CHAPTER3

The Political Crises

of the I790s

4+v7

The ratification of the Constitution put American politics 0n a new institutionalfooting. Yet within two years of the inauguration of President George Washington,

fresh divisions appeared at the national level, separating such former allies asAlexander Hamilton and James Madison. These conflicts, stemming mainly fromclashes over financial policy, showed that Americans disagreed sharply over thelegitimate powers of their new federal glvernment.

Events at home and abroad deepened the cleavage in American politics after1791. The continuing French Revolution, initially welcomed by most Americansas an extension of their own struggle, divided the population into those who werehorrified by the execution of Louis XVI in January 1793 and those who remainedsteadfast supporters. The Jay Treaty of 1794-widely viewed as a diplomatic sur-render to Great Britain and an attack on France-fanned political discontent. Intowns and cities across the country, popular clubs, known collectively as Democratic-Republican societies, organized t0 zppzse the direction of Washington's administra-tion. Popular resentment toward Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton'sfiscal program led to the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania, an immense show ofmilitary force, and additional disaffection. Events reached a crisis when PresidentWashington branded the " self-created" democratic societies as improper organiza-tions, and blamed them for fomenting the Pennsylvania uprising.

Washington's successlr, John Adams, did nothing to still the controversies.Although a man of moderation himself, Adams found his administration increas-ingly entangled with hardline Federalists led by Hamilton. Relations with revolu-tionary France degenerated into a quasi-war. Federalist reaction to public criticismprompted passage of the repressive Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798. By the endof that year, the citizenry was edging perilously close to a civil war-or so slmeobservers believed, as they listened to the vitriolic tone ofpublic debate. Yet in theend, the turbulence led not to warfare but to the narrlw election of Thomas Jeffersonto the presidenqt.

Did the Federalists represent a "mlnlcratic," regressive force in Americanpolitics, as their adversaries claimed? Were the emerging Republicans anything likethe French "Jacobin" revolutionaries so feared by the Federalists? Wh6t ultimately

58

Tlte Political Crises ofthe 1790s

were the major differences between the Federalists and the Republicans in the1790s, at every level ofpolitical life? How did these differences speakto broadersocial conflicts?

+DOCUMENTS

In Document 1, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton outlines his plan for sus-taining the nation's tinancial credit. The logic behind Hamilton's scheme, along withhis calls for a national bank and for federal excise taxes, stined fears that he was tryingto elevate an American monied aristocracy consisting largely of his friends and bene-factors. Document 2, in two pafts, features the debate over the national bank betweenHamilton and Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, delivered as separate appeals toPresident Washington. Outside Congress and the cabinet, opposition to Hamilton's planscame mainly from scores of local, self-organized so-called Democratic-Republicansocieties, which tried to establish themselves as independent vehicles ofpublic opinionand reform. The societies also took strong exception to the Washington administra-tion's foreign policy, which they believed tilted toward monarchical Britain in its waragainst the newly proclaimed French revoiutionary republic-matters detailed in theexcerpts tiom the minutes of the Philadelphia society and a circular fiom the New Yorkgroup in Document 3. As the New York society's circular shows, the Federalists tookstrong exception to the very idea of societies as dangerously democratic. An uprisingin Pennsylvania against the whiskey excise in 1194 led Washington to send 15,000troops west to crush the insurgents.

Document 4 is an excerpt from the president's blanket condemnation of theDemocratic-Republican clubs as the main cause of the disorder. Popular anger at theadministration deepened the following year over the Jay Treaty, as exemplified inDocument 5, selected fiom a poem included as part of a pamphlet entitled An Emetic

for Aristocrats! By 1196, Thomas Jefferson was so offended by what he perceived as

the administration's aristocratic drift that he ran for president himself, finishing a closesecond to the Federalists' candidate, Vice President John Adams. Before the campaignbegan, Jefferson expressed his fears about the Federalists in an angry letter to an oldassociate from the days of the Revolution, the Italian Phillip Mazzei, excerpted inDocument 6. Document 7, taken from Washington's famous farewell address (whichWashington wrote in collaboration with Hamilton) discloses the departing president'ssense of tbreboding about the nation's future.

The growing war crisis with France and then theXYZ affair in 1797-98 fed patrioticfervor and support fbr the new Adams administration, illustrated in Docume nt 8, a Fed-eralist cartoon about the XYZ incident. Once military hostilities with France began inwhat would become known as the Quasi-War, Federalists in Congress (with Adams'sultimate approval) passed a series of repressive measures, known collectively as theAlien and Sedition Acts; the Sedition Act is excerpted here as Document 9. The offi-cial crackdown on immigrants and civil liberties caused a major political explosion,as the next two documents reveal. The Kentucky Resolutions (secretly authored byJefferson but presented here as Document 10 in the milder version actually passed bythe Kentucky legislature) led to a failed effort to persuade the state governments toprotest the repression and interpose between the national government and the citizenry.Document 1l is a Federalist newspaper report on the trial of one David Brown, an un-terrified Massachusetts critic of the administration, which detailed the mechanisms ofthe Federalists' effort to stifle dissent and exposed the softs of ideas that were makingthe rounds in more democratic political circles. Document l2 is a pro-Jefferson song

59

60 Maior Problems in the EarLy RepubLic, 1787-1848

that shows how Jefferson's supporters perceived the political stakes in the election

of 1800. John Adams's bitter reaction to his def'eat for reelection, relayed in a letter

reprinted here as Document 13, contains a suggestive explanation for the changing

course of American politics.

1. Alexander Hamilton RePorts onthe Public Credit, 1790

. . States, like individuals, who observe their engagements, are respected and

trusted; while the reverse is the fate of those, who pursue an opposite conduct.

Every breach of the public engagements, whether from choice or necessity, is

in different degrees hurtful to public credit. When such a necessity does truly exist,

the evils of it are only to be palliated by a scrupulous attention, on the part of the

government, to carry the violation no farther than the necessity absolutely requires,

and to manifest, if the nature of the case admits of it, a sincere disposition to make

reparation, whenever circumstances shall permit. But with every possible mitigation,

credit must suffer, and numerous mischiefs ensue. It is therefore highly important,

when an appearance ofnecessity seems to press upon the public councils, that they

should examine well its reality, and be perfectly assured, that there is no method ofescaping from it, before they yield to its suggestions. . - . Those who are most com-

monly creditors of a nation, are, generally speaking, enlightened men; and there are

signal examples to warant a conclusion, that when a candid and fair appeal is made

to them, they will understand their true interest too well to refuse their concurrence in

such modifications of their claims, as any real necessity may demand.

While the observance of that good faith, which is the basis of public credit, is

recommended by the strongest inducements of political expediency, it is enforced by

considerations of still greater authority. There are arguments fof it, which rest on the

immutable principles of moral obligation. And in proportion as the mind is disposed

to contemplate, in the order of Providence, an intirrate connection between public

virtue and public happiness, will be its repugnancy to a violation of those principles.

This reflection derives additional strength from the nature of the debt of the

United States. It was the price of liberty. The faith of America has been repeatedly

pledged for it, and with solemnities, that give peculiar force to the obligation. . . .

Tojustify and preserve their confidence; to promote the encreasing respectabil-

ity of the American name; to answer the calls of justice; to restore landed propefiy to

its due value; to furnish new resources both to agriculture and commerce; to cement

more closely the union ofthe states; to add to their security against foreign attack;

to establish public order on the basis of an upright and liberal policy. These are the

great and invaluable ends to be secured, by a proper and adequate provision, at the

present period, for the support of public credit. . . .

It will procure to every class of the community some important advantages,

and remove some no less imporlant disadvantages.

From Alexander Hamilton, "Report Relative to a Provision in Support of the Public Credit, January 9,

1790," in Joanne B. Freeman, ecl., Alexander Hamilton: Writings (New York: Library of America, 2001),

pp.531-74.

The Politkal Crkes ofthe J790s 61

The advantage to the public creditors from the increased value of that part oftheir property which constitutes the public debt, needs no explanation.

But there is a consequence of this, less obvious, though not less true, in which

every other citizen is interested. It is a well known fact, that in countries in which the

national debt is properly funded, and an object of established confidence, it answers

most of the purposes of money. Transfers of stock or public debt are there equivalent

to payments in specie; or in other words, stock, in the principal transactions of busi-

ness, passes current as specie. The same thing would, in all probability happen here,

under the like circumstances.

The benefits ofthis are various and obvious'

Trade is extended by it; because there is a larger capital to carry it on. . . .

The proprietors of lands would not only feel the benefit of this increase in the

value of their property, and of a more prompt and better sale, when they had occa-

sion ro sell; but the necessity of selling would be, itself, greatly diminished. . . .

It is agreed on all hands, that that part of the debt which has been contracted

abroad, and is denominated the foreign debt, ought to be provided for, according to

the precise terms of the contracts relating to it. The discussions, which can arise,

therefore, will have reference essentially to the domestic part of it, or to that which

has been contracted at home. It is to be regretted, that there is not the same unanimity

of sentiment on this part, as on the other.

The Secretary has too much deference for the opinions of every part of the

community, not to have observed one, which has, more than once, made its appear-

ance in the public prints, and which is occasionally to be met with in conversation'

It involves this question, whether a discrimination ought not to be made between

original holders ofthe public securities, and present possessors, by purchase. Those

who advocate a discrimination are for making a full provision for the securities of

the former, at their nominal value; but contend, that the latter ought to receive no

more than the cost to them, and the interest: And the idea is sometimes suggested

of making good the difference to the primitive possessor. . ' .

The Secretary, after the most mature reflection on the force of this argument,

is induced to reject the doctrine it contains, as equally unjust and impolitic, as highly

injurious, even to the original holders ofpublic securities; as ruinous to public credit.

It is inconsistent with justice, because in the first place, it is a breach of contract;

in violation of the rights of a fair purchaser.

The nature of the contract in its origin, is, that the public will pay the sum

expressed in the security, to the first holder, or his csslgn ee . The intent, in making

the security assignable, is, that the proprietor may be able to make use of his prop-

erty, by selling it for as much as it may be worth in the market, and that the buyer

may be safe in the Purchase.Every buyer therefore stands exactly in the place of the seller, has the same right

with him to the identical sum expressed in the security, and having acquired that

right, by fair purchase, and in conformity to the original agreement and intention

of the government, his claim cannot be disputed, without manifest injustice.

That he is to be considered as a fair purchaser, results from this: Whatever neces-

sity the seller may have been under, was occasioned by the government, in not

making a proper provision for its debts. The buyer had no agency in it, and there-

fore ought not to suffer. He is not even chargeable with having taken an undue

oz Major Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1848

advantage. He paid what the commodity was worth in the market, and took the risksof reimbursement upon himself. He of course gave a fair equivalent, and ought toreap the benefit of his hazard; a hazard which was far from inconsiderable, and

which, perhaps, turned on little less than a revolution in government.

2. Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton Debatethe Constitutionality of the National Bank, l79l

Thomas Jffirson, 1791

I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on this ground: That "all powersnot delegated to the United States, by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to theStates, are reserved to the States or to the people." [Xth amendment.] . . .

The incorporation of a bank, and the powers assumed by this bill, have not, inmy opinion, been delegated to the United States, by the Constitution.

I. They are not among the powers specially enumerated. . . .

II. Nor are they within either of the general phrases, which are the twofollowing:-

1. To lay taxes to provide for the general welfare of the United States . . .

[T]hey are not to do anything they please to provide for the general welfare, butonly to lay taxes for that purpose. . . .

It was intended to lace them up straitly within the enumerated powers, andthose without which, as means, these powers could not be carried into effect. . . .

2. The second general phrase is, "to make all laws necessdry and proper forcarrying into execution the enumerated powers." But they can all be carried intoexecution without a bank. A bank therefore rs not necessary, and consequently notauthorized by this phrase.

It has been urged that a bank will give great facility or convenience in the col-lection of taxes. Suppose this were true: yet the Constitution allows only the means

which are "necessary," not those which are merely "convenient" for effecting theenumeratedpowers....

It may be said that a bank whose bills would have a currency all over theStates, would be more convenient than one whose cunency is limited to a singleState. So it would be still more convenient that there should be a bank, whose billsshould have a currency all over the world. But it does not follow from this superiorconveniency, that there exists anywhere a power to establish such a bank; or thatthe world may not go on very well without it. . . .

It must be added, however, that uniess the President's mind on a view of every-thing which is urged for and against this bill, is tolerably clear that it is unauthorizedby the Constitutionl if the pro and the con hang so even as to balance his judgment,a just respect for the wisdom of the legislature would naturally decide the balancein favor of their opinion. It is chiefly for cases where they are clearly misled by

From Julian P Boyd et al., eds., The Papers ofThomas Jefferson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 1950- ), vol. 19, pp. 275-82.

tlre Politi,al Criset of the I 7e0s 63

error, ambition, or interest, that the Constitution has placed a check in the negative

of the President.

Alexander Hamilton, 179 1

In entering upon the argument it ought to be premised, that the objections of the

Secretary of State . . . are founded on a general denial ofthe authority ofthe United

States to erect corporations. . . .

Now it appears to the Secretary of the Treasury, that this general principle is

inherent in the very definition of Government and essential to every step of the

progress to be made by that of the United States; namely-that every power vested

in a Government is in its nature sovereign, and includes by force of the term, a rightto employ alI the means requisite, and fairly applicable to the attainment of the

ends of such power; and which are not precluded by restrictions and exceptions

specified in the constitution; or not immoral, or not contrary to the essential ends ofpolitical society. . . ..

The circumstances that the powers of sovereignty are in this country divided

between the National and State Governments, does not afford the distinction re-

quired. It does not follow from this, that each of the ponions of powers delegated to

the one or to the other is not sovereign with regard to its proper objects.It will only

follow from it, that each has sovereign power as to certain things, and not as Io othe rthings. To deny that the Government of the United States has sovereign power as to

its declared purposes and trusts, because its power does not extend to all cases, would

be equally to deny, that the State Governments have sovereign power in any case; be-

cause their power does not extend to every case. The tenth section of the first article

of the constitution exhibits a long list of very important things which they may not

do. And thus the United States would furnish the singular spectacle of a politicalsocieQ without sovereignty, or of a people governed without Sovernment. . . -

This general and indisputable principle puts at once an end to the abstractquestion-Whether the United States have power to erect a corporation? That is to

say, to give alegal or artfficial capacity to one or more persons, distinct from the nat-

ural. For it is unquestionably incidenlto sovereign power to erect corporations, and

consequently to that of the United States, in relation to the objects intrusted to the

management of the government. The difference is this-where the authority of the

government is general, it can create corporations in all cases; where it is confined

to certain branches oflegislation, it can create corporations only in those cases. . . .

It is not denied, that there are implied, as well as express powers, and that the

former are as eff'ectually delegated as the iatter. . . .

Then it follows, that as a power of erecting a corporation may as well be implied

as any other thing; it may as well be employed as an instrument ot nrcan of carryinginto execution any of the specified powers, as any other instrument or mean what-ever. The only question must be, in this as in every other case, whether the mean to

be employed, or in this instance the corporation to be erected, has a natural relationto any of the acknowledged objects or lawful ends of the government. . . .

From Joanne B. Freeman, ed., Alexander Hamilton; Writings (New York: Library of America, 200i)pp.613-46.

64 Major Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1848

A strange fallacy seems to have crept into the manner of thinking and reasoning

upon the subject. Imagination appears to have been unusually busy concerning it. Anincorporation seems to have been regarded as some great, independent, substantive

thing-as a political end of peculiar magnitude and moment; whereas it is truly tobe considered as a quality, capacity, or mean to an end. . . .

To this mode of reasoning respecting the right of employing all the means requi-

site to the execution of the specified powers of the Government, it is objected that

none but necessary and proper means are to be employed, and the Secretary of State

maintains, that no means are to be considered as necessary,but those without whichthe grant of the power would be nugatory . Nay so far does he go in his restrictive in-terpretation of the word, as even to make the case of necessity which shall warrantthe constitutional exercise of the power to depend on casual and temporary circum-stances, an idea which alone refutes the construction. . . .

It is essential to the being of the National government, that so erroneous a con-ception of the meaning of the word necessaryr, should be exploded.

It is certain, that neither the grammatical, nor popular sense of the term requires

that construction. According to both, necessary often means no more than needfiil,requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive lo. It is a common mode of expression tosay, that itrs necessary for a government or a person to do this or that thing, whennothing more is intended or understood, than that the interests of the government orperson require, or will be promoted, by the doing of this or that thing. The imagina-tion can be at no loss for exemplifications of the use of the word in this sense.

And it is the true one in which it is to be understood as used in the constitution.The whole turn of the clause containing it, indicates, that it was the intent of theconvention, by that clause to give a liberal latitude to the exercise of the specifiedpowers. The expressions have peculiar comprehensiveness. They il's-"1e make alllaws, necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers andall other powers vested by the constitution in the government of the United States,

or in any department or fficer thereof." To understand the word as the Secretary ofState does, would be to depart from its obvious and popular sense, and to give it a

restrictive operation; an idea never before entertained. It would be to give it thesame force as if the word absolutely or indispensibly had been prefixed to it.

3. The Democratic-Republican SocietiesOppose Federal Policy, L793,1794

Democratic Society of Pennsylvania, Principles, Articles, and Regulations,Agreed upon, Drawn, and Adopted, May 30, 1793-July 31, 1794

The rights of man, the genuine objects of Society, and the legitimate principles ofGovernment, have been clearly developed by the successive Revolutions of Amer-ica and France. Those events have withdrawn the veil which concealed the dignityand the happiness of the human race, and have taught us, no longer dazzled with

From Democratic Society of Pennsylvania minutes. Reprinted by permission of Historical Society ofPennsylvania.

The Political Crises of the 1790s 65

adventitious splendor, or awed by antiquated usurpation, to erect the Temple ofLIBERTy on the ruins of Palaces andThrones.

At this propitious period, when the nature of Freedom and Equality is thus prac-

tically displayed, and when their value, (best understood by those, who have paid

the price of acquiring them) is universally acknowledged, the patriotic mind will nat-

urally be solicitius [sic], by every proper precaution, to preserve and perpetuate the

Blessings which Providence hath bestowed upon our Country: For, in reviewing

the history of Nations, we find occasion to lament, that the vigilance of the People

has been too easily absorbed in victory; and that the prize which has been achieved

by the wisdom and valor of one generation, has too often been lost by the ignorance

and supineness of another.With a view, therefore, to cultivate the just knowledge of rational Liberty, to

facilitate the enjoyment and exercise of our civil Rights, and to transmit, unim-paired, to posterity, the giorious inheritance of afree Repttblican Government, the

Democratic Socmry of Pennsylvania is constituted and established. Unfettered byreligious or national distinctions, unbiassed by party and unmoved by ambition, this

Institution embraces the interest and invites the support of every virtuous citizen.

The public good is indeed its sole object, . . .

Civic Festivalon ye 7st of May 1794

The Democratic Society of Pennsylvania, at their meeting in the city of Philadelphiaon the 24th of April, 1794, Resolved unanimously That they would commemorate the

successes of their Republican French Brethern in a Civic Festival on the first day ofMay 1194; and that to this Festival they would invite their Sister Society the German

Republican, and all other citizens who harmonized with them in sentiment. . . .

On the hrst day of May, agreeably to the aforesaid Resolution of the DemocraticSociety, about Eight hundred citizens assembled at the County Seat of citn IsraelIsrael, now called Democratic Hall, on the Passyunk Road. . . .

The Flags of the Sister Republics marked and ornamented the seat of festivity.

[The following toasts were drunk.]A Revolutionary Tribunal in Great Britain:-May it give lessons of liberty to her

King, examples of Justice to her Ministry, and honesty to her corrupt Legislature . . .

The Fair Daughters of America & France:-May they ever possess virtue toattrack merit, and sense to reward it.

The Democratic and Republic Societies of the United States:-May they pre-serve and dessiminate their principles, undaunted by the frowns of powers, un-contaminated by the luxury of aristocracy, till the Rights of Man shall become the

Supreme Law of every land, and their separate Fraternities be absorbed, in OneGreat Democratic Society, comprehending the Human Race. . . .

May every Free Nation consider a public debt as a public curse; and may the manwho would assert a contrary opinion be considered as an enemy to his Country. . . .

Thursday, July 3lil 1794

The Society met in Special Meeting, at the University, pursuant to a public notifica-tion for that purpose. . . .

66 Major Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1848

Cit'Leib offered a set of Resolutions against such opposition to the Excise orany other law of the land, as is not warranted by the Constitution of the U.S. . . .

.Resolved, as the opinion of this Society, that in a Democracy, a majority oughtin all cases to govern; and that where a Constitution exists, which emanated fromthe People, the remedies pointed out by it against unjust and oppressive laws andbad measures, ought to be resorted to; and that every other appeal but to the Consti-tution itself, except in cases of extremity, is improper & dangerous.

Resolved, as the opinion of this Society, that altho' we conceive Excise systemsto be oppressive, hostile to the liberties of this Country, and a nursery of vice and

sycophancy; we, notwithstanding, highly disapprove of every opposition to them,not warranted by that frame of Government, which has received the sanction of thePeople of the United States.

Resolved, that we will use our utmost efforts to effect a repeal of the Excise-laws by Constitutional means; that we will, at all times, make legal opposition toevery measure which shall endanger the freedom of our Country,-but that we willbear testimony against every unconstitutional attempt to prevent the execution ofany law sanctioned by the majority of the people.

The Democratic Society of the City of New-York,Address to the Republican Citizens of the United States, May 1794

Republican Friends and Fellow-Citizens! . . .

[W]e firmly deny, that either the principles, regulations, or practice of this so-

ciety, or any of the others alluded to, as far as our knowledge and judgment extends,

can justify, in the smallest degree, any accusation made against them, or us, as sowers

of civil discord or sedition, or as promoters of feuds and broils in the community:But that, on the contrary, we most sincerely wish for a union of sentiment through-out the nation, onthe real principles of the constitution, and original intention of the

revolution, and for a perfect and uninterrupted peace with all nations, upon safe and

honourableterms....

Yes, Fellow-Citizens, we take a pleasure in avowing to you, that we are lovers of the

French nation, that we esteem their cause as our own, and that we are the enemies,the avowed enemies, of him or those who dare to infringe upon the holy law ofLiberty, the sacred Rights of Man, by declaring, that we ought to be strictly neutral,either in thought or speech, between a nation fighting for the dearest, the undeniable,

the invaluable Rights of human nature, and another nation, or nations, wickedly, buthitherto (we thank God) vainly endeavouring to oppose her in such a virtuous, such

a glorious struggle. . . tAl very important advantage to be derived from the insti-tutions of societies similar to ours, is the promotion of useful knowledge, and the

dissemination of political information. . . .

[I]t is in republican governments-governments instituted upon the only just and

solid principle, to promote the universal good and welfare of the people, and not to

From Democratic Society of the City of New York, circular, 'At a Meeting of the Democratic Society ofthe City of New-York, on Wednesday, the 28th of May, 1794," Nerv-York Historical Society.

The PoLitical Crises lfthe 1790s 67

further the wicked designs and crafty intentions of men in power-governments inwhich political as well as civil liberty has established its salutary and happy seat . . .

that it becomes a duty more particularly incumbent upon individuals, to acquire aperfect knowledge of the government and political institutions of their country. . . .

4. President George Washington Attacks"Certain Self- Created Societies,,

over the Whiskey Rebellion, 1794Fellow Citizens of the Senate and of the House of Representatives: . . .

when we call to mind the gracious indulgence of Heaven by which the Ameri-can people became a nation; when we survey the general prosperity ofour country,and look forward to the riches, power, and happiness to which it seems destined, withthe deepest regret do I announce to you that during your recess some ofthe citizensof the United states have been found capable of insurrection. It is due, however, tothe character of our Goverrrment and to its stability, which can not be shaken by theenemies of order, freely to unfold the course of this event.

During the session of the year 1190 itwas expedient to exercise the legislativepower granted by the Constitution of the United States "to lay and collect excises."In a majority of the States scarcely an objection was heard to this mode of taxa-tion. In some, indeed, alarms were at first conceived, until they were banished byreason and patriotism. In the four western counties of pennsylvania a prejudice,fbstered and imbittered by the artifice of men who labored for an ascendency overthe will of others by the guidance of their passions, produced symptoms of riotand vioience.

It is well known that Congress did not hesitate to examine the complaints whichwere presented, and to relieve them as far as justice dictated or general conven-ience would permit. But the impression which this moderation made on the dis-contented did not correspond with what it deserved. The arts of delusion were nolonger confined to the efforts ofdesigning individuals. The very forbearance to pressprosecutions was misinterpreted into a fear of urging the execution of the laws, anclassociations ofmen began to denounce threats against the officers employed. Froma belief that by a more formal concert their operation might be defeated, certainself-created societies assumed the tone of condemnation. Hence, while the greaterpart of Pennsylvania itself were conforming themselves to the acts of excise, a fewcounties were resolved to frustrate them. It is now perceived that every expectationfrom the tenderness which had been hitherto pursued was unavailing, and that fur-ther delay could only create an opinion of impotency or irresolution in the Govern-ment. Legal process was therefore delivered to the marshal against the rioters anddelinquent distil lers.

No sooner was he understood to be engaged in this duty than the vengeance ofarmed men was aimed at his person and the person and property of the inspector

From "Sixth Annual Address" (1794), in James D. Richardson, ed,., A Compitation of the Messagesand Papers of the Presidents (Washington, DC: Bureau of National Literatuie andAri, 1910), volii,pp.154 64.

68 Major Problems in the Early RepubLic, 1787-1848

of the revenue. They fired upon the marshal, arrested him, and detained him forsome time as a prisoner. He was obliged, by the jeopardy of his life, to renounce

the service of other process on the west side of the Allegheny Mountain, and a depu-

tation was afterwards sent to him to demand a surrender of that which he had

served. A numerous body repeatedly attacked the house ofthe inspector, seized hispapers of office, and finally destroyed by fire his buildings and whatsoever they

contained. Both of these officers, from ajust regard to their safety, fled to the seat

of Government, it being avowed that the motives to such outrages were to compel

the resignation of the inspector, to withstand by force of arms the authority of the

United States, and thereby to extort a repeal of the laws of excise and an alteration

in the conduct of Government. . . .

5. An Anonymous Poet Protests the Jay Treaty,1795

A Poem on Jay's Treaty

Ye Patriots true, that's brave and bold,That stood "the times that try'd the soul;"That guarded well the public weal,

Once more to you we now aPPeal-Is't Britain's pow'r-e1 is it gold?Are we conquer'd? or are we sold?

Must we submit. or war. the fate?

Or caught like fish, with gold for bait?

Shameful tho't! we hear you say,

That ruinous Treaty, signed by Jay,

Is fraught with evils, not a few;Disgraceful to our country too.Rouse! then ye brave, 'ere 'tis too late,And give it, its deserved fate.

Our Nabobs they may prate and say,

'Tis a rabble-and only they,

That blames our well-beloved Jav. . . .

6. Thomas Jefferson Describes the'Aristocratical Party," 17 96

Letter t0 Philip Maue| April24, 1796

. . . The aspect of our politics has wonderfully changed since you left us. In place ofthat noble love of liberty and republican government which carried us triumphantlythrough the war, an Anglican monarchical aristocratical party has sprung up, whose

From 'A Poem on Jay's Treaty," in Anonymous, An Emetic for Aristocrats! Oa A Chapter RespectittgGov e rno r J o hn J ay and H i s Treaty (B oston : n.p., 17 9 5), 19 -23.From Thomas Jefferson to Phillip Mazzei, Aprrl 24, 1796, in Julian P Boyd et al., eds., The PapersofThomas Je.ffersdl4 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, i950- ), vol. 29, pp. 73-88.

The Plliticdl Crises ofthe 1790s 69

avowed object is to draw over us the substance, as they have already done the forms,of the British government. The main body of our citizens, however, remain true totheirrepublican principles; the whole landed interest is republican, and so is a greatmass of talents. Against us are the Executive, the Judiciary, two out of three branchesof the Legislature, all the officers of the government, all who want to be officers, alltimid men who prefer the calm of depotism to the boisterous sea of liberty, Britishmerchants and Americans trading on British capital, speculators and holders in thebanks and public funds, a contrivance invented for the purposes of corruption, andfor assimilating us in all things to the rotten as well as the sound parts of the Englishmodel. It would give you a fever were I to name to you the apostates who have goneover to these heresies, men who were Samsons in the field and Solomons in the coun-cil, but who have had their heads shorn by the harlot England. In short, we are likelyto preserve the liberty we have obtained only by unremitting labors and perils. Butwe shall preserve it; and our mass of weight and wealth on the good side is so great,as to leave no danger that force will ever be attempted against us. we have only toawake and snap the Lilliputian cords with which they have been entangling us dur-ing the first sleep which succeeded our labors. . . .

7. President Washington Bids Farewellto His Countrymerr, 1796

The unity of government which constitutes you one people is also now dear to you. Itisjustly so, for it is a main pillar in the edifice ofyour real independence, the supportof your tranquility at home, your peace abroad, of your safety, of your prosperity, ofthat very liberty which you so highly prize. But as it is easy to foresee that from dif-f'erent causes and from different quarters much pains will be taken, many artificesemployed, to weaken in your minds the conviction of this truth. . . .

In contemplating the causes which may disturb our union it occurs as matter ofserious concern that any ground should have been furnished for characterizing partiesby geographical discriminations-Nor/hetn and southern, Atlantic and. western-whence designing men may endeavor to excite a belief that there is a real differenceof local interests and views. one of the expedients of party to acquire influencewithin particular districts is to misrepresent the opinions and aims of other districts.You can not shield yourselves too much against the jeaiousies and heartburningswhich spring from these misrepresentations; they tend to render alien to each otherthose who ought to be bound together by fraternal affection. . . .

All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all combinations and associa-tions, under whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, control,counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action of the constituted authorities,are destructive of this fundamental principle and of fatal tendency. They serve toorganize faction; to give it an artificial and extraordinary force; to put in the placeof the delegated will of the nation the will of a party, often a small but artful andenterprising minority of the community, and, according to the alternate triumphs of

From"FarewellAddress"(1796),inJamesD.Richardson, ed.,ACompilationoftheMessagesandpapersofthe Presidents (washington, DC: Bureau ofNational Literature andArt, 1910), vol. t, pp. zos-to.

70 Ma.ior Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1848

different parties, to make the public administration the mirror of the ill-concertedand incongruous projects offaction rather than the organ ofconsistent and whole-some plans, digested by common counsels and modified by mutual interests.

However combinations or associations of the above description may now andthen answer popular ends, they are likely in the course of time and things to be-come potent engines by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will be

enabled to subvert the power of the people, and to usurp for themselves the reinsof government, destroying afterwards the very engines which have lifted them tounjust dominion.

As a very important source of strength and security, cherish public credit. Onemethod of preserving it is to use it as sparingly as possible, avoiding occasions ofexpense by cultivating peace, but remembering also that timely disbursements toprepare for danger frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it; avoid-ing likewise the accumulation of debt, not only by shunning occasions of expense,but by vigorous exertions in time of peace to discharge the debts which unavoidablewars have occasioned, not ungenerously throwing upon posterity the burthen whichwe ourselves ought to bear. . . .

Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Cultivate peace and harmonywith all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct. . . .

In the execution of such a plan nothing is more essential than that permanent,inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for othersshould be excluded, and that in place of them just and amicable feelings towardall should be cultivated. . . .

The great rule ofconduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending ourcommercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible. So

far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect goodfaith. Here let us stop.

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remoterelation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the cause of whichare essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise to us toimplicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics orthe ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. . . .

It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of thefbreign world, so far, I mean, as we are not at liberty to do it; for let me not be under-

stood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maximno less applicable to public than to private affairs that honesty is always the bestpolicy. I repeat, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense.

But in my opinion it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.

The political Crises ofthe t7g0s

Cartoonist Attacks the Degenerate Frenchover the XYZ Affair

7I

8.A

"cinque-Tetes, or the Paris Monster," a Federalist cartoon on the XyZ affair in 179g. TheFrench government, headed by a tive-man consortium known as the Directory, demands"Money. Money, Money!!" from the three American commissioners sent by President JohnAdams to try to end American hostilities with France. News of the afTair inflamed pro-warand pro-administration opinion in America. Note the depiction on the right of the French asa bloodthirsty, poor, and degraded radical people, '"vho would give a black man-perhapsone of the ex-slaves freed by the French republic-a place at the table for their ,,CivicFeast." O Bettmann/Corbis.

9. Congress Cracks Down on Dissent, L79gThe Sedition Act of Jttly 14, 1798 . . .

sEC. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the unitedStates of America, in Congress assembred, That if any persons shall Lrnlawfullycombine or conspire together, with intent to oppose any measure or measures ofthe government of the United states, which are or shall be directed by proper au-thority, or ro impede the operation of any law of the united states, or to intimidateor prevent any person holding a place or office in or ur-rder the government of theunited states, from undertaking, performing or executing his trust or duty; ancl if

From 'An Act in Addition to the Act, Entitled 'An Act for the Punishrlent of Certain Crimes Agarnst theUnited States."'http://wwrv.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/statutes/sedact.htm (August 6. 2006j.

72

8..*

Major Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1818

any person or persons, with intent as aforesaid, shall counsel, advise or attempt to

procure any insurrection, riot, unlawful assembly, or combination, whether such

conspiracy, threatening, counsel, advice, or attempt shall have the proposed effect

or not, he or they shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and on conviction,

before any court ofthe United States havingjurisdiction thereof, shall be punished

by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, and by imprisonment during a term

not less than six months nor exceeding five years; and further, at the discretion ofthe court may be holden to find sureties for his good behaviour in such sum, and

for such time, as the said court may direct.SEC 2. And be it further enacted, That if any person shall write, print, utter or

publish, or shall cause or procure to be written, printed, uttered or publishing, or shall

knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or publishing any

false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the

United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or the President

of the United States, with intent to defame the said government, or either house of the

said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them, or either of them, into con-

tempt or disrepute; or to excite against them, or either or any of them, the hatred ofthe good people of the United States, or to excite any unlawtirl combinations therein,

for opposing or resisting any law of the United States, or any act of the President ofthe United States, done in pursuance of any such law, or of the powers in him vested

by the constitution ofthe United States, or to resist, oppose, or defeat any such law

or act, or to aid, encourage or abet any hostile designs of any foreign nation against

the United States, their people or government, then such person, being thereof

convicted before any court ofthe United States havingjurisdiction thereof, shall be

punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not

exceeding two years. . . .

10. The I{entucky Legislature Proteststhe Repression, 1798

The l{entucky Resolutions, November 10, 1798

l. Resolved,That the several States composing, the United States of America, are

not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general government; but

that, by a compact under the styie and title of a Constitution for the United Staies,

and of amendments thereto, they constituted a general government for special pur-

poses-delegated to that government certain dehnite powers. reserving. each State to

itself, the residuary mass of right to their own self-government; and that whensoever

the general government aSSumeS undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative,

void, and of no force: that to this compact each State acceded as a State, and is an

integral part, its co-States forming, as to itself, the other party: that the government

created by this compact was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent ofthe powers delegated to itself; since that would have made its discretion, and not the

Constitution, the measure of its powers; but that, as in all other cases of compact

From Julian P Boyd et al. eds.,The Papers ofThomas Jefferson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 1950* ), vol. 30, pp. 550*56.

Thc P,.litirnl .risis of the l7e1s 73

among powers having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge foritself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress. . . .

3. Resolved, That it is true as a general principle, and is also expressly declared

by one of the amendments to the Constitution, that "the powers not delegated to the

United States by the Constitution, or prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to

the States respectively, or to the people"; and that no power over the freedom ofreligion, freedom of speech, or freedom of the press being delegated to the UnitedStates by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, all lawful powers re-specting the same did of right remain, and were reserved to the States or the people;

that thus was manifested their determination to retain to themselves the right ofjudging how far the licentiousness of speech and of the press may be abridged

without lessening their useful freedom, and how far those abuses which cannot be

separated from their use should be tolerated, rather than the use be destroyed. Andthus also they guarded against all abridgment by the United States of the freedomof religious opinions and exercises, and retained to themselves the right ofprotect-ing the same, as this State, by a law passed on the general demand of its citizens,had already protected them from all human restraint or interference. And that inaddition to this general principle and express declaration, another and more specialprovision has been made by one of the amendments to the Constitution, which ex-pressly declares, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment ofreligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom ofspeechor of the press": thereby guarding in the same sentence, and under the same words,the freedom of religion, of speech, and of the press: insomuch, that whatever vio-lated either, throws down the sanctuary which covers the others, and that libels, false-hood, and defamation, equally with heresy and false religion, are withheld from thecognizance of federal tribunals. That, therefore, the act of Congress of the UnitedStates, passed on the l4th day of July, 1798, intituled 'An Act in addition to the actintituled An Act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States,"which does abridge the freedom of the press, is not law, but is altogether void, and

of no force.4. Resolved, That alien friends are under the jurisdiction and protection of the

iaws of the State lvherein they are: that no power over them has been delegated tothe United States, nor prohibited to the individuai States, distinct frorn their powerover citizens. And it being true as a general principle, and one of the amendmentsto the Constitution having also declared, that "the powers not delegated to the

United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved tothe States respectively. or to the people," the act of the Congress of the UnitedStates, passed on the - day of July, 1798, intituled "An Act concerning aliens,"which assumes powers over alien friends, not delegated by the Constitution, is notlaw, but is altogether void, and ofno force. . . .

8. Resolved,. . . [T]hat confidence is everywhere the parent of despotism-freegovernment is founded in jealousy, and not in confidence; it is jealousy and notconfidence which prescribes limited constitutions, to bind down those whom we are

obliged to trust with power: that our constitution has accordingly fixed the limits towhich, and no further, our confidence may go; and let the honest advocate of con-fidence read the Alien and Sedition acts, and say if the Constitution has not beenwise in fixing limits to the government it created, and whether we should be wise in

74 Major Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1848

destroying those limits, Let him say what the government is, if it be not a tyranny,which the men of our choice have conferred on our President, and the President ofour choice has assented to, and accepted over the friendly stranger to whom the mildspirit of our country and its law have pledged hospitality and protection: that the menof our choice have more respected the bare suspicion of the President, than the solidright of innocence, the claims of justification, the sacred force of truth, and the formsand substance of law and justice. In questions of powers, then, let no more be heardof confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Consti-tution. That this commonwealth does therefore call on its co-States for an expressionof their sentiments on the acts concerning aliens and for the punishment of certaincrimes herein before specified, plainly declaring whether these acts are or are notauthorized by the federal compact. . . .

lI. A Federalist Newspaper Describesthe Tiial of David Brown, L799

Boston, June 17

Circuit Court.

On Monday the 10th inst., David Brown, who had pleaded gttilty to an indictmentfor seditious writings and practices, was sentenced by the court to pay a fine of400dollars, and to eighteen months imprisonment.

The indictment was lengthy. The two first counts consisted of numerous ex-tracts from two manuscripts, written by the defendant: the contents of which he has

industriously inculcated, in different parts of the commonwealth. These writingsare replete with the most malignant and perverse misrepresentations of the viewsand measures of the government of the United States. The government is repre-sented as 'a tyrannic

'association of about five hundred out of'five million, to engross to themselves all'the benefit of public property, and live'upon the ruins of the rest of the community.'

A1l the means which a vicious ingenuity could suggest, appear to have been used

by him to create discontent, and to excite among the people hatred and opposition totheir government. The last count in the indictment was for producing a label to bepainted and affixed to a pole erected at Dedham, in October last, the following wordsrecited in the indictment, made part of the inscription, 'No stamp act, no sedition,no alien bill, no land tax, Downfall to the tyrants of America, peace and retirement tothe President; long live the vice president and the minority.' . . .

After the inquiry, his honor judge Chase observed to Brown that having pleadedguilty to the indictment, and thrown himself on the mercy of the court, it becamehim to conduct frankly and sincerely; and to evidence his sincerity and contritionby disclosing to the government those who had prompted and aided him in his

From Columbian Centinel. June 17,1'799.

Tlte Political Crises of the 1790s 75

mischievous and dangerous pursuits and by delivering up the list of subscribers tohis pernicious writings.

He replied, that on the Monday following he would deliver to the court, in writ-ing, some observations relative to his situation and conduct. When called to the barto receive sentence, he delivered in a paper in which he expresses his sorrow foruttering his political sentiments'more especially,'he adds, 'in the way and manner Idid utter them.'By 'giving up the names,' to which the court referred, 'l shall lose,'say he, 'all my friends.' He promises to conduct as a peaceable citizen in future, andrequests that his punishment may be wholly by imprisonment andnotby fine.

Judge Chase, previous to declaring the sentence of the court, made some veryimpressive observations to Brown, on the nature, malignity, and magnitude of hisoffenses and on the vicious industry with which he had circulated and inculcatedhis disorganizing doctrines, and imputent falsehoods; and the very alarming and dan-gerous excesses to which he attempted to incite the uninformed part of the commu-nity. The court, he observed, saw no satisfactory indication of a change of disposition,or ameliorations of temper; and found nothing disclosed in the paper delivered themto justify the mitigation of that punishment which his very pernicious and dangerouspractices demanded. . . .

12. Thomas Jefferson's Supporters Singof His Victory, ca. l80l

Jffirson and Liberty

The gloomy night before us lies,The reign of terror now is o'er,Its gags, inquisitors and spies,

Its hordes of harpies are no moreRejoice, Columbia's sons, rejoiceTo tyrants never bend the kneeBut join with heart, and soul and voice

For Jefferson and Libertv. . . .

Within its hallow'd walls immenseNo hireling band shall e'er arise;

Anay'd in tyranny's defence,

To hear an injur'd people's cries.Rejoice etc.

No lordling here with gorging jaws.

Shall wring from industry its food;No fiery bigot's holy laws,Lay waste our fields and streets in blood.

Rejoice etc.

From "Jefferson and Liberty," ca. 1801, http:/lsniff.numachi.com/pages/tiJEFFllB;ttJEFFllB.html (Au-gust 6, 2006).

76 Major Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1818

Here strangers from a thousand shores

Compell'd by tyranny to roam;Shall find, amidst abundant stores,

A nobler and a happier home,

Rejoiceetc....

From Europe's wants and woes remote

A dreary waste of waves between,

Here plenty cheers the humble cot,

And smiles on every village green.

Rejoice etc.

Here, free as air's expanded space,

To every soul and sect shall be;

That sacred privilege of our race,The worshio of the Deitv.

Rejoice etc.

These gifts, great Liberty, are thine,Ten thousand more we owe to thee:

Immortal may their mem'ries shine,

Who fought and died for Liberty.Rejoice etc.

Let foes to freedom dread the name,

But should they touch the sacred treeTwice fifty thousand swords would flame,For Jefferson and Liberty.

Rejoiceetc....

13. John Adams Accounts for His Defeat, l80lLetter to Beniamin Stoddert, March 31, 1801

. . . We federalists are . . . complotely and totally routed and defeated. We are not yet

attainted by act ofCongress, and, I hope, shall not fly out into rebellion. No party,

that ever existed, knew itself so little, or so vainly overrated its own influence and

popularity, as ours. None ever understood so ill the causes of its own power, or so

wantonly destroyed them. If we had been blessed with common sense, we should

not have been overthrown by Philip Freneau, Duane, Callender, Cooper, and Lyon,or their great patron and protector. A group of fbreign liars, encouraged by a fewambitious native gentlemen, have discomfited the education, the talents, the virtues,and the property of the country. The reason is, we have no Americans in America.

The federalists have been no more Americans than the anties.

From John Adams to Benjamin Stoddert, March 31,of John Adams (Boston: Little, Brown, I 850-56), vol

1801, in Charles Francis Adams, ed., The Works9, p. s82.

The Political Crises ofrhe t 790s 77

sEssArsHow can we explain the intense political conflicts of the 1790s? were they, as an earliergeneration of historians posited, a result of the perennial ciash between agrarian democ-racy and urban capitalism? Did the ideas of politics and social order embodied in thefights over finance, foreign policy, and civil liberties defy simple social explanations?Or were concerns about the preservation of slavery and southern power the hidden forcedriving the Republican opposition, its national leadership dominated by southern slave-holders like Jefferson and Madison?

The political culture that energized the new republic in the 1790s was an extensionof developments that occurred during the Revolution itself. In the first essay, DavidWaldstreicher of Temple University examines how political rituals of the Revolutioneked out a space for both nationalism and partisanship that laid the groundwork forfuture groups like the Democratic-Republican societies.

James E. Lewis Jr., who teaches at Kalamazoo cotlege, sees the partisan battlesprimarily in ideological terms, pitting the friends of order and hierarchy against thefriends of liberty and equality. By focusing on the frenzy that led directly to the electionof 1800, Lewis reveals the fragility of the new nation's political institutions and showsthat both the Jeffersonians and Federaiists were driven to more extreme apprehensionsthan most historians have assumed. writing in a very dillerent key, John Ashworth of theUniversity of Nottingham criticizes interpretations that fail to describe the parties asdiverse coalitions, emphasizes the sectional character ofthe division, and suggests thatwhat he calls the .Ieffersonians' "populism" was ironically bor,rnd up inextricably withthe institution of slaverv.

Public Celebrations, Print Culture,and American Nationalism

DAVID WALDSTREICHER

Despite all the recent attention to public ritual and performance in the nineteenthand twentieth centuries, the role ofcelebratory activities in the revolutionary era-indeed, their crucial part in the invention of American nationhood-has been largelyneglected. This is somewhat surprising, especially when we consider that studentsof the American Revolution have long appreciated the political importance of ritrialsfor the prerevolutionary colonial resistance movement ofthe 1760s and early 1770s.what is lacking in the historiography of the Revolution is not an appreciation offestivity as a site of local political action, of conflict and consensus. It is rather anunderstanding ofthe relationship between local street theater and the nation: a rela-tionship that came into being through the mediation of print.

. . . I argue that American nationalism emerged from the conjunction of localcelebrations and their reproduction in the press. As the very practices of nationalism,those celebrations and publications drew upon the politicized rituals that Britons hadbeen employing for more than a century. The mobilization of citizens to celebrate

"Rites of Rebellion, Rites of Assent: Celebrations, Print Culture, and the Origins of American National-isml' JournaL of American History,82, 1995, pp. 35-61. Copyright O Organization of American Historians.http://www.oah.org. Reprinted with permission.

78 Major Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1848

patriotic occasions, with the reprinting ofaccounts ofthese events, gave the abstrac-

tions ofnationalist ideology a practical sense.

As they developed after l7'7 6, these rites of celebration, publication, and repub-

lication resolved certain problems of the American revolutionary struggle. Celebra-

tions and printed accounts of them embodied and mobilized a nationalist ideology,

an ideology that made consensus the basis of patriotism. Indeed, by fostering an

idea of the nation as extralocal community and by giving ordinary people the oppor-

tunity for local expression of national feeling, this reciprocal dynamic of celebrations

and print literally and figuratively papered over the disturbing class resentments (ex-

pressed in the antiaristocratic language ofthe Revolution) that had energized much

of the populace in the first place. By the 1790s those resentments would reemerge infestive culture, in nationalist celebrations where they were recast into national, par-

tisan political divisions. Yet during the war years, past and present divisions between

plebeians and elites were absorbed by the direct link between "the people" and the

nation whose independence they repeatedly celebrated. The local came to represent

the national while the pfesent gave proof, not of the past, but of the future. Diffused

by print, the unruly rites ofrebellion could serve as ruling rites of assent. . . .

Celebrations were not afterthoughts to independence, nor were they mere sym-

bolizations of accumulated oedipal anxieties. They were anticipated, deliberate,

necessary responses to the Declaration of Independence. By the summer of 1116,

independence had been in the air for at least a year, and the Continental Congress

had already declared a national fast day, July 20, l115.YeI on sending out the

printed declaration, the Congress did not recommend fasting, mourning, bell ring-

ing, or any other observance. Congress would not-could not-order the nation to

celebrate its own birth. Its members acted upon the assumption that the new nation

could not exist until the people spontaneously celebrated its existence, and untilevidence of this nationwide celebration appeared in print.

The Declaration of Independence signaled the ultimate rejection of England: itthrust all grievances onto the person of the king. Consequently, its public procla-

mation set off public vilifications of the king's body. New Yorkers tore down the

equestrian statue of George III and hacked it to pieces; in other places the monarch's

picture and royal arms were ceremoniously burned. Many scholars, most notably

Winthrop Jordan, have observed in these king-killing rituals "the symbolic transfer

of sovereign power from the king to the people of the American republic." Yet

these founding rituals drew less on some "prehistoric human pasf ' of ritual murder

than on a quite historic recent past of British monarchical political culture. More-

over, this king killing was not only a murder: it was also afuneral. Llke the corpse

of Liberty after the Stamp Act, George III was "laid prostrate in the dirt," his re-

mains set afire. In Savannah he "was interred before the Court House." With theirtown lit up at night in honor of the occasion, Baltimoreans saw "the effigy of our

Late King . . . carted through the Town, and committed to the flames, amidst the

acclamations of many hundreds-the just reward of a tyrant." Only "the people"

presided at such rites. At Huntington, Long Island, they took down the old liberty

pole (topped with a flag dedicated to liberty and George III) and used the materials

to fashion an effigy. This mock king sported a wooden broadsword, a blackened

face "like Dunmore's lslave] Virginia regiment," and feathers, "llke Carleton and

Johnson's savages." Fully identified with the Black and Indian allies his generals

The Pllitical Aises of the 1790s 79

had enlisted to fight the Americans, wrapped in the union jack, he was hung, ex-ploded, and burned.

whether the deceased arrived dead or was killed on the spot, this was no ordi-nary funeral: it inverted and transfbrmed the king's birthday celebration. The twomost often mentioned aspects of this independence day-the bonfires and the bells-had been centerpieces of those festivals. unlike the Stamp Act funerals, which hadalso turned funeral into festival, jubilation at the declaration rites was immediateand continuous, not deferred until the resurrection of the past. Thus the preserva-tion of birthday cheer at a funeral without solemnity: this death meant eternal life,the life of a new nation and its people. A few days after New yorkers toppled theequestrian statue of George lll-built in gratitude for the repeal of the Stamp Act-a correspondent expressed no doubt as to the place ofthe event in history.

The fourth instant was rendered remarkabie by the most important event that ever hap-pened to the American colonies, an event which will doubtless be celebrated through along succession of future ages, by anniversary commemorations, and be considered asa grand era in the history of the American slates.

Nationhood could not fail to occur if left to the people who had demonstrated theirassent. Even ifin the present there were still thirteen "colonies," in the future therewould be independent "states." Instead of toasting the king, patriots in Boston drank"prosperity and perpetuity to the u.s.A." New York seized the ultimate royal (onceheavenly) prerogative, declaring a jubilee-a "general jail derivery, with respectof Debtors."

The declaration spoke for the people, or at least for their representatives. But thenewspaper texts spoke as well, in response to the people's ritualized demonstrationof their assent. Critics who rightly point out the performative nature of .,declaring

independence" and who stress the declaration as the defining moment of the Ameri-can polity still often underestimate the mutually defining character of rhetoric andritual, and their joining in print, during the era of the American "founding." In onesense, there was and is a homology, or structural parallel, between rhetoric and ritual.Rhetoric works like ritual in that it persuades through invocation of reliable, repeatedmovements. Ritual, like rhetoric, brings us into communion with the performer andthe performance. Given this structural parallel, it might be enough to consider allofthe Patriots' actions as rhetorical, using the Iiterary critics'model ofthe rext, or rotalk of all their words as ritual, employing the tools of anthropologists.

To do so, however, wouid conflate and thus obscure the special conditions thatenabled this moment in history: the interplay of rhetoric and ritual, of oratory,street theater, and print. I would suggest that if the rituals of national birth ratifythe act ofdeclaring independence, the printed descriptions ofthose rituals also hada crucial, and not merely a supplemental, role. They too confirmed ,,the people"as the authors of independence, if not of "the Declaration of Independence.', Tounderstand these links it is necessary to see newspaper accounts ofcelebrations lessas objective reportage than as pieces ofrhetoric: a genre designed to define what itostensibly describes. These printed accounts played a crucial role in a celebratorypolitical culture: the role of enacting American belonging, of fulfilling the prophe-cies ofindependence. Reporting celebrations, they inspired new ones and thus newreports of celebrations.

80 Ltdjlr Prlblems in the Early Repuhlic. 1787-18']8

The generic newspaper accounts ofthe response to the declaration always stress

the voluble and visible assent of the people. At Easton, Pennsylvania, on July 8, the"great number of spectators" who heard the declaration "gave their hearty assent

with three loud huzzahs, and cried out, 'M.ry Godlong preserve and unite the Freeand Independent States of America.' " The people of Trenton, New Jersey, responded

to the declaration "with a loud acclamation." The sounds and sights, as reported, con-firmed the cross-class unity of the day. In Providence, Rhode Island, "The Declara-tion was received with joy and applause by all ranks." The Committee of Safety inHalifax County, North Carolina, asked both "fieeholders and Inhabitants" to attend

their public reading. This was not to be taken for granted. The shadow of the unrulycrowd hung over these ritual and rhetorical demonstrations of the new order. Thewriter of an account of the celebration in Richmond, Virginia, expressed relief:'Although there were near 1000 people present, the whole was conducted with the

utmost decorum; and the satisfaction visible in every countenance sufTicientlyevinces their determination to support [independence] with their lives and for-tunes." In Boston, Massachusetts, "undissembled festivity cheered and brightenedevery face." By contrast, pictures of the king and Tories were everywhere taken

down: their faces were not to be seen.

These rhetorical appeals to sight, to the sensory experience of seeing, can be

interpreted as one of the ways in which the newspapers successfully bridged street

theater and the act ofreading (itselfa visual experience). In this respect, printed ac-

counts acted nationally as the personal display of sentiment-the huzzah, the toast,

the beaming countenance-acted locally: both taught patriotic feeling and actioneven while dernonstrating that such virtue already predominated across class bound-

aries in those places where'Joy and festivity pervaded all ranks ofpeople." Readers

as far away as Philadelphia learned that in Savannah, "a great number of people

than ever appeared on any occasion before, in this province" came out to witness

the symbolic funeral of George III. The corollary. invoked explicitly in this case,

was that America would be great among the nations.

Reports of celebrations elsewhere demonstrated the simultaneity of nationalaction and the pervasiveness of national sentiments. The Virginia Ga.zette of Wil-liamsburg went to the trouble of reproducing accounts of the declaration cele-

brations fiom New York City and from Trenton and Princeton, New Jersey, whiJethe Nonvich Packet in Connecticut relayed an account that came all the way fromWilliamsburg, Virginia. This pattern continued during the war years. A Charlestonpaper carried an account of the Philadelphia Fourth of July celebration of 1119-five weeks later. The Pennsyl\,onia Journttl of Philadelphia reprinted descliptionsof the Fourth of July liom distant Richmond as well as nearby Trenton. The printeddescription of local display was thus the perfect way to spread nationalism. Thesame vehicle that reported the local and present-oriented recent past could makethe extralocal future self-evident.

Unfortunately for the Patriots, nationalist celebrations and publications alone

could not win the war for independence, much less guarantee present unity and

future glory. Charles Royster rightly observes that "many revolutionaries tried to winindependence by declaring it over and over. In the search for signs of grace, they

often convinced themselves, for a while, that words were works." They probably didso because the decade's rvorth of politicized celebration and printed commentary

lhe Pal i r i;al Crises of rhe t Taus 8t

that had characterized the resistance movement made it seem as if street theaterand printed words did combine to form the most effective of political works. Thisis why the ardent celebrating continued, and even escalated, after July 4, I116.Having affirmed the righteousness of their revolution by their manner of receivingthe good news, Patriots linked an increasingly interregional war effort to their localexperiences by holding "continental" fasts and thanksgivings, by celebrating anni-versaries of war victories and independence, and by mourning defeats and heroicdeaths. The Declaration of Independence celebrations and the Fourth of July anniver-saries that came to follow them annually were only models for the national cele-brations that filled the war years with sets of thirteen gunshots and lists of thirteentoasts. More important than the speed with which the Fourth of July celebrationspread, or even the local variations in the celebrations (if these were recoverable),is the generic quality of the commentary on the celebrations: the vagueness-theintentional obscurity-of the printed reports. The summation of the report on theJuly 4, lll7, celebration in Philadelphia proved to be typical in its guarantees:"Every thing was conducted with the greatest order and decorum, and the face ofjoy and gladness was universal." The overwhelming intent of these rites was unity.As a result, the achievement of sameness in these rites-such as the ubiquitous useof the number thirteen, one for each state-proved that national unity existed. Andthe generic descriptions that so frustrate the scholar looking for regional variationor local detail were chosen deliberately, for the same reason.

In a hundred birthdays and funeral rites, the Patriots built an experiential and adiscursive basis for the belief that "the nation" exists and can be spoken of, thatthere is a national mind that thinks, and a national character with a virtuous heart.Massachusetts Patriots took the lead in turning local episodes into occasions forrevolutionary-and by extension national-memory. Since 1770 they had markedthe Boston Massacre with dirges and orations on the dangers to liberty posed by astanding (British) army. The Sons of Liberty in Boston and elsewhere kept up theStamp Act holidays of August 14 and March 18. The encounter at Lexington wasonly the first battle to be commemorated annually. In June 1111 the Palmetto Societyof Charleston, South Carolina, established itself to commemorate the June 28, 1176,victory at nearby Sullivan's Island. After bell ringing in the rnorning, a churchservice and oration in honor of the militia, and intermittent gun blasts by the boatsin the harbor, three hundred Charlestonians headed to the fort for a dinner party.Two other groups dined together (one at the local ltberty tree), and fireworks closedthe festivities. Likewise, as early as 1778 and 1119 the inhabitants of Bennington,Vermont, and Saratoga, New York, sponsored civic feasts and orations that under-scored the national significance of their local victories. Local attachments were noprerequisite, though-American patriots as far away as St. Croix in the West Indiescelebrated the anniversary of Lexington.

More common, especially as the Continental army fared better, were the spon-taneous rejoicings when news amived of a Patriot victory. All of Cambridge, Massa-chusetts, was illuminated the evening word came of Gen. John Burgoyne's defeat atSaratoga in october 177'7. rn reports of such festivity, correspondents stressed theimmediacy of popular demonstration. Even more than the judicious preservation ofanniversaries, spontaneous joy revealed cross-class unity in the Continental cause.On June 25, 1779, a citizen of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, received a personal

82 Mn.jor Problems in the E'arly Republic, 1787-1848

letter from Gen. Horatio Gates, who wrote. "I do most heartily congratulate youupon the Success of our Anns in South Carolina, which I think finishes the BritishEmpire in AMERICA." "Immediately," the account reads, bells began to ring, and

continued to ring all day, interspersed with the firings of cannon. This particular de-scription, from the perspective of a gentleman, reveals the dependence of plannedfestivals on the more spontaneous (and inclusive) demonstrations of assent. Onlyafter describing the immediate revelation of patriotic joy does the author go on todescribe the gathering at the state house of the "most respectable gentlemen . . .

whose smiling countenances evidenced the sincerity of their Hearts." The toaststhese wofihies offered were not solely for their own consumption; described as pub-lic, they were "accompanied with three Huzzas in and out of Doors." The subjectsof the report are unquestionably members of the upper classes, but their sincere dis-plays of patriotic emotion are ratified by the populace at large.

Who were the possessors and perfonners of political virtue? Did the people "outof doors" have it-or merely recognize it when they saw it? Despite a consensus thatthe people were the source of political legitimacy, the character and limits of popularaction remained unresolved. Two years earlier in Portsmouth, on the first anniver-sary of the Fourth of July, a Captain Thompson had somehow succeeded in getting"all the friends of American independency" on board his docked Continental ship.But then who were the "large concourse of people" on the wharf who vociferouslyapproved the thirteen guns fired? Likewise, ifritual dinners occurred during daylighthours, the citizens appeared to ratify the sentiments ofthe toast givers by participat-ing in illuminations and frreworks at night. In revolutionary rhetoric and practicethere remained a vagueness, an indeterminacy about who were "the people" and whowere "the citizens," or true political actors. This contradiction would plague repub-lican ideology for many years to come.

Diff'erent definitions both of "the people" and of citizenship coexisted uneasilywithin the revolutionary alliance. Rituals and published descriptions of rituals oftenexpressed uncertainties about whether all the "people" were "citizens" even whilethey served as the potential sites for resolving the question. Early Fourth of Julycelebrations were attempts to (re)establish an organic link between elite and popu-lace, ratifying both popular sovereignty and the most tasteful displays of patrioticaffiliation. They did this by deferring controversial questions of political participa-tion and local control in favor of self-evident displays of national unity. The thirteentoasts generally offered-one for every state in the new union-not only spread rev-olutionary ideology; they also naturalized national pride. Rather than moving or-ganically from local to national identifications, the toasts moved from the nationalback to the local, making the local part of, or evidence for, the greater national entity.Invariably, the first toasts lauded "The United States," "The Congress," the Conti-nental army, George Washington, the holiday itself'-all national institutions. Onlyafterward did they (sometimes) move on to praise "the State of New Jersey," the"brave militia," or "our officers and privates" who lbught at the battle of MonmouthCourthouse. In the story told by these toasts, the original source ofjoy is alwaysnational. Local luminaries and events prove virtues epitomized by attachment tothe glory of America.

The muster of the militia on the Fourth of July, the new national holiday, pro-vided a particularly appropriate way to ratify local leadership while nationalizing

The Political Crises of the 1790s 83

popular sovereignty. On the morning of Independence Day, 1119, in Boston, the

militia paraded and performed a mock engagement before "a vast concourse of spec-

tators." Afterward, one hundred Patriots ate under a tent on the Common. Again

attendance and display prove the constancy ofrevolutionary sentiments.

The spirit of the people never appeared at once more elated and firm than upon this

happy occasion: An unaffectedjoy was diffused thro' the countenances of the generality

of the citizens-intermix'd with such composule and decency as afforded a most agree-

able indication of their entire satisfaction in this glorious revolution, and that the true

republican principles were not only well understood but highly relish'd.

The ,,generality" of citizens not only comprehend republicanism but show joy on

their faces and "decency" in demeanol-4 1e1n6(4ble statement of optimism in so

large ancl troubled a city as reYolutionary Boston. Coming at a time of military set-

backs, when the sustaining virtues of the populace seemed doubtful, rhetoric here

functioned as self-fulfilling prophecy, in that its local details, such as the smiling

faces, were meant to inspire what they described. Virtue is apparent in the response

to nationalist ritual; thus virtuous patriots would be citizens devoted to the needs

of the nation.Another way to ensure that celebration served virtue was to follow the dicta of

republican simpiicity. Sometimes this was a matter of necessity. As secretary of the

Philadelphia Council shortly after the British evacuation in 1718, Timothy Matlackmade itpublicly known that "because ofthe heat and 'scarcity'ofcandles, and other

considerations," the council suggested that residents forbear from Fourth of July

illuminations. A citizen of Newpoft, Rhode Island, reported in 1780 the thirteen gun

blasts fired by the French ships in the harbor, combined "with other such demon-

strations of joy as the embarrassed circumstances of the town would admit'" Con-

troversy attended the question whether the Continental Congress should sponsor

fireworks and festivities. William Henry Drayton urged the measure; his fellowSouth Carolinian Henry Laurens argued that such "fooleries" had brought down

the republics of ancient Greece. For the most part, leaders resolved this problem by

imagining their holidays to be sacred-and thus solemn. A gentlemen in Newbury-port, Massachusetts, wrote that the Fourth of July anniversary spurred his town to

comply with state requests and send more men off to battle. After an oration, fifty-nine were chosen to march off in the morning; local men of property showed theirzeal by pleclging to make good on the soldiers' pay. This was evidence of true virtue

and he rejoiced: "Plato thanked heavens he was born in the age of Socrates: I give

thanks that I was born an American; that I lived in the hour of the separation ofAmerica from Britain, and that I have seen the exertions of my country in the cause

of freedom, that rival the boasted patriotism of antiquity."Yet the mythic "patriotism of antiquity" was not the only kind that helped

achieve American independence, and some early skeptics underscored this by re-

minding others of the time-tested relationship of celebration to crowd action and

drink. After the first Fourth of July, Continental Congress member William Williamsof Connecticut wrote home to Jonathan Trumbull, "Yesterday was in my opinion

poorly spent in celebrating the anniversary ofthe Declaration oflndependence. . . . a

great expenditure of liquor, powder etc. took up the Day and of candles thro the Citygood part of the night." He added, "I suppose and I conclude much Tory unilluminated

84 Major Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1848

glass will want replacing." A broadside circulated in Philadelphia after the victoryat Yorktown pleaded that

those Citizens, who choose to ILLUMINATE on the GLORIOUS OCCASION, will doit this evening at Six, and extinguish the lights at Nine o'clock. Decorum and harmonyare earnestly recommended to every Citizen and a general discountenance to the leastappearance of riot.

Patriot leaders wanted order, but they needed popular celebration and its impolitereversals. Such expressions of praise and insult remained the main mode of distin-guishing Whig from Tory, a distinction that itself rested on the Whig assertion ofthe people's authority. At Princeton in 1778, the inhabitants were said to have foundparticular pleasure in firing the thirteen cannon, "being some of the brass field-pieces taken from General Burgoyne, one of thethree conquerors of America." Threeyears after the Treaty of Paris ended the war for independence, in NorthumberlandCounty, Pennsylvania, one could still find "Colonel JOHN BULL . . . unanimouslyplaced on the wheatsack."

This celebratory mode is captured h a 17'7 6 "new favorite song at the AmericanCamp." Sung to the tune of the "British Grenadiers," it inverts all thines British.truly turning the world upside down.

Your dark unfathom'd Councils, our weakest Hands defeat,Our Children rout your Armies, our Boats destroy your Fleet;And to complete the dire Disgrace, cooped up within a Town,You live the scorn of all our Host, the Slaves of WASHINGTON.

Great Heaven! is this the Nation, whose thundering Arms were hurl'd,Thro Europe, Africa, India; whose Navy rul'd the World;The lustre of your former Deeds, whole Ages of Renown,Lost in a moment, or transferred to us and WASHINGTON.

The British past has passed from relevance. Pausing for a moment to assure the lis-tener that freedom-not mere glory-inspires the American, the song concludes:

Proud France should view with Terror, and haughty Spain should fear,While every warlike Nation would court Alliance here.

And

-,

his minions trembling, dismounted from his T-,Pay homage to AMERICA and glorious WASHINGTON.

This is the heady, king-killing optimism of 1776; yer with the French alliance, inrer-national recognition reinforced these boastful wishes. As william Stinchcombeand Beverly orlove Held have shown, elaborate celebrations of the Treaty of Amityand Commerce, the birthday of King Louis, and the birth of the dauphin helped toprove Americans' sincere loyalty to their new ally and to define American nationalidentity against a common enemy. Celebrating the alliance at Washington's camp,"through the whole, there was a remarkable style of looks and behavior, undebauchedby British manners or British entertainments." The French ministry in America didits part by sponsoring orations and festivities on the Fourth of July as well as onFrench red-letter days. Though it required considerable ideological agility to explainhow the popish French monarchy could truly rejoice at the spectacle of the republi-can United States (and vice versa), the symbolic and actual presence of the French

Thc Ptliri,,rl Ct itct of rhc l;9t)s 85

at these celebrations helped to keep the focus national and to fix the burden ofopprobrium on the common enemy, England.

French support also reinforced a key idea in the development of Amelican na-tionalism: that the United States was at the center of a "world stage," acting out God'splan. Here national celebration became the site of that peculiar mixing-or perhaps

we should say remixing-of Patriot politics and millennial thought. Millennialthought in this context did not require (though it often included) belief in the comingof God's rule on earth; rather, political millennialism was characterized by an over-riding confidence in the future. "I congratulate you on your glorious prospects," saidDavid Ramsay in one of the first Fourth of July orations to be published.

When I anticipate in imagination the future glory of my country, and the illustrious fig-ure it will soon make on the theater of the world, my heart distends with generous pridefor being an American. What a situation fbr empire ! . . . Our independence will redeem

one quarter of the globe from tyranny and oppression, and consecrate it as the chosen

seat ofTruth, Justice, Freedom, Learning, and Religion.

In newspapers, such sentimental paeans to the American future are often juxtaposedwith mock funerary annollncements like "Old England's Last Will."

Benedict Anderson. Eric Hobsbawm. and others have shown how nineteenth-century Europeans invented traditions to fit new national mythologies. But the Amer-ican revolutionaries already had a tradition: an English tradition ofrevelry and rightsthat independence had rendered suddenly problernatic. For the American patriotsafter 1776, then, the more unprecedented everything appeared, the better. Appropriat-ing the oldest English commemorative rituals and rhetorics, celebrants of the nationduring the war struggled to keep the character of a "first celebration" by always cele-brating the ftfttrre-a strategy that helped deflect the difficulties of a less than per-fect present. 'A second celebration already has the character of a reification," PaulRicoeur tells us; communities usually celebrate the past in order to legitimate thepresent. Through their celebrations of each remarkable revolutionary event, Arneri-can nationalists repeatedly enacted the "foundin-e." In the present there was an armyto support and the class-based cultural rifts separating decorous diners from riotousrevelers. In the future there was unanimity. prosperity, nationhood-and none of theseproblems. Thus the problems of the present were incidental, local, passing, past.

Political Crisis and the "Revolution" of I800JAMES E. LEWIS, JR.

Writing to the Virginia jurist and essayist Spencer Roane in September 1819, ThomasJefferson described his election to the presidency as "the revolution of 1800." Itwas, in Jefferson's view, "as real a revolution in the principles of our government as

that of 1776 was in its form." He considered it revolutionary even though it had beeneft'ected not "by the sword . . . but by the rational and peaceable instrument of reform,

Horn, James J., Jan Ellen Lewis, and Peter S. Onuf, eds.,The Ret'olLrtion of 1800: Democrac'-, Race.and the Nev, Republic. pp. 3-29. O 2002. University of Virginia Press. Reprinted by pemrission.

86 Major Problems in the Early Republic' 1787-1848

the suffrage of the people." In juxtaposing these two "revolutions," Jefferson also

united them; the "revolution of 1800," in his view, redeemed and extended the Revo-

lution of i776. StiU, his dichotomies-1800 vs. l'/76, principles vs. form, suffrage

vs. sword-suggest the breadth of Jefferson's definition of "revolution." They also

obscure the complexities and potentialities of the election of 1800, when a revolution

in "form" effected by the "sword" seemed to many a real possibility. . . .

The election of 1800 capped a period of intense partisan rivalry in the UnitedStates. The Quasi-war with France, the Alien and Sedition Acts, the virginia and

Kentucky Resolutions, the expansion of the army, Fries' Rebellion, and countless

other developments fueled a sense of crisis in the United States that lasted the en-

tirety of Adams's presidency. The leaders of each party proposed dramatically differ-

ent responses to each of these developments. Throughout this crisis, party conflictremained at a fever pitch, with effects that extended from Congress and the executive

offices to the press, the dueling ground, the meeting hall, the tavern, and the street.

Parry rivalries did notjust affect politics. They also strained and distorted business

and social relationships.In this superheated atmosphere, the election of 1800 assumed tremendous im-

portance. Since each side believed that the other would destroy the nation if it con-

trolled the executive branch, a revolutionary result seemed possible, even likely, even

if the election itself proceeded in an unrevolutionary manner. Many Federalists

worried that a victorious Jefferson would fritter away federal power' stir up class

resentment, and bring about an alliance with France and a war against Great Britain.

Robert Goodloe Harper warned that if the Federalists lost the election, they might.'live to see our country mourn, in blood & ashes, over the consequences." The

rumors that reached Jefferson in early 1800 said that the Federalist "eastern states

would . . . throw things into confusion, and break the Union" if a Republican won

the election. At the same time, many Republicans feared that four more years ofFederalist rule would lead to a consolidated nation, a monarchical government, and

a return-in form, if not in name-to British subjugation. Virginia governor James

Monroe considered a Republican victory essential to "secure to us forever those

liberties that were acquired by our revolution [and] which ought never to have been

put in danger." If the Republicans lost, Hamilton warned, Virginia would "resort to

the employment of physical force" to gain power.

Both Federalists and Republicans expressed doubts that there would even be an

election in the two or three years before the electors finally cast their votes in Decem-

ber 1800. Outraged by the Republican response to the Quasi-War, the expanded

army, and the Alien and Sedition Acts, Federalists calculated that their opponents

might destroy the government before the eiection could take place. Writing from

Europe in June 1798, for example, John Quincy Adams passed along a French re-

port ;that the friends of liberty in the United States. . . . lwould] probably not wait

ior the next election, but in the mean time fwould] destroy the fatal influence of the

President and Senate by a Revolution." Both Theodore Sedgwick and Fisher Ames

warned that the Republicans in the large mid-Atlantic states would attempt a mili-

tary takeover once they finished "render[ing their] militials] as formidable as pos-

sibie, and supply[ing their] arsenals & magazines." "It is obvious to me," Ames

explained in early 1800, "that all other modes of decision will be spurned as soon

as the antis [the Republicans] think they have force on their side." Another prospect

fhe Polirical Crises of the l7a0s 87

that wonied Federalists during the months before the election was Republican dis-unionism. Virginia Republicans, in particular, emerged as committed secessionists inFederalist correspondence. A rumor that William Branch Giles, a former Virginiacongressman, had "expressly [stated] that he desired that the Union of the States

might be severed" even crossed the Atlantic in both directions. It traveled fromPhiladelphia to London in a private letter from the secretary of state to the minister to

Great Britain and returned from Berlin to Philadelphia in a letter from John QuincyAdams to his mother.

Republicans similarly questioned whether the election would even occur. Whenthe Federalists were at their strongest and the Republicans at their weakest, leading

Republicans feared that their opponents would use their position to transform the

government. In October 1798 Jefferson predicted a succession of steps by which

the Federalists would establish a government that was both monarchical and aristo-

cratic. If the public tolerated the Alien and Sedition Acts, he warned, "we shall im-mediately see attempted another act of Congress, declaring that the President shall

continue in office during life." Additional acts would complete "the transfer of the

succession to his heirs, and the establishment of the Senate for life." . . . By early1800 it seemed possible that the Federalists would try to seize power permanently

before they lost it in the election. "The enemies of our Constitution [the Federal-

ists.l are preparing a fearful operation," Jefferson wrote his son-in-law in February.

Chaotic conditions throughout the country, and especially in Pennsylvania, appeared

"too likely to bring things to the situation they wish, when our Bonaparte [AlexanderHamiltonl, surrounded by his comrades in arms, may step in to give us politicalsalvation in his way." . . .

The election of 1800 played out across a period of months, with the electors

chosen through different means and at different times in the sixteen states. Some ofthese elections favored the Republicans; others favored the Federalists. Until the

end, the final outcome remained in doubt. By late November both sides recognizedthat everything depended on the South Carolina legisiature's choice of electors inearly December, just one day before the electors were to cast their ballots in every

state. Even those familiar with the state's politics, much less the many interestedoutsiders, found it difficult to predict how it would vote. As the Connecticut Federal-ist Oliver Wolcott recognized, South Carolina's votes were "claimed, and expectedby both parties." Insiders asserted confidently, and contradictorily, that its votes

would be for Jefferson and Burr, for Adams and Pinckney, and even for Pinckneyand Jefferson. The legislators believed that they would decide the election, but theycould not have known just how close the votes would be in the other states (sixty-fiveeach for Jefferson, Burr, and Adams and sixty-four for Pinckney). Ultimately the

Republicans managed to filI all eight of the state's electoral college seats with menwho were piedged to cast one ballot for Jefferson and one for Burr. "Our Countryis yet safe," Peter Freneau, the Republican editor of the Charleston Ci4r Gazette,announced as soon as the electors were chosen.

But Freneau began his celebration too soon. Even though the electoral votes wouldnot be opened and counted until I I February 1 801 , it became clear within a coupleof weeks of the voting that both Jefferson and Burr would have seventy-three votesand that the House would have to choose between them. As late as 15 December.

88 lvlajor Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1848

Jefferson still believed that one or more electors from Tennessee, South Carolina, orGeorgia had withheld their second ballots from Burr in order to prevent a tie. Just afew days later, however, enough information had reached washington to dispel thishope. By 19 December Jefferson saw no grounds fbr doubting "that there [would]be an absolute parity between the two republican candidates." This result, he in-formed Madison, had "produced great dismay & gloom on the republican gentle-men here, and equal exultation in the federalists." The problem was that, while theRepublicans dominated eight of the sixteen state delegations in the House, theyneeded a majority to decide the outcome. of the remaining eight states, the Federal-ists heid six and two were evenly divided. one of the Republicans who experienced"dismay & gloom" because of this unexpected result was virginia congressmanJohn Dawson. Writing to Madison, Dawson lamented the defect in the Constitutionthat had made possible this outcome. In despair, he wondered: "who is to be presi-dent? In short, what is to become of our government?"

The final siate of the election of 1800 can be divided into two phases. The firstbegan in mid-December 1800, when it became apparent that Jefferson and Burrhad defeated Adams and Pinckney but had tied each other, and lasted until mid-February 1801. The second phase consisted of the actual balloting in the Housefrom 1 1 February to 17 February. Different options and different dangers emergedin each phase. But, throughout, the election seemed likely to become a "revolutionin form," as one side or the other or both considered extraconstitutional means toproduce a desired outcome or prevent a dreaded result.

In the first phase, the Federalists enjoyed a wide range ofoptions, since the elec-tion could not be decided without them. one obvious course was to acquiesce in thepopular will by voting for Jefferson as president and Burr as vice president; therewere Federalists, in and out of government, who supported this course. Anotherconstitutional option was to vote for Burr as president, counting on some Republi-can congressmen to vote for their second choice. Finally, the Federalists might feignsupport for Burr in order to pressure Jefferson into pledges about principles, policies,and patronage. It was this approach that Hamilton, who considered "Burr the mostunfit man in the U.S. for the office of President," urged in a series of letters to variousFederalist congressmen. Massachusetts's Fisher Ames also advocated the tactic ofsupporting Burr long enough to secure from Jefferson some sign that he would "notcountenance democratic amendmts., dependence on France, a wrangle or war withG. Britain, plunder of the banks and [their] friends, or Madison's empiricism inregard to trade & navy."

The Federalists did not limit themselves to constitutional measures, at least notindisputably constitutional measures, as they weighed their options during the firstphase of the crisis, however. Some insisted that if no president was elected by thetime that Adams's administration ended on 4 March 1801, the rules of successionwould take effect, placing executive power in the hands of the president pro tem-pore ofthe Senate or, ifnone had been chosen, the Speaker ofthe House. Since theFederalists held a majority in both houses, either of these individuals would almostcertainly have been members of their party. . . .

[T]he Republicans either learned of or surmised every tactic that was consideredby the Federalists; they imagined many more. It occurred to them almost immediatelythat the Federalists might try to obstruct a decision in order to transfer executive

I he Politi,al tri)?s of tlt, | 7q05 89

jwer to someone of their own choosing. As early as 15 December Jefferson hadalready heard, ancl was aiready spreading, a rumor that the Federalists intended to"let the government devolve on a President of the Senate." Over the next f'ew weeks

the Republican rumor mill added the chief justice, the secretary of state, and theSpeaker of the House to the list of Federaiists to whom power might be committed"by a legislative act." The very thought "of creating a president by Act of Consress."as Pennsylvania's John Beckiey put it. struck most Republicans as i-rnconstitutionaland unrepr-rblican. 'Any Larv empowering any Person to exercise the Presidency,"Sarnuel Smith insisted, would be viewed "as an Usurpation." That the Fecleralistsmight def-eat an election without any definite sense of the consequences of their ac-

tions also terrtfled Republicans. To Jeft-erson, "pret'ent[ing] an election altogether"seemed certain to produce "a suspension of the federal government, for want of a

head." This collrse, he informed one correspondent, would "fopen] to us an abyss,

at which every sincere patriot must shudder."Republican fears clearly exceeded Federalist plans. Many leading Republicans

worried, lbr exarnple, that the Federalists intended, by preventing a choice betweenJefferson and Burr, to fbrce an entirely new election. It seemed so obvious that such a

course could only lead to a second Republican victory that Albert Gallatin wondered:"what interest can the Federalists have in defeating an election?" His answer-that"they mean to usurp government"-was far more revolutionary than anything Fed-eralists in Washington ever discussed, as far as the existing evidence shows. . . .

Republicans hoped that they could defeat Federalist plans-constitutional andunconstitutional-through constitutional means. Reasonably confident that eightstate delegations would vote for Jefferson as president and Burr as vice president,they tmsted that the moderate Federalists in the Maryiand, Deiaware. or Vermontdelegations would provide the decisive ninth state. . . .

[But] the correspondence of leading Republicans demonstrates that they were

[also] willing to take unconstitutional steps, if needed, to foil the unconstitutionaldesigns ofthe Federalists. . . .

Albert Gallatin, a leading House Republican . . . drafted his own "plan," whichJefferson apparently approved. In an undated memorandum of late January or earlyFebruary, Galiatin examined the possible Federalist goals and weighed the variousRepublican options. He enumerated three Federalist "objects"-electing Burr, forc-ing a new election, and "assum[itgf executive power during interregnum." The firstcouid "be def'eated by our own firmness," the second by the Republican-dominatedHouse that would meet in December and would have to certify the results of anyelection. What worried Gaiiatin most was an unconstitutional assumption of powerby the Federalists. Such a course would place the party and the nation in a difficultposition. Either of the extrerne options-"total submission to usurpation on their partor . . . usurpation on our part"-could have alarming results. He preferred a middlecourse, treating the nine months until the next congressional session as an "interreg-num" in which "the several Republican States [would] act either separately or jointly,according to circumstances." In this period the Repubiican states would opposenew acts "flowing immediately from the person who shall have usurped," but ac-cept and uphold those "which [were] not immediately connected with Presidentialpowers." This solution seemed saf'er than Madison's. To Gailatin, "the dangers ofcivil war, of the dissolution of the Union, [and] of the stab given to our republican

90 Itlnior Problems in the Earl.r' Republir. :,787-1848

institutions by any assumption of power on lthe Republicans'] part not strictly jurtified by the forms of our Constitution, [were] the greatest" threats. A partial andtemporary acquiescence involved less risk than assuming power "by a joint act ofthe two candidates." . . .

In the view of some Federalists, the acceptable outcomes of the election hadshrunk to electing Burr or going without a president. Writing to his wife after sixteenballots, Griswold expressed this determination very simply: "I am willing to putthe Constitution, Government, and everything which belongs to it upon the issue ofthis business, and if our opponents will not take Burr, they shall take nobody."Many of the New England Federalists in Congress insisted to the very end of thecrisis that they would "go without a Constitution and take the risk of a Civil War"rather than elect Jefferson. Republicans actually worried less about the Federalistsabandoning the Constitution and more about their effecting some form of usurpa-tion. They saw indications that the Federalists intended to revive the scheme oftransferring power to the president pro tempore of the Senate. This goal could nolonger be accomplished through legislation. But the Federalists could block anelection through the end of the session and then rely on the existing rules of succes-sion. Republicans found confirmation for their f'ears when Adams called a specialsession of the Senate for 4 March. This session was ostensibly necessary to confirmthe new president's cabinet appointments, but Republicans recognized that mostof the senators would be Federalists and that, with Jefferson's term as vice presi-dent ended, they could not be prevented tiom choosing a Federalist president protempore to be an interim president.

A commitment to thwarting unconstitutional usurpation by the Federalists ledthe Republicans to consider unconstitutional, or at least extra-constitutional, meas-ures of their own. ln Virginia and Pennsylvania the governors took preliminary stepstoward readying their militias to descend on Washington. Precisely what they did, orwere prepared to do, remains unclear, in part because key documents were deliber-ately destroyed. , . . Jefferson also credited another extra-constitutional measure thatwas apparently discussed by the Republicans during the House vote-the idea of aconstitutional "Convention to reorganize & amend the government." . . .

Although neither the preparations of the Pennsylvania and Virginia militiasnor the prospect of a constitutional convention appear to have had the impact thatJefferson attributed to them, the possibility that the election of 1800 would devolveinto a "revolution in form" certainly hastened the ultimate resoiution of the crisis.After six days of voting and thirty-five ballots, Bayard-a Federalist and the onlyrepresentative from Delaware-promised an end to the deadlock when he declaredthat he would abandon Burr and support Jefferson. Bayard broke with his party inpart because he had concluded that Burr could not be elected and in part because

he believed that Jefferson had pledged himself on a few key policies. But it is alsocledr that he feared what might happen if there was no election by the House. As he

informed the governor of Delaware, he did not back down "till it was admitted onall hands that we must risk the Constitution and a civil war or take Mr. Jefferson."Along with the Federalist congressmen from Vermont, Maryland, and South Caro-lina, Bayard devised a plan in which two states that had previously voted for Burrwould cast blank ballots and two states that had previously been divided wouldvote for Jefferson. On l7 February, on the thirty-sixth ballot, they put this plan into

The Politicctl Crkes of the 1790s 91

action, with the result that ten states voted fbr Jeff'erson, four states continued tovote for Burr, and two states did not vote.

The most significant factor in keeping the election of 1800 from taking a revolu-tionary turn or producing a revolutionary result was the commitment of enough menin each party to the Constitution and the Union. During the crisis over the Quasi-Warand the Alien and Sedition Acts, this commitment led Republicans such as Jeffersonand Madison to counter disunionist extremists in their own party, in part by point-ing to the potential of the approaching election to dispel "the reign of witches." Thesame commitment weighed heavily on Gallatin's mind as he drafted the blueprint fora restrained and cautious Republican response to the threat of Federalist usurpationin January 1801. And it produced the final resolution to the stalemate in the House. Anumber of Federalist congressmen began the balloting committed, as one explained,"to makling] a choice, and to acced[ing] to the election of Mr. Jefferson, rather thanexpos[ing] the nation to the mischiefs which might result from leaving the govern-ment without a head." Bayard, who ultimately broke the deadlock, stated flatly thathe did so because he was "perfectly resolved not to risk the constitution or a civilwar." Men of both parties trusted, correctly as it happened, in what Gallatin describedas a general "love of union and order" to preserve the Constitution. . . .

Writing to the English liberal Joseph Priestley just weeks after his election tothe presidency, Jefferson downplayed the recent "storm." "I have been, above allthings, solaced by the prospect which opened on us, in the event of a non-electionof a President," Jefferson ref'lected. "In [that] case, the federal government wouldhave been in the situation of a clock or watch run down." The solution was simple, inJeflerson's thinking. A convention "would have been on the ground in eight weeks,would have repaired the Constitution where it was defective, and wound it up again."For Jefferson, it was the transfer of executive dominance from the Federalists tothe Republicans that was truly revolutionary. But, for us, it is the things that mighthave happened but did not, and the solutions that might have been attempted butwere not, that seem much more revolutionary. A "revolution in form"-whetherdisunion or a military takeover or usurpation or a new constitutional convention-appeared much more probable to Jefferson and his contemporaries than most ac-counts would suggest.

Slavery, Democracy, and the Jeffersonians

JOHN ASHWORTH

Contrary to the impression presented by many of the recent works on Republicanideology, the party that raised Jefferson to the Presidency was far from uniform inits beliefs and principles. . . . Recent scholarship has emphasized the ideologicaldistance between the two major parties, but it has given too little attention to thedivisions within them and especially within the Republican party. Yet, as RichardEllis had shown, serious differences of opinion were visible in the Republican partyfrom its very inception (although their practical importance was relatively slight

From John Ashworth, "The Jeffersonians: Classical Republicans or Liberal Capitalis ts? I' Jorrnal of Amer-ican studies, r8 (1984),425-35. Reprinted with the permission of cambridge university press.

92 Major Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1848

so long as the party was in opposition and faced with a powerful enemy). Theirpresence is enough to create doubts about the possibility of some of the generaliza-tions which historians are now offering. As Ellis has pointed out, the Madisonian(moderate) wing of the party must be clearly distinguished from that represented byJohn Taylor of Caroline. Jefferson himself was in many respects midway betweenthe two but it is as yet unclear how widespread and popular the specific ideas and

beliefs expressed by each of these Virginians were within the party. In short we donot yet know where the party's ideological centre of gravity lay, even in Philadel-phia, the federal capital, let alone within each of the states. We need to know howtypical a Jeffersonian Jefferson was. . . .

This need for qualification is apparent when we consider the extent to whichthe Republicans espoused what fJoyce] Appleby terms "the principle of hope." Inher view the Jeffersonians were hopeful and optimistic about the future; the Feder-alists, as befitted classical republicans, were not. But this is problematic. . . .

When we turn to the partisans of the 1790s, simple generalizations are stillmore difficult. Even the apparently uncontentious association of Federalism withpessimism can be seriously challenged. . . . [A]s John Zvesper points out in hisexcellent study of Federalist and Republican ideology, the Federalists in the late1780s and early '90s were both confident and optimistic. It is true that this confi-dence was swiftly dissipated when the Republican challenge was mounted but thisis still enough to place a question mark against Appleby's assertion. When we con-sider the Republicans the problem is still more complex. Undoubtedly Appleby'sinterpretation fits Thomas Jefferson himself, and fits him well. Jefferson's optimismdoes differentiate him from many classical republicans and Appleby has justly re-emphasized this. But as far as Madison is concerned her conclusions are far less

satisfactory. For Drew McCoy has shown conclusively that Madison expected the

United States to develop, as Britain had done, a surplus population of landlesspoor. This was a prospect which was most unwelcome and disturbing to him. But he

believed that at best the nation could only postpone its degeneration. In McCoy'swords, "Madison's republic was in a race against time."

It is none the less possible that Madison here was at odds with his fellow Re-publicans. John Taylor's view was rather different. Essentially Taylor was hopefulabout American society and the American economy but with the strict proviso thatthe government be conducted according to sound principles. His opinion as to thelikelihood of this varied over time; in general he was neither confident nor despair-

ing. Further research may well show that this attitude was the norm within the party

asawhole....As many scholars have pointed out, the historiography of the early Republicans

has suffered from a major defect. Whilst many works have focussed upon ideolo-

gies and the minority of the citizens who wrote as committed partisans, others have

concentrated upon the broader changes that were taking place in American society

and in the American economy at this time. Each of these schools has enormously

advanced our understanding of the history of these years; the problem, however, is

to reconcile their separate findings. . . . Is it possible to suggest an alternative?

Clearly any such hypothesis must be highly tentative; the present state of knowl-

edge simply will not support any lrm generalizations. Yet it is surely of interest that

the Republicans drew a disproportionate amount of support from the South. In the

The PoliticdL Crises of the 1790s 93

words of Richard Buel "the essential division" in politics was "between a RepublicanSouth and a Federalist New England," with the middle Atlantic states divided. There

were of course exceptions but the South undoubtedly provided the Republicans withdisproportionate electoral suppofi and with the great majority of their national leaders

and spokesmen. In addition to the three Presidents of the Virginia dynasty, men likeJohn Tayloq John Randolph and Nathaniel Macon were all Southerners. In this con-

nection it is instructive to consider what would have happened to American politicsfrom the 1790s if there had been no states south of the Mason-Dixon line. Historianswould then doubtless have recorded the successful attempt ofthe Federalist elite toimpose a republican but avowedly anti-democratic political system upon the nation.After the turbulence which often accompanies war a regime more akin to that of the

British would have emerged. But in actuality the Republican party upset all this.Nothing is more striking in retrospect than the willingness of Republican leaders totake their case to the people. Jefferson himself always insisted that the Republicans"cherished" the people while the Federalists feared or despised them. In ll8l , at atime when the Federalists (as they would become) were fearfui of social unrest and

political upheaval, Jefferson asserted that "a little rebellion now and then is a good

thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms in the natural." Buel attributes

this populism to the greater security which the Southerners enjoyed in their leader-ship roles. Ironically, "aristocratic" Southern leaders, perhaps because ofthe greater

economic homogeneity of the South, could embrace democracy in the confidentbelief that their own positions would be safe.

Buel's explanation is a perceptive one. Did Southern leadership give encour-agement and organizational support to the northern Republicans? Did it make theirviews more popular and more respectable? As yet our knowledge is not sufficient toallow a firm answer to these questions. If they can be answered in the affirmative,however, it is difficult not to be reminded of Edmund Morgan's brilliant argumentin his book A merican Slavery, American Freedom. Here Morgan claimed that it wasin large part slavery which enabled Americans to embrace republicanism. Slaverycreated a "sense of common identity" among whites and altered the relationshipbetween elites and masses. Because the slaveholders lived off the sweated labourof blacks the poorer whites were their allies rather than their antagonists. Similarlythe main threat to republicanism, the fear of levelling if the poorer classes couldvote, was much diminished if not entirely removed. As Morgan puts it: 'Aristocratscould more safely preach equality in a slave society than in a free one" since slaves

would never be permitted to form levelling mobs. The labour force in Virginia "wascomposed mainly of slaves"; this was a major structural influence upon Virginiansociety and it paved the way for Jefferson's celebrated eulogy of the yeoman farmer.

Morgan argues that slavery propelled Virginians and perhaps other Americanstowards republicanism. His book is concerned primarily with the period up to andincluding the Declaration of Independence. Critics may reply that other nations be-fore and since have embraced republicanism without slavery and that not all slavesocieties have generated republican sentiment. It is thus difficult to argue that slaveryis either a necessary or a sulltcient condition for republicanism. But is it not possiblethat Morgan's insights apply with greater force to the democratization of the repub-lic in the half century or so after the adoption of the Federal constitution? For atthis time the United States managed this remarkable transformation without any

94 Major Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1848

major political or social upheaval. The importance of Jeffersonian ideology, the roleof Southern leaders and the importance of Southern voters in the Republican andJacksonian Democratic parties are all so evident as to require little comment. In the1790s the Republicans began to popularize American politics; historians need toask what the precise function of American slavery was in this process.

Henry Ammon, The Genet Mission (1973).Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: The Evolution of a Party ldeology (1978).Ruth Bloch, Wsionary Republic: Millennial Themes in American Thought, 1756-1800

(1986).Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamihon (2004).Jerald Combs, The Jay Treaty: Political Battleground ofthe Founding Fathers (1970).Noble Cunningham, The Jffirsonian Republicans: The Formation of Party Organistion,

1789-1801 (1957).Alexander De Conde, The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the UndeclaredWar

with France, 1791-1801 (1966).Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic,

1788-1800 (2003).

Joseph Ellis, Passionate Sage: The Character and Life of John Adams (1993).His Excellency : George Washington (2004).

John Ferling, John Adams: A Life (1992).Adams v. Jefferson: The Tumultuous Election of 1800 (2004).

Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America (1976).Richard Kobn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establish-

ment in America, 1783-1802 (1973).

Stephen G. Kurtz, The Presidency of JohnAdams: The Collapse of Federalism, 1795-1800(r9s-1).

Edmund S. Morgan, The Genius of GeorgeWashington (1980).John R. Nelson, Liberty and Property: Political Econom)' and Policymaking in the New

Nation, 1789-1 8 I 2 (1987).Thomas R. Pangle, The Origins of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American

Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (1 983).Jeffrey L. Pasley, "The Tyranny of Printers": Newspaper Politics in the Early American

Republic (2001).James Roger Sharp, American Politics in the Early Republic: The New Nation in Crisis

(1e93).Thomas P. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution

(1986).James Morton Smith, Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition La**s and American Civil

Liberties ( I 956).William Stinchcombe, The XYZ Affair ( 198 1).AlfredF.Young,The Democratic Republicans of NewYork: The Origins, 1763-1797

(1966).John Zvesper, Political Philosophy and Rhetoric: A Study of the Origins of American Political

Parties (1977).