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Chancellerie fédéraleSection des droits politiques
Voting observation
in the context of the
Swiss internet voting projects
Workshop on the "Observation of e-enabled elections“ Oslo, 18-19 March 2010
I. Context
II. International guidelines on i-voting observation
III. Regulatory framework
IV. I-voting observation in practice
V. Conclusions
• Switzerland: a federal state (cantons have big cst’l autonomy with respect to political rights) and a (semi-) direct democracy (frequent votes at communal, cantonal and federal level)
• Three voting channels at federal level: polling station, postal voting (fully liberalized), i-voting (currently available to a part of the electorate in 4 cantons: three of them have developed their own i-voting system)
• A fourth channel at cantonal, communal level: Landsgemeinde
• Switzerland is the only country to have fully liberalized distant postal voting : at federal level some 90% of voters vote (~4 times a year) and elect (each 4 years) through this channel
• I-voting is being tested ~10 years with the aim of meeting existing needs (ex. Swiss abroad) and to gain experience : currently ~5% of the federal electorate are being involved in internet voting tests
• Control procedures vary depending on the voting channel*
• Landsgemeinde (only cantonal and communal level): each voter can see the result and hear the “estimation of results”
• Polling station vote: democratic control (of voting, counting, establishing and transmission of results) is exercised by voters’ representatives : jurés and electoral commissions
• Postal vote : same control as vote at polling station• i-voting : the impossibility to see needs be
compensated
* Andreas Auer, Nicolas von Arx, „La légitimité des procédures de vote: les défis du e-voting“:http://www.geneve.ch/evoting/doc/rapports/legitimite_e-vote.pdf
I. Context
II. International guidelines on i-voting observation
III. Regulatory framework
IV. I-voting observation in practice
V. Conclusions
• 1990 OSCE Copenhagen commitments
• Council of Europe – Venise Commission:Code of good practice in electoral matters (2002)Code of good practice on Referendums (2006)
• Council of Europe Recommendation on Legal, Operational and Technical Standards for E-Voting (2004)
• OSCE-ODIHR Discussion paper in preparation of guidelines for the observation of electronic voting (2008)
I. Context
II. International guidelines on i-voting observation
III. Regulatory framework
IV. I-voting observation in practice
V. Conclusions
Regulation of observation in general
• Art. 34.2 Federal Constitution1 Political rights shall be guaranteed.2 The guarantee of political rights protects the freedom of the citizen to form an opinion and to give genuine expression to his or her will.
Extent & modalities - regulated in cantonal legislation• Internal partisan and non-partisan observation and
international observation are not explicitly foreseen in federal law (but are possible*).
• Internal partisan observation (and sometime non-partisan) is foreseen in cantonal/communal legislations.
• Ways are always found to allow interested non-partisan observers to follow the election process*
*see OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report, Swiss Confederation federal elections 21 october 2007, chap. IV, E
Regulation specific to i-voting observation
• Art. 8a.2 BPR/LDP (electronic voting):
- the verification of eligibility to vote, voting secrecy and the counting of all the votes cast must be guaranteed and abuses prevented;
- the Federal Council (Gvt.) regulates details
Federal control exercised during the authorization procedure
• Asked how observers could exercise their task in the context of internet voting, the Federal Council replied (2005) that …electoral commissions …could also be involved in the establishing of internet voting results. Details are regulated in cantonal legislation.
Democratic control exercised through electoral commissions
• Individual voters’ control? Regulated in cantonal law
I. Context
II. International guidelines on i-voting observation
III. Regulatory framework
IV. I-voting observation in practice
V. Conclusions
Federal authorization
• When applying for authorization, cantons have to prove that i-voting will respect federal requirements
• They submit a complete documentation (complete transparency) to the federal authority
• An independent verification (ordered by the federal authority) is done when a system is first implemented and at each system modification
• Federal authorities have access to audit reports (ordered and paid by cantons)
• Issue of authorization is conditioned by implementation of recommendations for improvements
• The Federal Council can withdraw the authorization• Communication concept for reporting problems during an
i-voting trial is implemented
Electoral commission (best practices)
• A permanent electoral commission (EC) controls the regularity of i-voting (partisan+non partisan observers)
• EC can access documentation incl. source code of the applications and order controls all the time
• EC encrypts and decrypts the electronic ballot box + makes a “control vote” during a real vote (27nbis VPR/ODP). Control votes are treated as other votes. At the end of the vote the electoral commission can see whether systematic external manipulation of the ballot box occurred
• Procedural measures (federal and cantonal provisions) to control internal threats have been adopted. Ex.: any intervention in the system during the vote should be duly authorized, made by at least 2 persons (specific employment rules), duly reported and controlled ( incl. by observers)
• System monitoring produces observable data
Individual elector (best practices)
• Voter can verify that her vote was counted (control codes published on the Internet after the end of the vote)
• Transparency (publication of documents) of internet voting systems is regulated by cantonal legislation : transparency laws, political rights regulation and regulation specific to internet portal of cantons. Best practices include:
• Audits’ results are published
• Source code of the applications is made available for verification to any voter with an ideal/scientific interest who agrees to respect its confidentiality (upheld by the Federal supreme court)
• Access to other system documents= same as access to source code
I. Context
II. International guidelines on i-voting observation
III. Regulatory framework
IV. I-voting observation in practice
V. Conclusions
• In Switzerland Internet voting observation is organized similar to postal voting observation: through an electoral commission. Technical and procedural measures as well as access to the entire documentation by a permanent commission, make such observation meaningful
• Identification of best existing practices and their dissemination in i-voting cantons. Adopting specific communal/cantonal regulation takes more time
• Individual traceability (=each voter verifies that her vote was counted as cast) is not possible in other voting channels. Its feasibility in the Internet voting context is being studied (workshop on transparent i-voting systems, Fribourg – 6 September 2010, www.e-voting-cc.ch/)
