreign policies. The overwhelming dominance of the civilian tools is a

paramount fact, which shapes the entire structure of the EU external relations.

Despite previously raised hopes,4 the Lisbon treaty was not a break-through in

terms of the EU military capacities, reaffirming the ironic definition of the EU as

“economic giant, political gnome and military worm”.5 Thus, the concept of

normative power supported by economic means of influence remains the major

relevant explanatory model for the EU impact on the international politics. The

first post-Lisbon HR Baroness Ashton stressed that the EU “cannot deploy

gunboats or bombers”, instead by her opinion the strength of the EU “lies,

4 S. Stavridis, “Why the ‘Militarising’ of the European Union is strengthening the concept of a ‘Civilian power

Europe”, European University Institute Working Paper 17, 2001. 5 A. Plecko, “Die Nato ist die Eintrittskarte in die EU”, Wall Street Journal, 28 September 2014,

http://www.wsj.de/nachrichten/SB10349853011903034570704580177690824385742?mg=reno64-wsjde

3

paradoxically in its inability to throw its weight around”.6 Indeed those are trade,

aid and development assistance, which have traditionally been at the core of the

EU ability to exert its influence and promote its values beyond the territory of its

Member States.7 Therefore, from the perspective of synergy development CFSP

should be increasing functioning as ‘nexus decisions’ linked to other external

relations areas, foremost trade and development, rather than an isolated policy.8

The Lisbon treaty considerably enhanced EP’s position in most of the

policies, other than CFSP. The new formula, which inter-connected the consent

right with the ordinary legislative procedure,9 covers 87 different policy areas.

10 In

this sense trade, aid and development policies fall within the referred pattern of

strengthened EP’s role. Trade as the essential part of the Common Commercial

Policy (CCP) falls within the exclusive EU competence,11

meanwhile aid and

development policies represent a specific case of competence division, with the

Union having competence to conduct a common policy; however, without

preventing Member States from exercising theirs.12

In the practical sense as all

those policies are legislated in accordance with the ordinary legislative

procedure.13

For the CCP EP has become one of the key actors.14

In terms of

assistance to third countries EP not only co-decides with the Council on the

development cooperation instrument, but also on the financing aspects of all other

instruments,15

thus enjoying an equal footing with the Council in terms of formal

policy-making powers in this field.16

In terms of international agreements in these

policies, the procedure requires EP’s consent for all three cases.17

In a wider context Art. 218 TFEU and the framework agreement of 201018

confirmed a number of EP’s important rights, emphasizing the general principle of

6 Speech of Baroness Ashton at Corvinus University, Budapest, Hungary of 25.02.2011.

http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/126 7 D. Mix, “The European Union Foreign and Security Policy”, Congress Research Service 7-5700, 2013, p. 20

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41959.pdf 8 J. Wouters & K. Raube, opt. cit, p. 9

9 Art. 218 TFEU

10 T. Tiilikainen, The empowered European Parliament: Accommodation to the new functions provided by the

Lisbon Treaty. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. FIIA Briefing Paper 91, November 2011, p. 4 11

Art. 3 TFEU 12

Art. 4 (4) TFEU 13

Art. 207, 209, 212-214 TFEU 14

T. Tiilikainen, opt. cit, p. 7 15

In particular: Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, Instrument for European Neighbourhood Policy Initiative,

Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, Partnership Instrument and European Instrument for Democracy and

Human Rights 16

P. Bajtay, Shaping and controlling foreign policy. Parliamentary diplomacy and oversight, and the role of the

European Parliament. Belgium, 2015, p.27 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/search.html?authors=25360 17

Art. 218 (6 a (v)) TFEU 18

Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission, OJ [2010]

L 304/47, 20.11.2010.

4

equal treatment with the Council.19

These privileges, solidly based on the “hard

power” consent right and accompanied by its traditional agenda for foreign

policies, made EP an independent and powerful player in EU external relations.20

Moreover, EP managed to use the post-Lisbon institutional uncertainty to

successfully reinterpret its right to be “informed” in international negotiations and

transformed it into a right to be “involved”,21

by providing ex-ante control as

well.22

This raised its status to the position capable of steering negotiators’ agenda

and controlling the negotiation process.23

In this sense EP’s resolutions play a

double-fold role of highlighting its priorities to the target country and being inter-

institutional communication tools, thus providing “a second mandate” for the

Council and Commission.24

The case of the EU-South Korea negotiations is a

particular illustration of the new EP’s role,25

with a number of other examples

being provided in the academic literature.26

In the de facto preserved “second pillar” of CFSP, which continues to be

based on special rules,27

EP’s competences are much narrower. A number of

informational rights are secured by Art. 36 TEU, however EP is formally excluded

from conclusion of international agreements28

as well as from the policy formation

process. Those are the European Council and the Council, which shape the policies

and adopt decisions as for the operational action by the Union within this area.29

Although EP is to be informed of all the European Council decisions,30

this right

does not let it into the policy formation process as the Council does not have any

formal obligations, should EP adopt any document in this regard.

19

Point 9, ibid. 20

R. Passos, The European Union’s External Relations a Year after Lisbon: a First Evaluation from the European

Parliament in The European Union’s External Relations a Year after Lisbon 49- 56, at 51 CLEER working paper

No. 3 (P. Koutrakos ed. the Hague 2011). 21

Ariadna Ripoll Servent (2014) The role of the European Parliament in international negotiations after Lisbon,

Journal of European Public Policy, vol.21, issue 4, p. 568-586, p. 580 22

Rossi, Lucia Serena (2011): A New Inter-Institutional Balance: Supranational vs. Intergovernmental Method after

the Lisbon Treaty. In: The European Union after the Lisbon Treaty: Visions of Leading Policy-Makers, Academics

and Journalists. Luxembourg, Directorate-General for Education and Culture, 90-107, at p. 102. 23

A.Servent, opt cit., p. 580 24

R. Passos, The European Union’s External Relations a Year after Lisbon: A First Evaluation from the European

Parliament. In: Koutrakos, Panos (ed.) The European Union’s External Relations a Year after Lisbon. Cleer

Working Papers 2011/3, 2011, pp. 49-56, p. 55. 25

M. Elsig, & C. Dupont, ‘European Union meets South Korea: bureaucratic interests, exporter discrimination and

the negotiations of trade agreements’, Journal of Common Market Studies 50(3), 2012 492–507. 26

S. Stavridis & D. Irrera (eds.), The European Parliament and its International Relations, Routledge, 2015 27

W. Wessels & F. Bopp, The Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty: Constitutional

Breakthrough or Challenges ahead? CEPS Challenge Research Paper, No. 10, (Brussels 2008), p. 2.

http://aei.pitt.edu/9403/ 28

Art. 218 (6) TFEU 29

Art. 22 (1), 26, 28 (1), 29 TEU. 30

Art. 15 (6 d) TEU

5

All obligations towards EP are placed onto HR, who is formally obliged “to

ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into

consideration”.31

However, his/her major responsibility is to put CFSP into

effect.32

The practical aspects of Art. 36 TEU implementation are regulated by the

Inter-Institutional agreement of 2013, establishing a specific format of regular

political dialogue on CFSP and reports about the implementation of CFSP on a

quarterly basis.33

Nonetheless, with EP remaining formally excluded from CFSP

formation process as well as from adoption of instruments;34

it is often called an

“ex post facto information receiver”.35

The remaining split of EU foreign policy is illogical from the perspective of

already submitted interconnection between CFSP and other areas of foreign policy

as well as blurred borderlines in-between them. Furthermore, any form of external

action can be brought within the term of “foreign and security policy”, which

obviously develops into the problem of overlapping competences.36

Against this

background, the asymmetry of EP’s competences has already developed into a

separate institutional problem with a practical case of EU “targeted sanctions”,37

being an illustration of inter-institutional tensions.38

In a wider context the split of

EP’s competences causes its under-performance within the EU foreign policy as

formal limits of the CFSP considerable restricts the options for this policy area.

Further on the article studies benefits of the CFSP “parliamentarization”,

reaffirming the general argument of the article as for the potential that this process

possesses in terms of enhancing the EU international performance.

II. What is the problem?

This section studies structural flaws of the CFSP formation process, arguing

that the existing framework undermines the development EU foreign policy. For

31

Art. 36 TEU 32

Art. 22 (1) TEU 33

Section E of Part II of Inter-institutional Agreement of 02.12. 2013 between the European Parliament, the Council

and the Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial

management OJ [2013] C 373/01, 20.12 2013 34

Art. 25 TEU 35

S. Stavridis, The CFSP/ESDP, Parliamentary Accountability, and the ‘Future of Europe’ Convention Debate.

Working Paper No. 42, (Barcelona 2003), p. 3. 36

J. Schmidt, The High Representative, the President and the Commission—Competing Players in the EU’s

External Relations: The Case of Crisis Management /in EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon

Era. Cardwell P.J. (Ed.) T.M.C. ASSER PRESS, The Hague, 2012. P. 161-180. At 173-175 37

D. Cortright et al, Targeted Financial Sanctions: Smart Sanctions that Do Work, in Smart Sanctions. Targeting

Economic Statecraft 23-41 (D. Cortright & G. Lopez eds., Maryland 2002). 38

P. van Elsuwege, The Adoption of ‘Targeted Sanctions’ and the Potential for Inter-institutional Litigation after

Lisbon, 7 Journal of Contemporary European Research 4, 488-499 (2011).

6

decades EU foreign policy has been associated with “a lack of leadership,

continuity, consistency and diplomatic resources”.39

One of the major goals of the

Lisbon reforms was to rectify those defects. However, the post-Lisbon CFSP

“intergovernmental construction” is still associated with the lack of strategic

coherence and lack of “a spirit of unity, coherence and efficiency”, subsequently

leading to a weak international EU actorness.40

Supporting this claim, the article

submits that the intergovernmental policy formation mode prevents the formation

of consistent and coherent European foreign policy. Defining the

intergovernmental mode, the article refers to the combination of features, which

include the national veto right, dominance of national executives and the formal

exclusion of EP from the process.

The Member States’ veto right41

is one of the intergovernmental fetishes

within CFSP, which determines the framework of this policy area. Certainly, it is

one of the major reasons for the national-based policy formation mode, which,

however, meets the intention of the Member States (particularly the large and

powerful ones) to have own agendas for foreign policy. They have little intention

of letting HR assume an automatic lead on policy issues, particularly sensitive

ones, thus preventing him/her from creating her/his own political direction,

especially if it is proactive and robust.42

Therefore, EU foreign policy is often

associated with the leaders of the EU largest countries: Germany, France and the

UK. An illustration for this argument is a rather dubious situation of Egypt in the

aftermath of the “Arab spring”, when the new Egyptian government declared that

they are “too busy” to receive HR,43

however, about two weeks later they

welcomed the UK Prime Minister.44

Thus, the current national-based mode of CFSP formation, built around the

national veto right, constitutes “a principal obstacle to a more proactive EU foreign

policy”45

with at least three reasons to mention. First of all, it may prevent the

development of any policy at all,46

which is quite often the case. Moreover, instead

of developing a genuinely all-European policy this mode implies the coordination

39

J. Paul, “EU Foreign Policy after Lisbon. Will the New High Representative and the External Action Service

Make a Difference?” Center for Applied Policy (CAP) Policy Analysis. № 2, 2008, p. 8

http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2009/785/pdf/CAP_Policy_Analysis_2008_02.pdf 40

L. Corduneanu, “CFSP – vacillating between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism?”, CES Working

Papers, 6(1) 2014, p. 58 http://journals.indexcopernicus.com/issue.php?id=9384&id_issue=873835 41

Art. 31 (1) TEU 42

J. Howorth, “Catherine Ashton’s Five-Year Term: A Difficult Assessment”, Les Cahiers européens de Sciences,

03/2014, p. 20 http://www.cee.sciences-po.fr/en/publications/les-cahiers-europeens/2014/doc/1142/raw 43

“Don’t visit us for the moment, Egypt tells EU’s Ashton” Reuters News, 09.02.2011. 44

N. Gros-Verheyde, “La ‘course du Caire’, nouveau jeu européen. Ou comment griller la politesse à Lady Ashton”,

Bruxelles, 21.02.2011. 45

Paul, opt. cit, p. 30 46

D. Mix, opt. cit, p. 2

7

and unification of policies generated in national capital, with HR being burdened

with this duty. So, s/he is forced to play the role of the mediator shuttling between

the capitals and negotiating the compromises, being “caught somewhere between a

responsibility to coordinate and a responsibility to exercise some measure of

leadership”.47

However, the nature of such a coordination process is certainly

different from genuine policy formation. In many ways it is similar to consensus-

building, which is dealt with below. Furthermore, the absence of strategic policies

can hardly be compensated by any reactive actions, which is especially true for

rapidly developing crises.

The practical case of the Arab Spring is rather illustrative in this sense, with

HR being “caught in the middle of the chaotic responses forthcoming from the

various member states and proved incapable of leading an orchestra that was

already playing in cacophonic disharmony”.48

With the absence of any common

accords and the critical need for HR to obtain unanimous and full backing from the

Member States for her actions,49

the EU looked rather helpless against the rapidly

deteriorating situation.

A rather similar situation developed in Ukraine. With the outrage of

“Revolution of Dignity”50

Baroness Ashton made several visits to Kyiv. However,

her inability for effective steps and swift withdrawal from the conflict scene led to

caustic remarks, such as “she would have done better to keep out”.51

Furthermore,

“these visits seriously undercut the work being done by Füle and the Commission,

and were uncoordinated with the parallel visit to the Ukrainian capital, on 20

February 2014, of the EU member state troika of Laurent Fabius, Frank-Walter

Steinmeier and Radek Sikorski”.52

It was the cacophony emanating from Europe

that led the US Undersecretary of State, Victoria Nuland, to utter her famous

leaked expletive.53

The second reason is the fact that the national-based policy formation mode

facilitates the fragmentation of the EU foreign policies. In the absence of any

common policy the Member States certainly have an alternative modus operandi,

as they are capable of independent actions or actions within a group. These options

not only create additional pressure on the policy formation process, but also

marginalise CFSP to extraordinary cases of common threats, thus making this

47

Howorth, 2014, opt. cit, p. 20 48

Ibid, p. 15 49

D. Hannay, “Benchmarking the EU’s new diplomatic service”, Europe’s World, 21.01.2011. 50

December 2013-February 2014. 51

P. Lavelle, “The EU’s Ukraine policy: a moral bankruptcy” The Guardian (Sydney), No.1630, 12.03.2014. 52

J. Howorth 2014, opt. cit., p. 19. 53

Ibid, p. 19.

8

policy the “last resort” option against the divergence of national perspectives and

priorities, with Iraq and Kosovo cases being practical illustrations.54

.

The third reason is that the current mode of the policy formation “almost

inevitably” leads to the lack of “strategic thrust or “heroic” objectives”.55

The

diversity of national political interests varies so greatly that a consensus often

requires extraordinary efforts. Moreover, consensus is a matter of degree, “varying

in depth from an agreement on general policy parameters and objectives down to

specific policy details”.56

Against this background the logics of the consensus

building imply the lowest common policy denominators, as they are easiest to

reach within a limited time frame. However, this reality suggests two inevitable

consequences. First, is the constant coordination process, and second is the “thorny

path” from one “lowest common policy denominators” to another. Both

consequences are incompatible with the development of long-term strategies.

Neither consistency of common policy can be reasonably expected under the

circumstances. Ultimately, the process of constant compromises, coordination,

matching and concords between 28 different positions raises basic questions such

as what the policy actually is and who developed it. Under the intergovernmental

set-up, these questions have no answers

III. Why the European Parliament?

This section is focused on providing theoretical reasoning behind the idea of

CFSP “parliamentarization”. It briefly summarizes the major arguments in the

academic debate with further extrapolating them on the specific political

environment of the EU. In this sense the limited participation of national

legislatures in foreign policy of the Member State is a “false friend” for

comparison as the EU “no-state” status leads a number of tricky consequences,

which cannot be ignored without missing the devil in details. But theory comes

first.

Democracy and legitimacy. Separately or together, in one combination of

another these two concepts cover most of theoretic arguments for parliaments to

participate in making public policies and creating compulsory rules.57

From the

ancient Greece till contemporary post-modern societies these concepts continue to

54

D. Mix, opt. cit, p. 8. 55

J. Howorth &A. Menon, “Still Not Pushing Back: Why the European Union is not Balancing the United States”

Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(5), 2009, p. 727-744. 56

D. Mix, opt. cit, p. 9. 57

Jü. Mittag &, W. Wessels, opt.cit, p. 18.

9

shape the configuration of power architecture. There is no surprise that EP has

often been utilizing this type of arguments in its “egoistic” institutional purposes of

appealing for more competences. Although this argumentation got a reference as

“democratic blackmailing”,58

it still remains valid as it refers to the cornerstone

concepts, which have no alternative. Moreover, these concepts are at the core of

the “Western civilization” as a philosophical category, thus providing not only

political or legal but also a philosophical watershed.

Contained in the works the Enlightenment philosophers such as T. Hobbs, Ch.

Montesquieu, J. Locke as well as the US fathers-founders59

these concepts initiated

the modern type of state, and still remain its cornerstone. The same theoretical

tradition was continued by the social philosophers of the post-modern era, with Jü.

Habermass being one of the most famous and most consistent promoters of the

idea of democracy being at the core of legitimacy.60

Although developing

throughout last centuries due to the evolution of the societies, the concepts of

democracy and legitimacy preserved their clear and simple logics as well as their

close interconnection: “in liberal democracies there can be no legitimacy without

democracy and there can be no democracy without representation.”61

J. Rawls

echoes this understanding with the reference to the exceptional rule of these

concepts, stressing that democratic legitimacy is the only form of legitimacy

available to liberal societies. 62

The same concepts of democracy and legitimacy have for decades been at the

core of the European discourse63

with EP being their source for the EU institutional

system.64

It was the extending post-Maastricht “democratic deficit” debate,65

which

transferred the issue of EU democratization into one of the priorities for the Lisbon

reforms. EP was considered to be the key EU institution which would lead to a

new democratic quality for the Union, thus turning the entire EU system into an

58

D. Thym, ‘Beyond Parliament’s Reach? The Role of the European Parliament in the CFSP’, in European Foreign

Affairs Review, Spring 2006, vol. 11, n° 1, pp. 109-127, p. 115-117. 59

A. Hamilton, J. Madison, J. Jay The Federalist Papers, New-York: 1961. 60

Jü. Habermas, Die Postnationale Konstellation und die Zukunft der Demokratie, aus: Habermas, Jürgen. Die

Postnationale Konstellation. Politische Essays. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1998. S. 91—163. 61

Ch. Lord, The political theory and practice of parliamentary participation in the Common Security and Defence

Policy, Journal of European Public Policy, 18:8, 2011, pp. 1133-1150, p. 1147 62

Rawls, J. Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 38 63

Th. Banchoff & M. Smith: Introduction, Conceptualizing legitimacy in a contested polity, in: Th. Banchoff & M.

Smith (eds.): Legitimacy and the European Union, London/New York 1999, pp. 1-23 and A. Moravcsik:

Reassessing legitimacy in the European Union, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 4, 2002, p. 603-624 64

C. Strøby-Jensen, ‘Neo-functionalism’ in Cini, M. and Perez-Solrzano Borrag n, European Union Politics,

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 71-85, p. 75-77. 65

See for example, Decker, Frank. 2002. “Governance Beyond the Nation State. Reflections on the Democratic

Deficit of the European Union,” Journal of European Public Policy, 9, 2, pgs. 256-273; Majone, Giandomenico.

1998. “Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: the Question of Standards,” European Law Journal, 4, 1, pgs. 5-28.

10

“ordinary” democratic system.66

These ideas underlay the Lisbon

“parlimentarization” of the EU institutional system, thus reflecting the

interconnection between the democratic legitimacy at the conceptual level and

increase of EP’s institutional influence.67

The general nature of these concepts is evident as far as public policy is

concern. In a specific example N. Lalone has a sound argument that “democratic

foundation” reasoning would apply equally to CFSP.68

From this perspective no

specific public policy has an exceptional status, at least in theory. However,

traditionally it has been foreign policy, which continues to enjoy a special status of

being the realm of executives inter alia in terms of policy making.69

Nonetheless,

this tradition developed at the national level requires an additional examination in

terms of both reasoning and consequences, rather than being a mere pattern for a

transfer to the EU level.

With a common understanding of foreign policy being a policy of strategic

nature, where choices of values and strategies are made with long-lasting

implications,70

it sounds like a paradox to have against EP’s participation

arguments of secrecy, confidentiality and flexibility.71

At the current level of the

international relations the phase “secret strategy” sounds like an oxymoron

reviving memories of secret pacts, dividing the world into “spheres of influence”.72

Is it the pattern the EU follows? Obviously not. Furthermore, secrecy in the context

of CFSP sounds irrelevant against the background of the wide EP’s involvement in

other areas of the EU external relations. Prof. Lord connects the secrecy and

flexibility arguments with two Locke’s observations of unpredictable nature of

possible dangers and the appeal for a wider margin of freedom for the government

to adequately meet the challenges.73

However, he is rather sceptic towards the

validity of these arguments.74

66

Jü. Mittag &, W. Wessels, opt.cit, p. 12. 67

Bache, I., Bulmer, S. and George, S. (2011) Politics in the European Union, 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University

Press, p. 26-27. 68

N. Lalone, “Accountability in the EU‟s Common Foreign and Security Policy: Lessons from the Common

Commercial Policy.” In Anna Herranz and Esther Barbé (eds.), The Role of Parliaments in European Foreign

Policy: Debating on Accountability and Legitimacy. Oficina d'informació del Parlament Europeu, 2005, p. 9 69

D. Thym, Parlamentsfreier Raum? Die Rolle des Europäischen Parlaments in der Gemeinsamen Außenund

Sicherheitspolitik, www.whi-berlin.de/EPinderGASP.htm 2005, p. 13. 70

P. Bajtay opt. cit., p. 23, 39. 71

J. Böcker, Demokratiedefizit der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der EU? Analyse des deutschen, britischen

und Europäischen Parlaments. Nomos, 2012, p. 23. http://www.nomos-shop.de/14338; D. Peters, W. Wagner, C.

Glahn, Parliamentary Control of Military Missions: The Case of the EU NAVFOR Atalanta. RECON Online

Working Paper 2011/24, 2011. 72

USSR-Germany (Molotov-Ribbentrop) pact of 1939 for example 73

Ch. Lord, opt. cit. p. 1146 74

Ibid

11

Another reason is EP’s limited expertise,75

which sounds rather surprisingly

against the background of current wide EP’s involvement into adjoining areas. In

the course of the 7th legislative term (2009-2014) EP’s Committee on Foreign

Affairs (AFET) adopted 104 reports, 46 own initiative reports and 99 opinions.76

Furthermore, EP’s role certainly differs from that of highly specialized executive

technocrats, as it is to bridge the area of specialised expertise with the public

debate with further reference to the democratic legitimacy.77

EP’s experience in

public debate, political dialogue construction,78

its experience in sensitive

situations79

as well as in policy formation process is certainly able to provide

benefits to CFSP as well. Moreover, AFET members are not only deeply involved

into EU external relations, but also have access to the classified information.80

Perhaps, the last point to make here is the irrelevance between the secrecy

argument and the contemporary requirements for democracy ruling. Despite the

fact that Lisbon treaty has not provided a clear formal solution in terms of “the

tension between effective international security coordination and democratic

accountability,81

it marked the next level of EU development with Art. 10,82

recognizing it as a representative democracy, although some scholars emphasize its

peculiar order.83

From this perspective democracy ruling principles are formulated

as a legal obligation of a higher level traditionally enjoyed by principles in

comparison with other norms. Furthermore, the contemporary development of

post-modern societies has put more pressure on politicians, who are expected to act

within democratic arrangements.84

Thus, the compliance to minimal democratic

standards85

has developed into an absolute must. It is especially true for the EU

with its vulnerable “no-state” status, continuous legitimacy deficit debate and

dependence upon both European public opinion and policies of its Member States.

75

N. Lalone, opt.cit, p. 12. 76

P. Bajtay opt. cit., p. 3. 77

Ibid, p. 40. 78

G. Hamilton, Parliamentary Diplomacy. Adopted by the Committee of Senior Members of the Senate of the States

General, 16.11.2010, p.4. 79

F. Weisglas& G. De Boer, Parliamentary Diplomacy. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 2, 2007, pp. 93-99, p. 96. 80

Inter-institutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the Council concerning the forwarding to and

handling by the European Parliament of classified information held by the Council on matters other than those in the

area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of 12 March 2014. 81

W. Wagner, Demokratische Kontrolle internationalisierter Sicherheitspolitik: Demokratiedefizite bei

Militäreinsätzen und in der europäischen Politik innerer Sicherheit. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010, p. 187. 82

Art. 10 (1) TEU 83

P. Magnette, & K. Nikolaidis, The European Union’s Democratic Agenda. In: M. Telo (ed.): The European Union

and Global Governance. London, Routledge, 2009, pp. 43-63, p. 54. 84

U. Krotz, & R.Maher, International Relations Theory and the Rise of European Foreign and Security Policy.

World Politics 63, no.3, 2014, pp. 548-579, p. 573. 85

J. Bohman, “Democratising the transnational polity: the European Union and the presuppositions of democracy”,

in E.O. Eriksen (ed.), How to Reconstitute Democracy in Europe? Proceedings from the RECON Opening

Conference, RECON Report No 3, Oslo: ARENA, 2007, pp. 65–90.

12

From the experience of foreign policy formation at the national level two

observations must be noted. First is the fact that policy is made by a strong

political player, which is the government. Although the level of its internal

cohesion may vary, depending upon of the principles of its formation in a

particular country, it is still one government, which shares a certain level of

internal unity as well as the common political destiny as a government. In this

sense illustrative are the examples of the USA or UK governments, which are often

referred to for comparison. In both cases the governments play a central role in the

countries’ political establishment, they are strong players, possessing both

influence and resources. The second observation is the existence of rather blurred

(if any) borderlines between making foreign policy and implementing it as the

same people are involved at both levels. From this perspective the references to

secrecy, efficiency and flexibility make sense as they refer to the implementation

stage, which indeed requires them. Thus, the reference to national practices played

a trick with EU as there these stages are separated, at least formally.

Discussing the consequences for the EU of special status of foreign policy at

the national level of Member States, there are three of them to be stressed

separately. First of all, the limited parliamentary scrutiny over foreign policy at the

level of Member States substantiated the “democracy deficit” debate developing it

into “double democracy deficit” argument specifically for CFSP.86

This argument

implies that the involvement of EP into this policy area is crucial from the

perspective of the democratic legitimacy concept as national parliaments do not

fulfil this function.

The second consequence is the fact that executive policy-making mode,

which is typical for the national level is not appropriate for the EU due to the fact

that the Council and/or the European Council differ from national governments as

they are much more amorphous institutions. In this context the question comes

who actually makes CFSP. In reality the vast majority of the “spade work” is done

by auxiliary institutions87

against the format of “typically a three-hour meeting

followed by a two-hour lunch followed by three more hours of “deliberations” of

the institutions”,88

which are formally entrusted with the decision-making

authorities.89

Thus, the entire process is often described as decisions “rubber-

86

P. Bajtay opt. cit., p. 31. 87

J. Howorth, “Decision-Making in Security and Defence Policy: Towards Supranational Intergovernmentalism?”,

KFG Working Paper Series, No. 25, March 2011, p. 23. http://www.polsoz.fu-

berlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/publications/working_paper/index.html 88

Ibid, p.7 89

Art. 22 (1), 26 TEU

13

stamping by politicians”,90

which causes the painful déjà vu feeling with further

short circuit to the “democracy deficit” debate.

The reference to HR in terms of the policy formation process is not

appropriate. Despite the fact that she is quite often associated with the policy

formation,91

in reality she has neither formal competences nor resources to be a

substantial part of it, as the practical cases above demonstrated. However, these

associations emphasize the third consequence, which is the need for a clearer

distinction between policy formation and implementation levels, since the national

“mixed” mode does not fit into the EU level. Moreover, this distinction will allow

specification of debate in terms of EP’s involvement at either level.

Answering the question in the title of this section, the article argues that CFSP

“parliamentarization” provides a complex solution to most of the referred

problems. The first argument is that this development will support the EU unstable

sui generis status of “no-state”. Being such an entity implies difference from state

with all its established attributes of sovereignty, including international actorness.

From this perspective legitimacy develops into an issue of a major importance.92

Furthermore, actions establishing both own EU obligations and obligations for its

Member States require strong source of direct legitimacy, at least comparable with

national legislatures. Thus EP has no alternative. It is the only parliament at the EU

level, it directly elected by the Union’s citizens,93

it is the only institution able to

ensure democratic control over other EU institutions as collective bodies and its

powers and practices are common to the Union as a whole.94

Letting EP play a notable role within CFSP will undermine the “democracy

deficit” debate both in its general and specific “double deficit” formats. However,

this approach implies EP’s involvement into the entire political cycle, which

includes preparation and formation of CFSP as well as the supervision over the

policy implementation.95

For the EU this development promises a number of

benefits. My second argument is that EP’s participation will reinforce current

amorphous and tangled CFSP formation process. In its current state CFSP is

formed neither by legislature nor by executives. EP’s participation will structure

the policy formation process by introducing standard parliamentary procedures.

Against the background of specific aims of any parliament to debate policies

within well-established procedure as well as EP’s huge experience within other 90

Howorth, 2011, opt. cit, p.7 91

J. Paul, opt. cit, p. 17. 92

Jü. Mittag &, W. Wessels, opt.cit, p. 11. 93

Art. 14 TEU 94

Ch. Lord, opt. cit. p. 1143 95

Jü. Mittag &, W. Wessels, opt.cit, p. 17.

14

policy areas,96

this argument looks obvious. This argument is also valid in terms of

division between policy formation and implementation levels as different

procedures of EP’s participation need to be established.

The third argument is the influence of “parliamentarization” on both

European public opinion and partner countries. In this sense EP’s role is diverse

and multifaceted from provoking public resonance and mobilising public opinion97

to bridging CFSP with European public opinion in search of the public support

“and popular commitment for the EU’s global engagement.”98

In a more specific

perspective it should be stressed that foreign policy is now under increasing

pressure for more transparency from the public opinion, which has become

increasingly aware of the impact that international politics have on their lives.99

Furthermore, this policy area still entails high level of potential political risks,100

with the current refugee crisis being an illustration. Therefore the issue of the

public support is a fundamental necessity.101

With the close link between the public

support and democratic legitimacy and accountability issue,102

EP’s involvement

into CFSP formation process does not have an alternative, if the actions and

activities of the EU are to be accepted and supported by the citizens.103

In a wider context, elitism, over-bureaucracy, complexity and the inability to

communicate results continue to be evident features of the European integration

process in the public view.104

Against the background of Europeans losing their

trust in the EU project, the CFSP recurrent case of “democracy deficit” and

“rubber-stamping by politicians” simply does not have a chance to avoid EP being

involved into the entire policy cycle within this area.

Returning to the specific EU “no state” status, it should be emphasized that

EP’s support of particular policies traditionally resulted in more political weight

for the initiatives, thus ensuring a greater leverage to impact international

partners.105

A classic example is the WTO case with former Trade Commissioner

96

Specifically stressing international trade, aid and development policies. 97

D. Viola, European Foreign Policy and the European Parliament in the 1990s: An Investigation into the Role and

Voting Behaviour of the European Parliament’s Political groups. Ashgate, Aldershot, 2000, p. 177. 98

G. Albertini, Gabriele, The role of the European Parliament in the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The

European – Security and Defence Union, 2010, p. 1. 99

Nowotny, Thomas (2011): Diplomacy and Global Governance: The Diplomatic Service in an Age of

Worldwide Interdependence. New Jersey, Edison, Transaction, 2011, p. 155. 100

Ch. Lord, opt. cit. p. 1138-1139. 101

P. Bajtay opt. cit., p. 39. 102

Jü. Mittag &, W. Wessels, opt.cit, p. 1. 103

Ibid. 104

P. Bajtay opt. cit., p. 40. 105

D. Fiott, On the Value of Parliamentary Diplomacy. Madariaga Paper – Vol. 4, No.7, 2011, p. 2.

15

Pascal Lamy being quoted as for the direct interconnection of EP’s stance and

enhanced position of the Commission in the perception of international partners.106

Thus, from the theoretical perspective the “parliamentarization” of CFSP is a

rational process, which is based on grand theories of democracy and legitimacy

and is able to enhance this policy area by installing this theoretical background into

the foundation of the political processes within CFSP. By doing so

“parliamentarization” enhances the internal political stability of the Union and

places the EU into a wider all-European political context, reassuring the

development of the all-European political environment.

IV. From theoretical to practical reasoning.

Besides provided theoretical reasoning CFSP “parliamentarization” has a

number of practical benefits. This section submits that formal connection of public

political debate in EP with CFSP formation process will enhance its consistency,

effectiveness and transparency, simultaneously contributing to the formation of

genuinely common European policy, thus altering the current national-based mode.

The current CFSP rules do not deprive EP of hearing any international topic

with the reference to the general “power of debate” – something, that EP has been

constantly doing since the famous case of Spain Association Agreement of 1962.

The recent example of this practice continuation is the Ukrainian crisis with EP

closing following the development of the situation.107

Thus, EP has been

instinctively doing something that is considered to be the major task of every

parliamentary institution – to debate policies.

In this sense EP has developed an impressive arsenal of instruments including

both “rhetorical actions”108

and traditional parliamentary tools. In particular S.

Stavridis specified: foreign policy debates, declarations, reports and other

rhetorical statements, hearings as well as resolutions and policy

recommendations.109

This list can be specified and extended with rapporteurs,

106

N. Lalone, opt.cit, p. 11. 107

From December 2013 till January 2015 EP adopted 9 special resolutions on Ukraine. 108

F. Schimmelfennig, The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of

the European Union,” International Organization, 55, 1, 2001, p. 48. 109

S. Stavridis, The CFSP/ESDP, Parliamentary Accountability, and the ´Future of Europe´ Convention debate,

Working Paper n. 42, INSTITUT UNIVERSITARI D’ESTUDIS EUROPEUS, Barcelona, 2003, p. 3

16

committees, (special) commissions of inquiry, oral (written) questions110

and

financial/budgetary control.111

However, current “special” CFSP rules formally exclude EP both from policy

formation process and from participation in conclusion of international agreements

within this policy area. It is easier to start with the latter as there is not any valid

argument for this status quo, except for the position of Member States preferring to

keep CFSP intergovernmental. Against the background of EP’s wide involvement

in negotiations of international agreements in adjoining areas of foreign policy

based on its consent right, the traditional arguments of CFSP special nature with

further reference to secrecy, efficiency or time limits sound irrelevant, or even

ridiculous. On the other hand, the benefits of formal EP’s inclusion into the treaty-

making procedure are abundant and similar to those for its participation in the

policy formation process.

This section provides three major practical arguments for EP’s participation

in CFSP formation process, including its participation in the conclusion of

international agreements. First, EP is the only institution capable of being the

forum for shaping common European policies, reassuring the discussion of the

entire spectrum of the existing options and opinions. Furthermore, interconnection

between parliamentary debate and policy formation has traditionally been viewed

as a cornerstone of the process.112

Second, public debate in EP is the only

transparent way to set the CFSP priorities for the limited resources available.113

Third, parliamentary participation will ensure consistency of policies as well as

control over the transformation of the treaty-based Union values to specific

policies, thus ensuring the recognisability of EU foreign policy.

Already in 1970s EP was viewed as “an arena in which every opinion can

produce itself in full light to be tested in adverse controversy”.114

With enhancing

EP’s role in the EU institutional system its function as a potential forum for debate

and launching initiatives was emphasized separately,115

often with further

110

Jü. Mittag &, W. Wessels, opt.cit, p. 25. 111

Ch. Gusy, Parliaments and the Executive: Old Control Rights and New Control Contexts in German. In: Ziegler,

Katja S. – Baranger, Dennis - Bradley, A.W. (eds.): Constitutionalism and the Role of Parliaments. Oxford, Hart

Publishing, 2007, pp. 127-139, p. 132. 112

Witzleb, N., Martínez, A., and P. Winand (eds.), The European Union and Global Engagement Institutions,

Policies and Challenges, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015, p. 23-40; Saurugger, S., Theoretical Approaches to

European Integration, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 304 p. 113

March, J. and Olsen, J. (1995) Democratic Governance, New York: Free Press. 114

Mill, J.S. (1972) [1861] Utilitarianism. On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government, London:

Dent, p. 239–240 115

L. Corduneanu, opt. cit, p. 59.

17

connection to the phenomenon of elite socialization.116

Nowadays provision of a

“grand forum” for discussion of foreign policy is considered to be among EP’s

principal functions.117

There is obviously a match between the pressing necessity to

have a political debate within a highly politicised area, which is CFSP,118

and the

traditional function of parliaments, which is to ensure that policies are discussed

publicly and that reasons for the decision are provided to the public.119

In the EU

the necessity for the debate over foreign policy is even higher than in a state as

besides traditional general reasoning the EU has three own unique reasons.

The common general reasons for the debate are rather straightforward and are

based on a rationale of exposing and discussing diverse views on strategic

direction and policy priorities, thus diminishing potential risks for erroneous

decisions.120

Furthermore, public parliamentary debate ensures the discussion of

the entire spectrum of available solutions. Specific EU reasons include: need of

CFSP compliance with the declared values and principles, need for the formation

of all-European communalities and need to ensure synergy of CFSP with other

areas of foreign policy. Any of these tasks can hardly be achieved with EP’s

remaining formally excluded from the policy formation process.

The initial question for foreign policy formation implies the determination of

values and identities it is intended to defend.121

In the case of the EU these values

are stipulated in the founding treaties122

thus enjoying the highest normative power.

However, the transformation of those values and principle into specific policies

implies a certain degree of control over the policy making process. From this

perspective the article support the argument as for the importance of public control

over any exercise of political power in the context of collective choices of

values.123

In this context parliamentary procedures are sufficient instruments to

secure the compliance of policies with the declared values. Furthermore, the

established EP’s reputation for foreign policy as “the champion of the European

values”124

is a political guarantee for its value-based no compromise debate.

116

Strøby-Jensen, C. (2010) ‘Neo-functionalism’ in Cini, M. and P rez-Sol rzano Borrag n, N., 3rd ed., European

Union Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 71-85, p. 75-77. 117

Edwards, Geoffrey. “The Pattern of the EU’s Global Activity,” in International Relations and the European

Union, Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pg. 57. 118

P. Bajtay opt. cit., p. 39. 119

A. Benz,. “Path-Dependent Institutions and Strategic Veto Players: National Parliaments in the European Union,”

West European Politics, 25, 5, 2004. pp. 875-900. 120

P. Bajtay opt. cit., p. 39. 121

O. Waever, European security identitites’, Journal of Common Market Studies 34(1), 1996, pp. 103–132. 122

Art. 21 TEU 123

Ch. Lord, opt. cit. p. 1136-1137 124

The European Parliament as a champion of European values, Office for Official Publications of the European

Communities, 2008

18

Against the divergence among the Member States on foreign policy issues the

need for the communalities formation is another fundamental challenge for the EU.

Scholars stress the initial steps in the “slowly and painful” process of the

communalities generation.125

From this perspective the existence of the “grand

forum” for the search and debate of the communalities is an absolute must.

Moreover, the formal connection of the parliamentary debate with policy formation

will definitely foster the process as it will alter its mode from its current

intergovernmental setting. Thus, decisions must be based on the common

European interests, implying that these interests have been previously identified,

debated and consolidated. In this sense EP’s role in the consensus building is

supported by the legitimacy argument. In its turn, this consensus building process

can be a solid basis for long-term strategic guidelines, which are desperately

needed to enhance the coherence and consistency of the EU foreign policy.

Perhaps, the last point to make is the need for the “‘cross-pillar’

interactions”,126

or the development of synergy between CFSP and other segments

of foreign policy. In this context EP is also in a unique position as it is already a

part of the policy formation process for trade, aid and development. Moreover, for

decades it has been playing a significant role in terms of democratization and

human rights protection. Thus, EP’s exclusion from CFSP process remains an

illogical anachronism. In the academic debate the idea to “upgrade” EP’s role to

that of an active participant in CFSP decision-making process has been discussed

among “the simplest options to reduce the inconsistency of the Union’s

institutional design” already for a while.127

From the institutional perspective the

establishment of the parity for EP’s competences throughout all foreign policy

areas will result in practical rationality benefits, including the unification of rules

and procedures as well as the simplification and harmonisation of the EU

institutional system. Furthermore, it will certainly reduce transaction costs, which

is often identified as a factor of institutional development.128

V. Scrutinizing executives.

125

U. Guérot, Germany Goes Global: Farewell Europe, European Council on Foreign Relations, in: European

Council on Foreign Relations, 16.09.2010, http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_germany_goes_global/ 126

J. Wouters & K. Raube, opt. cit, p. 18 127

Jü. Mittag &, W. Wessels, opt.cit, p. 26. 128

Stacey, J. & B. Rittberger, ‘Dynamics of Formal and Informal Institutional Change in the EU’, Journal of

European Public Policy, 10(6), 2003, pp. 858-883, p. 866.

19

The parliamentary control over the policy implementation is the last but not

least stage of the political cycle in terms of democratic accountability.129

In this

sense EP’s role can hardly be over-estimated in terms of making executives

provide sufficient information and justify their actions.130

It is necessary to stress

that the post-Lisbon practice considerably progressed along this path, ensuring

EP’s involvement much further than the founding treaties stipulated. However, in

order to develop into a stable functioning system these practices require

formalization with further connection to EP’s formal competence to sanction

executives in case of unsatisfactorily performance.

It should be noted that traditionally EU informal practices aimed at

diminishing tension and inter-organisational conflicts131

are rather based on but not

constrained by the founding treaties and usually go much further than treaty-based

limits. Their scope includes inter-institutional agreements,132

informal

commitments and numerous written and unwritten rules. From this perspective the

post-Lisbon inter-institutional dynamics strengthened the influence of EP, which

enhanced its scrutinizing position towards all three major elements of the post-

Lisbon system of CFSP – HR, EEAS and Union’s delegations.133

EP’s relations with HR are now based on the new Inter-Institutional

agreement of 2013134

and traditional informal commitments practice. Moreover,

the practice of inauguration Commission commitments was spread onto HR.135

Together with a number of other similar documents136

these commitments ensured

substantially deeper EP’s cooperation with HR than the Lisbon treaty required.

Furthermore, HR volunteered for “special relations” with EP, emphasizing its

democratic legitimacy and understanding the importance of parliamentary

accountability.137

129

Hänggi, H. and H. Born ‘Governing the use of force under international auspices: deficits in parliamentary

accountability’. In: SIPRI Yearbook, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 199-222, p. 201. 130

Curtin, D., P. Mair, Y. Papadopoulos. ‘Positioning Accountability in European Governance: An Introduction’.

West European Politics 33, no. 5 (2010): 929 – 945, p. 937 131

J. Stacey, Integrating Europe: Informal Politics and Institutional Change, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010,

p.68 132

О. Moskalenko, “Role of inter-institutional agreements in the rise of European Parliament competences external

relations”, Studia Diplomatica – Brussels Journal of International relations LXVII (1), 2014, p. 15-27. 133

S. Duke, “The Lisbon Treaty and External Relations” Eipascope, 1, 2008, p. 13. http://www.eipa.eu 134

Supra note 33. 135

Hearing with Baroness Ashton at Committee on Foreign Affairs (06.01.2010). Parliament hearing of Mrs.

Mogherini (06.10.2014). 136

High Representative Declaration on Political Accountability (08.07.2010); High Representative Statement on the

basic organization of the EEAS central administration (08.07.2010). 137

K. Raube, “The Emerging Relationship between the European Parliament, the High Representative and the

External Action Service”, Working Paper No. 74, 2011, p. 9.

https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/new_series/wp71-80/wp74.pdf

20

To some extent, HR was driven by institutional reasons aiming at enhancing

her current uncertain position.138

From this perspective the article refers to the

new-institutional approach with its argument of maximization of own self-interests

and preferences,139

as CFSP “parliamentarization” has the potential to reinforce

HR’s institutional role for the implementation level,140

since the reference to

policies and programmes legitimated by EP’s participation will certainly add

his/her actions political weight. Thus, HR’s status of primus inter pares in relations

with the “Group of External Relations Commissioners” will acquire a different

meaning, as the implementation process would imply common responsibility

instead of current dependence of HR upon the commissioners involved.141

In its relations with the EEAS, which is often viewed as the corner stone of

the post-Lisbon architecture of external relations,142

EP used its budgetary leverage

to ensure the accountability of the service. It managed to establish a structured

relationship with the EEAS in terms of political control, supervision and budgetary

oversight.143

Furthermore, EP strengthened its influence after the EEAS reform of

2013,144

thus, going much further, than the Treaties suggested.145

EP also made some steps to ensure its scrutiny over the EU delegations. As

the US experience shows, diplomatic personnel can be held directly accountable,

however, the Lisbon Treaty has not provided for any special procedure in this

sense.146

Nonetheless, EP developed a rule to have heads of the delegations for

EP’s plenary debate before the start of their mission.147

This unofficial rule was

formalized by Rules of Procedure,148

often seen as a specific channel to reinforce

EP’s competences for CFSP matters.149

However, the attempt to develop this

practice into full-scaled US-like congress-hearings failed.150

Quite often the

reference is made to the absence of formal EP’s competence to block the

138

J-C. Piris, The Constitution for Europe: A Legal Analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 154 139

Rosamond, B. (2010) ‘New Theories of European Integration’ in Cini, M. and P rez-Sol rzano Borrag n, N., 3rd

ed., European Union Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 104-122. p.116 140

Art. 22 (1) TEU 141

J. Paul, op. cit., p. 29 142

K. Raube, op. cit., p. 3. 143

Ibid, p. 11 144

D. Fiott, “The Diplomatic Role of the European Parliament's Parliamentary Groups”, SIEPS European Policy

Analysis 3, 2015, p. 8-9. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2578868 145

E. Wisniewski, “The Influence of the European Parliament on the European External Action Service”, European

Foreign Affairs Review 18 (1), 2013, p. 100 146

K. Raube, op. cit., p.13 147

D. Fiott, 2015, op. cit., p. 8-9. 148

Rules 93, 95 EP Rules of Procedure (2011). 149

Rumrich, L. (2006) ‘The CFSP within the Institutional Architecture: The Role of the European Parliament’, Hans

Law Review, 2(2), 211-218, p. 215. 150

B. van Vooren, “A Legal-Institutional Perspective on the European External Action Service”, CLEER Working

Papers No 7, 2010, p. 30.

21

appointment of a head of the delegation.151

Nonetheless, in this case political

consequences may suffice as it will be rather embarrassing to have somebody

leading an EU delegation after a negative opinion from EP.

In addition to the referred special mechanisms EP can certainly use its

traditional scrutiny instruments such as special committees, rapporteurs, questions,

as well as special hearings, workshops, ad hoc missions, etc.,152

which already

place EP in a strong position in terms of scrutinizing CFSP executives.

Against the background of the well-developed informal but rather efficient

system of EP’s scrutiny over all CFSP major blocks, the question is why these

practices need formalization, moreover with further interconnection to a possibility

of sanctions. In general terms the “power to sanction” has traditionally been a part

of parliamentary control,153

thus making parliaments decisive actors co-

determining final policy outputs.154

From a more practical perspective there are

two basic answers to this question. First is the fact that EP should not expect too

much from “informal and indirect power”.155

This submission echoes the claim for

strengthening formal rather than informal EP’s rights, expressed in a number of

previous studies.156

The practical rationale of this argument lies in the need to

establish a systematic and institutionalised structure of interaction, which requires

reassurance of EP’s right “to be heard”, as this right is of critical importance for

the effectiveness of the parliamentary supervision.157

In this sense the

establishment of a stable basis requires its formalization by legal means.

The second argument stresses the importance of formal leverage in EP’s

relations with executives. Referring to the experience of EP’s consent right for

international agreements, it is necessary to stress that after two landmark “no-

consent” votes158

EP used this leverage to guarantee sufficient level of cooperation

throughout the negotiation process rather than followed the traditional

parliamentary voting pattern. In other words the formal leverage of possible

sanctions would foster development of mutually acceptable inter-institutional

practices without limiting the scope of parliamentary scrutiny.

151

K. Raube, op. cit., p. 6 152

P. Bajtay opt. cit., p. 31. 153

C. Caballero-Bourdot, Inter-parliamentary scrutiny of the CFSP: avenues for the future. Occasional Paper, no. 94,

Institute for Security Studies, Paris , October, 2011, p. 13. 154

J. Wouters & K. Raube, opt. cit, p. 4 155

N. Lalone, opt.cit, p. 14. 156

Jü. Mittag &, W. Wessels, opt.cit, p. 25. 157

K. Raube, op. cit., p. 4 158

SWIFT and ACTA cases.

22

CONCLUSIONS

The post-Lisbon practice has revealed that limited format of EP’s

involvement into CFSP leads to the EU international under-performance.

Furthermore, the current formal intergovernmental set-up for CFSP is often

recognized as the obstacle on the way to the synergy within EU foreign policy.

Against the background of current problematic development of EU external

relations the article studies the idea of CFSP “parliamentarization” from different

perspectives. Although the reasoning differs the conclusions, however, are

identical - “parliamentarization” of this policy area is a rational choice, providing a

practical and comprehensive solution to a number of diverse problems currently

existing for the EU external relations.

From theoretical perspective this process successfully meets the claim for

more democracy and legitimacy for the EU both in a wider context and within the

specific area of foreign policy. In the practical sense it will ensure a forum for a

public policy debate, thus enhancing transparency, coherence and effectiveness of

the policy formation process. Separately should be stressed the potential of

“parliamentarization” in meeting specific EU needs, which are formation of

genuinely common European CFSP, value-based policy formation process and the

development of synergy between CFSP and other areas of foreign policy.

The increased level of parliamentary scrutiny over the implementation stage

will ensure sufficient level of executives’ accountability through instruments of

parliamentary control. From the institutional perspective CFSP

“parliamentarization” will contribute to the harmonization of the EU institutional

system by unification of EP’s status and competences throughout all areas of

foreign policy and by reinforcing HR’s currently uncertain status in terms of the

policy implementation process.