Challenges Post Coldwar

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Security: Old Dilemmas and New Challenges in the Post-Cold War EnvironmentAuthor(s): Joseph A. CamilleriSource: GeoJournal, Vol. 34, No. 2, Military Geography: The Changing Role of the Military (

October 1994), pp. 135-145Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41146279Accessed: 11-11-2015 22:43 UTC

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2/12

GeoJournal 4.2

1

35-1 45

135

1994

(Oct)

by

Kluwer Academie Publishers

Security:

ld Dilemmas nd

New

Challenges

in

the Post-Cold

War Environment

Camilleri,

Joseph

A.,

Professor,

a

Trobe

University,

chool

of

Politics,

Bundoora,

Victoria

083,

Australia

ABSTRACT: ecurity,idely egardeds the entrepiecefgeopoliticaliscourse,as

been

raditionally

nderstood

n

ermsfnational

ilitary

efence. ore

ecently,

heorists

and

ractitioners

like ave

rgued

or

more

ncompassing,

ess tate-centricefinition

f

the

oncept,

hichakesnto ccount

on-military

hreats

o

ecurity

s well s

non-military

responses

o

both

military

nd

non-military

hreats.he nd f heCold

War

rovides

n

opportune

ime o reconsiderhese

rguments,

o establish hetherr not herelated

concepts

f commonnd

comprehensiveecurity

ave

ontemporatry

elevance,

ndto

identify

heir

ar-reachingolicy

nd nstitutional

mplications.

The

post-

945

political

nd

strategic

rder evolved

or

thebest

art

ffour ecades rroundwo

ompeting

lliance

systems

hich

argely upplanted

he UnitedNations

UN)

as

symbols

f collective

efence,

t least so far as their

members ere concerned.

et,

the

reassurancesxtended

by

both

uperpowers

o

their

espective

llies erved nother

purpose,namely

o entrench merican nd

Soviet

power

and

nfluence. s Kratochwil

1989)

points

ut,

heAtlantic

alliancecannot

be understood s a

security rrangement

operating

ithin he

"well-establishedonventions"

f

the

classical

alance

f

power.

The

argumentpplies

with ven

greater orce o the Warsaw act. In each case, powerful

integrative

endencies,

n

their arious

deological,

conomic

and

military

anifestations,

ere at odds with

raditional

notions of

statecraft,

lexible

diplomacy

nd

shifting

alliances.

espite

he outward

ppearances

f

stability

nd

quasi-permanence,

he

solution o

the

security

ilemma

offered

y

Cold War

alliances

only

partially

bscured

unresolved

mbiguities

nd

was

prone

o

periodic

rises.

he

end of

theCold

War

and,

more

pecifically,

hedissolution

of

the WarsawPact and

the

on-going

eorganization

f

North

Atlantic

Treaty

Organization

NATO)

provide

unique

opportunity

o

rethink

he

theory

nd

practice

f

security

n

a

post-hegemonic

orld.

Though

fficialnd

academic

ronouncements

bout he

end of theCold

War

nd

thebirth f a newworld rder re

proving

omewhat

premature,

he last ten

years

have

nevertheless

roduced

evidence

of

new attitudes nd

policies,

which

have resultedn a

number

f

disarmament

and

arms control

greements,

he

partial

resolution

f

several

egional

onflicts,

nd

the creationn

Europe

ofan

embryonic

ecurity

ramework

utting

cross

ong-standing

ideological

nd

geopolitical

ivisions.

ther

ositive

rends

include he riseofnewcentres f

economic nd

diplomatic

influence,

he

mprovement

n

Sino-Soviet

elationsndthe

tentative irst teps towardmore effectiveegional o-

operation

n

Asia-Pacific

enerally

nd

SoutheastAsia in

particular.

ncouraging

hough

hese

trends

may

be,

a

number f

obstacles tand nthe

way

f a

more

undamental

reassessmentf

ecurity

elationships,otably

he

ontinuing

reluctancef

policy-makers

nd

their

dvisers o

explore,

et

alone

mplement,

ew

approaches

o

security,

he

tendency

of

military

nd

political

lites to

cling

o

existing olicy-

making

processes,

he

lack of effective

mechanismsor

subjectingecurity olicy

o

probing ublic

crutiny,

he

relatively

nderdeveloped

haracterf

regional

o-operative

institutions,

nd

the

ontinuingmphasis

n

growth-oriented

economic

ompetitiveness

ithin

n

increasingly

ntegrated

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3/12

1

6

GeoJournal

4.2/194

world

market,

with all that this

implies

for

military

technology

nd defence

pending.

Conceptual

Ambiguities

nd

Complexities

The destructivenessfthe Gulf

War,

not to mention

the more recent violence that has

afflicted

omalia,

Angola,

Haiti and

much

of

the former

ugoslavia

and

Soviet

Union,

are an

apt

reminder hat

ecurity

emains

for

many

t best distant

ossibility.

he

insecurity

hich

continues o describe the lives of countlessmillions

suggests

hat he

key

question

s not

merely

he

dequacy

of

existing

nstitutional

rrangements

ut the

very

meaning

f

security.

For

many

heoristsnd

practitioners

ational

ecurity

remains he

key

to

describing, xplaining

r

justifying

particular olicies,yetthe concept endsto obscure as

much s to

clarify.

oes the

word

national,

or

xample,

refer o the tate

nd ts

eading

nstitutions

ie

executive,

legislature,

rmed

ervices,

ntelligencerganizations),

r

to the nation s a whole? f thefirst

meaning

s

intended,

thennational

ecurity

ecomes

virtuallyynonymous

ith

thedefence

f

sectional

nterests,

r at eastwith

nterests

as

defined

nd articulated

y

those n

positions

f

power

and

authority.

f the second

meaning

is

preferred,

difficult

uestions

rise as

who or what he nation

s and

what

kind f

security

s

envisaged

or hose

who are

part

of t. Nations

differ

reatly

ot

only

n

terms

f size and

cohesion

but also

in

terms

f

organizingrinciples

nd

institutions

Wiberg

987).

In

some

cases

the boundaries

of state and nationmayvirtuallyoincide eg Japan,

Denmark),

but

n

others

he state

may

comprise

wo

or

more

nations

eg

Canada,

Yugoslavia),

nd

n others till

the nation

may

be

divided

nto two or

more states

eg

Kurdish

nation),

or the

nation

may

have no state that

recognizes

ts existence

eg

East

Timor).

Equally

problematic

s

security

tself.

s it

a condition

to be

understood

primarily

n terms

of

objective

conditions,

ften

quated

with

protection

rom

hysical

threat,

r in terms

f

subjective

erceptions

which

we

may

oosely

refer

o as the

nation's tate

of mind?

t is

not

possible

to entertain

ecurity

s

a

policy

objective

without

at least

implicitly

ddressing

number

of

complex uestions:

Who or

what s to

be defended?

rom

what?Bywhom?How? At whatprice?Thosewhofind

national

ecurity

convenient

hort-hand

nswer

o these

questions

end

to

equate

security

withthe

defence

of

national

erritory,

resumably

n the

assumption

hat

he

preservation

fterritorial

ntegrity,

hat

s

the exclusion

of others

rom he

physical

pace

delineated

s one's

own

(national)

erritory,

oldsthe

key

to

the

defence

f the

nation's

well-being.

But

the

link between

defence

of

territory

nd

preservation

f

national

well-being

s

often

assumed

rather

han

demonstrated.

Precisely

because

it has

acquired

such

widespread

currency,

he

notion

f national

ecurity,

r to

be

more

exact,

national

military efence,

merits

areful

nalysis.

We

propose

to

begin by considering

ach of

the three

components

f

this formulation:

national",

defence",

"military".

We have

already

bserved hatnational oes

notnecessarily efer o a clearly dentifiable, onolithic

or

even cohesive

entity

whose interests re

capable

of

objective

efinition.

ndeed,

the nterestsf thenation r

state nd the means

by

which

hey

re to be

pursued

re

often he

subject

of intense ntellectual ontestationnd

political

division.

ven

if

we should

focus

our attention

on the

conceptual,

more

manageable,

less elusive

category

f the

state,

there s no

escaping

he

fact,

s

Buzan is at

pains

to

show,

that "states re

exceedingly

dissimilars

objects

of

security"Buzan 1983). They

are

vulnerable o different inds

of

threat,

s

a

result

of

vastly

different xternal and domestic environments.

States

differ ith

espect

o

size,

strength,

tructurend

political

radition. he

security

ilemma

acing ny

state

can be given concreteshape only in the contextof

particular

circumstances.

or some the main threat

originates

rom

utside

whileforothers nternal

ecurity

is the

primary

ocus,

given

fundamental

isagreement

between

sectional nterests bout the

norms,

ules and

procedures

which hould

govern olitical

nstitutionsnd

processes.

nternaldivisions

may

become

so acute

(eg

former

ugoslavia

or even

Bosnia)

as to

deprive

the

notion of the national

of

any

theoretical,

et alone

operational

utility. eyond

a certain

point

there s

no

recognizable

ntity

hich s either he

ubject

r

object

of

defence.

In

any

case,

the

security

f the state

or the

nation,

assuming

hese remain

elative

oherent

ntities,

annot

be equated with ndividual ecurity. hough t can be

argued

hat he

preservation

f the state

s conducive

o

the

maintenance

f social

and

political

rder,

hence to

the

security

f

the

citizen,

t is

just

as

plausible

hat he

actions

of the

state,

whether

n

waging

r

preparing

or

war,

will

prejudice

the

security

f the

individual. he

same

outcome

may

flow

from ctions aken

to

preserve

or restore

nternal

ecurity.

efending

he

state

against

external

or internal

enemies

may

have

profoundly

negative

consequenses,

indluding

conomic

hardship,

social

dislocation

or even

injury

nd

death

for

large

numbers

f

people.

National

security,

hen,

sheds

but

little

ight

n twodistinct

ut

closely

related

questions:

whose

security?

What

kind

of

security?

y

making

he

state centralto the definitionf security nd

to

the

identification

f

that

which

s to

be

secured,

t obscures

the

nature

f the

ultimate

bjective

nd the

identity

f

the

ubjects

who

are at

the

heart

f the

ecurity

ilemma.

We

can

now examine

littlemore

losely

he

concept

of defence

mplicit

n

national

ecurity

iscourse

which,

notwithstanding

he

tensions

nd

ambiguities

nherent

n

the

concept, ostulates

he

feasibilityand

desirability)

f

defence

nderstood

s the

protection

f state

boundaries

from

military

ncursion

y

other

tates.

This formulation

is defective

n

several

respects.

irst,

t

wrongly

ssumes

that

state

boundaries

re vulnerable

nly

to external

attack,

whereas

omestic

pheaval

f various

kinds,

ven



4/12

GeoJournal

34.2/1994

137

when

it falls short of

outright

ivil

war,

may

also

endanger

he territorial

ntegrity

f states. The recent

disintegration

f the

Soviet,

Yugoslav

and

Somali

states

are a case in point. Secondly, t is deficientn that t

concentrates

n the

use

of force

s the

only

erious

hreat

to

existing

oundaries,

hereas

ny

number f

economic,

political

nd

ideological

isturbances,

e

they

nternal

r

external

n

origin,may

have

precisely

he same effect.

Thirdly,

t

assumes,

again mistakenly,

hat

security

s

synonymous

ith he

protection

f

boundaries,

whereas

boundaries

may

remain

intact even as the

society

undergoes

traumatic

isruption rising

from racial or

religious

onflict

eg

Northern

reland,

outh

Africa)

r

revolutionary olitical change

(eg post-revolutionary

Russiaor

China).

Fourthly,

ven f t

could be established

that

protection

f

boundaries s a

necessary

ndsufficient

conditionfor

the achievement f national

security,

t

would not followthat such "security" an be readily

translatednto

ecurity

ither

or

he ndividual r for he

many

nd

diverse

roups

hat

omprise

he nation r

the

state.

Finally,

he

reference o

defence, efence orces,

and

defence epartments

lursthe

elusivebut

important

distinctionetween

efence ndoffencendobscures he

fact

that decisions on

military

ppropriations

nd

weapons ystems

made

n

the name of

defence

may

have

offensivententions r

consequences.

The third

distinguishing

haracteristic f national

security

iscourse s

the

closely

related

mphasis

n

the

military

imension,

hat is on

military

hreats s

the

primary

ource

of

insecurity

nd on

military

trategies

and

capabilities

s

the most

appropriate

nstrumentf

security. afetys associated lmost xclusively ith he

capacity

f

one state to

balance

the

military

ower

of

another.

Military

apabilities

re deemedusefulnot

only

for

purposes

f

actual

defence

n

the

event f

attack,

ut

for

purposes

f

deterrence

by

confrontingny

would-be

aggressor

ith

uperior

military

orce),

nd

perhaps

most

importantly

or

purposes

f

diplomacy, y

which

s meant

the

ability

o turn

military

ower

nto

political

nfluence

in

times

f

peace.

It is

doubtful,

owever,

whether he

contribution

f

military

orce o

security

s as

uniformly

beneficial s this

utilitarian

alculus

would

suggest.

Quite

apart

from

he

unprecedented

isks

posed

by

nuclear

deterrence,

et

alone

nuclear

defence,

military

force,

despite

the

refinements

made

possible

by

increasingechnical ophistication,emains remarkably

blunt

nstrument

orthe

attainment f

any

number f

social of

political

objectives.

As

Barry

Buzan

notes,

modern

military

ardware

s

particularly

ell

suitedto

destructive

urposes

but

"much ess

usefulfor

the fine-

tuning

f

voluntaristic

xchange

relations

where

neither

conquest

nor

destruction s

desired"

(Buzan

1981).

During

the

height

f

the

Cold

War,

the

availability

f

military

eans

tempted

oththe

United

States

and

the

Soviet

Union to

seek

military

olutions to

regional

conflicts

whether in

Eastern

Europe,

Afghanistan,

Vietnam,

Lebanon or

Panama.

However,

more

often

than

not

these

attempts

ither

failed

to

produce

the

desired

result,

or else led

to unintended

onsequences

more troublesome

han the

problem hey

were

initially

meant o resolve rameliorate. he

"Vietnam

yndrome"

becamea potent ymbol, speciallynAmerican olitical

culture,

of

the

counter-productive

ffects

f

military

power.

The more recent

pplication

f force

n

the Gulf

War

may

have revived

onfidencen certain

uarters

n

the

utility

f

militaryapabilities,

ut even hereone must

be careful

to

distinguish

etween the achievement

f

specific

militarybjectives eg

the removal

f

raqi

forces

from

Kuwait)

and

a

durable

solution to the

complex

challenge posed by

Saddam Hussein's domestic and

external

olicies.

The

preceding

iscussion f national

military

efence

has,

at least

implicitly, ointed

to a

number of

methodological

nd substantive ifficulties hich the

national

ecurity

iscourse ends to

overlook,

utwhich

mustbe recognizedf we are to developa moresolidly

grounded heory and praxis)

of

security.

hese

may

be

more

concretely ncapsulated

n a

number

f

seemingly

disparateyet closely

connected

propositions.

he first

refers

o

the

diminishingapacity

f small nd

arge

tates

alike to

defend heir

borders,

ttributablen

part

o the

increasing

destructivenessf

military

echnology.

he

decline

n

militaryrotective

apability

s itself function

of

the

increasing

scendancy

f

offensive ver defensive

weapons

systems,

but also

of

the

complex

web of

technological,

conomic nd social

processes

which

have

cumulatively

made state boundariesboth

more

porous

and more

contested

Herz 1962).

The

fortress-type

hells

of

defence

haracteristicf the

European

state

ystem

f

the sixteenth o the eighteenth enturyhave been

overtaken

y

numerous

vents,

not

least the adventof

total

war and

the

conscription

f

national

rmies,

he

potential

or

deological-political

enetration,

he

potency

of

economic nstrumentsf

warfare,

nd

the

increasing

incidence of

urban

terrorism nd aerial

piracy,

ll of

which

reflectsthe

increasing

vulnerability

f

highly

complex,

ndustrial

ystems.

o

put

t

differently,

n

the

atomic

ge

the

power

tohurthas

vastly

utdistanced

he

power

to

defend

Schelling 966).

Nowhere s

this ast

observation

more

pposite

han n

the case

of

modern

weapons

of

mass

destruction

ie

chemical,

biological

and

especially

nuclear

weapons).

This

brings

s to

the

second

proposition

hich

highlights

the fundamental nsecurity nderpinninghe nuclear

edifice.

The

balance of

terror

may

be

described

s the

ultimate xercise n

competitive

isk

aken.

The

resulting

nuclear

policies

of

brinkmanship

nd

bluff

were an

integral

art

of

the

climate of

hostility,

uspicion

nd

tension

which

governed

Soviet-American

elations

for

more than

forty ears.

Some

have

sought

o

qualify

his

assessment

yarguing

hat

the fear of

nuclear

war,

and

the

consequent

elegitimization

f

war

as an

instrument

of

policy,

s a

welcome

development

n that

t

compels

great

powers

to

make

sure

that

tensions

among

themselves

do

not

degenerate

nto

armed

hostilities

(Osgood

and

Tucker

1967);

Hinsley

1982).

There

is,



5/12

1

8

GeoJournal

4.2/1

94

however,

no

guarantee

that the

management

f the

strategic elationship

will

always produce

the

desired

result

if for no other reason

than

that successful

managementdepends on the permanentthreat of

wholesale

destruction,

hich must

somehow neverbe

carried out

(Camilleri 1976).

Nuclear

deterrence

s

credible

nly

o

long

as all-outwar remains

easible.

To

this must be

added the

possibility

f the

inadvertent,

unauthorized

r

accidentaluse

of nuclear

weapons.

In

any

case,

the

dynamic

f deterrence

annotbe confined

to a few

greatpowers.

To the extent

hat the nuclear

weapon

remains

symbol

f

power

nd

prestige,

uclear

capabilities

re

likely

to

spread

to

more and

more

countries,

ith

ar-reachingmplications

or he

reliability

of

strategic

alculations

nd the

predictability

f state

behaviour.

The sustainedbut

only partially

uccessful

efforts

n the

part

of successiveUS

administrations

nd

a rangeof nternationalnstitutionso construct viable

non-proliferation

egime

are

striking

estimony

f the

proliferation

endencies

inherent

n the deterrence

strategy.

Concerned

o

contain,

t not

eliminate,

he

obvious

dangers

rising

rom he

unilateral

se

of

force,

tates

have

continued

o

experiment

ith

number

f collective

security

rrangements.

n the

post-1945

eriod

these

fell

intotwo

main

categories:

hose

which

were embodied

n

a universal

rganization

ie

the

UN)

and

those

ssociated

withthe creation

of Cold

War alliances

(eg

NATO,

Warsaw

Pact).

Central

to both

projects

were

two

propositions:

firstly,

hat

all

members

of a

given

collective

ecurity

ystem

be

it

regional

or

universal)

wouldmakethepreventionfaggressionheir verriding

security

bjective;

nd

secondly,

hat

hese

states

would

be

ready

ndable

to

oppose

aggression

ith hemeasures

needed

to

preserve

he

peace.

However

elegant,

this abstract

formulation

was

surrounded

y

theoretical

nd

practical

ifficulties

hich

soon

exposed

the

limits

f collective

ecurity

Camilleri

1976).

Quite

apart

from the

problem

of

defining

aggression

and

identifying

ggressors

in

particular

conflicts,

one

of the

ollective

ecurity

rrangements

ad

the

power

to enforce

he

peace

if

the

aggressor

was

a

greatpower,

et

alone

a

superpower.

ad

NATO,

the

Warsaw

Pact

or the UN

taken

military

ction

o

oppose

the

nterventionist

olicies

f the Soviet

Union

n

(East)-

Germany,Hungary, zechoslovakia r Afghanistan,r

of theUnited

tates

n

Korea,

Vietnam

r

the

Dominican

Republic,

a

global

confrontation

ould

have

been

the

most

ikely

utcome.

n

any

case,

the

theory

f

collective

security

s

premissed

on

the

dubious

principle

that

military

onflicts

re

reducible

to the

designs

and

capabilities

f

"aggressive"

tates

nd

that he

resolution

of such

conflicts

epends

on

the actions

f

peace-loving

states.

Not

only

s this

neat

division

eldom

replicated

n

the

complex

world f

nternational

olitics,

ut the

very

attempt

o establish

t

may

do

no morethan

mpede

he

chances

f mediation

nd

conciliation,

nd

may

ven

ead

to the escalation

of hostilities

by

transforming

n

otherwise ocalized

dispute

nto a

major

international

conflict.

The calculation

f

the

costs nd benefits

f collective

security whether f the universal r regionalvariety)

remains

sharply

ontested xercise.

What s much ess

in

question

is the

profound mpact

which collective

security greements

nd initiatives

ave

had on

the

theory

nd

practice

f

sovereignty.

he

complex

web

of

alliance

arrangements

n the one

hand and UN

peace-

keeping

nd

peace

enforcement

nitiatives

n the

other

have

"given

ise o

an elaborate

et of

expectations,

ights

and

obligations

which have

greatly

modified the

fragmented

ystem

f

sovereign

tates"

Camilleri

992).

The

establishment

f

military

ases and

stationing

f

troops

n

foreign

oil,

the

adoption

f

oint

conventional

and nuclear

strategies,

nd

participation

n combined

military

xercises

have

substantially

roded

or at least

obscured the territorialdemarcation of national

sovereignties.

he

expanding

ntrusion

f

UN

military

and civilian

personnel

n a

range

of local and

regional

conflicts

a trend which

has

gained

considerable

momentumince

the end

of the

Cold

War

-

points

n

exactly

he

same direction.

None

of this is

to

suggest

that the

cumulative

influence

f collective

ecurity

rrangements

as been

entirely

or even

largely

beneficial,

but

rather to

emphasize

hatthe

quest

for

ecurity uring

he

greater

part

of this

entury

and

increasingly

ver

the ast

fifty

years

has

given

ise o

multiple

nd

diverse

nstitutional

responses,

ll

of which

have

to a

greater

r lesser xtent

contributed

o

the nternationalization

f

security,

hich

maybe attributedt least npartto theglobalizaiton f

the

military

rder.

Reference

as

already

been made

to

the corrosive

mpact

f

advanced

military

echnologies

n

the exercise

f

sovereignty.

qually

significant

as

been

the

mounting

inancial

urden

f

military udgets

which

have

obliged

arge

and small

tates

liketo

develop

oint

military roduction

nd

procurement

olicies

and

"to

share

each

other's

markets,

financial

resources

and

technical

knowledge"

(Taylor

1990).

Licensed

production,

o-production

nd

offsets,

oint

research

nd

development

nd

various

orms

f

subcontracting

re

ust

a

few

of

the

collaboration

rrangements

hich

have

resulted

in the

tmnsnationalization

f

defence.

The

intricate

network

of

interlocking

public-private

arrangements eans that the development

f

military

technology,

rms

transfers

nd even

strategic

octrines

are

increasingly

haped

by

industrial,

inancial

and

political

nstitutions

nd

processes

whose

ocus

of

action

and

modus

operandi

are

essentially

ransnational.

or

some

the

motivation

s

simply

hatof

"keeping

p",

for

others

it is

the

desire

to

maintain

a

sophisticated

technological

base,

and

for

others

still

increasing

dependence

on

revenues

derived

from

military

ales.

Regardless

of

motivation,

he

net

effect

f

increased

militarypending

s

the

development

f a

global

military

order

Kaldor

and Eide

1979;

Vyrynen

987;

Johnson

and

Thompson

1985)

which

puts

an

entirely

new



6/12

GeoJournal

4.2/1 94

1 9

complexion

n

the traditional

ecurity

ilemma:new

in

that t

compels

s to connect ational

ecurity

ith

ocal,

regional, upranational,

nternationalnd transnational

agencies ndprocesses;new also in that thighlightshe

complex inkages

which

ie

military olicy

o

economic,

cultural nd

political

nstitutionsnd

relationships.

A Multi-Dimensional

ramework f

Security

nalysis

Barry

Buzan's

People,

States

nd

Fear has made

a

useful

contribution

o

our

understanding

f

security

because

it identifies

three

levels

of

analysis

(ie

individuals,

tates

and the

international

ystem),

but

more

mportantly

ecause

it seeks

to

integrate

hethree

levels,

viewing

ach

not as

a

distinct,

eparable

ategory

but as one vantage pointfromwhichto observethe

sources,

ffects

nd

dynamics

f the

"systemic

ecurity

problem"

Buzan

1983).

Buzan

makes

t clear

that

the

security

f the

individual

annot

be

reduced to the

security

f the

state,

and

that the

pursuit

f

security

t

one level

may

be

prejudicial

to the

achievement

f

security

t the

other evel.

Similarly,

e

interprets

he

underlying

narchy

of the

international

ystem

as

constituting

n arena

of conflict

nd

rivalry

ut also

as

providing

field

f

opportunity

hich

an

help

to sustain

diversity

ith

ecurity,

r whathe

calls

"the

promulgation

and observance

f

mature narchic

norms ased

on the

mutual

respect

of units".

He

takes the

analysis

even

further

y positing

omplex inkages

etween

ecurity

nd

the internationalconomicenvironment. e contrasts,

for

example,

the

mercantilist

ystem

with a liberal

international

conomy,

but cautions

against

facile

interpretations

hich

associate

mercantilism

ith

zero-

sum

competition

nd

war,

and economic

iberalism

ith

harmonious

nterdependence.

ach economic

ramework,

he

argues,

offers

oth

advantages

nd

disadvantages

n

security

erms.

They

need

not in

any

case

be seen as

opposed

extremes

ut as

points

n a

spectrum,

uggestive

of a middle

ground

which enhances

the

security

advantages

of both

doctrines,

while

minimizing

heir

costs.

Buzan's

systemic pproach

o

security

ffers

richer

analysis

which ends

tself o morebalanced

policies

ikely

to restrain, f not eliminate,"the pendulumswings

between

excessive

vulnerability

and excessive

provocation",

whichhe associates

with he idealist

nd

realist

ositions espectively.

systemicpproach

has the

added

advantage

of

placing

the

military

imension

f

security

ithin wider

ramework,

hereby ncouraging

long-term

utlookwhich s concernedmore with the

causes

than

the

symptoms

f conflict.t offers emedies

that re not confined o the use of

military ower,

and

envisages ecurity esponses

hat llow for

he nitiatives

not

only

of

states but

of

larger

formal

nd

informal

security

ommunities. t alludes

to

the role

which

regional

and international

nstitutionsan

perform

n

generating

nternational

aw and

promoting

mechanisms

for

negotiation,

onciliation

nd the

peaceful

ettlement

of

disputes.

Helpfulthough t is, Buzan's analytical ramework

must nevertheless

e extended

nd

qualified

n

several

respects

f we are to

develop

a holistic

onception

f

security,

hich

s sensitive

o current

rends

nd future

possibilities.

While

giving

ue

regard

o his

three evels

f

analysis (individual,

state,

international),

such

a

conception

must lso

embrace

he

nteractingrocesses

f

regionalization

nd

globalization

nd the

ever

widening

network

f

dentities,

elationships

nd institutions

hich

cut

across

national boundaries.

As

Dalby points

out,

Buzan's

analysis

s deficient

n its lack

of historical

contextualization

Dalby

1992).

The

modern

state is

treated

as a

given,

as

if it had

no

origins,

was not

susceptible

o

change,

nd

was the exclusive

rovider

f

security. n what is still essentially state-centric

formulation

nsufficientttention

s

given

to the

role

of

international

nstitutions,

ongovernmental

rganizations,

social

movements,

nd

cultural

dentitiesnd traditions.

Though

conomic

nd,

to a lesser

extent,

nvironmental

factors re

considered,

hey

re

not

rigorously

ntegrated

into the

analysis

n

ways

which

lluminate

ither the

quality

or

pace

of historical

change.

A radical

reformulation

f the

security

ilemma would

need

to

reconsider

he

nature nd function

f the

state,

place

it

within he context

of

global

integration

nd

national

fragmentation

nd distance

ecurity

rom he zero-sum

preceptions

hich

ccompany

he exercise

f

sovereignty

and

project

states and

nations as

symbols

f

exclusive

loyalty.

Two

clearly

iscernible

rendswould

seem

especially

relevant

o our

analysis;

he

growing

nterconnectedness

of the international

ystem

nd the

emergence

of

a

macropolitical agenda (Camilleri

and

Falk

1992).

Internationalonflict

an no

longer

e understood

imply

as the collision of rival nationalisms.

ven the First

World War is best

characterizeds

the culmination

f a

protracted

nd multifaceted

ompetition

or

markets,

resources nd

power

which had

long

since

overspilled

national boundaries. The contest

between

competing

ideologies

in

the Second

World War and the

equally

polarized

conflict

etween

capitalism

nd communsim

after

1945

provide

further evidence of the

internationalizationf conflict.The Cold War period

witnessed a

global

contestfor

spheres

of

influence,

marked

by

a

succession

f

military

nterventions

nd the

forward

rojection

f

power,

which

ransformed

egional

rivalries nd

domestic

upheavals

into

"surrogates

f

systemic

war"

(Bloomfield

989).

Even when

separated

by

long

distances,

regional

conflicts

became

closely

interconnected

y

virtue

f

their lose

relationship

o

the

central alance.

Far from

eversing

he

trend,

he end of theCold War

provided

n added

stimulus o the

nternationalizationf

conflict.The

Gulf War

provided

the most

striking

illustrationf

this trend.Saddam Hussein's

nvasion

f



7/12

1

0

GeoJournal

4.2/1

94

Kuwait

provoked

concertednternational

esponse,

nd

a

punishing

erial

onslaughtby

the US-led coalition

against

raq,

whichwas all the more

remarkable

n that

it was legitimized ya number fUN Security ouncil

resolutions.

complex

web

of

economic,

political

nd

strategic

nterests,

not least the

West's continued

dependence

n

access to

cheap

and abundant

upplies

f

Middle East

oil,

helped

to sustain the otherwise

precarious

nti-Saddam

oalition. A

simiarly

ntricate

pattern

f

global nterdependence

nterpinned

he

uneasy

but

co-operative

Soviet-American

elationship

both

during

nd after he war.

The end

of

the Cold

War had a

second

but

closely

related effect. he

UN,

and in

particular

he

Security

Council,

which ad been

virtuallyaralyzed y

the East-

West confrontationas

now

given

new ease

of ife.

n

a

dramatic

xpansion

f ts

ecurity

unction,

t

embarked

on numerouspeacekeeping and peace enforcement

operations (eg Iraq-Kuwait,

Somalia,

Bosnia,

Cambodia), justifying

ts intervention

n humanitarian

grounds

or

citing

he

potential

hreat

o international

peace

and

security.Perhaps

the most succinctand

authoritativessessment

f thistrendwas

given

by

UN

Secretary-General,

outros-Ghali,

ho

argued

hat

the

time f absolute nd exclusive

overeignty

had) passed".

Conscious

of the

fluidity

nd

permeability

f national

boundaries

he advocated

a new balance "between

the

needsof

good

internal

overnance

nd the

requirements

of an ever more

nterdependent

orld"

Boutros-Ghali

1992).

The interconnectedness

f the international

ystem

wasnot,however, urely functionftechnologicalnd

geopolitical

hange.

t was also

linked o

otherfacets

f

international

ife,

not least the

globalization

of the

market

rising

fromthe

transnationalization

f

trade,

production

nd

finance.

he

phenomenon

was reflected

in

the

mounting ressure

orthe iberalization

f

trade,

the

increasingnterdependence

f most

economies,

he

growing

vulnerability

f

national

financial

policy

to

overseas

money

markets,

he

consequent

ecline

n the

ability

f national

governments

o

regulate

their

own

economies,

and the

rapidly

expanding

role of

international

nstitutions.

he diminished

alience

of

territorial

nd

policy

boundaries

was

compounded

y

a

multi-faceted

rocess

f environmental

egradation

hich

included hanging limate atterns, zone depletion nd

loss of

species

diversity,

ot to

mention

the

more

localizedbut

still

dispersed

ffects

f soil

erosion,

cid

precipitation

nd

radioactive

ontamination.

Numerous

roblems,

otably

nternational

ebt,

rade

rivalries,

destabilizing

financial

flows,

transborder

pollution,

human

rights

buses,

nuclear

proliferation,

drug

trafficking,

nd

massive

migrations

f

people,

are

now bothsources

and

consequences

of conflict.

hese

constitute

"macropolitical

genda"

Camilleri

nd

Falk

1992)

not

merely

because

they

have

assumed

global

proportions,

ut

in the

more

profound

ense

that

they

represent losely

nterwoven

hreads

f

global

disorder

which

exceed the

problem-solvingapacity

of

existing

institutions.he internationalizationf informationnd

communicationnd the increasedconsciousness f

the

scale and multi-facetedharacter f globaldisorder re

important

factors

shaping

and

sustaining

the new

macropoliticalgenda.

ts functions to call nto

uestion

the theoretical and

practical utility

of

territorial

demarcation as the

overriding rinciple

of

political

organization,

nd to draw attention o the

requirements

of

"global

governance" Senghaas 1993).

Implications

or

Security

The

interacting

nd often

ontradictoryrocesses

f

integration

nd

fragmentation,

hich ave become

one of

the distinguishingeatures f globalizationn the late

twentieth

entury,

ave

far-reaching

onsequences

or

he

way

we understandnd

handle he

ecurity

ilemma.

or

purposes

f

analytical

onvenience e

may

onsider hese

consequences

nder hree

main

headings:

he

conceptual

framework

which

ndows

ecurity

ith ts

meaning

nd

content);

he

strategic

esponse

which

governs

he

way

resources

are mobilized

and

deployed);

and the

institutional

rrangementswhich

structure

elations

among

tates).

Over the last

fifteen o

twenty ears

a substantial

transformation

as occurred

in

both

popular

and

academic

perceptions

f the

security bjective,

which s

not to

say

that uch

change

has

been uniform

r universal

or that t has manifestedtselfwith qual force rclarity

within hecivilian

r

military ings

f national

ecurity

establishments.

here

has nevertheless

een

a modest ut

discernible

rift

way

from

highly

militarized,

ero-sum,

deterrence-oriented

efinitions

f

security

owards

more

inclusivist

onceptions

which

privilege

r at least

give

added

emphasis

o

notions f

reassurance,

o-operation

and

nterdependenceMack

1991).

The destructiveness

f

nuclear

apabilities

oupled

with he

ntensity

f nuclear

brinkmanship

uring

he Second

Cold War

generated

heightened

ense

of

danger,

which n turn

provided

he

impetus

or

a "new

dtente"

Kaldor,

Holden

and

Falk

1989).

The decline

f Cold

War

tensions,

nd,

especially,

the

attempts

o overcome

he division f

Europe

were

premissed n notions f commondestiny nd

common

security,

which Gorbachev's

appealing

slogan

of a

"European

home"

sought

o

harness

nd

institutionalize

(Bialer

1988;

Yazov

1988;

Camilleri

992).

In

sharp

contrast

o the idea

of collective

defence

which seeks

to

establish

a

sharp

divide

between

aggressive

and

law-abiding

tates,

common

security

(Independent

ommission

n

Defence

nd

Security

982;

SIPRI

1985;

Wiseman

1989;

Boserup

and

Nield

1990)

rests

on

the

proposition

hat

any

durable

peace

must

incorporate

he

egitimate

nterests

f all

parties.

t seeks

to

manage

the

problem

of

aggression

ot so

much

by

punishing

r

coercing

he

aggressor

s

by nfluencing

is



8/12

GeoJournal

4.2/1 94 141

moviatation,

by offering

mix of incentives and

disincentives hich

predispose

him to act within he

constraints et

by agreed

norms and

procedures.

The

minimalist pproach to common security sometimes

referred o as

"cooperative ecurity")

eeks to reconcile

the

competing

nterests

f states

by nstitutionalizing

o-

operative

behaviour whether

hrough

onfidence- nd

security-building

easures

CSBMs)

or more ambitious

arms control and disarmament

greements.

n

its

maximalist ersion t

provides olitical pace congenial

o

the resolution f

conflicts

nd

ensures hat the

security

interests f

weaker,

ess

privileged

r

revisionistocieties

are not

marginalized y

the

priorities

f

stronger,

more

privileged,

tatus

uo

societies.

Equally important

n the

changing onception

of

security

as been

the

attempt

o move

beyond

ts

purely

military

anifestations,

o

ncludenot

only

he defence f

territoryut the preservation f social, political and

ecological

values which

are critical to material and

psychological

ell-being.

et

in

this wider

context,

he

defence of

territorymay

still

prove

crucial to the

preservation

of the

society's

values,

liberties and

traditions. n

many

instances,

however,

territorial

defence,

itherbecause of

the

particular

errain r

the

means

by

which t s defended

e g

use of

nuclear r other

weapons

of

mass

destruction),

may

do little o

advance

the

nation's

ecurity

nd

may

ven

seriouslyeopardize

t.

As noted

earlier,

the use of

force

may

be even less

relevant o

theachievementf

security

hen t s

applied

a

long way

from

home

territory

n

pursuit

f

economic,

diplomatic

r

strategic

nterests,

hich

have more to

do

with heenhancement f thestate'spowerand prestige

than

with a

society's

territorial

ntegrity

r

social

cohesion.

As an

antidote o the

emphasis

n

military

orms

f

defence and

deterrence

has

emerged

the

notion of

comprehensive

ecurity^

which

has

come to

encompass

such

notions s cultural

urvival

e

g

of

ethnic

minorities

and

indigenous

eoples),

environmental

rotection,

nd

defence f

human

ights.

hese

concerns ave

also been

subsumed

nderother

abels,

ncluding

unconventional

security"Bedeski

1992)

"human

ecurity"

Dewitt

and

Evans

1993),

"democratic

ecurity"

Johansen

991),

or

"alternative

ecurity"

Galtung 1984).

For

some the

use

of

such

labels

is an

expression

f

scepticism

bout

the

analytic alue oftheconcept.These labels, t is argued,

point

o

various

orms f

insecurity,

hich

re

grounded

primarily

in

the

experience

of

individuals

and

communities,

re

necessarily

lastic n

their

definitional

content

nd,

as a

consequence,

ack

the

empirical igour

and

analytical

sharpness

associated

whith

the more

conventional

notion

of

national

security.

The

fact

remains,

however,

that

economic

and

environmental

threats to

societal

stability

and

well-being

loom

increasingly

arge

on

the

domestic

and

international

political

genda.

Damage

to

the

local or

global

ecology

(eg

desertificationr

global

warming)

or

the

harsh

consequences

of

risingforeign

ebt

can

have a direct

bearing

n the

quality

f life and even

physical ntegrity

of small states. These conditions

an

in

turn

provoke

social and

political

nstability

f a

kindwhich an unleash

the use of force itherwithin r between tates.

The

notion of

"comprehensive

security"

is

theoretically

seful f for no other reasonthan that t

suggests

onnections etween different

ypes

of threat

and

calls into

question

the

sharp dividing

ine between

domestic nd international

olitics.

The economic and

political rrangements

ithin

countryeg

the

pattern

and

intensity

f social

conflict)

re

closely

onnected o

regional

and

global decision-making rocesses

and

institutions

eg

distribution

f

resources,

nvironmental

regimes, efugee lows).Comprehensiveecurity,acking

the

analytical

ocusof national

ecurity,

oes,

it is

true,

have to

grapple

with much

arger

ield f

nvestigation

and

a far more

complex

set

of

variables. The distinct

advantage is that it subjects to criticala range of

boundaries

(between

states,

between insiders and

outsiders,

etween

governmental

nd

non-governmental

institutions,

etween

the state and civil

society,

and

between

internal

and

external

security),

and

as a

consequence

ffersmuch

richer

nsights

ot

only

nto

he

causes

of

insecurity

ut ntothe

structures,

elationships

and

agencies

needed to sustain

viable

security ystem

(Camilleri

1992).

The shift n

conceptual

orientation,

hichwe

have

briefly

escribed,

has

prompted good

deal

of

policy

innovation oth in

terms f

academic

prescription

nd

governmental

ction.

Referencehas

already

been

made

to

the

numerousnitiatives hich

brought

o an end

the

Cold War division n Europe and set in trainthe far-

reaching

oviet-

merican

ialogue

forboth

conventional

and

nuclear

disarmament.Within

he

span

of ten

years

we

have seen

theconclusion f

the

ntermediate

uclear

Forces

(INF)

Treaty,

a

unilateral ffer

by

the

US

to

eliminate

ts

land-based tactial

nuclear

weapons

and

withdrawts

sea-based

ones,

followed

by

a

comparable

Soviet

offer.

Other unilateral

steps

have

included

Moscow's

force

reductions,

ts

withdrawal f

offensive

forces rom

Germany,

ts

advocacy

f a

strictly

efensive

posture

and

its

renunciation f

the

use of

force,

culminating

n

the

dismantling

fthe

Warsaw

Pact. All of

this,

coupled

with

the

Conventional

orces in

Europe

agreement

and

Soviet

acceptance

of

a

reunified

Germany, as radically ransformedhepsychologicals

much

s the

geopolitical

map

of

Europe

Morgan

1993).

Behing

these

striking

and

largely

unforeseen

developments

nd

the

new

security

escourse

was a

combination

f

factors,

many

f

which

were

nextricably

linked

to

powerful

political,

economic

and

cultural

undercurrents

perating

with

the

American

nd

Soviet

societies,

as

well

as

those of

Eastern

and

Western

Europe.

Though

hese

security

nitiatives ad

their

most

conspicuous

mpact

n

the

European

theatre,

hey

were

not

altogether

bsentfrom

Africa r

Asia,

where

imilar

but

more

modest

attempts

t

military

isengagement

coincided

with

renewed

efforts or

the

resolution

f



9/12

1 2

GeoJournal

4.2/194

regional

conflicts

eg Angola,

Nambia,

Afghanistan,

Cambodia).

None

of

this s to

suggest

hat lder

security

doctrines nd

practices

ad

been

discarded,

hat

he use

offorcehad beenabandoned s a primarynstrumentf

policy,

r that llstateswere

uniformly

ommittedo new

notions

of

common and

comprehensiveecurity.

t is

nevertheless

pparent

hat

greatmany

tates,

arge

nd

small

alike,

the

United

Nations

tself

nd a

number

f

regional rganizations

ere

prepared

o

explore range

of

security

measures nd mechanismswhich had been

previously

ismissed r

simply ut

n

thetoo-hard asket.

Since the ate

1980s

a

good

deal

of

energy

as been

invested

n

endowing

he

UN

with n enhanced

ecurity

function,

ost

graphically

llustrated

y

the

quantitative

and

qualitativeexpansion

of its

peacekeeping

role.

ThirteenUN

peacekeeping perations

were established

between 945

nd

1987;

thirteenthers etween

987

nd

1992 Evans 1993). he aggregateostof theseoperations

till 1992 was estimated

at

$

8.2

billion,

but the

peacekeeping

illfor

1992 lone

came close to

$

3

billion.

Over the last few

years

these

operations

have been

designed

not

simply

o monitor easefires

nd

place

a

bufferbetween

warringparties

but to facilitate

he

withdrawal

of

forces,

restore

order,

mediate

and

conciliate between

opposing

factions,

wind

up

a

protracted

omestic

onflict nd oversee the

temporary

administration

f a

country.

Indicative f the new

thinking

as Bourtros-Ghali's

An

Agenda or

Peace

(Boutros-Ghali

992)

which et out

a

series

of

far-reaching

ecommendations

nd

proposals

for

peacemaking

(eg

more extensive

use

of the

arbitration nd other dispute-settlement echanisms

available

to the International

ourt

of Justice

ICJ);

a

more

equitable

framework

for the

imposition

of

sanctions;

nd

in extremeircumstances

he actual

use

of

force,

ncluding

he

establishment

f

peace

enforcement

units)

and

preventive

iplomacy

eg

confidence-building

measures,

ormal

act-finding

issionsmandated

by

the

Security

ouncilor the General

Assembly;

stablishment

of

early warning

systems

with

respect

to nuclear

accidents,

natural

disasters,

famines,

environmental

threats,

nd

mass movements

f

populations;

reventive

deployment

f

UN

forces;

nd creation

f demilitarized

zones).

These

deas,

which ad hitherto

irculated

ithin

primarily

cademic

ircles,

now became

respectable

nd

the subject of considerabledebate at the UN and

elsewhere.

With

henotable

xception

f

the

proposal

or

UN

peace-enforcement

nits,

where

reactions

were

ess

than

nthusiastic,

n

Agenda

or

Peace

provoked

great

many

responses

nd

refinements,

ost

of whichhave

emphasized

he

relevance

of

non-military

olutions

o

miltary

hreats

nd

especially

he

part

which

diplomatic

processes

an

play

n the

prevention

s wellas

resolution

of conflict.

ne

important

ntitiative

n this ontext

was

the

study

released

by

Australian

Foreign

Minsiter,

Gareth

vans,

which onstructed

typology

f threats

o

peace

and

a

corresponding

ix

of

military

nd

non-

military esponses,

withthe

emphasis

firmly laced

on

preventive

iplomacy

nd

early

nterventionn

conflicts

(Evans

1993).

Beyond

concepts

of

international

ecurity,

which

almost nevitably evolvearoundexisting r enhanced

UN functionsnd

activities,

umerous ther

proposals

have

since

gained

wide

currency

n official

lmost as

much s in

academic

discourse. o far s

military

ecurity

is

concerned,

considerable ttentionhas

been

given,

especially

n the

European

context,

o

the

concept

of

non-provocative

efence

Canby

1980;

Mack

1984).

Put

simply,

dvocacy

of this

trategy

as

premissed

n two

distinct ut

closely

related

propositions:

he need to

devise

a

system

f

defence that was

as inoffensives

possible

and whose success

depended largely

on

conditions

f

relative elf-reliancend

invulnerability.

t

stressed he need for

mobile,

small units with

imited

range,

but well

dispersed

over the national

territory.

Over time, deas of non-provocativeefence assumed

increasing importance

in

Soviet

doctrinal

pronouncements,

articularly

fterGorbachev ssumed

office,

and

percolated through

to NATO's defence

planning

nd its

deployment

f conventional orces

n

Europe. Although

tailored

specifically

o

European

geostrategic

onditions,

onprovocative

efencewas seen

to have muchwider

application,

ven to countries ike

Australia

with a

predominantly

aritime nvironment

(Dibb

1986;

Camilleri

987).

Even notionsof civilian r social defence ttracted

renewed

interest,

although

these were

still

largely

confined,

t least at the official

evel,

to

Scandinavia

nd

a

handful

f other ountries

Wiberg

1987). Perhaps

he

most significant evelopment n policy-makingerms

since he

early

980s

has been the

greater

tress

laced

on

notions of

economic,

environmental

nd

political

security, artly

because of the

perceived

connections

between

conomy,

nvironment

nd

political

tability

n

the one hand

and

military

apabilities

n theother.Yet

this is

far from hewhole

story,

or "unconventional"

security

oncerns

ave

steadily

cquired

n

importance

f

their

own,

reflecting

n

part

the diminished

tility

f

military

orce

n the achievement

f otherthan

strictly

military

bjectives. qually

salient

has been

the

corollary

of this

proposition,

amely

he

expectation

hat

greater

national eliance

n the

acquisition,

eployment

nd use

of

military

apabilities

will o taxthe

society's

conomic,

ecologicaland political esources s to compromisehe

realization

f

key

security

alues.

The Institutional

ontext

That

scholarly

deas

and even

policy

ormulation

ay

be

in a stateof

flux

s

one

thing,

hat nstitutions

re

evolving

n

ways

which

re

conducive

o the

application

of these

deas

or

policies

quite

another.

he end

of the

Cold

War

and,

n

particular,

he

resultant

ransformation

of the

European political

andscape

have

once

again

focusedattention

n the

feasibility

nd

desirability

f



10/12

GeoJournal

4.2/1994

143

institutional

hange.

Two

keyquestions

re at issue here.

First,

to what extent does the state

or,

to be more

precise,

the

system

of states remain

the

defining

frameworkfor analysing and constructingecurity

rgimes?

econdly,

o what extentdoes theshift

n

the

global

distributionf

power,

f which heend

of

the Cold

War is but one

manifestation,

oint

to new

security

options

nd

arrangements?

As

regards

the first

question,

we have

already

observed hatthe state remains central ctor and

that

the

interstate

ystem

onfers n the

security

ilemma

many

of its

distinguishing

haracteristics.et the

state

must contend more and more witha

multiplicity

f

agencies

nd structures hich t can influence ut does

not

control,

nd which to

varying egrees shape

the

definitionf its own

objectives

nd the means

by

which

theymay

be

pursued.

t is not

only

hat he state an no

longerbe conceptualizeds a self-contained,erritorially

bound

decisional

unit,

but that

security

ecisions are

increasingly

he

by-product

f

an intricate etwork f

subnational,

upranational

nd transnational nterests

(Camilleri 992).

Ethnonationalist

entiment,

hether

n

Bosnia,

the

Ukraine,

or Northern

reland,

may

at first

sight ppear

as the

engine

f

conflict,

ut the

origins

nd

consequences

f

suchnationalist ervourave as much o

do with

he

process

f

globalization

nd the

disintegration

of

the state as with

the assertionof the

sovereignty

principle.

ike so

many

ther acets f nternational

ife,

the searchfor

ecurity

eflects ot

ust

national

dentity

and

state

interests ut a mosaic of

local,

regional,

national,

upranational

nd

transnational

paces, oyalties

and institutions.

The

complexity

f

this

rapidly

volving

multi-centric

world

provides

s with n

important

lue for

answering

the second

question.

f the Cold War and

the

collective

defence

arrangements

o

which it

gave

rise did not

provide

durable olution

o the

ecurity

ilemma,

t was

in

large

measurebecause of

the diffusion f

power

-

within,

etween nd

across

tates. n

the

post-Cold

War

period,

contradictory

pressures

and

powerful

disintegrative

endencieshave

continued o

erode

the

stability

f

the

major

alliance

systems.

he decline of

these

security

tructures,

hough

most

dramatic

n

the

case of

the former

ovietbloc

e g

dissolution f

Warsaw

Pact,

almost

omplete

disrepair

f

Russia's

security

ies

withNorthKorea, Vietnamand Cuba), is also at an

advanced

tage

n

the

case of

theWestern

lliance

ystem

(eg

steady

transformation

f

NATO's

objectives,

functionsnd

even

memberphip;

ithdrawalf

US bases

from

he

Philippines;

ncertainty

egarding

he

egal

and

political

status of

the

Australian,

New

Zealand and

UnitedStates

Treaty

ANZUS).

To

make

sense of

the

changing

onfiguration

f

interests,

ower,

norms nd

institutions,

ost

analysts

have

sought

o

identify

he

organizational

rinciple

r

principles

nderlying

he

emerging

ecurity ystem

by

reference o

one of four

models:

unipolar

security,

balance

of

power,

concert

of

powers,

collective

or

universal

security Camilleri 1993).

It

is

doubtful,

however,

whether

ny

one model does

justice

to

the

intricate

but

rapidly changing

framework f

security

policiesand institutions.he end of the Cold Warmay

have leftthe

United States

as the

pre-eminent ilitary

power

in the world and

the

only

one

capable

of

projecting

orce

n a

global

cale,

but t s

no

longer

ble

to

perform

he

coordinating

r

policing

ole it assumed

after 1945. The rise

of

new centres f

power, notably

Western

Europe

and

Japan,

coupled

with Russia's

continuingspirations

or

greatpower

tatus,

oints

o a

more

traditional

multipolar ystem

characterized

y

multiple,

iverse nd

shifting

lliances r

coalitions,

nd

perhaps

ompeting egional

locs.

Yet such divisions re

in

part

offset

by

America's residual

primacy,

new

patterns

of

global

economic and

technological

integration,

nd

increasing sensitivity

o notions of

common and comprehensiveecurity.The growth f

consultativend

co-operative

mechanism

n

international

diplomacy, specially

but not

exclusively

n

Europe,

in

both

the economic nd

security

ields,

may

enhance he

opportunities

or

adjusting

and

reconciling ompeting

geopolitical

interests and

priorities.

There exists

nevertheless no

single

forum

which

effectively

institutionalizes

concert

f

powers.

Nor

is

there an

agreed

et of

norms nd

expectations

hich

an

guide

ts

future

genda.

As

already

ndicated,

heUN has since

the ast

1980s

cquired

enewed

mpetus,

ntervening

n a

great

many regional

conflicts,

aising xpectations

nd

setting

ormative

tandardscross

wide

range

f

policy

issues.

But

any system

f

collective

ecurity

as still o

contendwith hemistrustnd jealousies of states,with

inadequate

resources nd

the

absence of a

greatpower

consensus.

All

of

this s not

argue

that

hesemodels re without

theoretical

or

practical

validity,

but that

they

each

capture

only

one slice of

contemporary

eopolitical

reality,

which

we

have

elsewhere escribed

s "a

mosaic

of

relatively

fluid

arrangements,

a

transitional

architecture

f

competingyet

overlapping

lobal

and

regional

esigns".2)

t

istnevertheless

ossible

o

discern

several

rendswhichwill

have a

considerable

earing

n

the

prospects

or

common

nd

comprehensive

ecurity.

Despite

the

primacy

f

US

military

apabilities,

ll the

indications

re that

we

are

moving

owards

multipolar

internationalystem Buzan 1991), in whichEurope,

Japan,

China,

Russia,

and

in due

course

India

and

perhaps

n

Islamic

coalition

will

play

a

part

n

defining

and

executing

referred

ecurity

utcomes,

nd in

which

co-operative

nd

competitive

endencies

co-exist

and

interact.

Without he

restraining

nfluence

f

the Cold-

War

greatpower

conflicts,

articularly

n

the

economic

arena,

may

become

particularly

cute,

not

least

among

former

llies. To

this

mustbe

added

the

unresolved

North-South

onflict,

which,

hough

dormant n

recent

years

partly

ecause ofthe

South's

reduced

everage,

will

sooner or later

re-emerge

with

the aid of

a

new or

revamped

anti-Western

deology.

The

resurgence

f



11/12

1 4

GeoJournal

4.2/1

94

Islamic

undamentalism

s bestunderstoodnthis ontext.

A third etof conflicts illrevolve round he renewed

tensionsbetween states

and

people,

as violations of

human rights nd a varietyof repressive trategies

provokeresponses

which ut across nationalboundaries

(Hoffmann 990-1991).

There

is

more, however,

o the

emerging ecurity

architecture

han the rise

of

a

polycentric ower

structure. lso

in evidence is an unmistakable

rend

towardsmultilateralism

urtured

y

the

intractability

f

theconflicts e have

ust

described

nd more

mportantly

by

the

growing

ealization

n the

part

of states that

"complex

nterdependence"

s here

to

stay Cox

1992).

The

argument

s most

succinctly xpressedby Stanley

Hoffmann:

The

very ynamism

f theworld

conomy

nd ts reckless

reallocation

f wealth nd

power equire

he ame

kind f

politicalontrolt theglobalevel hat he politicalealm"

of

authority,

he

state,

rovides

t the

country

evel;

and

that

ontrol,

oo,

can

come,

o

far,

nly

rom

pooling

f

state

fforts.3)

The result

s the

expansion

f

global

nstitutionalization,

that is the creation

of

co-operative

rameworks

nd

mechanisms

esigned

to enhance

policy

coordination

across a wide

range

of

policy

reas,

from ealth are to

environmental

protection

and from

agricultural

production

o

human

ights.

he

steady

nhancement

f

the UN's

peacekeeping

nd

peace

enforcement

ctivities

suggests

hat

the same

trend

s at work

n

the

security

field where

the state

has

traditionallyrided

tself

n

being

he

only

alient

ctor

Documents

Challenges Post Coldwar