CHAPTER 10 Battle's End of the U.S... · CHAPTER 10 Battle's End ON TO KUNISHI RIDGE1 At the same time the 6th Marine Divi-sion was landing on Oroku Peninsula, the 1st Marine Division

CHAPTER 1 0

Battle's End

ON TO KUNISHI RIDGE1

At the same time the 6th Marine Divi-sion was landing on Oroku Peninsula ,the 1st Marine Division was rolling upgains totalling 1,800 yards in its drivesouth from the Naha-Yonabaru valley .(See Map IX, Map Section.) Generaldel Valle's regiments made this advancewhile a faltering division supply systembehind them threatened to break downcompletely because of the mud and therain. The roads had become such quag-mires that even tractors and bulldozersbecame stalled when they attemptedto drag division vehicles out of orover the mud. Tanks and trucks wereunable to cross the Kokuba ; the ap-proaches to the bridge at the mouth ofthe river were untrafficable for a dis-tance of over 500 yards . 2 In an effor tto facilitate resupply and evacuationoperations, tanks were ordered off theroads. In general, forward units werelogistically supported by Marines whohand carried supplies up to dumps be-hind the lines ; the "trails were onlynegotiable for foot troops—vehiclescould not have been used if we [2/7 ]

' Unless otherwise noted, the material con-tained in this section is derived from : TenthArmy AR ; IIIAC AR ; 1st MarDiv SAR ; 1stMarDiv G—3 Jnl ; 1st Mar SAR ; 5th Mar SAR ;7th Mar SAR ; 22d Mar SAR, Ph III ; 7th MarHist ; MajGen Pedro A. del Valle, "Southwar dFrom Shuri," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no.10 (Oct45), hereafter del Valle, "Southwar dFrom Shuri. "

3 1st MarDiv G—3 Jnl, 4Jun45 .

could have gotten them across theinlet ." 3

On the division right on 4 June, the7th Marines pushed forward to close offthe neck of Oroku Peninsula and furtherentrap Japanese forces there . The hil lmass at the base of Oroku in the divi-sion zone held the commanding terrainfeature of the area, Hill 108 . This heightoverlooked the East China Sea and thenext major division objective, Itoman .Although the exposed right flank of th e7th Marines came under constant ha-rassing fire from high ground to th eright of the division boundary, the divi-sion left flank was generally securesince the adjacent 96th Infantry Divi-sion had moved forward steadily sinc eits advance from the Kokuba River line .

After the Japanese defenses at Shurihad collapsed, the 1st Marines remainedbehind in the vicinity of the city to pa-trol and mop up, and the 5th Marinespursued the fleeing enemy. Before thedawn of 4 June, the 1st joined in thepursuit ; 3/1 made a wide swing throug hthe zone of the 96th Division in orderto take the high ground north of Iwaand Shindawaku while 1/1 passedthrough the lines of the 5th Marines andtook up positions in front of Hills 57and 107 .

By 0930, 3/1 had reached the smallvillage of Tera, just north of Chan. 4 At

3 2/7 SAR, p . 7 .

' This Tera is not to be confused with a sec-ond village of the same name located nea rItoman on the east coast .

325

326

VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

1300, the battalion point was pinne ddown by fire coming from high groun djust west of the Tomusu-Iwa road, an dthe advance guard attempted withoutsuccess to clean out the enemy position .Just before 1400, the time scheduled for3/1 to make its coordinated attack with1/1, a cloudburst occurred . The supplyproblems here were further aggravatedby the rain, and because of a communi-cations blackout between the battalionand its artillery and naval gunfire sup -port, 3/1 broke contact with the enemyand withdrew to a bivouac area in adraw behind the 383d Infantry .

At 1730, Lieutenant Colonel Ross' en -tire battalion was in defilade, protectedfrom enemy artillery fire. Contact wit hthe artillery battalions and naval gun-fire support ships was still lacking atthis time and a mortar ammunitionshortage existed . The afternoon down-pours had turned the roads int omorasses and the fields into calf-deepmud wallows in which the suction ofthe ooze pulled the soles off of the shoesof men walking in it .

Since food as well as mortar am -munition was in short supply, the 383 dInfantry generously supplied the bat-talion with enough K-rations to enable3/1 to issue two meals to each Marine . 5It was the general consensus of themembers of 3/1 that "taking all thingsinto consideration, this day probabl ywas the most miserable spent on Oki-

6The commanding general of the 96th Divi-

sion believed that these Marines "were notequipped or organized for a protracted cam-paign . I was glad to assist in supply, air drops ,and the care of their wounded . They were fin ecomrades and cooperated to the fullest extent . "MajGen James L. Bradley ltr to GMC, dt d220ct54 .

nawa by the men of this battalion ." 6In addition, 3/1 found itself all but iso-lated from its regiment, since there wasneither communication with nor a sup-ply route to the 1st Marines CP, som e11,000 yards to the rear. ?

The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines,passed through the lines of 2/5 at ap-proximately 1000 on the 4th . This wasnearly three hours after Company F o f2/5 had attacked and seized Hill 10 7without opposition, and completed it soccupation of the high ground acros sthe entire front of the regiment . When1/1 took over from 2/5 at noon, thelatter passed into corps reserve wit hthe rest of the 5th Marines, but main-tained its positions as a secondary line . 8

Although the downpour on 4 June ha dforced General del Valle to cancel th eattack of 1/1 scheduled for 1400 thatafternoon, the 7th Marines on the righthad already jumped off . An hour later,the cancellation order was rescinded,and Lieutenant Colonel Shofner's bat-talion was again ordered to attack, tocontact the 7th Marines, and to seize it soriginal objective—the high groun dnorth of Iwa and Shindawaku .

At 1630, the assault companies of1/1 moved out to secure their target ,some 1,500 yards away. The route ofattack was up a valley floor, at the endof which a number of lesser hills rose in

front of the objective . A creek that ra neast to west across the valley was no tvisible from the LD ; but a map recon-naissance indicated that the assault

0 3/1 SAR, p . 41 .7 Ibid .

2/5 SAR, p . 16 ; 5th Mar SAR, p . 9 . At thi stime, the 5th Marines CP was moved to thevicinity of Giushi .

BATTLE'S END

327

forces would be able to cross it with,little difficulty . The Marines met noopposition after jumping off until reach-ing the "creek," now swollen into a rag-ing torrent by the day's rains. It pre-sented a formidable barrier to furthe rprogress. A reconnaissance of th estream banks uncovered a rudimentar ybridge for carts to the left of the bat-talion position.° The assault troops wereordered to move upstream, cross th ebridge, and redeploy on the other side.

As soon as the first Marine elementshad crossed and were wallowing in mu dtowards firm ground, the heretofore-silent Japanese opened up with mortarsand point-blank machine gun fire ,sweeping the ranks of the onsurgin gtroops. The Marines pushed on, none-theless, and two platoons made it acros sto the south bank of the creek, only tobecome pinned down .

The 7th Marines on the right was un-able to negotiate the swiftly flowingwaters and was held up on the nort hbank, 10 and the bridge-crossing site wasfully covered by enemy defensive firescoming from a 200-foot-high ridge i n

front of 1/1 . Therefore, the battalio ncommander ordered his troops to with-draw to the sector of 2/5 for the night . 1 '

Because 1/1 had sustained a number o fcasualties, a covering force remaine d

' LtCol Austin C . Shofner interview by Hist-Div, HQMC, dtd 19Mar47 hereafter Shofnerinterview .

""There was no bridge in the 3/7 ZofA[Zone of Action] . Several men were drownedattempting to carry lines across the stream i nan attempt to get troops across ." LtCol Walte rHolomon ltr to CMC, dtd 22'Mar65, hereafte rHolomon ltr .

11 Shot ner interview.

behind to evacuate the wounded afte rdark. The next morning, the 1st Bat-talion was ordered to bypass the enemystrongpoint by swinging into the zoneof the 96th Division and follow closelyin the trace of the 3/1 attack on Iwa . 1 2

Colonel Mason anticipated the prob-lem of maintaining radio and wire con-tact with his battalions as they racedsouth. His movement order providedthat, in case of a complete communica-tions breakdown between regiment andthe assault battalions, the most senio rbattalion commander of the committe dunits would assume tactical commandoverall until contact was establishe dwith regiment once more . 13 Following amud-slogging and wearying marchsouth on 5 June, 50 men from 1/1dropped out of ranks from exhaustion .During the trek, the battalion lost con-tact with regimental headquarters fora brief time and temporarily cameunder control of Lieutenant Colone l

Ross.' 'Out of contact with regimental head-

quarters from the time he had led his

battalion south from Shuri, and withthe battalion objective yet uncaptured ,Lieutenant Colonel Ross decided to com-plete his mission nevertheless . He tookhis command group forward early in th emorning of 5 June to make a visualreconnaissance of the target . While thi sinspection was taking place, the Marine sof 3/1 built fires in an attempt to warmthemselves and dry as much of thei rclothing as possible before mountingthe attack. Prior to the jumpoff, 3/ 1

12 1 /1 SAR, p. 21 .

"Col Arthur T. Mason ltr to CMG, dt d10Mar47 .

"1/1 SAR, p . 21 .

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received 19 supply air drops fromVMTB–232 aircraft. In between th eday's intermittent showers, the squad-ron flew a total of 41 resupply sorties ;its all-time high to that date . 15 The bat-talion departed its bivouac area at1030 and arrived at the assembly are ashortly thereafter ; Lieutenant ColonelRoss then issued his attack order forthe capture of the Iwa-Shindawakuridge .

Before jumping off at 1230, 3/ 1learned that patrols from 2/383 hadpassed through Iwa without opposition.As soon as the Marine attack began,lead elements were held up for a shor ttime by sporadic machine gun andsniper fire, but took the ridge befor edark. In the two days spent to envelo pthe objective, the battalion had travelledmore than 3,000 yards . By this time, th eadvance CP of the regiment had move dfar enough forward to enable ColonelMason to issue attack orders personallyto his battalion commanders .

The plan for the next day's attackcalled for 3/1 to continue the advanceand seize Shindawaku . The 1st Battalio nwould destroy all bypassed enem ypockets in the regimental zone and tothe rear of 3/1, and would backtrackto the stream where the 4 June attackhad been stymied .

To the relief of all, the rain stoppe dduring the night of 5–6 June. At dawnof the 6th, 1/1 moved out of its bivouaceast of Iwa, swung down to the village,and then turned north . At this point,all three of its infantry companies

16 VMTB—232 WarD, Jun45. The squadronparachuted more than 20 tons of supplies to1st Marine Division troops on 5 June . 1stMarDiv SAR, chap VII, OpAnx, p. 10.

formed a battalion skirmish line ove ran extremely wide front . The Marinesthen swept northward and past the zon ewhere 3/7 was preparing to attack in asouthwesterly direction . LieutenantColonel Shofner's troops accomplishe dtheir sweep at 1400 and then attacke dand seized the ridge overlooking thestream. The few enemy soldiers stil lmanning positions on this objective, notexpecting an attack from the rear, weresurprised while changing into civilia nclothes. After taking the position withlittle effort, 1/1 went into reserve nea rTomusu. l s

Because 3/1 had not been resupplie dbefore its attack at 0900 on the 6th, th e383d Infantry again issued the Marine sK-rations ; this time, enough to provideeach man in the battalion with one an da half meals. 17 After jumping off, 3/ 1advanced west and reached the outskirt sof Shindawaku at 1030, when enemytroops were discovered occupying com-manding ground on the ridge runningnorthwest from the village. By 1800,however, the battalion had secured theridge after a brief fight and 2/1 hadmoved to an area northwest of Iwa .Although the left flank of 3/1 was tie din with 2/383 for the night, the Marin ebattalion had not been able to contactthe 7th Marines on the right . Early thenext morning, 2/1 was moved into posi-tion to plug this gap .

During its drive south, the 1st MarineDivision was sporadically halted forbrief periods before a number of block-ing positions organized and manned bysmall enemy groups . Each of these

19 1/1 SAR, p. 21 .

" 3/1 SAR, p. 43 .

BATTLE ' S END

329

groups was generally the size of a com-pany, and all of them together com-prised a force equaling no more thantwo battalions. The Japanese holdingunits had been ordered and were deter -mined to delay the Tenth Army as longas possible . The tactical situation andthe nature of their mission, however ,prohibited their setting up anythingmore permanent and stronger thanhastily contrived defensive positions ,which were unable to hold back theaggressive Marine offensive for long .

When reconnaissance patrols uncov-ered these strong points, infantry com-manders deployed their forces to takethe objective by a combination of fir eand maneuver. In most cases, the majorattack force maneuvered into positionto assault the objective from its flankor rear. At this time, Marine element sin front of the target supported theattack by firing on the objective to kee pthe enemy fixed in position. At times,the enveloping force provided fire sup -port for a frontal attack. Regardless ofthe methods employed, the weather situ-ation, and the condition of the terrain ,General del Valle felt that "it was re-freshing to be able to maneuver again ,even on a modest scale ." 1 8

On the critical right flank, the 7thMarines paced the division advance on5 June with the 2d and 3d Battalionsattacking against increasing opposition ;1/7 followed behind, mopping up therear area. Acting as a screen to theright of 2/7 along the division rightboundary, the 1st Reconnaissance Com-pany dispatched patrols far ahead of thebattalion advance, which sent back in -

" del Valle, "Southward From Shuri," p . 39 .

valuable information. The company,however, found that its operations wer eseverely restricted by its limited com-munications system and supply organ-ization. 1 9

Like the 1st Marines, the 7th foundthe enemy less difficult than such othe rproblems as those caused by the weatherand the terrain. Marine wounded wereevacuated in the rain over a five-milesea of mud ; sniper fire generallyharassed the 8 to 10 litter bearers re-quired for each casualty during the en-tire trip to the rear . Each day's attackwas usually delayed until the weatherwas clear enough for land- and carrier -based 20 planes to make a supply drop ;so many sorties were flown for the 7thMarines as it trekked southwards thatthe trail of the regiment was blazedwith brightly colored cargo para-chutes . 2 1

The initial attack of the 7th Marinessouthwards from the Kokuba Rive rbridgehead on 4 June gained the regi-ment approximately 1,100 yards. Thatsame day, 2/7 captured Takanyuta . Onthe next day, the formerly raging tor-rent in front of 3/7 had receded to un-cover a causeway over which part o fthe battalion crossed ; the remaindermoved to the zone of the 2d Battalionand crossed the stream from there . 22

Once beyond the south bank, the assaul t

1° Snedeker ltr 1947 .

=° During the course of the entire campaign ,carrier-based planes often joined the Avenger sof the two TAF VMTBs in making supplydrops . Air Delivery Section, H&S Bn, CorpsTroops, IIIAC, ICEBERG Op AR, dtd 24Jun45 ,end A, hereafter AirDelSec AR.

21 7th Mar Hist, pp . 22-23 .

22 Holomon ltr.

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battalions of the 7th drove forward1,000 yards to a point just north ofHanja village.

When furious machine gun and mor-tar fire from a hill mass in the zone ofthe 6th Division held up the 7th Ma-rines, General del Valle received per-mission from IIIAC to lay the artilleryfire of the 11th Marines on the sus-pected enemy positions . General Shep-herd was authorized to cancel the fir ewhen it threatened his troops. As the1st Division continued its drive past th eneck of the Oroku Peninsula, expandin gthe already-lengthy right flank of th edivision, 1/22 was ordered into defen-sive positions along this flank .

On the next day, 6 June, the 22 dMarines battalion had not yet occupiedits assigned flank security positions . Itbecame necessary, therefore, to orde r1st Division troops into the 6th Divi-sion zone to capture Hill 103 anddestroy the enemy automatic weapon sand mortars harassing the right flan kof the 7th Marines . Lieutenant ColonelBerger's battalion had already attacke dand was, in fact, within a few yards o fthe crest of the hill when elements o fthe 22d Marines arrived . Reorientingthe direction of its attack to the sout htowards Hill 108, 2/7 advanced 1,00 0yards before encountering stiff opposi-tion near Dakiton, where it dug in fo rthe night. On the left, the 3d Battalionpushed to the high ground southeast ofthe same town and likewise dug in .

Clearing skies on 7 June heralded a1st Division success in breaking throug hto the coast that day and isolating Ad-miral Ota and his ill-fated troops onOroku from the rest of the doome dThirty-second Army in the south. Fol-

lowing up a thorough combined arm spreparation, 2/7 overran Hill 108 tocommand a view of the island south toKunishi . The former defenders of 108were seen fleeing south in small groupsranging in size from 10–20 men each .The fire of Marine support weapons an dmachine guns relentlessly pursued th eJapanese troops, killing many . After re-ceiving an air drop of supplies, 3/7attacked at 1430, overran Hanja, mad econtact with 2/1 on its left, and dug i nfor the night on a ridge just north o fZawa .

Following receipt of still anothersupply air drop early on 8 June, 3/7resumed its attack with a sweep throughZawa as advance elements of 2/7 probe dthe Japanese positions guarding Ito -man. Besides positioning the divisionfor a final drive south, the breakthroug hto the seacoast uncovered beaches o nwhich LVTs could land when a water -borne supply system was established .When the first LVTs touched down o nthe coast approximately 500 yards northof Itoman shortly after noon on 8 June ,General Hodge congratulated Generaldel Valle "for cutting the island i ntwo." 23 Use of this new water routebrought in enough rations to permitdistribution of the first full issue to 7t hMarines troops in more than a week . Asthe weather improved, some vehiculartraffic appeared over slowly dryin groads in the south. A few new bridgeswere constructed across the once-swollen streams in the north to helpspeed supplies of all sorts to assaul ttroops driving to the southern tip of th eisland .

=' 1st MarDiv G—3 Jnl, 8Jun45 .

BATTLE 'S END

331

Advancing abreast of and pacing th emarch of the 7th Marines to the sea o n7 June, the 1st Marines also reporte dsubstantial gains. Early in the morning ,2/1 filled the gap existing on the rightbetween 3/1 and 3/7, while 3/1 main-tained contact with 3/383 . By 1800, 2/1

was in possession of the height over -looking Zawa, and the 3d Battalion hadmoved 1,200 yards along the corp sboundary to occupy the high ground1,000 yards north of Yuza ; 1/1 hadmoved to Iwa preparatory to relievin g3/1. 2 4

All infantry battalions had beenplagued by the supply situation, but i tseemed to members of 2/1 that they hadbeen especially dogged since leavin gShuri . Their only source of supply hadbeen the air drops, and by the time thatone could be made, the assault com-panies were several thousand yard sforward of the drop zone . 25 The sup-plies then were recovered by head-quarters personnel, who carried themto forward dumps. At this point ,Marines from the reserve companywould pick up the supplies and carr ythem to assault units . 2 6

Sustained by supplies brought ashor eby the LVTs, in the continuing goo dweather of 8 June, 1st Division troop s

24 1st Mar SAR, p . 21 .26 2/1 SAR, p . 13 .29 Since a means of delivering water ration s

by air drop had not been perfected, the troop swere given permission to drink stream wateronly after each Marine had made the content sof his filled canteen potable by treatment withhalazone . Halazone is a white crystalline chem-ical compound used to disinfect water suspectedof being or known to be impure . The compoundwas compressed into tablets and became amajor medical supply item in the war .

pushed ahead against perceptiblystiffening resistance. The 1st Marinesrolled forward ; 3/1 secured its objec-tive near Yuza at 1600, when it was re-lieved by 1/1 and went into regimenta lreserve near Shindawaku . Slightly laterthat day, 2/1 secured the high groundoverlooking the Mukue River . On 9June, division assault units spent th eday probing enemy positions to theirfront in preparation for a major attac kon the 10th .

Improved weather conditions andcorrespondingly better road nets ove rwhich supply convoys could trave lserved to release the VMTBs for otherassignments. Following 6 June, whenVMTB–232 made 49 drops, groundunits requested paradrop missions o nonly eight other days in the rest of themonth. 27 By this stage of the campaign,the Marine pilots had become quite pro-ficient and accurate in paradrop oper-ations. In reference to a drop MajorAllen L. Feldmeier's VMTB–232 hadmade on 8 June to its soldiers, the 383dInfantry sent him the following mes-sage : "Your drops have excellent re-sults. We received 95 of the 97 packswhich you dropped ." 28 Later in themonth, VMTB–131 flew 3 missionstotalling 20 sorties in which 70 packs—each averaging 1,000 pounds of foo dand ammunition—were dropped .Ground units receiving the supplies re-

2'! VMTB—232 WarD, Jun45 .

28 "A History of MAG—22 in the OkinawaCampaign," Anx A in MAG—22 WarD, Aug45 .VMTB—131 arrived on Okinawa on 29 Maywhen it began antisubmarine warfare patrol -ling, its primary mission. During the laterstages of the campaign the squadron madesome supply air drops.

332


ported that they had recovered 90 per -

cent or more of the packs .Increased enemy opposition arose on

9 June as 1st Marine Division unit sapproached the Tera-Ozato area, whic hhad been outposted by the Thirty-secondArmy. Patrols from both the 1st an d7th Marine received heavy rifle an dmachine gun fire while attempting tocross to the south bank of the Muku eGawa. Small infiltration groups finallyforded the stream, but were unable toadvance beyond the bank. The 2d Bat-talion, 1st Marines, sustained moderat ecasualties during this day's fighting,but was unable to evacuate them untilafter dark because accurate enemy fire scovered evacuation routes .

In the 7th Marines zone, 1/7 relieve d3/7, which then went into regimentalreserve. No appreciable gains were mad eas 1/7 companies mounted two unsuc-cessful attempts to seize high groundoverlooking Tera. The second effort wa srepulsed by extremely heavy small arm sfire, which forced the assault element sto withdraw under the cover of a smokescreen. On the extreme right of the divi-sion, 2/7 patrols crossed the MukueGawa and attempted to seize the ridgenorth of Itoman, 29 but were thwarted byenemy fire coming from emplacement sfronting the 1st Battalion zone . Oneplatoon of Company E was able to ge t

29 Actually, the town of Itoman was south o fthe Mukue Gawa, although the 1 :25,000 battl emap used during the campaign indicated thatthe large inhabited area north of the river wa sItoman. Snedeker ltr 1947, encl D ; 2/7 SAR ,p . 8 . The latter spot was an undefended subur bof Itoman and did not hold up the advance o f2/7. Capt Verle E . Ludwig interview b yHistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 27Jan55, here -after Ludwig interview .

to the far side of the river where it wa spinned down immediately by accurat efrontal and flanking fire .

Operating a combination CP-OP whil eaboard an LVT (A) floating 100–20 0yards offshore of the battalion flank ,Lieutenant Colonel Berger had a grand-stand view of the fighting. When he sawthat the advance platoon was pinne ddown, he went ashore to order the restof the company to cross at the rivermouth and reinforce the stricken unit .Steady Japanese machine gun fire pre-vented the Marines from wading acros sand shortly thereafter denied passag eto troop-laden LVTs attempting th esame route. At nightfall, the battalio ncommander ordered the exposed unitsto withdraw to the northern bank of th eMukue River under the cover of LVT-(A) fire .

The 2d Battalion jumped off on th e10th with Companies F and G passin gthrough the night defenses of CompanyE, dropping onto the beach from thetop of a 10-foot-high seawall, and wad-ing 400 yards across the stream mouthto a point on the south bank opposit ethe ridge. Shells from LVT (A) spounded this high ground and Itomanbeyond it . Following this preparation ,the assault troops scaled the seawall toattack these two objectives . Althoughthe battalion lost five officers in the firs tseven minutes of fighting, 30 the onsurg-ing Marines swept over the ridge,through the ruins of Itoman, and on tothe high ground beyond the southernedge of the town .

At the same time that the 2d Battalionhad crashed through Itoman, 1/7, spear-

ao 2/7 SAR, p. 8.

BATTLE ' S END

333

headed by Company A, made a rapid an dunopposed rush to the crest of the hillnorth of Tera, where the Japanes estrongpoint that had opposed the 7thMarines on the previous day waslocated. From this newly gained height ,the battalion called for an artillery con-centration on the high ground immedi-ately east of Tera. Battalion 81mm mor-tars blistered the village with a barrageof white phosphorous shells, burning tothe ground all buildings still standing .Although few Japanese troops werefound in the area, numerous dazedcivilians, who had miraculously escapeddeath in the bombardment, were discov-ered wandering aimlessly among theruins. After sending the Okinawans tostockades in the rear, 1/7 preparednight positions and organized for thescheduled 11 June attack on Kunish iRidge . (See Map 21 . )

By 10 June, the rains had ended an dthe transportation problem, althoughnot so critical as it had been previously,was still not completely alleviated . Theground was drying and once-overflowin gstreams had lowered to a point wher ethe road-construction and bridge-build-ing efforts of the engineers could openthe way to tracked and wheeled vehicles .Division engineers had converted oi ldrums into culverts and built tank ford sover the fire-swept Mukue Gawa. In ad-dition, the engineers provided round -the-clock maintenance for these fordsso that the heavy traffic south couldcontinue unabated. One especially im-portant ford was built at the point wher ethe Zawa-Tera highway crossed theMukue . 3 1

3i 1st MarDiv SAR, chap VII, pt III, p . 13 .

The task assigned to 1/1 was the cap-ture of Yuza Hill, the high ground ap-proximately 700 yards west of Yuza andabout 450 yards directly north of Ozato ;2/1 was to support the attack by fire,while units of the 96th Division were t oprovide security to the left flank of the1st Marines . When the tank fords overthe Mukue were opened on 10 June,Shermans also moved forward to sup-port the 1st Marines attack.

Another support element, the 11thMarines, assisted the infantry assault.Following a rolling barrage, tank-in-fantry teams from 1/1 swept onto th ewestern nose of the hill and Company Cswarmed up to its crest in the face ofblazing enemy machine gun and artil-lery fire . The company lost 70 of its 17 5men in this charge . 32 Lieutenant ColonelShofner's attack plan called for Compan yB to follow in the left rear of the lea delements and then to attack straight upthe hill after first having worked its waythrough Yuza into jump-off positions .Upon reaching the crest, B was to tiein with Company C on its right and withthe Army units on the left . Although thelatter had begun the attack abreast of1/1, Japanese troops entrenched in theextremely well-fortified Yuza Dake es-carpment prevented the soldiers fro madvancing beyond their line of de-parture. Company B was unable to mov eforward because of the intense artiller yand mortar fire coming from the frontof the Army zone, and could not hel pCompany C, which was isolated in anexposed and extremely tenuous position .

Late in the afternoon, Shofner sentCompany B around to the right to join

"1/1 SAR, p . 21.

BATTLE 'S END

335

the company on the hill . Both assaultcompanies had sustained heavy casual -ties in the fighting, but C was hit hard-est ; all of its officers were either dead o rwounded. More Marines were lost dur-ing the night, 10–11 June, as a result ofthe constant deluge of enemy mortar andartillery fire placed on the hill . Added tothis heavy toll were the casualties cause dby grazing machine gun fire comingfrom weapons emplaced on Yuza Dake .Twenty more men were wounded in thedawn of 11 June, when at 0400, theJapanese mounted an unsuccessfu l

counterattack. For the next two days ,1/1 waited on Yuza Hill for the 96thDivision infantry to reduce the escarp-ment to the east . The Marine battalion

had little trouble in maintaining its hill

position despite the persistent Japanes e

artillery fire harassing it the entire time .

These mounting losses graduall yslowed the momentum of the Marineassault, which the battalion commande rattempted to revive by placing a secon dcompany in the line of attack to theright of the first. Despite the increasin gvolume of the massed fires provided by2/1 supporting arms, enemy fire con-tinued unabated. Disregarding theirslowly ebbing strength and the loss ofthree supporting tanks, the assault unit ssurged forward to capture the objectiveshortly before sundown. By dark, thebattalion had consolidated the positio nand set in night defense lines from whichit repulsed numerous infiltration at-tempts and blunted one counterattackbefore 11 June dawned .

In preparation for the many casual -ties anticipated during the fighting ye tremaining, a light plane landing stripwas placed into operation approximately2,000 yards north of Itoman on 11 June .It was noted at the time that, for main-taining morale and obtaining immediatemedical treatment for critical cases ,"the value of this means of evacuatin gcasualties cannot be overstressed." 3 3

Now casualties were flown almost di-rectly from medical clearing stationsimmediately behind the front to hos-pitals in the rear, a distance of 12 miles ,in an average time of 8 minutes . Thisbrief flight obviated a long and ofte nbody-racking haul in an ambulance

jeep over roads that were practicallynonexistent . From 11 to 22 June, VMO–3 and -7 flew out 641 casualties from

this strip . 3 4

22 1st MarDiv SAR, chap VII, Logistics Anx,

p . 9 .

34 Ibid .

While the 1st Battalion fought to gain

its objective on the 10th, 2/1 with thehelp of armor support successfully

cleaned the enemy out of the command-ing ridge between Tera and Yuza. Thenext day, because 1/1 had been stymiedon Yuza Hill, Lieutenant Colonel Ma-gee's battalion was ordered to captur eHill 69, the commanding terrain featur edirectly west of Ozato . At 1030, theclosely coordinated tank-infantry-artil-lery attack began when the battalio n

moved out in a column of companies .Initial progress was rapid, but whenthe infantry vanguard entered the valleyleading to Ozato, well-placed Japanes emortar and artillery concentrationscaused many Marine casualties . As the

left flank of the spearhead approachedOzato, enemy machine gun and rifle firebegan mowing down the attackers .

336

8TH MARINES landing on Iheya Shima. (USMC 126988)

VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

MARINE CASUALTIES are evacuated by a spotter plane from a temporary airstripnorth of Itoman. (USN 80-G-498161)

BATTLE 'S END

337

On the same day the landing stripbecame operational, Colonel Snedeker's7th Marines advanced 400 to 1,000 yard sagainst ever-stiffening enemy opposi-tion. The 1st Battalion, having cleare dTera, attacked to gain the high groun dimmediately south of the village . Aftermopping up in Itoman, 2/7 pushed 50 0yards southward. Confronting the regi-ment now, approximately 800 yard sequidistant from the outskirts of Teraand Itoman, was Kunishi Ridge, to b e"the scene of the most frantic, bewilder-ing, and costly close-in battle on thesouthern tip of Okinawa ." 3 5

BATTLE FOR KUNISHI RIDGE 3 6

Running from the northeast to thesouthwest for a distance of perhaps1,500 yards, the sheer coral escarpmentof Kunishi Ridge held Japanese posi-tions which comprised the western an-chor of the last heavily defended linein front of Kiyamu. Both the forwardand reverse slopes of the ridge werereplete with caves, weapons emplace-ments, and fortified tombs, all of whichreinforced natural defenses provided bythe complex and difficult terrain fea-tures of the ridge itself. In front of the7th Marines line, a broad valley contain-ing grassland and rice paddies led t othis crag and afforded the defendersunobstructed lanes of fire and the at-tackers little cover and concealment.Approaching tanks would fare no better

Ss Appleman, et . al ., Okinawa Battle, p . 451 .39 Unless otherwise noted, the material con-

tained in this section is derived from : 1stMarDiv SAR ; 1st MarDiv G—3 Jnl ; 1st Mar

SAR; 5th Mar SAR ; 7th Mar SAR ; 7th Mar

Hist ; 22d Mar SAR, Ph III .

than the infantry since they were re-stricted to two routes leading into theobjective area—both covered extremelywell by Japanese antitank guns. Oneroad followed the coast line ; the secondcut across the center of the ridge ata right angle, dividing it . (See Map 21 . )

Having pushed through Itoman an dTera during the morning of 11 June, 2/ 7and 1/7 prepared to continue on toKunishi Ridge . Immediately after mid -day, tank-infantry teams from both as-sault battalions moved out towards th eobjective . Two hours later, witheringfrontal fire from the ridge, enfilade firefrom the yet-uncaptured Hill 69, andaccurate artillery concentrations on thetanks forced the attack to a halt. Be-

cause of these fires, and more comingfrom Japanese-held Yuza Dake, th e

commander of the 7th determined thatit would be too costly to continue th e

attack in the daylight, so at 1447, heordered the assault forces to withdraw.After making an aerial reconnaissanc eof the ridge in a low-flying observationplane,37 Colonel Snedeker concludedthat a night attack would be the cours e

of action most likely to succeed . 3 8That afternoon, as the battalions dug

in a night defense and prepared to con-tinue the attack on the following day ,the two assault battalion commander swere thoroughly oriented on the general

37 Maj John S. Hudson ltr to CMG, dtd

27Mar47 .38 General del Valle had visited Snedeker' s

CP that day "in order to see how we coul dbreak the deadlock, stop our heavy losses an dget on with the war. When he suggested a bat-talion night attack for a limited objective, I

agreed." LtGen Pedro A. del Valle ltr to Ass t

G—3, HQMC, dtd 10ct65, hereafter del Valle

ltr 1965 .

338


scheme of maneuver at the regimenta lCP. Colonel Snedeker decided to attackstraight across the valley, using the roa dleading into the ridge as the boundaryseparating the battalion zones and thetelephone poles bordering the road as aguide. The assaulting battalions were topenetrate the enemy defenses at thepoint where the road entered the ridge .There the battalions were to peel off t otheir zones of attack and roll up theenemy's line . Until the hour of attack,0330, on 12 June, normal artillery fire swould be placed alternately on Kunish iRidge and then Mezado Ridge (500–60 0yards southwest of Kunishi) , and there-after only on the latter. In order tomaintain deception and guarantee thatthe enemy would be surprised, the divi-sion issued an order prohibiting the useof flares and illumination of any kind—except in emergencies—after 0245 . 3 9

Before the night attack began, how -ever, the Tenth Army decided to employanother type of weapon . Prior to andfollowing the 1 April assault landings ,the Japanese on the island had been sub-jected to a massive psychological war-fare effort in which propaganda leaflet swere delivered by aircraft and artilleryshells. Also, Japanese-language broad -casts were directed at the enemy overloudspeakers placed near the fron tlines . 40 For a period of several days pre-ceding 11 June, this war of paper an dwords had been accelerated and an em-phasis placed on the hopelessness of th eJapanese position and the futility ofcontinued fighting. Both the leaflets andthe broadcasts called upon GeneralUshijima to surrender.

"1st MarDiv G–3 Jnl, 11Jun45 .'° Tenth Army AR, chap 11, pt II, p . 21 .

On the afternoon of 11 June, GeneralBuckner sent a Tenth Army receptio nparty, fully empowered to negotiatewith any Japanese parley group, to th e2/7 observation post overlooking Ito-man. At 1700, all American firing cease din the 7th Marines zone in dubious bu thopeful anticipation of an enemy part ybearing white flags. No such group ap-peared, although six Japanese soldier sdid surrender about an hour later toMarines in the lines . The battlefield' sunnatural silence was shattered at 180 4when hostile mortar fire fell on the sur-render point and American artillery re-sumed fire on Kunishi in answer . 4 1

Both battalions were poised to attackKunishi Ridge with one company lead-ing the assault. At H-Hour minus 1(0230), Companies C and F proceededto assembly areas and contacted eachother on the line of departure . At 0500 ,when reinforcing Companies B and Gmoved out in their trace, the two assaultunits had already reached the crest o fthe ridge, achieving complete surprise .Company C, for example, destroye dseveral small enemy groups in the actof preparing their breakfasts .

41 1/7 SAR, p . 20 . General Ushijima did notimmediately receive the message affording himan opportunity to surrender to General Buck-ner . It arrived at Thirty-second Army head-quarters on 17 June, a week after it first hadbeen dropped behind Japanese lines . ColonelYahara stated that this was the normal amountof time required for a message to be passe dfrom the front to the rear at this stage of thecampaign . Yahara Interrogation . Upon de-livery of the Buckner communique, "Cho an dUshijima both laughed and declared that, asSamurai, it would not be consonant with thei rhonor to entertain such a proposal ." ShimadaInterrogation.

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339

At daybreak, while en route throug hthe valley to reinforce the Marines dig-ging in on the ridge, intense enemy fir ecaught the two follow-up companies an dpinned them down. It became painfull yapparent that the Japanese defendershad quickly recovered from their initia lsetback. In no mood to relinquish theirhold on Kunishi Ridge without a last-ditch fight, they began lobbing han dgrenades on the Marines situated in th eforward positions . Here, Company Fwas consolidating at a point approxi-mately 400 yards due north of Mezadovillage and was tied in on its left wit hCompany C, whose line was extende dsome 450 yards to the northeast .

Under the cover of smoke and wit hthe assistance of tanks, the companiesstalled in the valley made three attemptsto reach the ridge during daylight o nthe 12th. Meanwhile, the troops alreadythere needed rations, medical supplies,ammunition, and reinforcements ; therewere wounded to be evacuated also .Tanks attempting to get into firing po-sitions south of Tera to silence the enemyweapons and relieve the companiespinned down were themselves firedupon, and in fact were unable even toleave the cover of the village.

In midafternoon, the Shermans werepressed into service to carry rations an dpersonnel up to the ridge. At 1555, con-cealed in Tera from enemy observation ,the tanks were loaded with supplies an dMarines for the trip forward . Beforedark, a total of nine tankloads in threeruns had carried a reinforced platoonof 54 Marines and critical replenishmentitems up to the line. By displacing theassistant driver of each tank, it wa spossible to cram six riflemen inside in-

310-224 0 - 69 - 23

stead. On arrival ' at the ridge, men andsupplies were unloaded through tankescape hatches and casualty evacuee sembarked in their place .

No further trips to the ridge werepossible because of approaching dark-ness . In addition, the road leading to thefront lines had caved in under the lasttank in the column returning from thethird trip. This tank bellied up, andneither the crew nor the casualties insid ecould leave through the escape hatch .After Marine mortars had fired a smokecover for the tank, another came along -side to evacuate the troops it held . Thedisabled tank was then disarmed an dabandoned for the night. In all, 1st TankBattalion vehicles evacuated 22 woundedfrom the ridge . 4 2

The darkness precluding furthe rtank operations enabled the remainde rof the 1st and 2d Battalion of the 7thMarines to move to the ridge withoutincident. In regimental reserve, the 3 dBattalion patrolled to the rear an dguarded the flanks of the other two .With three companies now up front ,each of the two forward battalions ex-tended its lines further . By midnight ,the battalion commanders were con-vinced that their positions were reason-ably secure, 43 and reassured that "th elarge amount of artillery support avail-able could destroy any enemy counter-attack which might be made against th einitial ridgehead . . . ." 44 As General de lValle described it, "The situation wasone of the tactical oddities of thispeculiar warfare . We were on the ridge .

42 1st TkBn Summary, 12Jun45 .43 7th Mar Hist, p. 30.

44 Snedeker ltr 1955 .

340


The Japs were in it, both on the for -ward and reverse slopes ." 4 5

Patrols from the 1st Marines range dsouth along the corps boundary andinto the outskirts of Ozato on 12 June .Although furious fighting was thengoing on in the 7th Marines zone, the1st encountered relatively little opposi-tion except for sporadic fire fromKunishi Ridge that was placed on cave -sealing and mopping-up teams workingin the vicinity of Hill 69 . On the follow-ing day, combat patrols began recon-noitering towards Kunishi Ridge inpreparation for a predawn attac kscheduled for the 14th .

Throughout the division zone, al lefforts on 13 June were concentrated onpreparing for this large-scale operation .The incessant cannonading of artillerypieces and naval rifles gave the forces o fGeneral Ushijima in the southern partof the island no respite. Two rocke tlaunching craft took positions off thesouthern tip of Okinawa to rake revers eslope defenses of the Thirty-secondArmy. More than 800 5-inch rocketsripped into the towns of Makabe an dKomesu in an hour's time alone .

In the four days following its seizureof Kunishi Ridge, the 7th Marines wassomewhat isolated from other friendlyground units by "No Man's Valley," 4 6

the 800-yard approach to its positions .This broad expanse was thoroughlycovered by the fire of Japanese soldiersinfesting the lower slopes and crestsflanking the ridge . Supplies were eitherparadropped or brought in by tanks .Some air drops fell in the valley, "but

4" del Valle, "Southward from Shuri," p . 40 .48 7th Mar Hist, loc . cit.

they were in the minority." 47 The res twere right on target and fell into a dropzone under Marine control . Sometimesit was even dangerous for the Marine sto recover supply containers in thes esupposedly safe areas because of th emany enemy snipers awaiting suchtargets of opportunity . One Japanes esharpshooter alone killed and wounde d22 Marines before he was finally locatedand eliminated . 48

Despite the inviting target their shee rbulk offered, tanks had to be used anddid yeoman work in hauling supplie sforward to the ridge . On their retur ntrip, they evacuated casualties, some ofwhom were strapped to the side of th eShermans and then sandbagged as pro-tection against enemy fire . In the morn-ing of the 13th, a tank dozer constructeda bypass around the place where theroad had caved in on the previous day .Upon completion of the detour, thelumbering mediums began shuttlingback and forth to the ridge. Some of thetanks placed point-blank fire on enemyridge positions covering the supplyroute in the 1/7 zone, and other tanksoperated in the 2/7 zone, working ove rthe western end of Kunishi Ridge . Onthe supply/evacuation runs, tanks lifte dsome 50 Marines from Company A toreinforce the rest of 1/7 on the ridge ,and took out 35 casualties on the retur ntrip . 4 8

During the course of the day, the as-sault battalions continued consolidatin gtheir holdings on Kunishi, and 1/7 sen tpatrols east along the ridge to contact

" Snedeker ltr 1947 .48 7th Mar Hist, loc . cit.

48 1st TkBn Summary, 13Jun45 .

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341

the enemy and uncover his positions .The battalion advanced only slightly.When a Japanese smokescreen ob-scured Kunishi village to friendly ob-servation, 81mm mortars hammered thearea to disrupt enemy activity sus-pected there. Shortly after twilight, agroup of enemy troops was sighted onMezado Ridge and was quickly dis-persed by a heavy concentration of mor-tar and small arms fire. Marines from

2/7 patrolled along the west coast bu twere soon pinned down by long-rangeenemy fire coming from the easter npart of the ridge ; they had to be with-drawn under the cover of smoke .

An increasing number of tanks be -

came disabled by the accurate fire of A Tguns well hidden in the ridge. A salvofrom the main battery of a supportingbattleship scored four observed direc thits on enemy emplacements, but didlittle to subdue other Japanese position sin the area . This particular barrage ex-ploded on targets within 250 yards o ffriendly troops. 6 °

During the night of 13 June, the 1stMarines was ordered to attack the frontof Kunishi Ridge in its zone befor edawn the next day ; H-Hour was set fo r0330. Following a 30-minute artillerypreparation, 2/1 jumped off with tw ocompanies in assault. Despite an earlie rdivision order prohibiting the use offlares by units adjacent to the assault-ing force before and during an attackat night, the attack area and theattackers were nonetheless illuminated .Many urgent calls to higher echelonsfor an immediate ban placed on the

66 Marginal comment by the battalion com-mander in 2/7 SAR, p . 9 .

firing of flares proved fruitless . 51 Fortunately, the Marines advanced undis-covered by the enemy and initial prog-ress was unopposed . By 0500, twoplatoons from Company E had reachedthe topographical crest of the ridge ; thesupport platoon and company head-quarters were stopped well below thi spoint by extremely severe enemy fire .

Half an hour later, Company G ha dworked one of its platoons up to a pointon the ridge where it tied in with theleft flank of Company E . At daybreak ,increasingly active enemy sniping an dintense fire on the flanks and rear of theassault companies served to isolate theseplatoons from the rest of their battalion .Tanks then rumbled forward to supportthe beleaguered Marines, whose casual -ties were mounting rapidly. One com-pany lost six of its seven ofcers . 52 Be-cause routes to the advance positions

were under accurate and direct enemyfire, the mediums were again presse dinto action to haul supplies up to th eline and carry casualties to the rear ,much in the same manner as they ha dfor the 7th Marines elsewhere o nKunishi Ridge . At the end of the day,an estimated 110 wounded Marines hadbeen evacuated by the tanks .6 3

Even though the enemy attempted todislodge them, the Marines held onto

their tenuous position . After dark, thereserve company was moved up and aperimeter defense was established fo rthe night. Japanese small arms, mortar ,and artillery fire, and recurring shower sof hand grenades poured on the Marine

61 2/1 SAR, p . 15.

63 1st Mair SAR, p . 22.6' 1st TkBn Summary, 14Jun45 .

342


positions throughout the hours of dark-ness. In addition, the enemy made man yattempts to infiltrate all along the line .

As the sun rose on 15 June, 2/1 foun denemy pressure to be as constant as ithad been the day before, and battalioncasualties reaching alarming propor-tions . Although the tanks continued tocarry supplies and evacuate thewounded, 2/1 critically needed ammuni-tion and rations. A requested air dropscheduled for 0900 was delayed until themiddle of the afternoon, and then morethan two-thirds of the packs droppedinto enemy territory and could not berecovered. The efforts of 2/1 assaultcompanies notwithstanding, Kunish iRidge was far from secured when 2/ 5relieved 2/1 after dark on the 15th . 5 4

Earlier that day, 3/5 55 had relieved1/1 on Yuza Hill, following which, th elatter moved to an assembly area nearDakiton ; 3/1 had already set up in th evicinity of Shindawaku. With 2/5 onthe line, Colonel Griebel had complet eresponsibility for the zone formerl yheld by the 1st Marines .

During the afternoon before 2/5 wa sto go into the lines, its company com-manders were taken by tank to the fron tlines to: make a personal reconnaissanc eof the area they were to take over . Whenthey arrived at the positions of 2/1 ,they discovered that the tactical situa-tion precluded a daylight relief . Theyalso found that 2/1 held only a 75-yar dsection on the crest of Kunishi Ridge ,with a portion of the battalion occupy-ing a small pocket on the forward slopes

" 2/1 SAR, p . 15.G6 Lieutenant Colonel Robert E . Hill assumed

command of the battalion on 8 June, when 3/5had been in reserve .

of the ridge. As a result of this situation ,the commanders of 2/1 and 2/5 agree dthat the relief should begin only after i thad become dark . In order to maintaintight control over the move and preven tmatters from becoming confused in therestricted area where the relief was totake place, Lieutenant Colonel Benedictdecided to commit only one of his com-panies initially . The relief of 2/1 wa scompleted at 2030, a half hour after ithad begun. The 1st Marines as a wholewent into division reserve at 2300, afterhaving been in the division line for 1 2straight days during which it sufferednearly 500 casualties .

On the day before fresh troops ha djoined in the fight for Kunishi, the 7thMarines resumed its grinding advanc eby "the slow, methodical destruction o fenemy emplacements on the ridge, towhich the descriptive word `processing 'had come to be applied." 56 The 2d Bat-talion was ordered to seize the rest ofthe ridge in its zone and to be prepare dto continue the attack to Mezado Ridge .Company A attacked east to seize theremainder of the reverse slope of Kuni-shi Ridge within the 7th Marines zone ,while B and C provided fire support an dmopped up behind the assault company .Despite difficult terrain and an unre-lenting enemy opposition, Company Asucceeded in closing to the outskirts ofKunishi village .

At 1247, Company B was ordered tocontinue the advance through Kunishi ,and then to attack north to secure theforward slope of the easternmost sectorof Kunishi Ridge. Although the com-pany passed through the village and

7th Mar Hist, p . 31 .

BATTLE ' S END

343

began heading for the high ground withonly slight interference, withering ma-chine gun fire soon pinned down all buttwo rifle squads, which were able toclimb the height . Once the Marines ha dgained the crest of the ridge, the Japa-nese launched a strong counterattack ,forcing the squads from their temporar yholding. The company as a whole thenwithdrew to lines held the previousnight .

To the right of 1/7, the 2d Battalionwas subjected to increasingly intenseenemy fire despite suppressive America ncounter-barrages ; 2/7 reported onlylimited gains that day . At 1530, th elogistic and tactical support of the 7thMarines by tanks ended when the armo rbegan assisting the 1st Marines . On the14th, the tracked vehicles had carried48 men of the 7th Marines forward andevacuated 160. 5 7

During the following two days, 2/7was supported by naval gunfire, artil-lery, air, rockets, and 81mm mortars ,which mercilessly pounded the enemy .Both gun and flame tanks furnished di-rect close-in support, but could make n oappreciable dent in Japanese defenses .A stubborn enemy notwithstanding, 2/ 7moved its lines some 500–700 yards t othe right and in front of the first highground leading to the Mezado Hill mass ,the division objective after Kunishi .

The 1st Battalion fared no better inits attempt to seize the rest of KunishiRidge in its zone on 15 June than it ha don the 14th. Notified that 15 artiller ybattalions were on call for supportingfires, 1/7 moved out at 0945 followin gan artillery preparation and preliminar y

" 1st TkBn Summary, 14Jun45 .

patrolling . Company C attacked directlyeast along the ridge while B movedthrough Kunishi village and then turnednorth towards the high ground again .

Heavy Japanese fire from preparedemplacements prevented the Marine sfrom advancing across the open groundbetween the village and the ridge line ,and Company C was unable to relievethe pressure on B . At 1600, the tw ounits were withdrawn once again t opositions held 13–14 June .

During the night 15–16 June, smallenemy groups were active in front of1/7 lines harassing the Marines withsmall arms fire and lobbing hand gre-nades into their foxholes. Before dawnon 16 June, the troops on the left (east )flank were pulled back to the west ap-proximately 200 yards to permit amassive artillery preparation on the ob-jective which had stymied 1/7 the pre-ceding two days. An extremely heavyconcentration of artillery, mortar, androcket fire drummed that day's targetfor nearly three hours before the assaul tforces jumped off. By 1345, 1/7 hadcompletely seized the rest of the ridgein its zone and immediately began mop -ping up and consolidating its newly wonground. Shortly thereafter, battalio ntroops "repeatedly encountered and de-stroyed numerous groups of the enemywandering through the town of Kunishiin a confused, disorganized, and bewil-dered state . It was evident that the en dwas not far off ." 6 8

One other major accomplishment thatafternoon was the capture by CompanyA of "The Pinnacle," a particularly diffi-cult enemy strongpoint situated so that

"8 7th Mar Hist, p . 32 .

344


it could be neither destroyed nor neu-tralized by any type of support weaponimmediately available . It was in thisarea that the enemy sniper who had shot22 Marines earlier was hunted down andkilled . Approaches to The Pinnacle wereswept by Japanese fire, and its seizureby the infantry was slow, tortured, andcostly . 5 9

To the right of 1/7, the 2d Battalio nlines were extended some 400 yardsfurther west to where the battalion heldthe first high terrain approaching theMezado hills . This progress was accom-plished even while the battalion ha dsustained heavy casualties and lost it svaluable armored support, which fellvictim to Japanese land mines and 47mmAT guns. Expert employment of its sup-porting arms enabled 2/7 to make slightgains on the 16th . For example, salvosfrom the main battery of USS Idahowere called down on targets locatedwithin 400 yards of frontline troops . Inaddition, air liaison parties controlledair strikes, often consisting of 25–3 0planes each, which successfully de-stroyed stubborn pockets holding up th eadvance . s o

No longer was Kunishi Ridge a majorobstacle in the way of the 1st Marin eDivision, for the terrain that the Japa-nese had so doggedly defended here, in-cluding the approaches to Mezado, ha dbeen virtually cleaned out by the end o f16 June. Only that portion of the ridgeon the far left of the division, in the 5t hMarines zone, still presented some prob-lems. With the reduction of enemy op-position on The Pinnacle, the 7th Ma-

" Ibid., p . 31.

80 2/7 SAR, p . 10 .

rives was able to make physical contactwith the 5th.

As 1st Division troops prepared fo rthe final drive south, mopping up opera-tions on Oroku Peninsula neared an end .Concurrently, General Shepherd's staffdrew up plans for the eventual commit-ment of the 6th Division in the southernfront. Initially, the 22d Marines was topass through right flank elements ofthe 7th Marines on 17 June to relieve2/7 ; 3/7 would come out of reserve torelieve the 1st Battalion . (See Map 21 . )

In the 5th Marines zone on 16 June,2/5 attacked at 0730 and spent the dayworking over that portion of the regi-mental area that lay between KunishiRidge and Hill 69 . At approximately1800, a reinforced company reached th ecrest of the ridge and tied in with th eleft flank unit of the 7th Marines . Bitter ,close-quarter fighting had been the orderof the day for 2/5, whose assault com-panies had received continuously heavysmall arms fire . Rising casualty figure sagain required tanks to be employed a sevacuation vehicles ; this task was in ad-dition to their shuttling ammunition andrations forward. In face of Japanes eholding action to its front, 2/5 mad eslow but steady progress .

Although enemy infiltrators attempte dto breach 5th Marines lines during th enight 16–17 June, they were thoroughl ydiscouraged. As 2/5 resumed the attackon the 17th, oppressive enemy smallarms fire coming from the vicinity o fAragachi in the XXIV Corps zone pun-ished the front and flank of the battalion .Its task was to seize that portion of Ku-nishi Ridge still held by the enemy . At-tacking with a two-company front, the2d Battalion faced the problem of coping

BATTLE ' S END

345

with Japanese reverse-slope positions

and destroying them. To smooth the waysomewhat, a rocket barrage was lai don the objective . A short time later, a t1030, tanks moved out and clamberedover the ridge route, which had beenopened earlier by an armored bulldozer .

Murderous enemy fire criss-crossedthe crest of the ridge as 2/5 grimlypushed on. All tanks were pressed intoaction as armored ambulances onceagain, but only the walking woundedcould be taken inside of the vehicles and

evacuated. Stretcher cases presented aserious problem because they could notbe taken up through the tank escapehatches, but had to be lashed to theirrear decks . Often, wounded were hit asecond and third time on their trip to

the aid station.

Throughout the afternoon, the volum e

and intensity of enemy fire as well as the

ferocity of the enemy opposition re-

mained undiminished . Tank, artillery,

and mortar fire, and the ripple fire of

several rocket barrages were directe d

at suspected Japanese strongpoints and

weapons emplacements in an attemp t

to open the way for Marine tank-in-fantry teams. At 1700, Lieutenant Col-onel Benedict decided to commit his

reserve company and further strengthe nthe assault companies by sending for -

ward 133 replacements, which had been

assigned to the battalion three days

earlier. 6 1

61 2/5 SAR, p . 21 . On 11 June, the divisionreceived 369 officers and enlisted from the 55t hReplacement Draft, which arrived that day .With the arrival of the 62d Replacement Draftfive days later, the division absorbed 295 mor e

Marines . 1st MarDiv SAR, PersAnx, p . 7.

With this infusion of fresh troops inits line, 2/5 surged eastward along th eridge ; by nightfall, the battalion heldapproximately three-fourths of the 1,200yards of Kunishi Ridge in the regimenta lzone . 62 Because the position of the bat-talion was somewhat precarious, at duskColonel Griebel attached Company K,3/5, to the 2d Battalion with a missio nof protecting the battalion rear . At 2315 ,an estimated company-sized counterat-tack hit 2/5 positions, but was thor-oughly blunted ; Company K troopskilled the few Japanese that succeededin penetrating the lines .

On the coastal flank of the IIIAC zone ,6th Division Marines had become full yinvolved in the drive to the south by th e

end of 17 June . Moving forward duringthe afternoon of the previous day to re-lieve 2/7, the 1st and 3d Battalions of the22d Marines attempted to cross the val-ley between Itoman and Kunishi, butwere forestalled by the severe enemy fir e

covering this route . Forced to turn back

to their previous positions, the two bat-talions waited until dark to begin th e

relief . 63 The uneventful passage of th e

lines began at 0300, 17 June, and b ydawn assault elements were in jump-offpositions at the base of the norther nslope of Mezado Ridge, prepared to at-tack at 0730 in coordination with 3/ 7on the left .

An artillery, naval gunfire, and ai rbombardment of Mezado Ridge, and o f

Hill 69 64 and Kuwanga Ridge beyond it ,

preceded the attack . Once the fires hadlifted, the 22d Marines moved out with

e' 2/5 SAR, loc . cit .°a 7th Mar Hist, p . 32 .

04 This is not to be confused with the Hil l69 west of Ozato, or the Hill 69 east of Mezado.

346


two assault battalions abreast—3/22 o nthe left . Machine gun and intermitten tmortar fire paced the advance up th eslope of the ridge, but as the mornin gwore on, the Marine progress becam eincreasingly difficult in the face of stif-fening resistance .

To support the attack of 1/22, 6thDivision tanks moved around the rightflank of the regiment and through thewater towards an off-shore reef to gainfiring positions commanding direct ob-servation of the caves on the westerntip of Mezado Ridge. As one armore dplatoon began to negotiate the route, theunexpected depth of the water preventedit from working its way forward farenough to enfilade the ridge, and itstanks were forced to deliver supportin gfire from the most advanced points tha tthey had been able to reach . G5 Tankweapons could not suppress the heav ymachine gun fire coming from the re -verse slope of the hill mass holding u p1/22. As a result, the battalion was un-able to gain more than a foothold on th eforward slope of Mezado Ridge unti l1700, when it positioned two companieson the crest of the ridge for night de-fense .

Inadequate maneuvering room to thefront also limited the employment ofsupporting armor. Besides the flan kroute through the water, the only othe rsuitable tank road ran through a ric epaddy which had been cratered in fou rplaces and heavily mined as well . Oncethe mines were removed or neutralized,tanks lumbered up to these craters an ddumped into them bundles of large log sthat had been attached to their frontslope plates . Tanks and logs instead of

e6 6th TkBn SAR, Ph III, p . 20 .

dump trucks and fill dirt were usedto plug the craters because only ar-mored-plated vehicles could weather thesevere enemy fires .

After two craters in the road hadbeen filled, it was discovered that theapproaches to a small bridge further u pthe road had been mined . Sniper andmachine gun fire prevented enginee rclearing teams from neutralizing themined area, and the road project wasabandoned temporarily . Nonetheless ,the tanks advanced as far forward a spossible to deliver overhead supportin gfires .

By noon, 3/22 had secured the highes tpoint on the ridge and maintained themomentum of its attack to clean outthe town of Mezado as well . Before dusk ,the battalion had captured the key ter -rain around Hill 69 and was in commandof the ground overlooking the next ob-jective, Kuwanga Ridge. With the ex-ception of an attempted enemy counter-attack in the sector of 1/22 at 2210, agenerally quiet night was passed by th e22d Marines .

When 1st Division troops jumped offon the 17th, 3/7 attacked in a column ofcompanies, Company K leading, to tak ethe Hill 69 east of Mezado . Company Imaintained contact with the 22d Ma-rines, and Company L took up positionsto protect the left flank of K. Followingan unopposed 1,400-yard drive acrossthe plateau just east of Mezado to seiz eHills 69 and 52, 3/7 halted for a shor ttime to reorganize, and then attempte dto continue the drive to the crest of Hil l79—the last remaining barrier beforeMakabe. Heavy Japanese fire from po-sitions on the high ground commandingthe Kuwanga-Makabe road forced the

BATTLE 'S END

347

battalion to dig in for the night befor eit could gain the hill . Once dug in, 3/7Marines quickly organized to blunt al lenemy attempts to infiltrate and coun-terattack in the darkness .

When the Japanese 22d Regiment didlaunch its counterattack, it was directe dagainst 1/22 . This determined effortborn of despair was doomed from its in-ception because that portion of theenemy regiment scheduled to exploit thecounterattack had been almost com-pletely destroyed that afternoon. In ef-fect, the near annihilation of the 22dRegiment meant that the left flank ofthe Japanese outpost line had all bu tcollapsed, and that the 32d Regiment ,holding positions near Makabe, wasfaced with the threat of having its lef t

flank rolled up . 6 6

The Marines were prepared to tur nthis threat into reality by exploiting thesuccesses of 17 June with the commit-ment of fresh troops into the battle on

the next day. While the 7th Marine s

finished "processing" Kunishi Ridge, the8th Marines (Reinforced), commanded

by Colonel Clarence R . Wallace, pre-pared to relieve 3/7 to continue the at -

tack southward . Before the dawn of 18June, this 2d Marine Division infantr yregiment, now attached to the 1st Divi-sion, entered the lines .

IHEYA-AGUNI OPERATIONS 6 7

After its feint landings on the south-eastern coast of Okinawa on L-Day an d

ee Okinawa Operations Record, p . 134 .

B7 Unless otherwise noted, the material i nthis section is derived from : Tenth Army AR ;2d MarDiv WarDs, Apr-Jun45 ; Combat Tea m8 AR, Iheya-Aguni Operations, n .d., hereafter

L plus 1, the 2d Marine Division re-mained on board its transports whichsteamed in the vicinity of the targe tarea until 11 April . On that date, theDemonstration Group set out for Saipan ,arriving there four days later . On 14May, CinCPac ordered the division (lessone RCT) detached from the operationa lcontrol of the Tenth Army and desig-nated it as the area reserve under contro lof CinCPOA. In addition, General Wat-son received an alert for his division toconduct Phase III (d) of the ICEBERGPlan, the landing on Kikai Jima . Oncecaptured, this small island north ofOkinawa was to be utilized as a north -ern outpost for the Ryukyus area, an dwas to base four fighter groups, twonight-fighter squadrons, and one tor-pedo-bomber squadron . 68 The 8th Ma-rines (Reinforced) remained under thecontrol of General Buckner for the im-pending landings on Iheya and AguniShimas, and was ordered to reembar kimmediately .

For the entire month after its arriva lat Saipan, the division remained o nboard the transports . A warning orderfor the Kikai invasion had been issue don 6 May,69 but this alert was reduce din urgency four days later by a messag ethat indicated that Phase III (d) mightnot be conducted . With the arrival ofthe 14 May message releasing the divi-sion from Tenth Army control, theMarines began unloading and rehabili-tating their equipment ashore in prepa-ration for the time when it was to b e

8th Mar AR, Iheya-Aguni ; Combat Team 8 AR ,Okinawa Operation (11-22Jun45), n .d., here -after 8th Mar AR .

98 USAFMidPac G—5 Hist, p . 245 .

° D Ibid ., p . 258.

348


ordered to mount out for Kikai . On 3June, the landing was deferred for a nindefinite period, and on the 19th, th e2d Marine Division (less RCT 8) wasreleased from its role as Ryukyus areareserve and reverted to the control ofFMFPac.

Once again, on 24 May, the 8th Ma-rines departed Saipan headed for Oki-nawa ; its eventual target, the islands ofIheya and Aguni . Because of the heavydamage that had been sustained by thefleet and especially the radar picket sduring Kamikaze raids, early in MayAdmiral Turner asked General Bucknerto begin a study of outlying islands todetermine where long-range radar an dfighter director facilities could be in-stalled. Resulting from this study wasthe decision that Tori, Aguni, Iheya ,and Kume Shimas could be captured inthat order. A special landing force, areinforced company from the 165th In-fantry, made an unopposed landing o nTori on 12 May and a detachment fromAir Warning Squadron 1 began opera-tions almost immediately. (See Map 22 . )

Since the Okinawa campaign was nowreaching a crucial stage, General Buck-ner believed that the forces already com-mitted in the fight southward should notbe diverted to such secondary action sas the proposed landings on the otheroutlying islands noted above. He re-quested, therefore, that the reinforced8th Marines be returned to Okinawa t oeffect the Iheya-Aguni landings . Brig-adier General LeRoy P. Hunt, ADC ofthe 2d Marine Division, was designate dthe landing force commander for theseoperations . Flying to Okinawa with keymembers of his staff on 15 May, Genera lHunt spent the 16th and part of the 17th

conferring with Tenth Army staff offi-cers about the proposed operation plan .By 30 May, when the 8th Marines ar-rived at Okinawa, a complete navalgunfire and air support schedule hadalready been established, and detailedcontingency plans drawn up to meet an ysituation that might arise from enemysea or air action .

The attack force, commanded by Ad-miral Reifsnider, steamed from the Ha-gushi transport area early on 2 Juneand set a course for the target, locate d15 miles northwest of Hedo Misaki . Thebombardment prior to the H-Hour o f1015 proceeded as scheduled ; 7° 2/8 and3/8 landed on Iheya 27 minutes later . 7 1

Neither enemy opposition nor enemytroops were encountered. The Marinesonly found some 3,000 confused but doc-ile natives who were taken under tow bymilitary government teams supplied b ythe Tenth Army Island Command . Latein the afternoon of the 3d, the troopsbegan general unloading and the islandwas officially declared secure the nextday .

The landing on Aguni Shima, 30 mileswest of Okinawa, was delayed until 9June by inclement weather . On that day ,1/8 went ashore under circumstancessimilar to those found at Iheya. Theonly Marine casualties of the two am-phibious assaults were sustained a tIheya ; 2 Marines were killed and 1 6wounded by aerial rockets and shor trounds of naval gunfire . In accordanc ewith the instructions it had receive dfrom Tenth Army before the operation ,the 8th Marines stood ready for im-

S0 ComPhibGru 4 AR, Iheya-Aguni, Ser 0327 ,dtd 3Aug45, pt VI, p . 8.

S1 Ibid ., pt I, p . 1 .

350


mediate commitment on Okinawa uponcompletion of the two landings. Whenfresh units were needed for the finalthrust against the Japanese dug in onKiyamu Peninsula . Colonel Wallace andhis troops were available.

THE FINAL PUSH 7 2

By 4 June, the remnants of the Thirty -second Army had fully manned the out -post line of Kiyamu Peninsula . Concen-trated in this area were approximatel y30,000 Japanese troops, distributed a sfollows : 24th Division and attachments,12,000 ; 62d Division and attached units ,7,000 ; 44th IMB and attached units,3,000 ; 5th Artillery Command and at-tached units, 3,000 ; and troops attacheddirectly to Thirty-second Army Head-quarters, and the command itself, 5,000 ."Attrition during retirement opera-tions," 73 was the official Japanese ex-planation for the 20,000-man differentialbetween their estimated strength figureof 50,000 in late May and the totalnumber of effectives available at thebeginning of June.

Of General Ushijima's remainingforces, approximately 20 percent weresurvivors of the original, first-rate in-fantry and artillery defense garrison ;the rest were either untrained rear -echelon personnel or Boeitai . Leadingthis motley force at battalion level an dabove were many of the original senio rcommanders who had remained aliv eand were still capable of arousing a

" Unless otherwise noted, the material con-tained in this section is derived from : CTF 3 1AR; Tenth Army AR ; XXIV Corps AR ; 7thInf Div AR ; 77th Inf Div OpRpt, Okinawa ;96th InfDiv AR ; Okinawa Operations Record .

Okinawa Operations Record, p . 122 .

fighting spirt in their men .Their unflagging belief in a final Japa-

nese victory was unrealistic in view ofthe alarming losses of weapons andequipment that the Thirty-second Arm yhad sustained since the American land-ing on 1 April . Hand grenades and ex -plosives either were in short supply, o rin the case of some units, non-existent .Only 20 percent of the original numberof heavy machine guns owned by thearmy remained, and few of its heavyinfantry cannon and mortars were stil lfiring. Although the army ammunitio nsupply along with 2 150mm guns, 1 6150mm howitzers, and 10 antiaircraf tartillery pieces had been transporte dsouth to Kiyamu when Shuri wasabandoned, the stock levels of artilleryammunition precluded more than 1 0days of sustained firing.

Despite these outward signs of it simminent defeat and impoverished con-dition, the belief held by General Ushi-jima's army in ultimate victory wa sderived from deep-seated tradition ,strongly enforced discipline, and th ehistorically pervasive influence of Japa-nese military doctrine throughout th eEmpire. These intangibles, almost com-pletely alien and incomprehensible t oAmericans, promised that KiyamuPeninsula was not to fall and the battl efor Okinawa was not to end before afinal, violent climax .

Influenced by the location and relativestrength of enemy strongpoints facin gthe Tenth Army, and the availability andstatus of his assault forces, GeneralBuckner had shifted the corps boundar ywest on 4 June. In the now-narrowerIIIAC zone, General Shepherd's divi-sion sought to capture the Oroku Pen-

BATTLE'S END

351

insula while the 1st Marine Division wa sto cut off the peninsula from the restof the island, capture Itoman, seize bothKunishi and Mezado Ridges, and driveto Ara Saki, the southernmost point o fthe island. The assignment given XXIVCorps included the capture of the Yuz aDake-Yaeju Dake Escarpment as a pri-mary objective . On line facing this fore -boding terrain were the 96th and 7th

Divisions .Nearly two weeks of punishing an d

brutal fighting were to ensue before thetwo army divisions could eliminate al l

enemy resistance in this Thirty-secondArmy defense sector . (See Map IX, MapSection.) XXIV Corps units spent theperiod 4–8 June in regrouping and at-tempting to gain favorable jump-offpositions for the attack on the escarp-ment on the 9th . All supporting arm swere employed to soften the well -organized enemy defense system .Armored flamethrower, tank, assaultgun, and artillery fires were added tothe point-blank blasts of experimenta l57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles 74 in

" These newly developed weapons had bee nsent to Okinawa in late May by the War De-partment for test firing under combat condi-tions . After the limited supply of ammunitio naccompanying the weapons had been expended ,air shipments of the special ammunition wererushed to the island in time for employmen tby XXIV Corps units at the escarpment . Fiel dcommanders who had the opportunity to usethese weapons were unanimous in their praiseand recommended that the recoilless rifle beadopted as a standard infantry weapon . Ac -cording to the former commander of the 7thMarines, these weapons " . . . could have bee nused to great advantage by the 7th in it sseizure and processing of Kunishi ridge . The ywere asked for but the reply came back [that ]all their ammunition had been used up ."Snedeker ltr 1965 .

an effort to reduce the natural bastion .The defense of the Yuza Dake-Yaej u

Dake outpost line had been assigned totwo units . Guarding the escarpmentfrom Hill 95 on the east coast to Yaej uDake was the 44th 1MB; the remainderof the high ground, including Yuz aDake, was the responsibility of the 24thDivision . Added to the tenacious de-termination of the foe was the natural ,fortress-like quality of the terrain heguarded. This combination enabled theJapanese to defend the Yuza Dake are awith only one regiment, the 89th.

Facing the 7th Division were enemytroops who compared unfavorably withthe veterans defending Yuza Dake. Com-ing from miscellaneous shipping engi-neer, sea raiding, mortar, and line o fcommunication units, the soldiers wer eloosely organized into provisional in-fantry regiments and put into the 44thIMB line. The vital Hill 95-Nakaza Val -ley area was held by survivors of th e15th Independent Mixed Regiment ,which first began to give way under therepeated pounding of the 7th Divisio nattack. General Arnold's soldiers re-lentlessly pushed forward on 11 June,the second day of the all-out corps as-sault on the escarpment, and threatene dthe rest of the Thirty-second Army lineby breaking into the 44th IMB defenses .An attempt by General Ushijima t oshore up this section of his rapidlycrumbling outpost by committing jerry -built infantry units comprised of serviceand support troops proved to be "asineffective as throwing water on parche dsoil ." 7 5

The 89th Regiment continued to with -stand the inroads of 96th Division in -

"'Okinawa Operations Record, p . 129 .

352


fantry on 12 June, but this day marke dthe beginning of the end for the 44thIndependent Mixed Brigade . Although ithad been reinforced with two battalion sfrom the 62d Division as a result of thebrigade commander's urgent pleas, thetime for decision was already past, aswas the chance for these newly com-mitted units to affect the ultimate cours eof the battle .

Clear weather on 13 June, followin ga night of abortive enemy counterat-tacks, permitted General Hodge to em -ploy fully all of his supporting arms .Units of the 62d Division attempting toreach and revive the hapless 44th IMBwere themselves blasted by America nair, artillery, and naval gunfire. Al-though the 89th Regiment—reinforcedby the 24th Reconnaissance Regiment—still maintained its hold on Yuza Dake ,its rear and flank were threatened thi sday by the impending penetration soutof Yaeju Dake. (See Map X, Map Sec-tion.) Further advances on 14 Jun eforced General Ushijima to commit the13th Independent Infantry, which wasalmost immediately smashed by 7thDivision troops . Also committed and de-stroyed on the 14th were the remainingreserve battalions of the 62d Division.

Elsewhere, as Japanese positions be-gan to give way under the pressure ofthe American onslaught, Thirty-secondArmy headquarters lost all contact withthe 15th IMR—the last infantry elementof the 44th IMB able to maintain unitintegrity. To stave off the last stages o fa crushing defeat, General Ushijim aordered the 62d Division into the de-teriorating Japanese line from reservepositions southwest of Makabe, but asavage lashing from American artillery,

naval guns, and air-delivered napal mand bombs thoroughly disrupted thedeployment. Few, if any, of the enemytroops arrived at their destination .

The 96th Division took advantage o fthis confused situation to rush its in-fantry through the Yuza Dake perime-ter. On the left, the 7th Division surgeddown the coast . By the end of 17 June ,XXIV Corps regiments held firm contro lof all commanding ground on the YuzaDake-Yaeju Dake Escarpment . Com-pressed between the front lines of th ecorps and the southern tip of Okinaw awere the remnants of the Thirty-secon dArmy—a hodge-podge of units and indi-viduals from the 62d Division, 44th IMB,and 24th Division. Before the island hadbeen secured by the Tenth Army, mos tof these Japanese troops would di eviolently in a forlorn attempt to protectthe headquarters of General Ushijima .

DEATH OF AN ARMY 7 8

The death throes of the Thirty-secondArmy became even more obvious as theTenth Army advanced against steadilylessening resistance on 18 June . Al-though most sections of the Japaneseline proved softer than before, two iso-lated centers of opposition develope dduring the day—one around Medeer aand the other in the area of Mabuni .The first was held by the remnants of the

P6 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi ssection is derived from : CTF 31 AR ; TenthArmy AR ; ILIAC AR; XXIV Corps AR; 1stMarDiv SAR ; 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III; 7thInfDiv AR ; 77th InfDiv OpRpt, Okinawa; 96t hInfDiv AR ; 4th Mar SAR, Ph III ; 5th MarSAR ; 8th Mar AR ; 29th Mar SAR, Ph III ;Okinawa Operations Record.

BATTLE 'S END

353

24th Division, and the second, aroun dHill 89, was defended by elements of th eheadquarters and troops of the remain-ing Thirty-second Army units . (See Map16 . )

Leading the 1st Marine Division at -tack was the 8th Marines, which hadrelieved the 7th Marines the previousnight. At 0730, 2/8 (Lieutenant Colone l

Harry A. Waldorf) jumped off from

Mezado Ridge to head south and occup ya line west of Makabe from which itcould launch a "quick decisive thrust"

to the sea . 77 Light machine gun and riflefire, later mixed with sporadic morta rand artillery rounds, hit the left frontand flank of the battalion as it made arapid 1,400-yard advance to cap its firs t

day in the lines . By dark, the battalio nhad secured its objective and began dig-ging in for the night. Since its left flankwas well forward of 1/5, Company B ,

1/8, was attached to fill the gap.Early on 18 June, General Buckner

had gone forward to witness the fight-ing, and "probably chose the 1st Divi-sion front on this date because h ewanted to see the 8th Marines in action,"as he thought well of the regiment. 78 AsGeneral Oliver P. Smith recalled :

On his way to the front [to the 3/8 OP] ,General Buckner met Bob Roberts (Colone l

'7 LtGen Pedro A. del Valle ltr to CMC, dt d9Mar55, hereafter del Valle ltr 1955 . "WhenGeneral Geiger gave me the 8th Marines, afresh regiment at full strength, I conferredwith Colonel Wallace and we agreed upon hi sleapfrog attack, 3 battalions in column, withlimited objectives, while I would cover his

flanks with my exhausted troops. This was th e

`coup de morte' [death blow] which broke theremnant of the 32d Japanese Army." del Valle

ltr 1965 .48 Smith, Personal Narrative, p. 135 .

Harold C . Roberts, commanding Officer o f

the 22d Marines) . Roberts urged Genera lBuckner not to go to the front at this par-ticular point as the rapid advance had by -passed a good many Japanese, and ,further, there was considerable flanking

fire coming from the high ground in front

of the 96th Division . General Buckner di dnot heed this advice. (Roberts was killedan hour or so later on another part of th e

front .) The General got up on a ridge

where Lieutenant Colonel Paul E . Wallace

[commanding 3/8] had an OP . Tanks and

infantry were operating ahead. A rifle

company was on the ridge preparing tomove forward. General Buckner took po-sition behind two coral boulders separate d

by a slit through which he could look.

His position was slightly forward of the

crest . He had not been in this position

long when a Japanese 47mm shell hit the

base of the boulders . The first shell wasfollowed by five more in rapid succession .

Either a fragment of the first shell or a

piece of coral rock thrown out by thedetonation hit General Buckner in the

chest. This wound was . mortal . Hubbard

[General Buckner's aide], with the assist-ance of others in the vicinity, dragged

General Buckner over the crest to a def-

iladed position . A Navy hospital corpsman

was there and a doctor arrived within

three minutes . Plasma was available, bu t

the General had lost blood so rapidly tha t

plasma could not save his life . 7 9

Upon being informed of General Buck-ner's death, Brigadier General Elwyn D .

Post, Tenth Army Chief of Staff, sen t

a message to CinCPOA reporting the

death. In addition, General Post, know-ing General Buckner's expressed desire s

concerning the succession of command ,

recommended in the message that Gen-eral Geiger be designated the new Tenth

354


Army commander . 80 On 19 June, Gen-eral Geiger was appointed a lieutenantgeneral and was officially designate dCommanding General, Tenth Army(CTF 56) , the same day, making himthe senior officer present on Okinawa .This was the first time that a Marineofficer had commanded a unit of thi ssize. General Joseph W. Stilwell, U. S.Army, former deputy commander of theSoutheast Asia Command, arrived o nthe island at 0700, 23 June, succeedin gGeneral Geiger the same day, 81 afterthe Marine general had successfully di-rected the final combat operations onOkinawa.

Early in the morning on which Gen-eral Buckner died, the 5th Marines wa sto take Hill 79, northwest of Makabe .At dawn, 1/5 moved out around thewestern nose of Kunishi Ridge and the nsouth through the 8th Marines zone i norder to get into positions to jump off at

"Ibid., pp. 135-136 . During the planningphase of ICEBERG, General Buckner state dthat a second-in-command of the army shouldbe designated prior to the operation, and tha the felt General Geiger capable of handling afield army. A letter recommending this appoint-ment was sent to CinCPOA—the strategic com-mander of the area in which the operation wasto be held—via Lieutenant General Robert C .Richardson, Jr ., the Commanding General ,U. S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas . Thelatter returned the letter with a note statingthat this assignment was one for the WarDepartment to decide . No further action wastaken until the time of General Buckner'sdeath . Ibid., pp . 34-35. The right of AdmiralNimitz to make this assignment evolved fro mthe fact that the Tenth Army, Task Force 5 6for the Okinawa campaign, was a task unitwithin the Fifth Fleet, and not under the con-trol of General Richardson's command .

Si LtGen Merwin H. Silverthorn commentsto HistBr, HQMC, dtd 250ct65 .

0730 . 52 As soon as the attack began, th eassault units were pinned down by fir ecoming from the objective and unable tomove until 1100, when tanks arrived andrumbled into support positions . A co-ordinated tank-infantry assault wa slaunched soon after, and the Marine swere on the hill by noon . Following i nthe wake of the attack was 3/5, up fro mreserve, which moved into support posi-tions behind the 1st Battalion for nightdefense .

Enemy AT fire forced the Marinetanks to operate cautiously, but did notslow them down. Artillery-delivere dsmoke on a suspected antitank gun posi -tion on Hill 81 just north of Makabeblinded the enemy gunners and per-mitted the Shermans to operate withou tbeing fired upon . Other AT guns wer edestroyed during the day after havin gbeen spotted from the air by an experi-enced tank officer, who was flown ove rthe battlefield for that purpose . 83 Bydark, 1/5 had gained the lower slopes o fHill 79 with armored assistance, butcould not advance beyond that pointbecause of heavy enemy fire from highground in the 96th Division zone andHills 79 and 81 . At the end of the day,tank-infantry teams from 2/5 elimi-nated the last large pockets of enem y

' 2 The right (east) flank of the 5th Marine shad been exposed by the rapid advance of th e8th Marines . Therefore, "the battle-weary anddecimated infantry of the 1st MarDiv had t obe employed in attacking the various hill posi-tions along the [eastern] flank simply to coverit . . . . We knew that the XXIV Corps coul dnot keep up with the penetration executed b yfresh troops, so we planned our maneuver t oprovide for this expected contingency ." de lValle ltr 1955 .

" Ibid .

BATTLE'S END

MARINE TANKS shelling positions in the south, where the enemy is holed up in alast-ditch stand. (USMC 126411)

COOPERATIVE PRISONERS call upon other Japanese to surrender. Note man atwater's edge preparing to swim out to the LCI . (USA SC2095.33)

310-224 0 - 69 - 24

355

356


resistance on Kunishi Ridge, and dugin on commanding ground for the night .

In the 6th Marine Division zone, 2/2 2passed through the lines of 3/22 on18 June to attack Kuwanga Ridge . Mov-ing rapidly ahead despite steady auto-matic weapons fire, the battalion gaine da foothold on the high ground and begansimultaneous drives to the east and wes tto clear the ridge of enemy. Althoughfired upon by rifles, machine guns, an dmortars, the battalion possessed th egreater part of the ridge before mid-afternoon. At this time, General Shep-herd saw that the understrength 2/2 2was spread too thinly over the 1,800-yard-wide ridge to withstand a con-certed enemy counterattack, so heordered the 4th Marines to attach on ebattalion to the 22d for night defense ;Colonel Shapley ordered 3/4 forward .

The other two battalions of the 22 dMarines spent the day hunting down an ddestroying numerous enemy groups in-festing the reverse slopes of MezadoRidge. Forward observation posts be -came especially plagued by all sorts offire coming from these bypassed Japa-nese soldiers . Colonel Roberts, the regi-mental commander of the 22d Marines ,was killed at his OP by sniper fire at1430. The regimental executive officer ,Lieutenant Colonel August Larson, as-sumed command .

Assault forces of XXIV Corps alsomade important gains on the 18th . The96th Division push on Medeera posi-tions from the east was coordinatedwith the 1st Division attack on the sameobjective from the west. The 7th Divi-sion continued its drive with a two -pronged attack. One assault elementdashed down the reverse slope of Hill

153 to sweep past Medeera and ende dits attack at the corps boundary nearKomesu . Three battalions abreast spear-headed the second prong of the attack ,advancing slowly down the coast to-wards Mabuni . During the night of 18–19 June, at least 340 Japanese soldierswere killed in attempted infiltrationsand scattered attacks all along the TenthArmy front . 8 4

With the realization that "his Army' sfate had been sealed," 85 General Ushi-jima began spiritual and physical prepa-rations for a Samurai's death. On 16June, he sent the first of his farewel lmessages, this a report to IGHQ inTokyo, which read :

With a burning desire to destroy th earrogant enemy, the men in my comman dhave fought the invaders for almost thre emonths . We have failed to crush th eenemy, despite our death-defying resist-ance, and now we are doomed .

Since taking over this island our force shave, with the devoted support of the loca lpopulation, exerted every effort to build u pdefenses . Since the enemy landing, ou rair and land forces, working in concert ,have done everything possible to defen dthe island.

To my great regret we are no longe rable to continue the fight. For this failure Itender deepest apologies to the emperorand the people of the homeland . . . . I prayfor the souls of men killed in battle an dfor the prosperity of the Imperial Family .

Death will not quell the desire of m yspirit to defend the homeland .

With deepest appreciation of the kind-ness and cooperation of my superiors andmy colleagues in arms, I bid farewell toall of you forever.

Mitsuru Ushijima 8 6

84 Tenth Army G—2 Rpt No . 86, dtd 20Jun45 .

8 " Okinawa Operations Record, p . 133 .88 Inoguchi, Nakajima, and Pineau, Divin e

Wind, pp. 148-149 .

BATTLE' S END

357

Three days later, he sent a last mes-sage to all Thirty-second Army unitswith which he still had contact, congrat-ulating the survivors on having per-formed their "assigned mission in amanner which leaves nothing to regret"and calling upon them "to fight to th elast and die for the eternal cause o floyalty to the Emperor ." 87 General Ushi-jima then directed most of his staff offi-cers to leave the Mabuni command post ,to disguise themselves as island natives ,and to infiltrate the American lines i norder to escape to northern Okinawa .Some of his key advisors, like Colone lYahara, were assigned the mission o freaching Japan in order to report toImperial General Headquarters ; otherswere ordered to organize guerrilla oper-ations in the rear of Tenth Army tacticalunits and the Island Command . 8 8

Despite their having been thoroughlyindoctrinated with the tenets of Japa-nese military tradition, there were someenemy soldiers who did not particularl ywish to die for Emperor and Homeland .Psychological warfare teams had inter-preters and cooperative prisoners 89

broadcast surrender inducements inJapanese over loudspeakers mounted o ntanks operating at the 7th Divisionfront and on LCIs cruising up and downthe southern coast . These broadcasts

87 Okinawa Operations Record, p . 134 .88 Yahara Interrogation; Shimada Interroga-

tion.88 Commenting on this after the campaign ,

the 6th Division noted that "By far, the mostpotent propaganda messages are those com-posed by local civilians and prisoners of war ,and the most satisfactory broadcasts are thos ein which such persons are utilized . " 6th Mar-Div SAR, Ph III, chap VI, p . 13 .

successfully convinced 3,000 civilians t osurrender.

A more significant result of thes emessages occurred on 19 June, for in-stance, when 106 Japanese soldiers and283 Boeitai voluntarily laid down thei rarms and gave up in the face of the 7thDivision advance . 90 At this stage of thecampaign, the broadcasts influenced in-creasing numbers of the enemy to sur-render as the conviction that all waslost and their cause was hopeless sankinto their war-weary minds .

Their forward progress now slowe dby fleeing civilians as well as the en-trenched enemy, 7th Division troops ,nonetheless, advanced to within 200yards of the outskirts of Mabuni b ynightfall of 19 June. Tanks accompany-ing the assault infantry placed directfire on caves fronting Hill 89, not know-ing that at that very time, GeneralUshijima was giving a farewell dinnerfor his departing staff officers .

Farther inland, on the right of thedivision zone, 184th and 381st Infantryunits drove towards Medeera from thesouth and east against considerablylessened fire and resistance . Neverthe-less, small fanatic groups, defending thecomplex terrain protecting the 24th Di -vision headquarters, had to be overcomebefore the major objective could beseized. To the northwest of Medeera,96th Division soldiers pushing toward sAragachi from the north found the sameenemy reluctance to withdraw, encoun-tered elsewhere along the Tenth Armyfront, before they could reach the hig hground overlooking the village . Whileobserving the 384th Infantry fighting

eo Tenth Army G–2 Rpt No. 86, dtd 20Jun45 .

358

to gain these heights, the ADC of th e96th Division, Brigadier General Clau-dius M. Easely, was killed by enem ymachine gun fire . 9 1

The advance of IIIAC assault forceson 19 June was highlighted when the 8thMarines completely penetrated Japanes edefensive positions to reach the sea. Lesssuccessful, however, were the efforts o fthe 5th Marines in a day-long attackon Hills 79 and 81 . With a company oftanks in support, 1/5 jumped off at 073 0to take Hill 79 first and then 81 . Despit ethe direct fire placed on the initial ob-jective by the Shermans and M-7s, thebattalion was unable to take Hill 79 an dwas forced to return to positions heldthe previous night.

As he observed the course of thefighting and judged that neither Hill 79nor 81 were going to be taken, Colone lGriebel ordered 2/5 to take the latterfrom the south in order to lift some o fthe enemy pressure on 1/5 . LieutenantColonel Benedict's 2d Battalion, whichhad been relieved on Kunishi Ridge at1315 that day by 3/7, moved out in amarch column at 1515, made a wideswing to the southwest through the 8thMarines zone, and halted at a point som e300 yards southwest of Hill 79 at 1700 .Moving out some 15 minutes later, thebattalion headed towards Makabe pre-paratory to attacking Hill 81 . As the bat-talion cleared the southern slope of Hil l79 and began to maneuver across th e1,000 yards of exposed flat terrain ly-ing between that hill and Makabe, th eentire column was taken under sniperfire from the hill . Company G, in the

01 Davidson, et . al ., 96th InfDiv Hist, pp .182-183 .


lead, was forced to double time over th eentire route in order to reach somecover in Makabe. During this race fo rlife, the company sustained some cas-ualties from the fire as well as 20 ex-haustion cases .

To maintain the momentum of theattack, the battalion commander passe dCompany F through G at 1950 and hehimself accompanied the assault pla-toon, which was pinned down as soon asit attempted to move up the slope ofHill 81. The condition of his men, th elateness of the hour, and the intensityof the enemy fire compelled him to cal loff the attack and organize his battalioninto a defense perimeter near Makabe .

More satisfactory progress in the 1s tDivision advance was made by the 8thMarines . (See Map 23 .) After movingthrough 2/8 at 0800, 3/8 continuedsouth to attack Ibaru Ridge followin gan hour-long artillery preparation and a15-minute smoking of the target . At1024, the battalion was on the ridge .Quickly it reorganized and resumed it sdrive by passing Company K, 3/8 re-serve, through the initial assault ele-ments more "for the experience ratherthan for any tactical necessity ." 92 By1634, the entire battalion line was i nplace on the seacoast in its zone. The3d Battalion, 5th Marines, which hadtaken Makabe that morning, kept pacewith the rapid 2,500-yard advance of3/8 and reached the coast in its zon eat approximately the same time. With3/5 attached, Colonel Wallace's regimenttook charge of the night defense of th ecoastal zone, and tied in with the 5thMarines and the 4th Marines along a

°2 3/8 AR, p. 6, encl to 8th Mar AR .

360


curving line reaching from Komesu t othe boundary between the Marine divi-sions .

The 4th Marines made the major ef-fort of the 6th Division on 19 June, wit hthe 22d Marines mopping up behind .Colonel Shapley's battalions kept pacewith the 8th Marines most of the day ,but strongly defended enemy position sin the Kiyamu-Gusuku hill mass pre -vented the 4th from reaching the coaston the 19th . Mortar fire from defiladedemplacements behind the hill, and ma -chine gun fire as well, increased in vol-ume as the 1st and 3d Battalions move dinto the low ground leading from Ibar uRidge to the Kiyamu-Gusuku plateau .With the approach of night, the two bat-talions dug in at the foot of the steeprise leading to the hilltop . At 1845, 2/4 ,which had covered the open right flankof the regiment and had taken part i nthe attack on the ridge, was relieved b y1/29 . 9 3

Before moving into the 6th Divisionline on 20 June, the 29th Marines began

as At 1600, a POW revealed that there was a nenemy force of about 20 entrenched on thesmall island approximately 300 yards offNagusuku, and that these men were armedwith mortars and light machine guns, whichhad fired on the 4th Marines flank that day .Following a short but intense Marine artiller yconcentration on the islet, five soldiers wade dto the mainland and surrendered. One was sen tback to induce the others to do the same, bu twithout success . "The answer that came backwas a definite no, and also included a remar kthat was not exactly complimentary ." 4th MarSAR, Ph III, p . 15 . A task force, hastily organ-ized from the regimental weapons company,LVT(A)s, and the 1st War Dog Platoon,stormed the island . Five prisoners were taken,20 enemy killed, and several machine guns andmortars destroyed without a single Marinecasualty.

marching south from Oroku Peninsulaat 0800 on the 19th. Its former sectorwas then occupied by the 6th Reconnais -sance Company. At 1415, Colonel Whal-ing received orders to attack immedi-ately in coordination with the 4thMarines . The regiment jumped off fromKuwanga Ridge at 1705 with 1/29 o nthe left, 2/29 on the right . Movingrapidly against light enemy resistance ,the troops reached the Kiyamu-Gusuk uHill mass before dark and immediatelytied in with the 4th Marines for thenight.

Unperturbed by night-long disorgan-ized enemy infiltration attempts al lalong its front, the 6th Division jumpedoff with four infantry battalions abreast-3/4, 1/4, 1/29, and 2/29 from left toright—to take the hill complex on 2 0June. Again making the division maineffort was the 4th Marines, in whosezone lay Hills 72 and 80, the key terrai nfeatures on the objective . Directly infront of 1/4 line of departure was Hil l72, but the battalion could not placeenough men on the crest of that heightat one time to maintain a solid foothold .Japanese defenders hidden among thebrush and boulders lining the narrowapproach to the top frustrated all effortsto gain the hill . Tanks attempted to cuta road to the crest from the flank of th eposition, but this scheme was foile dwhen an armored dozer was completel ydestroyed by a satchel charge thrownfrom a distance of 15 feet. After a dayof bitter fighting at hand-grenade range ,the battalion dug in for the night at thesame place it had been the night before ,less than 20 yards away from the enem yon the ridge above .

BATTLE 'S END

361

on 20 June against little opposition ex-cept for heavy fire received on the leftflank of 1/29 from enfiladed positionson the reverse slope of Hill 72 . Later inthe afternoon, when General Shepher ddecided to envelope the Kiyamu-Gusukusector from the left (east), he shifte dthe boundary of the 29th Marines to theeast to include all of Ara Saki . The regi-mental line was then tied in with the 4thMarines for the night. The 29th Marinespositions barred escape to the sea fro mthe tip of the island .

On 20 June, psychological warfare de-tachments on board a LCI equipped wit ha loudspeaker broadcast surrender in-ducements to the many civilian and mili -tary personnel hiding in inaccessiblecave refuges lining the coastal cliffs . Afeeling that further resistance wasfutile as well as a sense of impendin gdoom impelled over 4,000 island nativesand some 800 soldiers to heed the mes-sage and to surrender. These POWswere then herded through the front linesbefore dark to stockades in the rear . 94

By 20 June, 1st Marine Division actioncentered about Hills 79 and 81. While1/5 and 2/5 concentrated their effort s

Steep rock cliffs, ranging from 50 to200 feet in height and covered withheavy undergrowth, faced 3/4. Since afrontal attack was clearly infeasible, th ebattalion commander sent a company tothe left through the 8th Marines zoneto take the ridge by attacking up its noseon the east ; this sector appeared to be theone most susceptible to attack. Clearingout several bunkers and numerous cavesto make way for Company L followin gin its wake, Company I mopped up th eeastern slope while Company L tied i nwith the 8th Marines in order to extendthe battalion's hold on the ridge . Bylate afternoon, 3/4 held strong positionson the left flank of Hill 72 and was read y

to close in on that strong point .

Although it was in regimental reservewhen the attack had begun, 2/4 wasalerted to support either of the othertwo assault battalions . At 1040, it wa scommitted on the right of 1/4 withorders to take Hill 80 . Attacking withtwo companies abreast, the battalio nreached its objective at approximately1230, when Company G fought its wayto the top against only moderate resist-ance. Company E, the other assault ele-ment, was held up at the base of thehill by an enemy pocket, which th ebattalion commander decided to bypass ,leaving a Company E platoon behind to

guard it . At 1520, the two-platoon com-pany passed through the right elementof Company G to seize the remainder ofHill 80 from the west . By 1645, all unitsof the battalion were on the hill an ddigging in. Possession of Hill 80 gav ethe battalion terrain commanding th eright flank of the stubbornly held Hill 72 .

On the extreme right of the division,the 29th Marines advanced to the coast

°' IIIAC G–2 PeriodicRpt No . 81, dtd 21Jun -

45 . A large number of the enemy surrendere din the zone of 3/4, which detailed some of it sMarines to strip and search the military pris-oners . Before they were escorted to the rear ,the POWs were employed to distribute the lastsupply air-drop made during the campaign .3/4 SAR, Ph III, p . 10 ; VMTB–232 WarD ,Jun45 ; AirDelSec AR . Some of the supplies i nthe drop were for 6th Division tanks, also .Pilots flying the mission reported that th etanks were so close to enemy troops that th eMarine armor was "obliged to use their flamethrowers to keep the Japanese away from th eprovisions." MAG–33 WarD, Jun45 .

362


in this area, extensive mopping up oper-ations were conducted by the 7th Ma-rines at Kunishi Ridge, the 8th Marine salong the coast north of Ara Saki, and3/5 around Komesu . These exercise sadded approximately 50 military and2,000 civilian POWs to those alreadycaptured by IIIAC forces . s 5

After 3/5 gave fire support to the 7thDivision from positions on KomesuRidge, its patrols linked up with 1/184at 1520. Physical contact was not main-tained for the night, but both battalionsoccupied high ground near Komesu andUdo and were able to cover the gap be-tween battalions by fire .

A brief but soaking downpour beforedawn turned the roads around Makab einto knee-deep quagmires, and thetanks and M–7s supporting 2/5 wereprevented from moving into positionuntil shortly before noon. A morefavorable situation existed in the 1/5zone, where tanks lumbered forward a t0730 to join the infantry in the attackon Hill 79. The battalion commanderswung the axis of attack from th enorthwest to the southeast and as-saulted the objective with three com-panies abreast. By 1300, Company C onthe right flank was 75 yards from th ehillcrest, while the other two companies ,A in the center and B on the left, wer edestroying snipers and machine gu nnests on the hillside with the aid of flam eand gun tanks . At 1635, Company Aannounced that some of its troops wereon the hill, but less than two hours laterit reported that heavy small arms fir ehad prevented it from consolidating it sslight hold with the few men available ;

"MAC G—2 PeriodicRpt, supra.

it was forced, therefore, to withdraw .In possession of most of Hill 79, 1/ 5dug in for the night, fully expecting t osecure the entire objective the next day .

At 1230, when the 2/5 tank-infantryassault on Hill 81 began, the trackedvehicles reported that road blocks i nMakabe denied them passage to the hill .An armored dozer cleared the way b y1400, and tanks moved along the roa don the corps boundary to positionswhere they could fire into the right o fHill 81 . The infantry battalion move dto and jumped off from the northernedge of Makabe at 1520 with CompaniesE on the right, F on the left, and G i nreserve. Twenty-five minutes later, Com-pany F was pinned down in the lowground south of the hill ; a smoke screenwas required to cover the evacuation ofcasualties . Company E, attacking fromthe southeast, pushed forward for about100 yards along the eastern slope of th ehill before it too was pinned down . FirstCompany F, and then G was orderedto pass through E and continue theattack. Enemy machine gun and morta rfire pinned down these two companie salso. When tanks supporting the at -tack ran out of ammunition at 191 0and withdrew, the assault companie sattempted without success to garnermore ground on their own. His troopsstymied, the battalion commander pulledthem back to more favorable positionsfor night defense .

To the left, in the XXIV Corps zone ,only two strong enemy pockets remainedat the 'end of 20 June. One was centere dabout the caves containing the Thirty-second Army headquarters in Hill 89 ,and the other was in Medeera and wes tof the village on Hills 79 and 85, which

BATTLE ' S END

363

together with Hill 81 in the 1st MarineDivision zone formed the Makabe Ridg edefenses. The last courier contact be-tween the two strongpoints was madeon the night of 20 June, after the com-mander of the 24th Division, LieutenantGeneral Amamiya, urged his soldiers "t ofight to the last man in their presentpositions." 9 0

This exhortation fell on deaf ears forthe general had few live men remainin gto defend the Medeera sector at the timeof proclamation . The 1st Marine Divi-sion had just about annihilated the 22dand 32d Regiments during its march tothe coast, and the 96th Division had de-stroyed the 89th Regiment and its rein-forcements when taking Yuza Dake an dAragachi . The only troops left to Gen-eral Amamiya were a motley conglom-eration of artillerists, drivers, medicalattendants, engineers, Boeitai, and per-sonnel from almost every headquartersunit of the forces that had made up theisland garrison on L-Day. Despite th egrowing numbers of the enemy whic hsurrendered and others who committe dsuicide, the Tenth Army still had tocontend with some Japanese who foughtto the last with fanatic determination .An attack to destroy these soldiers hold-ing the Makabe Ridge defenses wa sscheduled for noon of 21 June.

At 1027 that day, General Shepher dnotified the Tenth Army commander ,General Geiger, 97 that organized resist-

Be Okinawa Operations Record, "Record ofthe 24th Division," p . 194 .

B ' General Geiger retained command ofIIIAC during the period he temporarily com-manded the Tenth Army . LtGen Merwin H .Silverthorn comments to HistBr, HQMC, dt d250ct65.

ance had ended in the 6th Marine Divi-sion zone of action . Beginning this las tofficial day of the Okinawa campaign,the 4th Marines enveloped troublesom eHill 72. While 2/4 and 3/4 workedaround to the south of the ridge, 1/4 heldits position to support the attack by fire .Linking up at 0930, the two assault bat-talions and supporting armor workednorth to the objective, and then drov eover its top and down the reverse slope .By 1020, the Marines and both flame an dgun tanks were mopping up the lastvestiges of enemy resistance on the hill .At the tip of the island, the 29th Marinesmet only light opposition during itssweep of Ara Saki ; Company G, 2/22 ,attached to 1/29, raised the divisioncolors on the southernmost point of theisland later in the day . 9 8

Both the 7th and 8th Marines wereassigned the task of flushing out enemyholdouts in the IIIAC zone and of ac-cepting the surrender of an ever-increas-ing number of soldiers and civilians .Hill 79 was finally taken by 1/5 at 1735 ;more difficult, however, was the captur eof Hill 81 .

Although scheduled to jump off at0900, the attack of 2/5 was delayed un -til 1104 in order that tank routes coul dbe prepared and so that the battalioncould take immediate advantage of ablistering rocket barrage on the hill ob-

Be This company thus duplicated what it haddone earlier in the campaign when it had beenthe first unit to raise the same flag over thenorthernmost point on Okinawa, at Hed oMisaki . Cass, 6th MarDiv Hist, pp . 174-175 .It appears as though the 22d Marines had apredilection for securing the extremities ofisland objectives, for it had done the samething during the retaking of Guam . Lodge ,The Recapture of Guam, p . 154 .

364


jective . 99 The attack plan called forCompany E to lead the assault on thehill, and to be followed successively byCompanies F and G, which were to befed in from the left until Hill 81 wastaken. Company E encountered onlylight and scattered small arms fire as i tjumped off, and finally fought to and oc-cupied its assigned objective after hav-ing destroyed two machine gun position sthat had halted it on the way up . Almostimmediately, Company F began fightingits way up the slope to the hilltop, burn-ing out and sealing caves along theroute. Shortly thereafter, Company Gmade its tortuous trek up the incline t ojoin the other two at the top, all com-panies received heavy fire from caves ,which honeycombed the enemy position,

The effort to secure the objective wasspurred on by information received a tthe battalion CP of that Hill 81 was th elast organized enemy position on Oki-nawa ; this story later proved untrue.After having made several unsuccessfu lrequests for reinforcements, and beenordered in turn to continue the attac kwith the forces at hand, at 1430 Lieu-tenant Colonel Benedict was relieved andordered to report to the regimental com-mander. He then turned over commandof the battalion to his executive officer ,Major Richard T. Washburn. At 1500,the commander of 3/5 reported in atthe 2/5 OP and assumed joint comman dof the two battalions ; his Company Lbegan moving to Makabe soon after t osupport the attack on Hill 81 .

All companies advanced slowly dur-ing the afternoon, and as 2/5 reache dthe crest of the hill, enemy fire slackene d

as LtCol William E. Benedict ltr to CMC, dtd27Mar47.

noticeably. At 1700, all companies re-ported their portion of the objective se-cured ; all organized enemy resistancein the IIIAC zone had ended . lo o

In the XXIV Corps zone, a heavy4.2-inch mortar concentration on Hil l79 preceded the attack of 305th Infantr yelements at 1200. The crew-served weap-ons organic to the infantry battalionssupported the tank-led attack . At 1630,following an afternoon of witheringrifle and machine gun fire coming fro mcaves and pillboxes on Makabe Ridge ,the infantry launched a final, successfu lsurge to the top of the hill . Before XXIVCorps units could report the end of or-ganized resistance in the army zone ,they had to come to grips with a bitter ,last-ditch Japanese defense ; objective swere captured only after enemy defend-ers had been killed to the last man . Thesoldiers first secured Mabuni and thenHill 89. General Buckner's doctrine of"corkscrew and blowtorch" was em-ployed effectively by flame tanks anddemolition teams burning and blastingthe "palace guard" defending the caveentrances leading to General Ushijima'sheadquarters. By the end of the day,Hill 89 had been secured, and its inhab-itants were frantically attempting toescape a death by entombment . lo l

100 2/5 SAR, p. 25.

101 It was surprising that there were an yJapanese alive in the vicinity of Hill 89 at thi spoint . Discovered earlier in the month, theThirty-second Army CP had been a primetarget for TAF aircraft ever since . On 13 June ,for instance, a total of 64 planes—23 fromVMF–323, 24 from VMF-441, and 17 fromVMF–314—burned and blasted the hill and it senvirons with 124 napalm bombs and 33 55-inch rockets in less than an hour . ADCIntelSums, Jun45 .

BATTLE ' S END

365

After 82 days of bloody and bitterfighting, the rapid advance of the TenthArmy in the final stages of the campaignbrought about irrevocable collapse of allmajor Japanese opposition . GeneralGeiger could thus announce at 1305 o n21 June that the island of Okinawa ha dbeen secured by American forces. Theofficial end of the Okinawa campaignwas marked by a formal flag-raisingceremony at Tenth Army headquarter sat 1000, 22 June, attended by representa-tives of all units in that command. Asdescribed by General Smith : "A largemetal flagpole had already been erectedat Army Headquarters . . . . The onlyband available 102 was that of the 2dMarine Aircraft Wing. Prior to playingthe National Anthem," 103 the bandplayed "Anchors Aweigh," "The Ma-rines Hymn," and an appropriate Armytune. Brigadier General Lawrence E .Schick, USA, Tenth Army Deputy Chie fof Staff, read the official dispatch de-claring the end of organized resistance ,and General Geiger then gave the signa lfor the flag to be raised .

10Y Each Tenth Army division had its ownband, which participated in the campaign ac -cording to the combat functions assigned itby the parent division . None of the bandsfunctioned as musical units until after Oki-nawa had been secured . During the fighting,the bandsmen performed as stretcher bearers .

10' Smith, Personal Narrative, p . 138.

Following the official announcemen ton 21 June of the ending of organizedresistance on Okinawa, Tenth Arm yheadquarters began receiving congratu-latory messages from statesmen an dmilitary commanders throughout theworld. Though heartfelt and sincere ,none of these commendations to the menwho had fought the Battle of Okinawacould match the simple accolade be-stowed on Marines of the IIIAC by thecommander who had led them, for a sGeneral Geiger wrote :

This has been a hard campaign. Theofficers and men have simply been marve-lous . They have carried on day and night ,mud and battle, without a murmur andcould have continued had it been necessary .They have carried out every missio nassigned by the Tenth Army and havebroken through every position of theJapanese defenses which stood in thei rway in a minimum of time. The Marin eCorps can ever be proud of the two divi-sions which fought on this island. The costhas been high, but the time element wa sessential and I am sure you will be happ yto know that the Marines required n ourging to attack, attack, and again attack ,until the Japanese were completely anni-hilated. You will never know how I regretleaving the III Corps . 10 4

104 LtGen Roy S. Geiger ltr to CMC, dtd26Jun45 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondenc eFile, HistBr, HQMC) . Shortly thereafter, Gen-eral Geiger became the Commanding General,FMFPac .

366 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

MEN of the Tenth Army pay homage to their fallen leader, Lieutenant General SimonB. Buckner, Jr. (USN 80-G-498161)

SURRENDER of all Japanese forces in the Ryukyus takes place at Tenth Army head-quarters on 7 September 1945 . (USA SC211950)

CHAPTER 1 1

ICEBERG Dissolves

MOPPING UP I

With his defenses overrun and force sshattered, there was little hope of di-verting or lengthening the path leadingto the inevitable fate of his Thirty-sec-ond Army. Lieutenant General Mitsur uUshijima decided, therefore, to end hislife according to the dictates that gov-erned his living of it, the traditiona lway of the Samurai . Joining him in ful-filling his obligation to the Emperor anddying in the symbolic way of bushidowas the army chief of staff, Lieutenant

General Isamu Cho .Following a meal late on the night of

21 June, Cho and Ushijima composedtheir last farewell messages and the fol-lowing valedictory poems written in theclassic Japanese style :

The green grass of this isleWithers untimely before fall ,Yet it will grow againIn the warm spring of the Empire .

Smearing heaven and earth with our blood,We leave this world with our ammunition

gone ,Yet our souls shall come back again and

againTo guard the Empire forever . 2

' Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi ssection is derived from : Tenth Army AR;

ILIAC AR ; XXIV Corps AR ; 1st MarDiv SAR ;6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III ; 7th InfDiv AR ; 77thInfDiv OpRpt, Okinawa ; 96th InfDiv AR ; CaptRussell A . Gugeler, USA, The Operations o fthe 7th InfDiv on Okinawa, lApr-22Jun45, 3vols, n .d ., (OCMH), hereafter Gugeler, 7th

InfDiv Hist .2 Quoted in Hattori, War History, p . 131 .

At noon on 22 June, Ushijima dresse dhimself in his full field uniform an d

Cho donned a white kimono on whichhe had written "The offering of one' s

life is to fulfill the duties towards th e

Emperor and the Country . Cho, Is-amu." 3 As the two led a party of aides

and staff officers out to a ledge at th e

mouth of the cave headquarters, Cho

was quoted as saying, "Well, Command-ing General Ushijima, as the way ma y

be dark, I, Cho, will lead the way." Ushi-

jima replied, "Please do so, and I'll take

along my fan since it is getting warm." 4

Ten minutes after leaving the cave,

first Ushijima and then Cho died in th e

Japanese time-honored ritual of hara-

kiri . Each in turn bared his abdomento the knife used in the ceremonial dis-

embowelment and thrust inward ; as

each did so, there was a simultaneous

shout and flash of a sword as the head -

quarters adjutant decapitated first on egeneral and then the other. The bodies

were then secretly buried in graves pre-

pared earlier. Three days later, 32d In-

fantry patrols discovered them at the

foot of the cliff of Hill 89 where it

faced the sea. On the white beddin g

' Gugeler, 7th Inf Div Hist, p . 497. The ac-count of the deaths of the two generals in thi swork was derived from a POW interrogation .The Japanese officer who told this story hadlearned the details from other prisoners andprepared this account.

Ibid ., p. 498 .

367

368


cover which served as his winding sheetafter death, General Cho had written :

22d Day of June, 20th Year of ShowaI depart without regret, fear, shame, o r

obligations .Army Chief of Staff, Army Lt. Gen . Cho ,

IsamuAge at departure, 51 years .

At this time and place, I hereby certif ythe foregoing . 5

On 25 June also, the Imperial Genera lHeadquarters in Tokyo announced theend of Japanese operations on Okinawa ,and, in effect, of the Thirty-secondArmy. 6 IGHQ then put all of its effort sinto preparations for the defense of theHome Islands against an anticipatedAmerican invasion .

Although the commander and chiefof staff of the Thirty-second Army weredead, and many Japanese officers an denlisted men were surrendering, otherenemy soldiers both in groups and in-dividually continued a fanatic, last -ditch stand until they were destroyed.General Stilwell believed it necessary t oeliminate these isolated Japanese pock-ets to safeguard the Island Commandforces that were developing the addi-tional supply, training, airfield, and por tfacilities required to convert Okinawainto a massive base for further opera-tions against Japan. He ordered, there -fore, the Tenth Army to begin an in-tensive, coordinated mop-up of souther nOkinawa on 23 June ; 10 days wereallotted to this task .

The 1st Marines and 307th Infantrywere deployed in a line of blocking posi-tions paralleling the Naha-Yonabar u

Ibid.e Hattori, loc . cit.

highway to bar the way to enemy sol-diers who were attempting an escape t onorthern Okinawa. The American swee pnorthwards was mounted by the fiv eassault divisions that had made the fina ldrive in the south and had been on lin ewhen the war ended ; they began thesweep by merely making an about-facein position. As the soldiers and Marine sdrove towards the Tenth Army blockingpositions, they smashed all remainingenemy opposition, blew and sealed Japa -nese caves, buried all Japanese dead ,and retrieved all salvageable enemy an dfriendly equipment along the way . Tocoordinate and pace the 10-day sweep ,three phase lines were established .Flanking divisions were to guide on the96th Division as it progressed up th ecenter of the island. General Stilwell re-tained control of the entire operation .

On 30 June, in less than the time al -lotted, the mop up was successfully com -pleted. Elements of the 77th Divisio nreduced the final defensive positions ofthe 24th Division near the ruins ofMedeera ; the 96th Division thoroughl ycleaned out enemy pockets in theMedeera-Aragachi sector ; the 1st and6th Marine Divisions worked over Japa-nese survivors in the Kiyamu-Gusukuand Komesu Ridges ; and the 7th Divi-sion did the same to the Hill 89-Mabun iarea. Several brief but bloody fire fight sflared during the methodical, workman -like sweep of the objective area whenstrongly armed enemy bands triedfutilely to break through the America nline and were smashed .

Results of the sweep indicated that a nestimated 8,975 Japanese had been kille dand 2,902 military prisoners and 906labor troops had been added to those

ICEBERG DISSOLVES

369

already in Tenth Army stockades. En-emy losses for the entire Okinawa cam-paign, were placed at 107,539 counteddead and an estimated 23,764 morewhich were assumed to have been sealedin caves or buried by the Japanese them-

selves . In addition, a total of 10,755 ofthe enemy had been captured ; some ofthis number had surrendered . As theoverall Japanese casualty total of142,058 was "far above a reasonableestimate of military strength on theisland," Tenth Army intelligence agen-cies presumed that approximately 42,00 0

of these casualties were civilians thathad been unfortunately killed or

wounded in American artillery, navalgunfire, and air attacks on enemy troop sand installations while the natives ha d

been in the proximity . ?

American losses were heavy also. Thetotal reported Tenth Army casualty fig-ures were 7,374 killed or died of wounds,31,807 wounded or injured in action ,

and 239 missing . There were 26,221 non-battle casualties in addition . The combatdivisions alone reported a total of 38,006

IntelMono, pt I, sec B, chaps 2, 3 . OneJapanese source indicated that approximatel y75,000 soldiers and 50,000' Okinawan noncom-batant civilians were killed during the battl efor the island and that half of the survivorswere wounded. Okinawa Operations Record ,p . 152. A second and more recent Japaneseaccount, contradicting the casualty figuresnoted above as well as those cited by Americansources, stated that about 90,000 Japanesetroops and Okinawan volunteers were killedand that there were as many as 150,000 island

natives killed . This source said also thatslightly more than 7,800 troops had survive dthe battle, but half of these were wounded . The

other half continued to resist from under-ground positions and by operating as guer-rillas . Hattori, War History, p . 132 .

casualties of all types . 8 Between 1 Apri land 30 June, Army units received 12,277replacements ; Marine units joined11,147 Marines and naval corpsmen inthe same period .

Both British and American navalforces took heavy casualties while sup-porting and maintaining the TenthArmy. During the 82 days of groun doperations, 34 ships and craft were sunkand 368 damaged ; 763 carrier-based air-craft were lost to all causes . In addition,4,907 sailors were killed or missing inaction and 4,824 were wounded . At thetime that these losses were sustained,ships and ground antiaircraft artiller yand planes controlled or coordinated b ythe Navy claimed the destruction of7,830 Japanese aircraft and 16 combat -ant ships .°

In accordance with the planned suc-cession of operational control estab-lished for ICEBERG, 10 Headquarters,Ryukyus Area superseded the TenthArmy on 1 July 1945. At that time, Gen-eral Stilwell became a joint task forcecommander directly responsible to Ad-miral Nimitz for the defense and de-velopment of all captured islands andthe defense of the waters within 2 5miles of Okinawa . Concurrently, after

6 Sources for these figures are the appro-priate annexes in the Tenth Army AR and theARs of the combat divisions . See Appendix Mfor the final compilation by unit of all Marinecasualties .

B USSBS Campaigns, p . 331 . A Japanesesource states that 7,852 aircraft (2,393 Kami-

kazes) in both Kikusui and smallscale attack swere sent against American forces between 6April and 22 June . Of this number, 2,258 neverreturned. Hattori, War History, table facingp. 132 .

10 Tenth Army Tntv OPlan 1-45, Anx 1, p . 4 .

370


CinCPac had dissolved Task Force 31 ,Admiral Hill and his staff departed forPearl Harbor and Rear Admiral CalvinH. Cobb took over as Commander NavalForces, Ryukyus, under General Stil-well . TAF at this time came under theRyukyus command. All of these forces,and others that were to be sent to Oki-nawa, were to be commanded by Genera lStilwell . He was to coordinate and con-trol the massive effort supporting theimpending operations against the centerof the Japanese Empire. Slated to be -come a major force in carrying the ai rwar to Japan was the Tactical Ai rForce .

TAF FIGHTS 01\1 1 1

Only five days had intervened betweenthe eighth mass Kamikaze raid of27–28 May—Kikusui No. 8—and theninth, which began on the evening o f

3 June and lasted until 7 June . As be-fore, TAF fighter aircraft rose fromfields on Okinawa and Ie Shima to mee tapproximately 245 Japanese planes com-ing from the Home Islands . Americanpilots and antiaircraft artillery units

11 Unless otherwise noted, the material inthis section is derived from : CNO Record ;AirintelBuls, May-Sep45 ; CTF 51 AR ; TenthArmy Tntv OPlan 1—45 ; Tenth Army AR ; TAFWarD, Jun45 ; TAF PeriodicRpt, Jun45 ; AD CWarDs, Jun-Ju145 ; ADC Acf tOpAnalysis ,Jun45 ; ADC IntelSums, Jun45 ; ILIAC AR ;XXIV Corps AR ; 1st MarDiv SAR ; 2d MAWWarDs, Jun-Ju145 ; 6th, MarDiv SAR, Ph III ;1st Prov AAA Gru AR ; 53d AAA Brig AR ;MAG—14 WarD, Jun45 ; MAG—22 WarD ,Jun45 ; MAG—33 WarDs, Jun—Ju145 ; VMTB—131 WarD, Jun45 ; VMTB—232 WarD, Jun45 ;AirDelSec AR ; Hattori, War History ; Sherrod ,Marine Air Hist .

claimed a total of 118 enemy planesdowned during Kikusui No. 9 ; the Ma-rine pilots of TAF claimed 35 of thisnumber . l 2

At the same time that Generals Ch oand Ushijima began their suicide prepa-rations, Japanese pilots flying the fina lmass Kamikaze raid of the Okinawacampaign arrived over the island, pre -pared to die according to the philosophyof the Samurai, but in a more modernfashion. Approximately 68 of the 257aircraft launched in Kikusui No. 1 0were suiciders . The first group of raid-ers appeared over Kerama Retto on21 June at 1830, and correctly replie dto friendly recognition signals . 13 OneKamikaze dived headlong into the sea-plane tender Curtis to start night-longfires that severely damaged the ship .Shortly after, planes from this flightattacked LSM–59 as it was towing thehulk of decommissioned Barry 14 awayfrom the Kerama anchorage to act as aKamikaze decoy, and both vessels weresunk.

On 22 June, Marine pilots from MAG22 were flying a barrier combat ai rpatrol over Amami 0 Shima, when theywere jumped by approximately 60 en-

emy planes heading for Okinawa alon gthe well-travelled Kamikaze air route

12 CTF 31 AR, pt III, pp . 51—61 ; TAF WarD,Jun45. Japanese sources claim that only 54planes did not return . Hattori, War History ,table facing p . 132 .

13 CinCPac WarD, Jun45, p . 75 .1{ The APD Barry had been crashed by a

Kamikaze and gravely damaged late in May .A Navy Board of Inspection and Survey recom-mended that it be decommissioned and can-nibalized . Ibid .

ICEBERG DISSOLVES

371

from Kyushu . The skies immediatelybuzzed with a frenzy of darting and div-ing aircraft . One pilot was later heard tosay over the radio, "Come on up and hel pme, I've got a Frank and two Zekes

cornered." 15 No further word was heardfrom him, and he was later listed a s

missing.During the debriefing after this en-

gagement, the MAG–22 fliers reporte dthat the enemy had tried to decoy theminto unfavorable positions. Four of theJapanese planes were first sighted at20,000 feet, and as a division of Cor-sairs went after them, the decoy plane s

made a run for safety, but pulled up

"and dropped their belly tanks in front

of and above the Marine planes . Ourpilots had to [maneuver violently] in

order to evade the falling tanks. The

F4Us turned to press home their attack

when the larger force of enemy planes

jumped in and a general melee re-

sulted." 16 In evaluating the enemy, the

Marines reported that the Japanese pilots

flew a good, tight division formation of

four planes abreast, and "they seeme d

to be good pilots but maneuvered

poorly." 17 Of the 51 planes American s

claimed to have shot down in this en-

counter, TAF pilots listed 44 .Although MAG–14 (VMF–212, -222 ,

-223), commanded by Colonel Edward

16 MAG—22 WarD, Jun45 . The Zeke, knownearlier in the war as the Zero, was a singleengine fighter manufactured by Mitsubishi.The Frank, likewise a single engine fighterbut manufactured by Nakajima, was a newerand faster plane that appeared during the latestages of the war.

19 Ibid ." Ibid.

310-224 0 - 69 - 25

A. Montgomery, did not arrive on Oki-nawa until 8 June, too late to participat ein the "turkey shoots" against the Kami-

kaze attacks, once the group began op-erations on the 11th, its pilots and planestook part in the stepped-up tempo ofTAF strikes on such scattered targetsas Sakashima Gunto to the south of Oki -nawa, Kyushu to the north, and the coastof China to the west. On 22 June, Cap-tain Kenneth A. Walsh, an ace atGuadalcanal and winner of the Medalof Honor for achievements during th esame campaign, shot down his 21stenemy plane . In its brief combat tour i nthe Ryukyus, the group as a whol eclaimed nine kills .

Whenever the weather permitted in

June, TAF greatly expanded its offen-sive operations and strikes on outlying

targets. The primary mission of the far-

ranging American planes was to seek

out and destroy enemy planes and sup-

port installations . These operations in-

volved flights of large numbers of single

engine aircraft over water for distances

nearly equalling their maximum ranges .

Because of their long-range capability,

the P–47 Thunderbolts of the AAF

fighter squadrons attached to TAF 1 8

performed a dual role as both fighter s

and bombers. On some missions, the

P–47s bombed and strafed targets o f

opportunity as well as assigned targets ;

they escorted light, medium, and heav y

ie The 318th Fighter Group joined TAFabout 30 April and began operations from th efield on Ie Shima almost immediately there -after. The other two groups of the 301stFighter Wing arrived in Okinawa in succeed-ing months ; the 413th on 19 May and the 507th

on 24 June .

372


bomber missions after Bomber Com-mand joined TAF in June and July . 1 9

At this time, existing airfields on Oki-nawa were expanded, and new ones builtat Awase on the east coast and Chimu i nthe north in accordance with base de-velopment planning. The influx to theseand the other fields of newly joiningsquadrons increased ADC aircraftstrength from 432 planes at the begin-ning of June to 711 at the end . 20 Withthese additional aircraft, TAF mountedincreasingly stronger air attacks againstthe Japanese Home Islands . Marinefighter planes from ADC hit Kyush uinstallations for the first time o n10 June, the day before Major GeneralLouis E . Woods relieved Major GeneralMulcahy as TAF commander . 2 1

There was little change in the mis-sions of TAF, Ryukyus Command, fro mthose it had fulfilled as an agency of the

"Four AAF bomber groups of the Bomber

Command joined TAF, beginning with the 41stwhich arrived in Okinawa on 7 June . The 494thBombardment Group arrived on 24 June, the319th about 2 July, and the 11th actually on2 July.

" ADC WarD, Jun45 .

" "My assignment as General Mulcahy's re-lief was a most unexpected one for me . I was inPearl waiting to see [Major] General [Ralp hJ.] Mitchell, whom I was relieving as CG o fthe First Air Wing, then at Bougainville, whenAirFMFPac gave me immediate orders to g othere . I took off with double crews and flewcontinuously until arrival . Upon arriving, Ireported to General MacArthur's Headquarter sby dispatch . Several hours after my arrival Ireceived immediate orders to proceed to Guamand to report to Admiral Nimitz . I did asordered and Admiral Nimitz personally briefe dme, and told me to take the necessary steps tohave the ADC of TAF take over the air de-fense of the area in the very near future as

Tenth Army. On 1 July, when the com-mand change occurred, ADC assume dcomplete responsibility from TF 31 fo rthe air defense of the Ryukyus . At thistime, TAF aircraft strength was sub-stantially increased, especially by thebomber squadrons, and General Wood scould send his planes to better objectivesfurther away from Okinawa than thoseattacked previously. In its first raidunder TAF, on 1 July the 41st Bombard-ment Group sent its Mitchell bombers t oblast Kyushu . On that same day, TAFinaugurated a combat air patrol overKyushu in hope that Japanese pilotswould take off from island airdromes t oengage the American planes . Few enem ypilots rose to the occasion .

In another phase of TAF operations ,Thunderbolts began hitting Japanese in-

stallations on the China coast near th eYangtze Estuary on 1 July. A landmark

the losses from the Kamikaze attacks wer eheavy and he was going to withdraw all shipsas soon as possible . Upon my arrival [at Oki-nawa], I found that Admiral Hill and his flag -ship were responsible for the air defense of thearea, and that the ADC of TAF was reall yonly a fighter command and not responsiblefor keeping track of friendly aircraft in th earea . When I took command . . . I ordered theADC to get set up to take over the complet eresponsibility for the air defense . . . withoutdelay . . . . Why the ADC hadn't been calledupon to [keep track] of the friendly plane sin the area long before this has always bee na mystery to me, for how can an outfit provid eair defense properly unless it has full infor-mation about all friendly and enemy aircraf tin the area ?

To deepen the mystery was the fact that i thas been reliably reported to me that neithe rAirFMFPac nor Headquarters Marine Corp sknew of my being sent to Okinawa until afte rmy arrival ." Wood ltr I .

ICEBERG DISSOLVES

373

in TAF operations occurred on the 9th ,when B–24s attacked Japan from Oki-nawa. All together, the 47 heavy bomb-ers—and the 25 Mitchells and 32Thunderbolts acting as bombers ac-companying them—spread 1,880 clustersof fragmentary bombs and 280 clustersof incendiary bombs over dispersal area sand field installations of Omura airfiel don Kyushu. Another 92 Thunderboltsescorting the mission acted merely asspectators ; no enemy interceptors ap-peared .

In accordance with orders fromCinCPOA, TAF, Ryukyus was dissolve don 14 July . 22 On that date, all Marineair units reported to the 2d MAW, whichwas then designated Task Group 99.2 ,and assigned to the Ryukyus Command .AAF squadrons and groups that hadbeen temporarily assigned to TAF wer etransferred to the Far East Air Forces(FEAF), which assumed control of th emounting number of air attacks agains t

Japan .Under the Ryukyus Command, Ma-

rine squadrons continued flying thetypes of missions they had flown previ-ously, but they now ranged much furthe raway from the island than when theyhad been committed to the air defenseof ICEBERG forces. On 19 July, ADCflyers made their first visit to the Chin acoast, when 59 F4Us flew cover for T F95, then operating off the enemy-hel dlittoral . 23 At 0001, 1 August, the 2 dMAW and all of its squadrons with theexception of VMTB–131 and -232, andVMB-612,24 passed to the operational

22 TAF WarD, 1-13Ju145 .

22 2d MAW PeriodicRpt No . 1, 14-20Ju145 .2d VMB-612, commanded by Lieutenant Colo -

nel Jack R . Cram, was the first Marine bomber

29 2d MAW WarD, Jun45 .

control of FEAF ; the three other squad-

rons were assigned to the control o fFleet Air Wing 1 . 2 5

In the period 7 April through 13 July,TAF amassed a creditable record . A

Marine aviator himself, General Geigerwrote General Woods that the air sup-

port provided by TAF pilots was "out -standing and contributed materially to

a speedy and successful completion o f

the campaign ." 26 By the end of 13 July,

TAF claimed a total of 625 Japaneseplanes destroyed in the air and 29 proba -

bles ; MAG–33 pilots were the high scor -

squadron trained to operate at night employin gradar-operated bomb sights and search gear ,and to launch rockets from its PBJs (Mitchells ,twin engine bombers), the Navy-Marine Corpsdesignation for the B-25 . The squadron arrivedon Okinawa in July, and operated from Chimuairfield until the end of the war .

25 2d MAW WarD, Ju145. Before this changetook place, General Stilwell had received adifferent set of orders from CinCPac head-quarters concerning the future disposition of

the 2d MAW. According to Admiral Nimitz '

first directive, which assigned " . . . all theFighter Squadrons to the [FEAF] Fighte rCommand, and the VMTB squadrons to th e

Fleet Air Wing . That left only my [GeneralWoods] command headquarters without anyunits . . . under General Stilwell. On the las tday I was under his command, I went . . . tosee him, and told him I was a General `withoutportfolio' and asked permission to fly to Guam .I told him that I would be back in comman dof the units of the Wing or I wouldn't be back.

He wished me luck and I left . When I got to

Guam, I saw Vice Admiral [Charles H . ]

McMorris [CinCPac Chief of Staff] and afte r

some discussion all units were returned to m y

control and new orders were issued." Woods

ltr I.

374


ers with claims of having shot down 21 4enemy aircraft. 2 7

Of particular interest is the fact thatMarine night fighters came into thei rown in the air above Okinawa ;VMF (N) -533 registered claims o f35 enemy planes downed, 2S whileVMF(N)–542 claimed 17, and -543 ,11 . 29 Some overwhelming statistics ap-peared in the course of the Okinawa airoperations . For example, while flyin g118,982 hours and 38,192 sorties, TA Fpilots expended 4,102,559 rounds of .50caliber ammunition and 445,748 roundsof 20mm. In addition, the flyers released499 tons of napalm, 4,161 tons of bombs ,and 15,691 rockets . 3o

The pilots and planes of VMTB–131and -232 recorded some amazing sta-tistics during their supply drop opera-tions to ground troops . In addition tothe 70 supply sorties carrier-based air -craft flew in support of IIIAC groun dunits, the two TAF squadrons flew 76 0sorties for the Tenth Army--80 of thesewent to XXIV Corps, the rest to IIIAC .The total weight that the TBMs carrie don these missions was 668,984 pounds ;the supplies weighed 495,257 pounds ,cargo paracutes and air delivery con -

27 The pilots of the "Death Rattlers," VMF–323 commanded by Major George C . Axtell, Jr. ,contributed over half, 124 1/2 planes, to theMAG–33 score. One unusual feat in the ai rcampaign of Okinawa took place during theKamikaze attack on 22 April, when, in a 20 -minutes period, Axtell shot down five raidersand his two wingmen—Major Jefferson D .Dorroh, squadron executive officer, and Firs tLieutenant Jerry J . O'Keefe—destroyed sixand five enemy aircraft, respectively .

28 VMF(N)–533 WarDs, May-Ju145 .29 Ibid., Ju145 .

'° Ibid.

tainers took up the rest of the weight . 3 1

Handling these supplies on the carrier sfirst and at the airfields on Okinawalater was the IIIAC Air Delivery Sec-tion. Consisting of 1 officer and 82 en -listed Marines, the section was attachedto Tenth Army and worked very closel ywith the TAF squadrons .

Although seemingly prosaic whencompared to combat air patrols, supplydrop missions were very often just ashazardous. For optimum results, theAvenger pilot had to maintain an airspeed of 95 knots, very close to a stall ,at an altitude of about 250 feet whiletrying to spot a drop zone that was sup-posedly marked by colored smoke, WPgrenades, or panels, either separatelyor together . At the same time, he wasbeing fired upon by Japanese weapon sof all sorts—antiaircraft guns as well assmall arms . Some pilots had to fly underan arc of friendly artillery and navalgunfire . 3 2

In attempting to drop supplies on tar -gets, Marine aviators often found thatthe drop zone had not been properlymarked or correctly identified, or thatthe Japanese were using the same colo rof smoke that Tenth Army ground unit swere supposed to have employed . As aresult, the drop mission either wasaborted until the zone could be properlyidentified, or the pilots made an edu-cated guess—in which case, the suppliessometimes were dropped into enemyterritory .

When the drop zone was particularl ydifficult to spot, Air Liaison Parties fro m

31 AirDelSec AR, p. 2 .

2Y See discussion of LFASCU operations be -low for further comments on this problem .

ICEBERG DISSOLVES

375

the Joint Assault Signal Companies 3 3

attached to frontline infantry unit scoached the TBM pilots to their targetby radio. The primary mission of theALPs was to direct TAF and carrier-based aircraft to the target. Coordinat-ing the requests from lower echelonswere the three Marine Landing Forc eAir Support Control Units (LFASCUs )commanded by Colonel Vernon E . Me-gee. Colonel Megee wore two other hats :he was representative ashore of th eNavy Close Air Support Control Uni t(CASCU) that was on board Eldo-rado, and he commanded LFASCU—3which was the control unit at TenthArmy headquarters . LFASCU—3 co-ordinated the air requests forwarde dfrom the IIIAC infantry regiments b yLFASCU—1 and from XXIV Corpsunits by LFASCU—2. Each of thes econtrol units operated at the headquar-ters of the corps to which it was at-tached .

Although close air support technique sand the methods for their control wererudimentary at the beginning of Worl dWar II, during the latter stages of th ewar and especially on Okinawa, im-proved aircraft, proven control pro-cedures, and pilots skilled in providin gclose air support served together t omake this supporting arm one of th emost powerful that was available to theinfantry. On Okinawa, ground troops

" The JASCO was a joint Navy-Marin eCorps organization ; the naval component con-tained the shore fire control parties, whic hoperated with the frontline infantry battalions ,spotting targets for and controlling the navalgunfire support of these ground units. TheMarine ALPs functioned similarly, but con-trolled the close air support provided theinfantry.

developed great trust and confidence inthe ability of close air support tostrengthen attacks on particularly stub-born enemy strongpoints and to clearthe way for assaults in general. Sur-prisingly enough in view of the manysupport sorties flown, there were butfew instances when friendly troopswere bombed, strafed, or rocketed byaccident, even though strikes were oftenconducted less than 100 yards away fro mfriendly lines. After getting their firsttaste of what close air support could d ofor them, Army units were soon "insa-tiable in their demands ." 3 4

Throughout the course of the war i nthe Pacific, senior Marine commandersbecame and remained staunch adherentsto and supporters of the close air sup-port doctrine. As it developed, they be-came convinced that more extensive us eof the ALPs at the division, regimental ,and battalion levels would increase th equality and quantity as well as the ef-fectiveness of air support .

After the Okinawa campaign, the con-sensus of the Marine commanders pres-ent there was that, with proper commu-nications equipment and more intensiv eand complete training, ALPs coul deasily take over control of strike mis-sions from LFASCUs and "talk" th epilots directly to their targets . 35 This

" Col Vernon E . Megee quoted in Sherrod,Marine Air Hist, p . 411 .

"IIIAC AR, pp . 197—198 ; 1st MarDiv SAR,Air Support Anx ; 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph I&II ,pt X, pp . 24—26 ; CG, AirFMFPac ltr to CMC ,ser 002233, A16—3/G—3/eas, Subj : Air Support ,dtd 28Aug45, with encls A—H, Rpts of 1stMarDiv (Rein), 6th MarDiv, XXIV Corps, 7thInfDiv, 27th InfDiv, 77th InfDiv, 96th InfDiv ,and IIIAC, hereafter CG, AirFMFPac ltr .These reports duplicate the comments con-cerning air support each command made in itsOkinawa action reports.

376


procedure of direct air-ground contro lbetween ALPs and the planes abovethem had been developed by the Marin eCorps prior to the Okinawa invasion an dwas used in the 1st and 6th Marine Di -vision training cycles. Colonel Mege elater explained that this system was no tused at Okinawa because :

. . . to have permitted each battalion ai rliaison party to control striking aircraf ton a corps front of only ten miles, whe nmany simultaneous air strikes were beingrun, would obviously have led only topandemonium and grave hazard for al lthose concerned. On the other hand, whereconditions approximated those in thePhilippines, i .e ., battalion or regimenta lactions in an uncrowded area, actual con-trol of aircraft was frequently delegatedto the air liaison party.' °

After having read the comments andrecommendations of both Army and Ma-rine commanders concerning the air sup-port they received in the Okinawacampaign, Major General James T .Moore, commander of Aircraft, FleetMarine Force, Pacific, forwarded themto the Commandant of the Marine Corps .In a covering letter, General Moore rec-ommended "that Marine Air and Groundbe organized and combined under on ecommand with the primary mission ofMarine Air being the support of MarineGround Forces ." 37 This might very wel lbe interpreted as the first definitiv erecommendation made by a senior Ma -

'e Quoted in Isely and Growl, Marines an dAmphibious War, p. 567 . For the story o fMarine close air support operations in therecapture of the Philippines, see Maj Charle sW. Boggs, Jr ., Marine Aviation in the Philip -pines (Washington : HistDiv, HQMC, 1951) ;see also Garand and Strobridge, "WesternPacific Operations," passim.

37 CG, AirFMFPac ltr.

rive general for the establishment ofthe balanced air-ground amphibiousforce in readiness which has become thehallmark of the present-day MarineCorps .

That the ready acceptance of Marineaviation by Marine ground forces as anequal or supporting partner in amphib-ious operations was not an immediat ething is indicated by General Woods ,who said :

All senior ground generals in WorldWar II believed in the air-ground teambut when in the combat area, they werenever able to keep aviation under thei rcommand . Maybe it is because they gaveonly lip service to the doctrine. Even asearly as Guadalcanal, the First Wing wasnot under the command of General Vande-grift, and when the First Division left thecombat area, all [Marine] aviation unit swere left behind! 3 8

A review of Marine air activities i snot complete without mention of theMarine observation squadrons, th eVMOs. Although their exploits were notso spectacular as those of the fighterand torpedo bomber squadrons, nor thei rplanes so swift and deadly, the VMOsattached to IIIAC performed as vitallyimportant a role in the successful prose-cution of the Okinawa campaign . As-signed to the Marine components of theICEBERG forces as artillery spotters ,VMO—2, 39 -3 and -6 and their OY"Grasshoppers" were ashore and operat-ing from Okinawa fields by 3 April . Thesquadrons were soon flying other type sof missions, however, and not neces-

98 Wood ltr I.sa Until 15 April, when they returned to

Saipan, VMO–2 pilots flew missions for th e11th Marines with VMO–3, but used VMO–6planes . Tenth Army AR, chap 11, sec VI, p . 59 .

ICEBERG DISSOLVES

377

sarily for the Marine artillery regi-ments. Within two days, for example,both VMO–2 and -3 were serving a tota lof 11 Army and Marine artillery bat-talions—the equivalent of nearly threefull regiments . 40 As soon as VMO–7 ar-rived in early May, it, too, was keptbusy.

In addition to spotting missions,Grasshopper pilots and their aerial ob-servers flew photographic and reconnais-sance missions. Sometimes, line routesfor ground communications were se-lected after the observers had reporte dthe number and location of telephon epoles still standing. 4 ' In early June an duntil the end of the campaign, the VMO smade many evacuation flights . Duringthe 12-day period from 11–22 June in-clusive, VMO–7 made a total of 36 9evacuation flights from the strip behin d1st Division lines ; these were in additio nto the 243 spotting and 17 photo-recon-naissance missions flown in the sameperiod. 4 2

By the end of the Okinawa battle, thefour VMOs had flown 3,486 missions . 4 3

The most valuable of these, in the viewof artillery commanders, were the spot-ting missions. As the G–3 of IIIAC Artil-lery noted later :

If there was any group of indispensabl eofficers in IIIAC Artillery on Okinawa, i twas our air spotters. The nature of th eterrain in southern Okinawa seriously lim-ited ground observation—especially whil e

40 Air IntelBul, Jun45, p. 11 .41 Ibid .42 Ibid ., Aug-Sep45, p. 22 ; VMO—7 WarD ,

Jun45.42 Tenth Army AR, chap 11, sec VI, p . 59 .

Included in this number are the ones flown b yVMO—2 from 3—15 April .

we were fighting our way uphill on th eShuri massif . Without our AOs [AerialObservers], IIIAC Artillery would hav ebeen blind . 4 4

Colonel Henderson continued :

The courage and daring of our AOs an dthe VMO pilots was an outstanding fea-ture of the campaign . I think that VM Opilots are the unsung heroes of MarineAviation . . . .

When they wanted to really investigat esomething . . . they would go right downon the deck . Often they would fly past caveopenings at the same level so they coul dlook in and see if there was a gun there . 4 5

This tactic was most important becaus eof the difficulty that often arose in lo-cating Japanese artillery positions ,especially those sited in cave mouths .

Considered more a hindrance than asafeguard by both artillery and air sup -port units, restrictive fire Plans Negatand Victor46 greatly diminished the effectof artillery and naval gunfire bombard-ments during the early part of thecampaign. Colonel Henderson noted that

-"They were supposed to protect our ow nclose air support planes from friendlyartillery fire, but more often served toprotect the Japanese from our fire ." 4 7

In addition, the plans were invoked toooften, and then remained in effect far

" Henderson ltr.

"Ibid .48 Containing safety factors that were con-

tingent on specific danger conditions, Plan sVictor and Negat were invoked either sep-arately or jointly whenever an air strike wasto be delivered on the same target being firedupon by artillery and naval guns. The effect o fthe plans was to protect the pilots and plane sflying the close support mission . Tenth Army

Tntv OPlan 1-45, Anx 5, p . 5 .44 Henderson ltr .

378


too long. Colonel Kenneth H . Weir, com-mander of LFASCU-1, agreed in prin-ciple with this complaint. He said that"if air support units could have bee ngiven the maximum ordinates and azi-muths of the artillery and naval gunfirefalling into an area in which air strikeswere to be made," 48 in many instancesthe aircraft could have attacked o rcontinued an attack without invokin gthe restrictive fire plans . This contro-versial point was settled on 16 Maywhen Tenth Army cancelled the use ofPlans Negat and Victor, except i nunusual circumstances . 4 9

ISLAND COMMAND ACTIVITIES "

The tasks to be carried out by Islan dCommand during both the combat an dthe garrison phases of the Okinaw acampaign were more complex and stag-gering in many ways than those as-signed to other Tenth Army combatorganizations. Major General Fred C .Wallace was responsible for providingadministrative and logistic support tocombat units, executing the CinCPO Abase development plan, and assuming—when directed by Tenth Army—the re-sponsibility for the garrison and defens eof Okinawa and its outlying islands . Toachieve the objectives required in thes evarious assignments, Island Comman dhad been organized so that it woul ddirect, control, and coordinate a join ttask force comprised of a large portion

"8 Quoted in AirintelBul, Aug-Sep45, p . 24 .

4 ° Henderson ltr.

" Unless otherwise indicated, the material inthis section is derived from : IsCom AR ; Mil-GovtSec, IsCom, Histories of MilGovt Ops onOkinawa, Apr-Aug45 rpts ; 27th Inf Div OpRpt .

of the service and support troops in theTenth Army. As Tenth Army note dlater : "In effect, Island Comman d[served] as a combined Army ServiceArea and advance section of a Communi -cation Zone." 5 1

The degree and scope of the function sdelegated by Tenth Army to GeneralWallace increased in an almost directproportion to the decrease in fightin gand subsequent narrowing of the comba tzone. Before the beginning of July,Island Command controlled some 153,00 0men and had become responsible fo rthe defense and development of ever ymajor island in the entire Okinawanchain of islands . 52 Subordinate and re-porting to General Wallace were th ecommanders of Naval Operating Base ,Ryukyus ; Joint Communication Activi-ties ; Hydrographic Survey ; Army andNavy Air Bases ; Construction Troops ;Military Government ; and Ground De-fense Forces . Additionally, General Wal-lace exercised control over a large num-ber of service troops which had beenassigned directly to his headquarters .

When ICEBERG Plan Phase III op-erations against Miyako and Kikai werecancelled in late April, all base develop-ment efforts, and troops scheduled foremployment on these and other island sof the Ryukyus, were reassigned toOkinawa. In the planned revisions,

" Tenth Army AR, chap 11, sec XXVI, p . 1 .

Patrols of the 2d Marine Division recon -naissance company scouted Izena Shima—t othe north of Okinawa—from their base o nIheya Shima, on 23 June. No enemy soldier swere found ; the island held some 4,000 natives,however, who were friendly to the Americans .On 29 June, Island Command took over KumeShima, which had been captured by the FM FReconnaissance Battalion earlier in the month .

ICEBERG DISSOLVES

379

the number of airfields originallyscheduled for development on the islandwas doubled, and a corresponding in-crease in supply installations and troopstaging, rehabilitation, and trainingareas was envisioned . All of these im-pending developments, however, wereheld in abeyance until remnants of th eThirty-second Army had been destroyed .

As an example of his single-mindeddetermination to pursue the basic ob-jective, General Buckner had orderedall airfield construction units to concen-trate on maintaining and reconstructin gsupply roads to frontline organizationswhen the heavy rains and resultant mu dof late May and early June threatene dto bog down but failed to halt the TenthArmy attack . In spite of the weatherand incident delays, the first American-built airstrip on Okinawa—a 7,000-footrunway at Yontan—was completed by17 June. Before the end of the month, 5airfields were operational on the island,and 8 of the 18 proposed fields were sitedand were in the midst of being rehabili-tated or constructed to meet the needs ofthe increased numbers of newly arrivingB-29s .

Besides air base development an droad maintenance, the Island Commandengineering troops fulfilled other im-portant tasks . They widened over 160miles of existing native roads into two- ,three-, and four-lane highways to ac-commodate the burgeoning load of sup -ply and troop traffic . Island Commandalso opened new beaches, constructedpiers, and cleared dump areas to handl ethe influx of supplies to be used in th eimpending operations against Japanproper . Engineers developed a massivewater system capable of answering the

needs of hundreds of thousands of sol-diers and civilians . Other pipelines werelaid and tank farms built to handle th etankerloads of aviation fuel necessary t omaintain current and act as a reservefor projected air operations . Construc-tion of the hundreds of storage, admin-istration, and hospital buildings to b eused by invasion-bound troops paced th ebuildup elsewhere on the island .

As the end of organized resistanc eon Okinawa neared, Island Commandshifted the weight of its logistical sup-port from Tenth Army to preparation sfor approaching operations. One base de-velopment phase influenced by planne dfuture operations resulted in the pre -emption of vast areas of arable land insouthern Okinawa and on the MotobuPeninsula . Not only was the topographyof the island altered, but the way o flife, means of subsistence, and source sof sustenance of island natives wereirrevocably changed. Ejection of thenatives from generations-old familyholdings and removal of other islander sfrom more populated areas meant thatthey became, in effect, wards of theIsland Command .

The agency responsible to Island Com -mand and taking over its role as guard-ian for the displaced Okinawans wasMilitary Government. Like so many ofthe other agencies directed by GeneralWallace, this one was a joint serviceeffort . Even during the initial stages o fthe battle, military government team sfunctioned as though they were conduct -ing a "disaster relief operation," 53 inwhich they had to clear the islanders ou tof the way of the course of the fighting

" Tenth Army AR, chap 11, sec XXVII, pp .3-4 .

380


for reasons of mercy as well as for thepurpose of keeping them from hamper-ing Tenth Army operations. In this pe-riod, as the native population becameconcentrated in stockades and resettle-ment areas in northern Okinawa, theAmericans gave assistance to the Oki-nawans as the natives reconstituted thenormal functions of civil governmentand developed a self-sustaining localeconomy. Primary emphasis was on in -creased Okinawan participation in bothareas. An idea of the magnitude of thejob that was performed by a relativelysmall group of military government per-sonnel is reflected by the fact that itwas in charge of 261,115 civilians o n30 June, and 100,000 more by the endof the war.

Complementing the sweep that TenthArmy forces made in the south after th eend of organized resistance, Island Com-mand garrison forces in occupied area sof northern Okinawa conducted mop-ping-up operations, which lasted wel linto August and assumed the proportionof pitched battles at times . The majorityof the flare-ups occurred north of th eIshikawa Isthmus, garrisoned by the27th Infantry Division on 2 May. Armyforces on Kerama Retto also felt thebacklash from survivors of Japaneseunits that had been defeated but did notknow it . 6 4

G° A provisional infantry battalion, formedfrom the 870th Antiaircraft Artillery (Auto-matic Weapons) Battalion, relieved 2/305 asthe Kerama Retto garrison on 23 May. Theformer AAA gunners were given some rudi-mentary infantry training by experienced 27thInfantry Division officers and noncommissione dofficers, and then began operations which lasteduntil the end of the war to destroy the numer-ous survivors of the sea raiding battalion shidden out in the rugged hills of the island .

Upon passing to Island Command con-trol and moving to the areas in northernOkinawa formerly occupied by the 1s tand 6th Marine Divisions, the 27th Divi-sion began patrolling extensively, assist-ing the military government collectionteams, and blowing caves as well asfortified and prepared positions foun din its assigned zone of responsibility.When the toll of enemy dead rose fro man average of 3 or 4 to 15 a day an dArmy troops found evidence of increas-ing numbers of recently occupied an dprepared bivouac positions, GeneralWallace decided to make a thoroughsweep of northern Okinawa to kill o rcapture the Japanese remaining there .

On 19 May, the division began a sweep

northwards from the base of Ishikaw a

Isthmus with three regiments abreast .

Within five days, the soldiers met heav y

resistance at Onna Take, the heavily

forested hill mass rising to 1,000 feet

from the center of the isthmus . Here ,

1st Division Marines had fought guer-rillas in April while the 6th Division wa s

fighting the battle on Motobu Peninsula .

Since that time, the enemy had added to

the natural defenses of the area and

extensively fortified the region . The sol-diers fought a 10-day pitched battle her e

without benefit of air or artillery sup-port . After it was over, there was evi-

dence that a sizable number of Japanes e

had escaped the trap and headed further

north. The 27th Division continued it ssweep and followed the Japanese . The

mop up was finally completed on

4 August, when Army troops reachedHedo Misaki . The division reported atthe end of the nearly three-month drive

ICEBERG DISSOLVES

381

that it had killed over 1,000 Japanese

and captured 500 . 5 5

As the fighting on Okinawa drew to aclimax, preparations for another off-island operation began . Like Tori, Ibeya ,

and Aguni Shimas, Kume Shima had beenone of the targets originally selected for

capture during Phase III (d) of the ICE -

BERG operations . 56 The priority ofthese targets was downgraded later asthe ground campaign unfolded, and thi sphase of the ICEBERG operation wa sfinally cancelled . A Tenth Army study inlate May resulted in the choice of these

islands as radar and fighter directo r

sites. The first three were captured i nearly June, and Kume was targeted fo rseizure during the mop up phase on Oki-nawa. Largest of the outlying islandsselected for early-warning facilities—some 40 square miles in size—it i s

approximately 55 miles west of Naha .Assigned to capture the island was theFMF Amphibious Reconnaissance Bat-talion, which had been attached to Islan dCommand for garrison duty in the East -ern Islands after the Marines had seizedthem. On 21 June, the battalion was re-leased to Tenth Army control for theKume Shima assault landing. (See Map22 . )

Kume was scouted in the night of13–14 June by Company B patrols . In-formation received from capture dcivilians indicated that only a 50-man

enemy garrison held the island . Thisintelligence proved correct after thelanding on 26 June, but Company A andthe 81mm Mortar Platoon from 1/7were attached to Major Jones' 252-man

"Love, 27th Inf Div Hist, p . 649 .

"ICEBERG Study, App H .

battalion in case the Japanese force en -

countered was larger than expected .

Leaving the company from 1/7 behin dto guard the beachhead, Major Jonesand his battalion set out to contact theenemy. After five days of intensive pa-trolling, no Japanese were found andno opposition was developed . On 30 June,Jones declared the island secure . 5 7

Although the Kume assault force hadencountered no enemy in the late Jun eoperation, the garrison troops only sev-eral days later became involved in tw ofire fights with Japanese soldiers. Six ofthe enemy were killed and three of thei rfour machine guns were captured . Con-stant aggressive patrolling forced thesurvivors to scatter into the hills i nthe interior of the island, where theyoffered no threat to the successful opera-tion of air warning facilities . Air Warn-ing Squadron 11 arrived at Okinawa o n4 July, and its units were set up o nKume Shima two days later. By 12 July,the radar and fighter director sections ofthe squadron had begun operations andbeen integrated into the system con-

trolled overall by the Air Defense Con-trol Center on Okinawa . 5 8

EVALUATION OF OPERATIONS 59

As some scholars in the field of mili-tary history and tactics have noted, th e

"PhibReconBn AR, Ph III, encl A, TheAssault and Capture of Kume Shima, dtd15Aug45 .

" ADC Hist, p . 6 .

"Unless otherwise noted, the material inthis section is derived from : Tenth Army AR ;

ILIAC AR ; XXIV Corps AR; 1st MarDiv

SAR ; 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III ; Isely an dCrowl, Marines and Amphibious War .

382


Okinawa operation represents "the cul-mination of amphibious development i nthe Pacific war." 6° Shortly after theinitial landings, British observers ac-companying the ICEBERG force re-ported that "This operation was themost audacious and complex enterprisewhich has yet been undertaken by theAmerican Amphibious Forces, . . ." 6 1

And they were undoubtedly right, for"more ships were used, more troops pu tashore, more supplies transported, morebombs dropped, more naval guns firedagainst short targets" 62 than in anyprevious campaign in the Pacific. De-spite the immensity of all of the factor sinvolved in the ICEBERG operation,the Okinawa landing realistically dem-onstrated the soundness of the funda-mental amphibious doctrine that theNavy and the Marine Corps had de-veloped over the years and had tempere din the Pacific fighting . This thesis wasamplified by General Geiger, whopointed out that the battle for Okinawa"reemphasized most clearly that ou rbasic principles of tactics and tech-nique are sound, ìn the book,' and nee donly to be followed in combat ." 63

The touchstone to success at Okinawawas interservice cooperation, wher e"Army artillery supported Marine in-fantry and vice versa," and "Marin eand Army planes were used interchange-ably and operated under the same tacti-cal command," and "each contiguousinfantry unit was mutually supportingand interdependent," and finally, when

B0 Isely and Crowl, Marines and AmphibiousWar, p . 551 .

61 British Observers rpt .02 Isely and Crowl, loc . cit .e3 IIIAC AR, p . 194.

"the Navy's participation was vital t oboth throughout." 64 The target infor-mation center (TIC) was the primaryTenth Army agency that coordinated th erequest for and assignment of support-ing arms. In the TICs existing at divi-sion, regimental, and battalion levelsthroughout the Tenth Army, a central-ized target information and weaponsassignment system gave unit command-ers the ability to mass the maximu mamount of firepower on both assigne dtargets and targets of opportunity .

At each infantry echelon down to bat-talion level, the artillery liaison office rwas also in charge of the TIC andworked very closely with the operationsofficer . Utilizing previously collated in-telligence pinpointing enemy positionsand screening support requests, the TICsection head—an artillery liaison of-ficer—and the naval gunfire and ai rliaison officers allocated fire missions t oeach of the three support elements whichthey represented. A primary considera-tion in making each assignment was thecapability of the weapon or weapons t obe employed .

The target information center atIIIAC headquarters was controlled b ythe Corps Artillery commander—wh omade it one of his special staff agencie s—and its mission was to provide sup-porting arms with target information .Colonel Henderson, the operations of-ficer of IIIAC Corps Artillery, de -scribed the TIC as General Nimmer' sS–2 Section :

. . . expanded to meet the needs of artil-lery, NGF and CAS [close air support )on a 24 hour basis . The Corps Arty S— 2was the IIIAC TIO [target informatio n

84 Isely and Crowl, op. cit., p. 578 .

ICEBERG DISSOLVES

383

officer] . The working responsibility forcoordinating arty, NGF and air lay withthe Corps Arty S–3 for both planned firesand targets of opportunity .

The Corps Arty S–3, S–2 (TIO) andCorps AirO and NGFO were all located i na big hospital tent adjacent to IIIAC head-quarters most of the time. The S–3 andS–2 (TIO) had 'hot line' phones to Corp sG-3 and G-2. The Corps Arty FDC [firedirection center] and the Corps fire sup-port operations center were one and thesame facility—with NGF and air added .°5

The TIC was given radio jeeps and op-erators from the Corps Signal Battalionand Corps Artillery to man the SupportAir Request, Support Air Observation ,and Support Air Direction (SAD) radi onets . As all division and corps command -ers commented favorably on the TICsystem, Tenth Army recommended tha tit be adopted for all future operations .

In writing about the fire supportfunctions of the TIC, the commander ofthe 11th Marines noted :

For the first time in the Pacific, coordi-nation of naval gunfire and air supportwith artillery was prescribed in armyorders, a forerunner of the present FSC C[Fire Support Coordination System] .Examination of the record will show tha teach division and corps, Army and Marine ,used a different modification of it. It isworthy of note that the system used by th eFirst Marine Division was most like wha twe have today . 6 6

Until the Kamikaze threat waned inlate May and early June, most of theclose air support missions were flown bycarrier-based planes rather than theTAF aircraft on Okinawa . The latterwere too fully committed flying combatair patrols and intercepting Japanes e

e6 Henderson ltr 1965 .

B8 Brown ltr.

planes to fly strike missions until thelater stages of the campaign ; Marine-piloted Avengers on supply drops werean exception. The majority of the closesupport missions in the Okinawa cam-paign were pre-planned ; strike requestswere submitted to the LFASCUs, whichassigned them . well enough in advanceso that the strike pilots could be thor-oughly briefed before the mission wa sflown. When a ground element urgentlyneeded close air support, its air liaiso nparty submitted a request through th echain of command to the LFASCU a tcorps headquarters, which approved therequest or turned it down, if, in fact,this action had not taken place earlier a tregimental or division level .

Tenth Army unit commanders werefavorably impressed also by the aeria lsupply drop system that was of suchvital assistance to the attackers whe nsupply routes had become bogged down .They recommended that a unit similar t othe IIIAC Air Delivery Section b eformed to work with each field army o rindependent corps . Tenth Army alsorecommended that the JASCOs assigne dto each combat division be disbanded. 8 7Motivating this proposal was the feelin gthat when the marked dissimilarity i nthe training and functions of the variou scomponents of the JASCOs were takeninto account, separate air liaison, shorefire control, and shore party communica-tions parties would operate more effi -

87 It will be noted in the discussion of th eMarine division in pt VI, chap 2, infra, thatthis is what in fact took place with the publica-tion of the G-Series Tables of Organization i nlate 1945. An Assault Signal Company(ASCO) was made organic to the Marine divi-sion and placed in the division headquartersbattalion.

384


ciently. The naval gunfire spotting andliaison teams were specially commendedfor competently handling the staggeringvolume of naval shells fired in suppor tof the land forces .

The shore bombardment of Okinawaon L-Day was "the heaviest concentra-tion of naval gunfire ever delivered inthe support of the landing of troops ." 6 8Some 3,800 tons of shells poured in frombattleships, cruisers, and destroyers, an dfrom the rocket racks and mortars of thesupport vessels to explode on enem yshore targets . During most of the cam-paign, each frontline regiment was as -signed one call fire ship and one illumi-nation ship . In certain instances, such asduring the 6th Marine Division drive t othe Motobu Peninsula, each assault bat-talion had a destroyer on call . Most firesupport ships remained on station fo rthe entire campaign and were not ro-tated to other duties . As the operatio nprogressed, the quality and results oftheir shooting improved immeasurably .

On certain occasions, however, th eground units encountered intricatel ysited and deeply dug-in enemy position swhich were impregnable to even th eweight of naval gunfire salvos . At thesetimes, the Japanese positions woul dwithstand the fires of individual sup -porting arms or all of them together .Then, assault forces began a wearing -down process involving the employmentof flame and gun tanks, demolitions, an dinfantry all together in what GeneralBuckner referred to as "the corkscrewand blowtorch" method . Although artil-lery utilized every expedient conceiv-able, including the use of antiaircraft

08 Tenth Army AR, chap 11, sec V, p . 6 .

artillery guns and LVT (A) howitzer sto supplement their regular fires, theShuri and Kiyamu defenses remained in -vulnerable for long periods at a time.

One artillery weapon that was organi cto the infantry regiments and immedi-ately available for employment unde roptimum frontline conditions was the105mm self-propelled howitzer, th eM–7. This field piece was found in th e105mm howitzer (self-propelled) pla-toon containing four gun sections, whic hreplaced the 75mm howitzer (self-pro-pelled) platoon, in the regimentalweapons company when it was reorgan-ized on 1 May 1945 according to theG-series Table of Organization (T/0) .The 1st and 6th Marine Divisions hadreceived the T/O change, revampedtheir weapons companies, and were sup -plied with the M–7s before embarkingfor Okinawa . 6 9

No other Tenth Army units remainedcontinuously on line so long a period a sthe artillery battalions of both Marineand Army divisions during the battle i nsouthern Okinawa. In this period, theartillery of all six infantry divisionssupported the attack . Marine and Armycorps artillery units supplemented thefires of the 24 divisional battalions wit h12 of their own in general support .

Augmenting the Marine artillery wer ethe guns of two LVT (A) battalions,which had been organized and trained a sfield artillery before the landing . Be-

" Prior to the T/O change, the regimenta lweapons company consisted of a 75mm how-itzer (self-propelled) platoon and three 37mmgun platoons . After the new T/O went int oeffect, the company was comprised of th e105mm self-propelled howitzer platoon and tw o37mm gun platoons .

ICEBERG DISSOLVES

385

cause of its organization, each LVT (A )battalion had the fire support capabilit yof a four-battalion regiment of 75m mhowitzers .

Prior to Okinawa, General Geiger hadbecome convinced that the armore damtracs could be trained as field artil-lery and used as such immediately afterlanding on L-Day at H-Hour and unti l

direct support battalions arrived ashore .Thereafter, the LVT (A) s would rein-

force corps and divisional artillery.After landing on L-Day, the LVT (A) shad their "batteries laid and ready t oshoot for forward observers as early asH plus 30 minutes—but the Japa-nese wouldn't accommodate us with

targets ." 7 0

A total of 2,246,452 rounds were fire din support of the infantry by tanks ,LVT(A)s, M-7s, and field artillery

pieces ; this was more than triple th e

707,500 rockets, mortars, and rounds o f

5-inch shells or larger fired by the gun-

fire support ships . 71 In either case, thefigure is staggering. Because Tenth

Army had established a centralized sys-tem of target assignment and fire direc-tion, unit artillery commanders wereable to mass the fires of all their gunsthat were within the range of a specifi c

" Henderson ltr .'1 A breakdown of the first figure by type of

shell fired reveals : 75mm guns (tanks) —199,522 ; 75mm howitzers (including LVT (A)s )

- 387,112 ; 105mm howitzers (including M-7s )- 1,119,210 ; 155m howitzers—375,241 ; 155mmguns—146,359 ; 8-inch howitzers—19,008 . Be -cause of discrepancies appearing between th efigures given in the appropriate ammunitio nexpenditure sections of the section reports o fthe Tenth Army, the two corps, and the divi-sions, these totals represent those given by the

target with little effort in a minimumof time.

In an analysis of Marine artillery op-erations on Okinawa, General Geige rdiscovered that there had been instance swhen 155mm guns and howitzers wer eunable to destroy certain well-buil tJapanese defenses when called upon t odo so. Further, both corps and divisio nartillery often found it difficult to reducenatural cave positions, which fell onlyunder the direct fire of self-propelledguns or when artillery of a larger cali-ber than that found in Marine artillerybattalions were employed .

The expectation that the invasion o f

Japan would require a vastly increase d

fire potential in the existing Marine

artillery organizations led General

Geiger to recommend changes in it s

makeup. Accordingly, he proposed a newsetup consisting of a field artillery obser-

vation battalion and four group head -quarters and headquarters batteries, and

the following firing batteries : one

105mm howitzer (self-propelled) ; three

155mm howitzer ; two 155mm gun ; one

155mm gun (self-propelled) ; two 8-inch

howitzer ; one 8-inch howitzer (self -

propelled) ; and one 240mm howitzer .

unit in which a specific weapon was organic ;the reports of the LVT (A) battalions, attache dto the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions, wereincorporated within the division reports . The1st Battalion, 11th Marines, alone fired a tota lof 100,339 rounds of 75mm ammunition ,"which was the largest number of rounds fire dby Marine 75mm pack howitzer battalion inany of the Pacific campaigns during Worl d

War II ." LtCol Robert C. Hilliard commentto HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, 6Apr65 . Colone lHilliard is an artillery officer who served wit h

the 11th Marines at Okinawa .

386


General Geiger was particularly im-pressed by the penetrating and destruc-tive power of the 200-pound shell of th e8-inch howitzer when compared withthe results achieved by the 95-pound pro -jectile fired by 155mm guns andhowitzers, the largest caliber piecesorganic to Marine artillery units . TheMarine commander asked that some ofthese 8-inch battalions be included whe ntask organizations were formed forfuture scheduled Marine operationsagainst Japan scheduled for the future .

Teamwork was a most important in-gredient in the formula for reduction ofheavily fortified Japanese positions .During the course of the Okinawa cam-paign, the work of supporting arms, in-fantry-engineer, air-ground, and tank-infantry teams played a vital role in th edefeat of the enemy. Ground assaultoperations, however, were the especia lprovince of the tanks and the infantry .Concerning the armored support of 6t hDivision Marines on Okinawa, GeneralShepherd wrote that "if any one sup -porting arm can be singled out as havingcontributed more than any others dur-ing the progress of the campaign, thetank would certainly be selected ." 72 In abattle lesson issued to the Thirty-secondArmy, General Ushijima supported thi sopinion, stating that "the enemy's powerlies in his tanks. It has become obviou sthat our general battle against theAmerican forces is a battle against theirM–1 and M–4 tanks ." 7 3

In comparison with the factors limit-ing armored support during some of th e

72 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph III, pt III, p. 28 .

" Quoted in the preface to the Tank SupportAnx, 1st MarDiv SAR.

other Pacific island battles, tanks weremore widely employed, on Okinawa be -cause its terrain, for the most part ,favored armored operations. TenthArmy units lost a total of 153 tanks toaccurate enemy AT fire, vast and thicklysown minefields, and demolitions-ladenJapanese soldiers who attempted todestroy both the tanks and themselves ,but who failed in their efforts for themost part, however, because of the ac -curate fire of the infantrymen protectingthe tanks . Individual Japanese damagedseven tanks from the five Army bat-talions, disabled one from the 6th Ma-rine Division, and none in the 1stMarine Division where "the alertness ofthe covering infantry and the tankcrews prevented the successful comple-tion of these attacks ." 74

Tanks from the Army 713th ArmoredFlamethrower Battalion, the first uni tof its type to be formed and take partin sustained action, supported Armyand Marine units alike. After the cam-paign, the battalion was highly praisedfor "a consistently outstanding recordof performance ." 7 5

While covered by infantrymen andstandard tanks, flame tanks were par -

°' Ibid., pp . 23-24.

75 Ibid., p . 41 . A few tanks in each of thestandard tank battalions on Okinawa wereequipped with small, limited-range flame-throwers, which were mounted either on th eperiscope mounts or where the bow machinegun had been . Both were inferior to the gu ntube flamethrower of the 713th Armore dFlamethrower Battalion, which had "a greaterrange in addition to being an all-around bette rweapon and the most practicable of the three . "Tenth Army AR, chap 11, sec IX, p . 12 . Seealso pt VI, chap 2, infra, for a discussion ofarmored flamethrowers.

ICEBERG DISSOLVES

387

ticularly successful in burning theenemy out of rocky outcroppings, re-verse slope positions, and ruins . Thecommanders of both the XXIV Corpsand the IIIAC favored the increase demployment of flame tanks . Genera lHodge suggested the addition of twobattalions to each corps in future op-erations ; General Geiger recommende dthat one company of these tanks b emade organic to each Marine tank bat-talion .

Both Marine combat divisions ha dArmy 4.2-inch chemical mortar com-panies attached for the campaign . Thedivision commanders reported that theywere very satisfied with the perform-ance of the large-caliber mortars, whichcould furnish high angle fire on target snot otherwise suitable for 81mm mor-tars and artillery howitzers . After not-ing the successful results that hadfollowed employment of the 4 .2-inchmortars attached to his division, Gen-eral del Valle was convinced that theiraccuracy, long range, and tremendou sdestructive power were such that herecommended the inclusion of this typ eof company in the T/O of a Marinedivision .

Two other new Army support weap-ons impressed Marine leaders for thesame reasons as had the heavy mortars ;they were the 57mm and 75mm recoil -less rifles. Although neither had beenissued for testing by Marine units, norwere the rifles employed extensively bythe Army, after viewing a combat dem-onstration of the effectiveness of thenew weapons, IIIAC observers reportedthat the recoilless rifles held consider -able promise for tactical employment .General Geiger acted on this informa -

310-224 0 - 69 - 26

tion and recommended that the MarineCorps thoroughly field test both weap-ons with a view of adopting them i nplace of the 37mm guns and 2 .36-inchbazookas in the infantry regiments atthat time. 7 6

Few startling innovations to acceptedinfantry tactical methods appeared outof the Okinawa fighting. Concerningthis, General Geiger commented : "Nonew or unusual features of infantrycombat were disclosed or developed dur-ing the campaign on Okinawa whichwould tend to modify or annul curren tstandard principles or doctrines ." "Those facets of the battle sometimescited as having reflected the emergenc eof new concepts in the Pacific war—such as the employment of night attack sand refinement of tank-infantry tactics—were actually just the logical out-growth of existing tactical doctrine thatevolved after the Americans had becom efamiliar with the enemy and his wa yof fighting.

For the most part, in the early year sof the war, there was little inclination

toward night offensive action ; Marineswere too intent on tying in their linesbefore darkness in order to blunt in-

evitable Japanese counterattacks an d

infiltration of the lines. During theOkinawa campaign, however, Marin e

units took part in night operations mor eextensively than ever before, and with

a great degree of success . Approxi-mately 21 patrols and attacks wer e

mounted at night by Marines ; 13 of thi snumber were conducted by the Amphib-

40 IIIAC AR, p. 214 .

" Ibid ., p . 103 .

388


ious Reconnaissance Battalion. 78 Incommenting on this aspect of Marinetactics on Okinawa, General Geigersaid :

All night operations were characterize dby the fact that they were performed i nan orthodox manner . Previous training i nsuch maneuvers and existing doctrines o nthe subject were employed and provedsound. Daylight reconnaissance, a limitedobjective of a prominent terrain feature,explicit orders for all echelons, noise disci-pline, and contact were as prescribed i nthe training manuals . In every case sur-prise was achieved and the night attackor movement was successful. 70

Regarding the American night attacks ,Colonel Yahara commented that theywere :

. . . particularly effective, taking th eJapanese completely by surprise . TheJapanese had so accustomed themselves toceasing organized hostilities at nightfall ,and . . . reorganizing and relaxing durin gthe night that attacks in these hour s

P8 Major Jones' Marines conducted the follow -ing night patrols and operations as follows :Keise Shima, Aware Saki, Mae Shima, andKuro Shima, all pre-L-Day ; Tsugen Shima ,5—6 April ; Ike Shima, Taka Banare, HeanzaShima, and Hamahiki Shima, all 6—7 April ;Kutaka Shima, 7 April ; Minna Shima, 7—8April ; Yagachi, 20 April ; and Sesoko, 21 April .The following IIIAC units conducted nightoperations on Okinawa proper as noted : AsaKawa crossing by 22d Marines, 10 May ; Relie fof 1st Marines at Dakeshi-Wana by 5thMarines, 13—14 May ; Naha Canal crossing b y22d Marines, 29 May ; Reconnaissance of Orokuby 6th Reconnaissance Company, 2 June ;Kunishi Ridge attack by 7th Marines, 12 June ;Kunishi Ridge attack by 1st Marines, 14 June ;Kunishi Ridge relief by 22d Marines, 17 June ;and Mezado Ridge relief by 8th Marines, 1 8June .

' 9 111AC AR, p . 103.

caught them both physically and psycho -logically off-guard . 8 0

In general, a study of the Marine con -

duct of night operations on Okinaw arevealed no new, startling doctrine, forit indicated the following :

1. Orthodox methods are good methods .2. A correct estimate of the situation i s

a major contributing factor toward suc -cess.

3. Night operations need not be confine dto highly specialized units .

4. Such operations afford echelon com-manders with an excellent tactical device .

5. Present doctrine is quite satisfactor yfor the training and indoctrination oftroops . 8 1

In reviewing the success of those nightattacks launched during the Okinawacampaign, it seems surprising thatAmerican commanders did not employthis offensive tactic more often .

Immediately after the fighting forShuri had intensified, severe gaps ap-peared in the ranks of the assault ele-ments. Although replacements werefed to Tenth Army continually durin gthe course of battle, they were often to opoorly or incompletely trained to gointo the frontlines immediately . Yet ,they were needed to beef up the strengthof the hard-hit units . Nevertheless,Tenth Army issued an order to the corp scommanders directing that newly ar-riving personnel were to be indoctri-nated and oriented before assignment tofrontline units . It was very often diffi-cult to adhere to this directive, espe-cially when the situation demande d

84 Yahara Interrogation.

81 Capt James R . Stockman, "Night Opera-tions on Okinawa," Marine Corps Gazette, v .30, no . 9 (Sep46), p . 28 .

ICEBERG DISSOLVES

389

that the replacements be committed intothe lines before they were completely"shaken down . "

General Geiger "had only two divi-sions to fight" on Okinawa and foundit impossible to guarantee the "relief o ffront line divisions for rest and assimi-lation of replacements ." To remedythis, he suggested that a corps on ex-tended operations should have a trian-gular organization much like that of th eMarine divisions to provide for an"automatic reserve ." Without this, histwo Marine divisions had to remainconstantly on line until the end of theoperation. Based on the knowledg egained at Okinawa, a corps of at leastthree divisions was considered a mustfor future joint operations of a similarnature . 8 2

Some serious personnel problem sarose before and during the campaignfor Army and Marine divisions alike .Most deeply concerned was XXIVCorps, which had been deeply involve din the Philippines operation during th etime that preparations for ICEBERGwere underway. General Hodge favoredthe Marine replacement system in whichMarine replacements were attached t oand trained with infantry units duringthe preinvasion phases, and then trav-elled with these units to the target area ,where they worked as shore party labo runits until needed in the lines to replaceinfantry casualties .

Including the replacements they hadreceived before departing Pavuvu andGuadalcanal respectively, the 1st Marin eDivision landed at Okinawa approxi-mately 10 percent over T/O strength ,

ez ZIIAC AR, p . 195 .

and the 6th Marine Division arrived atthe target with a 5 percent overage .Because they had participated in th etraining and rehearsal phases of ICE -BERG, the replacements could be as -signed to line regiments when required .Most of the replacements who arrivedat Okinawa during the later stages ofthe battle had come directly from State-side. Since they were not so well trainedas the earlier replacements, the infantryunits to which they were assigned hadto divert some of their efforts to in-doctrinate and train the new arrivalsfor battle rapidly .

Possibly influenced by the Marine re-placement system, Tenth Army recom-mended that, in future operations, alarge-sized replacement company shouldbe assigned to and train with an infan-try division before an invasion, and the naccompany that division to the targetarea. General Hodge suggested thatinfantry battalions be permitted tocarry a 25-percent-strength overage tothe target, and that balanced infantryreplacement battalions, each consistingof 1,000 men, be attached to and loadedout with every invasion-bound infantr ydivision.

Both the 1st and 6th Marine Divisionscontained a large number of comba tveterans who had participated in twoor more campaigns in the Pacific . S3 Asof 30 June 1945, the 1st Marine Divisionhad 205 officers that had served over -seas 24 months or more ; over half ofthese had been in the Pacific area formore than 30 months . Nearly 3,200enlisted Marines had been in the fiel d

83 See pt II, chap 3 above, section entitle d"Training and Rehearsals."

390


for two years or more ; almost 800 ofthese had been in a combat zone for 30or more months. General del Valle con-sidered that these facts reflected th eapproach of a serious personnel an dmorale problem in the division . By thefall of 1945, 1st Marine Division per-sonnel already in or entering the two -year category "will have spent theirentire time in a coconut grove or junglewith not a single opportunity for leav eor liberty ." 84 Steps were taken later ,however, which alleviated the situationbefore it reached a crucial point . 8 5

The immediate replacement of infan-try losses was a problem common tocommanders of all assault echelons .They believed that the solution was t obe found in the establishment of asmoothly working replacement systems ,wherein replacements would be attache dto and train with an infantry unit be-fore an invasion . Experienced troopleaders knew that long hours of closelycoordinated training were needed be-fore assault and replacement organiza-tions could be considered combat ready .Arduous hours of team training servedas the basis of American successes atOkinawa. The final action report of th eTenth Army noted :

The support rendered the infantry bynaval gunfire, artillery, air and tanks wa sadequate in every respect . Without suchmagnificent support, little progress coul dhave been made by the infantry in theiradvance against the heavily organizedenemy positions in southern Okinawa . Sup-porting fires enabled the infantry to carryout the tremendous task of repeated

84 1st MarDiv SAR, PersAnx, p . 4.B3 See pt III below, section dealing with the

rotation home of combat veterans.

assaults against strongly fortified posi-tions . 8 8

Logistical planning too requiredteamwork, and the problems facing th elogistics planners reflected the magni-tude of the Okinawa operation . Con-sider for example, that in Phase I ofICEBERG alone, a total of almost 183, -000 troops and 746,850 measurementtons of cargo had to be loaded into 43 3assault transports and landing ships b y8 different subordinate embarkationcommands at 11 widely separated port sfrom Seattle to Leyte over a distanceof some 6,000 miles .

The Joint Expeditionary Force alonecontained 1,200 ships of all kinds . 87 Bythe time that the island was secured ,"About 548,000 men of the Army, Navy,and Marine Corps took part, with 31 8combatant vessels and 1,139 auxiliar yvessels exclusive of personnel landin gcraft of all types ." 88 These figurescoupled with the long distances ove rwhich supplies had to travel, create dlogistics problems of an immense naturebeyond all that which had transpiredin earlier Pacific operations .

Some concept of the size of the un-loading job at Okinawa may be seen inthe table in chapter 7, p . 240, whichdepicts the amounts of assault and firstechelon cargo unloaded in all the Cen-tral Pacific campaigns from the Gilbert sthrough Okinawa. This chart dramat-ically indicates that in the overall ton-nage of supplies and equipment un-loaded, the total for Okinawa wasalmost double that for the entir e

88 Tenth Army AR, chap 11, sec IX, p. 1 ."War Reports, p . 665.88 Ibid ., p . 664 .

ICEBERG DISSOLVES

391

Marianas operation and three time sthat for the Iwo Jima campaign . Errorsof omission and commission in the logis -tics program seemed critical at the timethat they appeared, but none was graveenough to effect the fighting for long .Some problems arising from the natureof operations began before L-Day andcontinued thereafter ; they were impor-tant enough, however, to cause uni tcommanders to comment on them andmake recommendations for improve-ment in their action reports .

In the logistics planning phase, em-barkation officers too often found thatships' characteristics data for assigne dships was incorrect or out of date ; attimes, it was either not furnished orunavailable . When division staffs bega ncompleting loading plans, they foundthat, for the uninitiated and non-special -ist, there were too many forms . Thesewere too complicated and often repeti-tive. During the loading phase, ships 'captains often received confusing andcontradictory orders, which on severaloccasions resulted in their ships arriv-ing in loading areas or appearing atplaces other than those to which theywere to have gone . In most cases, theconfusion arose from poor coordinationbetween Marine and Navy staffs .

A sequel to this liaison gap at time sappeared in the improper loading o fassault transports . The commander o fthe transport group that lifted the 1stMarine Division to the target from theRussells reported that plans for load-ing some of his ships were not evenbegun until the vessels were alongsid ewaiting to take a load . In reference tothe loading of his entire group, he alsosaid :

It can be fairly stated that these ship swere not combat loaded . It is true thatcargo was landed according to priority .However, the 60 per cent combat load a sexpressed in Transport Doctrine wa sgreatly exceeded. All ships were, in th eopinion of the squadron [TQM] 'commer-cial loaded, according to a definite prior-ity.' This was due to the fact that aninadequate number of vessels were as -signed by higher command to lift the FirstMarine Division . 89

During the preinvasion preparatoryperiod, Marine divisions, especially the6th, found the Marine Corps supplysystem on the Pacific overly cumber -some. Two basic factors aggravated thesituation. One was the fact that therelations of the Marine Supply Service ,FMFPac, to the several combat andservice commands in the Guadalcanalarea—where the greater portion o fIIIAC strength was based—causedmany delays because of the many agen-cies through which supply requisitionshad to pass before the requestor re-ceived the items requisitioned. In ad-dition the 6th Division was located to ofar away from the stocking agency ,which in this case was the 4th BaseDepot on Banika in the Russells .

General Shepherd believed :

Supply problems, many requiring writ-ten correspondence and decisions by highauthority, were not simplified by the addi-tion of another senior echelon, the SouthPacific Echelon, Fleet Marine Force, Pa-cific . The recent change in the concept ofoperations of the Corps, by which admin-istration of divisions is theoreticallydivorced from the Corps, has not benefitedthe Division. Supply and administration

88 Commander, Task Group 53 .2 (TransportGroup Baker) rpt in CNO Record, chap 7,p . 32 .

392


cannot, in practice, be separated from com-mand . 90

A built-in problem, inherent in th enature of the organization and equip-ment of a Marine division, appeare don L-Day. The initial lack of resistancebeyond the beachhead permitted thelanding of many Marines who wouldotherwise not have gone ashore unti lscheduled. This caused a shortage o flanding craft slated to move cargo tothe beaches and in turn brought abouta delay in the landing of such selecte ditems of division cargo as motor trans-port and prime movers, which wereticketed for unloading on L-Day .

The truth is that neither Marine divisionever had enough motor transportationeither to supply itself adequately or tomove its artillery. An allotment of moto rvehicles and prime movers which migh thave been sufficient to the normal smal lisland type of fighting to which Marineswere accustomed was insufficient for along operation such as Okinawa .9 1

At the end of the campaign, Generaldel Valle recommended that each infan-try regiment be furnished five prim emovers with trailers to supplementmotor transport already organic to th edivision. He also recommended that theinfantry regiments be given in additiontwo bulldozers for "initial road, trail,dump clearance . . . ." 92 The 1st Divisioncommander noted that motor transport,tractors, and engineering equipment,urgently needed for combat operation swere often deadlined for lack of spareparts. To alleviate this situation, he

80 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph I&II, chap III, p . 6 .01 Isely and Growl, Marines and Amphibious

War, p . 574 .92 1st MarDiv SAR, chap X, p . 19 .

recommended that, in future logisticalplanning, provisions should be made forthe inclusion of an ample supply ofspare parts in resupply shipments . 9 3

According to an officer who wa sdeeply involved in shore party and sup -ply operations at Okinawa :

Logistically, the touchstone of succes swas . . . interservice cooperation . In manyinstances, shortages of . . . supplies suf-fered by one service was made up b yanother service . It was a unique exampl eof the unification that was developedthroughout the campaign through the Cen-tral Pacific .9 4

In the end, hasty field expedients an dthe overwhelming superiority of Ameri-can materiel strength, as well as theinterservice collaboration, overcame an yobstacle to the capture of Okinawa thatlogistical problems may have caused .

The story of the Okinawa campaignis incomplete without a brief investi-gation of enemy tactics . Contrary to theJapanese beachhead defense doctrin eencountered in earlier Pacific landings ,when the enemy strongly defended hi sbeaches or ferociously attacked the in-vader before he could organize thebeachhead, at Okinawa, the Tenth Armymet a resistance in depth similar to tha texperienced by Americans in the Philip-pines invasion . IGHQ had ordered Gen-eral Ushijima to fight a long holdin gaction to buy the time necessary fo rJapan to complete Homeland defenses .If the Americans sustained a high attri-tion rate while attempting to batte rdown the Thirty-second Army defenses ,so much the better ; there would be thatfewer Americans in the anticipated in -

93 Ibid.

0' Blakelock ltr 1965.

ICEBERG DISSOLVES

393

vasion of Japan . From the time that theTenth Army landed over the Hagush ibeaches until it encountered the north -ern outposts of the Shuri line, it washarassed, harried, and delayed by smallprovisional units and somewhat strongerblocking forces, the latter comprised o fveteran regulars .

The fall of Saipan in 1944, if nothingelse, brought home to IGHQ the militarypotential of the United States . This losscaused the Japanese command to ac-celerate the construction of defensepositions in Japan as well as on IwoJima and Okinawa. The fast carrie rtask force air raids on Okinawa begin-ning in October 1944 spurred Genera l

Ushijima's Thirty-second Army on tostrengthen Okinawa defenses further.Beginning in mid-April, when the TenthArmy encountered the maze of con-centric defense rings encircling Shuri ,Americans became painfully aware ofthe results of these efforts .

The rugged and complex ridgelines i nthe Shuri area were defended from vas tentrenchments, from a wide variety offortified caves employed as pillboxes ,and from elaborate, multi-storied weap-ons positions and gun emplacementsthat had been gouged out of the ridge sand hills and connected by tunnels,which usually opened on the revers e

slopes . "The continued development andimprovement of cave warfare was themost outstanding feature of the enemy' stactics on Okinawa ." 9 5

Among other outstanding features o fThirty-second Army defense tactics wasthe use of a considerable amount o freinforcing artillery, mortar, and ma-

"Tenth Army AR, chap 8, p . 4.

chine gun fire . Also, the Japanese mademass Banzai charges only infrequently ,but with a hopeful view either of ex-ploiting a successful attack or of justkeeping the Americans off-balance . Theenemy did, however, fritter away hi sstrength and dwindling forces in small -sized counterattacks, which had littl echance of success and which were, inmost cases, blunted easily by the Ameri-cans .

Despite the obvious fact that hi sThirty-second Army was decisivelybeaten, General Ushijima must b ecredited with having successfully ac-complished his assigned mission . He didprovide Japan with valuable time tocomplete the homeland defense .

The final act of the Okinawa storyunfolded on 26 August 1945, when Gen-eral of the Army Douglas MacArthur—appointed earlier as Supreme Com-mander for the Allied Powers (SCAP)—authorized General Stilwell to negoti-ate the surrender of enemy garrisons i nthe Ryukyus . Responding to ordersissued by Stilwell, top enemy com-manders reported at the headquarter sof the Ryukyus command on 7 Septem-ber to sign "unconditional surrenderdocuments representing the complet ecapitulation of the Ryukyus Islands an dover 105,000 Army and Navy forces ." 9 6Witnessing the ten-minute ceremony inaddition to those officiating were Arm yand Marine infantry units and tan kplatoons, while above it all hundreds ofplanes flashed by .

"1st Information and Historical Service ,Documents Relating to the Surrender ofJapanese Garrison in the Ryukyus and th eOccupation of that Area by Elements of theTenth Army, September and October 1945, dtdDec45, attached news release .

394


In a report to the Secretary of th eNavy, Fleet Admiral Ernest J . King,CominCh, stated that "the outstandin gdevelopment of this war, in the field o fjoint undertakings, was the perfectionof amphibious operations, the mostdifficult of all operations in modern war-fare." 97 As the next to last giant step

07 War Reports, p . 658 .

leading to the defeat of Japan, the Oki-nawa invasion was a prime example ofa successful amphibious operation, an dthe culmination of all that Americanshad learned in the Pacific War in the

art of mounting a seaborne assaul t

against an enemy-held land mass. This

knowledge was to serve well in prepar-ing for the invasion of Japan .

PART III

The End of the War

CHAPTER 1

Future Operations

Following its participation in th esweep of the southern portion of Oki-nawa in June, on 2 July IIIAC wa sreleased from taking part in furthe rmop-up activities. Thereafter, corpsunits not already in the process of doin gso, moved to rehabilitation areas tha twere either on the island or at base selsewhere in the Pacific.

IIIAC was detached from Tent hArmy and came under the operationalcontrol of FMFPac on 15 July, the sam eday that the corps CP closed on Oki-nawa and opened on Guam . l During theperiod 13—18 July, Corps Troops, lessthe 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion ,a portion of IIIAC Signal Battalion, anda small detachment from the IIIACstaff redeployed to Guam. Genera lShepherd's 6th Marine Division had be-gun the move to Guam on 4 July andcompleted it on the 11th. The 8thMarines (Reinforced) had left Okinaw aon the first of the month and by 12 Julythe whole of the regiment and its rein-forcements had rejoined the 2d Marin eDivision on Saipan . IIIAC Corps Artil -

' IIIAC WarD, Ju145. On 30 June, Majo rGeneral Keller E . Rockey took over as com-mander of IIIAC, relieving General Geiger ,who shortly thereafter relieved LieutenantGeneral Holland M . Smith, Commanding Gen-eral, FMFPac . Brigadier General William A .Worton relieved Brigadier General Merwin H .Silverthorn as IIIAC Chief of Staff . Ibid. Onthe 25th, Major General Thomas E . Bourkehad relieved General Rockey as commandinggeneral of the 5th Marine Division . VACWarD, Jun45 .

lery and the 1st Marine Division re-mained on Okinawa and set up rehabili-tation camps on Motobu Peninsula .

About a thousand of General delValle's 1st Division Marines had beensent to Motobu during the last week ofJune to begin building campsites fo rthe rest of the division, which had re-mained in southern Okinawa until th eearly part of July, when the new cam pareas were ready for occupancy. Be-tween 1 and 15 July, some troops an dlight equipment were moved overlan dto Motobu ; heavy equipment was movedover a water route by way of Oroku inthe same period . On the 20th Generaldel Valle opened his CP at the Motob ucamp area . 2

Originally, the division was to hav ebeen rehabilitated in the HawaiianIslands and a number of units of therear echelon, which had remained onPavuvu, had embarked for the new restarea before the Okinawa campaign wasover ; a few had actually arrived i nHawaii before the remainder wasdiverted to Okinawa . When the rumorthat the division would remain on Oki-nawa and build its own bivouac areawas confirmed, "there was outright dis-may and discouragement in high andlow ranks ." 3 Of the six Marine divi-

1st MarDiv WarD, Ju145. Major Genera lDeWitt Peck assumed command of the divisio non 9 August, relieving General del Valle . Ibid . ,Aug45 .

' McMillan, The Old Breed, p. 424.

397

398


sions, the 1st had been away from civili-zation and in the Pacific for the longestperiod. As the troops began the displace-ment to the north :

. . . the feeling of persecution had begu nto go through its classic transformation .`Well, dammit,' said one man above th erumble of the truck, 'if they can dish itout, I can take it! '

And as he straightened the straps o fhis pack and turned to look out towardthe sea, there were grunts of belligeren tagreement behind him . 4

Even while IIIAC Marines took abreather before preparations for thefinal operation of the war, the size ofthe Corps continued to grow. MarineCorps strength on 30 June 1945 was476,709 men and women, nearly a seven-teenfold increase over the size of theCorps in July 1940 . 5 Over half of theMarines represented by the 1945 tota lwere serving overseas, most of them i nthe Pacific ; 184,800 alone were in FM Fground units. By June, final plans hadbeen initiated to commit them and otherforces in the massive assault againstJapan.

OPERATIONS OLYMPIC AN DCORONET S

While en route to Hawaii from IwoJima, General Harry Schmidt's VAC

Ibid.

CMC Rpt, 1945 .

° Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi ssection is derived from : CinCPac WarDs ,Jan-Aug45 (OAB, NHD) ; USAFMidPac G- 5Hist ; IIIAC WarDs, Jun-Aug45 ; VAC WarDs ,Apr-Aug45 ; War Reports ; McMillan, The OldBreed ; Johnston, 2d MarDiv Hist ; Aurthurand Cohlmia, 6d MarDiv Hist ; Proehl, 4thMarDiv Hist ; Conner, 5th MarDiv Hist ; Cass ,6th MarDiv Hist.

was ordered by CinCPac to begin plan-ning for Phase III (c) of Operatio nICEBERG, the invasion of Miyako Jim ain the Sakishima Gunto, southwest o fOkinawa. The VAC command postopened on Maui on 29 March, and o nthe next day its staff officers flew t oPearl Harbor for a conference atFMFPac headquarters concerning fu-ture VAC operations, primarily theMiyako Jima landing . Following thei rreturn from Iwo Jima to rest camps o nGuam and in the Hawaiian Islands, th e3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions bega na period of rehabilitation and filled i ntheir depleted ranks with replacements .Some replacement drafts that had bee nslated to restore VAC infantry regi-ments to full strength were diverted t oOkinawa, where there was an eve ngreater need for fresh troops. Within ashort period of time, other replacementsarrived, however, and the three VA Cdivisions were steadily built up .

When the Iwo Jima veterans wer erested and most infantry regimentswere again near-T/O strength, Genera lSchmidt's three divisions embarke dupon an extensive training programbased upon a VAC schedule for th eperiod 23 April to 1 July . By 1 July, allVAC units were to be ready for "am-phibious operations involving oppose dlandings on hostile shores . . . ."' Despitethe cancellation on 26 April of the Saki-shima Gunto operation, 8 VAC adhere dto the 1 July readiness date, and itsdivisions keyed their preparations tothe requirements of Operation LONG -TOM, which directed assault landings

' VAC TrngO 1-45, dtd 15Apr45 .' USAFMidPac G-5 Hist, p . 257 .

FUTURE OPERATIONS

399

on the China coast south of Shanghai .The FMFPac warning order issued VACgave a target date of 20 August, an dalso said that should this operation b ecancelled, another would take place atsome date after October.

As reflected in the CinCPOA JointStaff Study LONGTOM, issued on 2 7February 1945, 9 Admiral Nimitz' plan-ners assumed that ICEBERG had beencompleted, Luzon had been captured ,and that necessary service forces woul dbe made available for LONGTOM fromthe United States or sources outside o f

the Pacific Ocean Areas . The purpose sof LONGTOM were "to intensify ai rattacks against Japan" and "to seiz eapproaches to increase the effectivenes sof the blockade against Japan . . . ." 1 0

The assault forces assigned to LONG-TOM consisted of three Marine divi-sions in VAC, three Army infantr y

divisions in IX Corps, and two Army

parachute regiments . Once their objec-tive was captured, a garrison air forceconsisting of three Marine aircraft

groups, two Army Air Forces mediumbombardment groups, and other naval

and Marine aviation organizationswould be established. On 16 May, Cin-CPac assigned VAC the duty of develop-ing plans for a future operation basedon a Joint Staff study ; on 27 May Cin-CPac informed all of the commandsconcerned that the JCS had ordere dOperation OLYMPIC—the invasion ofsouthern Kyushu — executed on 1November 1945, and consequentl yLONGTOM was deferred for an in-

definite period. It was finally cancelled .On 31 May, CinCPac ordered Genera l

° Ibid ., p . 263 .

10 Ibid .

Schmidt to report by dispatch to theCommanding General, Sixth Army, forpurposes of planning for a future oper-ation—OLYMPIC .

The many changes in strategic plan-ning during the final year of the warwith Japan, and particularly in the las tsix months, reflected the constantlychanging aspects of the conflict itselfduring those 12 months. None of theadjustments that were made, however,deflected from the aims of the CairoDeclaration of 1943, in which the Allie sstated their determination to end thewar by forcing Japan to surrender un-conditionally. At the various major con-ferences and in their innumerable meet-ings, the wartime heads of governmen tand the Combined Chiefs of Staff were

faced with the problem of deciding jus thow Japan was to be defeated .

Events during the winter of 1944 an dspring of 1945 provided a variety of in-dications of the course that the warmight take in the Pacific in the summer

of 1945. The atomic bomb project wasnear completion but its future was un-certain . It seemed possible that Russia

would enter the Pacific battle becauseStalin had committed his country t othis action at the Yalta Conferencein February 1945, but this matterwas equally uncertain . Although thesuccessful invasion of Luzon had un-doubtedly made the collapse of Japanthat much more imminent, Americanplanners were faced with the urgent re-quirement of deciding the strategy b ywhich the enemy was to be brought to

his knees . Two of many alternativesparticularly favored by the JCS were :first, to rush the defeat of the Japanes eby continuing and intensifying the

400


existing blockade and bombardment ofthe Home Islands, and, second, to in-vade Japan and force the enemy tocapitulate when he was left with noother resource. Actually, these two con-cepts were not so much alternatives a sthey were parallel steps by which theAllies planned the defeat of Japan .

In July 1944, the JCS had submitteda proposed revision of the SEXTANTtimetable of operations against Japanto the Combined Chiefs of Staff for con-sideration at the OCTAGON Conferenceto be held at Quebec in September . 1 '

The American leaders had based theirrecommendations on one concept,among others, that envisioned an inva-sion into the industrial heart of Japa nfollowing the capture of Formosa . TheJCS stated :

While it may be possible to defeat Japanby sustained aerial bombardment and thedestruction of her sea and air forces, thiswould probably involve an unacceptabledelay. 1 2

The JCS recommendations were ac-cepted at OCTAGON, where the Com-bined Chiefs approved for planning pur-poses a new schedule of operations for1945 ; Kyushu was to be invaded inOctober and the Tokyo Plain in Decem-ber. 1 3

The Navy view of an invasion ofJapan has been stated succinctly b y

" See pt I, chap 1, supra, for a discussion ofAllied strategic planning in 1944 .

12 GCS 417/3, 11Jul44, title : Over-All Objec-tive in War Against Japan, cited in Cline ,Washington Command Post, p . 339.

"CCS 417/8, 9Sep44, title : Op for Defeatof Japan ; CCS 417/9, OCTAGON, 11Sep44,title : Over-all Objective in War AgainstJapan ; Min 173d Meeting CCS, 13Sep44, al lcited in Ibid .

Fleet Admiral William D . Leahy, Chiefof Staff to Presidents Roosevelt an dTruman, who wrote of the Quebec Con-ference :

. . . here the coming Battle of Japan wasat the top of the agenda . Nothing hadhappened to alter my conviction that th eUnited States could bring about the sur-render of Japan without a costly invasio nof the home islands . . . although the Arm ybelieved such an offensive necessary to in -sure victory. 1 4

Leahy never was in agreement withthe proposition that an invasion ofJapan was a prerequisite to a finalAllied victory, reasoning that :

A large part of the Japanese Navy wasalready on the bottom of the sea. The samewas true of Japanese shipping . There wasevery indication that our Navy woul dsoon have the rest of Tokyo's warshipssunk or out of action . The combined Navysurface and air force action by this tim ehad forced Japan into a position that mad eher early surrender inevitable . None o fus then knew the potentialities of th eatomic bomb, but it was my opinion, an dI urged it strongly in the Joint Chiefs ,that no major land invasion of the Japa-nese mainland was necessary to win th ewar . 1 5

Leahy credits the early pressure foran invasion of Japan to the Army ,which :

. . . did not appear to be able to under-stand that the Navy, with some Army ai rassistance, already had defeated Japan .The Army not only was planning a hugeland invasion of Japan, but was convincedthat we needed Russian assistance as wellto bring the war against Japan to a suc-cessful conclusion .

14 FAdm William D. Leahy, I Was There(New York : Whittlesey House, 1950), p . 2 ,hereafter Leahy, I Was There .

"Ibid., p. 245 .

FUTURE OPERATIONS

401

It did not appear to me that under th ethen existing conditions there was anynecessity for the great expenditure of lif einvolved in a ground force attack on th enumerically superior Japanese Army i nits home territory. My conclusion, withwhich the naval representatives [on JC Sand JCS planning staffs] agreed, was tha tAmerica's least expensive course of actio nwas to continue and intensify the air an dsea blockade and at the same time t ooccupy the Philippines .

I believed that a completely blockade dJapan would then fall by its own weight.Consensus of opinion of the Chiefs of Staffsupported this proposed strategy, andPresident Roosevelt approved ."

Leaders of the Army Air Forces tookthe Navy view that the Japanese coul dbe forced to surrender—without an in-vasion of the Home Islands—under th e"persuasive powers of the aerial attac kand the blockade." 17 It appeared thatother military planners, however," . . . while not discounting the possibil-ity of a sudden collapse, believed tha tsuch a cheap victory was not probable ,at least within the eighteen monthsallotted in the planning tables" estab-lished in the revised strategy agree dupon at OCTAGON . 18 In the end, th econcept that an invasion was necessaryprevailed and vigorous efforts were ap-plied in planning and preparing for it .

As the basic directive ordering the in-vasion of Japan took shape, it becameobvious that the command relationshipestablished between MacArthur an dNimitz in the Pacific in 1942 needed re -vision. Recognizing this need, the JCSdesignated MacArthur Commander in

" Ibid., p . 259 .

" Craven and Cate, Matterhorn to Nagaski,p . 703 .

18 Ibid.

Chief, Army Forces in the Pacific (Cin -CAFPac) on 3 April 1945 and gave hi mcontrol of all Army units in the Pacifi cexcept those in the North and Southeas tPacific Areas. This new appointmen twas in addition to the position he hel das commander of SWPA. Admira lNimitz was to retain his position andtitle as CinCPac–CinCPOA, and woul dhave under his control all naval re -sources in the Pacific with the exceptio nof those in the Southeast Pacific . TheTwentieth Air Force, with its B–29 sbased in the China-Burma-India Theateras well as in the areas controlled byNimitz and MacArthur, was to be sub-ject to the requirements of both com-manders under the new setup, but wouldremain under the direction of the JCS . I "In addition, the directive stipulate dthat the JCS would issue directions forfuture operations, assign missions, an dfix the command responsibility fo rmajor operations and campaigns . TheJCS also stated that hereafter Mac-Arthur would be responsible for theconduct of land campaigns and Nimitzfor naval operations .

On the same day that this directivewent out to the Pacific commanders, th eJCS sent them another operational di-rective which among other things, in-

I8 JCS 1259/4, dtd 3Apr45, cited in Ibid, p.682 ; JCS msg to CinCSWPA, CinCPac, an dCG, Twentieth AF, dtd 3Apr45 in Ibid, and inLtCol Henry G . Morgan, Jr., "Planning theDefeat of Japan: A Study of Total WarStrategy" (unpublished MS, OCMH), p . 152 .The Twentieth was a strategic air force estab-lished in 1944 to operate under the direct con-trol of the JCS. General H. H. Arnold, com-manding the AAF, was the executive agent ofthe JCS to implement its directives concernin gthe deployment of the very-long-range bombersof the Twentieth.

402


structed Nimitz to continue andcomplete the Ryukyus operations i naccordance with his earlier orders . In-cluded in this followup message was theprovision that the two theater com-manders would continue to comman dforces of the other services then allotte dto them and would not transfer thes eforces except by mutual consent or b yorder of the JCS . MacArthur was di-rected to complete the liberation of th ePhilippines, to plan to occupy NorthBorneo, and to provide Army forcesneeded by Nimitz . Both MacArthur andNimitz were to make plans for the in-vasion of Japan, cooperating with eachother in the task . 2 0

On 30 April, Admiral King proposedto the JCS that they issue the order fo rthe land-sea-air assault of Kyushu . 2 1

Less than a month later, on 25 May, th eJCS issued the order setting forth theprovisions for Operation OLYMPIC an dassigned a target date of 1 Novembe r1945 for the invasion . 2 2

This document presupposed that Ja-pan would be forced to surrender un-conditionally as the Allies lowered bothits will and its ability to resist, and asthe Allies later seized objectives in theindustrial heartland of Honshu . The de -feat of Japan would be accomplished i ntwo steps . The first, OLYMPIC, was theinvasion of Kyushu on 1 November,which was designed to isolate this south-ernmost island of the Japanese chain ,

2° JCS msg to CinCSWPA, CinCPac, and CG,Twentieth AF, dtd 3Apr45, cited in supra .

CominCh—CNO Memo to JCS, "Propose dIssue of ÒLYMPIC' Directive," dtd 30Apr45 .(OAB, NHD )

=' JCS 1331/3, dtd 25May45, cited in Cravenand Cate, Matterhorn to Nagasaki, p . 686.

destroy the enemy forces there, and cap-ture the airfields and bases required tosupport the second step, Operatio nCORONET—the invasion of Honshu ,tentatively set for March 1946 .

At a series of White House confer-ences following the issuance of the 2 5May directive, its contents were dis-cussed but not altered appreciably . TheJCS determined at their 14 June meet-ing that, pending the approval of Presi-dent Truman, the invasion and seizure ofobjectives in the Home Islands woul dconstitute the major effort in OLYMPI Cand that no other operations would b econsidered if they did not contributesubstantially to the success of the Kyu-shu landings. On the other hand, theJCS agreed that while preparations forthe invasion were taking place, aeria land naval blockades and bombardmentsof Japan were "to be maintained withall possible vigor ." 2 3

In their meeting with the Presiden ton 18 June, both Marshall and Kin gstrongly recommended an invasion ofKyushu at the earliest possible date . Ad-miral King had evidently modified hi spreference for an invasion of the Chinacoast in the vicinity of Amoy, and de-cided to go along with Marshall inrecommending the landings on Kyu-shu . 24 In accepting Marshall's views ,King noted that the more he had studie dthe matter, the more he was impressedwith the strategic location of Kyushu,whose capture he deemed a necessaryprerequisite to any siege operation sagainst the rest of Japan. 2 5

23 King and Whitehill, King's Naval Record,p . 605 .

=' Leahy, I Was There, p. 384 .King and Whitehill, op . cit ., p. 606 .

FUTURE OPERATIONS

403

Despite his concurrence in the plansfor the Kyushu landings, King retainedhis earlier belief that Japan could bedefeated by the sea-air power combina-tion and without the necessity of inva-sion. He was fully aware of the fact thatplanning for an amphibious operatio nwas a slow and painstaking process, andposed no objection to the preparation ofcontingency plans for the invasions ofKyushu and the Tokyo Plain . It was ap-parently for this reason that in June1945 he joined in the majority decisio nof the JCS "to make plans for the inva-sion and seizure of objectives in theJapanese home islands without sharingthe Army conviction that such opera-tions were necessary." 2 6

Marshall advanced the opinion tha tOLYMPIC "would not cost us more tha n63,000 casualties of the 193,000 com-batant troops estimated as necessary fo rthe operation ." 27 After hearing all argu-ments and absorbing the estimates ,President Truman approved the Kyushuoperation, but withheld his approval ofa general invasion of Japan for consider-ation at a later date. He also said that hewas in complete favor with any planthat would defeat the enemy with thesmallest loss possible of American lives ."It wasn't a matter of dollars . It migh trequire more time—and more dollars—ifwe did not invade Japan . But it wouldcost fewer lives ." 28 On 29 June, the JC Smet again to prepare the military agend afor the impending Potsdam Conference,and firmly set 1 November as the date

for OLYMPIC29

2e Ibid., p. 605n .27 Leahy, op . cit ., p . 384 .

26 Ibid., p . 385 .2e King and Whitehill, op . cit., p . 606 .

310-224 0 - 69 - 27

The JCS charged General of the ArmyMacArthur, 30 in his capacity asCinCAFPac/CinCSWPA, with the pri-mary responsibility for conducting Op-eration OLYMPIC including control, i ncase of exigencies, of the actual am-phibious assault through the appropriatenaval commander . In addition, Mac-Arthur was to make plans and prepara-tions for continuing the campaign i nJapan and to cooperate with Flee tAdmiral Nimitz in planning and prepar-ing for the naval and amphibious phasesof this aspect of OLYMPIC .

On his part, CinCPac was responsibl efor the conduct of the naval and am-phibious phases of OLYMPIC, subjec tto the JCS-imposed provision concernin gexigencies. Nimitz was required to cor-relate with and assist MacArthur in thepreparation and planning for the cam-paign in Japan and its conduct. TheJCS directive of 25 May enjoined bothsenior commanders to remember that"The land campaign and requirements

. . . are primary in the OLYMPIC Opera-tion. Account of this will be taken i nthe preparation, coordination and exe-cution of plans ." 31

Prior to publication of this JCS order ,

representatives of MacArthur and Nim-itz had met in Manila on 16 May 1945 to

3e On 11 December 1944, Congress hadauthorized President Roosevelt to appoint fourFleet Admirals and four Generals of the Army .The President immediately named King, Leahy ,and Nimitz to the naval five-star rank, andMarshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower, and Arnoldto the corresponding Army grade . Halsey wa snamed later as the fourth fleet admiral . Ibid. ,p . 582.

31 JCS 1331/3, dtd 25May45, cited in Cravenand Cate, Matterhorn to Nagasaki, p . 686.

404


discuss OLYMPIC plans and prepara-tions. Especially, they were to establis hfor the record a set of principles o rdivision of responsibilities that woul dgovern whatever action would be take nby either commander or his deputies i norganizing for the invasion of Japan .Primarily, these principles concerne dimpending and future deployments, at-tachments and detachments from bothcommands, and logistical plans andtroop buildup tasks charged to eachcommander . 32 Upon mutual agreementof these coordinating decisions and afterthe publication of the JCS implementingorder for OLYMPIC, the stage wa sfairly well set for the moves that wouldlead to the invasion itself .

Assigned to conduct the Kyushu land-

ings was General Walter Krueger, USA ,and his Sixth Army . The following unitscomprised the OLYMPIC assault force :I Corps, V Amphibious Corps, IX Corps ,XI Corps, 40th Infantry Division, 11t hAirborne Division, 158th Regimenta lCombat Team, Sixth Army Troops, an dArmy Service Command OLYMPIC . In-cluding the personnel in aviation an dfollow-up echelons, a total of 815,54 8troops was to participate in the opera-tion . 3 3

The fast carrier task groups of Ad-miral Halsey's Third Fleet were to pro -vide strategic support for the landingswhile Admiral Spruance's Fifth Flee tconducted the operations immediatel yconcerned with the seizure and occupa-

" CinCPac WarD, May45 .

" Sixth Army F1dO 74, dtd 28May45, An x3 ; CinCAFPac Staff Study—OLYMPIC Op-erations—Southern Kyushu, dtd 28May45.

tion of beaches in southern Kyushu. 3 4

Quite simply, the overall OLYMPICscheme of maneuver called for three o fthe four corps assigned to the SixthArmy to make separate landings on theeast and west coasts of the southerntip of Kyushu on 1 November, X-Day .(See Map 24.) The fourth corps woul dnot land until at least X plus 3 ; it wasto prepare to make a contingent landingor to reinforce other landing forces onorder. After they had captured thebeachheads, the landing forces were t ofan out, link up, and drive northwardto form a line from Sendai to Tsuno .After this deployment had been accom-plished, further operations were to b ebased on expediency influenced by thecourse of events . 35 Because the primaryobjectives of OLYMPIC forces were air -fields and sites for the establishment ofbases to be used for staging and mount-ing CORONET, the conquest of theentire island of Kyushu did not appearnecessary . On the other hand, becauseplans for the conduct of the campaignafter the establishment of the Sendai-Tsuno line were fluid, the possibilitythat all of Kyushu could or should b ecaptured was not excluded .

The most critical part of the amphib-ious phase of OLYMPIC, aside from th e

" CinCPac-CinCPOA Joint Staff Stud yKyushu Island for OLYMPIC, Ser 0005081, dt d18Jun45, App C. For OLYMPIC, the Thirdand Fifth Fleets, which previously had beenalternative organizational titles for much thesame groupment of ships, became separateentities .

" A chief source, in addition to the OLYM-PIC plan and the operation orders based onthis plan, has been Drs . K. Jack Bauer andAlvin D. Coox, "Olympic vs Ketsu-Go," MarineCorps Gazette, v. 49, no . 8 (Aug65), p . 32 if .

406


assault itself, was thought to be thecapture of Kagoshima, near the south-western tip of Kyushu. The importanc eof this objective lay in the fact that theAmerican planners had selected enor-mous Kagoshima Bay to become theprimary port through which troops andsupplies intended for the buildup ofCORONET would pass . In addition, Ka-goshima and its landlocked bay were t oserve as an advanced naval base.

The Kyushu landings were not ex-pected to be easy, for all intelligenceestimates had predicted that the islan dwould be heavily defended . Japanesestrength on Kyushu was placed at450,000 troops, of whom nearly hal fwere deployed south of a line betweenMinamata and Nobeoka . Intelligenceagencies believed that another three orfour divisions were in the northernmos tportion of the island and available a sreinforcements, and that other troop scould be brought over from Honshu .OLYMPIC planners did not expect tha tthis reinforcement would be a facto rto be concerned with, since the enem ywould undoubtedly be reluctant to re -lease any of the forces needed on Honshuto defend against future landings there .The Americans also expected that theJapanese would exploit the complexmountainous terrain inland of Kyushuand build formidable defenses to be heldby the existing garrison force .

Besides the resistance anticipatedfrom Japanese ground forces, OLYM-PIC intelligence estimates indicated tha tthe enemy had approximately 5,00 0Kamikaze planes and pilots availabl ewith which to attack the landing forces .Although most of the Special Attacksquadrons, like a portion of the ground

units, would be withheld for the defens eof Honshu, 60 airfields—and 5 more un-der construction—had been spotted o nKyushu ; 22 of these were located sout hof the Sendai-Tsuno line . The Japaneseresponse to American air attacks on th eHome Islands in the latter period of theOkinawa campaign and following it sconclusion indicated that the enem yeither did not have the available ai rstrength or the will to fight, or that helacked both . Another possibility was thatJapan was husbanding its resources fora massive air attack on the anticipatedAmerican invasion forces . The reportedJapanese air strength and the number offields on which it was based led OLYM-PIC planners to believe that enemy airposed a real threat to the landings . Re-ports of the presence of numerous sui-cide submarine and boat bases on th ecoasts of Kyushu led the Americans toexpect trouble from these craft duringthe assault phase of the operation .

Admiral Spruance's Fifth Fleet, a scomposed for OLYMPIC, was the largestand most formidable array of its kindyet to appear in the Pacific war . It con-tained two groups of fast carriers, agunfire support and covering force, a nescort carrier force, and a compositeforce containing the Third, Fifth, andSeventh Amphibious Forces . This wasthe first time in the war that threeamphibious forces had been assigned toa single operation. The Fifth Fleet alsocontained a minecraft group and a largeassortment of service units .

Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet wa scomprised of the Second Carrier TaskForce and the British Carrier TaskForce as well as numerous supportingelements . First of the OLYMPIC forces

FUTURE OPERATIONS

407

to go into action before the invasion, theThird Fleet was to make widespread at -tacks on all of the Home Islands in theperiod between 28 July and 23 Octoberto destroy the Japanese air potential ,

interdict communications between Kyu-shu and Honshu, and to sink anythingthat was afloat. For 10 days in thispreinvasion period, the British contin-gent would strike at the Hong Kong-Canton area. From X minus 14 to Xminus 8, the Third Fleet would concen-trate on targets in and around Honshu ,Kyushu, and Shikoku to create a diver-sion and to isolate the scene of the im-pending invasion. On 23 October, air -craft from two of Halsey's carrier taskgroups were to join Fifth Fleet plane sin a series of last-minute strikesagainst targets in the landing zone whil ethe rest of the Third Fleet would con-tinue to pound installations and target sof opportunity along the Japanese coast -lines. When directed by CinCPac afterX-Day, Halsey's two groups would b ereturned to the Third Fleet. 3 6

Third Fleet aircraft were to operat egenerally east of a boundary drawndown Honshu to the eastern tip of Shi-koku. Attacks west of that line anddiversionary strikes along the Chinacoast would be flown by the Far EastAir Forces (which included the Fifth,Seventh, and Thirteenth Air Forces andthe 2d Marine Aircraft Wing) com-manded by General George C . Kenneyfrom a forward CP established on Oki-nawa. In the period following X minu s10, FEAF was to cut communication sbetween the target area and northern

Kyushu. When the ground forces ha d

38 CinCPac OPlan 1E-45, dtd 8Aug45, p . 8(OAB, NHD) .

seized the beachhead and had seized o rbuilt airfields inland, and when a suf-ficiently large garrison force had lande dand was ready to maintain airfields an daircraft, Kenney would take over airsupport of the ground forces from theNavy.

Differing only in the size of the force sand the area involved, preinvasion op-erations would be conducted along thesame successful patterns that ha devolved from other Marine and Armylandings in the Pacific . Because the in-vasion of Kerama Retto prior to that o fOkinawa had demonstrated the value o fobtaining a base on islands that wereoffshore of the major target, OLYMPICplans provided for the seizure of Ko-shiki Retto and other small islands westof Kyushu on X minus 5 by the 40thInfantry Division . The OLYMPIC di-rective provided also for the capture o fthe northern portion of Tanegashima-south of Kyushu—by the 158th RCT o nor after X minus 5 if Japanese guns o nthe island threatened minesweeping op-erations. If they did not, the RCT woul dland as a reinforcing element on Xplus 3 .

Most of the Army troops assigned toland on X-Day would mount out of, re-hearse, and stage in the Philippines ; theMarines would hold rehearsals in theMarianas after their units mounted ou tof that area and the Hawaiian Islands .Because the assault forces were to landon three different and widely separatedbeaches, there were to be three differen tH-Hours .

At 0600 on X-Day, Admiral Turner'sadvance force, after conducting pre -invasion operations was to be absorbe dby Task Force 40, OLYMPIC Amphib-

408


ious Force, also commanded by Turner .At some time shortly thereafter," thethree attack forces would land theirlanding forces .

The Third Attack Force (Third Am-phibious Force, Vice Admiral TheodoreS. Wilkinson) was to land XI Corps (1s tCavalry, 43d Infantry, and AmericalDivisions) on the east coast of Kyushuon the beaches at the head of AriakeWan in the Shibushi-Koshiwabaru area .After the consolidation of the beach -head and the capture of Shibushi and it sairfield, XI Corps was to drive inlan dand to the north to make contact wit hI Corps. Upon establishing contact, thetwo corps, and VAC also, would forma line and advance northwards to es-tablish the Sendai-Tsuno line. (See Map24 . )

North of the XI Corps beachhead, ICorps (25th, 33d, and 41st InfantryDivisions) was to be landed by theSeventh Attack Force (Seventh Am-phibious Force, Vice Admiral Daniel E .Barbey) on beaches in the vicinity ofMiyazaki to secure a beachhead in theYamazaki-Matsuzaki area . I Corps wasthen to push inland and to the northtogether with XI Corps .

The third OLYMPIC landing, and theonly one to be conducted on the westcoast, was that of General Schmidt' sVAC (2d, 3d, and 5th Marine Divi-sions), which was to be lifted to th etarget by the Fifth Attack Force (FifthAmphibious Force, Vice Admiral HarryW. Hill) . Following its seizure of th eKushikino-Kaminokawa beaches, th eassault Marines would fan out to exten d

" The exact time for the three major land-ings had not yet been determined when OLYM-PIC planning ended .

the beachhead to Sendai. In addition ,VAC forces were to set up a line be-tween Sendai and Kagoshima to bloc kany Japanese drive down the west coas tand the southwestern leg of Kyushu .After consolidating the beachhead, VA Cwould join the other two corps in th egeneral drive to the north .

Besides the X-Day landings, OLYM-PIC plans called for the reserve force ,IX Corps (77th, 81st, and 98th Infan-try Divisions) , to land in the vicinit yof Kaimon-Dake on X plus 3 or later ,depending on the situation ashore . Oncethe whole of IX Corps had landed, i twould clear the southwestern shore ofKagoshima Wan and prepare FEA Ffacilities and installations for otherOLYMPIC garrison units .

The 13 assault divisions of the OLYM-PIC force would carry the full burde nof the fighting until on or after X plus 22(23 November), when the 11th Airborn eDivision, Sixth Army reserve afloat, wa sscheduled to be off Kyushu and ready toland. General Krueger's planners be-lieved that, based on intelligence esti-mates of the size of the Japanese de-fense forces, Sixth Army combatstrength would be superior to that ofthe enemy and would be able to advanc eto the Sendai-Tsuno line .

The war ended while CORONET wasstill in the planning stages and therewas little material distributed on thatoperation . A broad outline had beendrawn, however, which established thattwo armies, the Eighth and Tenth, num-bering nine infantry and two armoreddivisions and three Marine Divisions ofIIIAC, would land on the Pacific beachesof Honshu leading to the Kanto Plain—between Choshi and Ichinomaya—in

FUTURE OPERATIONS

409

March 1946 . Immediately following theassault armies ashore would be the Firs tArmy, redeployed from Europe, withone airborne and ten infantry divisions .The primary objectives of CORONE Twere to crush Japanese resistance on th eplain and to occupy the Tokyo-Yoko-hama area. If the accomplishment ofthese objectives did not force the enemyto surrender, the three armies were tofan out and secure the rest of the HomeIslands. Ultimately, an air garriso nequalling 50 groups was to support thesefinal operations .

On 2 June 1945, shortly after receip tof the OLYMPIC plan, VAC reported t othe commander of the Sixth Army fo rfurther orders in the impending Kyu-shu operation . 38 Even before the actua loperation order had been published,enough of the proposed plan had beenknown and made available to the assaul tforces to permit them to begin prepara-tions for the landings. Planning andtraining for OLYMPIC on a divisionlevel continued through June and July .Because the tentative mission of the 5th

39 CG, FMFPac ltr to CMC, dtd 13May46 ,end A, Administrative History of FMFPac,p . 7 .

Marine Division, for instance, orig-inally called for it to be in either th eassault or the reserve, General Bourk eformed nine BLTs in his division an dprepared each one to land at any stageof OLYMPIC. Division artillery andtanks also trained to land on short notic eon any designated beach in the VAC tar-get area and to operate under divisio ncontrol . During the summer, 5th Divi-sion BLTs rehearsed intensively an dmade many practice landings. Theirtraining for operations inland stressedthe assault of fortified positions, villageand street fighting, and the removal o fmines and demolitions. s s

The 2d and 3d Marine Divisions als oprepared vigorously, and like the 5th ,rotated their combat veterans homewhen due, brought their regiments upto strength as they received replace-ment drafts, including many second -timers, and refurbished their equipmentfor OLYMPIC. While VAC prepared forthis operation and IIIAC awaited it sfurther orders, Marine carrier plane sand pilots, along with the Third Fleetand FEAF squadrons, carried the warstraight to the heart of the Empire .

ae Conner, 5th MarDiv Hist, p. 130 .

CHAPTER 2

The Closing Day s

MARINE AIR ON CARRIERS 1

On 18 January 1939, the Secretary ofthe Navy approved the following mis-sion and organization of Marine Corpsaviation :

Marine Corps aviation is to be equipped ,organized and trained primarily for thesupport of the Fleet Marine Force in land-ing operations and in support of troopactivities in the field; and secondarily asreplacement squadrons for carrier-basednaval aircraft ;

The organization, personnel comple-ments, and other details of Marine Corp saviation are to conform as closely as prac-ticable to similar naval aviation organiza-tions ;

The Bureau of Aeronautics is to exer-cise supervision over their respectiveactivities connected with Marine Corpsaviation in the manner provided for sim-ilar naval aviation units .2

Until carrier-based Marine squadron ssupported Tenth Army landings onOkinawa in 1945, Leatherneck pilots hadbeen in a position to support an amphib-ious assault from its beginning onlytwice in World War II : at New Georgiaand Bougainville . And not until the lat-ter part of 1944, when a few squadron swere assigned to carriers did Marin eaviation fulfill its secondary mission .

' Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi ssection is derived from : AirintelBul, Aug—Sep45 ; Isely and Crowl, Marines and Amphib-ious War ; Sherrod, Marine Air Hist .

2 DivAvn OpD, dtd 1Jun45 .

In all other operations, landings wer emade so far away from the nearest airbase that Marine squadrons had to waitfor an airstrip to be completed or acaptured one to be put into operationagain before they could fly in to beginsupporting the ground troops . Assign-ment to carriers was the only solutio nby which Marine aviation could carryout the principal missions assigned t oit . As soon as it was feasible, Marin esquadrons landed on Henderson Field onGuadalcanal, but their basic role was inthe air defense of the island, with asecondary emphasis placed on air sup -port. When the American offensive be-gan climbing up the Solomons ladder ,Marine pilots flew missions under thecontrol of the Strike Command, Com-mander Air Solomons .

With the beginning of the CentralPacific campaigns in late 1943, Marineground commanders became increas-ingly dissatisfied with the type andamount of air support they received. AtTarawa, defense against air attack an dthe close support of ground troops wereboth entrusted to carrier planes flownby Navy pilots . In the opinion of bothNavy and Marine officers, the air sup -port at Tarawa left much to be desire din the way of accomplishment. Manyapparent shortcomings in this operatio nindicated that, among other things, trul yeffective air support was impossible un-less the pilots and ground troops ha dtrained as a team .

410

THE CLOSING DAYS

41 1

After the operation General Hollan dM. Smith recommended that Marine avi-ators, thoroughly schooled in the prin-ciples of direct air support, should beassigned to escort carriers and includedin any future amphibious operation un-dertaken by a Marine division . If thi srequest could not be granted, he con-tinued, the Navy airmen selected forthe task should be carefully indoctri-nated in the tactics they would employ. 3

Granting the validity of Genera lSmith's recommendations concernin gthe assignment of Marine squadrons t ocarriers, no one else in the Marine Corpsseemed disposed to push for such aprogram at that time . Earlier in the war ,

many factors, such as the shortage ofmanpower and the need to send increas-ing numbers of air units to inland basesin the Solomons, militated against theemployment of Marine air in support o fground operations . The pressure for theemployment of Marine Corps planes an dpilots in ground support operations in -creased as the war progressed and theneed for such support became apparent .

The criticism of the conduct of ai r

support at Tarawa was later echoe dfollowing the end of the Marianas cam-paign, where Marines believed that th eNavy system of controlling close ai rsupport missions was too rigid and tim econsuming. This matter was made anagenda item to be discussed during on eof the King-Nimitz Pacific conferences .

The item noted that :

During the Saipan operation T .F. 58was necessarily withdrawn from the im-mediate area, leaving 8 CVE's to performa multiplicity of missions, including directsupport of ground troops. What are

' VAC AR GALVANIC, dtd 11Jan44, p . 16 .

CinCPac's views as to the following pla nto avoid this situation in the future :

(a) Embark in CVE's Marine air -craft squadrons whose sole duty will b edirect support of ground troops .(Training in carrier operations willobviously be a preliminary requisite . )

(b) As soon as airfields are availabl eashore, transfer those same squadron sashore to continue direct support ofground troops . 4

During the 13–22 July 1944 confer-ence, Admiral Nimitz addressed thequestion of assigning Marines to car-riers. In essence, he did not consider theproposal desirable because he believe dthat "it would require a great deal ofextra training and equipping of Marinesquadrons for carrier operations, anti-submarine warfare, navigation, etc ." 5In addition, Nimitz believed that thepersonnel and equipment of the squad-rons would have to be revised consider -ably to make the Marine units suited forboth ship-based and advance base opera -tions. He also believed that, if Marine swere to be assigned to carriers, therewould be a surplus of Navy CVE squad-rons. As a final thought, CinCPac statedthat the Navy CVE pilots were rapidlygaining experience in ground supportoperations, and therefore, there was n oreal need for Marine CVE squadrons .

Admiral King then stated that, in hi sopinion, the Marine ground forces coul dbe supported adequately without employ-ing Marine aviation squadrons—and"thus prevent two air forces in th eNavy." ° For some time, CominCh had

Item 68, CominCh Agenda for conferenc ewith Adm Nimitz, dtd 10Ju144 (OAB, NHD) .

Minutes, CominCh–CinCPac Conference ,

13–22Ju144 .6 Ibid.

412


been concerned that the expansion o fMarine Corps aviation strength had ex-ceeded the point where it could be gain -fully employed, because there were notthat many missions available for Leath-erneck pilots. In view of the location o fMarine squadrons and the nature an dlocation of U . S. operations in the Pa-cific, he was right. As of 30 June 1944 ,Marine Corps aviation strength con-sisted of 5 wings, 28 groups, 128 squad-rons, and 108,578 personnel, of whichslightly more than 10,000 were pilots . '

Lieutenant General Alexander A .Vandegrift, who became Commandan tof the Marine Corps on 1 January 1944 ,also was concerned with the status of hi sair units and had consulted with Ad-miral King regarding the future em-ployment of those squadrons and pilotssitting in the backwash of the war onSouth Pacific islands . He proposed tha tone of the five wings be eliminated, butalso argued that to employ the fliers andplanes based in the rear areas of theSouth and Central Pacific gainfully Ma-rine pilots should be assigned to carriers .King agreed in principle to this compro-mise, but stated that Nimitz' approvalhad to be gained before any final actioncould be taken . $

A desire to visit his Marines in th ePacific as well as to determine at firsthand the facts surrounding the Saipancommand controversy ° impelled Gen -

7 FMF Air Status Rpt, 30Jun44 .8 Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift comment s

to Robert Sherrod, dtd Sep49, cited in Sherrod,Marine Air Hist, p . 327 .

For the story of the relief of the 27th In-fantry Division commander by Lieutenant Gen-eral Holland M . Smith, see Shaw, Nalty, an dTurnbladh, The Central Pacific Drive, pt IV,chap 5.

eral Vandegrift in late July 1944 t omake an inspection trip, in which hecovered :

. . . 22,000 miles in eighteen days, sawall the force, corps, and division com-manders and practically all the regimenta land battalion commanders in the field . Iwent to Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, gettin gto Guam just before the show was over .Our people did a superb job on all three o fthose islands, the fighting on all three o fthem being entirely different . . . .

I went from Guam to Kwajalein toGuadalcanal then up to the Russells to seemy old division and to Bougainville to seeRalph Mitchell and his crowd. Then backto Pearl for a three-day session withNimitz.1 °

Accompanying the Commandant wer eBrigadier Generals Field Harris—thenewly appointed Director of Aviation—and Gerald C . Thomas, the Director, Di -vision of Plans and Policies . Upon theirreturn to Pearl, they went into confer-ence with Nimitz, Vice Admiral John H .Tower, Deputy CinCPac–CinCPOA,Rear Admiral Forrest P. Sherman ,Nimitz' deputy chief of staff and headof his War Plans Division, and MajorGeneral Ross E . Rowell, since 1941 headof MAWPac (the forerunner ofAirFMFPac) . The decisions they madein the course of these talks determine dthe course that Marine aviation was t otake in the Pacific for the remainder ofthe war .

Vandegrift broached the subject o fthe future employment of Marine squad -rons, and informed Nimitz of what hadbeen said in the course of conversation s

10 LtGen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr t oGen Thomas Holcomb dtd 5Sep44 (Vandegrif tPersonal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQ -MC) .

THE CLOSING DAYS

41 3

about the matter with CominCh, es-pecially the recommendation that Ma-rines be assigned to carriers . AlthoughTowers argued that there had been noindication in the past that Marine swanted to operate from carriers, Vande-grift and Harris persuaded him thattimes and attitudes had changed.

It was agreed at this conference thatthe primary mission of Marine Corp saviation was to support the Marineground forces and to participate in am-phibious assaults. Therefore, in orde rto focus the activities of Marine avia-tion on its mission more effectively, th efollowing package of proposals sub-mitted to Admiral King were concurre din by Nimitz with an endorsement stat-ing that it would "more firmly integrat eMarine Corps aviation within the Ma-rine Corps and is therefore in the inter-est of the naval service ." 1 1

Essentially, it was recommended tha ta complement of Marine squadrons to b eemployed in the close support of am-phibious operations be assigned to oneCVE division of six CommencementBay-class carriers. This complement wa sto consist of six 18-plane fighter (F4 Uor F6F aircraft) and six 12-plane tor-pedo bomber squadrons whose pilotswere to be specially trained in the use o frockets with which their planes were tobe armed. It was further recommende dthat a Marine aviator of suitable rank bedirected to organize and prepare thesesquadrons for carrier operations . Helater would be assigned to duty on thecarrier division staff.

"CinCPac enforsement, ser 002567, dt d22Aug44, on CMC secret memo to CominCh ,Subj : Marine Aviation in the Pacific, n.d.(OAB, NHD) .

Concerning another aspect of the Ma-rine aviation problem, the conferee sagreed that Marine aviation shoul dgradually take over the responsibilit yfor controlling aircraft in direct supportof ground troops in amphibious opera-tions. Gradually, and as practicably a spossible without impairing the conductof combat operations then in process ,Marine Corps personnel would replacetheir Navy counterparts in the existingAir Support Control Unit organizations .

One other recommended change wa sto effect the reorganization of Marin eaviation in the Pacific, wherein MarineAircraft Wings, Pacific, would becom eAircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, inorder to identify the Marine air com-ponents more closely with the groundelements . This proposal also establishedthe relationship of AirFMFPac withComAirPac and FMFPac under th eoverall command of CinCPac .

In addition, the strength and composi-tion of Marine aviation forces in thePacific was to undergo change. Here-after, MAGs would be comprised ofthree 24-plane squadrons instead of fou r18-plane squadrons, and the number o fAir Warning Squadrons would be cu tfrom 32 to 24 or less in view of the num-ber of Army units of the same type that.were scheduled to arrive in the Pacificfor future operations .

General Vandegrift signed the basi cmemorandum listing the proposed rec-ommendations and stated in the lastparagraph of this report that "Everyeffort will be made to increase the mo-bility and effectiveness of marine avia-tion by accomplishing such readjust-ments of personnel and equipmentamong Headquarters, Service and Tac-

414


tical Squadrons as may be indicated ." 1 2

Admiral King approved the proposal son 10 September 1944 with the provisothat when Army Air Forces units wereavailable in the Pacific to replace certai nMarine Corps aviation squadrons, Ma-rine Corps aviation strength would bereduced by or up to the equivalent of on ewing. 13 In a bucktag comment on theconference proposals, Admiral Kingwrote : "Good, but does not go farenough towards reducing MarCorps avi -ation. K." 14 In notifying General Hol-comb of what had transpired regardin gthe future of Marine Corps aviation ,General Vandegrift wrote :

Another thing we have done, which Ipinch myself now and then to see if I amstill awake, we have gotten both Nimitzand King to approve a division of th elarger CVEs for use of Marines. That wil lgive us four carriers with a carrier grou pof Marines aboard, and I can assure yo uthat took some days of hard talking. 1 5

1 ° CMC memo to CinCUS [CominCh], Subj :Marine Aviation in the Pacific, n .d . (OAB ,NHD) .

" CominCh ltr FF1/A4—3 serial 002624 t oCinCPac and CMC, Subj : Marine Aviation inthe Pacific, dtd 10Sep44 (OAB, NHD) .

" CominCh bucktag comment dtd 10Sep44 onCinCPac End to Ibid (OAB, NHD) .

" LtGen Alexander A . Vandegrift ltr to GenThomas Holcomb dtd 5Sep44 (Vandegrift Per-sonal Correspondence File ; HistBr, HQMC) .General Vandegrift was perhaps, being undulymodest, for as General Gerald C. Thomas ,former Director of the Division of Plans andPolicies and later Assistant CMC, recalled :"General Vandegrift's relations [with King ]were pleasant, not familiar, but always on areally good sound basis, and never in my thre eand a half years with him there [Headquarter sMarine Corps], did I see him lose a battle . H ewon every one of them ." Gen Gerald C. Thomasinterview with HistBr, HQMC, dtd 26Sep66 .(Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) .

Following up the approval ofCominCh for placing Marine planes oncarriers, on 28 October 1944, the Chiefof Naval Operations directed the forma-tion of the Marine Air Support Divi-sion. lG To comprise this organization ,the Commandant of the Marine Corpsselected MAG–51, MBDAG-48, and thefollowing squadrons : VMO–351,1 7

VMF–112, -511, -512, -513, and -514 ,and VMTB–132, -143, -144, -233, -234 ,and -454. All of these units were at-tached to Marine Fleet Air, West Coast,(MarFAirWest) at San Diego and wer eredesignated as follows : MAG–51 be-came MASG–48 (Marine Air Suppor tGroup), and MBDAG–48 similarly be-came MASG–51 . All of the squadrons at-tached to these groups were furthe ridentified with the following letter s"CVS," meaning Carrier Support, a sVMF (CVS) -112 .

The overall designation given to theall-Marine carrier force was Marine

Carrier Groups, Aircraft, Fleet MarineForce, Pacific . The next subordinateechelon to this was the MASG, whichwas comprised of the fighter and torped obomber squadrons for a CVE division ofsix ships . Each of the escort carriers,

in turn, was to have as its air comple-ment a Marine Carrier Group (MCVG )consisting of a Marine Carrier Aircraft

10 CNO ltr Op—37—C—fgd serial 08837 toComAirPac, Chief BuAer, ComFairWest,CGAirFMFPac, and MarFAirWest, Subj :Marine Air Support Division, formation of ,dtd 280ct44 (OAB, NHD) .

" Although VMO—351 was an observationsquadron earlier in the war, its mission waschanged later and it became a fighter squadro nwithout a redesignation in its unit identifica-tion .

THE CLOSING DAYS

415

Service Detachment (MCASD), a VMF -(CVS), and a VMTB(CVS) .

MASG–51 was given four VMFs andfour VMTBs to form four active groups ,and MASG–48 was given the VMO, aVMF, and two VMTBs, which were tocomprise the two replacement groups .Marine Carrier Groups, AirFMFPac,was officially activated on 21 Octobe r1944 at Marine Corps Air Statio n(MCAS), Santa Barbara, California,

with Colonel Albert D . Cooley as com-manding officer.

For more than a month before the firs tMASG squadron went on board its CVE ,however, other Marine squadrons had

been flying combat missions from thedecks of fast carriers on a temporary

basis . The appearance of the Kamikazemenace during the Leyte operation inthe fall of 1944 created the need for ad-ditional fighter-type aircraft aboard thecarriers of the Third Fleet . Brigadier

General Frank G. Dailey, then a colonelassigned to TF 58 as Vice Admiral

Marc A. Mitscher's Marine Air Offi-

cer,18 commented that in addition to

the requirement for more fighters on the

CVs :

. . . another primary consideration i nputting Marine squadrons aboard wit h

F4Us was due to the fact that the Nav ysquadrons with their F6Fs did not hav ethe speed or altitude to intercept aJapanese light bomber designated `Betty, 'which appeared about this time. Conse-quently the Marine squadrons were als oused as fleet combat air patrols ; in fact ,for a time, this was their primary duty. Ithink it should be emphasized that, priorto this time, the Navy did not consider the

18 Col Frank G . Dailey ltr to Robert Sherrod ,

dtd 2Jun50, cited in Sherrod, Marine Air Hist ,p. 343 .

F4U a suitable aircraft for carrier opera-tions because of the known difficulty i ntake-offs and landings on CVs . When yo uconsider that these [Marine] squadronswere literally picked off the beach withvery little CV training to operate unde rwar time conditions, our operational losseswere expected and accepted . It is necessaryto have experience in carrier operations t oappreciate the magnitude of making thistransition in such a short time and espe-cially in this type aircraft. The plane crewsshould also be mentioned, as they wereoperating under conditions foreign to manyof them and kept a high aircraft availabil-ity, even by Navy standards .

When the decision was made to pu tMarine squadrons with F4Us on boardthe CVEs, it was thought that the opera-tional losses, in view of our experience onfast carriers, would be prohibitive . Hereagain, we were using aircraft which wer enot initially considered suitable for thelarge CVs . And now, we were expected tooperate from CVEs . Colonel Albert Coole ywas the officer responsible for the success-ful operations of this venture and prove d

it could be done. 1 9

It was not until the end of 1944 thatthe first of the VMFs boarded a big car-rier in the Pacific . Between January andJune 1945, 10 Marine fighter squadron s

flew from the decks of 5 CVs in major

fast carrier task force operations . On 28December 1944, VMF–124 (Lieutenant

Colonel William A . Millington) and -21 3

(Major Donald P. Frame) boarded the

Essex at Ulithi, "equipped with F4U–1DCorsair fighters, the initial introductio nof this type aircraft in the Fleet." 2 0

Two days later, in company with therest of the Third Fleet, the Essex

16 BGen Frank G. Dailey ltr to Hd, HistBr ,

G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 10Nov65, hereafter Daileyltr.

2° BGen William A. Millington ltr to Hd,

HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 18Nov65 .

416


steamed out of the anchorage bound fo ra series of strikes on Formosa and Lu-zon in the period 3–9 January 1945 .2 1

The weather during that week of opera-tions was foul and solidly overcast forthe greater portion of the time. At theend of their first days aboard the Essex,9 of which were spent at sea, the twoMarine squadrons had lost 7 pilots and13 F4Us solely as a result of operationalaccidents during instrument flight con-ditions . One Marine aviator stated : "Wejust can't learn navigation and carrie roperations in a week as well as the Navydoes it in six months ." 2 2

On 10 January, Admiral Halsey' sThird Fleet entered the South China Se ato log 3,800 miles in an 11-day series ofstrikes against targets on the coast ofIndochina and on Hong Kong and For-mosa . 23 Both Marine squadrons on theEssex participated in the TF 38 raids o nSaigon, Hainan, Hong Kong, Swatow,and Formosa . Lieutenant Colonel Mil-lington, the VMF–124 commander, be -came the air group commander of theEssex on 15 January, when Commande rOtto Kinsman, the naval officer holdingthat position, was killed in action . 2 4

After a last series of strikes on For-mosa, the Pescadores, and SakishimaGunto on 21 January, and following a

21 For Third Fleet operations in this period,see Samuel E . Morison, The Liberation of th ePhilippines—History of United States Nava lOperations in World War II, v . XIII (Boston :Little, Brown and Company, 1959), pp . 87–92 ,hereafter Morison, Liberation of the Philip -pines .

22 Sherrod, Marine Air Hist, p . 333 .

2' Morison, Liberation of the Philippines, pp .164–174 .

24 VMF–124 WarD, Jan45 .

photographic mission over Okinawa on

the 22d, the Third Fleet retired from theSouth China Sea and set a course forUlithi, arriving there on the 25th . At0001, 27 January, the Third Fleet be-came the Fifth Fleet when Admira lSpruance assumed tactical comman dfrom Halsey.

In their first month of carrier opera-tions, the two Marine squadrons claime da total of 10 Japanese planes destroye din the air and 16 on the ground . Marinepilots flew 658 sorties . Operational lossesof the squadrons, 7 pilots and 15 air -craft, were considerably greater thanthe 1 pilot and 2 planes lost in combat .

By 10 February, TF 38—now TF 58—was ready to sortie against the enemyonce more . The target this time wasTokyo, some 1,500 miles due north ofUlithi. Joining the Fifth Fleet werethree other large carriers, each with twoMarine fighter squadrons in its comple-ment. On the Bennington were VMF–112 (Major Herman Hansen, Jr .) and-123 (Major Everett V . Alward) ; theWasp had VMF–216 (Major George E .Dooley) and -217 (Major Jack R .Amend, Jr.) ; and VMF–221 (MajorEdwin S. Roberts, Jr.) and -451 (MajorHenry A. Ellis, Jr.) were on the BunkerHill . Admiral Spruance's fleet now hada total of eight VMFs on four large car-riers. Based on the lessons learned in theJanuary operations, all of the Marinepilots "had received intensive naviga-tional training at Ulithi" before board-ing the carriers "and would get more e nroute to Japan 'in weather notpreviously considered suitable for CVoperations .' " 2 5

25 Col Frank G. Dailey ltr to Robert Sherrod ,dtd 2Jun50, op. cit .

THE CLOSING DAYS

417

After the task force had departedUlithi, all hands learned that their targetwas to be Tokyo, and that these firstcarrier-plane raids on the enemy capita lwere to precede by three days the19 February invasion of Iwo Jima byVAC troops . It was also announced tha tthe Marine squadrons in TF 58 woul dfurnish air support for the Iwo landingforces beginning on D-Day.

of prelanding strikes on the target . For

20 minutes, between H minus 55 andH minus 35, 120 fighters and bomber sfrom the fast carriers hit the landingbeaches and adjacent areas . 27 At 0642 ,Lieutenant Colonel Millington led aflight of two Marine and two Nav yfighter squadrons—flying F4Us an dF6Fs, respectively—on a mission tonapalm, rocket, and strafe the flank sand high ground along the beaches .

The attacks were delivered from adouble-column approach with the divisionsof planes breaking to port and starboard ,dropping napalm on the first run, pullin gout to seaward and repeating attacks withrockets and .50-caliber bullets until th etime limit expired. The 48-plane flight thenrendezvoused for an H minus 5 strafin gattack along the landing beach. Theseattacks were delivered from north to southin steep dives, all planes pulling outsharply to the right to rejoin the tai lelement for repeated runs. The attack wasmoved inland gradually as the landin gcraft approached the beach so that thebullet-impact area remained 200 yardsahead of the troops. As the troops hit thebeach, the bullet-impact area was shifte d500 yards inland to smother the fire fromthat area against the shore line. Becauseof naval gunfire in the same area, pull-out swere ordered at 600 feet [altitude] . Theflight was ready to stand by for close -support missions but none was immedi-ately assigned . 2 6

Millington and Marshall had worked ou tthe plan for this low-level attack with

the commander of the Landing Force

Air Support Control Unit, Colonel Ver-non E. Megee, who later said that thiswas "one of the outstanding examples of

On 16 February, Vice Admiral MarcA. Mitscher's carriers launched theirplanes to hit the airfields and aircraf tfactories around Tokyo Bay. LieutenantColonel Millington led the first fighterstrike from the deck of the Essex asMajor David E . Marshall, skipper ofVMF-213, took off with his squadro n

from the same carrier to lead the escor tfor torpedo and photo-reconnaissanceplanes headed for the Tokyo area . Theother Marine squadrons were give nequally important missions. Althoughthe weather on the 16th was abominable ,the fifth air sweep of the area launchedthat day by the Essex and the BunkerHill found clear weather over their tar-get and had the honor of being "the firs tNavy [and Marine] fighter planes toarrive over Tokyo." 26 Additional strikeswere launched before and shortly afterdawn on the 17th, but with the weatherworsening rapidly and restricting fur-ther flight operations, Admiral Mitschercancelled the remaining planned strikes,recovered all of his airborne planes, andlaid a course for Iwo Jima .

When, on the morning of 19 February ,TF 58 was approximately 100 milesaway from Iwo, its planes began a series

27 Bartley, Iwo Jima, p . 49 .29 Morison, Victory in the Pacific, p . 22 .

2B Sherrod, Marine Air Hist, p . 347 .

418


=e BGen Vernon E . Megee ltr to Dr. Jeter A .Isely, dtd 10Feb50, cited in Isely and Crowl,Marines and Amphibious War, p . 507.

80 Morison, Victory in the Pacific, p . 57 .

almost routine ." 31 Following the Oki-nawa strikes, the carriers returned toUlithi, arriving there on 4 March, andrefitted for an immediate return to sea .The destination of Mitscher's carrier swas Kyushu, where TF 58 pilots were t ohit the airfields in a series of strikesprior to the invasion of 0knawa. At theUlithi fleet anchorage, VFM–124 and-213 were detached from the Essex on10 March and were returned to th eUnited States in the escort carrier LongIsland . Three days later, the entire Waspair group—including VMF–216 and-217—was replaced by an all-Navygroup. Upon their detachment, the twoMarine squadrons were transferredstateside by way of Ewa .

The ground crewmen of the fou rVMFs remained on the Wasp and Essexto service the Navy Corsairs, primaril ybecause the Navy crewmen were largel yunfamiliar with that type of plane . Withthe exception of those in the carrier-based VMFs, there were no other F4Usin TF 58 fighter squadrons up to thattime. The Essex Marines remained withthe carrier until early June ; the Marinesin the Wasp retired from the fightingmuch earlier when that ship was hit offShikoku on 19 March and returned toUlithi, and then steamed to Bremerton ,Washington, via Pearl Harbor, fo rrepairs . 3 2

Although two of Admiral Mitscher' scarriers lost their Marine squadrons be -fore TF 58 steamed out of Ulithi on

" Frederick C . Sherman, Combat Command :The American Aircraft Carriers in the Pacifi cWar (New York : E. P. Dutton & Company ,Inc., 1950), p . 342 .

32 USS Wasp (CV—18) WarDs, Mar, Apr4 5(OAB, NHD) .

effective precision beach strafing see nduring the Pacific War ." 2 9

For several days following D-Day,Marine carrier pilots supported groun doperations, and then TF 58 moved on tolaunch strikes at Chichi Jima . After oneday at this target, the fast carriers set anortherly course for a high-speed run toJapan and another round of attacks onTokyo. The first planes were launched on25 February when the carriers were ap-proximately 190 miles from the Japa-nese capital . 30 Again the weather wasbad, even worse, as a matter of fact ,than that which had been experiencedduring the attacks of 16–17 February .Most of the strikes were diverted to hi tsecondary targets or targets of oppor-tunity. When flying conditions becam eimpossible before noon, Admira lMitscher cancelled other sweeps thathad been scheduled for later that day .Because weather forecasts for the foI -lowing day boded no better conditions ,Mitscher decided to strike Nagoya andheaded the task force in that direction .Early on the 26th, he realized that highwinds and heavy seas would prohibithim from launching aircraft . The taskforce commander then cancelled th estrikes, headed for a refueling area, re-fueled, and then steamed towards Oki-nawa for a series of attacks on thatisland on the 1st and 2d of March .

The weather over the Ryukyus was aconsiderable improvement over that ex-perienced in the Home Islands, and al lTF 58 pilots "accomplished the usualpattern of devastation, which now was

THE CLOSING DAYS

419

14 March, the loss was made up whe nthe Franklin, carrying VMF–21 4(Major Stanley R. Bailey) and -45 2(Major Charles P . Weiland), joined theFifth Fleet. Following a refueling atsea on the 16th, Spruance's fleet began ahigh-speed run to its target, Kyushu .

The force was within 90 miles of the

island when, just prior to dawn on the18th, the first planes were launchedagainst Kyushu airfields. The TF 58pilots found few enemy planes on theground at the target area, and none i n

the air, and so they bombed hangars and

installations instead . Shortly after 0700,

the missing Japanese aircraft appeared

over the launching areas and began to

attack the carriers . The Yorktown, En-

terprise, and Intrepid were hit but notdamaged badly enough to put them out

of commission. The bomb that struck

the Enterprise did not explode, and the

Intrepid suffered only minor damag e

from a near miss when a Japanese plane

crashed and exploded alongside . Seven

crewmen were killed and 69 wounded i n

the Kamikaze attacks this day .3 3

On the next day, Mitscher sent his

planes against Japanese shipping in the

Inland Sea and in the harbors of Kobe

and Kure. A short time after the car-riers had launched their sweeps, sneak

raids began to punish the force . In the

case of nearly every carrier that wa shit, the damage was caused by a singl e

suicide plane that approached unde-tected and dove out of the clouds in anattempt to destroy the flattop below . At

0709, a suicider suddenly appeared over

the Wasp and landed a bomb whic h

39 Morison, Victory in the Pacific, p . 94.

310-224 0 - 69 - 28

penetrated the flight deck to the hanga rdeck, exploded a plane, and caused grea tdamage and many casualties . Within 15minutes after the attack, damage con-trol parties had repaired vital facilitiesand put out the fires ; by 0800, the Waspwas recovering her planes. A total of101 men were killed or died of wounds ,and 269 were wounded . 34 Despite herdamage, the Wasp continued to operatewith the fleet several more days befor e'limping to Ulithi and on to the State sfor repair .

Just two minutes before the Wasp

was attacked, the Franklin received two

bombs from an enemy plane which ha d

approached undetected . The "Big Ben,"

as she was called by her crewmen, wa s

in the midst of launching her secondstrike of the morning, and her flight

deck was studded with planes warming

up and ready to take off . The aircraft

were fully armed with bombs an d

rockets, and their fuel tanks loaded

with highly flammable aviation gasoline .

The first of the two bombs tore through

the flight deck and exploded in th e

hangar deck, wrecking the forward ele-

a ' Ibid., p . 95 . General Dailey commented onthe carriers' Marine guard, "whose duties in-cluded manning the 40mm AA batteries, an dat least on the Bunker Hill were given creditfor several enemy aircraft shot down . Theyin turn had their casualties by bombings ." Healso noted that "it was SOP in the fleet tha tif an interception of an enemy aircraft wasmade but not completed before coming over thefleet, contact was to be broken and the shipsAA fire would take over. At times, both Marin eand Navy pilots would be so intent they wouldfollow an enemy aircraft over the fleet regard -less of the AA fire and if they didn't get a kill ,follow right down until they (the enemy )splashed in the water ." Dailey ltr .


VMF(CVS)-511 CORSAIR ready to be launched by catapult from the deck of USSBlock Island . (USMC 43750)

AN EXPLOSION rips the critically damaged Franklin as crewmen run for safety .(USN 80-G-237900)

THE CLOSING DAYS

421

vator ; the second bomb hit the flightdeck and immediately started fires thatspread to the planes that were warmingup. The bombs on the planes began ex-ploding, and then the 11 .75-inch rockets ,"Tiny Tims," with which the aircraf twere armed, began going off :

Some screamed by to starboard, some toport, and some straight up the flight deck .The weird aspect of this weapon whooshin gby so close is one of the most awful spec-tacles a human has ever been privilegedto see. Some went straight up and sometumbled end over end . Each time one wentoff the fire-fighting crews forward wouldinstinctively hit the deck . 3 5

Three hours after being hit, th e

Franklin had lost all way and lay dea d

in the water. By noon, most of the fire s

had been extinguished or brought unde r

control and all of the wounded had been

evacuated to other ships standing clos e

by. The Pittsburg passed a towline to

the carrier and gradually began towin g

the critically wounded vessel out of th e

danger area . By 0300 on 20 March, the

Franklin had begun to work up her own

power and nine hours later she slippe d

her tow and headed for Ulithi an d

eventually New York .In the flaming and exploding infern o

following the bombing, Franklin lost

724 killed or missing and 265 wounded . 3 6

In these casualty figures, 65 of the dead

were pilots and ground crewmen fro m

the two Marine squadrons . Airborne at

the time of the attack on the Franklin,

VMF–214 and -452 pilots landed late r

3 ' Report of the Executive Officer of th eFranklin quoted in Morison, Victory in th ePacific, p . 96.

38 Ibid ., p. 98 .

either on the Hancock or the Benning-ton, from whose decks they continue dattacks on Kyushu until 19 March, whenthe task force retired from the area .The two Marine squadrons were sent toMarine Corps Air Station, El Centro ,California, where they remained unti lthe war ended .

From 23 to 25 March, TF 58 bega nthe last of the softening-up operationson Okinawa before the scheduled in-vasion . Together with the other squad-rons of the Bennington air group, VMF–112 and -123 flew many sorties over thetarget area. On L-Day, only four Marin esquadrons—VMF–112 and -123 in theBennington and VMF–221 and -451 i nthe Bunker Hill—remained in the taskforce. All four squadrons together withthe Navy pilots napalm bombed an dstrafed Hagushi beaches on 1 April, andthen later in the day hit targets beyondthe beachhead. Following the Okinawaground support missions of the first fewdays of the operation, TF 58 planes ,pilots, and ships were kept busy fending

off the destructive Kamikazes . The

battle against the Japanese suiciders wa sto keep the Fifth Fleet occupied for th e

rest of its stay in Okinawa waters . On

11 May, the Bunker Hill became the

hapless target of a successful suicid eattack, in which the carrier sustained

such widespread damage that it was

forced to limp to Bremerton for exten-sive repairs. After three months of

almost continuous action, VMF–221

and -451 were out of the war. VMF–112and -123, the last remaining Marine

squadrons in TF 38 (the tactical desig-nation changed again on 27 May, whe n

Halsey replaced Spruance and the Fifth

422


once more became the Third Fleet), "

operated from the carriers until 8 June ,when, following strikes on Kyushu, th eBennington was detached from theforce and headed for Leyte .

Even before the VMFs had begun

operating from the decks of the larg ecarriers with the fleet and the CVE pro -

gram had gotten underway, other de-cisions affecting the future role o f

Marine Corps aviation were being made .Growing out of the deliberations of thePearl Harbor conferees and the direc-tives of Admiral King, the composition

and strength of Marine aviation was t obe adjusted .

On 2 November 1944, CominCh issuedan order directing the decommissioningof four Marine medium bomber squad-

rons (VMBs) . In reply, the Com-

mandant pointed out that the Marin eCorps had, at that time, 12 tacticalVMBs and 4 in the replacement trainingprogram, and that CinCPac had indi-

cated he needed 8 of these squadrons inthe forward area . General Vandegriftfurther noted that, instead of the 1 1agreed upon, 15 Marine squadrons hadbeen recently decommissioned (11 in the9th MAW and 4 in MarFAirWest) 38 incompliance with Admiral King's direc-tive on 10 September. In view of thesefacts, the CMC recommended that no

"Regarding these changes in designations ,Halsey commented, "Instead of the stagecoachsystem of keeping the drivers and changing th ehorses, we changed drivers and kept th ehorses . It was hard on the horses, but it wa seffective." Halsey and Bryan, Halsey's Story ,p . 197 .

38 FMF Air Status Rpts, Oct—Nov44.

further Marine squadrons should becommissioned at that time . 39

Admiral King's senior staff officersagreed with the Commandant's recom-mendations for several reasons. Onewas that it had become obvious that thedecommissioning of the 15 squadronshad adversely affected the morale ofMarine aviation personnel . King's Dep-uty CNO (Air) stated further that h edid not believe it was the proper tim eto decommission four squadrons arbi-trarily in view of the critical shortag eof air support in the forward area an despecially in the Philippines. He thenrecommended that no action be takenregarding the VMBs until future re-quirements for Marine and Army air-craft in the Pacific had been more firmlyfixed, because the results of the Leytecampaign could be a determining fac-tor. 40 The Deputy CominCh–CNO, ViceAdmiral Richard S . Edwards, concurre din these recommendations and furthe rrecommended that the matter be studie dbefore a final decision was made. 4 1

Admiral King agreed, directed that th eDeputy CNO (Air) and the CMC ap-point action officers to conduct thestudy, and ordered the decommissioningof the VMBs held in abeyance pendinga report from these officers . 4 2

A satisfactory solution to this prob-lem, answering both the needs of Marine

CMC memo serial 008A30844 to CominCh ,dtd 2Nov44 (OAB, NHD) .

4° Capt Wallace M . Beakley, USN, memo forAdm Cooke, dtd 4Nov44 (OAB, NHD) .

41 Deputy CominCh—CNO memo to Ad mKing, dtd 7Nov44 (OAB, NHD) .

CominCh memo FF1/A16—3, serial 003246 ,to Vice CNO and CMC, Subj : Decommission-ing of 4 Marine Bombing Squadrons, dtd8Nov44 (OAB, NHD) .

THE CLOSING DAYS

423

aviation and improving the morale ofMarine pilots, was found in the require-ments of the CVE program. On 31 Jan-uary 1945, VMB—621 and -622 ofMAG—62, 9th MAW, were redesignate dVMTBs and assigned to escort carriers .The next month, on 15 February, VMB—623 and -624 of the same organizationwere similarly redesignated and re -assigned. At the same time, all foursquadrons were transferred from th eeast to the west coast .43

As of 21 December 1944, Marineaviation was organized into 5 wingswith 93 tactical squadrons, 29 replace-ment training squadrons, 3 operationa ltraining squadrons, and was assigne d2,342 aircraft as follows :

U

oUri

3

a

aFo

VMF

VMFB 108 960 384 1452

VMTB 72 168 96 336

VMB 144 48 192

VMF (N) 72 24 9 6

VMR 120 45 16 5

VMD 36 12 4 8

MOTG—81 53 5 3

TOTAL 180 1500 662 234244

"DivAvn OpDs, Jan—Feb45 ; FMF AirStatus Rpts, Dec44—Feb45 .

" Dir, DivAvn, HQMC, memo Op—37—C—fg dfor F—15 [AvnSec, Planes Div, CominCh] ,Subj : Proposed Program of Marine Corp sAviation, dtd 21Dec44 (OAB, NHD) .

Proposed

U

N

a,o

CCl)

Y

a0.

boF

FF

H0

am

U

VMF

VMFB 540 504 252 34 1330 -122

VMTB 360 72 36 20 488 +152

VMB 96 96 — 96

VMF (N) 72 30 102 + 6

VMR 120 45 165

VMD 12 24 12 48

MOTG—81 65 65 + 12

TOTAL 912 888 440 54 2294 — 484 6

Reflecting the increased emphasis onthe Marine CVE program, the MarineCorps proposed an aviation structur ewhich reduced the number of land-basedtactical squadrons from 93 to 52 and th ereplacement and operational trainingsquadrons from 32 to 20 . It was alsoproposed that the squadrons in the CVEprogram should be increased from 1 2to 61, and also that they should be aug-mented by 2 fleet training squadrons .In effect, while the total Marine aircraf t

requirement would be reduced by 4 8planes, the table above indicates thatthe fighters and torpedo bombers as -

signed to the CVE program would beincreased from 180 to 912 planes . Al-

"Ibid.

424


though it was also proposed that th e9th Wing, a training unit, be decom-missioned, and a Marine Air Trainin gCommand, East Coast, formed in itsplace, this change did not take plac euntil after the war, in early 1946 .

In approving the proposed changes ,CominCh directed that, hereafter, th etraining program of Marine Corpssquadrons was to emphasize close sup -port of ground troops in amphibiou soperations . In addition, he stated tha ta sufficient number of squadrons wer eto be trained in carrier operationsto permit an ultimate total of 1 6CVE groups to be embarked simulta-neously, and to furnish adequate spar egroups." 46 February 1946 was the tar -get date set for the completion of thecarrier training program .

Concerning other aspects of the Ma-rine aviation program, Admiral Kin gstated that the remaining tactical squad-rons were to be organized in two combatwings which would operate from shor ebases ; their primary mission was to b esupport of Marine ground troops an ddefense of bases to which they were as -signed. He made it clear that the transi-tion to the new program was not to in-terfere with the tactical employment ofMarine squadrons in current and futureoperations . Finally, King stated that,when CinCPac so recommended, the 4thMAW was to be decommissioned and it ssquadrons gradually absorbed into th eCVE program . 4 7

"° CominCh—CNO memo FF1/Al, serial00130, to CMC, Subj : Marine Corps AviationProgram, Revision of, dtd 15Jan45 (OAB ,NHD) .

" Ibid . The 4th Wing was not disbanded unti lafter the end of the war .

Immediately after the formation o fMarine Carrier Groups, AirFMFPac,its squadrons began training at th eMarine Corps air stations at Mojav eand Santa Barbara, California . In ac-cordance with CominCh instructions, aCommencement Bay-class CVE wasmade available on the west coast topermit the pilots to train for carrierqualification. Four CVEs were to be i noperation by 15 February 1945 . Eachship was to have an air complementconsisting of a VMF(CVS) with 1 8Corsairs and Hellcats, and a VMTB(CVS) with 12 Avengers .

This aircraft strength figure was notadhered to, however, for MCVG—1 onthe Block Island had "12 TBM, 10 F4U ,8 F6F night fighters and 2 F6F planes,planes, "because the Block Island wasequipped with an SP (height finder )radar suitable for night intercepts, henc ethe day-night character of her assigne dair group." 48 The MCVG—4 air comple-ment on the Cape Gloucester consistedof 12 TBMs, 16 F4Us, and 2 F6F photoplanes. By careful spotting of the air -craft on the carrier deck, it was foun dthat two additional F4Us could be addedto the strength of the group., and whenit passed through Hawaii en route t othe West Pacific, the Cape Gloucestertook on board these two extra planes togive it a total of 32 operating aircraft. 4 9

Before going on board the carriers ,the Marine fliers underwent the same

"° Been John F . Dobbin ltr to Hd, HistBr ,G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 3Nov65, hereafter Dobbi nltr.

BGen Donald K. Yost ltr to Hd, HistBr,G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 30Nov65, hereafter Yostltr.

THE CLOSING DAYS

425

type of carrier training that Navy pilot sexperienced. The training of the Marinesadditionally emphasized the tactics andtechniques to be employed during clos esupport missions . Besides taking partin the regular squadron training pro-gram, the new carrier pilots had to lear nor refresh their knowledge of the follow-ing subjects : communications and flightdeck procedures ; recognition, surviva land first aid ; map reading and naviga-tion ; ordnance and gunnery ; and escapefrom submerged aircraft procedures ef-fected from a training device called a"Dilbert Dunker." Subjects included inthe flight training syllabus were air tac-tics, night flying, carrier landings, rocketfiring, navigation, fixed and free gun-nery, and bombing. The flight syllabusfor VMTB pilots and crews also include dradar search and torpedo drops . 50 Oncethe squadrons were assigned to theCVEs, as part of their shakedown prepa-rations, the pilots had to make eightsatisfactory carrier landings to becom efully qualified . It was during this period ,when the squadrons were training on theCVEs, that a considerable number ofoperational accidents occurred.

These were caused by a combinationof pilot error and aircraft failure aris-ing almost directly out of the design ofthe F4U–1s and F4U–1Ds, the Cor-sairs, 51 flown by Marine fighter squad-rons and the flight deck characteristicsof the carriers . In comparison with the

G0 Ibid.

" The F4U—1 was assigned to Marine avi-ation in 1942 and the F4U—1D in 1944 . HistBr ,G—3 Div, HQMC, Marine Corps Aircraft, 1913—1960—Marine Corps Historical ReferenceSeries, No. 20, reprinted 1964 (Washington,1962) .

much larger and faster CVs, the Com-

mencement Bay-class escort carriersmade a top speed of only 19 knots, an dhad flight decks that were only 75 feetwide and 553 feet long.

The length of both Corsair models wasslightly more than 33 feet and their wingspan was nearly 41 feet . Both F4U typeswere powered by 2,000-horsepower Prattand Whitney radial engines . Driving athree-bladed propeller slightly more than13 feet in diameter, these powerful Cor-sairs were the first naval aircraft oper-ating in the war with a speed capabilityin excess of 400 miles per hour. In theopinion of one Marine ace who flew theplane in the Pacific : "The Corsair was afine carrier plane, and most of us pre-ferred it to the F6F . It was always calle d`The Bent Wing Widowmaker.' " 0 2

The cockpit of the Corsair lay wellback in the fuselage, behind a long nose ,which severely limited the vision of thepilot while the plane was in a landingattitude. The inverted, low gull winglocated forward of and below the pilo trestricted his vision during the criti-cal carrier landing approach . The hightorque characteristics of the engine, thatis, the tendency of the plane to roll tothe left and sometimes out of controlif power was applied when the plane wa stravelling at slow speeds, gave the pilota very small margin of error . 53 In land-based operations, hard right rudder an djudicious application of full throttl ewhen the plane was taking off, landing ,or being waved off were required ; aboardthe small carriers, these aircraft-han-

52 Dobbin ltr.

" Capt Harvey D. Bradshaw comments toHistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 26Apr65.

426


dling techniques became even mor ecritical .

Despite the aversion of the Navyto use of Corsairs on carriers, manychanges had been made in the planewhich made it suitable for such employ-ment. These included :

. . . raising the pilot's cabin to improvevisibility (November 1942), improve daileron action (January 1943), largerbearings in the tail wheels (March 1943) ,installation of a spoiler on right wing toreduce violence of stalls when under accel-eration and to provide new stall warnin g(November 1943), new oleo strut-fillin gprocedure (May 1944) . 5 4

The relative inexperience of the newMCVG pilots in CVE landing operationsand the inherent difficulty in flying th eCorsair resulted in numerous other train-ing and operational accidents . Althoughthe average number of carrier landing srequired for pilot qualification was 8, aCorsair pilot had to make a minimumof 20-25 before he could attain a real-istic proficiency level. 5 5

Takeoffs from the carrier while at seawere the source of another major prob-lem to the Corsair pilots . At best, th etop speed of the CVE would provide onl y19-19½ knots of headwind on a cal mday. Under optimum takeoff conditions,the Corsairs required a minimum head -wind of from 20 to 26 knots ; a 30-knotheadwind was ideal . 56 Unless optimumwind and speed conditions existed, aCorsair, heavily laden with bombs, rock-ets, armament, and fuel could not attai nflying speed and would drop off the end

Sherrod, Marine Air Hist, p. 330." Col Louis H. Steman comments to HistBr ,

G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 26Apr65 .56 Ibid .

of the flight deck into the sea ahead o fthe carrier . For this reason, the F4Uswere launched by catapult in almostevery case .

Lieutenant Colonel Royce W. Coln' sMCVG-3 pilots on USS Vella Gulf, soonfound :

. . . that in practically any external loa dcondition the risk was too unfavorable totry a fly away launch with the F4U . Wetherefore immediately adopted a SOP tha tall F4Us and F6Fs [launched] would becatapult shots rather than fly aways.TBMs which were usually spotted all th eway aft and under 28–30 knots relativewind with a 2000 pound internal load coul dfly off with reasonable safety. We alsofound that with this system we could do atotal launch of all aircraft in much lesstime . 5 7

MCVG-1 Corsairs on the Block Islandwere "almost always catapulted," fo rthe carrier "had two Cats . An H4 onthe Port and an H2 on the Starboar dbow. The H4 gave you a 4G slam an dwas the greatest feeling a pilot eve rhad, especially on a black night . Youknew you were going all the way theminute you felt it ." 5

8

Sometimes the hydraulic-poweredcatapults failed to accelerate the air-craft to flying speed by the time theCorsair left the flight deck—a "cold-catshot" in carrier pilot's parlance. Inthose cases, the pilot often was unabl eto keep the tail of his plane from drag-ging. If he could not gain the require dflying speed, the plane would "mush "right into the water directly in the pathof the sharp-prowed carrier before the

G' Col Royce W. Coln Ur to CMC dtd 16Nov65 ,hereafter Coln ltr.

" Dobbin ltr.

THE CLOSING DAYS

427

pilot could extricate himself from hisCorsair. It was in these cases tha tDilbert Dunker training proved it sworth. More often than not, however,pilot and plane were lost. Despite theoccurrence of these shake-down prob-lems, the CVE program was soundl ylaunched."

The first of the Marine escort carrierscommissioned was the USS Block Island ,which embarked Lieutenant Colone lJohn F. Dobbin's MCVG—1 (VMF(CVS)—511, VMTB (CVS)—233, andCASD—1) at San Diego on 19 Marc hand then headed for Pearl Harbor an dduty with the fleet . "

On 29 April, the Block Island arrivedat Ulithi and was ordered to suppor tthe Okinawa operation . From 10 Ma yto 19 June, as a component of Task Uni t32.1.3 the carrier alternated betweentargets in the Sakishima Islands and onOkinawa itself. MCVG—1 planes helpe dreduce Shuri Castle with 2,000-poundbombs, "and did some close air supportwork with the Marine Divisions onOkinawa." ("Not as much as we woul dhave liked," Dobbin noted .) 6 1

In the six-week period of operation sin the vicinity of Okinawa, the tas kunit sortied northward, where its planes

69 Not all Marine aviators were enthusedabout being stationed aboard carriers, for a sGeneral Rogers recalled, he "despised themmore than anything in the world. I was scare dof them, actually. Well . . . I'd been flying somuch longer than almost anyone else, and Iwould not trust myself to a [landing] signalofficer. I couldn't believe that the signal office rwas correct. I knew that I was correct ." Rogersinterview.

°° USS Block Island (CVE—105) WarDs ,Mar—Apr45 (OAB, NHD) ..

B1 Dobbin ltr.

conducted strikes against Kagoshima ,and as an alternate target when it wa sweathered in, Amami 0 Shima . At notime did Block Island aircraft encounteropposition over their targets, nor wa sthe carrier itself subject to Kamikaz eattacks .

Following these operations, the CV Ewent to Leyte for replenishment. On 25June, it went to sea again to participatein a three-day series of strikes in sup -port of the landings at Balikpapan ,Borneo. Immediately after Japan's sur-render, in company with another Marin eCVE, the Gilbert Islands, and fivedestroyer escorts, Block Island partic-ipated in a POW rescue operation .These ships steamed to Formosa befor ethe island commander had formallycapitulated, and took on board approxi-mately 1,000 Allied POWs who had beenimprisoned there .

The USS Gilbert Islands, the secondMarine CVE commissioned, embarke dLieutenant Colonel William R . Camp-bell's MCVG—2 (VMF(CVS)-512, VM-TB (CVS)—143, and CASD—2) on 6March at San Diego, and left for thePacific the following month . 82 On 25May, the carrier arrived off Okinawaand flew its first CAP and close ai rsupport strikes. On 1 June, the GilbertIslands joined the Block Island in TU32.1.3, then neutralizing enemy instal-lations in the Sakishima Gunto, an dlater participated in the Balikpapa npreinvasion strikes .

Two more Marine CVEs arrived i nthe Pacific before the end of the war .The Cape Gloucester, with Lieutenan tColonel Donald K . Yost's MCVG—4

B2 USS Gilbert Islands (CVE—107) WarDs ,Mar—Apr45 (OAB, NHD) .

428


(VMF (CVS)—351, VMTB (CVS)—132 ,and CASD—4) embarked, arrived atOkinawa on 4 July and was attache dto Task Group 31 .2 for duty . 63 Afterspending a few days covering mine -sweeping operations, the Marine CVEjoined three other carriers, and steamedfrom Okinawa on 1 August to conduc tantishipping operations in the Eas tChina Sea and to launch strikes agains tshipping in the Saddle and ParkerIsland groups near Shanghai at themouth of Hangchow Bay.

The fighter complements on the NavyCVEs in the task group consisted pri-marily of FM—2s (the General Motor s"Wildcat," a single engine fighter) ,which did not have the high-altitudeperformance characteristics of th eMarine Corsair . The performance ofthe Corsair was improved by removalof its rocket rails and one pylon, per-mitting "VMF—351 pilots to bag fourfast high-flying Japanese reconnais-sance planes in addition to the onetransport they caught on a course be-tween Shanghai and the Japanese home-land." 6 4

Following the surrender of Japan ,the Cape Gloucester debarked its Marineaircraft group at Okinawa and pro-ceeded to Nagasaki where it took onboard and transported to Okinawa 26 0liberated Australian POWs . MCVG—4then reboarded the carrier which re -turned to Japanese waters, over whichthe Marine pilots provided an air coverfor Fifth Fleet minesweeping and oc-cupation forces en route to Sasebo .

USS Cape Gloucester (CVE–109) WarD,Ju145 (OAB, NHD) .

84 Yost ltr.

While flying a reconnaissance missionover Kyushu, the MCVG commander ,Lieutenant Colonel Yost, flew his air -craft into high tension power linesstrung across a valley which, becaus eof rain and a low ceiling, he was follow-ing back to the coast and the carrier .The engine of his Corsair failed and h ewas forced to make a wheels-up landingat Omura airfield, "and he became aone-man premature ìnvasion' force" 6 5

which preceded the occupation o fKyushu by approximately a week .

The fourth Marine CVE commis-sioned was the Vella Gulf, which hadLieutenant Colonel Royce W . Coln'sMCVG—3 (VMF(CVS)—513, VMTB(CVS)—234, and CASD—3) on board.It sailed from San Diego on 17 June fo rPearl Harbor, where it conducted fur-ther training. On 9 July, the carrierleft for Saipan by way of Eniwetok andGuam. On 24 and 26 July, the Marinepilots flew strikes north of Guamagainst Pagan and Rota, two island swhich Allied fliers had attacked manytimes before . The Vella Gulf then pro-ceeded to Okinawa, where it arrived on9 August, the day that the secondatomic bomb was dropped . Followin g

°'Ibid . Soon after he landed, a Japanesestaff car drove up and an officer notified theMarine that the commanding general of thedistrict wished to see him. The Japanese werevery amicable and set up a guard around th eplane upon request . At the Japanese head-quarters, Lieutenant Colonel Yost was abl eto send a message to the American forces i nTokyo and to the Fleet notifying them of hi swhereabouts . Although the airfield was in poo rshape a TBM from the Cape Gloucester wasable to land and pick him up the next day .BGen Donald K. Yost comments to HistBr ,G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 14Mar67 .

THE CLOSING DAYS

429

the surrender of Japan, the CVE wasassigned to participate in the occupa-tion .

The Salerno Bay, carrying MCVG— 5(VMF(CVS)-514, VMTB(CVS)—144,and CASD—5), and the Puget Sound ,carrying MCVG—6 (VMF (CVS)—321 ,VMTB (CVS) -454, and CASD—6), ha dnot yet arrived in the war zone when th econflict with Japan ended . 66 Thus, onlyfour Marine CVEs saw any action i nthe Pacific. Although the Marine CVEproject had been established to provid eMarine fliers for close support of am-phibious landings and ground opera-tions, except for a few instances atOkinawa and Balikpapan, the carriersdid not fulfill their intended functions .

The Marine CVE program was con-ceived and activated too late in the wa rto do more than just begin to prove it -self . On the other hand, the Block Is-land and Gilbert Islands Marine pilotscould probably have been employed toa greater extent in support of groun doperations at Okinawa, for both CVE swere in the combat area for a longenough period .

As one of the carrier group com-manders observed, the significant aspectof the carrier program was :

The fact that, for the first time, Marineaviation would operate within its idea l`conceptual' role. This being that MarineAir would perform pre-D-Day operation sfrom carriers, then participate in theamphibious phase. . . . 6 7

69 In addition to those operating squadron salready assigned to carriers, a number of othe rsquadrons, destined for carrier assignmentwere undergoing training in California at E lToro, Santa Barbara, and Mojave .

eR Coln ltr.

Like many other projects that were bornduring the last stages of World War II ,the concept underlying the program wa ssoundly enough organized and firml yenough established, however, to becomean important and integral facet of post -war Marine Corps amphibious warfar edoctrine .

FINAL OPERATIONS 68

Allied air and naval pressure onJapan continued unremitting followin gthe fall of Okinawa and in the periodthat the ground and amphibious force sof both the Central Pacific and South -west Pacific commands prepared forOLYMPIC. At the 29 June meeting ofthe JCS, when 1 November was con-firmed as the date for the invasion ofKyushu, 69 the service chiefs also de-termined that the blockade from ai rbases not only on Okinawa and IwoJima but also in the Marianas and Phil-ippines was to be intentified . They alsoagreed upon the following courses ofaction in the Pacific : defeat of enemyunits in all of the Philippines ; alloca-

as Unless otherwise noted, the material i nthis section is derived from : CinCPac Ops ,Jun–Aug45 ; CinCPac WarDs, Jun–Aug 4 5(OAB, NHD) ; USAFMidPac G–5 Hist ;USSBS, Japan's Struggle ; Butow, Japan's De-cision ; Herbert Feis, Japan Subdued (Prince-ton: Princeton University Press, 1961), here -after Feis, Japan Subdued ; Halsey and Bryan ,Halsey's Story ; King and Whitehill, King'sNaval Record ; Leahy, I Was There ; Harry S.Truman, Year of Decisions—Memoirs, v . I(Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday & Company,Inc., 1955), hereafter Truman, Memoirs ; WarReports .

ea On 30 June, CinCPac sent out a warnin gorder for OLYMPIC to his entire command.CinCPac WarD, Jun45 (OAB, NHD) .

430


tion of all of the forces necessary toguarantee the security of Western Pa-cific sea lanes prior to OLYMPIC ; andacquisition of a sea route to Russia nPacific ports, 70 very likely a prepara-tory measure for the impending entryof Russia into the war with Japan .

During July, further steps were take nto revise and strengthen the prepara-tions and forces for the final operationagainst Japan. On the 10th, the JC Sordered the China-based XX and XXIBomber Commands deactivated . The per-sonnel and planes of the former wer etransferred to Lieutenant General Jame sH. Doolittle's Eighth Air Force, whic hhad deployed from Europe to Okinawa .XXI Bomber Command squadrons wer etransferred to Lieutenant GeneralNathan F. Twining's 71 Twentieth AirForce, which was based in the Marianas .The Eighth and Twentieth togetherwould comprise the United States Arm yStrategic Air Force in the Pacific(USASTAF), commanded by Genera lCarl A. Spaatz. Strategic control ofUSASTAF would remain with the JCSin the same manner as it had controlledTwentieth Air Force, and similarly Gen-eral Arnold would be its executive agent .

On 10 July, Nimitz turned over theSeventh Air Force, which had squadron son Iwo, in the Marianas, and in th eRyukyus, to the commander of the FarEast Air Forces (FEAF), GeneralGeorge C. Kenney, who had been airchief of the SWPA throughout the Pa-cific war. CinCPac also ordered MajorGeneral Louis E. Woods' Tactical Ai r

"° Leahy, I Was There, p . 385 ." General Twining is the brother of retired

Marine General Merrill B . Twining .

Force on Okinawa to conduct operation sin conjunction with the Eighth Ai rForce. Kenney's FEAF was expanded on13 July, and was composed at this tim eof the Fifth Air Force, which was, forthe most part, based in the Ryukyus ,and the Thirteenth Air Force, whichwas based in the Philippines . For OLYM-PIC, FEAF was to conduct tactical oper-ations in support of the invasion, andUSASTAF was to conduct the strategicbombing of the Home Islands .

Based on the JCS directive of 3 Aprilto Nimitz and McArthur, on 19 Jul yCinCPOA transferred to CinCAFPac th econtrol of U. S .-held areas in the Ryuk-yus. In turn, Nimitz retained responsi-bility for the operations of naval unitsand installations in this area . On 26July, General Stilwell was ordred t oreport to MacArthur with the Armyforces under his command at 1200 on31 July, at which time control of theRyukyus passed from CinCPac-CinCPO Ato CinCAFPac . 7 2

While these administrative and com-mand changes were taking place, air-craf' from carrier task forces and land -based commands embarked upon anaccelerated program of attacks designedto weaken Japan before the invasions o fKyushu and Honshu . From bases in theMarianas, B-29s averaged 1,200 sortiesa week in July. These large bombersdropped 42,711 tons of explosives on 3 9Japanese industrial centers during th emonth ; a large percentage of the mis-sions were mass incendiary raids . 7 3

Okinawa airfields captured during thecampaign, and others constructed late r

' 2 CinCPac WarD, Ju145 (OAB, NHD) .S3 CinCPac 0ps, Ju145, p. 16 .

THE CLOSING DAYS

431

on almost all of the suitable space o nthe island, were filled to overflowing wit haircraft of all types by July. Bomberstaking off from Okinawa to hit Japanesetargets were often covered by Iwo Jima-based AAF fighters, which also fle wfighter-bomber sweeps over the Empire .Kenney's fighters and medium bombers ,and Marine F4Us and TBMs (operatingwith, but not under, the AAF) struckJapan day and night in July, hitting awide assortment of vital targets on Kyu-shu, Shikoku, and Honshu in accordancewith OLYMPIC preinvasion plans . Incompletion of the transfer of Okinawaforces from CinCPac to CinCAFPac, o n31 July the Seventh Air Force assumedoperational control of the 2d MAW andADC.

For the Navy, the final phase of th ewar against Japan opened at dawn o n1 July, when the Third Fleet, statedHalsey :

. . . sortied from Leyte under a broaddirective : we would attack the enemy' shome islands, destroy the remnants of hi snavy, merchant marine, and air power, an dcripple his factories and communications .Our planes would strike inland ; our bigguns would bombard coastal targets ; to-gether they would literally bring the warhome to the average Japanese citizen. 7 4

Halsey's Third Fleet accomplishedwhat it set out to do. Strike day was 10July, when the fast carrier task forc earrived at launching positions an dfighter sweeps were sent over Tokyo .Not a single enemy interceptor was inthe air ; two snooper planes, which in-vestigated the American ships from be-yond the ships' AA range, were quickly

" Halsey and Bryan, Halsey's Story, p . 257.

shot down by carrier aircraft circlingoverhead . For the rest of the month incompany with TF 37, the fast carrie rtask force of the British Pacific Flee twhich joined on 16 July, TF 38 rangedup and down the Pacific coast of theJapanese islands, maintaining a seriesof heavy air strikes and surface bom-bardments against selected targets ."The enemy's failure to hit us impliedthat he was hoarding his air poweragainst an expected invasion, but mos tof us believed that he had little airpower to hoard ." 7 5

As soon as possible after he had as-sumed office following the death of Presi-dent Roosevelt, Truman concentrate dhis efforts on finding a way to end thewar in the Pacific. As the AmericanCommander in Chief, he was keptabreast by his military and civilian ad-visers of all developments in the wa rand briefed on plans proposed for futureoperations . He also faced the problemof getting to know the two other majorAllied heads of state and establishing arapport with them. Truman's heavyworkload and the necessity of findingimmediate solutions to pressing prob-lems prevented him from leaving Wash-ington for a Big Three meeting . Instead,as an interim measure, he sent Harry L .Hopkins and W. Averell Harriman, theAmbassador to the Soviet Union, to mee twith Stalin and his advisers in May . 7 6

Basically, their assignment was to in -form Stalin that "we wanted to carry

"Ibid., p . 260." Hopkins was sent because, as Roosevelt's

trusted advisor, he had met Stalin earlier i nthe war, when he had made several trips toMoscow to carry out missions for the President .

432


out the Roosevelt policies ." 77 Addition-ally, Harriman and Hopkins were to tryto get Stalin to commit himself to Rus-sia's early entry into the war agains tJapan and to obtain from him a firm dat efor that event . On 28 May, the two diplo-mats advised Truman that Stalin had se t8 August as the date he would declar ewar on Japan .

Stalin also told the Americans that,while he would remain a party to th epolicy of unconditional surrender, he be-lieved that Japan would not surrendereasily if the Allies insisted upon enforc-ing the provisions of this policy . Stalinconcluded that if Japan sued for peac ein hopes of obtaining terms that mightpossibly be less stringent than those im-plied in an unconditional surrender, theAllies should accept the offer and en -force their will upon the defeated enemyby occupying his homeland .

Truman stated later that he was :

. . . reassured to learn from Hopkinsthat Stalin had confirmed the understand-ing reached at Yalta about Russia's entryinto the war against Japan . Our militar yexperts had estimated that an invasio nof Japan would cost at least five hundre dthousand American casualties even if th eJapanese forces then in Asia were held o nthe Chinese mainland . Russian entry intothe war was highly important to us . 7 8

As the Allies drew closer to the heartof the Empire, Truman believed thatthis Russian action " . . . would mean th esaving of hundreds of thousands ofAmerican casualties ." 79 With furtherdiscussion of this matter as one of hismore compelling reasons for attending

" Truman, Memoirs, p . 258 .

Re Ibid., p. 265 .

48 Ibid.

a conference with Stalin and Churchill ,Truman agreed to meet with them on15 July at Potsdam, a suburb of Berlin .

On the day after the meeting hadconvened, Truman was informed thatthe first atomic bomb had been success -fully exploded in a test on 16 July a tAlamogordo, New Mexico . The next day,Secretary of War Henry L . Stimsonflew to Potsdam to give the Presidentthe full details of the test. Truman re-called that :

We were not ready to make use of thi sweapon against the Japanese, although wedid not know as yet what effect the newweapon might have physically or psycho -logically, when used against the enemy .For that reason the military advised tha twe go ahead with the existing militaryplans for the invasion of the Japanes ehome islands. 80

The atomic bomb project had been keptso secret that the JCS first learned of i tas a group only after completion of thetest . Marshall, however, had kept Kingabreast of the progress of the project . 8 'On 24 July, Truman casually mentionedto Stalin that the United States had "anew weapon of unusual destructiveforce. The Russian Premier showed nospecial interest . All he said was that hewas glad to hear of it and hoped that w ewould make `good use of it against th eJapanese.' " 8 2

Despite the vast potential suspecte dof the new weapon—and all the possibl eimplications inherent in its use—an dthe fact that OLYMPIC preparationsand preinvasion operations were wel l

e° Ibid., p. 415 .

81 King and Whitehill, King's Naval Record,p . 621 .

82 Truman, Memoirs, p . 416 .

THE CLOSING DAYS

433

under way, Admirals Leahy and Kingand proponents of strategic bombingstill held reservations about the needfor invading Japan. They were even les sin favor of dropping an atomic bomb o nthat country. They believed that Japa nhad already been defeated and wasready to surrender. King felt that thePresident gave his approval for thebomb to be dropped because the ChiefExecutive feared that too many Ameri-can troops would be killed in an inva-sion. King agreed with this estimate ,but he thought that :

. . . had we been willing to wait, theeffective naval blockade would, in thecourse of time, have starved the Japaneseinto submission through lack of oil, rice,medicines, and other essential materials .The Army, however, with its underestima-tion of sea power, had insisted upon adirect invasion and an occupational con-quest of Japan . 8 3

Faced with the prospect of either in-vading Japan or destroying that countr ywith atomic bombs, Truman was pre-sented with the suggestion that Japa nmight choose or even be induced to sur-render and end the war sooner than ex-pected . Late in May, Acting Secretar yof State Joseph C. Grew, a veterandiplomat who had been American Am-bassador to Japan for a 10-year periodbefore the war, suggested that Trumanissue a proclamation which called uponthe Japanese to submit and guaranteedthe continuation of the Emperor as hea dof state. The President favored the ideaand instructed Grew to send his recom-mendation through regular channels forconsideration by the JCS and the State-

88 King and Whitehill, King's Naval Record ,p . 621 .

War-Navy Coordinating Committee .The latter was a group of senior State ,War, and Navy Department officialswho assisted their chiefs in handlingpolitico-military matters . When Grew'srecommendation was approved in prin-ciple, he further recommended that thePresident's message to the Japanesepeople be issued at once to coincide withthe fall of Okinawa. The JCS demurred ,for they wanted to wait until the UnitedStates was ready to follow up a Japa-nese refusal of the peace offer with anactual invasion. Truman then decidednot to publish the proclamation unti lafter the Potsdam Conference had be-gun in order to give his declarationgreater weight by including Grea tBritain and China, 84 two of our cobel-ligerents in the war against Japan, asthe joint issuing powers, and by issuin git from the scene of a conference of vic-torious Allies .

After he had become President, andwhen he first learned of the developmentof the atomic bomb, Truman determine dthat the bomb was to be employedstrictly as a weapon of war againstpurely military targets . The final deci-sion to drop the bomb was to be hi salone. Before the Potsdam Conference,he had been given a list of suggestedtargets and the choice was finally nar-rowed to four cities in which werelocated important industrial and mili-tary complexes, according to intelli-gence reports. Hiroshima, Kokura ,Niigata, and Nagasaki were chosen inthat order, and on 24 July, GeneralSpaatz was directed to send the B–29 sof his USASTAF against one of th e

84 China was neither a party to nor presen tat the Potsdam Conference .

434


targets on the first day after 3 Augus t1945 that weather conditions would per-mit visual bombing .

On 26 July, the United States, in com-pany with the United Kingdom and th eRepublic of China, issued what hascome to be known as the Potsdam Dec-laration . 85 This surrender ultimatumgave Japan the opportunity to end thewar voluntarily or to face utter destruc-tion. The terms offered the Japanesegovernment included assurances that it speople would not be enslaved by the vic-tors. On the other hand, Japan's leader swere told that their country was to bedisarmed, shorn of its conquests of50-years' standing, and deprived of it swar-making potential in all sectors . Theauthority and influence of the militaristswere to be eliminated, and "until a ne worder is established and until there isconclusive proof that Japan's war-mak-ing power is destroyed, Japan shall b eoccupied by the Allies ." S6 Further, th eenemy was told that his countryme nwould be permitted access to sources ofraw materials and be given an oppor-tunity to develop their own form ofdemocratic self-government . Upon re-ceipt of the Potsdam Declaration, Japancould choose to surrender uncondition-ally or face complete annihilation . Dis-regarding all reality by not acceptingthe terms of the declaration, Japanchose the suicidal course . On 28 July ,Radio Tokyo broadcast Prime MinisterSuzuki's statement that he believed :

. . . the Joint Proclamation by the thre ecountries is nothing but a rehash of the

8G See Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrenderpp. 243-244, for full text .

88 Ibid., Article 3 (b) of the Potsdam Dec-laration .

Cairo Declaration . As for the Government,it does not find any important value in it,and there is no other recourse but to ignoreit entirely and resolutely fight for thesuccessful conclusion of this war . S 7

With this tacit rejection, Truman de-cided that the fastest way of ending th ewar with a minimum of U . S . casualtieswas to drop the bomb .

The Potsdam Conference was recesse dbriefly from 26 to 28 July, while PrimeMinister Churchill left for London tolearn that, following the counting o fthe absentee ballots holding the vote ofBritish servicemen, he had been de-feated in the general elections and hadbeen replaced by Clement Atlee . At thefirst evening session following the endof this recess, Stalin stated that on 13July, Japan had approached the SovietUnion with a request that it mediate anend to the Pacific War, but that Russiawould refuse to do so. Truman thankedhim in the name of the signatories tothe Potsdam Declaration, and restate dtheir determination to hew to the ulti-matum delivered in that document.

This was not the first time that Japanmade peace overtures. In September1944, the Swedish Minister in Tokyohad been approached by an unnamedhigh-level Japanese official, who sai dthat, in order to obtain peace, Japanwas prepared to surrender territoriesthat were taken from Great Britain andwould recognize all former British in -vestments in East Asia . The Tokyo-based Swedish foreign officer passe dword of this encounter to his seniors i nStockholm, ending his report with thecomment : "Behind the man who gaveme this message there stands one of the

" Quoted in Feis, Japan Subdued, p . 97.

THE CLOSING DAYS

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best known statesmen in Japan an dthere is no doubt that this attempt mustbe considered as a serious one ." 8 8

Stockholm passed the information onto London, which had Lord Halifax, th eBritish Ambassador to the UnitedStates, notify Secretary of State Cordel lHull of the conversation .

Hull concurred both with a Britishproposal to make no reply to the indirectJapanese approach and with London' ssuggestion to the Swedish Minister forForeign Affairs that he "reply, if he sowishes, that the Swedish Governmentconsidered it useless to deliver such amessage to His Majesty's Governmentin the United Kingdom ." S9 Althoughnothing further came from this attemp tof the Japanese another message wa sreceived in Stockholm from its Ministerin Tokyo to the effect "that he had beenadvised that the Japanese ForeignMinister was himself preparing to ap-proach the British Government ." 9 0

Despite the fact that no additional ma-terial on this matter has appeared, it i ssafe to assume that the reaction of th eAllies to this second approach woul dhave been the same as it was to the first .

On 6 August, the first atomic bom bwas dropped on Hiroshima . When theapparently heavy loss of life and wide-

88 Paraphrase of a telegram from theSwedish Minister of Foreign Affairs to th eBritish Foreign Office, dtd 24Sep44, quoted i nDepartment of State, Foreign Relations of th eUnited States : Diplomatic Papers, 1944. TheNear East, South Asia, and Africa . The FarEast, v . V (Washington : GPO, 1965), p . 1184 .

80 Ibid .80 Chief, Div of British Commonwealth Af-

fairs, U . S . Department of State, memo to AdmWilliam D . Leahy, CofS, U . S . Army and Navy ,dtd 100ct44, cited in Ibid ., p . 1186 .

310-224 0 - 69 - 29

spread damage caused by this bombingdid not impel the Japanese governmentto take any steps to end the war, Gen-eral Spaatz was ordered to continueoperations as planned . A second atomicbomb was dropped on Nagasaki on 9August. During the interval betweenthese atomic attacks, 550 B–29s an dcarrier aircraft struck at Japan in dayand night raids, and on 8 August theSoviet Union delivered a declaration o fwar on Japan, effective the next day .On 10 August, Japan sued for peace onthe basis of the terms enunciated in thePotsdam Declaration.

The next day, in reply to the Japa-nese suit, President Truman told thedefeated power that a supreme com-mander would accept its surrender . Inaddition, Japan was told that the Em-peror and the Japanese High Commandwould have to issue a cease fire to al lJapanese armed forces before the Allie scould accept its capitulation . Three daysof frantic discussions ensued in Toky obefore the Mikado's government coul dagree on how best to accept Potsdamterms and what reply to give to Tru-man's note of the 11th.

Meanwhile, on 13–14 August, B–29 sdropped 5½ million leaflets, printed inJapanese, which contained a text of theJapanese surrender offer, the Americanreply, and the terms of the Potsda mDeclaration. Other leaflet drops wer escheduled for 15 and 16 August .

Up to 13 August, the Japanese peoplewere only vaguely aware of the fact thattheir country was losing the war, an dhad no idea that the government wassuing for peace . Now that this wascommon knowledge, the Emperor's han dwas strengthened and he could take final

436


action without worrying about ex-tremists, who might have otherwiseattempted to keep Japan in the war .Further strengthening the Emperor' sposition was the fact that Japan was tobe permitted a conditional surrender ,the condition being that the institutionof the Emperor would be retained .

On 14 August, Hirohito asked theSwiss government to relay to the Allie sa message stating that he had issued a nImperial Rescript that denoted Japa-nese acceptance of the provisions of th ePotsdam Declaration. The message alsostated that he was ordering his com-manders to cease fire and to surrendertheir forces to, and to issue such ordersas might be required by, representativesof the Supreme Commander for th eAllied Powers, General MacArthur .

President Truman then notified theJapanese government that he regarde dthis message as a full acceptance of thePotsdam Declaration and ordered theEmperor to command all Japaneseforces everywhere to cease fire immedi-ately. The Japanese were ordered als oto send envoys to Manila to discussarrangements for the formal surrenderwith MacArthur and his aides . On 14August, CinCPOA issued the followin gmessage to all of his forces in th ePacific Ocean Areas : "OFFENSIVEOPERATIONS AGAINST JAPANESEFORCES WILL CEASE AT ONCE XCONTINUE SEARCHES AND PA-TROLS X MAINTAIN DEFENSIVEAND INTERNAL SECURITY MEAS-URES AT HIGHEST LEVEL AN DBEWARE OF TREACHERY." 81 At

01 Quoted in Halsey and Bryan, Halsey' sStory, p . 272 .

1900 that same day, President Trumanannounced that a cease fire was in effect ,and that the war was over.

THE SILENT GUNS 9 2

Almost immediately after announcin gthe capitulation of Japan, Presiden tTruman issued a directive to GeneralMacArthur, designating him SupremeCommander for the Allied Powers(SCAP) and giving him the power t oaccept the surrender of Japan for thegovernments of the United States, Re-public of China, United Kingdom, andUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics .Each of the heads of state of these gov-ernments was to designate a represen-tative to be with MacArthur at th esurrender ceremony and to sign th einstrument of surrender for his country ;Truman chose Admiral Nimitz as theAmerican signatory . From the momentthat the Japanese signed the surrenderdocument, the authority of the Emperorand Japanese government to rule wa ssubject to MacArthur, who, as SCAP,had supreme command over all Allie dland, sea, and air forces that were to b eallocated for employment on occupa-tion duty in Japan .

On 20 August, when the Japanes eemissaries arrived in Manila to reviewthe instructions relating to the sur-render, they received MacArthur's Gen-eral Order No. 1, which had been pre-pared earlier in expectation of the en d

"Unless otherwise noted, the material i nthis section is derived from : CinCPac Ops ,Aug—Sep45 ; CinCPac WarDs, Aug—Sep45 ;USAFMidPac G=5 Hist ; Butow, Japan's De-cision ; Feis, Japan Subdued ; Halsey andBryan, Halsey's Story; Truman, Memoirs ;War Reports .

THE CLOSING DAYS

437

of the war. Under the terms of thi sdocument, Japanese commanders o fforces in the Pacific islands south ofJapan were to surrender to Nimitz orhis representatives, and commanders o fforces in Japan proper, the Philippines ,and the southern section of Korea wereto surrender to MacArthur or to hi srepresentatives . On 15 August, the JCSamplified General Order No . 1 bydirecting the occupation of the ke yareas of Japan, Korea, and the Chinacoast. Under a system of priorities, th eswift occupation of Japan was to be re-garded as the supreme operation an dwould have first call on all available re -sources. Next in order was the earlyoccupation of Seoul and acceptance o fthe surrender of Japanese forces in thatarea. Operations to be undertaken onthe coast of China and on Formosa wer eto follow when forces and transportwere available .

The immediate purpose of occupyingthe China coast by gaining control ofkey ports and communications center swas to extend such assistance to ChiangKai-shek's Nationalist forces in Chin aas was practicable without Americaninvolvement in a major land campaign .As the first of the Allies to go to waragainst Japan, the Chinese governmentwas expected to accept the surrender ofthe Japanese on the mainland . The situ-ation on Chinese soil, and especially inthose great sections of the nation underJapanese control, was so confused, how -ever, that it appeared impracticable, i fnot altogether impossible, for the Na-tionalist Government to fulfill its func-tion as stated in MacArthur's Genera lOrder No. 1, viz ., to take the Japanesesurrender. Although the Chinese Corn -

munists had fought the Japanese, theyhad been fighting the Nationalists a swell, and were in fact, still trying togain the upper hand in China when thewar against Japan ended . To preventlarge stores of Japanese arms and equip -ment from falling into the hands of th eCommunists, the Japanese forces i nChina were instructed to surrender onl yto Chiang Kai-shek or his representa-tives .

The conflict between the Communist sand the Nationalists had been going onfor many years before and slackenedonly slightly during World War II, whenin the interests of national unity, bothparties turned their attention to oustingthe Japanese from the country . Withthe end of the war and the impendingsurrender of large Japanese forces, th eChinese civil war threatened to breakout anew and on a larger scale than be -fore, but this time with internationalimplications which threatened the newlywon peace . This, then, was what facedthe Allies in China .

When Lieutenant General Albert C .Wedemeyer, commander of U.S. forcesin China, apprised Washington of theexplosive situation then existing i nChina and of the need to take vigorou saction there to assist Chiang Kai-shekin re-establishing the authority of hi sgovernment, he was directed to arrangefor the movement of Chinese troops o nAmerican transport planes and ship sinto all areas in China and Formos aheld by the Japanese in order to disarmand repatriate the defeated enemy. Pre-viously prepared plans were then ap-proved for sending in Marines an dsoldiers to help Nationalist force ssecure key Chinese ports and communi-

438


cation centers . 93 At this time, while at-tention was focused on the situation i nChina briefly, MacArthur's head-quarters in Manila prepared for thesurrender ceremony in Tokyo Bay an dprepared to implement plans approve dearlier for the occupation of Japan .

At Manila, the Japanese delegationwas informed that MacArthur wouldformally accept the surrender of Japa nin Tokyo Bay on 31 August on board th eUSS Missouri. According to the prelimi-nary plans, 150 AAF technicians were t oland on 26 August at Atsugi Airdrome ,14 miles southwest of Tokyo, to prepar ethe way for a subsequent large-scal elanding two days later by the 11th Air -borne Division and advance headquar-ters of the Eighth Army, FEAF, an dArmy Forces, Pacific—a total of ap-proximately 7,500 men in all .

Elements of the Third Fleet were toenter Sagami Bay on the 26th also, whil eJapanese harbor pilots were to maneu-ver other naval units directly into Toky oBay on the same day.

Two days later, the Fleet LandingForce (TG 31 .3), comprised of the 4t hMarines (Reinforced) and commandedby Brigadier General William T.Clement, ADC of the 6th Marine Divi-sion, was to go ashore on Miura Pen-insula, 30 miles southwest of Tokyo ,and take over the Yokosuka Nava lBase . 94 On the same day, MacArthu rwas to land at Atsugi to discuss the con-duct of the full occupation with mem-

93See pt V below, "North China Marines,"

for a continuation and fuller exposition of thi sstory.

" The occupation of Yokosuka by the 4thMarines will be treated in fuller detail in p tIV, "Occupation of Japan," below .

bers of the IGHQ. Further airborne andnaval landings were to continue on th e29th and 30th, and on the 31st, as addi-tional occupation forces landed, thesurrender ceremony was to take place onthe Missouri . Because a typhoon struckthe Home Islands during the latter partof August, the entire schedule for theoccupation was postponed two days, andthe surrender ceremony was rescheduledfor 2 September .

On 27 August, however, the trans-ports carrying the Fleet Landing Forceand its components had already arrivedin Sagami Bay to find it congested withthe warships making up the Fleet Flag -ship Group, which was waiting to ente rTokyo Bay for the surrender ceremonies .To relieve the congestion, Missouri andthree destroyers steamed towards thechannel leading to Tokyo Bay in orderto pick up the Japanese pilots who woul dnavigate the ships to their anchorage sin the bay. After the Fleet Flagshi pGroup had entered the bay, TG 30 . 2(British Flagship Group), TF 35 (in-cluding TG 35 .90 (Support Force) ,TF 37 (British Support Force), andTF 31 (Yokosuka Occupation Force )followed in that order. While an air um-brella of hundreds of planes from TF 38carriers covered the task forces andgroups slowly moving in Sagami Wan ,many more land-based fighters andbombers from Okinawa and Iwo Jim apatrolled the skies over Japan proper .

The 150 technicians from the FifthAir Force landed at Atsugi on the 28thwith their emergency communication sand airfield engineering equipment an dbegan operations preparatory to subse-quent landings . On the 30th, the 11t hAirborne Division and the various ad-

THE CLOSING DAYS

439

vance headquarters staffs arrived atAtsugi from Okinawa. Meanwhile, inconjunction with the arrival of the air -borne division, an amphibious landingforce comprising U. S . Marines andsailors, British sailors, and Royal Ma-rines went ashore at Yokosuka an doccupied the harbor forts off Miur aPeninsula .

During the last day of the month ,Fleet Landing Force troops consolidatedtheir hold on the occupied naval baseand prepared to send patrols down thepeninsula to demilitarize outlying in-stallations. By the close of 1 September ,as the hour for the Japanese surrende rapproached, Allied troops had gainedcontrol of most of the strategic are aalong the shores of Tokyo Bay, exceptingTokyo itself.

At 0908, the instrument of surrenderwas signed on board the Missouri . Sign-ing first for Japan on behalf of theEmperor and the Japanese Governmentwas Foreign Minister Mamouri Shige-mitsu. Next was General YoshijiroUmezu, Chief of Staff of the Army, wh osigned for the Imperial General Head -quarters. General MacArthur thensigned as Supreme Commander for theAllied Powers . Flanking him were twoofficers who had been recently release dfrom a prison camp near Mukden an dinvited by him to witness the surrender :Lieutenant General Jonathan M . Wain-wright, the defender of Bataan and Cor-regidor, and Lieutenant General Arthur

E . Percival, the British commander ofSingapore at the time of its capture .Following his signing, MacArthurcalled upon the representatives of theAllied Powers to sign in the followingorder : the United States, the Republic

of China, the United Kingdom, th eUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics, th eCommonwealth of Australia, the Do -minion of Canada, the Provisional Gov-ernment of the French Republic, th eUnited Kingdom of the Netherlands, andthe Dominion of New Zealand . As thesesignatories fixed their names to the tw odocuments—one for the Allies, and aduplicate for Japan—a mass flight of450 aircraft from TF 38 "roared overthe Missouri masthigh ." 99 After all hadsigned, General MacArthur ended th eceremonies, saying :"Let us pray thatpeace be now restored to the world andthat God will preseve it always. Theseproceedings are now closed ." 9 6

In addition to the principals and th esignatories present at the signing manyAllied flag and general officers who hadparticipated in the war against Japa nwere witnesses . Ship's personnel fromthe Missouri and Marines from her de-tachment manned every possible vantag e

point . The Marine officers present wereLieutenant General Roy S. Geiger andhis aide, Major Roy Owsley fromFMFPac ; Brigadier General William T .Clement, commander of the Fleet Land-ing Force ; Brigadier General Joseph H .Fellows, from the staff of CinCPac–CinCPOA ; and the officers of the Marinedetachment of the Missouri, CaptainJohn W. Kelley, and First Lieutenant sFrancis I . Fenton, Jr., Alfred E. W.Kelley, and Josiah W . Bill . 9 7

Although the signing of the surrenderdocument formally ended the war in th e

"Halsey and Bryan, Halsey's Story, p . 283 .

°° Morison, Victory in the Pacific, p . 366 .

s ' Records Group 24, Records of the Burea uof Naval Personnel, Log of USS Missouri,entry of 2Sep45 (National Archives) .


AMONG THE FEW MARINES present at the surrender ceremony on USS Missouriare (1) Lieutenant General Roy S . Geiger and (2) Brigadier General Joseph H .Fellows. (USA SC211066)

CORSAIRS AND HELLCATS fly in formation over Tokyo Bay during the surrenderceremonies. In the left foreground is the Missouri . (USN 80-G-421130)

THE CLOSING DAYS

441

Pacific, it did not mean that the worl dwould return to normalcy or that al lMarines would once again take up peace-time types of duty . A drastic reductionin Marine Corps strength in the immedi-ate postwar era did not necessaril ymean a commensurate reduction in thenumber and types of responsible mis-sions assigned the Corps, for the in -creased role of the United States in in-ternational affairs after the war had adirect bearing on what Marines wereto do and where they were to do it . Inaddition to the assignment of part of th eVAC to occupation duty in Japan an dthe deployment of IIIAC troops toChina, some Marines participated in thesurrender of Japanese-held islands an dtheir later occupation, other Marine swere assigned to reactivated peacetim egarrisons in the Pacific Ocean Areas ,and the majority was rotated back to th eUnited States and released or discharge dfrom active duty.

THE MARINE CORPS AT THEEND OF THE WAR 9 8

By V-J Day, the day that the sur-render was signed, the Marine Corp shad reached a peak strength of 485,833 .Of this figure, 242,043 Marines were

9A Unless otherwise noted, the material i nthis section is derived from : CMC Rpt, 1946 ;FMFPac Hist ; FMF Grd and Air Status Rpts ,Aug45 ; USMC HistDiv, Administrative His-tory of the United States Marine Corps in th ePost-war Period (lSep45-10ct46), dtd 19Aug -47, hereafter USMC Admin Hist ; CG, FMF-Pac, Administrative Activities of the FleetMarine Force, Pacific, lSep45-10ct46, end Ato CG, FMFPac ltr to CMC, ser 2863, dtd24May47, hereafter FMFPac Admin Hist ,1945-1946 .

serving overseas . The major portion ofthe overseas figure-190,945--consistedof ground forces in six Marine divisions,a Fleet Marine Force headquarters ,three amphibious force headquarters ,and supporting service and tactica lunits . Total Marine Corps aviationstrength on 31 August 1945 was101,182 ; 61,098 Marines in this figur ewere serving overseas in four Marin eaircraft wings, an Air, Fleet Marin eForce headquarters, and supportingservice and headquarters squadrons .

The major Marine ground commandsin the Pacific at this time consisted o fFMFPac at Oahu, IIIAC on Guam, andVAC on Maui . The Marine division swere located as follows : 1st on Oki-nawa, 2d on Saipan, 3d on Guam, 4thon Maui, the 5th at sea en route to Japan ,and the 6th, less the 4th RCT at Yoko-suka, on Guam. Of the Marine aviationorganizations, AirFMFPac was basedat Ewa, the 1st MAW was at Mindanao,the 2d on Okinawa, the 3d at Ewa, andthe 4th on Majuro . The groups an dsquadrons of these four wings wer ebased either with the wing headquartersor on various islands throughout th ePacific . Attached to the 3d Wing was aMarine carrier group in four escort car-riers that were under the operationa lcontrol of Carrier Division 27 .

Fleet Marine Force ground and train-ing-replacement activities on the eas tcoast of the United States in Augus t1945 consisted of the Marine TrainingCommand and the 7th Separate Infantr yBattalion at Camp Lejeune, the MarineCorps Base Depot at Norfolk, and th eTraining Battalion and the Field Artil-lery Training Battalion at the Marin eCorps Schools, Quantico . On the west

442


coast, the Marine Training and Replace-ment Command, San Diego Area, wa sresponsible for training and replacementfunctions at Camps Pendleton andElliott .

Marine aviation operations in theUnited States were under the control oftwo commands. The 9th MAW, withheadquarters at the Marine Corps Ai rStation, Cherry Point, N .C., was re-sponsible for aviation training and re -placement activities on the east coast .Marine Fleet Air, West Coast, with head -quarters at the Marine Corps AirStation, Miramar, Calif., held similarresponsibilities on the west coast .

Besides these Marine air and groun dtraining and replacement commands i nthe United States were Marine Corpsrecruit depots at Parris Island, S . C. ,and San Diego, California, and nu-merous posts, stations, and independen tguard detachments attached to variou snaval facilities . All of these, as well asthe FMF organizations, were to facedrastic revision as the Marine Corp sbegan to revert to a peacetime status .

Four major personnel problem areasfacing the Marine Corps, like the othe rServices at the beginning of the postwarperiod, concerned demobilization, dis-bandment of activities and suspensionprogram ; personnel procurement ; andpostwar, fiscal, and mobilization plan-ning. The most immediate problem fac-ing the Commandant in the perio d1 September 1945 to 1 October 1946—when wartime and immediate postwarexigencies had eased—was the rapi ddemobilization of his Corps, for, in ef-fect, all of the personnel problems o fthe Marine Corps related in one way o ranother to demobilization .

On 11 August 1945, the Commandantsubmitted to the Secretary of the Navya general plan, commonly known later a sthe Point System, which governed thedischarge and separation of enlisted Ma-rines . 99 Approved on the 15th, this planwas intended to supplement, but not re -place, existing Marine Corps policy an ddirectives concerning discharges an dreleases . It also provided the most equi-table means of establishing the priorit yin which Marines 100 were to be release dby computing their service credits . EachMarine received 1 point for each monthof service from 16 September 1940 ; 1point for each month overseas or onduty afloat from 16 September 1940 ;5 points for each decoration and for eachcampaign or engagement for which abattle star was awarded ; and 12 point sfor each child under 18 years of age, butnot more than 36 points for children .With 12 May 1945 as the cutoff date forcomputations, the critical score to beused when the plan first went into effec ton 1 September was 85 points for mal eMarines and 25 points for Women Re-servists . The original plan provided tha tthe critical scores would be reduced t oreflect changes in the missions, andtherefore the personnel requirements, ofthe Marine Corps. The plan also pro-vided that enlisted personnel with suffi-cient discharge points could remain o nactive duty for as long as they wante dto, and for the time that their serviceswere required, without their having tosign an enlistment contract . Conversely,the Marine Corps found it necessary to

°° G—1 OpD, Aug45 ; USMC Admin Hist, p . 2 .100 The provisions of this plan did not apply

to regular enlisted Marines serving under afour-year contract or the extension thereof.

THE CLOSING DAYS

443

retain on active duty, until their reliefswere procured and trained, certain keypersonnel who otherwise had amasse dthe required score for release an ddischarge .

Since the number of officers to be re -leased was relatively smaller than thenumber of enlisted men involved, theMarine Corps gave individual considera-tion to the case of each officer . Because i thad obtained its officers from variou ssources during the war, the Corps ha dto provide for either the demobiliza-tion, integration into the regular com-ponent, or return to enlisted ranks ofeach officer concerned .

On 10 October 1945, Marine Separa-tion Centers were activated at theUnited States Naval Training Centersat Bainbridge, Maryland, and GreatLakes, Illinois . Initially, the Bainbridgecenter was set up to handle a maximum

of 400 discharges a day, but by19 November its quota had been ex-ceeded, and two months later the centerwas processing 500 discharges a day . 10 '

From time to time, as the current sit-uation permitted, the Marine Corps de-mobilization plan was revised to increas ethe flow of discharges. In effect, thespeed-up was accelerated by reducingthe number of points required for sepa-ration. On 8 October, barely more thana month after the program had begun ,the critical score was lowered to 60points and all enlisted personnel withthree or more dependent children under18 years of age could request discharge .The point score was further reduced to50 on 1 November and 45 on 1 Februar y1946. By 1 July 1946, the Marine Corp s

10 ' USMC Admin Hist, p . 4 .

made it possible for inductees or reserv-ists with 30 months of active duty to be-come eligible for discharge, regardles sof the number of points each of themhad acquired . The required discharg escore for Women Reservists was com-parably reduced each time that the scorefor male Marines was revised . Finallyon 1 October, all reservists and selecteesbecame eligible for discharge regardles sof length of service time . 10 2

By the end of June 1946, the MarineCorps demobilization program was en-tering its final stages and the strengthof the Corps had been reduced to 155, -592 Marines. This was a decrease of 68percent from the September 1945 figureand 87 percent of the entire net decreaserequired to bring the Corps to theplanned postwar limit of 108,200 . TheFleet Marine Force, which had carriedthe offensive combat burden of the Corpsduring the war, was the hardest hit ofall Marine activities during the demobi-lization. At the end of the fighting ,FMFPac immediately took steps to be-gin reducing the strength of its force scommensurate with its commitments .On 1 October 1946, FMFPac was approx-imately 8 percent of its 1 September1945 size, or to put it another way, therewas a total of 21,343 Marines in air an dground units in the Pacific in late1946 . 10 3

During the 13-month period from 1September 1945 to 1 October 1946,FMFPac received 30,071 replacements .In turn, 102,115 Marines were returne dto the United States from the Pacifi c

ALMAR 117, dtd 16Aug46 .101 FMF Air and Grd Status Rpts, Aug45 ,

Sep46 .

444


and Far East . This unusually rapid rat eof demobilization stripped FMFPac unit sof the majority of their experienced per-sonnel—officer and enlisted—and cause da situation in which an insufficient num-ber of trained regulars remained over-seas to perform specialist duties prop-erly. On-the-job training of remainingMarines and the arrival of replacemen tdrafts containing some experienced per-sonnel partially, but not sufficiently, al-leviated the situation .

Nonetheless, FMFPac faced a partic-ularly acute situation in this period be -cause it was heavily committed withunits carrying out either occupation,garrison, or repatriation duties in Chinaand Japan, and on many of the Pacificislands, such as Truk, Guam, Kwajalein ,and Eniwetok . During the immediat epostwar months, many Marine units hadbeen disbanded, some new ones activate don either a temporary or a permanentbasis, and some garrison detachmentsformed and transferred to island andarea commanders for operational con-trol . 1o4 All units under FMFPac werereorganized to reflect currently effectiv etables of organization and prescribedpersonnel ceiling strengths . In the faceof the various administrative and or-ganizational changes occurring durin gthis time, all units found it most difficul t

104 As an example, appearing in FMF groun dstatus reports for the first time in April 194 6are the following units : Marine Detach-ment (Provisional), Headquarters, Com-mander, Philippine Sea Frontier, which wa sattached to the FMFPac Representative, Mari-anas Area for operations ; Marine Detachment(Provisional), Eniwetok, attached to Atol lCommander, Eniwetok, for operations ; andMarine Detachment (Provisional), Samar, at-tached to FMFPac for operations. The last

to perform their missions properly be-cause of the excessive personnel turn-over . Moreover, insufficient transporta-tion to rotate home eligible Marines, whowere scattered throughout the Pacific,created additional problems. Instancesoccurred when the return home of man yof these Marines, whose early discharg ewas desired by the Marine Corps becauseof existing postwar plans, was delaye dbecause troop transports were not im-mediately available .

The second major problem facing th eMarine Corps in the postwar era wa sto convert a greatly expanded wartimeorganization into a competent peacetimeinstrument of national security. Thischangeover resulted ultimately in th e

consolidation or disbandment of many

Marine activities, and a reduction in th e

mission of others to reflect their lessene dsize. From 1 September 1945 to 30 Sep-tember 1946, 368 Marine organizationswere disbanded and 104 activated . A ma-jority of the latter, such as replacementor rotation drafts, had been activated ona temporary basis only, and some of theothers actually were redesignated ratherthan activated . One of the most impor-tant aspects of the disbandment of ac-tivities and suspension program was it ssensitivity to the progress of the de-

two detachments named were to revert to th ePost-War Shore Establishment upon order .FMF Grd Status Rpt, Apr46. Appearing in th eMay status report was a provisional detach-ment on Bikini . By October, only the Kwaja-lein, Truk, and Eniwetok detachments re-mained, and the time left to them was limited .A more complete review of the organizatio nand deployment of Marine security forces i nthe Pacific will be found in the next chapter ,"Back to the Islands ."

THE CLOSING DAYS

445

mobilization program. Because of this ,close coordination in the conduct of bothprograms was essential, and Marin e

Corps personnel allowances had to b econstantly revised in order to maintaina proper balance between Marine Corp smissions and the number of Marine savailable to conduct those missions suc-cessfully .

An example of how one program af-fected the other may be seen in the closerelationship of demobilization with th ebase roll-up program in FMFPac . Thatheadquarters held the mission of closin gdown Marine supply installations andbases in the Pacific, and of disposing ofmillions of dollars of surplus propert yand goods therein . The early loss of largenumbers of experienced supply, service ,and clerical personnel from FMFPac lo-gistics agencies imposed a particularhardship on those units which had th eactual duty of closing out scattered basesand receiving from disbanding line or-ganizations vast quantities of materialwhich had to be stored, maintained, safe -guarded, and finally disposed of . 105 At-testing to the enormity of the task is th efact that on 1 July 1945, the Marin eCorps had on hand in the Pacific prop-erty valued in excess of $400 millio nat cost. In the following year, MarineCorps supply activities had disposed ofsome $207 million worth of items . Atthe end of the fiscal year, on 1 July1946, the Marine Corps still had $68million of surplus property to disposeof, but fewer Marines were available t o

do the job. 10 6

1 ° 5 FMFPac Admin Hist, p . 5 .

106 CMC Rpt, 1946.

Personnel procurement was the thir dproblem to confront the Marine Corpsat the end of the war . Even with a mas-sive separation and discharge programunderway, the Corps had to return to apeacetime status almost immediately ,and to reach its required manning levelof 108,200 Marines . The officer procure-ment program in the postwar perio dfeatured the cessation of the mass office rcandidate programs of the war years an dthe return to peacetime methods for th erecruitment and training of regular per-sonnel . The huge task of selecting 4,40 0outstanding reserve and temporary offi-cers for transfer to the regular estab-lishment began after V-J Day, and wa sin its final stages by 30 September 1946 .

One of the important sources for Ma-rine Corps officers had been the Nav yV–12 College Program, which provide da number of billets for Marines . At theend of the war, approximately 1,900men remained on active duty in the Ma-rine Corps portion of the V–12 program .The Corps, however, had no desire t obear the expense of educating office rcandidates who would not be part of th epeacetime establishment . Finally, afte rconsiderable study, the Marine Corpsoffered individuals who had complete dseven or eight semesters of study a nopportunity to accept reserve commis-sions and choose between immediate re -lease to inactive duty or a brief tour o factive service. Those who chose the lat-ter might apply for a regular commis-sion if they so desired . Undergraduatesnot eligible for a commission were per-mitted either to resign, transfer to gen-eral duty, or transfer to an NROTC

unit . On 30 June 1946, the Marine Corps

446


phase of the V–12 program was deacti-vated . 1 ° 7

Another source for officers along wit hthe V–12 program was the wartime offi-cer candidate course at Quantico . This ,too, was allowed to lapse and so the prin-cipal postwar sources of permanent Ma-rine officers were both the vast numberof men who had been temporarily com-missioned during the war and reservist smobilized at its beginning .

One important goal in the postwa rperiod was to build up enlisted strengt hby recruiting as many enlisted regularMarines as possible and by reenlistin gall of the regulars whose enlistment con-tracts had been or were about to be com-pleted . On V-J Day, 72,843 Marines wereserving on regular enlistment contracts ;by 30 June 1946, however, 60 percentof these contracts were scheduled to ex-pire. Since a postwar level of 100,000male regular Marines had already beenestablished, the Marine Corps found itnecessary to initiate an intensive pro-curement program to recruit replace-ments for men scheduled for dischargeand to acquire an additional number s othat the postwar manning level could b eachieved . By 1 October 1946, this goa lhad nearly been reached with a total o f95,000 regulars on active duty, and ver yfew of them due for discharge unti l1948. As a result of all of this soundplanning, the Marine Corps personnelpicture was consonant with postwarplans that had been developed .

The establishment of postwar, fiscal ,and mobilization plans was the fourt h

10i For a fuller story on the Marine Corp sV—12 program, See Condit, Diamond, an dTurnbladh, Marine Corps Training, chap 15 ,pp. 288—316.

major problem with which the Marin eCorps had to contend. There were twodistinctive phases in this planning—th erecession phase and the postwar devel-opmental phase. The first of these con-cerned the period September 1945–March1946, when most of the measure sadopted for expediency during the warby the Marine Corps expired . The secon dphase was a period in which the entir eMarine Corps began to function in ac-cordance with its established postwarroles and missions . The most importantevent of 1946 insofar as those objective swere concerned was the publication ofthe Navy Basic Post-War Plan No . 2 . 10 8

This plan was to be used for planningpurposes only, but Admiral Nimitz, wh oreplaced Admiral King as CNO on 15December 1945, indicated in his coveringletter that, the Marine Corps would b efairly well established along the line sof the plan as it then stood. A note ofthe future was sounded in the final para-graph of CNO's covering letter, whichread : "In all planning, it is essential tha tan effective, balanced, mobile fleet, in-cluding air components, have first prior-ity. Economy in men, money, and mate-rials is mandatory ." 10 9

General Vandegrift, Commandant o fthe Marine Corps since 1 January 1944 ,determined from this plan that the gen-eral task of the Marine Corps would b eto perform the following functions :

(a) To provide a balanced Fleet Marin eForce, including its supporting air corn-

108 CNO ltr to distr list, dtd 21Mar46, Op—001/mac, (SC) A16—3/EN, Ser : 051P001,Subj : Basic Post-War Plan No. 2 (OAB ,NHD) .

108 Ibid.

THE CLOSING DAYS

447

ponent, for service with the Fleet in th eseizure or defense of advanced NavalBases or for the conduct of such limitedland operations as are essential to th eprosecution of a Naval campaign .

(b) To continue the development o fthose aspects of amphibious operation swhich pertain to the tactics, technique, andequipment employed by landing forces .

(c) To provide detachments and organ-izations for service on armed vessels o f

the Navy .(d) To provide security detachments

for protection of Naval property at Navalstations and bases . il o

To ensure that the Marine Corpswould adequately perform these func-tions, it was determined that th estrength of the Corps would be 108,200 ,or approximately 22 percent of the over-all Navy postwar strength of 487,700 .With this number, the Marine Corps wasto maintain the Fleet Marine Force ,ships' detachments, security forces forthe naval establishment, HeadquartersMarine Corps, and Marine supportingactivities .

In his annual report for the fiscal yea r1946 to the Secretary of the Navy, theCommandant expounded on the func-tioning of these four tasks as follows :

(a) Fleet Marine Force :Experience in the war gives incontro-

vertible evidence that amphibious warfar eis an essential adjunct of naval warfare .. . . In the war in the Pacific, the Flee twas able to play its historic role . . . onl ybecause of the existence of the Flee tMarine Force . . . .

110 CMC Rpt, 1946 . Also see Col Thomas G .Roe, et. al . A History of Marine Corps Role sand Missions : 1775–1962—Marine Corps His-torical Reference Series, No. 30 (Washington :HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, 1962) for a survey ofthese functions during the period indicated i n

the title.

The Fleet Marine Force, in conjunctionwith Headquarters Marine Corps and th eMarine Corps Schools, will continue it srole in the- development of these aspect sof amphibious operations which pertain t othe tactics, techniques, and equipmentemployed by landing forces .

(b) Detachments Afloat :On carriers, battleships, and cruisers ,

Marine detachments will provide a traine dnucleus for the ship's landing force, guncrews as required, and local security fo rthe vessels. On amphibious command ships ,Marines will perform duty on staffs unde rthe direction of amphibious force com-manders, and communications duties as di-rected by the commanding officer of th evessel . Marine detachments on transportswill perform transport quartermaste rfunctions and provide local security a s

directed.(c) Security Forces :Marine Corps personnel will be assigned

the task of providing necessary interna l

security for Naval Shore Establishmentswithin and beyond the continental limit sof the United States, and of providing

external security in accordance with spe-cifically assigned missions in such estab-lishments outside the United States .

(d) Supporting Activities :In order to maintain the Corps, it wil l

be necessary to procure, equip, train, an dadminister Marine personnel in such amanner that assigned missions can b eaccomplished . Marines within supportin gactivities will therefore be serving atLogistic Establishments, Recruit TrainingDepots, Personnel Procurement offices ,Headquarters establishments, training ac-tivities, and in non-available dutystatus.l l i

According to Basic Post-War Plan

No. 2, the Fleet Marine Force was t o

consist of two Marine divisions and on e

Marine brigade, reinforced, and sup -

porting naval units when and as re -

"CMG Rpt, 1946 .

448


quired . Normal locations would be : onedivision at Camp Lejeune and one a tGuam., and the brigade on the west coastat Camp Pendleton. Marine aviationwas to consist of two aircraft com-mands : one, AirFMFPac, with respon-sibility in the West Coast-Hawaii -Marianas area ; and the other in overal lcommand of six Marine carrier group saboard as many escort carriers. Thefinal components of the FMF were to beHeadquarters, Fleet Marine Force ,Pacific, and Headquarters, Fleet Marin eForce, Atlantic (FMFLant), with Forc eTroops assigned to each command .

Ships' detachments were to consist o fMarine detachments assigned to thelarger combatant naval vessels, amphib-ious command ships, transports o fthe Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, andtransports of the Naval Transportatio nService. Small Marine aviation servic edetachments were to be assigned to th eCVEs that had Marine carrier squad-rons in their air complements . The se-curity forces would consist of interiorguards for naval establishments withinand outside of the continental UnitedStates, and air warning and antiair-craft artillery units. Headquarters

Marine Corps and supporting establish-ments were to be composed of theMarine headquarters at Washington,the recruit depots at Parris Island an dSan Diego, school activities, logistic sactivities, Marine barracks and camp slocated outside of naval establishments ,Marine air stations in the continentalUnited States, and Marine air station sin the Hawaiian area and the MarineAir Facility (in caretaker status) at St .Thomas, Virgin Islands .

These then, were the first postwa rplans of the Marine Corps, and th eforces with which they were to be ac-complished . In the months immediatel yfollowing V-J Day, Marine plans hadfrequently been revised to reflect ne wrequirements, and the plans werechanged even more drastically as eachpostwar year passed . Necessary stepswere taken to reorganize the MarineCorps each time that the need arose .As the situation changed, the continuin greduction in the strength of the Corp soverall had to be considered before newmissions were assigned . As best it could ,the Marine Corps built up its forces inthe Pacific, the area where new peace -time responsibilities were waiting .

CHAPTER 3

Return to the Islands

At war's end, Marine units not des -tined for an occupation assignment or

deactivation went ashore to accept th e

surrender of Japanese forces on island s

throughout the Pacific . After supervis-ing the demilitarization and repatri-

ation of the former enemy, the Marine

units involved in these activities eithe rwere returned to the control of parentorganizations, redesignated to reflect

new duties as barracks or guard detach-

ments., or deactivated .

Primarily, the story of the Marine

Corps in the Pacific following the end

of the war concerns Marine surrenderand occupation duty, the activation of

postwar garrison forces, and the many

changes that the FMF underwent be -

fore the Marine Corps attained a peace -

time stance .

SURRENDER AND OCCUPATIO NDUTY 1

Long before Japan had indicated a

willingness to sue for peace, staffs in

1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi ssection is derived from : CinCPac Rpt of Sur-render and Occupation of Japan, dtd 11Feb46,hereafter CinCPac Surrender and Occupatio nRpt (OAB, NHD) ; FMF Grd Status Rpts ;Guam Island Comd WarDs, Aug45—May46 ;Peleliu Island Comd WarDs, Sep44—Feb46 ;Occupation For, Truk and Central Carolin eIslands, WarDs, Dec46—Apr46, hereafter TrukWarD, with date ; MarDet, Truk and EasternCaroline Islands, AnnRpt of Activities, 1946.

Washington and at Pearl Harbor were

specially constituted to work on plan sfor implementing the surrender of iso-lated Japanese garrisons on the man yislands and occupied areas in the Pacific .The question facing these staff planner s

was whether the Japanese island an darea commanders would follow the lea d

of their government and surrender or

whether they would put up fanatic re-sistance that could continue long afte r

V-J Day. On 14 August, the Empero r

had issued an Imperial Rescript calling

upon his commanders to surrender and

cooperate with the victors . After they

had received their Emperor's orders

and were convinced of their authentic-ity, the outlying garrison commander s

were more than willing to comply with

them.To provide for an orderly and sys-

tematic program of accepting the sur-render of Japanese island garrisons an dlater occupying the islands, CinCPOAorganized two task forces from th e

Marianas and Marshalls-Gilberts Area

commands . These were : TF 94 (Com-mander, Marianas), established to op-

erate the bases of that area and to

occupy the East, Central, and WesternCarolines (notably Truk, Yap, th e

Palaus, and the Bonins), and to evacu-ate enemy nationals from the Marianas ;

and TF 96 (Commander, Marshalls -Gilberts), organized for the same pur-

449

450


poses as TF 94, but scheduled to oper-ate in the Marshalls-Gilberts Area. 2

Prior to V-J Day, American forcesin the Marshalls and Gilberts hadgained control of Eniwetok, Kwajalein ,Majuro, and Tarawa Atolls . AfterJapan surrendered, Task Force 96 unit shad to set up occupation forces on suchbypassed atolls and islands as Mille ,Jaluit, and Wake, following the capitu-lation of the former enemy garrison slocated there . In the Carolines; Ulithi ,

Peleliu, and Angaur had been in Ameri-

can hands since late 1944 . Facing Cin -

CPac elsewhere in the Pacific at th ebeginning of September 1945 was thesurrender of Japanese forces in th e

Bonins, the rest of the Marianas an dPalaus, and the formerly important

strongholds of Yap, Truk, and Woleai ,

and their lesser satellite island garri-sons. The occupation of some of these

places, their demilitarization, and theevacuation of Japanese nationals wasthe responsibility of units of the FleetMarine Force and small naval surface

forces assigned to support them . As

their tasks were accomplished, theMarine units either were gradually re-duced in size until disbanded, with-

drawn, or eventually replaced by smal lnaval and Marine garrison forces . (SeeMap 25 . )

The job of evacuating and repatriat-ing Japanese military personnel andcivilians was almost overwhelming . Theenormity of the problem is best de -

On 5 January, Task Force 96 was dissolve das a separate command under CinCPOA . Thesubordinate commands formerly under TF 9 6were absorbed by the Marianas command.

scribed by the numbers involved-

100,000 military and 50,000 civilians .

Aggravating the situation was the fac t

that most American and other shippingwas employed to return home liberate d

Allied POWs and veterans scheduled fo r

demobilization, and to carry back to theFar East replacement drafts and ma-

terial required by the occupation forces

in Japan and China. The solution to

the shipping problem was eventually

found in the employment of war-wearyLSTs and demilitarized Japanese ships ,none of which were suitable for other

transportation requirements .

The vast majority of the island gar-

risons that were to surrender were i nthe area under the control of Vice Ad-

miral George D. Murray, Commander,Marianas . To standardize the conductof the surrender and occupation pro-

gram, on 20 August he organized from

within his force the Marianas Surren-der Acceptance and Occupation Com-

mand (TG 94.3) . Comprising thisgroup were the following task units andtheir commanders : Truk Occupation

Unit, Brigadier General Robert Blake ;Bonins Occupation Unit, Colonel Pres-ley M. Rixey ; Palau Occupation Unit ,Brigadier General Ford O. Rogers ;Guam Evacuation Unit, Major Genera lHenry L. Larsen ; and three other unitscommanded by naval officers . 3

A plan was devised standardizing th eoperations of these units and standard-izing such specifics as the format of th e

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surrender document 4 and the conduc tof the surrender ceremony, the Ameri-can flag raising, and the demilitariza-tion of enemy forces, which were to becalled thereafter "disarmed militarypersonnel." In addition, the directiv eordered each task unit commander todetermine whether any Allied or Ameri-can prisoners were present on the is -land being surrendered or if any ha dbeen kept there . The commanders alsowere to conduct spot interrogations andinvestigations to determine whether an ywar crimes or atrocities had been com-mitted during the Japanese occupation .

According to the task force directive ,relations between the victors and thevanquished were to be properly con-ducted at all times and all military

' Brigadier General Ford O . Rogers becam ePeleliu Island Commander on 7 August 1945 ,the day after the first atomic bomb was droppedon Japan. He recalled that his first conclusio nafter hearing of this bombing was that thewar was all but over. Because he had not atthat time received instructions from Com -Marianas regarding how he was to conductthe surrender of Japanese forces in the Palaus ,General Rogers directed his Chief of Staff ,Colonel Charles L. Fike, and his AssistantChief of Staff for Operations, Captain Melvi nH. Bassett, USN, to prepare , a surrenderdocument to be used for that purpose . Whenthe end of the war was announced, Rogers flewto Guam and submitted to Admiral Murrayfor approval the document his staff had pre -pared . "He took my surrender . procedure wor dfor word, and used it in all the other surrender sconducted under his command ." Rogers inter -view . After ComMarianas had approved thi sdocument, Colonel Fike flew a spotter-typeplane over Babelthuap, the headquarters of theJapanese Palaus command, and dropped a cop yof the surrender terms to the enemy below .Fortunately, he was not shot at, although hehad expected to receive ground fire . RAdmMelvin H. Basset, USN, comments to HistBr ,G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 270ct66.

courtesies were to be observed both be -fore and after each surrender and flag-raising ceremony had been completed .Japanese interpretation of these ordersoften resulted in more than one enliste dMarine or sailor being saluted by allJapanese ranks .

The garrison on Mille Atoll, southwestof Majuro in the Marshalls, surrendere don 22 August—11 days before the Japa-nese government signed the surrender onthe Missouri—and thus became the firstenemy group in the Pacific Ocean Area sto do so. On the same day that Mille gav ein, the garrison commander on Ak aShima in the Ryukyus surrendered toelements of the Tenth Army, which alsoaccepted the surrender of the forces onTokashiki Shima in the same islan dgroup the next day . On 29 August, theJapanese commander on Morotai, whocontrolled the garrisons of the entireHalmahera group, capitulated to thecommander of the 93d Infantry Division .

Two days later, the garrison on Mar-cus Island, located between Wake andthe Bonins, was the next major Japanes egroup to give up. Marcus figured prom-inently in Navy postwar plans . It wasestimated that when the naval air baseand terminal proposed for the islandbegan operations, it would shorten theHonolulu-Tokyo air route by 1,049 miles .To administer the air base, CinCPacplanned to establish a Marcus IslandCommand, but the numerous Japanes eon the island had to be repatriated be-fore the island could be developed . Atthe time of the surrender, there wer e2,542 Japanese Army and Navy per-sonnel and a number of Japanese civil-ians remaining—the majority sufferingfrom all forms of tropical maladies an dmost of them severe malnutrition cases .

RETURN TO THE ISLANDS

453

Not only were they unfit as laborers ,their continued presence on the islandpresented a threat to the health of th eoccupation forces .

In order to evacuate the Japanes egarrison as quickly and expeditiousl yas possible, the Marine 11th Militar yPolice Company (Provisional), of th e5th Military Police Battalion, IslandCommand, Saipan, was sent to Marcu son 2 September. Arriving two days later ,the unit remained on Marcus as theisland guard until it was disbanded on16 April 1946. 5 Two months earlier, o n18 February, the Heavy AntiaircraftArtillery Battery (Provisional) ha dbeen formed on the island . It was re-designated Marine Barracks, Marcus ,on 10 April and passed to the adminis-trative control of the Department of thePacific (MarPac) that same day .° On12 May, the Marine Barracks was dis-banded, the same day that the Nava lAir Base, Marcus, was deactivated .

The next Japanese area commanderto yield was Lieutenant General Sada eInoue, who surrendered on 2 September1945 the entire Palau Group and al lforces under his command, includingthose on Yap, to Brigadier General For dO. Rogers, island commander on Pele-liu . ? The Peleliu Island Command ha dbeen organized on 16 July 1944, as th e3d Island Base Headquarters under th e

FMFPac Admin Hist, pt I, end A, Sched-ule of Demobilization of FMFPac, 1Aug45 —1Oct46, p . 1 .

See section, "Peacetime Garrison Forces, "below for further information concerning thisand other provisional and barracks detach-ments in 1946 and later .

' See also Garand and Strobridge, "WesternPacific Operations," pt III, "The Peleliu Cam-paign ."

command of Brigadier General HaroldD. Campbell ; it was redesignated IslandCommand, Peleliu, on 16 November .Brigadier General Christian F . Schiltrelieved General Campbell as IslandCommander on 19 March 1945, and h ewas in turn relieved on 7 August byGeneral Rogers .

Beginning 15 September, elements o fthe 111th Infantry occupied Koror ,Malakal, and Arakabesan, and liberate d539 Indian and Javanese POWs, mostof them suffering from marked malnu-trition and beri-beri . By 5 October, allJapanese had been removed to Babel-thuap, the largest island of the Palaugroup. A month later, the Indian andJavanese troops were repatriated . Atthe end of September, General Roger ssent a small force to reconnoiter island sand atolls in the vicinity of the Palausto search for missing Allied personnel ;none was found . 8

' General Rogers knew that the Japanesehad taken one prisoner, the member of a B—2 4crew which had been shot down. This man ha djumped and crewmen of another plane in theraid had observed a Japanese boat pickin gup the American, who appeared alive an dwell . Rogers' first question to General Inoueafter the surrender had been signed was : "Youhave one prisoner, where is he?" The Marinegeneral was told that the prisoner had beenkilled by a Japanese officer, the commanderof an antiaircraft battery, who had been givencustody of the flyer in order to practice hisEnglish in conversations with him. TheJapanese took the American "out to where ourbombers had killed almost his entire antiair-craft command, began to brood over that, de-cided to punish him, and he shot him, burie dhim on the spot, and prayed over him." GeneralRogers ordered Inoue to produce the officer ,but on the next day all he received was a pic-ture of that individual laying on the groundwith a hole in his head . He had committedsuicide . Rogers interview .

454


On 26 October, less its 2d Battalio nwhich had been disbanded, the 26th Ma-rines arrived to relieve the 111th Infan-try as the Peleliu garrison force . Thefollowing March, the Marine Detach-ment (Provisional), Peleliu, was acti-vated and on the 15th, the 26th Marineswas disbanded . The provisional forcewas redesignated Marine Barracks ,Peleliu, on 15 April 1946, when admin-istrative control of the unit passed t othe Department of the Pacific.

On the same day that the Palaussurrendered, the commander of Japa-nese forces on Rota, located northeastof Guam, capitulated to Colonel Howar dN. Stent, the representative of the Is -land Commander of Guam, Major Gen-eral Henry L . Larsen. Rota was formallyoccupied on the 4th, and shortly there-after all of the 2,651 disarmed Japanes emilitary personnel, except for 5 patients ,were transferred to POW stockades o nGuam. Colonel Gale T . Cummings wasappointed the temporary island com-mander of Rota, and Marine and Seabe eforces under his command immediatel ybegan to repair the airstrip on theisland, completing the task by the 1stof October .

The largest enemy force in the Centra lPacific submitted on 2 September, whensenior Japanese Army and Navy officer son Truk signed the instrument of sur-render. Preparations for this act and th eoccupation of the former enemy terri-tory were initiated on 30 August, whenBrigadier General Leo D . Hermle ,Deputy Island Commander, Guam, dis-cussed with Vice Admiral Chuichi Hara ,commander of the Fourth Fleet, andLieutenant General Shunsaburo Mugi-kura, the Thirty-first Army commander,

the steps to be taken for the surrende rof all personnel and areas under thei r

command .

Regarding his part in the presur-render discussions with the Japanese ,General Hermle recalled :

I carried out this mission under th eorders of Vice Admiral Murray wh ofurnished me a staff of about 12 officers ,mostly technicians such as aviators, har-bor defense [experts], engineers and tw ointerpreters, etc. Contact with the Jap-anese on Truk was made from Guam vi aradio. We left Guam in the evening, on ehalf the staff with me aboard a destroye rand the other half aboard a D .E. [de-stroyer escort] . We anchored off Dublon ,Truk, the next morning .

Japanese officials had been instructed ,via radio, to approach the destroyer aboarda small boat displaying a white flag . Anadmiral and a general came aboard ac-companied by a small staff. None of theJapanese would admit that they under -stood English, so all negotiations were con -ducted through the interpreters. I in-formed the Japanese that Vice AdmiralMurray would take their formal surrende raboard his flagship and that they wouldreceive further instructions concernin gthis matter by radio . They were informe dthat at the surrender they would be re-quired to furnish lists of personnel, ships ,planes, harbor defenses, etc. . . . At al ltimes, they were very cooperative and theconference proceeded to a satisfactor yconclusion in a few hours . During the con-ference, the captain of the destroyer gav ethem a light lunch for which they ex -pressed great satisfaction . °

By signing the terms of surrender on2 September on board USS Portland,Admiral Murray's flagship, GeneralMugikura committed the troops on thefollowing islands under his control to

° LtGen Leo D . Hermle Itr to Hd, HistBr,HQMC, dtd 1Nov65 .


455

lay down their arms and await Ameri-can occupation : Truk, Wake, the Palaus ,Mortlake (Nomoi), Ponape, Kusaie ,Jaluit, Maloelap, Wotje, Puluwat, an dWoleai, and Mille, Rota, and Pagan,which had already capitulated . In addi-tion to these Army-controlled islands ,the following bases under the control o f

the Navy were pledged to surrender at

the same time by the signature of Ad-miral Hara : Namoluk, Nauru, andOcean. When the military capitulated ,Rear Admiral Aritaka Aihara, IJN(Retired), head of the Eastern Branc hof the South Seas Government—a Japa-nese agency with headquarters on Tru k—signed for the 9,000 civilians thereand for those on the other islands withi nhis jurisdiction . l o

When an actual survey of the force son Truk was made later, a total of38,355 soldiers and sailors—including3,345 Korean military personnel—wa scounted. In addition, a census of thecivilians in the islands totalled 11,486, ofwhich 1,338 were Japanese, 252 Korean ,9,082 native Caroline Islanders, 79 3natives of Nauru, 8 Germans, 7 Span-iards, and 6 Chinese .

On the larger islands of Truk wer esuch major Japanese military installa-

tions as bomber and fighter strips ,

seadromes, submarine and torpedo boat

bases, ammunition magazines for weap-

ons of all calibers and types, coast artil-lery defense installations, and other mil-

itary facilities . All of these had to b e

demilitarized, dismantled, or destroyed .

But first, the many sick Japanese on

10 CinCPac Surrender and Occupation Rpt ,pp . 180—181 .

them had to be either treated and re-patriated or evacuated .

Except for receipt of their regula rshare of American naval and air bom-bardments, some of the bypassed Japa-nese island garrisons did not fare toobadly, especially if they had been basedon one of the lush and fertile Pacificislands where they could raise their ownfood. There are some cases on recor dwhere Japanese commanders upon sur-rendering refused offers of food fro mthe Americans because the garrison ha da supply that was sufficient to maintai nits members until they were embarkedfor return to the Home Islands .

Moen, one of the chief islands of Truk,was not a tropical paradise . When theoccupation forces went ashore there ,they found that bugs and worms had s oravaged the sweet potato crop, on whichthe Japanese garrison had so largely de-pended for subsistence, that all of thetroops were suffering from malnutri-tion .

Rank upon rank of `living scarecrowslined up along the route of the inspectingparty—men with ankles as thin as skinnywrists, with sunken cheeks, and with ever yrib showing sharply .' 1 1

Three days before the surrender date ,Brigadier General Robert Blake wasdesignated Prospective Island Com-mander, Truk, a designation which waschanged on 27 September to Prospectiv eCommanding General, Occupatio nForces, Truk and Central Carolines. Themission of his command was to occupyand develop Truk "as a fleet anchoragewith facilities ashore limited to recrea-tional purposes and for the support o f

"Ibid ., p . 181 .

456


assigned aircraft and the servicing oftransient aircraft ." 12 With the aid ofa small staff under the jurisdiction ofthe Island Commander, Guam, Genera lBlake organized the unit that was tocomprise the Truk Occupation Force .Because of the urgency of the Marin eCorps demobilization program, the unitwas formed slowly. Initial administra-tive duties were undertaken by the staffof the 2d Provisional Antiaircraft Ar-tillery Group before it was disbanded .The headquarters of this group, how -ever, provided the nucleus for the staffof the occupation force. The first detai lof the new force to report in was themilitary government unit. A Base Head-quarters Company (Provisional), wasactivated on 1 October 1945. It wasformed according to the T/O of a Pro-visional Brigade Headquarters Com-pany, and did not reach full strengthuntil shortly before it departed for Truk .

In keeping with the future tasks ofthe force, elements of the 29th Nava lConstruction Battalion and Acorn 52 1 3were assembled from bases all over thewestern Pacific . Both of these units alsosuffered from the loss of skilled andexperienced artisans .

On 14 November, the 2d Battalion ,21st Marines, 3d Marine Division (thenstill on Guam), came under the contro lof the occupation force. The commanderof 2/21, Lieutenant Colonel Lyman D .Spurlock, and a small detachment ofMarines from the battalion had been sen t

"G—3 WarD, end (B) to Truk WarD ,Dec45 .

"An acorn was a naval unit designed toconstruct, operate, and maintain an advancedlandplane and seaplane base and to providefacilities for operations .

to Truk in September to supervise theevacuation of Japanese personnel an dKoreans, Okinawans, and Formosans ,who had been members of Japanese -controlled forces . On 28 October, Spur -lock was relieved by his executive officer ,Major Robert J . Picardi, who remainedin charge of the evacuation programuntil Lieutenant Colonel Spurlock re -turned to Truk on 25 November with th erest of 2/21 and the occupation force.

To that date, 6,696 Japanese civilianand military and Japanese-controlle dforces, and their wives and children ,had been repatriated ; by December, thi snumber had risen to 20,410, leaving19,575 remaining in the islands. In Janu-ary, 14,298 more evacuees left Truk ,and in February, 1,426. At the end ofApril 1946, only 3,811 disarmed militarypersonnel and their families remained ,most of them working as laborers an dassisting in the destruction of Japanesearms, fortifications, and munitions. Theremarkable factor in the history of allof the former Japanese possessions inthe Pacific that were surrendered to andoccupied by American forces is the highdegree of cooperation, docility, and lackof rancor on the part of the losers . Therewere few incidents of Japanese intransi-gence ; those that did occur took plac eamong the accused war criminals, whowere usually more confused and contrit ethan sullen and unremitting .

One mission common to all Alliedoccupation and surrender groups was toinvestigate alleged Japanese war crimesand atrocities, and hunt down and im-prison until their trial those accused ofsuch acts . 14 By the time that war crimes

14 See below, this chapter, for Marine involve-ment in the conduct of war crimes trials .


457

tribunals had been convened, a consider-able number of accused Japanese werebeing held in stockades on the variousislands under Allied control throughou tthe Pacific . If evidence of an allegedcrime was discovered after the accusedhad been repatriated to Japan, deposi-tions were taken and presented to Allie dtribunals convened in that country .During the first few months of the Tru koccupation, General Blake's investi-gators had uncovered evidence suffi-ciently damning to warrant apprehen-sion and detention of 42 individuals .Since no tribunals were held on Truk,the detainees were tried elsewhere, de-pending upon which of the Allied gov-ernments had paramount jurisdiction . 1 5

Following the raising of the Americanflag on 25 November over the islan dgroup formerly held by the Japanese,General Blake's forces conducted asearch of Truk and its neighboringislets for missing Allied personnel ;none were found .

On 26 February 1946, the Base Head -quarters Company, Occupation Forces ,Truk and Central Caroline Islands, wa sredesignated the Marine Detachment(Provisional), Truk. Personnel to ex-pand the new detachment to its author-ized strength were low-point personneltransferred from 2/21 . The next day ,the battalion was detached from GeneralBlake's command and returned to Guam ,where it was disbanded on 5 March . On15 April, the occupation forces comman ddesignation was changed to Commander ,Truk and Central Caroline Islands . Ex-actly one month later, General Blakewas relieved by a naval officer, who had

"Truk WarDs, Dec45, Jan—Apr46 .

the additional duties and title of Com-mander, Naval Air Base, Truk . In July1946, the complement of the provisiona lMarine detachment was reduced fro ma strength of 256 to 42 men . On 12 Octo-ber, administrative control of the de-tachment passed to MarPac .

Wake Island, which had been capturedby the Japanese on 24 December 1941 ,was regained by the Americans on 4September 1945, when Rear Admira lShigematsu Sakaibara surrendered th eforces under his command to the com-mander of the 4th MAW, BrigadierGeneral Lawson H . M . Sanderson, whowas the representative of the Com-mander, Marshalls-Gilberts Area, fo rthe ceremony. 1 6

Following his appearance on th eLevy (DE–162) on 4 September to re-ceive and sign the surrender documents ,Admiral Sakaibara departed from th eship to make preparations ashore fo r

the American flag to be raised tha tsame afternoon . The first America nagain to set foot on Wake when Genera l

Sanderson's party arrived was Colone lWalter L . J . Bayler, famed as the "last

man off Wake Island." 17 At 1330 :

10 This narrative of the Wake surrender an doccupation is derived from : Comdr, WakeIsland Surrender Acceptance Unit, ltr to CT G96.14, dtd 7Sep45, Subj : Surrender Acceptanc eof Wake Atoll on 4Sep45, Narrative of (OAB ,NHD), hereafter Wake Island Surrende rRpt; CinCPac Surrender and OccupationRpt, pp . 186—187 ; ComMarianas ltr to Dir ,Naval History, dtd 1Jan47, Subj : Narrativeof the Marshalls Area Comd, lSep45—10ct46 ,Anx V, Wake Island Comd Rpt for sam eperiod, hereafter Marshalls Area Comd His t(OAB, NHD) .

1S See LtCol Walter L. J . Bayler, Last ManOff Wake Island (New York : Bobbs-Merrill ,1943) .


TO THE COLORS sounds as the American flag is raised over Wake Island for thefirst time since December 1941 . (USMC 133686)


459

With the platoon at `Present Arms,' withboth American and Japanese saluting, th eColors were then hoisted and two-blocke dwhile the notes of `To the Colors' wer esounded on the bugle. As the Colorsreached the peak of the flag pole, the Lev ycommenced and completed firing a twenty -one gun salute . i s

Although a Japanese garrison of 60 9Army and 653 naval personnel had sur-rendered, this total was only a smal l

fraction of the total number of Japa-nese that were isolated on the islan dfrom the time it was first bypassed b y

the Americans . Since that time, Ameri-

can bombs and shells had killed 600 of

the enemy, 1,288 had died of malnutri-tion and disease, and 974 had beenevacuated to the Home Islands as hospi-tal cases. Of those remaining when th eAmericans arrived, 405 were ill—200

of these bedridden . Immediately upon

occupying the island, American author-ities sent food and medical supplies tosuccor the garrison.

In accordance with CinCPac plans ,

Wake was designated a Naval Ai r

Facility on 4 September. Occupationforces arrived beginning the 7th, in-cluding a Marine detachment consistingof 2 officers and 54 enlisted from

Engebi . These forces at once concen-trated on repairing the airstrip, dispos-ing of mines, destroying Japanese am -

munition and bombs, and establishinga shore-based communication establish-ment. An inspection of existing ai r

facilities disclosed that the east-west

strip of the airfield was in good condi-tion and capable of landing planes of

any type or size . The seaplane laneformerly used by Pan American Air-

19 See Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Har-18 Wake Island Surrender Rpt, p . 4.

bor to Guadalcanal, map on p . 97 .

ways flying clippers was re-marked dur-ing the first few weeks of the reoccupa-tion, and mooring buoys for seaplaneswere also placed during this period.

By the middle of September, all Japa-nese had been removed from Wake, th echief island of the atoll, to Peale and

Wilkes Islands . 1 ° All Japanese, with theexception of Admiral Sakaibara and 1 6commissioned and noncommissionedofficers, were repatriated by 1 Novembe r1945. The admiral and the others were

temporarily detained before their trans-fer to Kwajalein for further investi-gation in their responsibility in thealleged execution of approximately 10 0American civilian workers in Octobe r

1943 .Wake was officially commissioned a s

an Island Command and a Naval AirBase on 1 November, with a naval offi-cer installed as the commander of boththe island and the air base . On 14 Jan-uary 1946, the Marine Detachment(Provisional), Wake, consisting of 5officers and 110 enlisted was established .Less than a month later, on 10 Febru-ary, the unit was redesignated Marine

Detachment (Provisional), Eniwetok ,and transferred there with orders t odisband on conclusion of OperationCROSSROADS, the atomic bomb test sat Bikini Atoll . On 10 December, th edetachment was disbanded .

Eight days after the provisional de-tachment left Wake, a Marine Heav yAntiaircraft Artillery Battery (Pro-visional), Wake, was activated. Likeother provisional units formed in thi speriod, the strength of the battery wa s5 officers and 110 enlisted Marines . In

460


view of the decreasing importance ofWake in postwar plans, the battery wasdisbanded on 19 August 1946 .

Another important Japanese capitu-lation occurred on 3 September 1945 ,when Lieutenant General Yosio Tachi-bana, senior commander of the Japaneseforces in the Ogasawara Gunto (BoninIslands) surrendered to Commodor eJohn H . Magruder, Jr. aboard USSDunlap, outside the harbor of Chich iJima. Until the fall of Iwo Jima and hi sdeath, the former commander of th eBonins forces, Lieutenant GeneralTadamichi Kuribayashi had made hi sheadquarters on that volcanic island .After Kuribayashi's death, the sub -commander of the Bonins succeeded tocommand and moved the headquarter sto Chichi Jima .

Approximately 140 nautical mile snortheast of Iwo Jima, Chichi Jima wa sseriously considered by American plan-ners as a potential target for an am-phibious landing . 20 Chichi Jima wasdropped in favor of Iwo Jima, because ,although it had a good protected har-bor, its terrain was too rugged to per-mit the rapid construction of airfields .Even more condemning were the resultsof photo-reconnaissance missions whichshowed Chichi Jima to have been moreheavily fortified than Iwo . 21 Confirmingthis evaluation after the war was thereport of the Bonin Occupation ForcesCommander. Following some prelimi-nary comments, Colonel Rixey wrote :

This writer has seen Jap defenses fromTarawa to Iwo . Nothing previously see ncan compare with coast and artillery de-fenses . . . surrounding Chichi harbor.

"° See pt I, chap 1, supra .21 Morison, Victory in the Pacific, pp . 5—6 .

Concrete emplacements, high in the moun-tains with steel door openings are toonumerous to count . Artillery and machinegun fire which could have been placed onthe airfield would have prevented any[force commander's italics] attempt at alanding there. With camouflage, as prac-ticed by the Japs, in place, NGF spotterswould have had a very difficult time locat-ing these cleverly placed positions . . . . Thelocation of many of the emplacements ,which have to be seen to be appreciatedindicate that the Jap plan was to permitan entrance into the harbor or onto th eairfield, then to give us the `works .' Mostof these positions are inaccessible an dmany could not have been reached by NG Fas they are situated on reverse slope sfacing east. 2 2

Survivors of the Japanese garriso non Chichi and Haha Jimas comprise d20,656 Army and Navy personnel and2,285 civilian laborers who had beentransported to and employed in theislands by the military . Additional Jap-anese garrison troops located on othe rislands near the Bonin group wereevacuated by the U. S. Navy .

In mid-September 1945, at the sam etime that 2/21 was designated as th emilitary element of the Truk Occupa-tion Force, the 1st Battalion, 3d Ma-rines, 3d Marine Division, was desig-nated the military element of the BoninsOccupation Force. Immediately upo nreceipt of the orders detaching the mfrom parent organizations, both bat-talions began reorganizing for the mov eand filling their ranks with volunteers ,regulars, and low-point Marines .

On 10 October, the advance echelo nof 1/3, consisting of Rixey's small staff

" Bonins EvacRpt of Inspection 10-110ct45 ,by Col Presley M. Rixey, encl (A) to Com -Marianas Itr to CinCPac—CinCPOA, dtd 6Nov —45, subj : Bonins EvacRpt (OAB, NHD) .


461

and 20 military policemen, landed andmet the Japanese liaison group headedby Major Yoshitaka Horie . When Colo-nel Rixey discovered that GeneralTachibana and Vice Admiral KunizoMori, the senior officer in tactical com-mand at Chichi Jima, were not presentin the group, he "sent for them to reportto me at the dock, which they, of course,complied with ." 2 3

The Marines were the first America ntroops to set foot in the Bonins sinceCommodore Perry's expedition there i n1853 . 24 Rixey's group had a primarymission of evacuating and repatriatingthe Japanese. A secondary task was t odestroy the extensive Japanese defensesexisting on the island. When the re-mainder of the battalion arrived on 13December, it carried with it a large sup -ply of explosives with which to accom-plish this mission .

This main body had been designatedthe Bonins Occupation Force at Guamon 1 December . When it landed onChichi Jima 12 days later, Colonel Rixeyordered the American flag raised overthe former Japanese stronghold . Afterhe had originally landed on 10 October ,Colonel Rixey determined that the en -tire 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, woul dnot be required to garrison the island ,to supervise repatriation, and to demili-tarize the defenses . He therefore recom-mended that the Occupation Forces b ereduced in strength to 400 men only. Helater found that even less troops could

" BGen Presley M. Rixey ltr to Hd, HistBr ,HQMC, dtd 10Nov65, hereafter Rixey ltr.

=4 Aurthur and Cohlmia, 3d MarDiv Hist, p .334 . It should be noted that Iwo Jima is in th eVolcano Islands .

have been used because the Japanes ewere most cooperative and willing toplease. It was not necessary to establis ha manned boundary between the Ameri-can and Japanese zones on the island ;"A drawn line on a map was suffi-cient ." 25 On 1 June 1946, after fulfill-ing its assigned mission, 1/3 was dis-banded on Chichi Jima, and its Marineswere transferred to other FMFPacunits in the Pacific and the Far East .

During the several visits to th eBonins by American fast carrier tas kforces in 1944 and 1945 and the subse-quent air and naval gunfire bombard-ments of those islands, one Marine an dseveral Navy aviators were shot dow nand listed as missing in action . AfterColonel Rixey had assumed his role asthe commander of the Bonins, he insti-tuted an investigation to determine th efate of these downed pilots. Soon, Rixeybegan hearing rumors and receivinganonymous reports concerning the in -humane and barbaric treatment Ameri-can POWs had received at the hands oftheir Japanese captors .

Shortly after Colonel Rixey's arriva lon Chichi Jima, a Japanese Coast Guar dcutter entered the harbor. On boardwere Frederick Arthur Savory and histhree uncles, all of whom were descend -ants of Nathaniel Savory, a Massa-chusetts whaler who had settled in th eBonin Islands in the 1830s . After thefall of Saipan, the Japanese had evacu-ated the American-Chamorro-Hawaiia nfamily to the Home Islands . While inJapan, Fred Savory had heard rumorsspread by soldiers repatriated fromChichi Jima regarding cannibalism o n

Rixey ltr.

462


that island. He passed these stories onto Colonel Rixey .

The morbid story of the Chichi Jimagarrison was related in full at the war -crimes trials held later at Guam . Twonaval aviators—one captured in March1944 and the other in August after theyhad parachuted from their disabled air-craft—were bayoneted to death at Gen-eral Tachibana's orders following theirinterrogation. Five more American air -men, one a Marine, were executed afte rthey, too, had been captured when the ybailed out of their aircraft . Three werebeheaded, one was bayoneted, andanother beaten to death . It was upon theflesh of these five that certain membersof the Japanese garrison fed. Testimonyexonerated the majority of the Chich iJima command from having been in-volved in this disgusting incident, an dindicated that with the exception of th eperpetrators of this foul deed, thos ewho ate the flesh did not know whatthey were eating .

Reporting his reaction upon learnin gof the uncivilized actions of the guiltyparties, Colonel Rixey wrote : "We wereflabbergasted at first . We had expecte dbeheadings, of course . But never can-nibalism! What manner of men werethese?" 26 The war crimes trials of 2 1Chichi Jima officers and men were hel don Guam during the fall of 1946, andentailed more than 1,000 pages of testi-mony and exhibits . Of the 21 accused,one officer who had no knowledge of th ecannibalism was acquitted . The other20 were found guilty and given variou ssentences ranging from death by hang-ing to life imprisonment and lesse r

28 Cited in Sherrod, Marine Air Hist, p . 352 .

penalties . One was hanged in June ;General Tachibana and three of hi sother officers were executed at Guam on24 September 1947 . 2 7

In quick profusion, the followin gformer Japanese-garrisoned islands inthe Central and Western Pacific island swere surrendered to CinCPac represen-tatives in September 1945 : Aguijan ,Jaluit, Yap, Wotje, Maloelap, theRyukyus, Kusaie, Ponape, Nauru ,Lamotrek, Woleai ; 26 and in October ,Ocean. Some of these little-know nislands with unfamiliar names weresmall and held nothing but a weathe rstation manned by a few Japanesecivilians and a slightly larger nativepopulation . Military garrisons of vari-ous sizes were on some of the large rislands, the size of the force determine dby the strategic value that the Japanes ehad given the island . Regardless of th elocation or size of the former enemygarrison, the terms of the Potsda mDeclaration bound the Allied Powers t opermit, and by inference to assist, al lJapanese military personnel to returnto their homes after they and thei rorganizations had been completely de -militarized. Because American shipping

27 CO, MarBks, Guam, ltr to CMC, dtd27May 48, Subj : Hist Narrative of SpecialWar Crimes duties performed by personnel o fthe MarBks, Guam, hereafter, MarBks, Guam ,Hist Narrative .

28 Representing the Island Commander ,Guam, Lieutenant Colonel Parker R . Colmeraccepted the surrender of the Woleai Atol lCommander, Major General Kitamura, on 19September . Two days earlier, a small Marinedetachment under Lieutenant Colonel Colmerhad landed on this tiny atoll in the Centra lCarolines to arrange for the demilitarization ofthe islet and the evacuation of its personnel .Island Comd, Guam, WarD, Sep45 .


463

was fully committed to the support o fMacArthur's occupation and surrende rforces and in the return of U . S. serv-icemen to the States, until they could b erepatriated, the disarmed enemy garri-sons on the various atolls were super-vised, but generally left undisturbed .The Japanese were allowed to fend forthemselves from their own gardensuntil such time that Japanese shippingcould be made available to transportthem home .

2B CinCPac Surrender and Occupation Rpt ,p . 168.

ation vessels . By the end of December1945, all Japanese military personnelhad been evacuated from the Marshalls -Gilberts Area . By 10 January 1946,73 .9 percent of the Japanese nationals ,military and civilian, on the islands inthe Marianas had been evacuated toJapan . Not included in these group swere the Japanese who had been de-tained on either Guam or Kwajaleinawaiting trial as war criminals or wait-ing to appear as witnesses at thes etrials. Nonetheless, before the middl eof 1946, most disarmed military person-nel had been returned to their homes inJapan, Korea, Okinawa, or Formosa ,and thus many of the provisional Ma-rine detachments that had been forme dto supervise their repatriation could bedeactivated. The Marine forces in thePacific were ready then to phase intotheir postwar garrison programs .

PEACETIME GARRISON FORCES 3 0

By 1 October 1946, of the 10 provi-sional Marine detachments and the mili -tary elements of occupation forces that

30 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi ssection is derived from : CMC Rpts, 1946—1948 ;USMC Admin Hist ; G—1 and G—3 OpDs ,lAug45—31Dec47 ; FMF Air and Grd StatusRpts, Aug45—Dec47 ; FMFPac Admin Hist,1945—1947 ; CofS, MarPac, ltr to CG, MarPac,dtd 5Mar46, Subj : Hist of Hq, MarPac, Durin gWorld War II, hereafter MarPac WW II Hist ;CG, MarPac, ltr to CMC, dtd 20Mar47, Subj :Narrative of MarPac lSep45—10ct46 ; CG,MarPac, Itr to CMC, dtd 15Apr47, QuarterlySummary of MarPac, lOct46—lApr47 ; CG,MarPac ltr to CMC, dtd 10Jul47, same subject ,period lApr—lJu147, all hereafter MarPa cHist, with inclusive dates ; MarGarForPa cOpDs, for periods lSep45—10ct46, lOct46 —1Apr47, and lApr—1Jul47, all hereafter Mar -GarForPac OpD, with inclusive dates.

Although American shipping wasthoroughly involved in "Magic Carpet, "the return home of combat veteransfrom the Pacific, and in operations inthe Far East, the Japanese had 2 1tankers, 101 transports, and 21 1freighters still in operating conditionafter the war. General MacArthur said ,however, that there was a more press-ing need for these vessels to ship foo dand clothing to the Home Islands thanto repatriate troops from outlyingislands. "As of 7 October, according toDomei [the Japanese news agency] ,only 38,645 troops had been returne dfrom overseas, including the continentof Asia, which meant that some 3,320, -000 Japanese Army and 300,000 Nav ypersonnel still remained outside thehome islands." 29 CinCPac alleviated th esituation somewhat in November, whenit began to use amphibious vessels no tsuited for "Magic Carpet" in the re-patriation of Japanese from the Mar-shalls-Gilberts and Marianas Areas.Liberty ships and LSTs in Philippinesports and at others in the Pacific wereassigned to duty as Japanese repatri -

464


had been formed since the end of th ewar, 31 all except the ones on Wake ,Kwajalein, and Eniwetok were dis-banded, redesignated a Marine Bar-racks, or made a permanent Marinedetachment . 32 Between April and Jul y1946, the following redesignations tookplace on the dates noted : 15 April ,Marine Detachment (Provisional) ,Peleliu, became the Marine Barracks ,Peleliu ; 20 May, 8th Military PoliceBattalion (Provisional), became theMarine Barracks, Guam ; 10 June, 5thMilitary Police Battalion (Provisional) ,became the Marine Barracks, Saipan ;20 June, Marine Detachment (Provi-sional), Samar, became the MarineBarracks, Samar ; and 4 July, Ma-rine Detachment (Provisional), Head -quarters, Commander, Philippine Se aFrontier, became the Marine Detach-ment, Commander, Naval Forces, Phil-ippines. The last-named organizationwas reorganized on 1 January 1947 a sthe Marine Barracks, Sangley Point ,Philippine Islands .

The realignment and reduction ofFMF units in the Far East also affectedthe organization of the garrison force sin the Pacific. For instance, in January1946, CinCPac notified CNO that heanticipated a drastic reduction in th esize and scope of fleet activities at Yoko-

51 See previous chapter, section entitled "Th eMarine Corps at the End of the War," p . 444n .

" On 10 December 1946, the provisional de-tachments on Wake and Eniwetok were dis-banded . The Kwajalein unit was redesignatedMarine Barracks, Kwajalein, and came underthe administrative control of Marine Garriso nForces, Pacific. FMFPac Admin Hist, 1Oct46-1Apr47 .

suka for the remainder of the America noccupation of Japan, and recommende dthat the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines—part of the Yokosuka Occupation Forc e—be redesignated as the 2d Separat eGuard Battalion (Provisional), FMF ,and remain there for interior guar dduty. The change in title took place on15 February 1946. Five months later,the size of the provisional battalion wa sreduced and on 15 June it became Ma-rine Detachment, Fleet Activities, Yoko-suka, and was placed under the admin-istrative control of MarPac .

Based on the provisions of the post -war plans, all of these Marine units wer egiven missions consisting of maintain-ing internal security and standing in-

terior guard duty at the naval activitiesto which they had been assigned . Inaddition, the Marines on Truk, Marcus ,and Peleliu islands manned antiaircraftartillery positions, while the garrison son Guam, Saipan, and Truk had the

important and difficult task of guardingand supervising nearly 7,000 Japanesewar crimes prisoners and disarmedmilitary personnel .

From 1 June 1946 until 5 May 1949 ,when the War Criminal Stockade wasclosed, the Guam garrison was respon-

sible for the custody, discipline, feeding ,clothing, and, in some cases, executio nof Japanese war criminals confined inits custody. A total of 13 inmates wasexecuted by hanging following theirtrial and conviction by the War Crime sCommission convened on Guam. Elevenexecutions were conducted by an ArmyOfficer, a member of the Military Polic eCorps, who was an official hangman .

465RETURN TO THE ISLAND S

During the period he was attached tothe Marine Barracks in order to carryout his duties, he trained two enliste dMarines "in the technique of execution

by hanging." They executed the last tw owar criminals condemned to die afte rhe left. 3 3

On the date that the designations o f

the various garrisons changed, the y

were detached from FMFPac and place dunder the administrative control of th e

Department of Pacific, or MarPac as it

was both officially and familiarly ab-

breviated . Operational control of thePacific garrisons was vested either withthe naval activity or the senior naval

command on the island to which th e

Marine unit was assigned .On the effective date of attachment

of the barracks and detachments, Mar-

Pac in turn placed them under the con-

trol of Marine Garrison Forces (Mar-

GarFor), 14th Naval District, in

Honolulu. MarGarFor had been forme d

on 13 December 1941 in order that al l

of the various Marine garrison forces

in the 14th Naval District could be cen-trally administered .

Headquarters Marine Corps directed

Brigadier General Harry K. Pickett to

assume command as Commanding Gen-eral, MarGarFor, 14th Naval District.

Although General Pickett and subse-

quent commanders functioned as dep-uties of the commanding general of

MarPac, they did not carry the title. At

the end of the war, because of the in-

creasing importance of the Honolulu -

based command and to ensure an effi-

cient administrative control of th e

widely separated Marine Corps posts i nthe Pacific, the MarPac commander

recommended that the title of the Mar -

GarFor commander be changed to

Commanding General, Pacific Ocean

Marine Garrison Force, and that he b e

assigned as the deputy commander o f

MarPac. 34 The Commandant approve d

the redesignation, and it became effec-tive on 15 October 1946, when the ne w

title, Commanding General, Marin e

Garrison Forces, Pacific, appeared . 3 5

The first officer assigned to this com-

mand was Brigadier General William

A. Worton, who established his head-

quarters at the Marine Barracks, Pear l

Harbor, T .H., and reported his assump-

tion of command on the 15th to both

CinCPac and MarPac . 3 6

When the Marine Garrison Forces

was first organized in 1941, there wer e

only a few barracks and detachments

under its command, and all of these wer e

in the Hawaiian Islands and on John-ston and Palmyra Islands. At the end of

the war, the number of subordinate unit s

increased considerably ; the mission as -

signed MarGarForPac at the time of

its redesignation in 1946 made it respon-

sible for all posts, detachments, offices ,

and other Marine Corps organization s

in the Pacific Ocean Areas with the ex-ception of FMF units, Marine Corps ai r

stations, and shore-based air warnin g

" MarPac WW 77 Hist, p . 4 .

" CMG Spdltr ser MC-819560, dtd 27Sep46 ;MarGarForPac GenO 2-46.

"8 MajGen William A. Worton ltr to Hd ,

" MarBks, Guam, Hist Narrative .

HistBr, HQMC, dtd 25Oct65 .

466


units . 37 On 23 May 1947, MarGarForPa cbecame an administrative command di-rectly under the control of HeadquartersMarine Corps. As before, CinCPac ha doperational control of the Marine post sand stations in the Pacific . The MarineGarrison Forces, Pacific, command wasdeactivated on 31 August 1948, and theCommanding General, FMFPac, as-sumed administrative control of all Ma-rine security forces and supportingestablishments in the Pacific formerlyunder the control of MarGarForPac . 3 8

Although it was purely an adminis-trative command throughout seven yearsof existence, MarGarForPac played anincreasingly important role in supervis-ing the constant change in the composi-tion, designation, and number of Marin egarrisons in the Pacific during the pe-riod 1945-1948. The assumption o fcontrol over these Marine outposts b yFMFPac meant that the Marine Corp stransition to peacetime status had beenaccomplished and security forces an d

" MarGarForPac consisted of the followin gin October 1946 : H&S Co, MarGarForPac ;MB, USNB, Pearl Harbor, T .H. ; MB, NAD ,Oahu, T .H . ; MB, NAS, Ford Island, Pear lHarbor, T .H . ; MB, NAS, Barber's Point, Oahu ,T .H . ; MB, NAF, Honolulu, Oahu, T .H . ; MB ,NAS, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T .H . ; MB, NAS ,Kahului, Maui, T .H . ; MB, NOB, Midwa yIsland ; MB, NAS, Johnston Island ; MB ,Guam ; MB, Saipan ; MB, NOB, Okinawa ;MB, NOB, Subic Bay, P .I . ; MB, Peleliu ,Palau Islands ; MD, (Prov), USNBS, MarcusIsland ; MD, Truk ; MD, Fleet Activities ,Yokosuka ; MD, Commander, Naval Forces ,Philippines ; MB, Kwajalein ; MD, Fita-FitaGuard, Samoa . Muster Rolls, MarGarForPac ,Oct46 (Diary Unit, Files Sec, Pers Dept ,HQMC) .

" CMC Spdltr ser MC—1034430, dtd 19Aug48 ,cited in Ibid ., Aug48 .

supporting establishments in the Pa-cific were stabilized—for the time being ,at any rate . Closely paralleling the stepsleading to stabilization of these non-Fleet Marine Force organizations werethe day-to-day changes that carriedFMF units from a war to peacetimecharacter .

STABILIZATION OF THE FMF 3 9

By the beginning of 1947, the Marin eCorps had adjusted to operating on apeacetime level with a complement dras-tically reduced from a peak strength ;there were 92,222 Marines on active dutyon 30 June 1947 . 4 ° Because of major or-ganizational changes and the constantturnover of personnel in activities wher etrained and experienced Marines wereneeded, the retention of key Marine swas especially critical in Marine logis-tical, aviation, and recruit trainingunits . The problem was all the mor egrave in face of the missions assigne dto the Marine Corps for Fiscal Year1947 . 41 These missions were a combina-tion of those previously assigned inaccordance with the postwar programof the Corps and those foreshadowingwhat the National Security Act of 194 7and later amendments would assign .

'° Unless otherwise noted, the material i nthis section is derived from : CMC Rpts, 1946—1949 ; USMC Admin Hist ; G—1, G—3, and Div-Avn OpDs ; FMF Air and Grd Status Rpts ;FMFPac Admin Hist .

"CMG Rpt, 1947 .41 As other agencies of the Federal govern-

ment do, the Marine Corps operates on a fisca lrather than a calendar year, or from 1 Julyof one year to 30 June of the following year .Fiscal year 1947 then would have been fro m1 July 1946 to 30 June 1947 .


467

In essence, the Marine Corps was :

(a) To provide fleet marine forces o fcombined arms, together with supportin gair components for service with the fleetin the seizure or defense of advance nava lbases and for the conduct of such lan doperations as may be essential to theprosecution of naval campaigns .

(b) To develop in coordination withother armed services, those phases ofamphibious operations which pertain tothe tactics, techniques and equipmen temployed by landing forces.

(c) To provide detachments and or-ganizations for service on armed vesselsof the Navy .

(d) To provide security detachments fo rthe protection of naval property at nava lstations and bases .

(e) To be prepared in accordance withintegrated joint mobilization plans for th eexpansion of the peacetime componentsto meet the needs of war .

(f) In addition, to maintain such activ-ities as necessary to insure the adequateadministration, supply, training and tech-nical directions of personnel and unitsengaged in accomplishment of the basicmissions . 4 2

To meet the challenges engendered bythese missions and at the same time toreduce its size to reflect peacetime tasks ,the Marine Corps reviewed and re-vamped the assignments given to it smajor components . In conjunction withHeadquarters Marine Corps and th eMarine Corps Schools, the Fleet Marin eForce was to continue its role as state din paragraph (b) quoted above . Marinedetachments afloat on carriers, battle-ships, and cruisers were to provide atrained nucleus for the ships' landin gforces, gun crews as required, and loca lsecurity for the vessels . Marine detach-ments on transports would perform th e

" CMC Rpt, 1947 .

310-224 0 - 69 - 31

functions of transport quartermaster sand local security as directed. Marinesin security forces assigned to naval shor eestablishments within and outside of th econtinental limits of the United Stateswould provide necessary internal se-curity ; those detachments assigned tosuch establishments outside of theUnited States would provide externa lsecurity in accordance with specificall yassigned missions. In order to maintai nthe Marine Corps and to assist it i naccomplishing its missions, Marine sup-porting activities, such as logistic estab-lishments, recruit training depots ,personnel procurement offices, head -quarters establishments, and trainingactivities, would procure, equip, train ,and administer Marine personnel . 4 3

During the last two war years, th eFMF had been organized in accordanc ewith the F-Series Tables of Organiza-tion, by which a Marine division con-sisted of a headquarters battalion, tank,engineer, and pioneer battalions, servic etroops, an artillery regiment, and thre einfantry regiments, totalling 843 officer sand 15,548 enlisted, or 16,391 Marinesoverall . A reinforced regiment, or RCT ,consisted of the infantry regiment itself ,an artillery battalion, engineer, pioneer,transportation, ordnance, service andsupply, medical, and tank companies, areconnaissance platoon, and a band sec-tion, all totalling 4,585 Marines . Underthe G-Series T/O (peace)," approved 4September 1945, the Marine Corps reor-ganized to reflect its postwar size andconditions at that time . A Marine divi-sion consisted of the same component s

" CMC Rpt, 1946 .

" See App H for this T/O .

468


as before, but its strength was increasedto 962 officers and 17,182 enlisted Ma-rines, or a total of 18,144. While the sizeof the division was increased, the num-ber of Marine divisions scheduled foractive service according to postwar

plans had dropped to two. As soon as theG-Series T/O was authorized, all Marineorganizations affected by it were re-constituted . Many units, because of thei rmissions as well as their depleted states ,could be reorganized at only 90 percen tof their authorized strength . During th eperiod February-April 1946, the 1st Ma-rine Division in China and a few othe runits had dropped down to 80 percent o fauthorized strength. To rectify the situ-ation, the Commandant ordered them toorganize on the basis of the prevailin gG-Series T/0, and beefed up thei rstrengths slightly to reflect their currentassignments .

In late 1945, two of the Marine divi-sions that had served so spectacularly i nthe Pacific during their tours in combatwere disbanded. The 4th Marine Divi-sion, which had been formally activate don 16 August 1943 at Camp Pendleton ,returned to the United States from Mau ion 3 November 1945 and its units dis-banded that month, again at CampPendleton. Following the earlier forma-tion of some of its organic units, th e3d Division had been activated on 16September 1942, also at Camp Pendle-ton like the 4th Division. A little morethan three years later, on 28 December1945, the 3d—less 1/3 in the Bonins an d2/21 on Truk—was disbanded on Guam.Replacement drafts consisting of low-point men boarded CVEs for the trip t oChina, where they were to join the 1stMarine Division ; high-point Marines

scheduled for discharge or reassignmen twere transferred to a transient center onGuam, where they awaited transporta-tion to the States .

From September 1945 to June 1947 ,FMFPac was reduced in size until i tapproached the postwar form it wouldtake. Many changes in the compositionand designation of FMFPac units occur -ring in this period will be discusse dlater when the occupations of Japan andNorth China are considered. On 30 June1947, FMFPac strength was 19,125 Ma -rines in units at Camp Pendleton, th eHawaiian Islands, China, and Guam . Inthe months leading to this date, othe rmajor Marine commands, FMF an dnon-FMF, were formed .

On 22 January 1946, the Commandantdirected the Commanding General, Ma-rine Barracks, Quantico, to form aspecial infantry brigade to be prepare dfor expeditionary service and main-tained in a state of readiness . Theheadquarters and two battalions of the1st Special Marine Brigade was forme dat Quantico, and the 3d Battalion wa sformed at Camp Lejeune . The followingmonth, on 4 February, administrativ eand operational control of the brigadepassed to the brigade commander, Briga-dier General Oliver P. Smith . Four dayslater, General Smith was directed tomaintain his command on two weeksreadiness, and to report to the Com-mander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet(CinCLant), for planning purposes .Although organized along the basic line sof a FMF team, the brigade was not partof the Fleet Marine Force . In May 1946 ,it conducted the only major MarineCorps training mission undertaken dur -ing that fiscal year, a joint amphibious


469

exercise in the Caribbean area. At theend of July, General Smith was directedto disband the 1st Battalion at Quantic oon 10 August. The brigade headquarter sand the 2d Battalion, which had joinedthe 3d Battalion at Camp Lejeune inMarch, were disbanded on 31 August . 4 5

Another significant event occurringin 1946 was the activation on 16 Decem -ber of Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic(FMFlant), under the operational con-trol of CinCLant . Three days before it sformation, the Commanding General, 2dMarine Division, at Camp Lejeune, wa sdirected to activate FMFLant and toact as its commanding general in addi-tion to his duties as head of the 2 dDivision. He was to assume command ofthe ground units comprising the forceon the 16th, and to take over the aviationunits on 2 January 1947 .

In December 1946, Marine aviationcommands in the Atlantic and Pacifi careas were designated as subordinat eunits of the Fleet Marine Force, Atlanti cand Pacific, respectively . In the proces sof this change, the 2d Marine Aircraf tWing at Cherry Point was redesignatedAircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic .

Marine aviation went through asmany changes as the ground componen tfollowing the end of hostilities, and wa slikewise concerned with reaching it spostwar level as quickly as possible .These transitions required the rapid butcontrolled demobilization of personne l

and deactivation of units and stationswithout the loss of a high state of com-bat readiness. The first phase of the

46 The material concerning the formation anddisbandment of the 1st Special Marine Brigad ewas derived from CMC Rpts, 1946 and 1947 ;

G—3 OpDs, Jan—Ju146 .

program relating to the withdrawal o foverseas units depended on future re-quirements of Marine aviation in th ePacific.

The deployments of the 1st Marin eAircraft Wing and its four groups t oChina and MAG–31 to Japan were thelast World War II tactical operations ofAirFMFPac. It then became possible fo rthe aviation command to plan for th erotation of excess units and personne lto the States, and the redeployment be-gan when transportation became avail -able. The strength of AirFMFPac on 1September 1945 totalled 43,819 Marines ;13 months later, this force had been re-duced 90 percent to a total of 4,693 . Theloss of experienced personnel created asmuch of a problem in the air units as i thad in the ground organizations . Asdemobilization progressed, approxi-mately 80 percent of the replacementssent to AirFMFPac to fill in the gap swere inexperienced and untrained inso-far as the technical requirements of tha tcommand were concerned . As a result,the squadrons and groups soon reache dthe point where they had insufficientnumbers of experienced key personnel ,not only for maintaining operationalfunctions but also for training the in-experienced Marines . This situation waseased somewhat when the Commandantimmediately ordered overseas a largenumber of fully qualified noncommis-sioned officers . As a result, AirFMFPacwas able to continue essential opera-tions with some degree of efficiency and ,in effect, improve them as the new per-sonnel were trained and became more

fully qualified .A second personnel problem en-

gendered by demobilization was the

470


acute shortage of personnel to fill thejobs formerly held by aviation groundofficers . During the war, most aviatio nground billets were filled by non-flyin gofficers specifically trained for those po-sitions which could be filled by a groun dofficer . This practice permitted the full -time assignment of pilots to flyingduties . Since the postwar aviation T/O sdid not include provisions for the assign-ment of ground officers to the wings an dtheir subordinate commands, those or-ganizations had to set up extensiv etraining programs to requalify pilot sfor the ground billets . Once they weretrained in and fulfilling the functions o fcommunications, ordnance, engineering ,and air combat intelligence officers, thepilots continued regular flight duties i norder to maintain proficiency in thei rprimary assignment.

Owing to the constant transfer ofpilots and skilled maintenance person-nel, the operations of the fighter squad-rons were reduced to a bare minimum .Even harder hit were the transportsquadrons, whose pilots were release dfaster than those of the other tacticalsquadrons. When the workloads of thetransport squadrons increased greatlybecause they were employed to carrysupplies to the units in the Wester nPacific and the Far East—and to trans-fer personnel scheduled for dischargeback to the States—the demand for th eservices of transport pilots increasedaccordingly . To meet the demand, pilot squalified to fly other types of aircraftwere transferred from overseas an dStateside tactical squadrons to thetransport units for immediate retrain-ing .

Concurrent with the release and trans-fer of aviation personnel were the de-activation and transfer of many majo rand subordinate aircraft organizations .On 31 December 1945, the 3d MarineAircraft Wing was decommissioned a tEwa. The 2d MAW transferred fro mOkinawa to Cherry Point, where it wasto be based, on 15 February 1946 . Thenext month, on 13 March, the 4th MAWclosed its headquarters on Guam anddeparted for the west coast, where it wa sto be based. The units attached to theseStateside-bound wings were transferredto the headquarters of other Marineorganizations in the islands, and re-turned to the United States when trans-portation became available for thei rredeployment .

Completing the postwar roll-up ofMarine aviation in the Pacific was thedeparture of MAG–31 from Yokosukafor the United States on 20 June . The 1stMAW remained in China with one trans -port and two observation squadrons an dMAG-24, which was composed of threeVMFs and one VMF (N) . MAG-15, th eonly Marine aviation command remain-ing in the Hawaiian Islands, was basedat Ewa with two VMRs ; the group alsohad a fighter squadron based at Midway .With its peacetime functions stabilize dby October 1946, AirFMFPac operationsin the latter part of the year consistedmainly of training replacements androuting trans-Pacific supply and replace-ment personnel passenger flights .

In the 22 months following the signin gof the Japanese surrender at Tokyo Bay ,the strength of the Marine Corps wa sreduced from a peak of 485,837 on 1September 1945 to a low of 92,222 on


471

30 June 1947. While this decrease repre- during the transition from war to peace ,sented a drop of 82 percent, the 1947 Marine units adjusted to the variou sfigure was considerably greater than situations with which they were con -28,277, the size of the Corps on 1 July fronted and continued to operate on a1940. Although some problems occurred relatively high level of efficiency .

PART IV

Occupation of Japan

CHAPTER 1

Initial Planning and Operation s

The war was over, but the victory wasnot yet secure . Foremost among themultitude of new and pressing problemsconfronting Allied planners was thequestion of how the Japanese militarywould react to the sudden peace . On by-passed islands throughout the Pacific,on the mainland of Asia, and in Japa nitself, over four million fighting menwere still armed and organized for com-bat. Would all of these men, who hadproven themselves to be bitter-end ,fanatical enemies even when faced withcertain destruction, accept the Em-peror's order to lay down their weapons ?Or would some of them fight on, refus -ing to accept or believe in the decisionof their government? Would the tradi-tion of fealty to the wishes of the Em-peror overbalance years of conditioningthat held surrender to be a crushin gpersonal and national disgrace ?

Logically, the focal point of Japanes ephysical and moral strength was th eseat of Imperial rule. If Tokyo could beoccupied without incident, the chance sfor a successful and bloodless occupationof Japan and the peaceful surrender o foutlying garrisons would be greatly en-hanced. Plans for seizure of ports ofentry in the Tokyo Bay area by occupa-tion forces received top priority . Speedwas essential and the spearhead troop sof the occupying forces were selecte dfrom those units with the highest stat eof combat readiness .

From General MacArthur's com-mand, the 11th Airborne Division wasto stage from Luzon through Okinawa

to an airfield outside of Tokyo . AdmiralNimitz ordered the Third Fleet, cruis-ing the waters off Japan, to form a land-ing force from ships' complements tosupplement the force that was to seiz eYokosuka Naval Base in Tokyo Bay . Toaugment this naval force, FMFPac wa sdirected to provide a regimental combatteam for immediate occupation duty .These Marines, and others who followedthem, were destined to play an im-portant role in the occupation of Japan .

THE YOKOSUKA OPERATION 1

Months before the fighting ended ,preliminary plans and concepts for the

1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi ssection is derived from : Eighth U. S. Armyin Japan Occupational Monograph, v. I,Aug45-Jan46, n .d., hereafter Eighth ArmyMonograph I (Army Sec, WWII RecDiv, NA) ;CinCPac WarDs, Aug-Sep45 ; CinCPac Sur-render and Occupation Rpt ; CTF 31 AR, Occu-pation and Securing of the Yokosuka NavalBase and Airfield, 18Aug-8Sep45, dtd 8Sep45,hereafter Yokosuka Occupation Force AR ;CTG 31 .3 AR, Initial Occupation of YokosukaNaval Base Area, Japan dtd 7Sep45, hereafte rFleet Landing Force AR (OAB, NHD) ; CT U31 .3 .2 Record of Events, dtd 6Sep45 ; CTU31 .3 .3 AR, Initial Landings Incident to th eOccupation of Tokyo, 20Aug-4Sep45, dtd5Sep45 ; MAG-31 WarDs, Sep-Dec45 ; 3/4WarD, Jan46 ; 2d SepGdBn (Prov) WarDs,Feb-Jun46 ; Kenneth W . Condit and Edwin T .Turnbladh, Hold High The Torch: A Historyof the 4th Marines (Washington : HistBr, G- 3Div, HQMC, 1960) ; Henry I . Shaw, Jr ., TheUnited States Marines in the Occupation ofJapan—Marine Corps Historical ReferenceSeries No. 24 (Washington : HistBr, G-3 Div,HQMC, 1961), hereafter Shaw, Marine Occupa-tion of Japan.

475

476


occupation of Japan had been formu-lated at the headquarters of Mac-Arthur and Nimitz . Staff studies, based

on the possibility of swift collapse ofenemy resistance, were prepared an ddistributed at army and fleet level forplanning purposes . In the early summerof 1945, as fighting raged on Okinawaand in the Philippines, dual plannin gwent forward for both the assault onJapan (OLYMPIC and CORONET )and the occupation operation (BLACK-LIST) . (See Map 26 . )

Many essential elements of the tw oplans were similar, and the Sixth Army ,which had been slated to make the at -tack on Kyushu under OLYMPIC, wasgiven the contingent task of occupyingsouthern Japan under BLACKLIST . 2In like manner, the Eighth Army ,utilizing the wealth of information ithad accumulated regarding Honshu inplanning CORONET, was designatedthe occupying force for northern Japan .The Tenth Army, also scheduled for th eHonshu assault by CORONET, was

given the mission of occupying Koreain BLACKLIST plans . 3

When, in the wake of atomic bomb-

ings and Russian entry into the war, th eJapanese government made its momen-tous decision to surrender, the "onl ymilitary unit at hand with sufficientpower to take Japan into custody at

2 Sixth Army Rpt of the Occupation ofJapan, 22Sep–30Nov45, n .d ., p . 10, hereafterSixth Army Rpt (Army Sec, WWII RecDiv ,NA) .

3 On 13 August 1945, MacArthur's head-quarters substituted XXIV Corps for TenthArmy as the Korean Occupation Force . Ibid . ,p. 11.

short notice and enforce the Allies' wil luntil occupation troops arrived" 4 wasAdmiral William F. Halsey's ThirdFleet, at sea off the enemy coast . Ad-vance copies of Halsey's Operation Pla n10–45 for the occupation of Japan,which set up Task Force 31, the Yoko-suka Occupation Force, were distributedon 8 August . Two days later, Rear Ad-miral Oscar C. Badger (Commander,Battleship Division 7) was designate dthe commander of TF 31, and all com-manders of carriers, battleships, andcruisers in the Third Fleet were alertedto organize and equip bluejacket andMarine landing forces from amongsttheir crews. At the same time, FMFPacdirected the 6th Marine Division t ofurnish one RCT to the Third Fleet fo rpossible early occupation duty inJapan. 5

General Shepherd, the division com-mander, without hesitation selected th e4th Marines . This was a symbolic gestureon his part, as the old 4th Marine Regi-ment had participated in the Philippin eCampaign in 1942 and had been capturedwith other U. S. forces in the Philippines.Now the new 4th Marines would be th emain combat formation taking part in th einitial landing and occupation of Japan .6

Brigadier General William T . Clement,Assistant Division Commander, wasnamed to head the Fleet Landing Force.

On 11 August, IIIAC prepared pre-liminary plans for the activation ofTask Force Able, which consisted of askeletal headquarters detachment, the

Halsey and Bryan, Halsey's Story, p . 247 .

IIIAC WarD, Aug45, p . 3 .s BGen Louis Metzger ltr to Hd, HistBr ,

G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 6Jan66, hereafter Metzgerltr.

478


4th Marines, Reinforced, 7 an amphibia ntractor company, and a medical com-pany. Concurrently, officers designate dto form General Clement's staff wer ealerted and immediately began planningto load out the task force. Warningorders, directing that the RCT withattached units be ready to embarkwithin 48 hours, were passed to th estaff .

The curtain of secrecy surroundingthe proposed operation was lifted at0900 on 12 August so that task forc eunits could deal directly with the neces-sary service and supply agencies with -out processing their requests throughthe corps staff . All elements of the tas kforce were completely reoutfitted, andthe 5th Field Service Depot and receiv-ing units went on a 24-hour day to com-plete the resupply task. The 4th Marinesjoined 600 replacements from th eFMFPac Transient Center, Marianas ,to fill the gaps in its ranks left by com-bat attrition and stateside rotation .

Dump areas and dock space wer eallotted by the Island Commander ,Guam, to accommodate the five trans-ports, a cargo ship, and an LSD o f

' The 4th Marines was reinforced by th efollowing units : 1st Battalion, 15th Marines ;Company G, 6th Tank Battalion ; Tank Main-tenance Section, 6th Service Battalion ; Com-pany A, 6th Engineer Battalion ; Company A ,6th Pioneer Battalion ; Company A, 6th Medi-cal Battalion ; Truck Company, 6th MotorTransport Battalion ; 1st Platoon, Ordnanc eCompany, 6th Service Battalion ; Service Pla-toon, 6th Service Battalion ; Supply Platoon ,6th Service Battalion ; Band Section, 6thMarine Division Band ; and a Shore PartyCommunication Team, Ships Fire Contro lParty, and Air-Ground Liaison Team of th e6th Assault Signal Company. Fleet LandingForce AR, p . 2 .

Transport Division 60 assigned to liftTask Force Able . The mounting-outprocess was considerably aided by th eannouncement that all ships wouldarrive in port on 13 August, 24 hour slater than they were originally sched-uled. On the evening of the 14th, how-ever, "all loading plans for supplie swere thrown into chaos" 8 by news ofthe substitution of a smaller type oftransport for one of those of the origi-nal group. The resultant reduction o fshipping space was partially made u pby the assignment of an LST to th etransport force . Later, after the taskforce had departed Guam, a second LS Twas allotted to lift most of the remain-ing supplies, including the tractors ofCompany A, 4th Amphibian Tracto rBattalion .

Loading began at 1600, 14 August,and continued throughout the night.The troops boarded ship between 1000and 1200 the following day, and thatevening, the transport division saile dfor its rendezvous at sea with the Thir dFleet. "In a period of approximately 96hours the Fourth Regimental Comba tTeam, Reinforced, had been completel yre-outfitted, all equipment deficiencie scorrected, all elements provided aninitial allowance to bring them up toT/O and T/A [Table of Allowance]levels, and a thirty-day re-supply pro -cured for shipment." 9

Two days prior to the departure ofthe main body of Task Force Able, Gen-eral Clement and a nucleus of his head-quarters personnel left Guam on theLSV (landing ship, vehicle) USS Ozarkto join the Third Fleet . There had been

' Fleet Landing Force AR, p . 6.' Ibid .

INITIAL PLANNING AND OPERATIONS

479

no opportunity for preliminary planning ,and no definite mission had been re-ceived, so the time en route to th e

rendezvous was spent studying intelli-gence summaries of the Tokyo Bay area.Halsey's ships were sighted and joined

on 18 August . The next morning,Clement and key members of his stafftransferred to the battleship Missourifor the first of a round of conferences o n

the coming operation . 1 °Admiral Badger formed TF 31 on 1 9

August from the ships assigned to himfrom the Third Fleet . The transfer o f

men and equipment to designated trans -ports by means of breeches buoys an dcargo slings began immediately . Car-riers, battleships, or cruisers wer ebrought along both sides of a transport

to expedite the operation . 11 In additionto the landing battalions of bluejacketsand Marines, Third Fleet units forme dbase maintenance companies, a navalair activities organization to operate aYokosuka airfield, and nucleus crews t otake over captured Japanese vessels .Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings 'British Carrier Task Force contribute da landing force of seamen and Royal

10 Upon arrival at Tokyo Bay, "GeneralClement and his small staff were assigned adestroyer escort for several days" to be use das a "taxicab" for visiting and holding con-ferences on the flagships of the key command-ers involved in the landing. "Transfers of theGeneral and staff were made in breeches buoysranging in quality from mail pouches to Ad-miral Halsey's fancy fringed model ." ColOrville V. Bergren ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div ,HQMC, dtd 14May66, hereafter Bergren ltr .

11 "It was quite a sight to see a transportship under way in open sea with an aircraftcarrier on one side and a battleship or cruise ron the other transferring their Marine detach-ments or bluejackets to the transport. " Ibid.

Marines . In less than three days, thetask of transferring at sea some 3,50 0men and hundreds of tons of weapons ,equipment, and ammunition was ac-complished . The newly formed units, assoon as they reported on board thei r

transports, began an intensive progra mof training for ground combat opera-tions and occupation duties .

On 20 August, the ships carrying th e4th RCT arrived and joined theburgeoning task force. General Clem-ent's command now included the5,400 men of the reinforced 4th Ma-rines, a three-battalion regiment o fapproximately 2,000 Marines takenfrom 33 ships' detachments, 12 a navalregiment of 956 men organized from thecrews of 10 ships into a regimentalheadquarters, landing battalions, and 8nucleus crew units to handle capture dshipping, 13 and a British battalion o f

250 seamen and 200 Royal Marines . Toact as a floating reserve for the landin g

force, five additional battalions of blue -jackets were organized and appropri-ately equipped from within the carriergroups.

12 This regiment, commanded by LieutenantColonel William T. Lantz, came from th eMarine Detachments of the following ThirdFleet ships : USS Alabama, Indiana, Massa-chusetts, Missouri, North Carolina, SouthDakota, Wisconsin, Bataan, Belleau Wood, Ben-nington, Bon Homme Richard, Cow pens, Han -cock, Independence, Lexington, Monterey,Randolph, San Jacinto, Ticonderoga, Wasp ,Yorktown, Amsterdam, Atlanta, Boston, Chi-cago, Dayton, Duluth, Oklahoma City, Pasa-dena, Quincy, Springfield, Topeka, and Wilke sBarre . CTU 31 .3 .2 Rec of Events, dtd 6Sep45 ,passim .

13 CTU 31 .3 .3 AR—Initial Landings Incidentto the Occupation of Tokyo—Period 2OAug–4Sep45, dtd 5Sep45, pp . 3, 6 (OAB, NHD) .

480


FLEET LANDING FORCE personnel are transferred from USS Missouri to USSIowa somewhere at sea off the coast of Japan prior to the initial occupation landings.(USN 80-G-332826)


481

Halsey had assigned TF 31 a primar y

mission of seizing and occupying th e

Yokosuka Naval Base and its airfield .

(See Map 27 .) Initial collateral mis-sions included the demilitarization ofthe entire Miura Peninsula, which

formed the western arm of the head-

lands enclosing Tokyo Bay, and theseizure of the Zushi area, tentative

headquarters for MacArthur, on the

southwest coast of the peninsula . Toaccomplish these missions two alter -

native schemes of maneuver were con-sidered. The first contemplated a land-ing by assault troops on beaches nearthe town of Zushi, followed by an over -land drive east across the peninsula tosecure the naval base for the landing ofsupplies and reinforcements. The sec-ond plan involved a direct landing fro mwithin Tokyo Bay on the beaches an ddocks of Yokosuka Naval Base and Ai rStation, followed on order by the oc-cupation of Zushi and the demilitariza-tion of the entire peninsula. All plan-ning by TF 31 was coordinated with

that of the Eighth Army, whose com-mander, Lieutenant General Robert L .Eichelberger, had been appointed byMacArthur to command the force sashore in the occupation of northernJapan .

On 21 August, General Eichelberger ,

who had been informed of the alter-

native plans formulated by TF 31,

directed that the landing be made at

the naval base rather than in the Zush i

area. Admiral Halsey had recommende d

the adoption of the Zushi landing plan

since it did not involve bringing ship -

ping into restricted Tokyo Bay until

assault troops had dealt with "the pos-

sibility of Japanese treachery ." 14 Theweight of evidence, however, wasrapidly swinging in support of thetheory that the enemy was going to co -operate fully with the occupying force sand that some of the precautionsoriginally thought necessary could no wbe held in abeyance . But the primaryreason for the selection of Yokosuk arather than Zushi for the landing are awas the problems that would arise i nmoving the landing force overland fromZushi to Yokosuka . "This overlandmovement would have exposed the

landing force to possible enemy attackwhile its movement was restricted overnarrow roads and through a series o ftunnels which were easily susceptible tosabotage. Further, it would have de-layed the early seizure of the majo rJapanese naval base ." 1 5

Eichelberger's directive also includedthe information that the 11th AirborneDivision was to establish its own air-head at Atsugi airfield a few milesnorthwest of the north end of the MiuraPeninsula . The original plans of theFleet Landing Force, which had beenmade on the assumption that Genera l

Clement's men would seize Yokosuk aAir Station for the airborne operation ,had to be changed to provide for asimultaneous Army-Navy landing . Atentative area of responsibility includ-ing the cities of Uraga, Kubiri, Yoko-suka, and Funakoshi was assigned toClement's force, and the rest of thepeninsula became the responsibility o fthe 11th Airborne Division .

To ensure the safety of Allied war -

ships entering Tokyo Bay, Clement' s

" Halsey and Bryan, Halsey's Story, p . 275 .' Metzger ltr .


483

operation plan detailed the BritishLanding Force to land on and demili-tarize four small island forts in th eUraga Strait at the entrance to TokyoBay. To erase the threat of shore bat-teries and coastal forts, the reserv ebattalion of the 4th Marines (2/4) wa sgiven the mission of landing on Futts uSaki, a narrow point of land juttinginto the eastern side of Uraga Strait.After completing its mission, 2/4 wasto reembark in its landing craft and re-join its regiment . Nucleus crews fromthe Fleet Naval Landing Force were t oenter the inner Yokosuka Harbor prio rto the designated H-Hour and take ove rthe damaged battleship Nagato, whoseguns commanded the landing beaches .

The 4th Marines, with 1/4 and 3/4in assault, were scheduled to make th einitial landing at Yokosuka on L-Day .The battalions of the Fleet Marine andNaval Landing Forces were to land i nreserve and take control of specifi careas of the naval base and air station,while the 4th Marines pushed inland t olink up with elements of the 11th Air -borne Division landing at Atsugi air-field. The cruiser San Diego, AdmiralBadger's flagship, 4 destroyers, and 12gunboats were to be prepared to furnishnaval gunfire support on call . Althoughno direct support planes were assigned ,approximately 1,000 fully armed air -craft would be airborne and availableif needed. Despite the hope that theYokosuka landing would be uneventful ,TF 31 was prepared to deal with eitherorganized resistance or individual act sof fanaticism on the part of the Japa-nese .

L-Day had been originally schedule dfor 26 August, but on 20 August, a

310-224 0 - 69 - 32

threatening typhoon forced AdmiralHalsey to postpone the landing date tothe 28th. Ships were to enter SagamiWan, the vast outer bay, on L minus 2 .On 25 August, word was received fro mMacArthur that the anticipated ty-phoon would delay Army air operation sfor 48 hours, and L-Day was conse-quently set for 30 August and the entryof the Sagami Wan ordered for th e28th .

The Japanese had been warned asearly as 15 August to begin minesweep-ing in the waters off Tokyo to facilitatethe operations of the Third Fleet . Onthe morning of the day stipulated fo rAmerican entry into Sagami Wan, Japa-nese emissaries and pilots were to mee twith Rear Admiral Robert B . Carney,Halsey's Chief of Staff, and Admira lBadger on board the Missouri to receiveinstructions relative to the surrender o fthe Yokosuka Naval Base and to guid ethe first Allied ships into anchorages .Halsey was not anxious to keep hi sships, many of them small vesselscrowded with troops, at sea in typhoo nweather, and he asked and received per-mission from MacArthur to put int oSagami Wan one day early ."

The Japanese emissaries reported o nboard the Missouri early on 27 August .They said a lack of suitable mine -sweepers had prevented them fromclearing Sagami Wan and Tokyo Bay,but the movement of Allied shipping tosafe berths in Sagami Wan under th eguidance of Japanese pilots was accom-plished nonetheless without incident .By late afternoon, the Third Fleet wa sanchored at the entrance of Tokyo Bay .American minesweepers checked the

"Halsey and Bryan, Halsey ' s Story, p . 275 .

484


channel leading into the bay and re-

ported it clear .

On 28 August, the first American taskforce, consisting of combat ships ofTask Force 31, entered Tokyo Bay anddropped anchor off Yokosuka at 1300 .Vice Admiral Totsuka, Commandant ofthe First Naval District and the Yoko-suka Naval Base, and his staff reporte d

to Admiral Badger in the San Diego forfurther instructions regarding the sur-render of his command. Only the ab-solute minimum of maintenance person-nel, interpreters, guides, and guard swere to remain in the naval base area ;the guns of the forts, ships, and coastalbatteries commanding the bay were t obe rendered inoperative ; the breech-blocks were to be removed from allantiaircraft and dual-purpose guns .Additionally, the Japanese were told t ofly a white flag over every gun positionand to station at each warehouse an dbuilding an individual who had a com-plete inventory of the building and keysto all the spaces. "Both of the abovewere meticulously carried out ." 1 7

As the naval commanders mad earrangements for the Yokosuka landing ,a reconnaissance party of Army troop slanded at Atsugi airfield to prepare th eway for the airborne operation o nL-Day. Radio contact was establishedwith Okinawa, where the 11th Divisionwas waiting to execute its part inBLACKLIST. The attitude of the Japa-nese officials, both at Yokosuka andAtsugi, was uniformly one of docilit yand cooperation, but bitter experienc ecaused the Allied commanders an dtroops to view with a jaundiced eye th e

17 Metzger ltr .

picture of the Japanese as meek andharmless.

On the evening of 27 August ap-peared a reminder of another aspect ofthe war. At that time, two Britis hprisoners of war hailed one of the Thir dFleet picket boats in Tokyo Bay an dwere taken on board the San Juan, com-mand ship of a specially constitutedAllied Prisoner of War Rescue Group .Their harrowing tales of life in theprison camps and of the extremely poo rphysical condition of many of th eprisoners prompted Halsey to order therescue group to stand by for action o nshort notice . On 29 August, the Mis-souri and the San Juan task groupentered Tokyo Bay. At 1420, Admira lNimitz arrived by seaplane and author-ized Halsey to begin rescue operation simmediately . 18 Special teams, guidedand guarded by carrier planes overhead,immediately started the enormous tas kof bringing in the prisoners from th emany large camps in the Tokyo-Yoko-hama area . By 1910 that evening, th efirst RAMPs (Recovered Allied Mili-tary Personnel) arrived on board th ehospital ship Benevolence, and at mid-night 739 men had been brought out .1 °

Long before dawn on L-Day, the firstgroup of transports of TF 31 carrying2/4 began moving into Tokyo Bay . Al l

18 General MacArthur had directed that theNavy role in the POW rescue operations beheld up until it could be coordinated with thework of specially constituted Eighth Arm yrescue teams . Admiral Nimitz, however, real-ized that MacArthur would understand theurgency of the situation, and gave the go-aheadsignal to Halsey. Halsey and Bryan, Halsey' sStory, p . 278 .

19 Ibid .

485

the story was much the same—thecoastal guns had been rendered ineffec-tive, and the few Japanese remainin gas guides and interpreters amazed th eBritish with their cooperativeness .

The Japanese had not only cleared th enaval yard and the airfield areas as di-rected, but had removed from the immedi-ate area all Japanese whom they consid-ered ` hot-headed ' or whom they believe dwould not abide by the Emperor's decree .Additionally, uniformed police from Tokyohad been brought down and were statione doutside of the Initial Occupation Linewhich effectively cordoned the occupationforces from the Japanese population . Itwas obvious that the Japanese fully in -tended to carry out the terms of the sur-render . 2 0

INITIAL PLANNING AND OPERATION S

the plans of the Yokosuka OccupationForce had been based on an H-Hour of1000 for the main landing, but last-minute word was received from Mac-Arthur on 29 August that the firs tserials of the 11th Airborne Divisio nwould be landing at Atsugi airfield at0600. Consequently, to preserve th evalue and impact of simultaneous Army-Navy operations, TF 31 plans werechanged to allow for the earlier landingtime .

The first landing craft carrying Ma-rines of 2/4 touched the south shore ofFuttsu Saki at 0558 ; two minutes later ,the first transport plane rolled to a sto pon the runway at Atsugi, and the occu-pation of Japan was underway . In bothareas, the Japanese had followed thei rinstructions to the letter. On FuttsuSaki the coastal guns and mortars ha dbeen rendered useless, and only the bar eminimum of maintenance personnel, 2 2men, remained to make a peaceful turn-over of the forts and batteries . By 0845,the battalion had accomplished its mis-sion and was reembarking for the Yoko-suka landing, now scheduled for 0930 .

With first light came dramatic evi-dence that the Japanese would compl ywith the surrender terms . On everyhand, lookouts on TF 31 ships could se ewhite flags flying over abandoned andinoperative gun positions. Nucleuscrews from the Fleet Naval Landin gForce boarded the battleship Nagato at0805 and received the surrender from askeleton force of officers and tech-nicians ; the firing locks of the ship' smain battery had been removed and al lsecondary and AA guns had been dis-mounted . On the island forts, occupiedby the British Landing Force at 0900,

The main landing of the 4th Marines ,commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Fre dD. Beans, was almost anticlimacti cExactly on schedule, the first waves of1/4 and 3/4 crossed the line of de-parture and headed for their respectiv e

beaches . At 0930, men of the 1st Bat-talion landed on Red Beach southeast ofYokosuka airfield and those of the 3dBattalion on Green Beach in the heart ofthe Navy yard. There was no resistance.The Marines moved forward rapidly,noting that the few unarmed Japanesepresent wore white armbands, accord-ing to instructions, to signify that theywere essential maintenance troops, offi-cials, or interpreters . Leaving guards atwarehouses, primary installations, andgun positions, the 4th Marines pushedon to reach the designated Initial Occu-pation Line.

General Clement and his staff landedat 1000 on Green Beach and were metby a party of Japanese officers, wh o

"Metzger ltr.


MEMBERS of the Yokosuka Occupation Force inspect a Japanese fortification onFuttsu Saki . (USMC 1347.41)

GENERAL CLEMENT looks over Yokosuka Naval Base after its surrender by theformer commander (r .) . (USMC 133863)


487

formally surrendered the naval basearea. "They were informed that non-

cooperation or opposition of any kindwould be severely dealt with ." 2 1

Clement then proceeded to the Japanese

headquarters building, where an Amer-ican flag presented by the 6th Marine

Division was officially raised . 2 2

Vice Admiral Totsuka had been

ordered to be present on the docks of

the naval base to surrender the entire

First Naval District to Admiral Carney,acting for Admiral Halsey, and Ad-

miral Badger . The San Diego, with

Carney and Badger on board, tied up a tthe dock at Yokosuka at 1030 . The sur-

render took place shortly thereafterwith appropriate ceremony, and Bad-

ger, accompanied by Clement, departedfor the Japanese Naval Headquarters

building to set up the headquarters ofTF 31.

With operations proceeding satisfac-torily at Yokosuka and in the occupatio nzone of the 11th Airborne Division ,

General Eichelberger took over oper-ational control of the Fleet Landing

Force from Halsey at 1200 . Both of thetop American commanders in the Allieddrive across the Pacific set foot on Japa-

nese soil on L-Day ; General MacArthurlanded at Atsugi airfield at 1419 t obegin de facto rule of Japan, which wasto last more than five years, and Ad-miral Nimitz, accompanied by Halsey,

=1 Fleet Landing Force AR, p. 18 .

" This was the same flag that had bee nraised by the 1st Provisional Marine Brigadeat Guam and the 6th Marine Division at Oki-nawa . Cass, 6th MarDiv Hist, p . 203 .

came ashore at Yokosuka at 1330 tomake an inspection of the naval base.

Reserves and reinforcements lande dat Yokosuka during the morning an dearly afternoon according to schedule .The Fleet Naval Landing Force tookover the area that had been secured b y3/4, and the Fleet Marine LandingForce occupied the airfield installation sseized earlier by 1/4. The British Land-ing Force, after evacuating all Japa-nese personnel from the island forts ,landed at the navigation school in thenaval base and took over the area be-tween the sectors occupied by the FleetNaval and Marine Landing Forces .Azuma, a large island hill mass, whic hhad been extensively tunnelled for us eas a small boat supply base, was part ofthe British occupation area. It was in-vestigated by a force of Royal Marinesand found deserted .

The 4th Marines, relieved by theother elements of the landing force ,

moved out to the Initial Occupation Lin eand set up a perimeter defense for th enaval base and airfield . Patrol contact

was made with the 11th Airborne Divi-sion, which had landed 4,200 men dur-

ing the day .

The first night ashore was unevent-ful, marked only by routine guard duty .General MacArthur's orders to disar m

and demobilize had been carried ou twith amazing speed . There was no evi-dence that the Japanese would do any -thing but cooperate with the occupyingtroops. The Yokosuka area, for example ,which had formerly been garrisoned b y

about 50,000 men, now held less than atenth of that number in skeletal head-

488


quarters, processing, maintenance ,police, and minesweeping units. It wasclear that, militarily at least, the occu-pation was slated for success .

On 31 August, the Fleet LandingForce continued to consolidate its holdon the naval base area. Company L of3/4 sailed in two destroyer transport sto Tateyama Naval Air Station on thenortheastern shores of Sagami Wan toreconnoiter the beach approaches andto cover the 3 September landing of th e112th Cavalry RCT. Here again, theJapanese were waiting peacefully t ocarry out their surrender instructions .

Occupation operations continued torun smoothly as preparations were mad eto accept the surrender of Japan onboard the Missouri . Even as the sur-render ceremony was taking place, ad-

vance elements of the main body of th eEighth Army occupation force wereentering Tokyo harbor . Ships carryingthe headquarters of the XI Corps andthe 1st Cavalry Division docked at Yoko-hama. Transports with the 112thCavalry RCT on board moved to Tate-yama, and on 3 September, the trooper slanded and relieved Company L of 3/4 ,which then returned to Yokosuka .

As the occupation operation pro-ceeded without the discovery of anynotable obstacles, plans were laid to dis-solve the Fleet Landing Force and TF 31 .The 4th Marines was selected to tak eover responsibility for the entire navalbase area. By 6 September, ships' de-tachments of bluejackets and Marine shad returned to parent vessels and th eprovisional landing units were dis-

banded.

While a large part of the strengthof the Fleet Landing Force was return-ing to normal duties, a considerabl eaugmentation to Marine strength i nnorthern Honshu was being made. On 23August, AirFMFPac had designatedMarine Aircraft Group 31, then atChimu airfield on Okinawa, to move toJapan as a supporting air group for th enorthern occupation. Colonel John C .Munn, its commanding officer, had re-connoitered Yokosuka airfield soon afterthe initial landing, and on 7 Septemberthe first echelon of his headquarters andthe planes of Marine Fighter Squadro n441 flew in from Okinawa . Surveillanceflights over the Tokyo Bay area bega nthe following day as additional squad-rons of the group continued to arrive.Initially, Munn's planes served unde rThird Fleet command, but on 16 Sep-tember, MAG–31 came under opera-tional control of Fifth Air Force .

Admiral Badger's TF 31 had beendissolved on 8 September when the Com -mander, Fleet Activities, Yokosuka ,assumed responsibility to SCAP for thenaval occupation area. General Clem-ent's command continued to function fo ra short time thereafter while most o fthe reinforcing units of the 4th Marinesloaded out for return to Guam. On 20September, Lieutenant Colonel Beansrelieved General Clement of his respon-sibilities at Yokosuka, and the genera land his Task Force Able staff flew backto Guam to rejoin the 6th Division .Before he left, however, Clement wasable to take part in a ceremony in which120 RAMPs of the "old" 4th Marinescaptured at Corregidor, received thecolors of the "new" 4th from the hand sof the men who had carried on the regi-


489

mental tradition in the Pacific war . 2 3

After the initial major contributionof naval land forces to the occupation ofnorthern Japan, the operation becamemore and more an Army task . As addi-tional troops arrived, the Eighth Armyarea of effective control was enlargedto include all of northern Japan. In Oc-tober, the occupation zone of the 4thMarines was reduced to include only th enaval base, airfield, and town of Yoko-suka. In effect, the regiment becam ea naval base guard detachment, and o n1 November, control of the 4th Marine spassed from Eighth Army to the Com-mander, U. S. Fleet Activities, Yoko-suka . 2 4

In addition to routine security andmilitary police patrols, the Marines alsocarried out Eighth Army demilitariza-tion directives, and collected and dis-posed of Japanese military and navalmaterial. Detachments from the regi-ment supervised the unloading at Uragaof Japanese garrison troops returningfrom bypassed Pacific outposts .

23 Ibid., p . 205 . This was an occasion of deeppersonal significance to General Clement, wh ohad been present in Manila as Marine officer o nthe staff of the Commander, Asiatic Fleet, a tthe outbreak of the war . He had volunteered t oserve with the 4th Marines on Corregidor whe nfleet headquarters withdrew from the area, bu the was ordered to leave the island fortress bysubmarine just before the American surrender.

24 Shortly after the 4th Marines occupied th eYokosuka naval base, the small Japanese navalgarrison there entertained a group of officer s

from the regiment. During the course of thegathering, "it developed that a Japanese Lieu -tenant Commander present had been in the

directly under FMFPac. Orders werereceived directing that preparations bemade for 3/4 to relieve the regiment ofits duties in Japan, effective 31 Decem-ber. In common with the rest of th eArmed Forces, the Marine Corps facedgreat public and Congressional pressureto send its men home for discharge asrapidly as possible . Its world-wide com-mitments had to be examined with thisin mind. The Japanese attitude of co-operation with occupation authoritiesfortunately permitted considerable re-duction of troop strength .

In Yokosuka, Marines who did no tmeet the age, service, or dependencypoint total necessary for discharge inDecember or January were transferredto the 3d Battalion, and men with th erequisite number of points were con-centrated in the 1st and 2d Battalions.On 1 December, 1/4 completed loadingout and sailed for the States to be dis-banded. The 3d Battalion, reinforced bythe regimental units and a casual com-pany formed to provide replacementsfor ships' Marine detachments, relieved2/4 of all guard responsibilities on 24December. The 2d Battalion, with th e

garrison at New Georgia Island and ha dheaded the SNLP [Special Naval Landin gParty] that was occupied, among other things ,in trying to locate and capture the MarineCoast-Watcher who had been providing intel-ligence from New Georgia Island for som etime. The Coast-Watcher happened to be Majo rClay Boyd, who was present at the party. Itwas interesting to hear these two forme renemies describing their experiences and ex-changing questions regarding their NewGeorgia activities . It provided an interesting[situation] whereby two officers of differentcountries could exchange such friendly con-versation after having been such deadly ene-mies only months before ." Bergren ltr.

On 20 November, the 4th Marines wa sdetached from the administrative con-trol of the 6th Division and placed

490


Regimental Weapons and the Headquar-ters and Service Companies, loaded ou tbetween 27—30 December and sailed forthe United States on New Year's Day .

The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, as-sumed the duties of the regiment at mid -night on 31 December, although a tokenregimental headquarters remained i nYokosuka to carry on in the name o fthe 4th Marines . On FMFPac order, thi sheadquarters detachment left Japan on6 January to join the 6th Marine Divi-sion at Tsingtao, in North China .

On 15 February 1946, 3/4 was reor-ganized and redesignated the 2d Sepa-rate Guard Battalion (Provisional) ,FMFPac. Its military police and securityduties in the naval base area remaine dthe same. Most of the occupation tasksof demilitarization in the limited areaof the naval base had been completed ,and the battalion settled into a routine o fguard, ceremonies, and training thatwas little different from that of an yNavy yard barracks detachment in theUnited States .

The continued cooperation of theJapanese with SCAP occupation direc-tives and the lack of any overt signs ofresistance considerably lessened theneed for the fighter squadrons of MAG—31. On 7 October, Fifth Air Force re-turned control of the group to the Navy .Regular reconnaissance flights in theTokyo area were discontinued on 1 5October, and the operations of MAG—3 1were confined largely to mail, courier ,transport, and training flights . Person-nel and unit reductions similar to thos eimposed on the 4th Marines also oc-curred in the air units. By the springof 1946, the need for Marine participa-tion in the occupation of Japan had

diminished, and early in May, MAG—3 1received orders to return to the UnitedStates . By 20 June, all serviceable air -craft had been shipped out and on thatdate, all group personnel were flownout of Japan. The departure of MAG—3 1marked the end of Marine occupationactivities in northern Japan and closedthe final chapter of the Yokosuka opera-tion.

SASEBO-NAGASAKI LANDINGS 2 5

The favorable reports of Japanes ecompliance with surrender terms innorthern Japan allowed a considerabl enumber of changes to be made in th eoperation plans of Sixth Army andFifth Fleet. Prisoner of war evacuationgroups could be sent into ports of south -ern Honshu and Kyushu prior to thearrival of occupation troops, and themain landings could be made adminis-tratively without the show of force orig-inally thought necessary. In fact, beforethe first troop echelon of Sixth Armyarrived in Japan, almost all of theRAMPs and civilian internees had bee n

'' Unless otherwise rioted, the material i nthis section is derived from : CinCPac WarDs,Sep-Oct45 ; CinCPac Surrender and Occupa-tion Rpt; ComFifthFlt AR—The Occupationof Japan, 15Aug–8Nov45, n .d., hereafter Com-Fif thFlt AR ; Sixth Army Rpt ; ComPhibGru4 Rpt of Occupation of Sasebo and Nagasak iand of Fukuoka-Shimonseki Areas, dtd 11Nov -45 ; VAC OpRpt, Occupation of Japan, dtd30Nov45, hereafter VAC OpRpt ; VAC WarD ,Sep45 ; 2d MarDiv

OpRpt,

Occupation

ofJapan, dtd 1Dec45,

hereafter

2d

MarDivOpRpt ; 5th MarDiv OpRpt, Occupation ofJapan, dtd 5Dec45,

hereafter

5th

MarDivOpRpt ; 5th MarDiv WarD, Sep45 ; MAG–2 2WarD, Sep45 ; Shaw, Marine Occupation o fJapan .


THE "NEW" 4TH MARINES passes in review for members of the "old" 4th, recentlyliberated from prison camps . (USMC 135287)

26TH MARINES moves into Sasebo . (USMC 139128)

491

492


released from their prisons and proc-essed for evacuation by sea or air .

Japanese authorities received ordersfrom SCAP to bring Allied prisonersinto designated processing centers o nHonshu and Kyushu . In the EighthArmy occupation zone, Yokohama wa sthe center of recovery activities, an dby 21 September, 17,531 RAMPs an dinternees (including over 7,500 from theSixth Army area) had been examine dthere and hospitalized or evacuated .2 " On12 September, after Fifth Fleet mine -sweepers had cleared the way, a prisonerrecovery group put into Wakayama i nwestern Honshu and began processingRAMPs. In less than three days, th eremainder of the prisoners in the Sixt hArmy area on Honshu and those fro mShikoku—in all 2,575 men—had bee nembarked in evacuation ships .

Atom-bombed Nagasaki, which hasone of the finest natural harbors inJapan, was chosen as the evacuationport for men imprisoned in Kyushu .Minesweeping of the approaches to theport began on 8 Septembel-, and theRAMP evacuation group was able t oenter on the 11th . The operation wasessentially completed by the time occu-pation troops began landing in Naga-saki ; over 9,000 prisoners were re-covered .

At the time that the Eighth Army wasextending its hold over northern Japan ,and the recovery teams and evacuationgroups were clearing the fetid prisoncompounds, preparations for the SixthArmy occupation of western Honshu,Shikoku, and Kyushu continued. Theoccupation area contained 55 percent of

29 Eighth Army Monograph I, pp . 23-28 .

the total Japanese population, includinghalf of the presurrender home garrisons ,three of the four major naval bases inJapan, all but two of its principal ports ,four of its six largest cities, and three ofits four main transportation centers .Kyushu, which was destined to b elargely a Marine occupation responsi-bility, supported a population of 10 mil -lion in 15,000 square miles of precipi-tous terrain. Like all of Japan, everypossible foot of the island was inten-sively cultivated, and enough rice an dsweet potatoes were produced to allowinter-island export . The main value o fKyushu to the Japanese economy, how-ever, was its industries . The northwesthalf of the island contains extensive coa lfields, the greatest pig iron and stee lproducing district in Japan, and mostimportant shipyards, plus a host o fsmaller industrial facilities .

The V Amphibious Corps, initiall ycomposed of the 2d, 3d, and 5th Marin eDivisions, had been given the task o foccupying Kyushu and adjacent areas ofwestern Honshu and Shikoku in SixthArmy plans, at the same time that th eI and X Corps of the Eighth Army tookcontrol of the rest of western Honsh uand Shikoku. The Fifth Fleet, under Ad-miral Raymond A . Spruance, was re-sponsible for collecting, transporting,and landing the scattered elements ofGeneral Walter Krueger's army. 27 Be-cause of a lack of adequate shipping, th eMarine amphibious corps was not able to

`7 On 19 September, Admiral Spruance a sCommander, Fifth Fleet, relieved AdmiralHalsey of his responsibilities in the occupatio nof Japan and assumed command of all navaloperations in the Empire .


493

move its major units to the target simul-taneously. 28 Therefore, it was necessar ythat the transport squadron that liftedthe 5th Marine Division and VAC Head -quarters from the Hawaiian Islands besent to the Philippines to load out the32d Infantry Division, which was sub-stituted on 6 September for the 3dMarine Division in the occupation force . 2 9

The first objective to be secured in theVAC zone under Sixth Army plans wasthe naval base at Sasebo in northwest -ern Kyushu. (See Map 28 .) Its occupa-tion by the 5th Marine Division was t obe followed by the seizure of Nagasak i30 air miles to the south by the 2 dMarine Division . When the turn-aroundshipping arrived, the 32d Infantry Divi-sion was to occupy the Fukuoka-Shimonoseki area, either by an overlandmove from Sasebo or a direct landing,if the mined waters of Fukuoka harbo rpermitted . Once effective control ha dbeen established over the entry por tarea, the subordinate units of VAC divi-sions would gradually spread out over

28 Had there been sufficient shipping, othe rproblems would have arisen, for unloadin gfacilities were either primitive or badly dam -aged by bombing . At Sasebo, there were onl ytwo or three docks available, no unloadin gequipment, and inefficient loading crews .MajGen William W . Rogers ltr to Hd, HistBr ,G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 12Jan66, hereafte rRogers ltr.

29 In order to guard against any possibl etreachery on the part of the thousands o fJapanese troops on bypassed Central Pacifi cislands, the Navy "requested that one ful lMarine Division remain in the Marianas pre -pared for any eventuality ." Aurthur andCohlmia, 3d MarDiv Hist, p . 331. The 3dMarine Division was given the stand-by job ,and consequently the 32d Infantry Divisio nwas attached to VAC as a replacement unit .

the entire island of Kyushu and acros sthe Shimonoseki straits to the Yama-guchi Prefecture of Honshu to complet ethe occupation tasks assigned bySCAP . 3 0

Major General Harry Schmidt, VA Ccommander, opened his command poston board the Mt. McKinley off Maui inthe Hawaiian Islands on 1 Septemberand sailed to join the 5th Division con-voy., already en route to Saipan . LST andLSM groups left the Hawaiian area on3 September with corps troops and th enumerous Army augmentation unit snecessary to make the combat units a neffective occupation force . At Saipan,the various transport groups rendez-voused and units of the 2d Marine Divi-sion embarked. Conferences were hel dto clarify plans for the operations, an dtwo advance reconnaissance partieswere dispatched to Japan. One, led b yColonel Walter W. Wensinger, VACOperations Officer, and consisting of ke ystaff officers of both the corps and th e2d Division, flew to Nagasaki, where itarrived on 16 September. The secondparty of similar composition, but withbeachmaster representatives and 5thDivision personnel included, left fo rSasebo by high speed transport (APD)on 15 September . The mission of theparties was :

. . . to facilitate smooth and orderl yentry of U. S. forces into the Corps zon eof responsibility by making contact with

30 There are seven prefectures or kens onKyushu : Fukuoka, Oita, Miyazaki, Kagoshima ,Kumamoto, Nagasaki, and Saga . The prefec-ture very much resembles the American countyin political form. Each of the seven takes it sname from the largest city in the ken, the loca-tion of the prefectural headquarters .


495

key Japanese civil and military author-ities ; to execute advance spot checks oncompliance with demilitarization orders ;and to ascertain such facilities for re-ception of our forces as condition andsuitability of docks and harbors, adequacyof sites selected by map reconnaissance fo rCorps installations, condition of airfields ,roads, and communications . 3 1

After issuing instructions to Japaneseofficials at Nagasaki, Colonel Wensingerand the corps staff members proceededby destroyer to Sasebo where prelim-inary arrangements were made for thearrival of the 5th Division . On 20 Sep-tember, the second reconnaissance partyarrived at Sasebo, contacted Wensinger ,and completed preparations for the land -ing .

At dawn on 22 September (A-Day) ,the transport squadron carrying MajorGeneral Thomas E. Bourke's 5th MarineDivision and corps headquarters troop sarrived off Sasebo. Members of the ad-vance party transferred from an APDwhich had met the convoy, and reportedto their respective unit command ships .At 0859, after Japanese pilots had di-rected the transports to safe berths inthe inner harbor of Sasebo, the 26thMarines (less 3/26) began landing onbeaches at the naval air station. As themen advanced rapidly inland, relievin gJapanese guards on naval base installa-tions and stores, ships carrying othe relements of the division moved to th eSasebo docks to begin general unloading .The shore party, reinforced by the 2 dBattalion, 28th Marines, was completel yashore by 1500 and started cargo un-loading operations which continuedthrough the night .

"VAC OpRpt, p . 7 .

The rest of the 28th Marines, i ndivision reserve, remained on board shi pon A-Day . The 1st Battalion of the 27thMarines landed on the docks in late af-ternoon and moved out to occupy thezone of responsibility assigned its regi-ment. Before troop unloading was sus-pended at dusk, two artillery battalion sof the 13th Marines and regimenta l

headquarters had landed on beaches i nthe aircraft factory area, and the 5thTank Battalion had disembarked at the

air station . All units ashore establishedguard posts and security patrols, but thefirst night of the division in Japanpassed without any noticeable event .

On 23 September, as most of the re-maining elements of the 5th Divisionlanded and General Bourke set up hi scommand post ashore, patrols started

probing the immediate countryside .Company C (reinforced) of the 27thMarines was sent to Omura, about 22miles southeast of Sasebo, to establisha security guard over the naval air

training station there. Omura airfiel d

had been selected as the base of Marin e

air operations in southern Japan .

A reconnaissance party, led by ColonelDaniel W. Torrey, Jr ., commanding offi-cer of MAG—22, had landed and in-spected the field on 14 September, andthe advance flight echelon of his ai r

group had flown in from Okinawa six

days later. Corsairs of VMF–11 3

reached Omura on 23 September, and

the rest of the group flight echelo n

arrived before the month was over. The

primary mission of MAG–22 was simi-lar to that of MAG–31 at Yokosuka :

surveillance flights in support of occu-pation operations .

496


As flight operations commenced at

Omura and the 5th Division consolidate dits hold on Sasebo, the second majorelement of VAC landed in Japan . Theearly arrival at Saipan of the transportsassigned to lift the 2d Division, couple dwith efficient staging and loading, ha denabled planners to move the divisionlanding date ahead two days . When re -ports were received that the approache sto the originally selected landing beache swere mined but that the harbor at Naga -saki was clear, the decision was madeto land directly in the harbor area . At1300 on 23 September, the 2d and 6thMarines landed simultaneously on th eeast and west sides of the harbor .

The two regiments moved out swiftl yto occupy the city and curtain off theatom-bomb-devastated area . The Marinedetachments from the cruisers Biloxi

and Wichita were relieved by 3/2, whichtook up the duty of providing securit yguards in Nagasaki for RAMP opera-tions. Ships were brought alongside ofwharfs and docks to facilitate cargohandling, and unloading operations wer ewell underway by nightfall . A quiet calmruled the city to augur a peaceful occu-pation .

On 24 September, as the rest of MajorGeneral LeRoy P . Hunt's 2d Divisionbegan landing, the corps commander ar-rived from Sasebo by destroyer to in-spect the Nagasaki area . GeneralSchmidt had established his CP ashoreat Sasebo the previous day and takencommand of the two Marine divisions.The only other major Allied unit ashorein Kyushu, an Army task force that wa soccupying Kanoya airfield in the south-

ernmost part of the island, was trans-ferred to General Schmidt 's commandfrom the Far East Air Forces on 1

October. This unit, which was builtaround a reinforced battalion (1/127 )of the 32d Infantry Division, had bee nflown into Kanoya on 3 September t osecure an emergency field on the aeria lroute to Tokyo from Okinawa and th ePhilippines .

General Krueger, well satisfied withthe progress of the occupation in th eVAC zone, assumed command of al lforces ashore at 1000 on 24 September .The first major elements of the othe rcorps of the Sixth Army began landingat Wakayama the next day. On everyhand, there was ample evidence that theoccupation of southern Japan would b ebloodless .

Among the VAC troops, whose previ-ous experience with the Japanese i n

surrender had been "necessaril y

meager," considerable speculation de-

veloped regarding :

. . . to what extent and how, if at all, th eJapanese nation would comply with th eterms of surrender imposed . . . . The onl ything which could be predicted from thepast was that the Japanese reaction woul dbe unpredictable . 3 2

And it was. In fact, the eventual keyto the pattern and sequence of VAC oc-cupation operations was "the single out-standing fact that Japanese compliance

with the terms was as nearly correct as

could be humanly expected ." 3 3

"= Ibid., pp. 11-12 ."

Ibid .

CHAPTER 2

Kyushu Deployment to December 1945

KYUSHU OCCUPATION 1

Original plans for the occupation o fJapan had contemplated military gov-ernment of the surrendered nation ,coupled with close operational contro lover the disarmament and demobiliza-tion of the Japanese armed forces . Dur-ing the course of conferences with enemysurrender emissaries at Manila, radica lmodifications of these plans were made,however, "based on the full cooperatio nof the Japanese and [including] meas-ures designed to avoid incidents whichmight result in renewed conflict ." 2

Instead of instituting direct militar yrule, the responsible occupation forc ecommanders were to supervise the ex-ecution of SCAP directives to the Japa-nese government, keeping in mindMacArthur's policy of using, but notsupporting, that Bove-nment. 3 An im-portant element of the surrender wasthe clear statement by the Allied power sthat from the moment of capitulation ,

1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is derived from : CinCPac WarDs, Sep–Nov45 ; Sixth Army Rpt ; VAC OpRpt ; VACWarDs, Sep–Nov45 ; 2d MarDiv OpRpt ; 5thMarDiv OpRpt ; 5th MarDiv WarDs, Sep–Nov45 ; Fukuoka Base Comd OpRpt, Occupa-tion of Japan, dtd 25Nov45 ; Conner, 5thMarDiv Hist ; Shaw, Marine Occupation o fJapan .

'Eighth Army Monograph I, p . 12 .

SCAP, Summation No. 1 of Non-MilitaryActivities in Japan and Korea, Sep–Oct45, p . 3(Army Sec, WWII RecDiv, NA) .

the Emperor and the Japanese Govern-ment would be under the absolute au-thority of SCAP. The Japanese militar yforces were to disarm and demobiliz eunder their own supervision, and th eAllied forces were to occupy assigne dareas at the same time that Japanesedemobilization was underway .

The infantry regiment (and divi-sional artillery operating as infantry )was to be "the chief instrument of de-militarization and control . The entir eplan for the imposition of the terms ofsurrender was based upon the presenc eof infantry regiments in all the pre-fectures within the Japanese home-land." 4 In achieving this aim, a fairlystandard pattern of occupational dutie swas established with the division of re-sponsibilities based on the boundariesof the prefectures so that the existingJapanese government structure coul dbe utilized. In some instances, especi-ally in the 5th Marine Division zone,the vast size of certain prefectures, th edensity of civilian population, and thetactical necessities of troop deploymentcombined to force modifications of th egeneral scheme of regimental respon-sibility for a single prefecture .

Generally speaking, the method ofcarrying out the regimental missionvaried little between zones and units ,whether Army or Marine . After selectedadvance parties of staff officers fromhigher headquarters and the unit con -

Sixth Army Rpt, p . 35.

497

498


cerned had established initial liaiso nwith local Japanese authorities, th eregiment moved into a bivouac area i nor near the zone of responsibility. Re-connaissance patrols were sent out toverify the location of military instal-lations and check inventories of wa rmaterial submitted by the Japanese .With this information, the regimenta lcommander was able to divide his zon einto battalion areas, and the battalio ncommanders could, in turn, assign thei rcompanies specific sectors of responsi-bility. Billeting and sanitation detail spreceded the troops into these areas t ooversee the preparation of barracks an dsimilar quarters, since many of thesebuildings were in a deplorable state ofrepair and rather filthy .

The infantry company or artillerybattery then became the working unitthat actually accomplished the occupa-tion duties. Company commanders wereempowered to seize any military instal-lations in their zone and to use Japa-nese military personnel not yet demo-bilized or laborers furnished by Hom eMinistry representatives to dispose ofall material within the installations .SCAP directives governed dispositio nprocedures and divided all material int othe following categories :

destroyed or scrappedand armaments no tsouvenirs or training

2 .

3 .

4 .5 .

6 Ibid.

The dangerous job of explosiv eordnance disposal was handled by th eJapanese with a bare minimum ofAmerican supervision . Some explosiveswere either dumped at sea or burned inapproved areas, some were exploded inunderground sites ; and because it wastoo dangerous to enter certain explo-sives storage tunnels, these were seale dand the contents left buried.° Weaponsand equipment declared surplus to th eneeds of occupation troops were con-verted into scrap, mainly by Japanes elabor, and then turned over to the Hom eMinistry for use in essential civilian in-dustries. Foodstuffs and other nonmili-tary stocks were returned to the Japa-nese for distribution .

Although prefectural police main-tained civil law and order and enforce ddemocratization decrees issued at theinstance of SCAP, constant surveillancewas maintained over Japanese methodsof government . American intelligenceand military government personnel ,working with the occupying troops ,acted quickly to stamp out any sugges-tion of a return to militarism or evasionof the surrender terms. Regarding thehandling of war criminals, the JCS, on14 September, had directed MacArthu rto "proceed without avoidable delaywith the trial before appropriate mili-tary courts or tribunals and the punish-ment of Japanese war criminals as havebeen or may be apprehended, in accord-ance with the desire of the President . " 7

Known or suspected war criminals weretherefore apprehended and sent toTokyo for processing and possible ar-raignment before an Allied tribunal .

° Col Saville T . Clark It- to Hd, HistBr, G— 3Div, HQMC, dtd 8Dec65 .

7 CinCPac WarD, Sep45 .

1 . That to b e(explosivesneeded forpurposes) .That to be used for our operation s(telephones, radios, and vehicles) .That to be returned to the Japanes eHome Ministry (fuel, lumber, etc .) .That to be issued as trophies .That to be shipped to the U . S. astrophies or training gear . 5

KYUSHU DEPLOYMENT TO DECEMBER 1945

499

In addition to the apprehension of warcriminals and the exercise of super-visory control of Japanese demobiliza-tion of the home garrison, occupatio ntroops were responsible for ensuringthe smooth processing of hundreds o fthousands of military personnel an dcivilians returning from the outposts o fthe now defunct Empire. At the sam etime, thousands of Korean, Formosan,and Chinese prisoners and "voluntary"laborers had to be collected, pacified attimes, 8 housed and fed, and returned totheir homelands. In all repatriationoperations, Japanese vessels and crew swere used to the fullest extent possibl ein order to conserve Allied manpowe rand allow for an accelerated program o fpostwar demobilization .

Soon after the initial VAC landingson Kyushu, investigation disclosed thatthe Japanese had begun repatriation oftheir own people from Korea and wer ereturning Koreans home from Japan .The port of Hakata, a short distance upthe coast from Fukuoka, was beingutilized as an embarkation point, an dMoji and Shimonoseki were employe das receiving and holding areas. TheJapanese used small craft for the re-patriation program, "and processin gcenters, records, sanitation, etc ., wereconspicuous by their absence." 9 Con-fronted by the first groups of incomin gJapanese, the 5th Marine Division set

a Deep-rooted feelings of antipathy towardsthe Japanese among the Koreans and Chinese ,coupled with delays in the repatriation pro -gram caused by lack of shipping, sometime sled to riots and disturbances . Most of thesewere handled by Japanese police, but America ntroops occasionally had to intervene to preven tserious trouble.

VAC OpRpt, Anx D, App 3, pp. 1-2.

310-224 0 - 69 - 33

up a repatriation center at Uragashira ,which shortly after 26 September wasreceiving and processing nearly 3,000repatriated and demobilized Japanesetroops a day. Soon after, Hakata and it sreceiving area were operating underoccupation supervision . The ports o fMoji and Shimonoseki were closeddown and not authorized for purposesof repatriation because the harbor ap-proaches were still heavily mined an dhad not yet been cleared .

According to reliable informationavailable to the occupation authorities,there were well over a million Korean sto be repatriated from Japan, and addi-tional ports and receiving centers wereset up immediately . Following theirinspection, Senzaki, Hakata, Sasebo,and Kagoshima were authorized a sVAC zone ports of embarkation and theJapanese were instructed to improveand expand facilities there . AvailableJapanese shipping, however, fell farshort of port capacity.

In addition to the Koreans discoveredin the zone, the Americans found thatsome 40,000 Chinese had to be re-patriated ; 6,000 of these were in theVAC zone of responsibility along withapproximately 7,000 Formosans and15,000 Ryukyu Islanders . Higher head-quarters advised VAC that theRyukyuans and Formosans—half ofwhom were demobilized soldiers—coul dnot be repatriated yet, but the Chines ecould . The return home of the Chines eon Japanese shipping began early inOctober from Hakata, and it was foun dnecessary to place U . S. guard detach-ments on many ships to prevent dis-order because the Japanese crews coul dnot control the returnees. The Koreans,

500


on the other hand, were relativelydocile .

With "their constant drift out o fnowhere" 10 into repatriation centers,the Koreans soon clogged these point sbeyond the capacity of available ship -ping. SCAP authorized the use of 80LSTs for a China-to-Sasebo run for th erepatriation of Japanese, and a Sasebo-to-Korea or -China run for others . After30 November, the port of Kagoshimawas used as a repatriation center. Thefirst Chinese repatriates, a total o f2,800, left Sasebo on 24 Novemberunder this system .

The pattern of progressive occupa-tion called for in SCAP plans wa squickly established by VAC :

After the 2d and 5th Marine Divisionshad landed, VAC's general plan was forthe 2d Marine Division to expand south o fNagasaki to assume control of the Naga -saki, Kumamoto, Miyazaki, and Kago-shima Prefectures . The 5th Marine Divi-sion in the meantime was to extend eastto the prefectures of Saga, Fukuoka, Oita ,and Yamaguchi . The latter division wa sto be relieved in the Fukuoka, Oita, an dYamaguchi areas upon the arrival ofsufficient elements of the 32d Division . 1 1

Troops occupying Sasebo found aserious breakdown in those sanitary an dpublic services 12 ordinarily rendered by

1° VAC OpRpt, Anx D, App 3, p . 4 .11 Sixth Army Rpt, p . 26 .12 For example, the telephone service in

Sasebo, and western Japan as well, wa satrocious. "A telephone call to a point 50 mile saway often took many hours for a connectio nand then [one was able to get] only an unin-telligible response." To improve these condi-tions, VAC established a line of sight systemsimilar to that used in Hawaii, where therewas a scrambler unit at the origin and anautomatic unscrambler at the receiver . "An

the city. Containing the third largestnaval base in Japan, Sasebo was a citywhose normal population was approxi-mately 300,000 until 29 June 1945 . Onthat day, Sasebo suffered its only B–29raid of the war which destroyed a largeportion of the city, but left the Navyyard area relatively undamaged . Thisraid made over 60,000 Japanese home-less and killed 1,000.

On 27 September, four days after hehad first landed at Sasebo, GeneralBourke moved his CP to the naval re-cruit training center at Ainoura, seve nmiles to the west of Sasebo . 13 The 5thPioneer Battalion, with military polic eand motor transport units attached ,garrisoned Sasebo. This reinforced bat-talion furnished working parties for th e5th Division quartermaster, unloade dships, provided guards for supplydumps and water points, and establishedmilitary police patrols for the city .

As the 5th Marine Division estab-lished order in the Sasebo area, it bega npreparations to extend the occupationthroughout the northern area o fKyushu and onto nearby islands, in-cluding southern Honshu. A reinforcedcompany of the division was establishe dat Omura almost immediately afte rlanding, and motorized patrols recon-noitered the approaches to Sasebo . Verypoor road conditions existing along theroute from Sasebo to Omura were par-ticularly bad on the outskirts of the

unsung triumph of the communicators," thi ssystem was used throughout the VAC area an dwas "finally extended to Tokyo" with excellentresults. Rogers ltr.

12 It was later discovered that the defendersof Tarawa had trained at Ainoura . BGenClarence R. Wallace ltr to CMC, dtd 4Jan66 .


501

former city. The many narrow bridgesencountered were often in poor repairor entirely impassable . Japanese malesmet by the patrols were usually friendly,but the woman and children appeare dfrightened. As the Japanese populac egrew more accustomed to the presenc eof the Marines and became assured thatthe occupation forces would not harmthem, their shyness and fear disap-peared.

During the latter part of the firstweek of occupation, VAC continued toextend its zone of occupation operations,guarded Japanese military installation sand arms and supply dumps, and beganto inventory and dispose of the materia lin these dumps in line with prescribe dregulations . The 2d Marine Divisionestablished detachments at Isahaya(northeast of Nagasaki) and Kawatan aat the same time that patrols exercisedsurveillance over all roads and strategi careas.

One week after the initial landings,the 5th Division zone of responsibility(Z/R) was extended to include Yagi-hara, Miyazaki, Arita, Takeo, Sechi-bara, and other small towns to the northand west of Sasebo . The normal occu-pation missions of the division con-tinued to proceed in a satisfactor ymanner. Japanese equipment was inven-toried rapidly and Japanese guardswere relieved by Marine sentries a ssoon as the inventories were completed .On 29 September, VAC published anoperation order for the occupation o fFukuoka. (See Map 28. )

FUKUOKA OCCUPATIO N

The decision to occupy Fukuoka,largest city in Kyushu and administra-

tive center of the northwestern coal an dsteel region, was made almost immedi-ately after the initial landings . Becausethe waters of Fukuoka harbor wer eliberally sown with mines, the move-ment to the city was made by rail an droad from Sasebo. An advance party ,consisting of officers from VAC and th e5th Division, reached Fukuoka on 2 7September and began making prelimi-nary arrangements for the entry of thetroops. Meetings were held with Japa-nese military and civilian authoritie sregarding the conduct of the occupation .Leading elements of the occupatio nforce began arriving on 30 September .Brigadier General Ray A. Robinson ,Assistant Division Commander of the5th Marine Division, was given com-mand of the Fukuoka force whichconsisted of the 28th Marines (Rein-

forced) and Army augmentation de-tachments .

The Fukuoka Occupation Force(FOF), which was placed directlyunder VAC command, began sendingreconnaissance parties followed bycompany- and battalion-sized occupa-tion forces to the major cities of north-ern Kyushu and across the Straits o fShimonoseki to Yamaguchi Prefecturein southwestern Honshu . Because of thelimited number of troops available toFOF, Japanese guards were left i ncharge of most military installations,and effective control of the zone wasmaintained through the use of motor-ized surveillance patrols .

In order to prevent possible outbreak sof mob violence, Marine guard detach -ments were set up to administer theChinese labor camps found in the area ,and Japanese Army supplies were

502


requisitioned to feed and clothe theformer POWs and laborers . Some ofthe supplies were also used to sustainthe swarms of Koreans who gathered intemporary camps near the principal re-patriation ports of Fukuoka and Sen-zaki (Yamaguchi Prefecture) whilethey awaited shipping to return to thei rhomeland . The Marines supervised theloading out of the Koreans and madecontinuous checks on the processing anddischarge procedures used to handle th eJapanese troops who returned with eac hincoming vessel . In addition to its re-patriation activities, the FOF locatedand inventoried vast quantities of Japa-nese military material for later disposi-tion by the 32d Infantry Division .

On 1 October, General Robinson con-ferred with ranking Japanese officer sconcerning orders and instructions per-taining to the occupation . At the direc-tion of higher authority, the FOF com-mander ordered sentries posted at themore important buildings and dockfacilities, and in a swift move to crusha suspected black market operation i nforeign exchange, he immediately closedthe branches of the Bank of Chose nthroughout the FOF zone, posted guardsat these branches, sealed their safesand vaults, and impounded the recordsof the bank .

Further establishment of occupationforces throughout the zone began on 4October with the movement of a rein -forced company from 3/28 into Shi-monoseki as the Shimonoseki Occupa-tion Group. On 6 October, anotherreinforced company of the battalion wa ssent into the Moji area . The rest of thebattalion moved into Moji on 1 0October, the day that the Shimonoseki-

Moji Occupation Group was formed . Adetachment was sent from Shimonosek ito Yamaguchi the next day, and eightdays later, occupation forces were setup at Senzaki .

As General Robinson's force tookcontrol of Fukuoka and Yamaguch iPrefectures, the 5th Marine Divisionexpanded its hold on the area east ofSasebo . On 5 October, the division Z/ Rwas extended to include Saga Prefec-ture and the city of Kurume in the cen-ter of the island. The 2d Battalion, 27thMarines, moved to Saga city, operatingfor a short time as an independentoccupation group . On 24 October, theregiment (less 1/27) established itsheadquarters in Kurume and assume dresponsibility for the central portion ofthe division zone, which now extende dto the east coast (Oita Prefecture) .Through all of these troop movements ,the maintenance of roads and bridge swas a constant problem since the inade-quate road net quickly disintegratedwhen punished by the combination ofheavy rains and extensive military traf-fic. The burden of supplying and trans-porting the scattered elements of VA Cwas borne by the Japanese rail sys-tem. 1 4

After it had moved to Saga, 2/27 dis-covered on the airfield there 178 Japa-nese fighter planes, all but 8 of which

14 The state of the Kyushu road net, much ofwhich would not support even medium-sizedvehicles, and the extensive rice paddy areascontiguous to these roads would have consti-tuted extremely serious obstacles to the prose-cution of OLYMPIC, the projected invasio nof Kyushu . Fortunately, the extensive Japanes erail network was capable of handling most o fthe supply requirements of the occupationforces .


503

had been damaged by typhoons . Thebattalion also uncovered a vast "am -munition dump where the Japanese hadstored approximately one-fifth of thecountry's ammunition for home de-fense ." 15 A battalion patrol located aninternment camp at Shimizu, whereDutch, British, Italian, Portuguese ,Swiss, and Belgian nationals had beenconfined during the war . Upon enteringthe camp, the Marines found that :

The only remaining internee was an82-year old Swiss who amazed everyoneby proving that he was an ex-U . S . Marine .Edward Zillig had enlisted in the Marin eCorps in 1888 in Philadelphia, had beendischarged in 1893, and then had reen-listed during the Spanish-American War.He produced a letter from the VeteransAdministration showing that he had re-ceived a pension . From 1936 until hishouse was blown to bits, he had lived inNagasaki with his Japanese wife . Zilligturned over two items to the patrol : (1 )a statement of the kind treatment he hadreceived from a Japanese police sergeant,and (2) a request for renewal of his $60-a-month pension. 1 6

Zillig also had a request for the "one

more thing I want to see in life," a full -

dress Marine Corps parade . 17 The old

man received his wish shortly there -after, when he stood beside Lieutenant

Colonel John W. A. Antonelli 2/27 com-mander, and "watched the modernLeathernecks swing by—and he remem-bered to salute at the right time." 1 8

The former Marine's pension was re-newed, for as soon as the Veterans Ad-

1G Conner, 5th MarDiv Hist, p . 153 .19 Ibid.1T Washington Star, 3Dec45 .18 Ibid .

ministration received evidence of Zillig'sexistence, it began sending him a checkagain. Veterans legislation that ha dbeen passed in Congress during the waryears had increased Zillig's pension t o$75 a month. Unfortunately, he did no tlive long enough to cash more than a fe wchecks, for he committed suicide o n9 March 1946 .

FURTHER EXPANSION

When it was decided to occupy OitaPrefecture, the entire 180-mile trip fromSasebo to Oita city was made by rail .The occupation force, Company A (Re-inforced) of the 5th Tank Battalion ,operating as infantry, 19 set up in thecity on 15 October and conducted a re-connaissance of the military installa-tions in the coastal prefecture by meansof motorized patrols . The companyserved as an advance party for 32dInfantry Division troops, and becauseof its small size, was forced to relyon Japanese labor for most of its mate-rial inventory work .

The Marines found that the naval air

station at Oita had been almost com-pletely destroyed by American bombs,although nearly 100 dispersed Japaneseplanes remained in semi-operable condi-

tion. Despite the fact that Oita had never

been singled out as a primary target for

AAF raids, approximately 40 percent ofthe city had been razed because B–29s

""Tanks were never used even for showpurposes because the soft roads would not bea rtheir weight . The Iwo-scarred Shermans hadbeen landed and parked at the Sasebo navalair station, and there they stayed." Conner ,5th MarDiv Hist, p . 155 .


BATTERED BUDDHIST FIGURES symbolize the atomic destruction suffered atNagasaki. (USMC 136176)

MORE THAN 200 Japanese planes are destroyed at Omura as part of the Allied dis-armament program. (USMC 139991)


505

had been diverted there when their pri-mary target could not be hit or when th ea bomb load left over from those dropped

on the initial target . From Oita, the oc-cupation spread northwest along theeast coast of Kyushu to Beppu, wherethe most famous beaches and shore re -

sorts of Japan are located .The 13th Marines, occupying the are a

to the south and east of Sasebo in Naga -saki and Saga Prefectures, supervised

the processing of Japanese repatriate sreturning from China and Korea, and

handled the disposition of the weapons ,

equipment, and ammunition that wer e

stored in naval depots near Sasebo an d

Kawatana. The 1st Battalion, 27th

Marines, which was detached from itsregiment, was stationed in Sasebo under

division control, and furnished a portion

of the garrison for the city as well a s

detachments that investigated the island

groups offshore. The division reconnais-

sance company was sent in DUKWs to

Hirado Shima, north of Sasebo, on

2 October. Finding everything in order ,

the company returned to Sasebo on the

4th .

The 26th Marines, whose patrol s

ranged the hinterland north and east of

Sasebo, had a very short tour of duty

in Japan. On 13 October, the regimen twas alerted for transfer to the Palau

Islands . 20 While the 26th was making

2 ° The 6th Marines of the 2d Marine Divisionwas originally scheduled to answer this cal lfrom CinCPac, and when its Palau alert wa scancelled, it was directed to stand by to mov eto Sasebo to replace the 26th Marines . On 17October, this second alert was cancelled whe nVAC attached the 127th Infantry Regiment tothe 5th Marine Division .

preparations to move to Peleliu an d

supervise the repatriation of Japanese

troops from the Western Carolines, 21 the

first elements of the 32d Division began

landing at Sasebo . An advance party of

the division had arrived in Fukuoka

earlier, on 3 October. The 128th Infan-

try, followed by the 126th Infantry and

division troops, moved straight on

through the port and entrained for

Fukuoka, where the Army units came

temporarily under the control of FOF.

The V Amphibious Corps placed the

127th Infantry (less 1/127), which

landed on 18–19 October, under the op-erational control of the 5th Division t o

take over the zone of responsibility o f

the 26th Marines .

The Fukuoka Occupation Force was

dissolved on 24 October when it was re-lieved by the 32d Division, which opened

its command post in Fukuoka on th e

same day . 22 At this time, the Fukuoka

Base Command, composed of the service

elements that had been assigned to Gen -

eral Robinson's force, was set up to

support the operations in northern

Kyushu and continued to function until25 November, when the Army divisiontook over its duties. The 28th Marines

-` See pt III, chap 3, "Return to the Islands, "above.

" "The movement of the 32d Army Divisio nto the Fukuoka area created a problem. It wa sunsafe to send [it] by sea because of the re-maining harbor mines. Overland was almostimpossible because of the narrow bridges an dturns" facing the division's heavy equipment,and surmounting all of this was the impossibl e

loading situation in Sasebo . The 32d "finallywent overland in what was a really remarkablelogistic feat." Rogers ltr .

506


and the 5th Tank Battalion occupationforces were relieved by Army units : the128th RCT 23 took over YamaguchiPrefecture, the 126th patrolled Fukuok aand Oita Prefectures, and the 127th ,after it was relieved by the 28th Ma-rines in the zone formerly occupied bythe 26th Marines, occupied Fukuokaand the zone to the north .

The 26th Marines began boardingship on 18 October and 127th Infantryunits moved into the vacated billets . On19 October, the Marine regiment wasdetached from the division and returne dto FMFPac control as loading con-tinued. Before the transports departedon 21 October, orders were receive d

from FMFPac designating 2/26 for dis-bandment, and the battalion returned tothe Marine Camp, Ainoura—the 5th Di -vision headquarters outside of Sasebo .On 31 October, 2/26, the first of manywar-born Marine infantry battalions t oend its Pacific service passed out of ex-

istence and its men were transferred toother units .

While Brigadier General Robert B .McBride, Jr.'s 32d Infantry Divisionmoved north to take over the area occu-

pied by the Fukuoka and Oita Occupa-tion Forces, the 2d Marine Divisio ngradually expanded its hold on souther nKyushu. Immediately after landing, th e

=' The infantry units of the 32d Infantr yDivision were organized as RCTs comprisingan infantry regiment, an artillery battalion ,and other attached division and corps troop sto perform occupation duties . In the Marin edivisions, where the artillery regiment was a norganic unit, it was reinforced and used as anoccupation force in the same manner as th einfantry regiments .

2d and 6th Marines moved into billets i n

the vicinity of Nagasaki, with the mis-sions of surveillance in their assignedareas and of disposition of enemy mili-

tary material in the nearby countrysideand on the many small islands in the vi-

cinity of the coast. The 8th and 10th Ma-rines went directly from their transportsto barracks at Isahaya, where they beganpatrolling the peninsula to the south an dthe rest of Nagasaki Prefecture in th e2d Division zone .

On 4 October, VAC changed th eboundary between divisions to includeOmura in General Hunt's zone . The 5thDivision security detachment at the Ma-

rine air base was relieved by 3/10 andreturned to parent control. Shortlythereafter, the 10th Marines took ove rthe whole of the 8th Marines area inNagasaki Prefecture .

The corps expanded the 2d Divisionzone on 5 October to include all of highly

industrialized Kumamoto Prefecture .An advance billeting, sanitation, and re-

connaissance party of the 8th Marine stravelled to Kumamoto city in the south -western part of the island to make con-tact with the Japanese authorities andpave the way for regimental assumptio nof control . By 18 October, all units of th e8th Marines established themselves i n

and around Kumamoto and began th eby-now familiar process of inventor yand disposition. In line with SCAP di-

rectives outlining measures to restore

the civilian economy to a self-supportinglevel, the Marines assisted the local gov-

ernment wherever necessary to speed the


507

conversion of war plants to essentia l

peacetime production . 2 4

The remaining unoccupied portion of

Kyushu was taken over by the 2d Divi-

sion within the next month. Advance

parties headed by senior field grade of-

ficers contacted civil and military offi-cials in Kagoshima and Miyazaki

Prefectures to ensure compliance with

surrender terms and adequate prepara-

tions for the reception of division

troops. 25 Miyazaki Prefecture and the

half of Kagoshima east of Kagoshim a

Wan were assigned to the 2d Marines .

The remaining half of Kagoshima Pre-

fecture was added to the zone of the 8th

Marines ; later, the regiment was also

given responsibility for conducting oc-

cupation operations in the Osumi and

Koshiki island groups, which lay to th e

Z' A military government team, compose dprimarily of Army and Navy officers, wa sassigned to each regimental headquarters an dperformed a valuable liaison function betwee n

the Marine commanders and local government

agencies. LtCol Duncan H . Jewell ltr to Hd ,HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 3Jan66 .

25 Colonel Samuel G. Taxis, the G—3 of th edivision, headed up the team which went t osouthern Kyushu to meet with the commandersof the Forty-seventh and Fiftieth Armies and

the head of the Naval Base Force at Kagoshimato explain the provisions of the surrender .When Colonel Taxis compared the strength ofthe Japanese forces with that of the occupationforces, he came to the conclusion that "a boywas sent to do a man's job ." BGen Samuel G .Taxis comments to HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC,dtd 28Dec65. General Taxis also recalled tha this team was purposely composed of only afew Marines in the belief that if a show of

force had been made in the south, the Japanese

armed forces there would react. Ibid.

south and southwest respectively ofKyushu .

On 29 October, a motor convoy carry-

ing the major part of 1/8 moved fromKumamoto to Kagoshima city to assum e

control of western Kagoshima . The bat-talion had to start anew the routine o f

reconnaissance, inspection, inventory,

and disposition that had occupied i t

twice before . The 2d Battalion, 2d Ma-

rines, assigned to the eastern half of

Kagoshima, found much of its prelimi-

nary occupation spadework alreadydone. The Army task force at Kanoyahad been actively patrolling the area

since it had come under VAC command .

When 2/2, loaded in four LSTs, arrive d

from Nagasaki on 27 October, it wa s

relatively easy to effect a relief. The

Marines landed at Takasu, port fo r

Kanoya, and moved by rail and road to

the airfield . On 30 October, 2/2 assumed

from 1/127 operational control of the

Army Air Force detachment mannin g

the emergency field, and the 32d Divi-

sion battalion prepared to return to

Sasebo to rejoin its regiment.

The remainder of the 2d Marines als omoved by sea from Sasebo to Takasu an d

thence by rail to Miyazaki Prefecture

in early November. Regimental head-

quarters and 3/2 set up their bases of

operations at Miyakonojo, and the 1st

Battalion moved into billets in the city

of Miyazaki . 26 By 14 November, with

the occupation of . Miyazaki complete ,

Subsequently, one reinforced company wasdeployed to a small coastal town half-way be-tween Miyazaki and Oita, and remained thereuntil the entire regiment was withdrawn. Ibid.

508


VAC had established effective contro l

over its entire zone of responsibility . 2 7

At the end of November, VAC coul d

report substantial progress in its major

occupation tasks . Over 700,000 Japanes e

returning from overseas had been proc-

essed through ports and separatio n

" In late November, in order to determin ewhether the VAC plan for OLYMPIC wa svalid and feasible, Brigadier General Willia mW. Rogers, VAC chief of staff, called intoSasebo for a three-day war games session thecommanders, chiefs of staff, and principal staffofficers of the Japanese forces which wer eto have defended Kyushu. In the course of thesesessions, the play of the games was based o nthe VAC plan and the defense orders and plan swhich the Japanese participants brought wit hthem, after some initial reluctance to do so o ntheir part. Questions were asked at random ,capabilities and reaction times were measured ,and all conceivable factors were taken into con-sideration. The Japanese were asked how longit would have taken them to move one division .Instead of the 36 hours that the Marines hadexpected, the answer was 9 days . The reasonwas that the former enemy commanders coul donly move their troops at night, and by foot,because of the complete American air supe-riority over the target by day. At the com-pletion of the war games, it was decisivelyproven that U . S. air superiority had in fac tguaranteed success to the VAC plan. In addi-tion, although the strength of Japanese forcesin the south of Kyushu was great, manysoldiers were armed with spears only. Themore than 2,000 aircraft on Kyushu posed athreat to the American landing, but theseplanes were held back to be employed in amass Kamikaze attack which was neverordered. The entire three days of sessions wereconducted on a thoroughly professional basiswith attention paid to mutual courtesy an drespect . In the end, General Rogers was satis-fied that the VAC plan would have been valid,if OLYMPIC had been consummated. ColRobert D. Heinl, Jr ., comments to HistBr,G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 19Aug66.

centers under corps control . The tideof humanity had not all flowed from onedirection, since 273,276 Koreans, Chi-nese, and Okinawans had been sent backto their homelands . On 1 December, onlyabout 20,000 Japanese Army and Navypersonnel remained on duty, all em-ployed in demobilization, repatriation ,minesweeping, and similar activities .On that date, in accordance with SCA Pdirectives, these men were transferredto civilian status under newly create dgovernment ministries and bureaus . Thedestruction or other disposition of warmaterial in the Corps area proceededsatisfactorily with surprisingly fe wmishaps,28 considering the enormousquantity of old and faulty munitionsthat had to be handled .

The need for large numbers of combattroops in Japan steadily lessened as th eoccupation wore on, and it became in-creasingly obvious that the Japanes eintended to offer no resistance . Report-ing to Washington in September, Gen-eral MacArthur told General Marshallthat he had inspected the occupied area sabout Tokyo Bay, and that he believe dthat Japan was very near to economi c

and industrial collapse . MacArthur wenton to say : "It appears the fire raids haveso destroyed the integrity of the indus-trial establishment as to prevent con -

43 In November, several accidents in the VA Czone occurred during the munitions dispositionprogram. At Kanoya, a dump of parachuteflares was accidentally ignited and the result-ing fire touched off a major explosion. AtSoida, in the 32d Infantry Division zone, a cavefull of propellant charges and powder explode din a devastating blast, which spread deathand destruction among nearby Japanese. NoAmerican personnel were injured in eitheraccident.


509

tinuance of modern war." 29 MacArthur

continued :

Manpower alone is the only warlike re -source available or potential . The Japanes eImperial Government and the Japanes eImperial General Staff are fully cognizantof these conditions and as near as can b ejudged are completely through with thi swar . Their attitude encourages the strongbelief that these agencies are striving totheir utmost to effect rapid disarmamen tand demobilization . They are submissiveand apparently sincere . . . . I feel confidentthat the strength of occupation forces ma ybe cut and retrograde movement of unitsto the United States well under-way by th e1st of the year or shortly thereafter . 3 0

The first major Marine unit to ful-fill its mission in southern Japan andreturn to the United States was MAG–

22. On 14 October, Admiral Spruance ,acting for CinCPac, had queried theFifth Air Force if the Marine fightergroup was still considered necessary t o

the Sasebo area garrison . On 25 Octo-

ber, the Army replied that MAG–22 wa sno longer needed, and it was returnedto the operational control of the Navy .Both the group service squadron an d

its heavy equipment, which had just ar-rived from Okinawa, remained on boar d

zB CinCAFPac Adv 041207Z of Sep45 toWARCOS in CinCPac WarD, Sep45 (OAB,NHD) .

'° Ibid .

ship, and in less than a wee kAirFMFPac directed that the unit re-turn to the United States . Its planeswere flown to an aircraft replacemen tpool on Okinawa, and low-point me nwere transferred to MAG–31 as re -placements for men eligible for rotatio nor discharge. On 20 November, afte rpicking up MAG–31 returnees at Yoko-suka and similar Army troops atYokohama, MAG–22 left for home . TheMarine Air Base, Omura, remained i noperation, but its aircraft strengthconsisted mainly of light liaison andobservation planes of the observatio nsquadrons assigned to VAC divisions . 3 1

The redeployment of MAG–22 wa sonly a small part of the general patter nfor withdrawing excess occupatio nforces. On 12 November, VAC informedthe Sixth Army that the 5th MarineDivision would be released from itsduties on 1 December for return to the

United States . By the turn of the year ,the 2d Marine Division would be theonly major Marine unit remaining onoccupation duty in southern Japan .

'1 MAG–22 WarDs, Oct–Nov45. A thirdMarine air base at Iwakuni to support opera-tions in the Kure area had been a part o foriginal occupation plans . It was not estab-lished, however, and the transport squadron sof MAG–21 intended for it were reassigned,

VMR–353 to Guam and VMR–952 to Yokosuka.ComFifthFlt AR, pt VI, sec L, p . 2.