Chapter 17-Section 8

7/31/2019 Chapter 17-Section 8

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German Neutrality

The Rapacki Plan (Polish foreign minister)

Proposal of the establishment of a denuclearized zone in

Central Europe

Poland, Czechoslovakia, and both parts of Germany

Thoughtful and attractive alternative to the remilitarization of

Germany

Possible first step toward resolving the German Question

Response to a NATO decision to rearm West Germany W. German chancellor Konrad Adenauer asked the West to

provide bombers, artillery, and missiles

The West obliged immediately (except the missiles)


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German Neutrality

1958- US rejects the Rapacki Plan Premise that Western troops in Germany would be at

the mercy of the vast Soviet conventional forces inCentral and Eastern Europe

Plan also went against what the West wanted anyway(a rearmed Germany)

US had little to lose as they werent giving W.

Germany any nuclear weapons anyway USSR gained a propaganda advantage from the

proposal (but diverted by the news of Sputnik)


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German Neutrality

US publicly decried the tragedy of a dividedGermany, but secretly wanted nothing to dowith a unified, neutralGermany

W. German chancellor Adenauer rejectedSoviet offers of reunification as well Believed that a reunified Germany must be firmly tied to the

West

Despised East German Saupreussen (sow Prussians) Eastern European militarists with marginal ties to the West

Feared that his Catholic and capitalist ChristianDemocratic Union would be voted out of power ifreunified


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German Neutrality

US (Eisenhower) wanted a possibly reunited Germany to have ties toNATO and the European Economic Community (EEC)

France wanted to ally itself with the economic powerhouse of CentralEurope (W. Germany)

But feared a reunified, rearmed Germany 1958- Charles de Gaulle came to power in France

French opposition to a reunified Germany became more pronounced

The French were losing faith in NATO

Suggesting that the US would not risk an attack for defending

Paris Sought closer ties with W. Germany through the EEC

1963- Franco-German Friendship Treaty

Britain would side with the US on any policy toward Germany as theyknew who saved Europe from German domination in 1917 and 1941


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Khrushchevs Berlin

Ultimatum, 1958-59 March 1958- Bulganin was ousted as premier as Khrushchev took the

position himself

No more pretense of a collective Soviet leadership

November 10, 1958- Khrushchev declared his intent upon signing a treaty

with E. Germany Would force the West to negotiate access rights to West Berlin

directly with the E. German government

West immediately declared their rights in Berlin were guaranteed by the1945 Yalta agreements

Soviets were looking for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Berlin

Ike would agree, but only if both halves of the city would be abandonedand all access routes were patrolled by the UN

Khrushchev had abandoned Soviet push for reunification and neutralityand was now talking about turning over East Berlin to E. Germany


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Khrushchevs Berlin

Ultimatum, 1958-59 Khrushchev delivered an ultimatum to the West- six

months and out, or else!

Soviets hoped that W. Germany would withdraw from

NATO and E. Germany would withdraw from theWarsaw Pact

Effectively neutralizing Germany, even if it wasntreunified

Ike felt like Khrushchev was bluffing as he had before(Suez and Lebanon crises)

Had espionage info from U-2 sorties that showed theSoviets did not have nearly the capability to respondwith nukes


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Khrushchevs Berlin

Ultimatum, 1958-59 May 1959- US war scare as deadline of Khrushchevs ultimatum was

nearing

Ike demonstrated his willingness to negotiate and his refusal to panic

Ike also had contingency plan if E. Germany were to cut off access to

West Berlin A new airlift and severed relations with USSR

Britain and France pushed for a summit meeting with Khrushchev

Ike and Dulles wanted to avoid a meeting unless there were guaranteedresults

Offered a conference of foreign ministers in Geneva May 11, 1959- Geneva summit convened

Khrushchev hinted that his deadline would not expire if talks wereamicable, and then he invited Ike to Moscow

Tensions began to lift


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Khrushchevs Berlin

Ultimatum, 1958-59 July 1959- Ike decided in July he would invite Khrushchev to

America for a few days in September

Special representative, Robert Murphy, conveyed thesuggestion to Soviet first deputy premier Frol Kozlov

Murphy did not know that the invite was linked to how wellthe Geneva summit was going and delivered an unconditionalinvitation

Khrushchev accepted on July 22 stating that he would tour theUS for ten days

Ike was exasperated and knew that this wouldnt havehappened if Dulles would have been alive (died of cancer justas this was all going down)

Khrushchev was exhilarated as this would show the equality ofthe US and the USSR


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Berlin Ultimatum, 1958-59

Vice President Richard Nixon arrived inMoscow the day after Khrushchevs acceptance Purpose of Nixons trip was to accompany a US art

and technology exhibition

The Kitchen Debate Nixon and Khrushchev toured a typical American

kitchen all the while trading barbs and insults about

each others nations

All captured on film, which boosted Nixons publicimage


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Khrushchevs Trip to America

September 15, 1959- Premier and Mrs. Khrushchev arrived inWashington for what would turn out to be a 12-day visit

First ten days was spent meeting US politicians and film stars in NewYork, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Pittsburgh

Last two days were spent in private talks with Ike at Camp David Presidential retreat in Marylands Catoctin Mountains

Khrushchev pushed Ike on US-Chinese relations

Sino-Soviet split was widening and the Soviets wanted toreduce Chinas possible nuclear capabilities

Ike pushed for an end to Soviet ultimatum in Germany andendorsed a summit meeting of the four great powers

Khrushchev accepted and invited the entire Eisenhowerfamily to the USSR in June 1960 and flew back home to aheros welcome


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Khrushchevs Trip to America

Trip produced modest results, but tangibly its effects were

significant

Khrushchev had demonstrated his equality with Ike and had

defended Soviet interests with vigor and skill Ike now believed that Khrushchev was a man with whom he

might work for a truly lasting peace

The hope (in both the US and USSR) that a peaceful

reconciliation of both nations would occur soon

Helped to stabilize US-Soviet relations and furnished abenchmark against which later such trips would be judged

Even if the German Question had not been settled


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The Nuclear Test Ban Issue

Key issue to be discussed at the upcoming 1960summit Growing concern over the deadly fallout from testing nuclear

weapons by both superpowers 1954- US H-bomb testing produced radiation sickness in

Japanese fishermen near the test site

Einstein and Schweitzer (nuclear scientists) were calling for aban on tests

US refusal to ban nuclear testing was giving Moscow the edgein world opinion

As the world watched and waited for the fallout to worsen

Soviets constantly offered to suspend their testing for two /three year periods as long as the US would do so as well


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US tried to counter with a proposal full of provisions that were

unacceptable to Moscow

March 31, 1958- USSR voluntarily suspended their own testing

program and invited the US to join them US refused and offended the court of world opinion

Ike offered a conference of nuclear techs to devise an

inspection and detection system

Khrushchev agreed

Summer 1958- US, Britain, and the USSR met in Geneva and

designed a workable approach

Ike sensed a chance to restore USs reputation invited the

Soviets to meet and negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty


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October 31, 1958- Ike promised that the US would not test its

nuclear weapons for one year from this date

Brits followed suit

USSR agreed to talks beginning on that date A test ban looked to be within reach and the world rejoiced (yay!)

But difficulties remained (ahhh!)

No atomic tests by either side were detected for the next three

years

Early 1959- US and Britain agreed to decouple the test ban from

other arms issues


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Talks in Geneva stalled

US announced that the detection system was deficient because

it could not identify small nuclear tests conducted

underground Delayed a resolution for over a year

Negotiators could not find a way around this problem

Early 1960- US and Britain suggest that the ban only apply to

above-ground testing and underground blasts large enough to be

detected with existing seismic equipment

March 1960- Soviets agreed

Provision added that declared a moratorium on underground

tests while the detection research was proceeding


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The U-2 Affair

Paris Summit, 1960-

Charles de Gaulle held up the original date for the meeting ashis government was testing its first nuclear weapon

France had now joined in the four-nation nuclear club May 16, 1960- Paris Summit convened

Khrushchev had earlier announced a reduction in the RedArmy by 1.2 million men (a bargaining chip that he no longerpossessed at the later Paris summit)

Ike believed, through Soviet reduction in conventionalmilitary, that the USSR was ready to make serious moves inthe direction of arms control

Inspections remained the most difficult obstacle to overcome

US Senate wouldnt ratify any treaty if it looked like theRussians could cheat


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The U-2 Affair

Since 1956- US had the capability to know the nature and extent of theUSSRs ballistic missile deployment through the use of U-2reconnaissance airplanes

Provided high-quality, top-secret photographic intelligence

Highly secretive CIA program U-2s could fly at 70,000 feet- some 25,000 feet higher than Soviet missiles

and had a range of 4,750 miles

Equipped with cameras that allowed for continuous pictures of a stripof land 750 miles wide

As late as 1960, photographs convinced Ike that the USSR had not one

operative ICBM

But couldnt tell anyone why he believed this

Khrushchev couldnt either for fear of exposing his bluffs about hiscountrys inability to stop the US from flying through Soviet airspace

Ike suspended all U-2 espionage flights over the USSR duringKhrushchevs visit to the US


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The U-2 Affair

CIA director Allen Dulles asked for resumption of U-2 flights in the spring of 1960

Ike approved wanting to know what Russia was up to, but only reluctantly as

the Paris Summit was approaching

April 9, 1960- first U-2 espionage run over the USSR went without incident

May 1, 1960- U-2 flight crashed in Soviet territory

US spun the story of it being a weather flight that had strayed off course

Incident presented Khrushchev with a dilemma

Hardliners pressed him to cancel the summit

Khrushchev decided to expose the spy plane

US denials were refuted when Khrushchev announced that they had captured thepilot

Khrushchev was hoping for an apology from Ike stating that the intelligence

services had extended their intended goals without his knowledge

This way, Khrushchev could still attend the summit in a position of triumph


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The U-2 Affair

Ike now had his own dilemma

How could subordinates create such a crisis without hisknowledge (didnt look good for the US president)

Ike couldnt lie because who knows what the pilot said underinterrogation

Ike couldnt tell the truth about espionage during peacetime

Would break the trust he had developed just recently withKhrushchev and mess up the Eisenhower visit in June

Ike decided to state that the U-2 flights had been carried out underhis general orders and might continue until the USSR agreed toreciprocal inspection of bases and installations

This put an end to the thaw in the Cold War and destroyedpersonal relations between Khrushchev and Ike


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The Collapse of the

Paris Summit Khrushchev responded to Ikes admittance about the U-2 Affair with an

emotional tirade

Would have been worse had he known that Ike wanted Air Force Oneto be equipped with cameras as he flew to the USSR in June

Paris summit was in danger Khrushchev arrived in Paris early hoping for a public apology from Ike

In hopes of continuing with the summit and Ikes visit to the USSR

May 14-15, 1960- de Gaulle and Macmillan (of Britain) were trying toconvince Khrushchev that no head of state would apologize for usingespionage during peacetime

May 16, 1960- de Gaulle opened the conference and immediatelyKhrushchev demanded the floor and read a lengthy statement denouncingthe US

Withdrew his invitation to Ike and suggested that the summit bepostponed for 6-8 months until a new American president wasinaugurated


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The Collapse of the

Paris Summit In response-

Ike promised that U-2 flights would not resume whilehe was still in office

De Gaulle defended the US by talking about a Sovietsatellite that flew over France 18 times a day

Khrushchev insisted on an apology for the sake of hiscountrys honor and his own internal political

situation Macmillan emotionally pled with the summit leaders

to not throw away the last two years of intense effortsfor negotiations


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The Collapse of the

Paris Summit The meeting broke up in turmoil anyway

Khrushchev refused to meet again until the US admitted regretover the incident

Would not negotiate with the US about the arms race or theGerman Question until a new man was in the presidency

Khrushchev claimed that from this point forward he did nothave full control over his government

Hardliners pushed for a huge military buildup to competewith the US

Sino-Soviet relations would crumble

He was forced to strengthen the Soviet global posture

Laid the foundation for the Berlin and Cuban crises of1961 and 1962


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The Collapse of the

Paris Summit Ike was enraged and frustrated believing that

Khrushchev was throwing away world peace over animpossible demand

More than likely upset at himself for letting the U-2sgo just prior to the summit

Heartened by de Gaulles support at the summit

De Gaulle was incensed at Khrushchev's conduct

Macmillan was devastated Britain was liquidating its African and Middle

Eastern colonies

Badly wanted a US-Soviet agreement

Reduced to a supporting role in the Cold War


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US Presidential Campaign

of 1960 Republican Richard Nixon

Democratic candidates included

John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Humphrey, andSymington

Much younger than Ike and ready to rip the

Republican Party for their handling of the Paris

summit and the perpetuation of the Cold War Kennedy accused Ike of irresponsibility in refusing to

apologize to the USSR

Kennedy won the nomination for the Democrats


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of 1960 July 1, 1960- an RB-47 bomber was shot down along the

north coast of the USSR Two survivors were in Soviet custody

UN Security Council debated the matter Meanwhile, a C-47 flew over the Kurile Islands north of Japan

and the Soviets attempted to shoot it down also

Escalating tension played into the hands of Nixon The US would be looking to a more experienced politician to

handle the Cold War

Khrushchev wanted Kennedy to win- he hated Nixonspolitics He kept the downed airmen until after the election


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of 1960 September, 1960- Khrushchev visits the US

To address the UN on its 15th anniversary

Threats on his life kept him restricted to Manhattan Met with Fidel Castro

Macmillan got up and discussed Khrushchevs behavior at theParis summit Khrushchev heckled him and took off his shoe and pounded it on the

desk

Assembly president broke his gavel trying to regain order

Khrushchev and Gromyko began pounding their fists in unison on

their desks US saw that Soviet leadership had changed dramatically

Reasonable Khrushchev of 1959 had been replaced by the uncouthbuffoon of 1960


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of 1960 John Kennedy won the election

Alleged existence of a missile gap helped get himinto office and that Ike and Nixon designed a defense

budget that starved the American missile programand that the Soviets were turning out ICBMs in largenumbers

Kennedy did not know the truth as Ike did thanks to

U-2 photos Couldnt tell Kennedy the truth due to the secrecy of US

policy towards the USSR

Kennedy took office in spring 1961 and found outthat there was no missile gap


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of 1960 Khrushchev was ready to make peace with Kennedy

Offered to release downed RB-47 pilots in exchangefor not using them as propaganda purposes and not

to authorize anymore recon flights over the USSR Kennedy agreed

U-2 pilot would later be released in exchange forSoviet agent Rudolph Abel in 1962

Kennedy hoped that espionage flights were the worst ofhis problems, but

A new communist regime in Cuba was established

The German Question had not been resolved

Documents

Chapter 17-Section 8