Chapter 1 SAFETY SURVEILLANCE OF NUCLEAR · PDF fileUnit#2 was in shutdown state. It resulted dynamic loads into supply header causing deformation and dislocation of supports. Subsequently,

1PBAERB Annual Report - 2016

SAFETY SURVEILLANCE OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES1

Chap

ter

1.1 SAFETY REVIEW MECHANISM OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES

Nuclear facilities in India are sited, designed, constructed, commissioned and operated in accordance with strict quality and safety standards. AERB oversees the safety of the nuclear and radiation facilities and has been mandated to frame safety policies, lay down safety standards and requirements. AERB has established a regulatory framework, which involves stipulating the safety requirements, issuance of regulatory consents, verificationofcompliancethroughsafetyreviews& inspections during various stages viz. siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation etc.

The safety reviews related to the consenting decisions and safety monitoring during various stages are carried out through multi-tier system of safety committees. The committees include experts inrelevantfields,includingprocessdesign,controland instrumentation, thermal hydraulics, structural analysis, reactor physics, seismology etc., relevant to nuclear and radiation safety. The higher level Committees include experts from academia, national R&D institutes and government bodies. The multi-tiered system of safety reviews follows the principle of “management by exception”, following graded approach and is based on principles, requirements and criteria specified byAERB in its regulatory documents.

In this approach, the issues of greater significance are given consideration at higherlevel committees for their satisfactory resolution. Recommendations of these committees concerning the various safety issues and consents are further considered by AERB for arriving at regulatory decisions. This arrangement ensures comprehensiveness of the reviews and checks

compliance with the specified requirements.Additionally, AERB carries out periodic regulatory inspections to check conformance with regulatory norms and consenting conditions.

The license for operation of the facilities is given after ensuring satisfactory construction and commissioning as per the approved design, complying with the quality requirements and the specified safety/regulatory requirements. Thelicense for operation is given for a maximum validity period of 5 years. Renewal of license is considered based on separate application along with a comprehensive safety review as per the laid down requirements and process.

For regulatory oversight w.r.t. nuclear security aspects, AERB has been entrusted with the responsibility of review and assessment for different types of nuclear facilities in India. AERB has published various regulatory documents specifying nuclear security requirements for such facilities. The physical protection systems for security of systems affecting safety of nuclear facilities are reviewed against relevant regulatory requirements pertaining to that project stage. Multi-tier approach is adopted for review of security aspects. Initial review of all the projects is carried out by a lower level committee. Security issues of greater significance are considered athigher level committees. Recommendations of these committees are further considered by AERB for arriving on regulatory decisions.

Security review structure in AERB was restructured in September 2016, with constitution of single Committee for Reviewing Security Aspects (CRSA). Additionally one working group (CRSA-WG) under CRSA, was constituted for carrying out the preliminary review of the submissions related to nuclear security aspects of

32AERB Annual Report - 2016

NPPs, Radiation Facilities, Radioactive Sources etc. and giving the necessary inputs to CRSA.

CRSA undertakes the detailed study to identify the security aspects related to safety (including cyber security related to safety) which are required to be brought under the regulatory purview of AERB and submits recommendations to AERB. Review of draft documents and updating AERB documents related to security of nuclear and radiation facilities based on new information including internationally available information will also be taken up in CRSA.

The safety status of the nuclear facilities i.e. nuclear facilities under construction; operating nuclear power plants and research reactors; nuclear fuel cycle and other related industrial facilities; overall safety performance of the nuclear facilities in operation and construction; R&D units and other facilities; industrial safety of nuclear facilities; and significant events & enforcement actions duringthe year 2016 are covered in following sections.

1.2 NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION

The meetings of the important safety review committees of the facility undergoing reviews are in the following Table.

Table 1.1 Safety Review Committee Meetings of the Power Projects

Project Safety Committee Number of Meetings

ACPSR-LWR 6

ACPSR-PHWR & PFBR 1

PDSC-PFBR 5

PDSC KKNPP-3&4 1

PDSC (KAPP-3&4, RAPP-7&8, GHAVP-1&2)

4

PDSC (DFRP, FRFCF and DFMF) 2

(A) NUCLEAR POWER PROJECTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION: REVIEW STATUS

A1. Light Water Reactor Based NPPs

(i) Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (KKNPP) Unit - 2

Subsequent to the completion of review of application for Initial Fuel Loading (IFL) and First Approach to Criticality (FAC) along with Phase-B Low Power Physics Experiments, AERB granted Clearance for IFL on May 04, 2016 and FAC on June 27, 2016.

Loading of Fresh Fuel in KKNPP#2

Clearance for Phase-B2 Low Power Physics experiments was issued on July 12, 2016. Clearance for Raising Reactor Power up to 50% FP and synchronisation of generator (Phase-C1) was issued on August 13, 2016.

After completion of all Phase-C1 commissioning tests, KKNPP Unit #2 reactor was operated and stabilised at 50% FP. Clearance for Phase-C2 commissioning was issued on November 11, 2016. Accordingly reactor power was raised to 75% FP and commissioning tests were carried out successfully. Clearances for further power raise up to 90% and 100% were given subsequently for conductingspecifiedtests.

The following are the highlights of safety review of KKNPP Unit #2:

a) Post-Fukushima Safety Enhancements

All the 17 recommendations made by AERB Committee to Review Event of External Origin (AERB/SC/EE) have been implemented for KKNPP Unit # 2. Commissioning of various systems proposed viz., Mobile DG, make up systems for


Spent Fuel Pool (SFP), Steam Generators (SG) and Process Water System etc. have been completed successfully.b) Radiological Survey Radiation survey in Unit#2 indicated that for mostofthelocations,thefieldsaresimilartothoseobserved in Unit#1. However, at certain locations there were some discrepancies. These discrepancies were attributed to layout differences in the piping and sampling lines of primary coolant around the survey points in Unit#2 as compared to Unit#1. As recommended by AERB, Site carried out re-survey at 50%FP and confirmed that all areas have lessactivity than the permissible limit.c) TDFP Drive Steam Supply Pipeline

Support Dislocation Steam supply valve from auxiliary header opened during testing of Accelerated Preventive Protection (APP) push buttons which led to admission of steam into steam supply lines of Turbine Driven Feed Pumps (TDFP) when the Unit#2 was in shutdown state. It resulted dynamic loads into supply header causing deformation and dislocation of supports. Subsequently, the pipeline hasbeenrepositionedandsupportswererectified/replaced. Assessment of the event indicated need for positive isolation of power supply to these valves after stopping of TDFPs. Operating procedure was revised to include this aspect to avoid such events in future. Subsequently, as recommended by AERB, Site submitted detailed stress analysis report of the pipeline. d) Operator Training During operation of Unit #2 few events occurred due to human error. These events have not resulted in any consequences as the safety system performed as intended. Hence, AERB recommended Site to strengthen the human performance factor to avoid such instances in future. Accordingly, Site has drawn up regular training plan to update and sensitise the operators to enhance the human performance factor.e) Alternate Design of Double Check Valves

(DCVs) Based on out-of-pile and in-situ tests carried out on DCVs after Phase-B LPPE in Unit#2, it was noted that even though performance of DCVs was

satisfactory, the opening and closing pressures were not consistent. Hence, NPCIL was recommended toexpeditefinalisationofalternatedesignofDCVand it should be out-of-pile tested adequately at Russian Federation, as well as at Indian out-of-pile test facility for reliable performance.During the course of commissioning activities, AERB had posted its independent AERB Observer Teams (AOTs) at KKNPP Site for physical verification of compliances to the requirementsand recommendations made by AERB as well as to witness various commissioning tests. The reports of the AOT were regularly reviewed for necessary follow up.

(ii) Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (KKNPP#3&4)

AERB had issued the Siting consent for 4 more of 1000 MWe VVERs (KKNPP - 3 to 6) in 2011. Subsequent to AERB clearance for site excavation(i.e.firststageofconstructionconsent)for Unit-3&4, on January 21, 2016, site had started excavation activities. Site had completed pit excavation of Reactor Building (RB), Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) & Turbine Building (TB) up to founding level. Excavation of tunnels and intercepting drains, consolidation grouting, confirmatory sub-soil investigations and concretelevelling course of main plant structures were in progress. Three plate load tests were planned one each for RB, RAB and TB area. AERB recommended Site to conduct the tests at locations with highest weathering zone. AERB reviewed site characteristics and analysis/design of civil engineering structures, QA plan and work procedure for pit excavation, dewatering scheme, estimation of safe blast charges for excavation, intake-outfall scheme and construction details of intercepting drains, estimation of extreme flood beyond design basisfor KKNPP considering cyclone/storm surge etc. Analysis and design methodologies of Structures, Systems and Componants (SSC) including seismic analysis and design of mechanical components and software validation were discussed and actions for resolutionoftheissueswereidentified.

A.2 Fast Breeder Reactor Based NPPs

(i) Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) As part of Phase-A commissioning, pre-


commissioningactivityforpurificationofsodiumin secondary sodiumpurification circuit in SGB-1 was completed. Pre-commissioning activities related to melting of sodium in Secondary Sodium Storage Tank-1 (SSST-1) east loop and its purificationwerecompleted.Sodiumwasdrainedinto the SSST-1. The results including the report onflexibilityanddeflectionanalysisofthepipingcircuits were reviewed by AERB and identifiedissues were resolved. AERB had also carried out independent safety analysis for assessment of stresses in the piping circuits.

Top view of PFBR Reactor Assembly

Reactor containment building was being made ready for carrying out Integrated Leakage Rate Testing (ILRT). Preparation for pressure hold test of main vessel was in progress. BHAVINI submitted a proposal to AERB for containment test of PFBR which was reviewed by AERB.

Integrated Leakage Rate Testing of PFBR Reactor Containment Building

A Task Force for Containment Test of PFBR (TF-CT-PFBR) visited PFBR site and evaluated the preparedness with respect to integrated leakage rate and Structural Integrity Test (SIT). Aspects related to methodology for measurement of strains anddeflections,outcomeoftrialtestsetc.areunderdiscussion. PSI of SG tubes and commissioning of fuel handling equipment were in progress.

AERB carried out safety reviews pertaining to integratedpreheatingandidentifiedcommissioningissues including demonstration of Pump and Intermediate Heat Exchanger Flask (PI flask),Large Rotatable Plug/Small Rotatable Plug radial inflatable seals, Air Heat Exchanger, design ofsource subassembly, pre-service inspection of steam generator tubes etc.

The following are the highlights of Safety Review of PFBR:

a) Demonstration of Healthiness of Air Heat Exchanger (AHX)

During pressure hold up test of one of the AHX, leakage was observed from few tubes. Report on repair carried out on AHX-B was reviewed. AERB recommended BHAVINI to carry out pressure hold test at higher pressures; stress analysis of Safety Grade Decay Heat Removal (SGDHR) loop and demonstrate compliance of Leak Before Break (LBB) criteria. BHAVINI satisfactorily completed the corrective actions.

PumpandIntermediateHeatExchangerFlask(PIflask)Assembling

b) Design of Source Sub-assembly Design note on source sub-assembly was reviewed. AERB recommended BHAVINI to experimentally validate the prediction of counts per second (cps) at control plug neutron detector location in test reactor. Subsequently, BHAVINI completed the experimental validation and AERB accepted the results.

c) SG tube Leak Detection System Based on operation feedback of FBTR, AERB recommended BHAVINI to examine the feasibility of providing Sputter Ion Pump (SIP) based control and instrumentation in addition to Electro Chemical Hydrogen Meter (ECHM) at outlet of individual SGs.


A.3 Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR) Based NPP

Currently two twin-unit 700 MWe PHWR NPPs are undergoing construction at Kakrapar Atomic Power Project (KAPP-3&4), Gujarat and Rajasthan Atomic Power Project (RAPP-7&8) at Rawatbhata. Review of application for site excavation consent for Gorakhpur Haryana Anu Vidyut Pariyojana (GHAVP-1&2), Haryana is in progress.

KAPP-3&4, RAPP-7&8 Construction activities are in progress. Safety review was in advanced stage of completion. Clearances for erection of major equipment were earlier issued for these projects. NPCIL had proposed erection of the IC dome liner assembly for KAPP-3&4 as a single unit, a firsttimeexerciseinIndia.Detaileddesignsafetyreview of the dome liner assembly considering construction, erection and other loading was undertaken by AERB. AERB visited KAPP-3&4 site to witness preparedness for fabrication and erection of dome liner assembly and took stock of the construction activities in progress. Subsequently, the dome liner assembly was erected successfully, following the approved procedure.

View of KAPP-3&4 Project Site

Installation of Pressure Tubes at RAPP-7

AERB also reviewed documents pertaining to design of supporting platform for Passive Decay Heat Removal System (PDHRS) vent isolation valve support, analysis of New Fuel Bulk Storage Building (NFBSB) for extreme earthquake beyond design basis, and action plan for mitigation measuresagainstexternalfloodforKAPPsite.

GHAVP -1 & 2 Siting consent for 4 units of 700 MWe PHWRs at Gorakhpur, Haryana site (GHAVP-1 to 4) was issued in 2015. NPCIL has submitted application seeking clearance for Excavation for GHAVP-1&2. AERB undertook review of the NPCIL submittals pertaining to detailed seismotectonic and geotechnical investigations for GHAVP site. Necessary inputs from subject experts intheidentifiedareaswerealsotaken.Estimationof design basis for external events, especially groundmotion,flood,windandtemperaturewerereviewed. AERB undertook a detailed review of the analysis methodology for safety related buildings incorporating soil structure interaction. Actions to be taken by NPCIL to address the review observationswereidentified.Highlights of the safety review of PHWRs under construction (KAPP-3&4, RAPP-7&8 and GHAVP-1&2) are given below:a) Erection of Dome Structure of Primary

Containment of KAPP-3 Primary containment is provided with liner for reducing the leakages through the containment. For ease of construction, dome structure along with the liner was pre-fabricated and placed over the primary containment wall. AERB completed the detailed review of installation of major equipment in the Reactor Building, mechanical aspects of ring header of containment spray system etc.

Erection of Dome Structure of Inner Containment at KAPP-3


b) Shutdown Cooling Pump (SDCP) Shielding Wall

AERB reviewed the design change report for deletion of SDCP shielding wall in KAPP-3&4 to ensure adequate space for O&M activities / ISI of SDCP. AERB recommended NPCIL to provide a shielding door of carbon steel along with arrangement for radiation monitoring.c) Containment Filtered Venting System

(CFVS) As part of Post-Fukushima safety enhancement, CFVS, which is a First-of-a-Kind (FOAK) system for PHWR projects, was proposed, as additional operationalflexibilityagainstoverpressure insevereaccidents. Experimental studies were done on a scale down model at TAPS-3&4. AERB reviewed and accepted the results. d) Passive Catalytic Recombiner Devices

(PCRD) PCRD are proposed for hydrogen management during severe accidents. Performance check was carried out at Hydrogen Recombiner Testing Facility, NPCIL R&D Centre at Tarapur. AERB recommended NPCIL to carry out detailed study forfinalisationofnumberandlocationofPCRDtoavoid local peaking of hydrogen concentration due to geometry of structure inside the Reactor Building.e) Emergency Preparedness for Religious

Place Near GHAVP-1 & 4 A religious place ‘Agroha Dham’ is situated at around 12 km away from GHAVP Site. AERB recommended NPCIL to address evacuation of transient population during festive season in Emergency Preparedness Plan.

KAPP Testing of Diesel Driven Fire Water Pump

KAPP-Welding of Safety Related Piping at Steam Generator Nozzle

(B) FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION: REVIEW STATUS

Safety review activities related to fuel cycle facilities continued during the year.B.1 Demonstration Fast Reactor Fuel

Reprocessing Plant (DFRP) Civil works of Head End Facility (HEF) except cell area were completed. As a part of pre-commissioning activities calibration of various tanks, steam jet, air lifts were under progress. Installation of process equipment and piping work was completed. Erection of Sample Handling Robot (SHR) and pneumatic conveying transfer systems was completed and pre-commissioning checks were in progress. Pre-commissioning checks of fume hoods and glove boxes, various equipment & systems were in progress.B.2 Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility (FRFCF) Excavation activity along with geological mapping and confirmatory geo-technicalinvestigations in the Nuclear Island of FRFCF was completed. Civil construction of Waste Management Plant (WMP) and Core Sub-assembly Plant (CSP), Fuel Fabrication Plant (FFP) & Reprocessed Uranium Plant (RUP) are in progress. Consolidated grouting work for Fuel Reprocessing Plant (FRP) was in progress. Application for seeking extension of construction consent of FRFCF along with responses to stipulations was submitted. Safety reviews on issues related to stack height, crane drop load analysis, design criteria for structural concrete mix, QA in


construction were carried out. Based on review and resolution of issues extension of construction consent was issued on December 07, 2016. The following are the highlights of Safety Review of FRFCF:a) Commencement of the Pouring of Concrete

for WMP and Allied Structure Compliance to stipulations related to civil structure was confirmed before start of civilconstruction work of Solid Waste Building (SWB) and WMP. Towards this the review pertaining to construction methodology, QA in construction, concretemixdesignandconfirmatorygeotechnicalinvestigation reports etc. were completed. Subsequently, a team of AERB inspected the excavated pit of WMP and allied structure and regulatory observations were discussed. After confirming the compliance to stipulations,commencement of the pouring of concrete for WMP and allied structure was permitted.b) QA in Construction AERB reviewed QA program for construction and recommended Site to ensure assigning responsibility of QA implementation agency during variousstages,availabilityofsufficienttrainedandqualifiedmanpower.Compliancetotheabovewassubmitted, which was reviewed and accepted by AERB.B.3 Demonstration Facility for Metallic Fuel

Fabrication (DFMF) Demonstration Facility for Metallic Fuel Fabrication is proposed for technology demonstration of fabrication of metallic fuel pins. The application along with supporting documents for construction consent submitted was reviewed by AERB. The following are the highlights of Safety Review of DFMF:a) Safety Classification and Seismic

Categorisation Assessment of hazard category is made at plantlevelwhereassafetyclassificationandseismiccategorisation are made for SSCs of the plant. Seismic qualification was carried out with FBTR spectra(only SSE level). AERB recommended DFMF to use PFBR spectra for both Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE).

b) Criticality Safety To meet the criticality safety requirements, all factors like size, shape, composition, presence of neutron reflecting/absorbing/moderatingmaterialsin the surroundings and neutron interactions with otherfissilematerialswerecheckedduringreviewof criticality analysis. AERB accepted criticality analysis and further recommended that criticality calculation for each glove box for normal operation and postulated accident condition should be submitted separately for review. c) Radiological Safety AERB checked shielding adequacy for each processing area considering respective source term concentrations, shielding thickness, dose criteria, occupancy factor etc., and found that the estimated shielding thickness are adequate and meeting the requirements of dose criteria for the design of accessible and controlled areas.1.2.1 Regulatory Inspection AERB carries out Regulatory Inspections (RIs) of the Nuclear Power Projects as a safety audit measure to ensure compliance with the AERB safety requirements and stipulations. Emphasis is given on aspects related to Project Management, Safety Culture, Quality Assurance, Civil Construction, Equipment Storage & Preservation, Fabrication and Erection of major safety related components, Documentation, Commissioning activities, Industrial & Fire Safety, Radiological Monitoring and Emergency Preparedness. Inspections are carried out periodically as well as under special circumstances. Generally, the inspections are carried out with prior announcement. AERB also carries out special unannounced /surprise inspections with specific objectives asdeemed necessary. The regulatory inspection team also has the powers to take on-the-spot enforcement actions, if necessary, in cases of serious non-compliances. During construction and commissioning stages of nuclear power projects, the planned inspections are carried out at a frequency of four inspections in a year. In addition to plan inspections, AERB also identifies a list of important activities duringconstruction and commissioning as hold points for which the facility is required to inform AERB in advance for deputing its representatives/ experts in the respective areas to witness the relevant activities.


The number of regulatory inspections carried out by AERB in the nuclear facilities under construction during the year 2016 (April- December 2016) is presented in following table.

Table-1.2 Details of AERB Regulatory Inspections of NPPs under Construction

Project No. of RIs KKNPP-2 03KKNPP-3&4 03KAPP-3&4 06RAPP-7&8 04GHAVP-1&2 01PFBR 03DFRP 01FRFCF 01

Total 22

During these inspections, a large numbers of observations/recommendations are made by the inspection teams of AERB. Typical observations /recommendations from these RIs in the projects under construction are given below:

• LevelswitchofEmergencyDieselGenerator(EDG) Day Tank in KKNPP Unit #2 was stuck at low level, resulting in continuous operation ofmake-uppumpandoverflowofday-tank.Site was recommended to rectify the problem, assess and modify the design to have reliable failsafe indication or else provide alternate means of level measurement. Subsequently, Siterectifiedtheproblem.

• Access control has been established inKKNPP Unit-2. Identified areas have beenmarked as per radiological zoning. It was observed that one of the doors in controlled area was open. Site was recommended that any unauthorised movement bypassing access control, should not be allowed. Later the door was kept closed.

• Duringpre-heatingofthepurificationcircuitof secondary sodium circuit-1 at PFBR, it was observed that the heaters provided in these lines were underrated. After relook into the analysis made for arriving at the heater capacity, several modifications were

recommended. It was also recommended to confirmthatthefeeders(cableandprotectivedevices) supplying to these heaters are adequately rated to cater to the modifieddemands. In compliance to this, Site had implemented all the recommendations before start of integrated pre-heating.

• InKAPP-3&4,radiographyrecordsofvariouswelds of pipes indicated that Site QA Group of NPCIL recommended repair of several weld joints which were earlier cleared by contractor’s QA personnel. Site was asked to take measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the QA checks by contractor. Subsequently, Site took corrective action.

• In KAPP-3&4, non-safety related controlcable trays were observed to be laid below safety related control cable trays in few locations. Site was asked to ensure cable routing separation between non-safety and safety related trays satisfy the provisions given in IEEE-384 standards. Subsequently, Site took corrective action.

• In RAPP#7, the gap between InstalledEnd-Shield (ES) cooling outlet lines and nearby shielding blocks was less than the minimumgapspecified.Similarobservationwas made in KAPP#3 where modificationwas implemented creating required gap. CorrectionofthedeficiencyinRAPP#7wasrecommended; further recurrence of similar problem should be avoided in RAPP#8. Subsequently, Site took corrective action.

1.3 OPERATING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND RESEARCH REACTORS

1.3.1 Operational Safety Review

AERB carries out safety review and monitoring of operating NPPs and research reactors following multi-tier review process. Exhaustive review takes place during review of application for renewal of licence. Currently there are 21 operating nuclear power plants in India. The details of these nuclear power plants is given in Table 1.3. During the year, applications for issuance/renewal of licenses submitted by TAPS-3&4, RAPS-1&2, RAPS-5&6, MAPS-1&2, KAMINI and RAPPCOF were reviewed by AERB.


Table-1.3 List of Operating Nuclear Power Plants

NPP NPP Site / District / State Type

Gross Capacity

MWeCommencement

of OperationValidity of

License

Tarapur Atomic Power Station TAPS-1&2

TAPS-1Tarapur/Palghar/

Maharashtra

BWR160

October-1969 March 2017TAPS-2 160

TAPS-3&4TAPS-3

PHWR540 August -2006 August

2021TAPS-4 540 September -2005

Rajasthan Atomic Power Station RAPS-1&2

RAPS-1#

Rawatbhata/ Chithaurgarh

/RajasthanPHWR

100 December-1973August 2019RAPS-2 200 April-1981

RAPS-3&4RAPS-3 220 June-2000 October

2017RAPS-4 220 December-2000

RAPS-5&6RAPS-5 220 February-2010 December

2017RAPS-6 220 March-2010

Kakrapar Atomic Power Station KAPS-1&2

KAPS-1 Kakrapar/Tapi/

GujaratPHWR

220 May-1993July 2019

KAPS-2 220 September-1995

Madras Atomic Power Station MAPS-1&2

MAPS-1 Kalpakkam/Kancheepuram

/Tamil NaduPHWR

220 January-1984 December 2020MAPS-2 220 March-1986

Narora Atomic Power Station NAPS-1&2

NAPS-1 Narora/Bulandshahar /Uttar Pradesh

PHWR220 January-1991 June 2018

NAPS-2 220 July-1992

1.3.2 Consents / Clearances / Permissions Issued A number of applications from the utilities were reviewed and licenses for operations / clearances / permissions were issued. • Renewal of license for operation of TAPS-

3&4 up to August 2021• Renewal of license for operation of RAPS-

1&2 up to August 2019

• RenewaloflicenseforoperationofRAPS-5& 6 up to December 2017

• RenewaloflicenseforoperationofMAPS-1& 2 up to December 2020

• RenewaloflicenseforoperationofKAMINIup to June 2020

• RenewaloflicenseforoperationofRAPPCOFup to July 2021


NPP NPP Site / District / State Type

Gross Capacity

MWeCommencement

of OperationValidity of

License

Kaiga Generating Station KGS-1&2

KGS-1

Kaiga/Uttar Kannada /

Karnataka

PHWR

220 November -2000May 2017

KGS-2 220 March-2000

KGS-3&4 KGS-3 220 May-2007 April 2018KGS-4 220 January-2011

Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant KKNPP-1

KKNPP-1Kudankulam/Thirunelveli/Tamil Nadu

PWR 1000 December-2014 July 2020

# Unit under shutdown since 2004 and the reactor core is defueled.

1.3.3 Safety Review of Operating Nuclear Facilities Number of meetings conducted by various safety committees / standing committees during the year are given in Table 1.4.

Table- 1.4 Meetings of Safety Committees

Name of the Safety Committee No. of meetings

SARCOP 16

TAPS-1&2 Safety Committee 10

PHWR Safety Committee-1 (RAPS-1&2, MAPS-1&2, NAPS & KAPS-1&2) 18

PHWR Safety Committee -2 (KGS-1&2, KGS-3&4, RAPS-3&4 & RAPS-5&6) 12

PHWR Safety Committee-3 (TAPS-3&4) 3

KK Safety Committee (KKSC) 7

IGCAR Safety Committee (RR & CORAL) 6

SARCOP Standing Committee on Reactor Physics (SC-RP) 1

SARCOP Standing Committee on Control, Instrumentation & Computer based Systems (SCCI & CS) 3

ExpertGrouponEquipmentQualification(EG-EQ) 2

Expert Group on Coolant Channels (EG-CC) 8

Civil Engineering Safety Committee for Operating Plants (CESCOP) 4

Total 90


SARCOP Meeting in Progress at Zirconium Complex, Tuticorin

(i) Tarapur Atomic Power Station:

Health Assesment of TAPS-2 RPV

TAPS-2 was under refuelling shutdown from September 10, 2015 to July 25, 2016. During the refuelling outage, inspections of RPV upper shell longitudinal weld joint (L11 & L12) using Weld Inspection Manipulator-2 Modified (WIM-2M) and core belt region longitudinal weld joints (L21 & L22) using BARC Vessel Inspection System (BARVIS) were completed. RPV inspection results were reviewed by experts from BARC, IGCAR and NPCIL. Structural integrity assessment was carried out independently by NPCIL, BARC and AERB. Assessment indicated the availability of sufficient safety margins for reactor operation. Based on the satisfactory review, AERB permitted the restart of TAPS Unit-2.

Reactor Pressure Vessel Inspection by BARVIS

Installation of Cryogenic N2 Tank for Containment Inserting System at TAPS- 1&2

TAPS-3&4 License for operation of TAPS-3&4 was extended up to August 31, 2021. TAPS-3&4 had implementednumberofsafetymodificationsbasedon the operating experience for enhancing the safety and reliability of systems. Issues related to theperformanceoffirst-of-a-kind(FOAK)systemswere either resolved or were in the advanced stage of resolution. The radioactive discharges from the TAPS-3&4 remained well within the technical specification limits. ISI and surveillance haveshown that the condition of various systems/equipment is satisfactory. Station had instituted a comprehensive Equipment Qualification (EQ)programme for qualifying the components required to function during accident conditions. Based on the EQ test results, some components had been replaced and actions were in progress for replacement of the other identified components. TAPS-3&4had also completed most of the short term and medium term recommendations identified post-


Fukushima reviews and actions were in progress for implementing long term recommendations such as installation of CFVS systems, provision for hydrogen management, creation of On-site Emergency Support Centre (OESC), DSS, etc.

(ii) Rajasthan Atomic Power Station:

RAPS-1&2 License for operation of RAPS-1&2 was valid up to December 31, 2016. Subsequently, RAPS had submitted application for renewal of license for operation to AERB along with status of the issues identified during renewal of license in 2014, status of other pending SARCOP / Safety Committee recommendations and the applicable recommendations made during reviews related to renewal of license for operation of MAPS beyond June 2016. SARCOP considered the station application in the light of review carried out by AERB Safety Committees.

SARCOP noted that station has made reasonable progress towards resolution of identified issues during renewal of licence in 2014 and some of the issues have been resolved satisfactorily. A major concern regarding long term operation of the RAPS-2 is the incidents of leak in boiler hairpins for which station has initiated actions for en-masse replacement of boilers' hairpins and submitted that these replacements will be carried out in April 2018. NPCIL is also in-process of implementing some long term actions identified based on post Fukushima accident's reviews, such as installation of PCRDs, implementation of CFVS, DSS, PCRDs and provision for mixing boiler room and FM vault areas and construction of OESC etc., and these are expected to be implemented by the end of year 2018. Also, the provision of additional hook-up line for water injection to calandria will be implemented by June 2017. This will further strengthen the in-channel retention strategy for severe accident management at RAPS-2. Based on the progress made by RAPS-2 in complying with the pending issues, AERB had extended the license for operation of RAPS-2 up to August 31, 2019.

RAPS-5&6 License for operation of RAPS-5&6 was extended up to December 2017. AERB had earlier

extended the license for operation of RAPS-5&6 up to May 31, 2016 pending completion of the activities like revision of mandatory documents, completion of ISI activities, implementation of post Fukushima identified safety upgrades andestablishment of equipment qualification etc.Subsequent assessment indicated that performance of RAPS-5&6 had been satisfactory during the last one year period. Station had completed all pending ISI activities. However, actions for replacement of the third stage blades of turbine generator of RAPS-6, resolution of problem of high dissolved oxygen in calandria vault cooling system, implantation of long term safety upgrades identified postFukushima review, establishment of EQ etc., are in progress.

(iii) Madras Atomic Power Station: License for operation of MAPS-1&2 was renewed up to December 31, 2020 subject to satisfactory resolution of pending issues.

Review of application for extension of license of MAPS-1&2 showed that station had addressed pending issues such as health assessment of civil structures and inaccessible components, Level-1 PSA for external and internal flood, seismic assessment of additionalequipment and piping identified during postFukushima reviews and installation of 1010 kVA DG set etc. Further implementation of long term measures viz. installation of Containment Filtered Venting System (CFVS), Decision Support System (DSS), provisions for hydrogen management, creation of On-Site Emergency Support Centre (OESC) etc. are in advanced stages. Based on the good progress made by MAPS in complying with the recommendations made during review of PSR application, AERB extended the license for operation up to December 31, 2020.

(iv) Kakrapar Atomic Power Station:

KAPS-1&2 have been under shut down due to incidents of pressure tube (PT) leaks since March 11, 2016 and July 1, 2015 respectively.

Leaky tube (Q-16) and some other tubes removed from KAPS-2 had indicated the presence of localised corrosion spots on pressure tube (PT) outer surface. Subsequently, non-destructive inspection


technique was developed for detection of such localised corrosion marks on PT outer surface. Similar corrosion marks were detected on the outer surface of the other tubes of KAPS-2 as well as PTs of KAPS-1 including the failed PT Q-15. In view of this, as mandated by AERB, inspection of coolant channels was carried out in other PHWRs to check the existence of similar corrosion spots. Inspection carried out so far in TAPS-3, RAPS-2, RAPS-6, NAPS-2, KGS-2 and KGS-3, in selected channels did not reveal the existence of such corrosion spots on PT outer surface in any other PHWR. Similar inspection is planned for remaining reactors.

Affected pressure tube (Q-15) of KAPS-1 has been removed from the core and transported to the laboratory at BARC for further examination. Removal of the pressure tube from reactor was done with proper procedure and specially developed tools to ensure that no evidence gets lost in the process of removal for establishing root cause of the failure. TheseaspectswerespecificallyreviewedbyAERBbefore approving the removal and transporting the pressure tube to BARC. Preliminary examination oftheaffectedpressuretubeconfirmedthepresenceof number of through wall cracks. Presence of localised corrosion spots were also observed on the pressure tube outer surface similar to that of observed on the pressure tubes removed from KAPS-2 reactor (Q-16, Q-15 and N-6). Based on the findings of preliminary examination, AERBhad asked a plan for detailed examination of PT and completion of the investigation for establishing the root cause of coolant channel leak expeditiously. Detailed investigations are in progress.

The investigation on the cause of the corrosion spots seen on KAPS PTs points to the possible presence of some trace impurity in the CO2 gas, which is used in the Annulus Gas System of coolant channels in KAPS units. The inspection results of PTs removed earlier for PIEs (S-7 & Q-10) indicate that this could have happened sometime after year 2012. Further investigations are in progress. As an abundant precaution, AERB has asked other operating PHWRs to strengthen the QA checks on the CO2 gas being used in Annulus Gas System.

In view of observed corrosion spots on outer surface of the PTs in both units of KAPS, NPCIL has proposed to undertake En-Masse Coolant

Channel Replacement (EMCCR) in both units. EMCCR campaign is divided into number of stages viz. channel defueling and spent fuel bundles discharge to SFSB, PHT system draining and flushingwith lightwater,preparatoryworks inFMvaults, feeder cutting and replacement, coolant channel removal & replacement activities, fuel loading, normalisation works in FM vaults and re-commissioning of the systems. AERB has decided to give stagewise clearance for each activity after satisfactory completion of the preceding activity. Presently, in KAPS-1, fuel has been removed from the core. Inspection of some more channels using BARCIS is in progress to collect additional data that may be helpful in establishing the root cause of the PT failure. In KAPS-2, core defueling, PHT system draining and drying and PHT system feeder cutting has been completed. Coolant channel cutting activity is in progress. AERB has also granted the permission for construction of vaults for storage of PTs, end fittings and garter springs and other radioactivewaste generated during EMCCR of KAPS-1&2. Construction of the storage vault is in progress.

(v) Permission for 25th Irradiation Campaign of FBTR:

With the permission of AERB, 24th irradiation campaign of FBTR was started on December 23, 2015 and completed on March 16, 2016. Subsequently, FBTR, IGCAR submitted a proposal for seeking permission for 25th irradiation campaign. The main objectives of the 25th irradiation campaigns are (i) continuing irradiation of the sodium bonded metallic fuel pins at two locations; (ii) continuing irradiation of Natural U-Zr metallic fuel pins; (iii) to continue long term irradiation of structural materials; and (iv) irradiation of grid plate material for reassessing the residual ductility of grid plate. FBTR application was discussed in detail by IGCAR safety committee and SARCOP. After satisfactory safety review of the application, AERB permitted the commencement of 25th irradiation campaign of FBTR.

(vi) Extension of License for Operation of KAMINI:

AERB assessment indicated that IGCAR had addressed most of the recommendations made during review of PSR report of KAMINI. Actions are in progress to address remaining


pending issues such as refurbishment of control and instrumentation system, seismic evaluation, installation of in-duct gas monitor etc. The review of PSR has not indicated any major safety concern for the operation of the reactor till its next license renewal period. Based on the above, the license for operation of KAMINI has been extended up to June 30, 2020.

(vii) Extension of License for Operation of RAPPCOF:

SARCOP had been giving permission for fabrication of Cobalt Teletherapy Sources (CTS) at RAPPCOF on campaign basis. As recommended by AERB, RAPPCOF submitted an application seeking license for operation of the facility under Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004. RAPPCOF application was reviewed in detail by AERB.

Assessment indicated that the operating performance of RAPPCOF, including fabrication of CTS, has been satisfactory during last 5 years. The radioactive waste transfers to Centralised Waste Management Facility (CWMF) remained within the authorised limits. The individual radiation dose remained much below the prescribed limits and collective doses were within the approved budgets. Severalmodifications /replacementswere carriedout since the initial construction of the facility to improve operational & safety performance. RAPPCOF had revised various operational documents including technical specificationsfor operation, radiation protection procedures, operation manual, EOPs and has also prepared new documents viz. safety analysis report, ISI program and security aspects. Based on the satisfactory review of the application, the license for operation to RAPPCOF is issued up to July 31, 2021.

1.3.4 Safety Assessment of Operating Nuclear Power Plants in the wake of accidents at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants

Safety assessment carried out post Fukushima accident, indicated that the Indian NPPs have inherent strength in dealing with external hazards. However, certain safety enhancements were identifiedforstrengtheningthedefencesagainsttherare external events exceeding the design bases and enhancing severe accident mitigation capabilities.

Theseactionswereclassifiedasshort,mediumandlong term measures. Implementation of the short and medium term actions were completed. Actions are in progress for the long term measures which include provision of Containment Filtered Venting System (CFVS), implementation of hydrogen management provisions, establishing OESC etc. AERB is closely monitoring the status of implementation of the identified safety upgrades. Present status of longterm safety upgrades is as follows:

(a) Enhancing severe accident management programme:

The generic Technical Basis Document (TBD) on ‘Accident Management Guidelines (AMGs)’ for Indian PHWRs was reviewed and accepted by AERB. Based on this document, station specificaccident management guidelines are in place at all stations and personnel have been trained. Surveillance programme is also established for all implemented post Fukushima provision/upgrades. Review of Generic TBD for TAPS-1&2 by AERB was near completion.

(b) Strengthening hydrogen management provisions:

The proposed hydrogen management scheme in Indian PHWRs includes installation of sufficientnumber of Passive Catalytic Recombiner Devices (PCRD) along with provisions for mixing the containment atmosphere. NPCIL proposal for installation of PCRD in all PHWR operating stations and mixing of containment atmosphere has been reviewed and accepted by AERB. As per NPCIL, PCRD will be installed at all NPPs by December 2018.

(c) Provisionofcontainmentfilteredventing: Containment Filtered Venting Systems (CFVS) for Indian NPPs are planned to be installed to prevent containment pressure exceeding the design pressure. Performance evaluation of indigenously developed CFVS (works on wet scrubbing concept) is being done on a scale down facility at TAPS-3&4 (for all PHWRs) and at TAPS-1&2 through extensive experimentation. Erection of system components such as scrubber


tank, piping along with associated valves has been completed at TAPS-1&2. System is likely to be commissioned by December 2017. DBRs for CFVS system at PHWRs are under review in AERB.

CFVS Scrubber Tank Shielding Wall Construction for TAPS-1&2

CFVS Test Facility at TAPS-3&4

(d) Creation of on-site emergency support centre:

It has been decided to establish On-site Emergency Support Centres (OESCs) at all NPPs, which is capable to remain functional under radiological conditions following a severe accident and withstand extreme external events (flood, cyclone, earthquake, etc.). Requirementsand guidelines for establishing OESC have been framed by AERB. Civil DBRs of OESC have been reviewed and accepted by AERB. OESC is being implemented in phased manner in all the sites and MAPS is taken up on priority for implementation.

1.3.5 Regulatory Inspections Regulatory inspections for operating NPPs are carried out twice a year. The following areas are covered during typical regulatory inspections.

• Operation & maintenance and quality assurance programme

• Adherencetothetechnicalspecificationsforoperation

• Compliance to various regulatory recommendations

• Adequacy of licensed staff at NPPs• Performance of safety related systems• Radiation safety and ALARA practices • Emergency preparedness• Industrial&firesafety Further, the physical protection systems of the NPP for security of systems affecting safety is carried out once in a year. Special inspections are conducted during Biennial shutdowns (BSD) to assess the radiological safety aspects. Special regulatory inspections are also carried out as necessary following an event, depending on the safety significance or after major modificationsin the plant and forms the basis for considering clearance for restart of the unit.

As a new initiative first time RegulatoryInspection of NPCIL Headquarter's activities was carried out by AERB. Some important observations were made pertaining to NPCIL's organisation structure, independence of QA functions, sub-contracting, designer's verification of the on-site construction & commissioning activities, unambiguous role of Field Engineer, assessment of independent safety review committees, effective utilisation of feedback, knowledge management, safety culture etc.

During the period, a total of 33 regulatory inspections of operating NPPs and research facilities were carried out, which included 19 scheduled inspections for nuclear & radiological safety aspects, 8 scheduled inspections for nuclear security aspects, 6 special inspections including 2 unannounced inspections one each at TAPS-1&2 and TAPS-3&4. Four special regulatory inspections one each at TAPS-3, RAPS-5, KGS-1 and KGS-3 were conducted during the BSD of nuclear power plant units to monitor the radiological safety aspects.

AERB follows up the implementation of all the recommendations made during these inspections. The number of regulatory inspections of operating NPPs and research facilities during the period is given in Table 1.5.


Table- 1.5Number of Regulatory Inspections at the NPPs

and Research Facilities

UnitNumber of Inspections

Planned Special

TAPS-1&2 2 1

TAPS-3&4 2 2

RAPS-1&2 1 0

RAPS-3&4 1 0

RAPS-5&6 2 1

MAPS-1&2 1 0

NAPS-1&2 2 0

KAPS-1&2 2 0

KGS-1&2 1 1

KGS-3&4 1 1

KKNPP-1 2 0

CORAL 1 0

RAPPCOF 1 0

Total* 19 6

* In addition, 8 number of scheduled inspections were carried out to cover aspects related to nuclear security affecting safety of NPPs.

During these inspections, a number of observa-tions are made by the inspection teams of AERB. These observations/recommendations are further categorised adopting the graded approach as an internal mechanism for follow up of their reviews and resolutions. Some of the typical important observations/recommendations having safety implications which emanated from these RIs in the operating NPPs and the regulatory action taken are given below:

• At NAPS, it was observed that the surveillances requiring starting of emergency

diesel generators (EDG) as well as diesel drivenfirewaterpumpsarebeingcarriedoutkeeping starting battery charger in service. However, surveillance test for ensuring that these batteries can independently (with charger out of service) supply the design load on demand was not being practiced. In view of the importance of the equipment it was recommended to devise a surveillance programtoensurethatEDGflashingbatteriesandstartingbatteriesofdieseldrivenfirewaterpumps are capable to meet their design intent with battery charger out of service. Based on the recommendation, station has taken correctiveactionsthroughmodificationintheimplementing procedure for the surveillance.

• At RAPS-5&6, it was observed that procedure for taking air samples from the RB in case of accident with containment isolation is available at the station. However, periodic surveillance to ensure the operability of this sampling set up was not performed. In view of this, it was recommended for conducting the same to meet the design intent. Subsequently, station has started the periodic functional testing of this air sampling set up to ensure availability.

• Fire water system is the back-up system for removal of heat from important systems & equipment of nuclear power plants. While carryingoutthefieldjobobservationondieseldriven firefighting pump testing during theinspection of TAPS-3&4, it was observed that station is adhering to the procedure for testing and overall performance of pump was found satisfactory. However, it was observed that some part of control cables of the pump were lying on the floor where spilled waterwas present which can lead to degradation of the control cables. Some cracks were also observedonthewallsofreservoiratfirewaterpump suction. It was recommended to the station to take the preventive measures before any breakdown leading to failure of this pump


on demand. Station has implemented the corrective measures like elevation & proper laying of control cables to prevent degradation and to ensure the healthiness & availability of dieseldrivenfirewaterpumps.

1.3.6 Licensing of Operating Staff Operating personnel of NPPs are required to go through a licensing procedure which includes clearing checklists, written exams, walkthrough and finally Qualification interviews. The finalassessment/ Qualification interviews for NPPoperating personnel responsible for control room operation namely Shift Charge Engineer

Table- 1.6 Licensing of Operating Staff

PlantsNo. of Persons Licensed Licensing committee

meetingsSCE ASCE ASCE (F) CE CE (F)

TAPS-1 & 2 3 0 0 2 0 1

TAPS-3 & 4 1 9 4 9 0 4

RAPS- 1 & 2 1 0 1 2 1 1

RAPS- 3 & 4 3 4 3 6 2 1

RAPS-5 & 6 3 0 0 6 0 1

MAPS-1 & 2 1 2 2 3 2 1

NAPS 2 2 3 4 2 2

KAPS 6 1 0 8 0 1

KGS- 1 & 2 3 3 2 6 0 1

KGS- 3 & 4 4 4 0 4 2 1

KKNPP 0 2 0 12 0 1

Total 27 27 15 62 9 15

1.3.7 Authorisation for Safe disposal / transfer of Radioactive Wastes for DAE Facilities under GSR-125

The authorisation for safe disposal or

(SCE), Assistant Shift Charge Engineer (ASCE) and Control Engineer is conducted by the finalassessment committee constituted by AERB, which includes AERB representatives. A candidate after successfully completing the pre-requisites of licensing procedure, is licensed/re-licensed for the given position.

During the year, 15 meetings were held for licensing/re-licensing of operating personnel responsible for control room operations at various operating plants. Total of 140 candidates were licensed / re-licensed. In addition to this, manpower for FBTR/KAMINI operation is also licensed. Details are given in table 1.6.

transfer of radioactive waste from Indian Rare Earth Limited (IREL), OSCOM was valid up to December 2016. Subsequently after establishment of quantities and activity of radioactive waste generated from this facility based on operating


Table-1.7 List of Facilities Authorised for Safe Disposal / Transfer of Radioactive Waste

S. No. Name of DAE Organisation No. of Facilities

1 Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL) 10

2 Indian Rare Earth Limited (IREL) 03

3 Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) 05

4 Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) 14

5 IGCAR 05

6 Board of Radiation & Isotope Technology (BRIT) 05

7 Technology Demonstration Plant (HWB) 01

Total Number of Authorisations 43

1.4 OPERATING NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND OTHER RELATED INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES

1.4.1 Operational Safety ReviewThe nuclear fuel cycle facilities and other related industrial facilities under the regulatory control of AERB are mines and ore processing plants of UCIL, mineral separation plants and chemical processing plants of Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL), Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC), Zirconium

Complex (ZC), Heavy Water Plants (HWP), Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research (AMD), Board of Radiation & Isotope Technology (BRIT) and some of the facilities of Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR). In addition to this, Beach Sand Minerals (BSM) and other facilities handling Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) are also regulated by AERB with respect to radiological safety aspects. The list of fuel cycle facilities is presented in Table 1.8.

experience considering the expansion activities of the facility, authorisation was amended and extended up to December 2018. During the year, application for safe transfer/disposal of radioactive waste was received from Integrated Facility for Radiation Technology (IFRT), BRIT. Based on review of the application, authorisation was issued to IFRT for the period up to December 2018.

The existing authorisations of all other authorised facilities are valid up to December 2018. All these facilities submit the periodic waste disposal reports to AERB to demonstrate compliance with the authorisation conditions. A list of DAE facilities authorised for safe disposal/transfer of radioactive waste is brought out in Table: 1.7.


Tab

le- 1

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tatu

s of N

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Dec

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June

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1


1.4.2 License Renewed/Issued

AERB continued its regulatory supervision of fuel cycle facilities. During the year, a number of applications from the utilities were reviewed and licenses were renewed/issued/extended to various DAE units under the Factories Act, 1948 / Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004. The licencesarevalidforaperiodofmaximumfiveyears.

• License for operation of Technology Demonstration Plant, RCF, Mumbai was renewed up to October 31, 2021.

• License for operation of Heavy Water Plant, Manuguru was renewed up to June 30, 2020.

• License for operation of Heavy Water Plant, Baroda for production of TBP and k-Metal was renewed up to May 31, 2021.

• License for operation of ECIL, Hyderabad was renewed up to June 30, 2020.

• License for operation of ECIL, Tirupati was renewed up to October 27, 2021.

• License for operation of Banduhurang mine of UCIL was renewed up to June 30, 2017.

• License for operation of Zirconium Complex, Pazhayakayal was renewed up to June 30, 2017.

• License for operation of 150 TW Ti: Sapphire Laser System at RRCAT, Indore was renewed upto June 30, 2021.

• Licence for operation for 1.7 MV Tandetron Accelerator and 150 kV Accelerator at PIF, IGCAR, Kalpakkam was issued on August 29, 2016 and valid up to August 31, 2021.

1.4.3 Safety Review of Fuel Cycle Facilities Number of meetings conducted by various safety committees for fuel cycle facilities and other industrial facilities during this period is given in Table 1.9.

Table-1.9 Meetings of Safety Review Committee of Fuel

Cycle Facilities

Name of the Committee No. of Meetings

Design Safety Review Committee for Uranium Extraction Projects (DSRC-UEP)

1

UCIL-AMD Safety Committee 1

BSM-NORM Safety Committee 2

NFC Safety Committee 3

HWP Safety Committee 5

DAE-Accelerator and Laser Safety Committee (DAE-ALSC)

2

IGCAR Safety Committee 2

Total 16

The highlights from safety review of the operating fuel cycle and other industrial facilities are given below:

(i) Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL)

The mines at Narwapahar, Turamdih, Banduhurang, Bagjata, Mohuldih and Tummalapalle were under normal operation. Operations at Jaduguda and Bhatin Mine are under shutdown. The mills at Jaduguda & Turamdih were in operation during the year. Trial run operation at Tummalapalle Mill is under progress. The following proposals were reviewed

• The application for renewal of license for operation of Banduhurang Mine was reviewed. Based on the action plan for addressing the identified issues,License foroperation was extended up to June 2017.


• The application for trial operation of Tummalapalle Mill for carrying out test runs for improving recovery and grade of end product was reviewed. The process of Tummalapalle mill is not yet fully stabilised and in view of that consent for trial operation of Uranium ore processing at Tummalapalle mill was issued on April 29, 2016 for limited period up to December 2017.

SARCOP Team Visit to Tummalapalle Mill of UCIL

Regulatory Inspection of Tummalapalle Mill of UCIL

(ii) Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL) Rare Earth Division at IREL Udyogamandal and Mineral Separation Plants (MSP) of IREL at Chavara, Manavalakurichi and Chatrapur operated safely during this period. Monazite Processing Plant (MoPP) at IREL, Orissa Sand Complex (OSCOM), Chatrapur were in operation. The following proposals were reviewed.

• The proposal for bringing natural uranium bearing processed uranium cake from NFC, Hyderabad for processing at IREL, Udyogamandal for the recovery of uranium was reviewed. Permission was granted on October 04, 2016 for the processing of 26 MT of processed uranium cake on campaign basis for 6 months.

• Thorium Retrival Uranium Recovery & Storage (THRUST) operation was started at

IREL, Udyogamandal in 2004 for the retrieval of thorium concentrate from silos and process for the production of thorium oxalate and nuclear grade ADU. Around 32800 MT of thorium concentrate was processed from 6 silos and the operation was completed in 2012. The THRUST Closure Report submitted by IREL, Udyogamandal was reviewed and accepted by AERB.

(iii) Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) & Zirconium Complex (ZC)

• All the plants of NFC, Hyderabad and ZC, Pazhayakayal operated safely during this period. The following proposals of NFC and ZC were reviewed.

• Application for renewal of License for operation of Zirconium Complex, Pazhayakayal was reviewed. Keeping in view of pending recommendations, License for operation of Zirconium Complex, Pazhayakayal was renewed for one year i.e., up to June 30, 2017.

• The proposal for setting up Magnesium Recycling Technology Development and Demonstration Facility (MRTDDF) was reviewed. Based on the safety review, clearance was granted for Siting and Construction of MRTDDF at Zirconium Complex, Pazhayakayal.

• The proposal for setting up 1.5T batch size Zirconium Sponge Technology Demonstration Unit (TDU) was reviewed. Based on safety review, clearance was granted for Construction of 1.5T batch size TDU at Zirconium Complex, Pazhayakayal.

SARCOP visit to Zirconium Complex, Pazhayakayal


(iv) Heavy Water Plants (HWPs)

The Heavy Water Plants operated safely during the year. Presently, HWP, Baroda is engaged in production of potassium metal, sodium metal and Tri-ButylPhosphate(TBP)solvent.Diversifiedprojectsnamely, Versatile Solvent Synthesis Plant (VSSP) at HWP, Tuticorin and Versatile Solvent Production Plant (VSPP) at HWP, Talcher were under normal operation. The following proposals were reviewed:

• Based on review and satisfactory compliance, License for operation of TDP, Chembur was renewed for 5 years up to October 31, 2021 subject to renewal of lease agreement with M/s RCF beyond June 2018. Also, the revised Technical Specifications for the operation of TDP, RCF,Chembur were reviewed and approved.

• The proposal for renewal of License for operation of TBP and Potassium Metal plant at HWP, Baroda was reviewed and license was renewed on May 30, 2016 for further period of fiveyears.

(v) Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research (AMD)

Exploration work at various sites of AMD in northern, southern, eastern, western, central and south central regions was in progress. Considering the low hazard potential these sites are inspected once in two years. Three AMD sites were inspected during this period.

(vi) Beach Sand Minerals (BSM) & Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) Facilities

Regulatory inspection of beach sand mineral facilities was carried out during this period and the periodic radiological reports submitted by the facilities were reviewed.

1.4.4 Regulatory Inspections

During the period, a total of 67 regulatory inspections were carried out which includes 13 inspections of operating NPPs and 16 inspections of nuclear power projects. Some of the major recommendations/suggestions are as follows:

• It was recommended to carry out hydro test of drain header line in H2S generation area of HWP Kota as per Rule 36 of Atomic Energy (Factories) Rules, 1996; and to carry out the load test & examination of material handling equipment once in 12 months as per the requirement mentioned in Rule 35 of Atomic Energy (Factories) Rules, 1996.

• Development of height pass system for work at height; and availability of competent persons at the plant for supervision of handling of hazardous substances [Section 41 (c) (b)] and dangerous fumes [Section 36] at ECIL, Hyderabad.

• Fluoride bearing waste at NFC, Hyderabad should be stored under sheds at designated areatopreventleachingoffluoride.

• To take engineering measures to avoid spillage below mixed hydroxide filter press and toprevent gland leakage at IREL, OSCOM.

1.5 OVERALL SAFETY PERFORMANCE OF THE NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION

Pre-commissioning/commissioning activities at KKNPP Unit # 2 completed as per approved procedures and found to meet the acceptance criteria. RadiologicalreleaseswerewithinspecifiedlimitsofTechnical Specifications for Operation. However,during Phase-C commissioning stage, there were few instances resulting in shutdown of Unit # 2 for attending the maintenance/overhauling of some components. These are indicated in Section 1.8.

There were no major reportable incidents calling for enforcement actions during Site excavation stage of KKNPP-3&4.

No major reportable incidents calling for enforcement actions during construction and equipment erection stage of KAPP-3&4 and RAPP-7&8. Precommissioning activities are underway without any incident.

There were no major reportable incidents calling for enforcement actions during construction of FRFCF and equipment erection of DFRP.


AERB continued its regulatory supervision for twenty one operating nuclear power plants. The operational performance and significant eventsare reviewed and the required modifications areimplemented. The operational performance of all the NPPs has remained satisfactory during last year, except incident of failure of pressure tube in KAPS-1 and 2 which led to declaration of a plant emergency. Currently, the units are under shutdown for investigations.

Total 33 regulatory inspections were carried out at operating NPPs and research facilities to ensure compliance with AERB requirements and overall operation safety. All the 34 significantevents occurred at operating NPPs were reviewed in detail in AERB to see the adequacy of investigations, corrective actions, lessons learned and the need for any regulatory actions. All these events were rated as level-1 or below on INES. The radioactivity releases from all the nuclear power plants were below the limits specified inthetechnicalspecificationsforoperation.Effectivedose to member of public in the vicinity of NPP sites was far less than the annual dose limit of 1 mSv. The radiation exposure to occupational workers in these plants was also well below the prescribed

limit of 30 mSv. Plant, site and offsite emergency exercises were conducted as per the schedule and the responses of various involved agencies were found to be satisfactory.

All Fuel cycle facilities operated safely during the period. There were no cases of individual radiation exposures exceeding the prescribed limits. The radioactive wastes generated during the operation of the facilities were managed without any undue impact to the public and the environment. There were no industrial related accidents in any of the fuel cycle facilities under construction. However there was a fatal accident that took place at NFC, Hyderabad the details of which are given under Section 1.8.

1.6 R&D UNITS AND OTHER FACILITIES IN CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION

Safety review of Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre (VECC), Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced Technology (RRCAT), Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) and Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL) was done by AERB apart from the Fuel Cycle Facilities. The status of R&D units and other facilities are presented in Table 1.10.

Table- 1.10Status of R&D and Other Facilities

Type of Facility

Name Functional Status

Scope of the Facility Validity of Current License

Facility operated by VECC, Kolkata, West Bengal

Particle Accelerator Research Facility (PARF)

Room Temperature Cyclotron

(K-130)

In operation Heavy ion acceleration August 31, 2017

Super Conducting Cyclotron

(K-500)

Commissioning Heavy ion acceleration No time limit

Medical Cyclotron Project

Equipment Erection

Cyclotron machine along with 3 beam lines for production of radio-pharmaceuticals

March 31, 2018


Type of Facility

Name Functional Status

Scope of the Facility Validity of Current License

Facility operated by RRCAT, Indore, Madhya Pradesh

LASER 150 TW Ti: Sapphire Laser System

In operation 90 TW – for regular and 150 TW- trial (25 femto-second)

June 30, 2021

PARF TWINDUS LINAC-1

Stage 3: Commissioning

10 MeV, 5 kW March 31, 2018

TWINDUS LINAC-2

Stage 1: Installation, Testing and Commissioning

Electron Acceleration 10 MeV, 1 kW

September 30, 2017

20 MeV Microtron Stage 1: Testing Electron Acceleration February 28, 2017

Agricultural Radiation Processing Facility (ARPF)

Construction Technology Demonstration for Food Irradiation

March 31, 2018

INDUS-1 In operation 450 MeV, 100 mA electron Storage ring

August 31, 2018

INDUS-2 In operation 2.5 GeV, 200 mA SRS March 31, 2021

Accelerator Electron LINAC In operation 10 MeV, 10 kW January 31, 2018

LASER 1 PW Laser System

Construction 1 PW(femto second)

August 31, 2018

Facility operated by Post Irradiation Facility (PIF), IGCAR, Kalpakkam, Tamil Nadu

Accelerator 1.7 MV Tandetron Accelerator

In operation 1.7 MV August 31, 2021

150 kV Accelerator In operation 150 kV August 31, 2021

Facilities Operated by ECIL

Electronic component development

ECIL Hyderabad In Operation Production of Instrumentation, Control & Communication systems and other Electronic components.

June 30, 2020

ECIL, Tirupati In Operation Production of Nuclear Industrial Instrumentation systems, EVM & VVPAT power packs etc.

October 31, 2021


1.6.1 Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre (VECC)

The Room Temperature Cyclotron (K-130) was under operation delivering alpha and proton beams of various energies and intensities. Commissioning of Super-conducting cyclotron & Radioactive Ion Beam facility are in progress. The civil construction of medical cyclotron, which will be used, for commercial production of Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography (SPECT) isotopes as well as high end technological research is completed. The following proposal was reviewed by AERB.

• Equipment Erection for Medical Cyclotron Facility at Kolkata

After the completion of civil construction of the facility, the application for equipment erection was reviewed. Based on the safety review, permission for equipment erection of the cyclotron machine along with three radiopharmaceutical beamlines was granted. It was recommended to submit the certificate of the healthiness of thecomponents of the cyclotron machine before commissioning activities. Presently activities like erection of different equipment of the Medical Cyclotron system are under progress.

1.6.2 Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced Technology (RRCAT)

INDUS-1 Synchrotron Radiation Source was under operation with beam energy of 450MeV and beam current of 100 mA delivering synchrotron radiation through five licensed beam lines.INDUS-2, which is a synchrotron cum storage ring, was under operation at 2.5 GeV (max) beam energy and beam current of 200 mA (max). Six beam lines of INDUS-2 have already been authorised by AERB for carrying out experiments. In addition to these major accelerators, other accelerators and Laser Facilities/Projects at RRCAT are being periodically reviewed. The following proposals/issues related to RRCAT were reviewed.

• Permission for trial operation of the Infra-Red Free Electron Laser (IR-FEL) facility

An Infra-Red Free Electron Laser (IR-FEL) is under development at RRCAT wherein a pulsed 90

keV electrons will be accelerated in a Linac system to variable energy of 15-25 MeV for generation of IR radiation. RRCAT has submitted the proposal for trial operations of this facility. The proposal was reviewed, based on safety review, AERB agreed for conducting experiments up to 6 W Continuous Wave (CW) average electron beam power.

• Use of TW-INDUS Linac-1 of RRCAT for conducting irradiation experiment

RRCAT was granted the commissioning consent for 10 MeV, 5 kW TW-INDUS Linac-1 in IMA building of RRCAT in year 2015. In order to qualify the Linac for radiation processing of food and industrial products, RRCAT wanted to carry out irradiation experiments for dosimetric measurements to optimise the operating parameters of the Linac and to standardise the irradiation process parameters for different products. Accordingly, the application for conducting irradiation experiment at TW-INDUS Linac-1 was reviewed at AERB and by DAE-ALSC. Based on the commissioning experience report, results of TW-INDUS Linac-1, ventilation aspects w.r.t. O3 production, AERB permitted RRCAT for conducting irradiation experiment subject to control of irradiated samples without releasing them outside the plant.

• Testing of TW-INDUS Linear Accelerator -2 at RRCAT

RRCAT is developing a new TWINDUS Linac-2 same as that of TWINDUS Linac-1 with 6 kW beam power at 10 MeV. The application for installation, testing and commissioning of developed new ‘TWINDUS Linac-2’ at RRCAT was reviewed in AERB and by DAE-ALSC. Based on review, AERB granted permission for installation and commissioning for TWINDUS Linac-2 up to stage 1, i.e. for low power test (1 kW at 10 MeV).

• Regular Operation of 150 TW Ti: Sapphire Laser System at RRCAT

RRCAT had been granted the permission for commissioning of 150 TW Ti: Sapphire Laser System at 150 TW. The application for regular operation of 150 TW Ti: Sapphire Laser System along with data


on radiological survey measurements carried out during the commissioning of the Laser system was reviewed. As the operational experience data was available only up to 90 TW power, AERB granted consent for regular operation for Laser System up to 90 TW power.

1.6.3 Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR)

• Renewal of license for operation of 1.7 MV Tandetron accelerator and 150 kV Heavy Ion Accelerator at Particle Irradiation Facility.

Presently two accelerators are in operation viz. 1.7 MV Tandetron Accelerator (imported from Netherland) and 150 kV Heavy Ion Accelerator. The third 400 kV Heavy Ion Accelerator is presently under re-installation for change in orientation. The application for renewal of licence along with safety report was reviewed, based on the safety review license for operation of 1.7 MV Tandetron accelerator and 150 kV Heavy Ion Accelerator were renewed with stipulations.

• The following proposals of IGCAR Facilities (RML, RCL & FRTG)) were reviewed:

i) Safety report for the ‘Sodium bonded metallic testfuelpinfabricationandpinqualificationfacility’ submitted by MC&MFCG.

ii) Safety reports of the following facilities for conducting experiments:

a) Mini Sodium Experimental Facility (MINA)

b) Sodium Cable Interaction Facility (SOCA)

c) Sodium Fire Experimental Facility (SFEF)

d) Sodium Fuel Interaction Facility (SOFI)

1.6.4 Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL)

All the manufacturing units of ECIL were in operation. The following proposals for renewal of license were reviewed:• Based on the satisfactory review of the

application, the License for operation of

ECIL, Hyderabad was renewed on June 30, 2016 for a period of four years (up to June 30, 2020) under the Factories Act, 1948.

• Similarly, the License for operation of ECIL, Tirupati was renewed on October 27, 2016 for aperiodoffiveyears(uptoOctober31,2021)under the Factories Act, 1948.

1.7 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES

1.7.1 Industrial Safety Award AERB presents Industrial Safety Award every year to the DAE units who achieve highest performance in Industrial Safety. The assessment of the plants for the award is based on a set of parameters that include longest accident free period, implementation of safety management system, injury statistics, dangerous occurrence, type of plant and operation, safety training imparted to personnel and efforts made by the plant towards improving safety. For Industrial Safety award DAE units are categorised on nature of plant operation as Production Units-I, Production Units-II, R&D & Other Low Risk Units and Construction Units category. For the year 2016, following units were the winners of the Awards in various categories

Category Name of the Winner Unit(s)

Production Units –I

Madras Atomic Power Station 1&2

Production Units–II

Zirconium Complex (Pazhayakayal) & ECIL, Hyderabad (joint winners)

R&D and Other Low Risk Units

Heavy Water Plant, Talcher

Construction Units

Kakrapar Atomic Power Project-3&4

1.7.2 Fire Safety Award This award is instituted by AERB to ensure that maximum efforts are made to prevent occurrence of fire incidents and appropriate managementsystem is in place to prevent fire in DAE units.


The award is based on the marks computed based on management system, efforts for improvement, trainingandfireincidentstatistics.DAEunitsarecatagorisedbasedonfirepotentialasGroup-IandGroup-II units. Based on this criteria, in Group-I award winner is Kudankulam Nuclear Power Station 1&2 and in Group-II is RAPP-7&8.

Table-1.11Unitwise Comparison of Reportable Occupational Injuries in DAE Units for 2016

UnitNo. of

Lost Time Injury

No. of Man-

days Lost

No. of Fatal

Injury

Frequency Rate

Severity Rate

Injury Index

Incidence Rate

NP Plants 7 346 0 0.23 11.50 0.003 0.57

NP Projects 3 213 0 0.07 5.02 0.0004 0.23

HWPs 1 7 0 0.08 0.59 0.0000 0.21

IREL 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.0000 0.00

NFC & ZC 8 18992 3 0.82 1942.34 1.589 1.88

UCIL Mills 3 50 0 0.57 9.49 0.005 1.15

ECIL 1 26 0 0.13 3.42 0.000 0.33

IGCAR 4 49 0 0.27 3.36 0.001 0.74

AMD 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00

BRIT 3 60 0 1.43 28.54 0.041 2.89

VECC 1 59 0 0.49 28.68 0.014 0.95

Total 31 19802 3 0.23 150.04 0.035 0.61

1.7.3 Occupational Injury Statistics of DAE Units

The compilation of Occupational Injury Statistics for the year 2016 of DAE units (other than BARC facilities and mines of IREL & UCIL) provides the data on accidents and analysis of number of injuries and loss of man-days. Details are presented in Table 1.11.

• During the calendar year 2016, there were 31 reportable injuries including three fatalities with a loss of 19,802 man-days compared to 18 reportable injuries including 2 fatalities with a loss of 17, 243 man-days in 2015. The three fatalities during the calendar year 2016 occurred at Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC), Hyderabad.

• The year 2016 recorded a Frequency Rate (FR) of 0.23 as compared to 0.13 in the year 2015 and a Severity Rate (SR) of 150.04 as compared to 122.00 in 2015.

• These figures, highlight better safetyperformance of some of the DAE units among other similar industries in the country. Table 1.12 gives the comparision of incidence rates in some DAE units with other similar industries in the country.

• There was no notifiable disease reportedduring the period from any of the operating units of DAE under the purview of AERB.

Unitwise comparison of reportable injuries in 2016 is presented in Figure 1.1. Yearwise comparison of Injury Index in DAE Units is shown in Figure 1.2.


Fig. 1.1 Distribution of Reportable Injuries in DAE Units in 2016

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Fig. 1.2 Year Wise Comparison of Injury Index With Its Trend


Table 1.12Comparison of Incidence Rates of DAE Units with Equivalent Non-DAE Industries (Data Source- Pocket Book of Labour Statistics - 2015 published in February 2017, Labour Bureau, Ministry of Labour & Employment,

Govt. of India ISSN 0971 5398)

Industry TypeIncidence Rate

(per thousand workers employed)

Fatal Non-Fatal

Heavy Water Plants (2016) 0.00 0.21

Manufacture of Chemicals & Chemical Products (2013)

0.25 1.12

Nuclear Fuel Complex (2016) 0.80 1.07

Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products except Machinery and Equipment (2013)

0.07 0.18

Nuclear Power Plants (2016) 0.00 0.57

Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply (2013)

0.46 0.63

1.8 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS & ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

1.8.1SignificantEvents AERB requires NPPs to report certain events that occur in the plant which have or may have impact on operational safety. Under the reporting system established by AERB, the events reportable to the regulatory body are divided into two categories, termed as,(a) Events and (b) SignificantEvents This categorisation of events is done based

on their safety significance and importance tooperational safety experience feedback. Based on the established reporting criteria, Event Reports (ER) andSignificantEventReports(SER)aresubmittedto AERB. The SERs received from the operating NPPs are rated on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The INES rates events at seven levels (1 to 7) depending on their safetysignificanceasshowninfigure1.3below.

A C

C I D

E N

T

ANOMALY

2

3

4

56

7

1

INCIDENT

SERIOUS INCIDENT

ACCIDENT WITH

ACCIDENT WITH

SERIOUS ACCIDENT

MAJOR ACCIDENT

LOCAL CONSEQUENCES

WIDER CONSEQUENCES

Below Scale / Level 0 NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

I N C

I D E

N T

Figure- 1.3: INES Scale

Events rated at level 4 and above are termed as ‘Accidents’. The accidents at Chernobyl NPP in former USSR (now in Ukraine) in April 1986 and Fukushima NPPs in Japan in March 2011 were rated at level 7 on INES. Events rated at levels 1, 2 and 3 are called ‘Incidents’. The level 0 or below scale means events that have no nuclear and radiological safetysignificance.

(i) SignificantEventsinNPPunderConstruction Therewere2SignificantEventsReported

during the period at KKNPP-2

• During Phase-C1 commissioning, while reducing reactor power to bring to Hot-Shutdown, reduction inTDFPdischargeflowresulted in reduction of SG levels, tripping of RCPs and actuation of Emergency Protection. The event was reviewed and based on the same, Site made corrective actions on tuning TDFP frequency controller.

• In one of the commissioning test on Turbine system, non-closure of LP turbine Stop Valve (SV) was observed. In order to attend the same, unit was brought to hot shutdown state.


After carrying out necessary maintenance/overhauling, reactor was started back. PM checklistwasmodifiedtoincludemonitoringof misalignment during surveillance.

(ii) SignificantEventsinOperatingNPP Inyear2016,atotalof34significanteventswere reported from operating NPPs. Out of these, twosignificanteventsatNAPS-2andKKNPP-1wereratedatlevel-1onINESandonesignificantevent at KAPS-1 was provisionally rated at level 1

on INES. All other events were rated at level-0 on INES. The number of SERs in each NPP and their ratings on INES are given in Table-1.13.

For the purpose of analysis, the events were categorised as per the IAEA-IRS coding system. The classification of systems failed / affected inthe significant events is given in Figure-1.4.Theclassification of direct causes and root causes ofthesignificanteventsaregiveninFigure-1.5&1.6respectively.

Table-1.13

INESRatingofSignificantEventsinNPPsReportedduringCalendarYear2016

NPP Number of Event of INES-0

Number of Event of INES-1

Number of Event of INES-2 & above

TAPS-1 & 2 2 0 0

TAPS-3 & 4 4 0 0

RAPS-1 & 2 6 0 0

RAPS-3 & 4 4 0 0

RAPS-5 & 6 2 0 0

KAPS-1 & 2 0 1* 0

NAPS-1 & 2 2 1 0

KGS- 1 & 2 2 0 0

KGS- 3 & 4 1 0 0

MAPS-1 & 2 4 0 0

KK-1 4 1 0

Total 31 3 0

*Provisional Rating


Primary Systems;

44%

Essential Reactor

Auxiliary Systems; 9%

Electrical Systems;

22%

Feedwater, Steam and

Power Coversion

Systems; 9%

I & C Systems;

16%

Figure-1.4:ClassificationofFailed/AffectedSystemsofSERs

Mechanical Failure; 49%

Electrical Failure; 24%

Chemistry related failure;

5%

I & C failure; 12%

Human factors; 10%

Figure-1.5:ClassificationofDirectCausesofSERs


Threesignificanteventsof theyear2016ratedatlevel-1onINESarebrieflydescribedbelow:

• On March 11, 2016, KAPS-1 experienced an event of Pressure Tube (PT) failure during plant operation. Following the event, the reactor underwent automatic shutdown and all systems provided in the design to bring the reactor to safe state performed as intended. The event did not result in any radiation overexposure to plant personnel. The radioactivity releases remained withinthespecifiedlimitsfornormaloperation.

Immediately after the event, plant emergency was declared as per established procedure. The post event investigation activities identifiedQ-15 as the failed pressure tube. The plant emergency was terminated after safely defueling and isolating the failed channel from primary coolant system on March 21, 2016.

The in-situ inspection of the failed channel using a non-destructive technique indicated presence of multiple longitudinal cracks in the pressure tube, along with localised corrosion spots on its exterior surface. Similar corrosion spots were also found during inspection of other

channels of KAPS-1&2. On such observations, AERB ordered for expeditious inspection of the coolant channels in other operating PHWRs. No abnormality was observed in any other operating PHWR. This confirmed that theproblem of localised corrosion on the exterior surface of pressure tubes is specific to KAPSunits. Further investigations revealed that the corrosion phenomena on exterior surface of KAPS pressure tubes might have taken place sometime after 2012 due to presence of some unlisted impurity in the CO2 gas which is used in annulus gas monitoring system (for pressure tube leak detection). Experiments are being carried out for determining the trace impurity and understanding the mechanism of localised corrosion. As an abundant precaution, AERB asked other operating PHWRs to further strengthen the quality assurance checks on the carbon dioxide gas being used in annulus gas monitoring system. The affected portion of pressure tube has been successfully removed from reactor and brought to a hot cell facility in BARC, Mumbai. This tube is being examined for determining the root cause of the pressure tube failure event.

Human Performance

related- Personnel work practices ; 12%

Human Performance

related- Procedure unavailability/

incompleteness/ non-compliance ;

12%

Equipment related- Design configuration & analysis ; 17% Equipment

related- Aging ; 19%

Equipment related -

Specification, manufacture, storage and

installation ; 7%

Equipment related -

Maintenance, testing or

surveillance ; 19%

RCA under progress; 7%

Others; 7%

Figure-1.6:ClassificationofRootCausesofSERs

PB34AERB Annual Report - 2016

• On September 16, 2016, an event of loss of normal power supply occurred at NAPS-2. Following the event, reactor tripped automatically and all three emergency diesel generators started for catering power supply to essential loads. However, only one diesel generator could connect to its bus and restore power supply to the essential loads. The other two diesel generators failed to connect to their respective buses due to malfunctioning of relays of circuit breakers in electrical system. One out of the two affected diesel generators could be connected to its respective bus without anysignificantdelayaftertheeventbymanualintervention. After the event, station took necessary corrective measures and tested the emergency power supply system successfully.

• Following shutdown of KKNPP Unit#1 on November 26, 2016 a search operation was undertaken for identification of leak fromprimary coolant system. A leak was observed in the vent nozzle of Quick Boron Injection System (Train-3) connected to pressuriser spray header. The leak was due to a longitudinal crack in the nozzle. During investigations, similar part through-wall defects were also found in the vent nozzles of two other trains of Quick Boron Injection System and in pressuriser spray header. The observed structural defects were rectifiedusingestablishedprocedures.

(iii) SignificantEventsinIndustrialPlants TwosignificanteventsreportedtoAERBwerereviewed in detailed and measures to prevent the recurrence of such incidence was recommended:

Brief description of events and subsequent enforcement actions are given below:

• At HWP-Kota, on October 12, 2016, at 07:53 hours, automatic plant trip was initiated due to lowsteamflowtoWastestripper.Asperlogic,all the boundary valves including the suction and discharge valves of the gas boosters of the process loop should close. However, the Booster-2 Discharge Valve (310V469) did not close as intended.During rectificationand

checking/opening of the valve, the instrument air supply was used (directly to the 4-port control valve of the air motor bypassing the solenoid valve) to open instead of hand-wheel. During opening of the valve, there was sudden leakage of H2S gas through the gland packing of the valve. The valve operation was immediately stopped. Three employees were exposed to H2S gas. Two employees sustained first-aidinjuries while rescuing one of the employees. One employee who got exposed to the gas was treated in Hospital. Eight man-days were lost due to the event.

Facility was instructed immediately to submit safety assessment and root cause analysis reports to AERB. Subsequently, HWP- Safety Committee reviewed the H2S release incident and recommended the facility to take necessary steps as recommended, by way of engineering control, administrative measures and training to ensure that such incidents do not recur.

• On September 27, 2016, one fatal accident took place at NFC, Hyderabad. The accident occurred while unloading the condemned transformer from tractor trailers and the deceased caught between two tractors’ trailers. This accident was investigated by AERB. It concluded that the event was caused by breach in multiple layers of defence-in-depth, indicating root cause to be an organisational failure.

AERB expressed serious concern about recurring accidents and recommended NFC to take appropriate corrective actions in order to avoid such events in future. AERB desired a suitable mechanism for monitoring the effective compliance to the recommendation made in this regard and to assess the safety culture at NFC, Hyderabad. AERB Observer Team (AOT) was deputed for three months at NFC Hyderabad.

The analysis and recommendations of the accident were forwarded to all units of DAE for information and lessons to be learnt from this incident.

Documents

Chapter 1 SAFETY SURVEILLANCE OF NUCLEAR · PDF fileUnit#2 was in shutdown state. It resulted dynamic loads into supply header causing deformation and dislocation of supports. Subsequently,