Chapter 1: Origins of the Korean People

Topics on Korean History (S. Kye)

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Chapter 1: Origins of the Korean People

Who were the ancestors of the ―Korean‖ people? When did they appear and set

up their civilization in the Korean peninsula for the first time? How are Koreans related

to other ethnic groups such as the Chinese, Japanese, Mongols, Turks, and even Native

Americans?

There are three possible ways to trace the origins of a people: linguistic,

archeological, and biological approaches. Language is the aggregate of a way of living,

speaking, thinking, eating, playing, and other aspects of lifestyle; it is one of the

foremost representatives of culture. Therefore, if two peoples speak the same or a very

similar language, then it would suggest that the two groups share their origins or at least

historical experiences. The linguistic approach is thus important in tracing the origin of

a people. Syntax, for example, is one of the most important criteria for the classification

of languages. ―I am a student‖ is translated as ―나는 학생이다‖ in Korean, ―Watashi

wa gakusei desu‖ in Japanese, and ―Wo shi xue sheng‖ in Chinese. In the English and

Chinese sentences, the main verb ―am‖ and ―shi‖ must be followed by the complement

or object. In Korean and Japanese, however, the main verb ―다‖ and ―da‖ must be

placed at the end of the sentence. This is also the case with Mongolian and other Altaic

languages such as Turkish. We can thus draw a tentative conclusion about the origins of

the Korean people in terms of linguistics: that is, the Koreans may have been more

closely related to various peoples of Inner Asia rather than China.

Archeological artifacts can also provide clues for determining the early stages

of a civilization. The dominant pottery of the Neolithic period in East Asia is

Geometric-Design Pottery with a V-shape conical bottom as well as the designs on the

surface of parallel lines that resemble marking made by combs. This type of pottery has

been found in Outer Mongolia, Manchuria, and the peninsula. The pottery found in the

western part of the Japanese archipelago is also similar. It has not been found yet in

China Proper, especially along the Yellow River where the Chinese civilization arose.

For a better understanding of the cultural differences between the Neolithic

period inhabitants of Korea and China, let us examine the characteristics of the

Neolithic pottery excavated in China. Yangshao culture, which archeologists and

historians generally attribute to the earliest forefathers of the Chinese people, inhabited

the region from the middle course of the Yellow River to northwestern China Proper. A

hallmark feature of Yangshao culture is Red Plain Pottery, decorated by black

illustrations of considerable sophistication such as geometric patterns. As such, the Red

Plain Pottery differs sharply from that of Geometric-Design Pottery specimens

excavated in the peninsula and Manchuria. Eventually, Yangshao culture was replaced

by Longshan culture, which was centered in the middle course of the Yellow River and

the Shandong peninsula of eastern China. Unlike Yangshao pottery, Longshan pottery is

black, thin, light, and lustrous. It is also more widely distributed throughout North

China and the lower basins of the Yangzi River valley, indicating a great expansion of

the earlier Neolithic civilization based in the Yellow River valley. The Black Pottery

evolved into various similar types of Bronze Age and later pottery. Some Red Pottery

and Black Pottery specimens excavated in the peninsula imply cultural contact between

the inhabitants of China and Korea, but throughout the Neolithic Period the dominant


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pottery style remained the Geometric-Design Pottery.

At any rate, the distribution patterns of Geometric-Design pottery suggests that

at least two distinct cultural spheres coexisted in Neolithic East Asia. One was based in

the middle reaches of the Yellow River in North China and the other extended from East

Siberia through Liaoxi, Liaodong, and Manchuria to the Korean peninsula. These

distribution patterns may imply that the Neolithic culture that developed in the

peninsula might not have been related to that of China’s Yellow River Valley.

[Picture 1] Geometric-Design Pottery

This hypothesis may also apply to the Bronze Age. The beginning of the Bronze

Age in Korean history is estimated at about the tenth century BCE—most likely earlier

in the north, including Manchuria, Liaodong, and Liaoxi. This Bronze culture gradually

expanded down into the Korean peninsula. The predominant pottery of the Bronze Age

is Designless Pottery, typified by round bottoms and a lack of conspicuous patterns on

the surface. During the transition from the Neolithic Period to the Bronze Age, the

Designless Pottery replaced the Geometric-Design Pottery. Moreover, no ―transition‖

types of pottery between the Geometric-Design and the Designless potteries are known.

This seems to suggest that a more technologically advanced people with bronze tools

and the Designless Pottery moved from Inner Asia down to the Korean Peninsula, either

conquering or assimilating the less technologically advanced indigenous population

using Neolithic tools. For sure, there was some continuity between the Neolithic Period

and Bronze Age cultures of the peninsula. For example, some geometric designs

continued to be used despite the general disappearance of Geometric-Design Pottery.

Nonetheless, a break rather than continuity better explains the nature of the transition

from the Neolithic Period to the Bronze Age for the Korean Peninsula.

[Picture 2] Designless Pottery


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Bronze swords also provide a critical clue for understanding the origin of the

Korean people. The bronze swords cast by those who inhabited Liaoxi, Manchuria, and

the Korean peninsula are of two distinct types: one is the flute-shaped (or mandolin-

shaped) bronze sword, the other a narrow-bronze sword. A flute-shape sword has a

convex-shaped blade. According to some archeologists, the shape prevents the user

from stabbing the enemy too deeply so that he can pull the sword quickly out of the

enemy’s body, but other scholars argue that the sword might have been used as an

emblem of politico-ritual authority rather than as an actual weapon. In addition, both

types of bronze sword were assembled with two detachable parts, blade and grip.

Similar bronze swords and spearheads have been found in the Korean peninsula, Liaoxi,

Manchuria, central Asia, and Eastern Europe, but not in China. The locations suggest

that the early bronze culture of Korea must have been more closely related to the culture

of Inner Asia than China.

Regardless, both the temporal and spatial distributions of the flute-shaped

bronze swords and the narrow bronze swords differ. Whereas flute-shaped bronze

swords were common during the early Bronze Age, the narrow bronze swords prevailed

in the late Bronze Age. Also, there are some in-between types of bronze swords. In fact

the blade width of the flute-shaped bronze sword gradually became narrower, that is

evolving into the narrow-bronze sword. In other words, continuity rather than an abrupt

break marked the transition from one bronze sword style to the next.

[Picture 3] Flute-Shape and Narrow Bronze Swords


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While the flute-shaped bronze swords have been excavated mainly in Liaoxi,

the tip of the Liaodong peninsula, and the Korean peninsula, the narrow-bronze swords

have been found in the Korean peninsula and its vicinity. This is why the latter type is

often called a Korean-style bronze sword. Such difference in distribution may indicate

that that those inhabiting Liaoxi and producing the flute-shaped bronze swords

somehow lost control of their territory and moved into the peninsula at some point

during the Bronze Age, most likely due to clashes with the Chinese.

Based on the existing linguistic and archeological evidence discovered so far,

we can draw several conclusions about the origins of the Korean people. First, the

ancestors of Koreans likely had closer relations—if they were not very closely related—

with the peoples of Inner Asia rather than China’s Yellow Valley. Second, the ancestors

of the Koreans, if not the early Koreans themselves, may have been nomadic but

gradually adopted agriculture in the course of their migration to the Korean peninsula.

Third, the Bronze Age people who produced the Designless Pottery as well as the flute-

shaped and narrow bronze swords mostly likely constituted the mainstream of the early

Korean civilization.

[Map 1] Distribution of the Flute-Shaped Bronze Sword


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Chapter 2: Old Joseon and the Foundation Myth

Old Joseon is the earliest known political entity in Korean history. The history of

Old Joseon has two distinct dimensions: one, ancient Chinese accounts; and two, the

foundation myth of Dan’gun, the alleged founder of Old Joseon, as transmitted among

Koreans. This chapter first discusses Old Joseon history, as based on Chinese historical

sources, and then follows with an interpretation of the foundation myth.

According to the earliest record on Old Joseon, the Old Joseon ruler dispatched

a mission to China’s Zhou Dynasty court in the seventh century BCE. Although it

provides no other detail about the mission, this record suggests that Old Joseon must

have been a polity with enough resources at its disposal to dispatch a diplomatic

mission to the capital of Zhou which was still the most prestigious power in East Asia,

with its suzerain standing at least ostensibly recognized by the states of northern and

central China. The reference also implies that Old Joseon might have shared its western

border with a Chinese state.

Beginning in the fifth century BCE, China’s Warring States Period witnessed

more frequent, larger-scale battles that enabled more powerful states to conquer weaker

ones while the nominal authority of the Zhou sank to irrelevance. Among the Warring

States, Yan, which was based in the modern Beijing area, expanded into Liaoxi.

Accordingly, the Yan state came to share its border with Old Joseon.

In this situation, Yan constructed a long wall (which would eventually become

the east part of the Great Wall) to secure its northeastern border (map 1). At the time of

construction, the Yan state most likely controlled both sides of the wall, as constructing

such a great wall technologically required working from both sides. The eastern extent

of the wall also suggests that Yan did not regard Liaoxi, the territory northeast of the

wall, to be its permanent territory or possession. Otherwise, Yan would not have

constructed the wall in the way it did.

In addition, some Chinese historical accounts comment on the relations

between Old Joseon and Yan. A typical description reads as follows.

When the Yan people adopted the title of ―Wang,‖ meaning king, for their

supreme ruler, Old Joseon also took the same title for its ruler. At that time,

Old Joseon planned an attack on the Yan state.… Old Joseon people are

arrogant and cruel.… [At the end of the fourth century BCE,] the Yan state

launched a series of military campaigns against Old Joseon and established a

commandery in Liaodong. [Shi ji (Record of History)]

From various Chinese accounts and the significance of the eastern end of the

Great Walls, it is clear that Old Joseon was an enemy of the Yan. Moreover, Old Joseon

was strong enough to fight against the Yan for more than one hundred years, but in the

course of territorial loss in the Liao River basins it gradually retreated southeastward

toward Korea. This conclusion accords well with a central point in chapter 1: during the

Bronze Age, if not in the fifth or fourth century BCE to be more precise, the people

using the flute-shaped bronze swords in Liaoxi (ancestors of the ―Koreans‖) lost control

of the region and moved into the Korean peninsula. In other words, Old Joseon might

have lost its original heartland in Liaoxi to the Yan around the time of the wall


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construction, though without any direct evidence showing that the users of flute-shaped

bronze swords of Liaoxi were indeed the Old Joseon people.

In the course of turbulent political transitions and incessant warfare in China,

many refugees fled to Old Joseon. By 221 BCE, one of the Warring States destroyed the

rest and created the unified Qin Dynasty (221–207 BCE). In the process, the Yan was

the next to last to resist the Qin. The Qin empire, however, disintegrated amidst

struggles among competing warlords, among whom the founder of the Han Dynasty

(202 BCE–220 CE) emerged victorious and reunified China. During this process, a

certain Wiman from the former state of Yan took refuge in Old Joseon. Upon arriving at

the Old Joseon border, Wiman and his followers pledged allegiance to King Jun of Old

Joseon. Accepting them, King Jun appointed Wiman as the commander of a border

garrison that utilized refugees from China against any possible attack from the

expanding Han. In 194 however, Wiman drove out the king and proclaimed himself the

new ruler of Old Joseon. According to some sources, King Jun and his family escaped

southward and founded a new kingdom in southwestern Korea, conquering a number of

lesser polities in the process.

The leadership of the Wiman regime or Wiman Joseon (194–108 BCE) was

formed from a coalition of migrants led by Wiman and the indigenous ruling elite of

Old Joseon. Extant records show that the majority of high-ranking officials at Wiman’s

court had native Joseon (Korean) names, not Chinese names. The name of Wiman’s

grandson and the last king of Wiman Joseon was Ugeo, a native Korean name. In

addition, Wiman retained the name of the kingdom after ascending the throne. In fact,

the label ―Wiman Joseon‖ was used much later, in the thirteenth century, by Korean

historians who used Wiman’s usurpation to divide Joseon history into two periods: Old

Joseon and Wiman Joseon. For these reasons, it seems that a coalition of migrants and

Joseon natives founded Wiman Joseon, though the indigenous population apparently

assimilated the new arrivals.

The foundation myth of Old Joseon adds another dimension to the history of

Old Joseon that we have examined so far. While certainly not reliable in terms of

historical facts, a foundation myth nonetheless can yield some useful insights on the

founding of a state. The foundation myth of Old Joseon is no exception in that it sheds

some light on origins of Korean history’s first kingdom. In terms of dramatic structure

and theme, the story told by the myth comprises the following six scenes:

(1) Before our time, a younger son [Hwan’ung] of the Heavenly God wanted

to descend to the earth to bring order to the human beings below. The

Heavenly God let him go down and gave him a kind of regalia as the

symbol of authority.

(2) Hwan’ung descended on top of a sacred mountain. He was accompanied

by several key assistants and about 3,000 additional men. Hwan’ung called

himself ―Heavenly King‖ and supervised agriculture, life, punishment,

judgment, and other [aspects of governance].

(3) At that time, a tiger and a bear came to the Heavenly King and asked him

to transform them into humans. The Heavenly King gave them mugwort

and garlic. In order to become humans, the tiger and the bear had to dwell

inside a dark cave, eating only those plants for 100 days. The tiger gave up

in the middle. The bear, however, passed the test and finally became a

woman. She was called ―Bear-Woman.‖


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(4) The Bear-Woman married the Heavenly King and gave a birth to a son,

called ―Dan’gun.‖

(5) Dan’gun established a sacred city for his residence and called his kingdom

―Joseon.‖ Later he moved his city to another place.

(6) About 1,500 years later when the emperor of Zhou China enfeoffed Gija

as the Lord of East, Tan’gun moved his city yet again. Later, Dan’gun

returned to his former city, but hid himself and became the Mountain God.

He was 1,908-year-old. [Samguk yusa (Memorabilia of the Three

Kingdoms)]

Scene (2) seems to tell a story of the establishment of a new political order by

migrants with more advanced technology than the natives. If so, then where did

Hwan’ung and his followers come from? In light of the linguistic and archeological

evidence as discussed in chapter 1, Inner Asia may have been their place of origin.

Scene (3) and (4) may allude to the origins of the ruling house of Old Joseon.

More precisely, the two scenes seem to reflect a coalition government of migrant and

native clans in Old Joseon. The method of alliance may have been a marriage between

the male leader from the migrant group and a female chosen from a native clan whose

totem might have been bear, thus resulting in the representation of a Bear-Woman. In

contrast, the tiger may represent the natives that resisted the new migrant ruler and

ultimately suffered defeat. This implies that the migrants were powerful enough to

overcome the natives that resisted.

Though not providing the reason why Dan’gun moved his sacred city, scene (5)

may reflect Old Joseon’s defeat by—and loss of Liaoxi to—the Yan in the fifth or fourth

century BCE, if not earlier, and movement eastward toward Korea. According to the

majority of early Korea historians, the final capital of Old Joseon was Pyongyang, the

present capital of North Korea, in northwestern Korea. However, the earlier center, if

not the capital, of Old Joseon might have been in Liaoxi. In fact, the distribution map of

flute-shaped bronze swords lends credence to this possibility, as the flute-shaped bronze

swords have not been excavated in or around Pyongyang but rather in Liaoxi and the tip

of the Liaodong peninsula. Thus scene (5) may suggest that Old Joseon moved its

capital southeastward a couple of times, probably due to clashes with the Yan.

Scene (6) alludes to what many traditional Chinese and Korean sources

describe as the Zhou Dynasty’s enfeoffment of Gija (Ch. Jizi), a prince of the fallen

Shang Dynasty (1600–1046 BCE), as the ruler of Joseon. Aside from the historicity of

Gija’s alleged migration, which most scholars doubt, Old Joseon of Dan’gun probably

was not overthrown by a new force but instead shifted its center and maintained a state

whose ruler continued to use the title of ―Dan’gun.‖ In other words, the Dan’gun that

lived almost 2,000 years was not the son of Hwan’ung and the Bear-Woman but rather

the title given to a series of Old Joseon rulers. Consequently, Scene (6) implies that Old

Joseon was a political entity that existed for almost two millennia.

In conclusion, the history of Old Joseon as reconstructed above shows

movement of people from the continent to Korea, followed by migration further

southward within Korea. Historical sources and the Dan’gun myth suggest these

patterns. In fact, all extant East Asian foundation myths are either expulsion-and-flight

type or exodus-or-migration type. Both generally narrate a hero’s journey from his

birthplace to another location. The fact that some of the other East Asian foundation

myths resemble the foundation story of Old Joseon seems to suggest the gradual


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migration of the various groups from north to south.


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Chapter 3: The Foundation of Early Korean States

After the fall of Wiman Joseon in 108 BCE, by the third century CE a number of

polities in parts of Manchuria and Korea not controlled by the Chinese developed into

more powerful states. They began competing for more land and human resources. In

terms of overall social development, there was much regional variation. In general, the

states in Manchuria and northern Korea were more advanced than those in southern

Korea. For example, northern polities maintained a more differentiated social hierarchy

and practiced a more complex state organization. This chapter examines the early stages

of Buyeo, Goguryeo, Baekje, and Silla state formations with an emphasis on their

origins and founders.

Dwelling in the Sungari River basins in northern Manchuria (See Map 2), the

people of Buyeo engaged in farming and animal husbandry. A tribal federation governed

by five tribes or petty states, Buyeo had a general tribal council that was comprised of

the elders from the five tribes and controlled royal succession. Ostensibly a king, the

Buyeo ruler was more a tribal alliance leader than an autocratic monarch. In fact, the

council could even replace the king with a new one in the event of a natural disaster.

By the turn of the first century CE, it was likely that a clearly defined social

hierarchy existed in Buyeo: the ruling class, commoners, and slaves. Buyeo laws treated

murder, adultery, jealousy, and robbery as serious crimes and meted out harsh

punishments. The state also protected personal property. However, in cases of adultery,

only the woman of an offending couple was sentenced to death and executed in public.

Jealous wives could also be executed. These customs imply that Buyeo society was

patriarchical and polygamous.

To the south of Buyeo, Goguryeo rose to power in the middle reaches of the

Amnok (Yalu) River. According to the Goguryeo foundation myth, the founder-king

was Jumong and the royal family name was Go. Born as a secondary son of the king of

Buyeo and growing up to be an excellent archer, Jumong eventually had to leave Buyeo

due to the jealousy of his half-brothers. When Jumong fled southward, a company of

helpers and warriors accompanied him. Jumong and his followers established their own

state just to the north of Amnok River in southern Manchuria and named it Goguryeo.

The tale suggests that Goguryeo arose as a confederated kingdom of migrant

leaders, as represented by Jumong, and indigenous petty states in the region. According

to the Goguryeo foundation legend, ―Goguryeo‖ was the name of the petty state where

Jumong established his capital. However, according to a reliable Chinese historical

source, a Goguryeo state was already in existence in the middle course of the Amnok

River even before the legendary founding year of 37 BCE. This suggests that he did not

or could not have given a new name to his kingdom. Also, the legend states that his

original family name was Go which was, of course, the first syllable of the state name.

However, his original family name could not have been Go since he was a prince from

Buyeo. We can infer that Jumong and his followers took over the existing Goguryeo

state but could not completely overcome the natives. The migrant group led by Jumong

thus might have negotiated with the natives in power and formed an alliance in the

course of establishing a new order.


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[Map 2] Migration of the Ruling Houses of Early Korean States

Given these suppositions about the nature of Goguryo state formation, royal

power in early Goguryeo could not have been absolute. Similar to Buyeo, a general

tribal council determined royal succession. In fact in the mid-first century CE, the ruling

house seems to have shifted from the migrant clan to a native one, about one hundred

years after the alleged founding of Goguryeo by Jumong. In short, not only were the

migrants led by Jumong unable to overcome the natives, the latter probably assimilated

them.

Much further south, Baekje arose in the lower basins of the Han River in

western central Korea (map 2). According to the Baekje foundation legend, the founder-


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king, Onjo, was a son of Jumong by his new wife who hailed from a native Goguryeo

tribe. When Jumong fled south, he left his first wife and an infant son, Yuri, in Buyeo.

As the story goes, Yuri, the son that Jumong had with his first wife but had left behind

in Buyeo, arrived in Goguryeo. Jumong wanted to designated Yuri as his successor and

so Onjo left Goguryeo for the south. Upon arriving in the lower basins of the Han River,

Onjo and his followers established their own state, Baekje.

Not only is the story of the founding of Baekje similar to that of Goguryeo, the

early history of Baekje also bears striking similarities to that of Goguryeo. Instead of

using his father Jumong’s surname, Go, Onjo adopted a new family name, Buyeo, that

was the name of his grandfather’s kingdom. This action may indicate that rather than

Gogueyo, Onjo sought to trace the origins and legitimacy of his new state back to

Buyeo. Also, the name Baekje derived from Sipje, the name of a petty state that was

already in existence in the lower basins of the Han River where Onjo established his

capital. Respective meanings of Sipje and Baekje are ―ten ferries‖ and ―one hundred

ferries,‖ implying that the new, larger Baekje state might have been a product of

political negotiation between the migrants and natives.

Saro, later known as Silla, arose in the southeastern corner of Korea and had its

own distinct foundation story which sheds some light on its origins. The founder of Silla

is alleged to have been born from an egg in the shape of a gourd, bak in Korean, upon

which a horse had sat upon before ascending to heaven. Six tribal elders named the

infant emerging from the egg ―Hyeokgeose,‖ meaning bright, and gave him ―Pak‖ as

the family name. When thirteen years old, Hyeokgeose married a girl born from the rib

of a hen-dragon and ascended to the throne.

This myth suggests that the founders of Silla might have been new arrivals,

possibly horse-riders. Of course, unlike the cases of Jumong and Onjo however,

Hyeokgeose was raised by native leaders and ascended the throne after many years.

This implies that he might have already been indigenized before he became the ruler,

and the tribal leaders assisted in his enthronement. In fact, historical sources record that

in early Silla, a supreme council determined royal succession on a rotating basis among

three clans. The six tribal elders constituted the council and deliberated on state affairs,

including royal succession. All this suggests that early Silla was a federation of several

tribes, one of which might have migrated from elsewhere (map 2).

This ―Korean‖ type of the foundation myth is also known on the Japanese

archipelago. For instance, the story of Jimmu, the legendary founder of the Yamato state

which eventually brought much of Japan under its control, is similar to the Dan’gun

legend in thematic structure:

The Sun Goddess has a discussion with her spouse and decides to send a son

down to earth to establish his rule there. At the suggestion of the Sun

Goddess’s son, his second son is designated to take his place and descend to

earth. Unexpectedly, a spirit offers to accompany the grandson of the Sun

Goddess on his descent. Before her grandson descends to earth, the Sun

Goddess gives him three sacred regalia representing his authority to rule, and

selects the retinue of gods who will accompany him. The grandson of the Sun

Goddess descends to earth on top of a mountain. He sets off from his base on

a long journey, eventually encountering the daughter of an earth spirit whom

he marries. His wife gives birth to a child who becomes the ancestor of

Jimmu, the founder of the Yamato state. [Kojiki (Records of Ancient Matters)]


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As implied in the story above, Yamato also seems to have been founded by a

migrant group, as represented by Jimmu, with the support of some native tribes. And the

two forces were joined through marriage. In light of this story, it is clear that the origins

of early states in Korea history should be considered in a larger East Asian context. It

seems that a common characteristic of many early states in East Asia is the

establishment of a new political order by a coalition of migrants and natives that

eventually assimilates the former into the latter.


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Chapter 4: The Korean Peninsula and the Japanese Archipelago

For a long time, explaining Korean-Japanese relations in ancient times has been

a contentious issue between historians in the two countries. As the Yamato period (fifth

to seventh centuries CE) in Japanese history and the Three Kingdoms period (fourth to

seventh centuries CE) in Korean history overlap almost entirely, the Korean-Japanese

relations of this era have received much attention. Yamato, the earliest known polity of

the Japanese archipelago, maintained an especially close relationship with Baekje, one

of the Three Kingdoms in the Korean peninsula.

At the beginning of the 1950’s, Egami Namio, a Japanese archeologist,

presented a new interpretation on who established the Yamato state. Known as the

―horserider theory,‖ his argument attracted support through new studies as well as

strong criticism. Within a couple of decades, Western scholars also found themselves

tackling the theory in one way or another.

Based on a large quantity of excavated artifacts from huge tombs in western

Japan, Egami argued that Yamato was founded in the late fourth century from the

foreign conquest of native societies. According to Egami, the foreign invaders were

warlike horseriders. Moving from the Asian continent and landing on Kyushu Island,

the horseriders advanced eastward and reached Nara, near modern Osaka on the

southern coast of the central archipelago. Egami concluded that once they reached

Nara, they established the Yamato state (map 3).

Egami’s theory created a sensation in postwar Japan under American

occupation (1945–53). In the context of the ―national humiliation‖ of unconditional

surrender to the United States, many Japanese harshly criticized the theory that

apparently credited foreign invaders rather than native Japanese as the founders of the

first Japanese state. If Egami’s interpretation is valid, then it would naturally follow that

the ancestry of the Japanese imperial lineage could be traced back to foreign invaders

from the Korean peninsula. If those horseriders were not from the peninsula, then they

at least passed through Korea since there was no other way by which a large group of

horse-riding invaders could have reached the archipelago across the sea. Some extreme

Japanese nationalists even publically threatened Egami, demanding that he retract his

theory.

Since the 1868 Meiji Restoration, Yamato has been a potent symbol of modern

Japanese nationalism. In the same way that modern Korean nationalism traces Korea’s

origins back to Old Joseon, Japanese nationalism does likewise with Yamato. For

example in 1948, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) designated October 3rd as the

anniversary of the beginning of Korean civilization with Dan’gun’s founding of Old

Joseon. Likewise during World War II, the name of the biggest Japanese aircraft carrier

was Yamato. When the American fleet completely destroyed and sank Yamato during

the battle for Okinawa in 1945, many Japanese reportedly wept over the fate of the

emblem of the Japanese Empire. In the context of first wartime and then postwar

occupied Japan, the horserider theory crediting foreign invaders as the founders of

Yamato ran counter to the sensitivities of many Japanese.

In the course of the theory’s introduction to Western scholarship in the

following two decades, it received further support from an American historian, Gari

Ledyard. Unlike Egami who had presumed that the invaders might have been an Inner


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Asian people without being more specific, Ledyard built on Egami’s argument by

specifically identifying the invaders. After examining various historical sources and

analyzing similarities between the ancient Buyeo and Japanese languages, Ledyard

hypothesized that the invaders who established Yamato might have been the Buyeo

people.

[Map 3] The Korean Peninsula and the Japanese Archipelago

However, Ledyard’s argument leaves some critical questions unanswered. First,

if the Buyeo people indeed moved southward through the peninsula, then the regions

that they passed through most likely should have experienced some warfare. On the

contrary, no historical source or archeological material suggests such a large-scale

population movement occurred. Second, considering the situation in the peninsula and

Manchuria in the mid-fourth century, it was not possible for the Buyeo people to simply

pass through the territories of Goguryeo and Baekje, both of which had become more

powerful than Buyeo by that time. Third, historically a large-scale movement of a

population group requires an explanation behind such an extreme movement, but in this

case no historical or archeological evidence provides such an explanation.

Other Western scholars have criticized the horserider theory. Among them,

Walter Edwards has presented a new interpretation of Yamato culture. Main points of

Egami and Edwards’s arguments are as follows (table 1):


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[Table 1] The Horserider Theory and Its Criticism

Egami Edwards

Periodization 2 phases:

early (late 4th c.) and late

3 phases:

early (late 4th c.), middle

(mid-5th c.), and late

Speed of change

Sudden change from early

(indigenous culture) to late

(continental, horeseriding

culture)

Gradual change from early

(indigenous culture) to middle

(transition) to late (hybrid

culture)

Relationship

between old and

new cultures

Discontinuity:

agrarian → horseriding

Continuity:

continental contributions to

the indigenous agrarian

mainstream

Founder of

Yamato

Horseriding invaders

(late 4th century)

Indigenous forces

(mid-5th century or earlier)

Meaning of

―continental‖

Ethnically and culturally

North Asian nomads of Inner

Asia or Manchuria

Chinese culture either directly

from China or by way of

Korea

Evidence Own archeological work

Works of Japanese

archeologists critical of

Egami

First, Egami and Edwards disagreed on the periodization of the era of Yamato

state formation. Whereas Egami proposed two phases, that is the early and late periods,

Edwards recognized three by adding a middle period as a transition phase. Also, Egami

placed the beginning of the new horserider culture in the late fourth century, while

Edwards argued for the mid-fifth century.

Regardless of whether Egami’s or Edwards’s view is more accurate, the most

likely transmitter of continental culture to the archipelago was the people of Baekje in

the fourth and fifth centuries. If Egami’s interpretation is valid, then the final departure

point for the continental migrants most likely was Baekje. Most importantly, limited

navigation technology at the time hardly permitted direct travel from eastern China to

Kyushu. The earliest known direct route between the two regions does not predate the

mid-ninth century. Moreover, Baekje had emerged as a maritime power with trading

bases in Liaoxi, the Shandong peninsula, and Japan’s Kyushu Island by the late fourth

century. Even if Edwards is right, it seems undeniable that throughout the fifth century

(especially around mid-century) the Japanese archipelago experienced an influx of

migrants introducing a more advanced continental culture. As well documented in

historical sources, many Baekje royals and nobles took refuge in Japan in the mid-fifth

century when Baekje lost its capital near present-day Seoul to Goguryeo.

Egami and Edwards also disagreed on the speed of cultural change. Egami

argued for a sudden change from an indigenous agrarian culture of the early period to a

new horserider culture of the late period. Accordingly, he argued that sudden conquest

must have played a crucial role in the founding of Yamato. In contrast, Edwards


17

recognized a transitional period between the early and late periods. He rejected any

possibility of foreign conquest of the archipelago and instead argued that the indigenous

culture simply acquired a new dimension of continental culture in the mid-fifth century.

As for the nature of Yamato, Egami believed that it was founded by the horseriding

invaders in the mid-fifth century, whereas Edwards argued that a Yamato state that had

already been established by the natives was further developed into a federation, if not a

kingdom.

In light of Edwards and Egami’s arguments, the foundation legend of Yamato is

revealing. According to the Nihon shoki (Writings and Records of Japan), a Japanese

historical account compiled in the early eighth century, the founder of Yamato was

Jimmu. Considering what we have examined so far, Jimmu—if not an individual or a

group he represents—may have been a migrant, not a native. According to the story of

Jimmu as discussed in the previous chapter, he made a long journey from heaven to

earth. Even after descending to earth, Jimmu had to wander for several more years

before establishing his rule. This implies that like Old Joseon, Buyeo, Goguryeo, and

Baekje, the founder of Yamato may been a migrant who had to negotiate with natives in

the course of the establishment of his state. Regardless of the nature (a sudden change or

a long-term transition) and timing (late fourth century or mid-fifth century) of the

founding of Yamato, the story of Jimmu seems to reflect a significant cultural change on

the Japanese archipelago due to continental influence.

Other details of Jimmu story further suggests that the migrants led by Jimmu

were not powerful enough to overcome the natives. According to the story, Jimmu had

to negotiate with native tribal leaders for a long time to establish his rule and his

marrying the daughter of an earth spirit seems to reflect such political compromises.

Thus the early Yamato state was similar to the early Old Joseon, Wiman Joseon,

Goguryeo, Baekje, and Silla states. Edwards’s stress on the cultural continuity between

the pre-Yamato (early) and the Yamato (late) periods also implies that the migrants were

not powerful enough to immediately overcome the natives. This also suggests that by

the time of Yamato state formation, the natives assimilated the migrants. In fact, the

name ―Yamato,‖ which literally means ―great unity‖ or ―grand harmony,‖ may reflect

compromises between two groups.

The new cultural influence from the continent must have been closely related to

Baekje. As Edwards pointed out, many artifacts excavated in the Yamato region

originated in Korea. Considering the interstate relations of East Asia at the time, Baekje

is the only logical candidate since it was the only peninsular power friendly to Yamato

at the time.

In sum, the foundation of the early states in Manchuria, the Korean peninsula,

and the Japanese archipelago needs to be understood in a larger East Asian context. In

the late fourth century, Baekje developed into a significant maritime power wielding

influence in Liaoxi, Shandong, and Kyushu among others. In the mid-fifth century

however, Baekje suffered a setback when it lost its capital in the present-day Seoul area

to Goguryeo, which even captured and executed the Baekje king. In the midst of the

crisis, the ruling house of Baekje had no choice but to move the capital further south

and a number of royals and nobles migrated to the Japanese archipelago. The migration

continued until the destruction of Baekje kingdom in the mid-seventh century.


18

Chapter 5: The Bone Rank System and Early Korean Aristocracy

Until the turn of the sixth century, Silla was the most backward among the Three

Kingdoms. Located in the southeastern corner of the Korean peninsula and insulated by

high mountains, Silla did not even have direct contact with China. Consequently, Silla

society and culture maintained more indigenous characteristics and conservatism in

comparison to the other two of the Three Kingdoms, Goguryeo and Baekje. Accordingly,

we cannot regard Silla as typifying ancient Korean society, but the relative dearth of

sources on Goguryeo and Baekje allows us no choice but to focus on Silla. In fact, Silla

is the best candidate for understanding the continuity of Korean civilization within a

single territorial state, since it brought roughly two-thirds of the Korean peninsular

under its control in the late seventh century. Accordingly, this chapter examines the

social status system of Silla, especially in light of the longevity of Korea’s traditional

ruling elite.

Silla strictly maintained a rigid, hereditary social hierarchy, known as the bone

rank system. It was ―hereditary‖ in that birth essentially determined one’s station in life

rather than ability or talent. Established during the process of Silla’s development as a

centralized kingdom in the sixth century, the original bone rank system incorporated the

ruling elites of conquered neighboring states into the Silla aristocracy. This status

system comprised eight strata: two grades of bone rank and six grades of head rank. The

two bone ranks—holy bones and true bones—included royal family members, the Pak,

the Seok, and the Kim, that also monopolized the highest ranking government posts.

The six head ranks consisted of lower-ranking aristocrats and administrators, possibly as

well as commoners, unrelated to the bone-rank royals and aristocrats.

Occupying the highest status, the holy bones consisted of royal family members

who were eligible for the throne regardless of gender. Precise criteria by which holy

bone status was defined are unclear, but it is highly likely that in order for an individual

to be a holy bone both of his or her parents had to be holy bones. Not surprisingly,

consanguineous marriage was widespread within the Silla aristocracy. Apparently, the

holy bones died out with two female rulers in the mid-seventh century due to the very

narrow criteria by which the holy bone status was defined.

All subsequent Silla monarchs were true bones, the status just below holy bones.

The true bones were originally comprised of other members of the royal family who

were somehow ineligible for the throne. However, the later true bones produced

monarchs as well as high-ranking officials in the government. In an exceptional

situation, some royal family members of fallen Gaya Confederation also became true

bones.

Below the top two bone-rank groups, the remaining ruling elites belonged to six

strata. Head-rank six was the highest and head-rank one was the lowest. Head-ranks six,

five, and four were low-ranking aristocrats and administrators, while head ranks three,

two, and one are believed to have been commoners. However, it is not certain that the

last three strata even existed in reality. As the Silla kingdom continued to expand, it

granted head-rank status to lesser local rulers who submitted to Silla and moved to the

capital. The specific rank awarded to those adopted into the system depended on their

power and merit. Accordingly, the ruler of an incorporated petty state typically received

head-rank five or four, while a more influential ruler could receive head-rank six. In the


19

course of Silla’s triumph over both Goguryeo and Baekje in the mid-seventh century,

the Goguryeo aristocrats who defected to Silla received the sixth head-rank, and their

Baekje counterparts were awarded the fifth head-rank.

Under the bone rank system, birth limited an individual’s advancement

opportunities. Overlaying the bone rank system, Silla government officials were ranked

in a seventeen-level system of ranks with seventeen being the lowest and one being the

highest. For promotion to a higher post, a higher grade of rank was required. To attain

a higher grade of rank, higher birth status was critical. For instance, unlike the true bone

aristocrats, a head-rank six aristocrat could not advance beyond the sixth grade of rank

(out of seventeen) regardless of his abilities. As a result, he could not be appointed to a

ministerial post requiring fifth or higher grades of rank.

As the true bone aristocracy monopolized all of the best political privileges, the

head-rank men of talent were unhappy with the bone rank system, which contributed to

the demise of Silla. Many of the head-rank men had studied in cosmopolitan Tang China

where government posts were open to anyone passing the civil service examination.

Among the head-rank elite that had served in the Tang court and returned to Silla, some

presented reform proposals such as the adoption of a Chinese-style government service

examination system. Certainly unwilling to share their power and privileges with others,

the true bones rejected such proposals.

The conservative nature of the Silla elite takes on greater significance in light of

the longevity of the traditional Korean aristocracy. Royal power in traditional Korea

was hardly autocratic as it was elsewhere, particularly in imperial China. This fact alone

suggests that in Korea the aristocracy was powerful enough to check the throne and

enjoy remarkable longevity. Not only did the traditional Korean aristocracy endure for

more than a millennium, its composition changed relatively little.

A variety of factors explain the durability of the Silla elite. Above all, no

external power succeeded in subjugating Silla by force, which enabled the Silla

aristocracy to retain its elite status. When Silla voluntarily submitted to the Goryeo

Dynasty (918–1392) in 935, a great majority of Silla aristocrats retained their power and

privileges under the new regime. In fact, the Silla elite went on to form the backbone of

Goryeo aristocracy. The case of Silla offers a stark contrast when compared with other

ancient Korean states that vanished from Korean history by the late seventh century.

When Goguryeo fell, Tang China forcibly relocated a considerable number of Goguryeo

royals and nobles to China where they eventually became assimilated into Chinese

society. In the case of the Baekje elite, most were either transplanted to China or took

refuge in Japan. Needless to say, the nature of Goguryeo and Baekje’s demise was

critical for the ultimate fate of their elites.

The Silla case also differs from Chinese cases as most Chinese dynasties were

ended through either by foreign conquests or peasant rebellions. In particular, the

founders of foreign conquest dynasties were able to exercise autocratic power from the

outset. This implies that many dynastic changes in Chinese history were followed by

considerable change in the make-up of the ruling elite. Even though the Chinese

aristocracy endured as a socially meaningful group for centuries, individuals and

families within the aristocracy changed dramatically in the course of its history.

In comparison, the top Silla aristocracy, comprised only of the true-bone royals

and aristocrats, was much more exclusive. During the Silla-Goryeo transition, the Silla

elite went on to constitute an integral element of the new Goryeo aristocracy. Again in


20

1392 when Goryeo was supplanted by the new Joseon Dynasty (1392–1910), much of

the Goryeo elite was able to maintain its power and privileges.


21

Chapter 6: Goguryeo, Balhae, and China’s “Northeast Project”

Early Korean civilization had its roots in both Manchuria and the Korean

Peninsula, as seen in the cases of Buyeo and Goguryeo. Even after its destruction of

Goguryeo in 668, Tang China was unable to exercise control of Manchuria. Soon after,

a new kingdom called Balhae (698–926) arose to rule the region as well as northern

Korea for about two hundred years. This chapter examines both Goguryeo and Balhae’s

places in Korean history and how government-sponsored Chinese scholars have

recently placed the two states in Chinese history, thus fueling a sort of ―history war.‖

Balhae arose as Goguryeo’s successor state. After destroying Goguryeo, Tang

China transplanted a Goguryeo general, Dae Joyeong, and a large number of other

Goguryeo inhabitants to Liaoxi. When the region’s Khitans, who were related to the

later, better known Mongols, revolted against the Tang, Dae Joyeong capitalized on the

situation by leading his people to eastern Manchuria. In the process, they were able to

repel pursuing Tang troops, and in 698 he founded Balhae.

Balhae had stormy relations with Tang China. In the early eighth century,

Balhae not only defeated Tang forces in the middle reaches of the Yalu River, but it also

attacked the Shandong peninsula in eastern China. Eventually, the Tang had no choice

but to recognize Balhae’s control of Manchuria while still regarding it as a tributary

state—the same treatment it accorded Silla.

A type of ―cold war‖ ensued between Balhae and Silla. Other than an

unsuccessful Silla expedition that was launched against Balhae at Tang request in the

eighth century, relations between two kingdoms remained cool as they avoided even

exchanging official envoys. In contrast, Balhae maintained closer ties to the Turks of

Outer Mongolia who pressured the Tang. Although Balhae had its own difficulties with

Japan, Balhae reached out to Japan as a potential common enemy of Silla.

By the mid-eighth century, Balhae was in control of almost all of the former

Goguryeo territory and a region further northeast. The extent of Balhae kingdom was

from the Sungari River to the north, the Liao River to the west, the Taedong River to the

south, and the present-day Russian Maritime Province to the east. Around that time,

Balhae and the Tang also normalized their relations, due to the fact that Tang was

suffering from internal strife and thus wanted peace with Balhae. Neither Silla nor Japan

were involved in any interstate conflict at the time, and the relative peace in Northeast

Asia lasted over one hundred years until the late ninth century when Tang, Balhae, Silla,

and Japan all entered a period of decline.

With the fall of Balhae, all of its territory, except for northern Korea, effectively

ceased to be a meaningful part of Korean history until the late nineteenth century. In 926,

Balhae surrendered to the attacking Khitans. Originally semi-nomadic tribes inhabiting

the Liao River basins, the Khitans had established their first state there earlier in the late

ninth century and pressured Tang China. Shortly before the Khitan conquest, a large

number of royals, nobles, and others from Balhae began fleeing southward to take

refuge within the new Goryeo Dynasty (918–1392). As a part of his effort to unify the

Korean peninsula and integrate local strongmen into a more centralized system, the

Goryeo dynastic founder welcomed the Balhae refugees—even providing them with

homes and land.


22

[Map 3] Rise of the Balhae Dynasty (698–926)

For centuries, the question of whether or not Balhae belongs to Korean history

has been a subject of debate. Extant historical accounts describe Dae Joyeong, a

Goguryeo general and the founder of Balhae, as a man of either Goguryeo or Mohe (Ko.

Malgal) stock. Ancestors of later Jurchens, the Mohe were indigenous tribes inhabiting

central and eastern Manchuria during the existence of Goguryeo and Balhae. Except for

those of eastern Manchuria beyond Goguryeo control, the Mohe were under Goguryeo

rule until the mid-seventh century when the joint Tang-Silla military expeditions

destroyed Goguryeo. Upon the establishment of the new Balhae state in 698, the Mohe

constituted a significant segment, if not the majority, of the Balhae population.


23

Balhae seems to have been a multi-ethnic state wherein a predominantly

Goguryeo-stock elite governed a preponderantly Mohe population. Compared to the

predecessor state of Goguryoe, the Mohe most likely made up a higher percentage,

perhaps even the majority, of the total population since a large segment of the Goguryeo

elite had relocated—willingly or not—to Tang China, Silla, and Japan. Nonetheless, the

Balhae ruling elite was largely of those with a Goguryeo background. Out of 380

Balhae individuals who were mostly elite and whose names are known, nearly thirty

percent are Daes, presumably all members of the Balhae royal family. About seventeen

percent are Go, the surname of the Goguryeo royal family. This suggests that a coalition

of Daes and Gos founded and governed Balhae. Thus in terms of ethnic backgrounds,

Balhae certainly has a place in Korean history, as does Goguryeo.

Moreover, Balhae was historically a Goguryeo-successor state. The Balhae state

presented itself to others as the successor to Goguryeo. For example, in a letter carried

by its envoys to Japan, Balhae introduced itself as ―Goryeo,‖ a historically well-

documented abbreviation of ―Goguryeo.‖ Also, Tang China regarded the Mohe as one

of the ethnic groups of Goguryeo. Moreover, the Silla elite was so insecure about

Balhae’s claim to the Goguryeo legacy, military prowess, and success of the students in

the Tang civil service examination that it tried to dismiss Balhae as a barbarian state.

In modern times, too, the question of how to understand Balhae’s place in the

national histories of East Asia has fueled much controversy. Around the turn of the

twenty-first century, the government of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter PRC)

launched a drive to study and present all the historical states and peoples that had

flourished within the current territory of PRC as part of Chinese history. Including the

Koreans in Manchuria, the Tibetans of Tibet, and the Uighurs of Xinjiang (northwestern

China), the Chinese government recognized fifty-four minority ethnic groups, including

those like the Tibetans that have pursued independence movements. While continuing to

suppress any attempts at independence, the government remains mindful of the fact that

historically, only two dynasties that ruled all of China Proper—namely the Mongol

Yuan (1271–1368) and the Manchu Qing (1636–1912) dynasties—ever controlled

Manchuria. In addition to regarding the Yuan and Qing dynasties as integral parts of

Chinese history, which is a position accepted by historians in general, the Chinese

scholars participating in the government-sponsored Northeast Project also argue that

both Goguryeo and Balhae were ―provincial regimes‖ of Chinese dynasties.

Such an argument willfully distorts historical facts. Certainly, a modern nation

can regard the past of everyone living in its present territory as part of its national

history. This is also true for Chinese history in understanding the histories of various

people of Manchuria, such as the Koreans. At the same time, historians must study

without distortion the activities of all those peoples who had ever lived in Manchuria,

even before it became a Chinese territory. For example, Americans today study and

regard the history of the southwest as part of American history. However, they also

recognize the historical fact that the southwest was formerly a part of Mexico, an

independent nation, until the United States won the Mexican War (1847–48). In other

words, American historians do not insist that Mexican authorities in the southwest nor

Mexico itself before 1847 was a local American power or entity.

All the same, Koreans themselves have also contributed to the current

controversy over whether Goguryeo and Balhae belong to Korean or Chinese history.

As mentioned, the Silla elite denigrated Balhae, regarding it and the Mohe as


24

qualitatively distinct from Goguryeo, one of the Three Kingdoms of ancient Korea.

Much later, most Confucian scholars of the Joseon Dynasty (1392–1910) also showed

little interest in Balhae. It remained a forgotten part of Korean history until the late

eighteenth century when a few scholars recognized Balhae as a Korean state. They

argued that the eighth and ninth centuries in Korean history should not be understood as

the period of Unified Silla but rather that of Southern and Northern Dynasties


25

Chapter 7: Goryeo’s Foreign Relations and the Tribute System

The Goryeo Dynasty (918–1392), which brought much of the Korean peninsular

under its rule, defines the medieval period of Korean history. Though not yet ―Korean‖

in the sense of a modern national identity, a cohesive group consciousness of those

living on the peninsula became stronger during the era when various neighboring

peoples attacked Korea. While relations with native Chinese dynasties remained

peaceful, Goryeo had to deal with a series of incursions by others such as the Khitans

(tenth and eleventh centuries), the Jurchens (twelfth century), the Mongols (thirteenth

century), and the Japanese (fourteenth century). During peaceful periods, Goryeo

negotiated the so-called tribute system with various continental powers, in the same way

as earlier Korean states and the succeeding Joseon Dynasty (1392–1910).

As seen repeatedly in the history of Korea’s relations with non-Chinese

continental powers, the Khitans, who were bent on advancing into China Proper under

the Song Dynasty (960–1125), wanted to ensure that Korea did not threaten its flank.

Originally inhabiting the Liao River basins, the Khitans expanded rapidly in the early

tenth century. Harboring ambitions to conquer China Proper, the Khitans adopted the

Chinese-style name of the Liao Dynasty (947–1125) and demanded that Goryeo sever

ties with the Song and transfer tributary obligations to the Khitan emperor. When

Goryeo rejected the demands, it was merely a matter of time before the Khitans could

find an opportune moment and pretext to attack Korea.

The first Goryeo-Khitan war (993) quickly ended in a peaceful settlement after

a battlefield parley. The Goryeo side presented their dynasty as the successor to

Goguryeo and argued that the Jurchens dwelling between the Amnok (Yalu) and

Cheongcheon rivers in northwestern Korea prevented direct communications with the

Khitan court. The Khitans agreed to recognize the region as a Goryeo territory on the

condition that Goryeo would end relations with the Song. The agreement shows that the

Khitans who were more concerned about the Song were content to secure good relations

with Goryeo.

Goryeo was ambivalent about honoring their part of the agreement which

sparked off the second Goryeo-Khitan war (1010–11). In addition to maintaining

relations with Song China, Goryeo constructed six fortresses in the new territory—an

action which the Khitans viewed as a hostile gesture. Bypassing Goryeo’s mountain

fortresses in the border area, the Khitans advanced straight to the capital and sacked it

after the Goryeo king had fled southward. Nonetheless, the Khitans could not stay in the

capital for long, since the Goryeo border garrison forces threatened to cut off their

supply routes. As soon as the Goryeo king made an overture of peace and promised to

visit the Khitan court, the Khitans found a face-saving way to withdraw.

The third Goryeo-Khitan war (1018–19) erupted when Goryeo again did not

keep its promises and the Khitan armies invaded. This time, the Goryeo forces inflicted

a crushing defeat on the attackers with General Gang Gamchan’s brilliant victory at

Gwiju in the northwest. Of the 100,000 Khitan troops, only about 2,000 are said to have

survived. After this debacle, the Khitans were not in a position to launch another major

offensive against Goryeo. For their part, Goryeo did not want another war with the

Khitans. Accordingly in the following year, the two sides held peace talks. Ultimately,

they agreed to normalize their relations and establish a suzerain (Khitans) - tributary


26

(Goryeo) relationship that formed the basis of a peace that lasted over a century.

According to the new relationship, the ritually superior Khitan emperor granted

investiture to the Goryeo king, whose regular tribute submissions served as a token of

allegiance. From the standpoint of Goryeo, paying tribute rather than conducting

warfare was a far more cost-effective way of dealing with the Khitans. In fact, Song

China was already doing the same. From the Khitan perspective, they could maintain

the notion that both the Goryeo and the Song were recognizing the superiority of the

Khitans without military subjugation. As typical of suzerain-tributary relations in

premodern East Asia, the Khitans did not meddle in the internal matters of Goryeo.

Buttressed by such arrangements, Northeast Asia enjoyed a century of peace with a

balance of power maintained among the Khitan Liao, the Song, and the Goryeo (map 4).

[Map 4] Northeast Asia in the eleventh century.

Note: The Song controlled both the grey- and the white-

colored regions immediately to the south until losing the grey

region in the early twelfth century to the Jurchens (not shown

on the map) from Manchuria.

Around the turn of the twelfth century, the expanding power of the Jurchens of

Manchuria disrupted the existing balance of power. After initial defeats by the Jurchen

cavalry, Goryeo mounted an effective counter-attack that established nine fortresses and

brought the region south of the Tumen (Duman) River under Goryeo control. Not long

after however, increased Jurchen pressure and internal debate at the Goryeo court over

the merits of occupation forced Goryeo to relinquish the region. In effect, Goryeo

returned the region to the Jurchens with their promise that they would not attack.

Afterward, the Jurchens indeed concentrated their military campaigns in the west and

conquered the Khitan Liao in 1125 while Goryeo maintained neutrality.

Encouraged by their success, the Jurchens became more demanding. In the

following year, they demanded that the Jurchen-Goryeo relationship be changed to that

of an elder brother-younger brother relationship. In this relationship, the Goryeo king


27

was required to pay tribute for investiture by the Jurchen ruler. After a heated internal

debate, the Goryeo court accepted the Jurchen demand. Consequently, the Jurchens

neither attacked the Goryeo nor meddled in their internal affairs.

With the prospect of a two-front war now eliminated, the Jurchens launched a

series of major attacks on the Song and eventually captured the capital located in the

middle reaches of the Yellow River as well as conquering northern China in 1127. The

overthrown Song court reestablished itself in the region to the south of the lower basins

of the Yangzi River. Known as the Southern Song Dynasty (1127–1279), the re-

established Song also paid tributes to the Jurchens on a regular basis (map 5).

[Map 5] Balance of Power in East Asian under the Jurchen Dominance, 1100s

In the thirteenth century, the Mongols attacked Goryeo six times (1231–59).

Rising to power in Inner Asia, the Mongols subsequently swept across much of Eurasia

and destroyed various states, including the Jurchen empire (1234). When the Mongols

demanded heavy tribute from Goryeo, the court – dominated by the military – rejected

their demand and decided to fight them. After the first Goryeo-Mongol war (1231), the

military strongmen wielding power at the time sought to capitalize on the enemy’s

limited maritime transportation skills and moved the court to Ganghwa Island (1232) at

the mouth of the Han River. Although the Mongols were unable to conquer the island,

the rest of Korea suffered tremendously from the Mongol onslaught which lasted nearly

a generation. Amidst growing discontent with the military leaders, the civil aristocracy

drove out the hard-line military leaders in 1258. In the following year, the court finally

surrendered to the Mongols. Nonetheless, the Mongols were unable to end the


28

remaining pockets of anti-Mongol resistance among many Goryeo military leaders until

1273. With the conquest of the Southern Song in 1279, the Mongols found themselves

the masters of an empire stretching from the East Sea (Sea of Japan) in the east to the

Black Sea in the west and from the southern steppes of Siberia in the north to the Indian

Ocean in the south (map 6).

[Map 6] The Mongol Empire and Goryeo, ca. 1300

Note: Although ostensibly under the authority of a ―great khan‖ based in

East Asia, local khanates ruled various parts of the empire almost from

the beginning of the Mongols conquests. By the end of the thirteenth

century, the great khan’s actual authority had become limited as the

emperors of the Yuan Dynasty (1271–68) governing East Asia.

For about eighty years until the mid-fourteenth century, the Goryeo kings

reigned largely in name only as the Mongols excised tight control. Unlike previous

continental powers that agreed to the notion of a tributary Korean state in a strictly

ritualized sense, the Mongols imposed a tributary status on Goryeo that was more akin

to that of a vassal. Not only did the Mongols often heavy-handedly control the Goryeo

royal succession, every Goryeo king had to marry a Mongol princess. Moreover, the

entire nomenclature associated with the Goryeo throne and government was

downgraded to reflect Goryeo’s vassal status. For example, the posthumous temple

name for a deceased Goryeo king used to include either jo (Ch. zu, ―progenitor‖) or jong

(Ch. zong, ―ancestor‖) character like most Chinese emperors. However, the Mongols

prohibited the use of a temple name and instead allowed only a posthumous title that

included chung (―loyal‖) character to stress a deceased Goryeo king’s loyalty to the

Mongol emperor.

Beyond making demands that were only symbolic or ceremonial, the Mongols

imposed onerous requirements for both the material and human resources of Goryeo.

For example, Goryeo had to provide troops and ships to support Mongol expeditions


29

against Kamakura Japan in 1274 and 1281. Considering that Goryeo had endured

decades of devastating warfare against the Mongols, such obligations were a huge

burden. Also, the Mongols imposed tributary obligations that greatly strained the limited

economic capacity of Goryeo. Annual submissions included gold, silver, cloth, women,

and horses.

In sum, the status of Goryeo as a tributary of a continental power changed

drastically under the Mongols. Earlier, neither the Khitans nor the Jurchens meddled in

the internal affairs of Goryeo as long as it recognized the ritual supremacy of the

suzerain and performed minimal tributary obligations. In other words, Goryeo Korea

maintained autonomy while benefiting from regular diplomatic contacts with the

dominant power in or near China’s Central Plain. To be sure, the Mongols exercised

much tighter control of Goryeo, an innovation that was not only a historical aberration

but also in terms of Korea’s later tributary ties to a dominant continental power.


30

Chapter 8: Korean Buddhism and the Meditation School

Since its introduction to the Korean peninsula in the fourth century, Buddhism

enjoyed its status as the state religion until the Confucian Joseon Dynasty (1392–1910).

During the period of elite patronage, Korean Buddhism was not just a religion but also a

sociopolitical force. For example, the rise of new Buddhist schools in the eighth and

ninth centuries contributed to the fall of Silla (57 BCE, trad.–935 CE). The following is

a survey of the evolution of Korean Buddhism in the Silla and Goryeo periods.

For a better appreciation of Buddhism’s place in Korean politics and society, it

is critical to understand the differences between the textual schools and meditational

schools (or lineages) in Buddhism. Buddhism views the endless cycle of reincarnations

or the chain of causation, which is karma, as painful. The ultimate goal for a Buddhist is

to transcend the cycle by achieving nirvana, the state of nothingness where there would

be no pain. Throughout history, the way to achieve nirvana has raised many questions

among Buddhists. Is it by worshipping the Buddha? Or is it through good deeds? If so,

then how many good deeds? In the process, is self-awakening or enlightenment

necessary? What do they mean? Does one achieve enlightenment through meditation or

studying Buddhist texts?

In grappling with such questions and countless others, a number of Buddhist

denominations and schools arose in various sociopolitical climates. The predominant

form of Buddhism during the Three Kingdoms period was the Vinaya School that

emphasized disciplines and doctrines, respectively based on the scriptures and textual

studies. Since the royal house took the initiative in accepting Buddhism, the ruling strata

organized and financially supported most Buddhist temples. Appointed by the throne,

the State Preceptor (Kuksa) stood at the top of the Buddhist hierarchy. In fact, a member

of the royal family, such as the king’s brother or son, usually filled the post. Certainly

embracing politics, this kind of Buddhism contributed to the development of a powerful,

centralized royal governance.

This characteristic of early Korean Buddhism continued into the late Silla

period when more Buddhist schools from Tang China were established in Korea. Five

schools came to dominate Silla Buddhism. Stressing textual studies and knowledge for

achieving spiritual goals, all five were forms of textual Buddhism. Accepting no other

interpretation or authority, the five schools in effect entrusted the ruling elite, which

naturally dominated scholarship and education, with interpretive authority. During this

period, many if not most of the eminent monks were members of royal family or true

bone aristocracy. A kind of religious authoritarianism, the phenomenon was also linked

to Silla’s autocratic royal power during the late seventh and early eighth centuries.

In late Silla, meditational Buddhist schools began to challenge this practice.

The Buddhist meditation is generally known as seon in Korean, chan in Chinese, and

zen in Japanese, all meaning self-contemplation or meditation. Tending to reject textual

disciplines and existing interpretative authority, meditational Buddhism emphasized

meditation as a method for better understanding the real nature of Buddha and

experiencing the state of Nirvana. In other words, meditational Buddhism valued self-

awakening over textual studies. In one sense, meditational Buddhism advocated

religious individualism.

In late Silla, head-rank aristocracy and local strongmen especially welcomed


31

meditational Buddhism. Developing in late Tang China, meditational Buddhism spread

to Silla Korea by way of head rank aristocrats who studied in Tang China. Upon their

return to Silla, these aristocrats advocated reform by submitting memorials to the throne.

At the same time, meditational Buddhism enjoyed the support of increasingly

autonomous local powers for its emphasis on independence and individualism. In fact,

all meditational Buddhist temples of this period were established in regions outside the

Silla capital.

After accepting Silla’s surrender and establishing control over the Korean

Peninsula, Goryeo however was lukewarm toward meditational Buddhism for its focus

on individualism based on self-awakening or self-enlightenment. While the founder of

the Goryeo Dynasty was a local strongman and thus favored meditational Buddhism

because it challenged the existing political and religious authorities of Silla, he turned to

textbual Buddhism in order to strengthen post-unification Goryeo Dynasty. In fact, the

early Goryeo kings attempted to rally all Buddhist schools under a central authority. In

this vein, the dynasty patronized a movement for bringing the textual and meditational

schools together. The result was a new Buddhist lineage, the Cheontae School (literally

―Heavenly Terrace‖), which soon became the mainstream Goryeo Buddhist school

under royal patronage.

The Cheontae School combined textual and meditational approaches with more

emphasis on the former rather than the latter. In Goryeo Korea, the person who offered a

systematic explication of Cheontae doctrine was Uicheon, born into the royal family as

the king’s son. Attaining the position of State Preceptor (Kuksa), he tried to unite the

textual and meditational schools into the Cheontae School, but he excluded meditation-

related references from his curriculum.

During the period of military rule (1170–1270), the textual Buddhism-biased

movement toward unity in Goryeo Buddhism took a new turn. As the military

strongmen in power purged uncooperative civil officials who had patronized textual

Buddhism, relations between the military regime and textual Buddhist temples turned

violent. Suppressing textual Buddhism as both a religious and political institution, the

military rulers promoted meditational Buddhism. The military tried to reorganize and

unify various meditational, as well as textual, schools into a new school under a central

authority. As a result, a new school emerged in meditational Buddhism—the Jogye

School, literally meaning a group of creeks, implying unity of disparate branches.

The founder of the Jogye School – and proponent of Jogye as the new unifying

force in the Korean Buddhist world – was Jinul. His appointment as the State Preceptor

during the period of military rule suggests that the military strongmen in power found

his ideas to be in line with their policies toward Buddhism. In one sense, Jinul tried to

combine textual and meditational Buddhism into one school. He preached a symbiotic

relationship between two ideas. The first was sudden enlightenment through meditation

and the second was gradual cultivation by textual disciplines. According to this

understanding, textual knowledge must support one’s self-awakening, and the textual

knowledge should be experienced through self- awakening. However, meditation-

related references and practices dominated the Jogye School curriculum. Although

military rule ended in 1270, the Jogye School continued to grow. In fact, the most

popular Buddhist denomination in contemporary South Korea is still the Jogye School.

In Goryeo society, both the social status of high-level Buddhist clergy and the

economic foundations of Buddhist temples and monasteries reflected their intimate ties


32

to the royal family and the aristocracy. Throughout the Goryeo period, Buddhist monks

received an appointment in the government by passing the special civil service

examination reserved for the clergy. The highest post for Buddhist monks was the State

Preceptor who was an advisor to the king. For their services in the government, monk-

officials also received stipend land. Moreover, all registered Buddhist monks were

exempt from tax and corvee obligations. Of course, these were attractive privileges and

the state regulated the process by which an individual could become a monk. To be a

registered monk, one had to be able to read and write well enough to discuss Buddhist

scriptures and their explications of Buddhist metaphysics and cosmology. In a

premodern society of limited education and literacy such as Goryeo Korea, it is no

wonder that most of the registered monks hailed from the royal family or the aristocracy.

Goryeo Buddhist temples and monasteries enjoyed financial support from the

state and individual aristocratic families. Buddhist teachings on merit accumulation

through good deeds such as offerings and donations and their ultimate importance in

achieving salvation resulted in temples receiving a considerable amount of economic

resources such as land and slaves. Owning significant amounts of rice paddies, dry

fields, wineries, livestock, and slaves, large Goryeo Buddhist temples mirrored the

wealthy churches of medieval Europe (picture 4).

[Picture 4] The Hall of the Haeinsa Temple


33

After the Goryeo-Joseon dynastic change, Buddhism lost its privileged position

in Korean society. Established by Confucian scholars who advocated anti-Buddhist

reform proposals, the new Joseon Dynasty ended the presence of Buddhist clergy in

court politics and rituals as well as weakening economic foundations of Buddhist

temples. Although having lost the position of official state ideology to Confucianism,

Buddhism continued to flourish as a popular region among women and ordinary folks,

as well as serving as the personal religion of aristocratic men, throughout the Joseon

period. In fact, many early Joseon kings were devout Buddhists and Buddhist royal

funeral rituals for a deceased monarch remained the norm during the first century of the

Joseon Dynasty.


34

Chapter 9: Origins of Korean Surnames

Every Korean today has a surname. About 55 percent of South Koreans have

one of the five most common surnames, Kim (김), Yi (Lee, Rhee 이), Bak (Park, Pak

박), Choe (Choi 최), and Jeong (Chung, Jung 정). Among the five, the Kims make up

roughly a quarter of the Korean population, meaning that one out of every four Koreans

is a Kim. When Koreans discuss a surname, they do so by specifying a particular

ancestral seat (bongwan 본관, 本貫), an identifier comparable to those of ―clans‖ as

recognized in other societies such as Scotland and Ireland. What is an ancestral seat?

How has every Korean come to bear a surname with an ancestral seat associated with it?

And what role has it played in the formation of Korean kinship groups and identities?

A clan seat denotes the place where the founding ancestor lived, typically

during the Goryeo period (918–1392). Historically, the direct male descendants—as

well as their sisters and daughters (a woman normally did not pass on her surname to

her descendants)—identified themselves with the original ancestral seat designation

even if they relocated to somewhere far away. As a result, the actual place of residence

and the ancestral seat do not correspond for the majority of Koreans today. Even if they

are personally unaware of their family ancestral seat, a person of Korean heritage born

outside Korea can often easily discover that information by talking to older family

members. Many foreign-born Koreans might discover that they are a Gimhae Kim, a

Miryang Bak, or a Jeonju Yi, just to name three of the most common ancestral seat-

surname combinations among Koreans today.

Even in ancient times, Koreans used surnames, although the practice was

almost entirely limited to elites. In Silla – which we know far better than other ancient

Korean states – royals and aristocrats used surnames like Kim, Bak, Choe, and Seol. At

the same time, Koreans were not yet subscribing to a firm notion of descent group or

lineage as denoted by a surname and an ancestral seat. In other words, even a surname-

bearing individual of ancient Korea did not yet have a clear concept that he or she had

to use the father’s surname nor that they belonged to a distinct kin group along with

others using the same surname.

The notion of the ancestral seat arose during the process of incorporating the

local strongmen that had become autonomous in the late Silla period into the central

governing structure of the Goryeo Dynasty. In the eighth and ninth centuries, Silla’s true

bone Kim aristocrats fought among themselves over royal succession. During the last

120 years of Silla, seventeen monarchs occupied the throne. Among them, ten were

either assassinated or dethroned. This situation drastically reduced royal authority, and a

new monarch was often more a leader of a particular aristocratic faction than the entire

realm. Furthermore, a number of true bone aristocrats that had been defeated in the

succession struggle at the center re-established themselves in the countryside as

increasingly autonomous local strongmen. For example, the Gangneung Kim descended

from an aristocrat who suffered defeat during a succession struggle in the late eighth

century and settled in the east coast locale of Gangneung in central Korea.

As chaos continued in the capital, the local administration system controlled by

the central government collapsed. The number of magistrates and viceroys dispatched to

the provinces by the central government decreased, and the countryside passed into the

hands of local strongmen. With increased control over local manpower and revenue


35

base, the more powerful strongmen even expanded their power spheres by

subordinating the leading descent groups of neighboring locales. These strongmen

created de facto local regimes with elaborate administrative systems, including tax and

military bureaus, through which they usurped the central government’s powers of

taxation and policing. They even expressed their autonomy by claiming ranks and titles

identical to those of the central government. Some leading local powers even formed

alliances extending across a good part of the peninsula and competed with others for

more human and material resources.

Facing what was essentially a confederation of local strongmen in central Korea,

the new Goryeo dynasty had to successfully undertake the accommodation and

integration of a well-entrenched local sociopolitical order. Goryeo had little choice but

to rely on the cooperation of local strongmen in carrying out even the most basic

governmental functions such as tax collection and manpower mobilization for military

service or corvee labor. At the same time, local strongmen who had allied with Goryeo

in the course of the Silla-Goryeo transition needed the center to legitimize their

positions.

This situation facilitated the emergence of the ancestral seat system by which a

descent group identified itself with the place of its origin rather than Silla’s bone rank

system. There are many unanswered questions, but the generally accepted explanation

of the genesis of this system holds that as the bone rank system began to unravel, locally

prominent descent groups began to identify themselves by their locales. Thus, for

example, the Baks that were dominant in Pyeongsan in central Korea became known as

the Pyeongsan Pak.

The clan seat system was the linchpin of the early Goryeo local administrative

system which was critical to establishing stability in the countryside after decades of

warfare. The new dynasty encouraged the establishment of the ancestral seat system. On

many occasions, the dynastic founder granted new surnames to locally prominent

individuals who submitted to the court. The ancestral seat system benefited both the

central government and the local elite. By working with now readily identifiable local

families of prominence, the state increasingly expanded its authority in more outlying

areas. For their part, the local elites gained dynastic sanction of their privileged position

as well as enjoying greater access to central officialdom, membership in which

essentially defined the new aristocracy of Goryeo.

Though much more diverse in composition than the true bones of Silla, the

Goryeo aristocracy similarly valued the importance of family background in

determining status. Once established as central aristocratic lineages, members of the

ruling elite continued to identify themselves by their ancestral seat. While Kim is the

most popular surname among Koreans today, the Kims of Goryeo included various

prominent aristocratic descent groups such as the Gyeongju Kim, the Gangneung Kim,

the Ansan Kim, the Andong Kim, the Eonyang Kim, and the Gwangsan Kim.

However, even the Kims in early Goryeo were unable to demonstrate descent from a

particular late Silla king as well as contemporary Kims are able to do. Other prominent

aristocratic descent groups included the Gyeongju Yi, the Pyeongsan Pak, the Haeju

Choe, the Tongju Choe, the Yeonil Jeong, the Papyeong Yun, and the Munhwa Yu.

Such a notion of ancestral seat was an elite phenomenon. In fact, the majority

of population – that is to say, commoners and slaves – did not even have a surname, let

alone any concept of ancestral seat until the Joseon period (1392–1910). Like most


36

Eurasian societies, the spread of elite culture (encompassing literacy and rituals) and

increased status consciousness among the ordinary people fostered the adoption of

surnames and ancestral seat designations and possession of written genealogies. By the

twentieth century, all Koreans had come to subscribe to the notions of surname and

ancestral seat.

In addition to status consciousness, increasingly stricter notions of patriarchy

and patrilineal kinship ties contributed to the spread of the ancestral seat system.

Although originally limited to the elite, an emphasis on family affiliation and extended

family ties became important in influencing an individual’s chances for success in life

by the late Joseon period. Similar to both China and Japan, a Korean person writes his

or her name with the surname first as the family name, followed by the given name (for

example, ―Ban Ki-moon‖). In contrast to the West where historically individualism has

been stronger and better developed, the order is reversed in the fashion of ―John Smith‖,

where the family name functions more as extra information in identifying an individual.

The Korean naming custom stands out in other ways as well. In the case of

China, a person – and his descendents – generally assumed a new lineage identity while

keeping the old surname after relocating to a new location. Today, most Chinese no

longer maintain a strong concept of lineage membership. In Japan, most people have

surnames derived from the names of places where their ancestor lived. For example,

Nakamura literally means ―middle village,‖ Toyoda means ―fertile field,‖ and Honda

means ―main field.‖ In contrast, the majority of European surnames derive from the

names of occupations (for example, Smith/Schmidt, Miller/Müller, Stewart, Wheeler)

and place names as in the case of family names ending with ―meyer‖ which means

―valley‖ (Meyer, Obermeyer, Mittemeyer, Hintermeyer, Untermeyer). In short, the

Korean ancestral seat system identifies a person of Korean heritage—no matter where

he or she lives—in a way distinct from those with non-Korean surnames.


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Chapter 10: The Goryeo-Joseon Transition

In 1392, Korean society experienced its final dynastic change when the Joseon

dynasty (1392–1910) replaced the Goryeo dynasty (918–1392). In terms of symbolism

and substance, the transition raises many questions. How and why did the Goryeo

systems break down? What did Goryeo do in an effort to reform the system, and why

was it unsuccessful? Who overthrew Goryeo and founded the new dynasty, and why?

With the new dynasty, what changed and what did not? We can begin to answer these

questions by considering the reform of King Gongmin (r. 1351–1374), which was aimed

at restoring the autonomy and royal authority of Goryeo Korea.

As the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) underwent rapid decline, Gongmin

took drastic measures to shake off its century-long dominion over the Goryeo. While the

reforms resulted in clashes with the Yuan, they also produced internal conflict between

the throne and pro-Mongol aristocrats. The first step that Gongmin took towards reform

was a wholesale purge of pro-Mongol figures. During what was essentially a coup by

the throne, loyalist troops slaughtered leading pro-Mongol officials who were

summoned to the palace for an audience with the king. Among those killed was Gi

Cheol, brother to the wife of the Yuan emperor and the mother of the heir to the throne.

Gongmin also abolished the Yuan liaison institutions in Korea and severed official

relations with the Yuan. Moreover, he restored earlier Goryeo institutions that the

Mongols had abolished or downgraded—including the civil service examination system.

This particular institution was especially important for the reform because it allowed the

throne to resume recruiting a new generation of officials who were more dedicated to

Confucian virtues such as the loyalty to the ruler.

Many aristocrats supported Gongmin with his efforts to assert Goryeo Korea’s

autonomy from the Yuan, but they were lukewarm toward reform measures that would

encroach upon their interests. Gongmin created the Directorate for Reclassification of

Farmland and Farming Population to return the land and slaves that were unlawfully

seized by powerful families to their original owners as well as freeing those who had

been wrongly enslaved. He appointed Sin Don, a Buddhist monk from a humble

background, as chief of the Directorate. While landless peasants and slaves

enthusiastically welcomed this reform, it ran counter to the vested interests of the

wealthy, landed, slaveholding aristocrats. Fierce resistance by the elite not only forced

the king to dismiss and execute Sin, the position of Gongmin himself was so insecure

that he was ultimately murdered amidst a scandalous affair involving one of his consorts

and young aristocratic men.

Some aristocrats continued to recognize the need for reform, especially those

who had passed the civil service examination during Gongmin’s reign and had won his

trust as reputable Confucian scholar-officials. The Confucian scholar-officials sought to

reform Buddhist Goryeo society according to the teachings of Confucian classics. While

they represented a broad spectrum of society in terms of family wealth, they generally

opposed the high concentration of economic resources within a small number of

powerful families. Although they supported Gongmin’s effort to redistribute the land

and slaves, Gongmin’s untimely death left the reformist scholar-officials in a vulnerable

position at court where a handful of aristocratic statesmen assumed paramount power

during the minority of Gongmin’s successor.


38

At the same time, military commanders from the countryside became more

powerful in court politics. Especially prominent were those from the northeast

territories, which Gongmin had recovered for the Goryeo after decades of Yuan control.

Both during and after Gongmin’s reign, Goryeo had to repel attacks by the Yuan, Red

Turban bandits (anti-Yuan Chinese rebels), and Japanese pirates. The Japanese pirates in

particular were especially troublesome because they not only devastated the farming

villages of coast regions and inland areas alike, the raids often paralyzed maritime

traffic and threatened transportation of grains and taxes. Since the Yuan had essentially

dismantled the Goryeo military organization, the Goryeo state had no choice but to

encourage powerful individuals inside and outside the court to raise their own armies to

fight the pirates.

During the decades-long struggle against the Japanese and other invaders, many

military commanders rose to power, but especially prominent were Choe Yeong and Yi

Seonggye. Extremely popular for their battlefield successes, both generals usually

stayed in the capital when not leading their armies. All the same, their backgrounds and

political interests were different. Hailing from a distinguished aristocratic family based

in the capital, Choe sided with other families that were similar to his own. In contrast,

Yi came from a local strongman’s family in the northeast that helped Gongmin take the

region from the Yuan. He aligned himself with a broader range of families, including the

northeastern military types and reformist Confucian scholar-officials. In general, the

capital aristocracy represented by Choe wanted to check the power of new military men

like Yi. The latter group was not happy with the new reality where the old aristocracy

continued to monopolize political power and economic resources.

Gradually, friction between these two groups became increasingly overt, and

the new military group began to harbor intentions of overthrowing the Goryeo dynasty.

The northeastern military men and reformist scholar-officials needed each other. While

the scholar-officials needed Yi’s military might to seize power, the latter needed the

former for outlining reform programs and instituting them. The key leader of the

reformist scholar-officials working with the new military men was Jeong Dojeon who

was, in effect, Yi’s visionary strategist and ―architect‖ of the new Joseon dynasty.

For decades, the origins of the Joseon dynasty have fueled a lively debate

among historians. Whereas older studies have explained the nature of the Goryeo-

Joseon dynastic transition as a social revolution lead by a new social class of small- and

medium-size landholding scholar-official families from the provinces, revisionist

studies have argued that the dynastic change effected mostly by the members of the

existing elite entailed far more continuity than previously recognized. This debate raises

many questions. First, how were the forces spearheading the dynastic change different

from the old powerholders, if at all? Regardless of whether the former were mostly

members of the old elite or social newcomers, why did they want to overthrow the

Goryeo? What did they want to achieve?

According to the most recent studies, a number of new families joined the new

dynasty, but they did not play a major role in the course of dynastic change. Most of

those who played major roles and filled high office in the new government came from

influential descent groups that had been producing central officials for at least several

generations during the Goryeo period. While some, like Jeong Dojeon and Yi Seonggye,

hailed from relatively less distinguished families, the top seven leading descent groups

of the new dynasty had been prominent in the late Koryo period, namely the Andong


39

Gwon, the Hwangyeo (Yeoheung) Min, the Papyeong Yun, the Munhwa Yu, the

Gyeongju Yi, the Pyeongyang Jo, and the Cheongju Han. During the early phase of the

Joseon dynasty, their members dominated court politics. During the dynastic change,

there were only four descent groups that were cast out of the power structure—an

insignificant number since the rise and fall of particular families on the political stage

was commonplace during the Goryeo period. Although many military men who seized

power came from less distinguished families, they were apparently unable to entirely

replace the old elite. Instead, the newcomers joined the existing aristocracy. Then as a

whole, why did the founders of the Joseon dynasty have to reject the Goryeo system

under which they had been enjoying a variety of privileges?

The reformist scholar-officials who effected the dynastic change were a new

generation of Goryeo aristocrats that thought differently from their fathers and

grandfathers on statecraft and society. Passing the civil service examination restored by

King Gongmin, they shared his reformist visions and harshly criticized rampant

corruption within ineffective governing institutions and the Buddhist establishment.

Also, they criticized the high concentration of wealth in the hands of a small number of

powerful families from which they hailed. In an effort to reform the Goryeo system that

had survived military rule, Mongol Yuan domination, incessant warfare, and

institutional breakdown, many reformers turned to Neo-Confucianism which had been

introduced in the thirteenth century to Goryeo society and flourished during Gongmin’s

reign. What they found in Neo-Confucianism was a comprehensive system of thought

stressing individual moral cultivation and harmonious communities, though well into

early Joseon they would remain eclectic in terms of seeking more practical answers to

the various challenges of statecraft.

In sum, the Goryeo-Joseon transition encompassed significant change

in ideology, religion, institutions, and culture while the composition of political

leadership did not change drastically. Accordingly in the long run, Joseon elite as a

whole was resistant to more fundamental reforms. The new generation of Goryeo

aristocrats advocating reform founded the Joseon dynasty with the help of military men,

but their reform proposals could not challenge their vested interests. As no sweeping

reforms affected the existing land tenure or slavery system, the founders of the new

dynasty remained wealthy land and slave owners just like the Goryeo aristocracy

Documents

Chapter 1: Origins of the Korean People