Chapter 2 Capacity Building for Human Security 2.pdf · 2019. 2. 7. · Mindanaw had no intention to work with the military when they began their peacebuilding work in 1996. The director

CASESTUDIESOFPEACEBUILDINGAPPROACHES 31

Chapter2CapacityBuildingfor

HumanSecurityTraininghasanumberoffunctionsrelatedtolocalownershipinsecurity.Trainingplaysarolein capacity building for both civil society and security forces to enable basic understanding,shared terminology, and skills necessary to work together. While real reform andtransformation of the security sector often takes 20 years, training is a shorter-termintervention with limited impact. Without sustained institutional support and change, androbust consultation and participation in designing human security-oriented strategies withcivilians,trainingisunlikelytomakeanimpact.InBurundi,traininginconflictmanagementandleadership for the security sector was pitched as a “slice of SSR” – it enables and supportsbroaderSSR/Dprocesses.Butinpractice,buildingcapacityandtrustthroughtrainingfirstcansetafoundationthatledtoinstitutionalchange.

Trainingalsoplaysaroleinbuildingtrustandrelationshipsbetweencivilsocietyandsecurityforces.Trainingoftenisastartingpoint,enablingdialogue,problemsolvingandmoreadvancedlevelsof joint coordination forhumansecurity.Mostof the case studies in this sectionof thereportdocumenthowcivilsocietyisprovidingtrainingtosecurityforcestohelpthemimprovetheir community engagement strategies. However, in the section on Community Policing andDDR for example, civil society organisations provided training to community members topreparethemtodialogueandcoordinateeffectivelywithsecurityforces.

Forall theattention to thedemocratisationofsecurity forces,protectionofciviliansandcivicassistance, thereare relatively few training courses for themilitaryandpolice to learnaboutcivilsocietyorforcivilsocietytounderstandandrelatetothesecuritysector.Allstakeholdersneeda shared set of terminology, concepts, skills andabilities for civil society-military-policecoordinationtosupporthumansecurity.WhiletheUNprovidestrainingforhumanitariancivil-militarycoordination,thisisonlyforhumanitarianassistance.Formal,institutionalisedtrainingtoenablecivil-military-policecoordinationtosupportabroaderapproachtohumansecurityisstillrare.

TrainingforSecuritySectorSecuritysectortrainingprogrammesarerequestingtrainingonarangeoftopicsthatrelatetocivil society or what some countries refer to as “the human aspects of military operations”including civil-military coordination, protection of civilians, negotiation, governance, trauma,civic assistance, conflict assessment, conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Some militarytrainingcentresalreadyoffertrainingonsometopics.Butoftentherearenociviliansinvolvedinwritingthematerials,andthetermsanddefinitionsusedoftendonotreflecttheperspectivesof civil society. Some police training centres have begun to include and expand training oncommunitypolicing,problem-solvingpolicingandrestorativejustice.Buttheseapproachesarenotyetwidelyaccepted.

Militaryandpolicecommunityengagementstrategies,wherethesecuritysectoraimstobuildrelationships with the community, requires capacity building to help themilitary and policeunderstand civil society and their approaches to human security. Many military and policetrainingprogrammefocusmostlyontheuseofforceagainstan“enemy”or“criminal”andtheirconceptofwhociviliansarecanoftenbenegativeorhostile.Insomecountries,securityforceshave been taught in trainings that civilians are inferior tomilitary personnel. Security forceshaveevenbeenencouragedtotakeanythingtheyneedfromcivilianswithstatementssuchas

32 LOCALOWNERSHIPINSECURITY

“civiliansarethefieldforthemilitarytoharvest.”Althoughtrainingprogrammesmaymentionthenecessitytoprotectcivilians,theyrarelyteachthespecificskillsthatarerequiredtorelate,communicate,andcoordinatewithcivilsocietytosupporthumansecurity.So,anycurriculumortrainingprogrammewillneedtoprovidetheseskillswhilealsotakingintoaccountsecuritysectorviewsofcivilians.Iftheselatterarethesourceofmistrust,theymustbetransformedsothattrustbetweenthesecuritysectorandcivilianscanincrease.

TrainingforCivilSocietyIn order for local people to participate in security-related analysis andproblem solving, theymustbeable tounderstandthesecuritysector’srolesandresponsibilities. Insomecountries,civilsocietyorganisationsattendeducationalconferencesorworkshops ledbythemilitaryorpolice, to learn more about the security sector. Civil society educational programmes inuniversitiesandNGOsoftenteachpeacebuildingandhumansecurity-relatedcourses.But fewhavecoursesonunderstandingthemilitaryorpolicemandateandoperationalprocedures,orlearning how to use peacebuilding processes to improve communication and coordinationbetween civil society and the securitysector. Civil society requires moretrainingandeducationtounderstandthemandate and capabilities of securityforces, to understand how to leveragethesecapabilitieswhereappropriate,andtocommunicate support requirements ina way that avoids unintendedconsequences such as increasing attacksagainstcivilians.Trainingforcivilsocietycanalsoprovideanideaofwhat“success”looks like in terms of democratic state-societyrelationsandsuccessfulSSR/D.

Many civil society organisations areinvolved inproviding training tosecurityforces (see list of training topics here).Whilehumansecuritydependsonfruitfulcivil-military-police understanding andcoordination, a lack of opportunities forintegrated,multi-stakeholdertraininganddialogue inhibits these goals. Integratedtraining between security policymakers,security forces, andcivil society canhelpidentify common ground in nationalsecurityandhumansecurityperspectivesand also help people recognise the areaswheretheirapproachesaredifferent.Thiscan allow cooperation in overlappingareas while appreciating the need forindependencetoprotectthesafetyofcivilsociety.

JointTrainingforCivilSocietyandSecuritySectorCurrently,fewopportunitiesforjointtrainingforbothcivilsocietyandthesecuritysectorexist.Themilitary andpolice tend to thinkof security as their job alone.And civil society tends todistrustthemilitaryandpolice.Thefewthatdoexisttendtoberunbycivilsociety.Ofthecasestudiesdocumentedinthisreport,jointtrainingforthemilitary,policeandcivilsocietyisseenasanimportanttoolforbuildingconfidence.Manyofthecasestudiesthatincludejointtrainingreport that including space for groups of security forces and civilians to identify and thenchallengetheirstereotypesofeachotherbuildstrustbetweenparticipantsinthetraining.

TrainingTopicsConflictAssessment:Understandthecausesanddynamicsofconflictandviolence

DemocraticState-SocietyRelations:Understandtheroleofsecurityforcesandcivilsociety

CivilianHarmMitigation:Prevent,mitigate,count,&respondtociviliancasualties

ProtectionofCivilians:Identifylegalframeworksandcivilianandmilitaryrolestoprotectcivilians

HumanitarianCivilMilitaryCoordination:Identifycivilianandmilitaryobligationsandguidelines

CivilianAssistance:Supportdevelopment,governance,ruleoflaw,etc.

ConflictPreventionandPeacebuilding:Addressdriversofconflictandsupportdialogue,negotiation,andmediation

TraumaandStress:Buildresiliencetostressandtrauma

CivilianOversight:Buildjointinstitutionalmechanismstomonitorandevaluatesecuritysectoraccountabilityandperformance


The“HandbookforCivil-Military-PoliceCoordinationforHumanSecurity”isacompaniontothisreportpreciselybecauseitfillsagap.Itprovidesajointtrainingcurriculumwherecivilsocietyand security sector learn shared terminology, appreciate their differences as well as theircommon ground, and learn how to coordinate their assessments, planning, assistance, andprotectionactivitiesrelatedtohumansecurity.Manyofthecasestudiesinthissectionillustratehowacivil societyorganisationcreateda safe space for training forboth thecommunityandsecuritysector leaders.Oftendesignedbyuniversities, think tanks,or religiousorganisations,jointtrainingprogrammescreateuniqueopportunitiesfornewwaysofthinkingabouthumansecurity.

ThePhilippines:CivilSociety-Military-PoliceCapacityBuildingWrittenwithArielHernandez,MylaLeguro,DengGiguiento,ChitoGenerosoandJonRudy

Following a long period of brutal colonial rule by first Spain and then the United States,Philippinegovernmentpoliciesofmartial lawandauthoritarianismcorrelatedwithincreasingaccusations of human rights abuses bymilitary forces and a decline in civilian control of themilitary.Undertheserepressiveandcorruptinfluences, internal insurgencymovementsgrew,themainonesbeingTheCommunistPartyof thePhilippines–NewPeople’sArmy(CPP-NPA)andtheMoroNationalLiberationFront(MNLF).

An increasingly emboldened civil societyopposition to authoritarianism led to abroad-baseddemocratic movement of “people power” that ultimately toppled President Marcos in 1986.Ultimately, civil society-military cooperation contributed toward making the transition to ademocratic political system. While foreign security assistance programmes for the ArmedForcesofthePhilippines(AFP)concentratedontrainandequipprogrammesaimedtoenablecounterinsurgency, Filipino civil society organisations identified the military and police ascritical stakeholders in the peace process and reached out to the Armed Forces of thePhilippines(AFP)tobegindialogue.

With a robust and highly skilled civil society, thePhilippinesbecameoneofthefirstcountrieswherecivilsocietypeacebuildingorganisationsbegan toreachouttothemilitaryandpolicetooffertrainingandadviceonbuildingpeace.AnumberofFilipinocivilsocietygroupshave taken part in large-scale capacity building inpeacebuilding values, skills, and processes forthousandsofmilitaryofficials,staff,andcivilianreserveforces in the Philippines in conflict assessment,facilitation,mediation,negotiation,buildingacultureofpeaceandotherconflicttransformationstrategies.27

Like most other Filipino civil society groups, BalayMindanaw had no intention to workwith themilitarywhentheybegantheirpeacebuildingworkin1996.ThedirectorofBalayMindanaw,Ariel(Ayi)Hernandez, first learnedtoknowmilitaryofficersinaleadershipdevelopmentprogram.“WhileallIheardaboutthemilitarybeforewastheirabuses,hereIwastalkingfacetofacewithsoldierswhoarewillingtochange,willingtohelpimproveour people’s lot,” Hernandez recalls. In particular, Hernandez built a relationship with thenColonel Raymundo B. Ferrer. Balay Mindanao reached out to the Mindanao PeacebuildingInstitutetobegindiscussionontrainingthemilitaryinpeacebuilding.

Thechallenge:Securityforcesandcivilsocietyviewedeachotherwithsuspicion,makingthepeaceprocessdifficult.

Theoryofchange:Jointtraininginmediationforallstakeholderswillimprovelocalcapacitytosupportthepeaceprocessbymanagingconflictandsolvingproblemswithouttheuseofforce.


InitialCivilSocietyTrainingforMilitaryOfficersTheMindanaoPeacebuildingInstitute(MPI)wassetupasatraininggroundforcivilsocietyin2000.Whenmilitarypersonnelappliedtotakecourses,therewasatfirstresistance.MPIfacultyworried that admittingmilitary personnel into their coursesmight affect the safety of otherparticipants, or would change the dynamic of the learning environment, intimidating otherstudents. There was also concern that the military wanted to spy on NGOs attending thetraining,togatherintelligence.

Trainers at the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute had previous negative experiences withmilitary forces.Lead trainerDengGiguiento fromCatholicReliefServices,hadbeenona fact-findingmission inNorth Catobato, Philippineswhen soldiers stopped her. The soldiersweredrunkandhadremovedtheirnametags,sotheycouldnotbeidentified.SixpointedtheirgunsatGiguiento,pushingtheriflebarrelsintoherdress.Giguientowassubsequentlyhesitantaboutletting military personnel take her course on conflict transformation. However, other MPIfaculty had more positive experiences with soldiers. Another MPI trainer Rudy Rodil (akaOmpong)hadbeenpartofagovernmentpanelthatnegotiatedatrucewiththeMoroNationalLiberationFront(MNLF)andtheMoroIslamicLiberationFront(MILF)andhadseen,throughthat process, that soldiers could become respectful and skilled peacebuilders. One particularFilipino military leader was the first to seek training in peacebuilding. Balay Mindanao andanotherFilipinoNGOPakigdait,whose story is told later in this report, vouched for thegoodrelationshiptheyhaddevelopedwiththenColFerrer.Asaresultofcivilsocietyadvocatingonbehalf of theirmilitary colleagues, Giguiento agreed to let Colonel Ferrer into her course onconflicttransformation.

MPIstaffsetstrictgroundrulesformilitarypersonnelattendingMPI:“noguns,nouniforms,nobodyguards, no ranks, just the participants’ first and last names would be used, and nointelligencegathering.”28Militarypersonnellearnedsidebysidewithciviliansworkingforcivilsocietyorganisations.Themixedworkshopswereopportunitiesforthemilitarytoengagewithgroups that theydon’tusuallyengagewithsuchasMuslimpeaceadvocates,grassrootspeaceleaders,andyoungpeaceactivists.Thisallowedforbreakingdownstereotypes,anddevelopingrelationshipsbetweencivilsocietyandmilitarypersonnel.Ferrerhelpedtoeasecivilsociety’sanxiety by listening closely to other participants, not interrupting others, and demonstratingrespectthroughallhisinteractions.

Balay Mindanao, the MindanaoPeacebuilding Institute faculty,Catholic Relief Services andother Filipino civil societygroups planned follow up afterthese initial trainings. Civilsociety invited trained militaryofficials to becomemembers ofprovince-based networks ofpeacebuilders. Various groupsestablishedfollow-upstructuresas support mechanisms for thetrained military men andwomen. The support mostlycomes informally throughfollow-up conversations, phonecalls, and texts. Formalstrategies included the conductof regular meetings, invitingtrained military personnel intolocalpeacenetworks,andcivil societyvisits tomilitarycamps.Local level initiativesbetweenmilitary commanders, local leaders, and communities included joint community-based

Photo1:DengGiguientowithArmedForcesofthePhilippines;PhotoCredit:BobbyTimonera,BalayMindanao


peacebuildingeffortssuchaslocalzonesofpeace,localdialoguebetweenwarringpartiesatthevillage levels, and community development projects. Key leaders in civil society beganreframingtheirperspectiveofthemilitaryfromanenemytoapartnerinsupportingthepeaceprocess.Expandingthe“SoldiersforPeace”ApproachColonel Ferrer continued to reach out to Filipino civil society groups working in peace,development and human rights after he received training at the Mindanao PeacebuildingInstitute. His promotion to Brigadier General came along with the title of “Peace General”becauseofhispeaceleadershipandnegotiationskills.Recognizingthehistoryofbadrelations

andmilitaryabuses,Ferrersoughttoinvolvesoldiersinactsofatonementandreparation.

Referring to stories of human rights abuses, Ferrer recognised: “Admittedly, we had becomepartoftheproblemintheconflictinMindanao.”TheArmedForcesofthePhilippines(AFP)hadused brute force against armed opposition groups in deterring violence. But the more force

Photo2:BalayMindanao'sreportdocumentitsworkwiththeFilipinomilitary


used, the more people joined armed opposition groups. Meanwhile, government servicesreached only main cities. In recognizing the roots of civilian distrust, Balay Mindanaw andGeneral Ferrer began designing a joint project to provide peacebuilding and conflictmanagement training workshops for the officers and soldiers of the 1st Infantry “Tabak”Divisionwith thegoalofdeescalating theviolence inMindanao.29Ferrercommittedhisentiredivision to Balay Mindanaw’s Operation Peace Course (also known as “OP KORs”). BalayMindanao’s President Kaloy Manlupig supported the project, recognizing that peacebuildingrequires involvingthesecuritysector,whichwasat thecentreofpeaceandsecurity issues inthe Philippines. Manlupig quoted Albert Einstein, “No problem can be solved from the samelevelofconsciousnessthatcreatedit.”Trainedforwarfighting,workingforpeacewouldatfirstglaceappeartobecontradictory.Fortransformationtohappeninthesecuritysector,securityforces needed a new approach. Soldiers needed to learn communication skills so they coulddeescalate and defuse conflicts through active listening, dialogue, negotiation and mediationprocesses.

Balay Mindanaw began offering three levels of training in response to Brigadier GeneralFerrer’sinterestinexpandthetrainingofsoldiersforpeace:

• Atwo-daycourseforseniorofficers,sincetheycanonlybeabsentfromtheircommandforamaximumof3days;

• A five-day course for junior officers, some of whomwere trained as trainers so theycouldtakethelessonstotheirrespectivebattalions,companiesandunits;

• Afive-daycoursefornon-commissionedofficersatthecommunitylevel.ThisincludedtrainingmembersofthevolunteerCitizenArmedForcesGeographicalUnits(CAFGUs).

Balay Mindanaw also carried out policy advocacy. First, Balay Mindanaw attempted toinstitutionalise the peacebuilding and conflictmanagement skills courses in all of the formalacademic institutions in the Department of National Defence and the Armed Forces. Second,BalayMindanawaimedtochangethedoctrineofthebasisofpromotionforthesoldiers,sothatthey would be rewarded for the peace leadership and not just for howmany enemies werekilledorcaptured,orhowmanyweaponssurrenderedorcaptured.

Through the training and Ferrer’s leadership, soldiers in violence-prone Basilan provinceimproved their relationshipswith local civilians andworked side by sidewith them to buildhouses andwater supply systems.Ferrer questioned why his troopshadbeentaughttoscowlatpeopleand “to put on a fierce face.” Heencouraged soldiers to smile atpeople and to greet them withrespect. 30 Ferrer wantedparamilitary troops to be “peacemultipliers”not“forcemultipliers.”And slowly his efforts yieldedresults. People began going to thesecurityforceswiththeirconcernsrather than running away fromthem when they drove to theircommunity.BMI’s colourful reportcalled“SoldiersforPeace”includesphotographs and stories of theimpact of training for themilitaryinpeacebuilding.Forexample: Photo3:TrainingforCAFGU.Photocredit:ChitoGeneroso


The Army’s 403rd Infantry “Peacemakers” Brigade arranged a ceremony for a return to thecommunityfor22membersoftheNewPeople’sArmy.Livingalifeofabjectpovertyinaremotevillage far fromgovernment services, theyoungmenhadbeeneasy recruits to theNPA,whopromised them a right to self-determination if they took up arms to topple the government.Recognizingthepowerofofferingrespecttoeachhumanbeing,regardlessoftheiridentity,theArmydidnotusethemorecommontermofa“surrender”ceremony.Theyissuedanapologytothe22formerNPAmembers,notingthattheArmyhadcommittedhumanrightsabusesagainsttheir people. Then Army officers helped the NPA to reintegrate, often by pushing civiliangovernmentofficerstodotheirjobinprovidingmedicalcare.

Footsoldiersarenowperceivedasbeingmorerespectful intheirdealingswithpeople.Policeandmilitaryofficershavestartedtohelpmediatelargeandsmallconflictsinthecommunities;includingdefusinglocaldisputesoverland.Whenthepubliccallsonsecurityforcestorespond,policeormilitarysoldierstrainedinmediationusetheseskillsratherthanuseforce.

WhenaGermannationalandhisthreeFilipinocompanionswerekidnappedinNorthCotabato,Philippines,militaryofficerswhowereinthemidstofattendingapeacebuildingcourseattheMindanao Peacebuilding Institute pursued dialogue with the kidnappers by contacting thepolice, local government officials, peace negotiators and the MILF instead of sending troopsafterthekidnappers.Thevictimswerefreedwithin6hours.31

TrainingforCitizenArmedForceGeographicalUnitsWhile much of the civil society training for the military focused on the southern, MindanaoregionofthePhilippinesandemphasisedtop-levelmilitaryleaders,anothergroupwasfocusingon training in the northern region. Like other Filipino leaders, the Interfaith Center forConciliation and Nonviolence (ICCN) vieweda strong partnership between the military andkeygovernmentservicedeliveryunitsasmainfactortoreducethelevelofdissatisfactionofthepeople.ICCNencouragedstrongcollaboration–especiallyintheoperationallevel-betweentheciviliangovernmentandthemilitary.Thiswouldhelp‘capacitate’civilianunitstoallowthemtohandlelocalpeaceandorderproblemswithoutdependenceonthemilitary.

From2010to2013,ICCNunderthedirectionofChitoGeneroso,partneredwiththeOfficeofthePresidential Adviser to the Peace Process (OPAPP), and the Philippine Army’s Civil-MilitaryOperations Office (G3) ona projecttotrain selectlocalCAFGUs (Citizen Armed ForceGeographical Units) and their commandersto support peace and human security in armedconflict affected areas.ICCN’s trainings for these paramilitary groups included conflicttransformation,alternativedisputeresolution,andmediationintenCAFGUBattalioncampsinLuzon,VisayasandMindanao,withafocusontraineesfromdetachmentsfromremotevillagesnoteasilyaccessibleforgovernmentservices.

IntheCordilleraregioninparticular, localgovernmentunitsledaninitiativetousemediationtoaddresslocalconflictsthatdriveviolence between state and non-state armed groups.In 2011atLagawe,Ifugao, the ProvincialGovernor, with UNDP support,formally organised and launchedone hundred and six (106)mediators, consisting of localgovernment officials, line-agencyemployees, civil societyorganisationmembers,policemen,and security personnel as the“IfugaoMediatorsClub.”

Photo4:ICCNforCAFGU.PhotoCredit:ChitoGeneroso


IsraelandPalestine:TrainingSecurityForcesinNegotiationWrittenwithNoahSalameh

TheOsloAgreementof1994instigatedatwo-foldprocess.First,itlaunchedPalestiniansecuritysector reform (SSR) aimed to protect Palestinians and serve as pillar of statehood. Second, itmandated Israeli and Palestinian security forces to work together in border regions, jointlysupervisingvariousbridgesandboundaries.

The Palestinian security forces were chosen for theirloyalty to the Palestinian cause. Many were formerprisoners.Theywere trainedandequipped in theuseof force,butnotprovidedwithskills forworkingwithcivilsociety.Inspiteoftheirloyaltytotheirpeople,andtheirpassiontohelp,theylackedknowledgeonhowtoengageeffectivelywithcivilsociety.

Like the Israeli and Palestinian populations at large,IsraeliandPalestiniansecurityforceshaveahistoryofantagonismandviolence.Theyhadlittleopportunitytomeeteachotherandunderstandlittleabouttheother’sculture, experiences and perceptions. This causedtensionsandproblemswiththecivilianscrossingthesecheckpointsbetweenGazaandIsraelandbetweentheWestBankandJordan. IsraeliandPalestiniansecurityforces need communication skills and conflictresolutionskills todealwith thepublicandwitheachother.

A number of local initiatives responded to these challenges. Between1996 and 1999 severalfreelance conflict resolution trainers set up a programme to train Palestinian police, securityforces,andgovernmentemployeesonhowtobetterrelatewiththepublic.Theprogrammewasled by the Palestine Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (CCRR), an interfaithcentrethatprovidespeacebuildingeducationprogrammestoavarietyofaudiences, includingthe police, security forces, and government employees, in collaboration with PANORAMA, aPalestinian NGO focused on democracy and civil society, and the Palestinian IndependentCommission forHumanRights. Itspurposewas to improverelationshipsbetweenPalestiniansecurityforcesandPalestiniancivilsociety.

In Hebron, Bethlehem, Abu Dis, Jericho, and Ramallah the trainers reached at least 200Palestinian members of the security forces. The programme focused first on facilitating aninternal dialogue between the different factions in the security forces, to help them learn tounderstand eachother andcoordinate witheach other. Thetrainingincludedanintroduction toconflict resolutionskills and methods,aself-assessmenttoreflectontheirownmotivations andbehaviours andhow these impactthe public, adiscussion of the

Thechallenge:Internaldivisionswithinsecurityforcesmadeitdifficultforthemtoworkwitheachother.Alackofskillsinrelatingtocivilsocietymadeitdifficultforthepublictotrustthem.Theoryofchange:Facilitateinter-groupdialogueandprovidetrainingtosecurityforcesoncommunication,negotiation,andproblemsolvingskills.

Photo5:Jointtraining.PhotoCredit:NoahSalameh


impactofinternalconflictswithinthePalestiniansecurityforcesonthepublic,andanexerciseonimprovingrelationswiththepublic.32

In1998-1999, a separateprogrammebrought together Israeli andPalestinian security forcesmandated to manage a 24-hour a day border checkpoint at Allenby bridge at the Jordanianborder and at Karmy bridge between Gaza and Israel. Given the history of conflict andanimosity,thisprogrammeaimedtoimprovetherelationshipsbetweenIsraeliandPalestiniansecurity forces. The CCRR and the Israeli Centre for Negotiation and Mediation designed amodel of training material course for 40 hours, co-facilitated and co-trained with onePalestinianandoneIsraelifacilitator.Seniorofficersonbothsidesalsoattendedthecourse.

Theofficershad little informationabouteachother’shabits, valuesandgeneral cultureotherthanthenegativerumoursandstereotypeseachsideheldoftheother.Giventhe lackoftrustandunderstanding, itwasdifficult for them toworkwith eachother. This course focusedonwaystoresolvedailyconflictsbetweenthetwosides,includingcommunicationskillsandcross-culturalunderstandingtochangetheimageeachsidehasoftheother.Thetrainingbeganwithbasic trust building. Facilitators helped participants understand the experiences andperceptionsthatshapedeachperson’sunderstandingandbehaviouremphasizingtheirsharedhumanity.Eachparticipantwasgiventheopportunityto introducetheircultureandvaluestotheothers.Thesecourseswerethefirstopportunityforthoseofficerstogettoknoweachotherandtolearnhoweachsideseestheother.Allparticipantsandtheirrankingofficersreportedagreat interest in these courses, and a commitment to continue attending it. Participantsindicatedthat theirrelationshipwitheachotherhaschangedafter takingthiscourse,andthewaytheyweredealingwitheachotheralsochangedandbecamebetter.33

Photo6:JointtrainingforPalestinianandIsraelisecurityforces.Photocredit:NoahSalameh


SouthAfrica:BuildingCapacityforHumanSecuritySouth Africa is perhaps the most important case study of successful, locally ownedpeacebuildingandhumansecurity.IntensivetrainingandcoachingofSouthAfricanleadersinnegotiation,mediationandconflictanalysissupportedtheintensetransitionfromapartheidtopoliticaldemocracy.Locallevelpeacebuildingeffortsaddeduptonational-levelpeacebuilding.As one of the most inspiring success stories of locally-led peacebuilding, South Africa’sindependentandhighlyskilledcivilsocietyplayedimportantrolesinbothlocalandhigh-levelnegotiationandmediationprocesses.Growingoutofthisexperience,SouthAfricansarenowinapositiontoassistinpeacefultransitionstodemocracyinothercountriesthroughtheAfricanCentre for theConstructiveResolutionofDisputes (ACCORD).ACCORD takesanon-sectarian,independentstancetoadvancehumansecurity.ACCORD’s Training for Peace (TfP) Programme began in 1995 to build the capacity of civilsociety and the security sector in peacebuilding, particularly in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia,Burundiandcountries in theSouthAfricanDevelopmentCommunity(SADC),butalso furtherafield in Europe and elsewhere. ACCORD runs the TfP programme in collaborationwith TheInstitute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria; the Kofi Annan International Peace TrainingCentre(KAIPTC)inAccra;andtheNorwegianInstituteforInternationalAffairs(NUPI)inOslo.Approximately7000civilians,policeandmilitary–manycurrentlyserving inUNandAfricanpeaceoperations–havebeentrainedthroughtheTfPProgramme,andabout300publicationshave been produced, encompassing research papers, books, reports, manuals, readers andhandbooks.The TfP Programme's primary purpose is to significantly improve the civilian capacity ofAfrican states, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) / Regional Mechanisms (RMs), theAfricanUnion(AU)andtheUnitedNations(UN)toprepare,plan,manageandmonitormulti-dimensionalpeacekeepingandpeacebuildingoperationsinAfrica.Thisisdonethroughacombinationoftraining,appliedresearchandpolicydevelopment,towards:• Building civilian capacity for AU and UN peace

operations;• Contributing towards the development of a

multi-dimensionaland integratedapproach toAfricanpeaceoperations;

• Assisting the AU and the RECs/RMs in thedevelopmentof thecivilianstructuresof theirstandbyforcesandPLANELMs;and

• Creating awarenesson the civiliandimensionoftheASF.

Training of civilian and police peacekeeping andpeacebuilding personnel take place in “classrooms, boardrooms, in halls of power and theAfricanbush”withafocusonconflictanalysis,negotiationandmediation,theroleofcivilians,particularly women, in peace and security. ACCORD works closely with the African CivilianStandby Roster for Humanitarian and Peacebuilding Missions (AFDEM), whose role is toprovide the link between training and deployment. Graduates of the TfP are screened andplacedonAFDEM'sstandbyroster.AFDEMalso facilitatesdeploymenttoUNorAfricanpeaceoperations,UNagenciesorcivilsocietyorganisations.ACCORD also takes part in gender mainstreaming and integrating the women, peace andsecurity agenda in peace operations, having over two decades of practical experience inpeacekeepingandtheimplementationofUNSCR1325(SeeFijicasestudyonwomen,peaceandsecurityinthisreport).ACCORDfacilitatescapacitybuildingforwomentounderstandtheUN

Thechallenge:PeacekeepingmissionsinAfricaoftenlackcapablepeopletosupportpeacebuilding,especialwomenleaders.Theoryofchange:Buildthecapacityofleaders,especiallywomen,atalllevelsandsupportciviliancomponentsofpeacekeeping


Secretary General’s SeniorWomen Talent Pipeline Project (SWTP) that aims to increase thenumberofseniorlevelwomeninpeacekeepingmissions.The first phase of the project led to the identification of 64 women for the Pipeline anddeploymentof4seniorwomentoUNpeaceoperationsintheareasofPoliticalAffairs,RuleofLawandSecurityInstitutions,CivilAffairs,PublicInformationandCommunication.ThesecondphaserolledoutinNovember2014,withanemphasisonFrenchandArabicspeakers,andledtoanadditional27womenjoiningthePipeline.AspartofthethirdphaseoftheprojectbeguninMay2015,ACCORD/TfPisworkingwiththeUNtoidentifyandtrainmorewomentoapplytotop-levelUNpeacekeepingmissions.ACCORDalsoplaysrolesintrainingUNandAfricanUnionstaff ingendersensitivity tosexualandgender-basedviolence(SGBV)andprotectionofmen,women,boysandgirls.ACCORD’s Peacekeeping Unit focuses on improving the capability and professionalism of UNCivil Affairs; the development of a strategic framework on protection of civilians in UNpeacekeeping operations; clarifying the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus; and enhancingcivilian capacities. It has specifically focused on civil affairs, and has conducted research tounderstandthespecificcontextandneedsofCivilAffairsOfficers.TheUnitconductsspecialisedtailored in-missionconflictmanagement trainingcoursesandsupports theUNDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations(DPKO)PeacekeepingBestPracticesSection(PBPS)intherolloutofthe Civil Affairs Skills Training Methodology. It has also developed a Civil Affairs Handbook(launchedinApril2012)thatservesasareferenceguidefor(CivilAffairs)Officersinthefield.

Photo7:SouthAfricanservicememberswithcommunitymembers.PhotoCredit:SPCTarynHagerman,WikimediaCommons


Brazil:Civil-Military-PoliceJointTrainingWrittenbyThiagoRodriguesCivil-military relations and security sector reform in the Caribbean and Latin America facedistinctchallenges.DuringSpanishandPortuguesecolonialism,theconqueror’smilitaryforcesusedastrategyofpacificationtoputdownrebellionsandtocontroloreventodestroynativepeoples. Afterwards, this repressive attitude toward society continued, defining most of thehistoryofmilitary-civilsocietyrelationsinLatinAmerica.Yetingeneral,sincethe1980s,therehas been a transition away from military-led governments toward greater democracy andcitizenparticipation inall aspectsofpublic life.LatinAmericangovernmentsare increasinglyworking together on regional issues, particularly in response to regional challenges oftraffickingindrugs,weaponsandpeople.Civil-militaryrelationsintheCaribbeanandLatinAmericaaredistinctfromWesterncountriesinavarietyofways,duetoadifferenthistoricalevolutionof thesecurity forcesanddifferentgovernance arrangements. Since 2012, there has been an effort to build up a civil societynetworkofuniversityscholarsandNGOstoworkwithmilitaryofficerstoimprovecivil-militaryrelationsintheCaribbeanandLatinAmerica.This“MilitaryandSecurityinLatinAmericaandthe Caribbean” network aims to produce an overview on the recent experience of safety,differentreports,andpossibilitiestocreateahumansecurity/humanrightsorientedpolicy.Ithasbeenmostlyajointeffortspreadamongmilitaryandscholars.Brazilianeffortstouseuniversitiesasanintermediarytoprovideasafespaceforcivil-military-police dialogue on issues of public safety and national security could eventually spreadthroughout the region. Formulas that connect civilian scholars, civiliangraduateprogrammesandmilitarygraduatecourses–orevenhybridgraduateprogrammes–havebeenpartofthisrecent Brazilian experience. If analysed in its first outcomes, and adapted respecting localdynamicsandexpertise,thismodelcouldbetranslatedmorewidelyinLatinAmerica,usingthiskindofcooperationestablishedwithmilitaryschools.Photo8: RioDoJaneiro/Favéla.PhotoCredit:WikimediaCommons


Brazil itself has assisted in SSR/Defforts inother countries such asHaiti, Guinea-Bissau, andTimor-Leste,bothbilaterallyandthroughorganisationssuchastheCommunityofPortuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP). Yet as with other countries assisting with SSR, civil-militaryrelationswithinBrazilandinternalSSR/Deffortsstillneedattention.WithinBrazil,thehistoryofmilitaryinterventionsandmilitaryrulehascreatedlastingmistrustbetween the military, police, and civil society. Historically, the military viewed politicalopposition as “the internal enemy” thatmust be “eliminated” rather than addressed throughdemocraticprocesses.Whiledemocratisationoccurredwithinthegovernment’spoliticalsector,themilitaryandpolice sector still runbasedonamodel establishedduring theauthoritarianregime (1964-1985). This model gives to the military police a primary repressive task inordinarylawenforcementactivitiesandasecondarycompetenceasNationalArmy´sauxiliarytroops(exactlythesameasduringthedictatorshipperiod).InBrazil,eachstatefederalunityinBrazilhasitsownmilitarypolicecorps.Thesepolicecorpsaremilitarisedinagendarmerie-likecorporationunderstateGovernor’sauthority.On the other hand, the National Army has a contradictory history. Officially, the Armymainprerogative is to protect national sovereignty, and as a second level of competence, to act ininternalissuessuchaslawenforcement.Itmeansthattrainingandweaponryisgearedtowardidentifyingandfightingenemiesandnotasmuchonprotectingandservingthepopulation.Nevertheless,Brazil’smilitaryhashadasignificantroleinrespondingtointernalhumanitariancrises,suchasfloodsortherecurrentsupporttominimisedesertificationeffectsonvulnerablepopulations.ThisdegreeofcompetencehasincreasedsincethebeginningofthedeploymentofBraziliantroopstoleadthesecurityworkinUNmissions,especiallyinHaiti(2004onwards).Inpreparation for thismission,Brazilian forces trained inurbancombatsimulations inorder toactinPort-au-Princeslums34.ThisexperienceexposedBrazilianforcestotrainingonUNvaluesandconceptsonProtectionofCiviliansandrelatedconcepts.35TheBrazilianmilitaryexperienceofpolicingoperationsinHaiticouldleadtoashiftinhowtheBrazilianmilitaryoperates side by side in public safety issues withinBrazil, particularly in favelas (slums). The BrazilianMinistry of Defence, answering to a formal request byRio de Janeiro’s Governor, formed two “PacificationForces”thatoccupiedthreesetsofslumsintwophases,the firstone fromDecember2010to July2012,andthesecond betweenMay 2014 and April 2015. Part of theArmy’s troopsoperating inRio’s slums included formerUN troops in Haiti. Besides that, the operations wereconnected to a state Military Police programme calledPolice Pacification Units (UPP) aimed to occupycommunities where drug trafficking takes place. Therearemanyquestionsstemming fromthiskindof collaborationbetween theArmedForcesandthe Military Police.36The memory of the military participation in the so-called “dirty war”against political opposition during the 1960’s and 1970’s ignites a difficult debate amongscholars,militarystaff,politicians,andcivilsocietyorganisations.37If it is true that themove toward civilian governments inBrazil has opened thedoor tonewconversations on security, Brazilian society has not had practice in participating in securitydiscussions. Brazilian academics point out that in a democratic country, society must thinkabout these issuesandprovideoversight toensure that themilitary isaccountable tocivilianleadershipandthecivilianpopulation.OnJune20th,2013,closeto1.5millionpeoplemarchedinovereightycitiesacrossBrazilinthelargestpublicdemonstrationssinceredemocratisation

Thechallenge:Securityforceshaveadifficulthistoryofrelationswiththepublic.Theoryofchange:Createajointtrainingsecurityforcesandcivilsocietytobuildcommonunderstandingofthechallengesandoptionsforsupportinghumansecurity.


in1985.Then,stateMilitaryPoliceusedextremeforceontheprotestors,indiscriminatelyusingteargas,peppersprayandrubberbullets.38Politicalleadersandmediaportrayedtheprotestsasillegalacts,whilecivilsocietyperceivedtheprotestsaslegitimateactsofpoliticalopposition.AftertheMilitaryPolicebrutalityeventraditionalpoliticalpartiesandthemajormediaturnedagainstthesecurityforces.Insuchacontext,BrazilianacademicsandNGOsaretryingtobuildbridgesofcommunicationbetween themilitary,policeandcivil society tooffer forums fordialogueon theemphasisonpublic safety versus national security. However, there is an increasing consensus of theimportance to discuss these issuesmore openly among Brazilian society, not only in silos ofthosedirectlyinvolved.Theeducationalfieldseemstobearespectedintermediarytoprovideforumsforcivil-military-policedialogue.InBrazil,universitiescanprovideasafespaceforcivilsociety and themilitary to interact, and therefore serve as an entrypoint,whilst overcomingstigmafromtalkingtothemilitary.TheInstituteofStrategicStudies(ISS)of theUniversidadeFederalFluminense, inNiterói,RiodeJaneiroisthefirstacademicinstituteinBrazildevotedtocivil-militaryrelations.ISSopenedits doors in 2012 after a ten-year process of consolidation within the Political SciencesDepartment.Scholarsengagedinitscreationhadahistoricalinvolvementwithcivilian-militaryissuesandhadhelpedtoestablishorganisationssuchastheBrazilianAssociationforDefenceStudies (ABED), in 2008. ISS has cooperation agreements with high-level military schools inBrazil(Army,Navy,AirForce),withspecialattentiontotheirgraduatecourses.Besidesthat,ISSoffersanundergraduatecourseinInternationalRelationsandapostgraduatecoursedevotedtocivil-military relations. There are around 20 military officers in the institute, under civiliansupervision,andamongitsprofessorsthereareformsmilitaryofficers.FollowingISSexperience,otherUniversities inBrazilstartedtheirowngraduateprogrammeson Strategic Studies or Defence Studies, including the Army’s and Navy’s high-level schoolsbased inRiode Janeiro.The Institute isestablishingconnectionsbetween these twoseparateworlds inBrazil– theworldof themilitaryandpolice’andtheirperspectivesonsecurityandtheworldofcivilsocietyandtheirperspectivesonpublicsafety.Fiji:TrainingonTraumaandConflictTransformationWrittenwithKoilaCostelloOlsson

AseriesofmilitarycoupshasleftFijiansonallsidesoftheconflictwithasenseoftraumaandfear. Themilitary and police have suffered in particular. Many of them perpetrated violencewhen takingpart in repressingpublicprotestsagainst thecoups.ThosewhoarepartofFiji’slongstandingcommitmenttoUNpeacekeepingwitnessedorexperiencedviolencewhenservinginpeacekeepingmissionsinIraq,Lebanon,Sinai,GolanHeights,Sudan,orTimorLeste.Finally,someoftheex-militarypersonalalsocommittedorsufferedfromviolencewhenparticipatingas mercenaries/private contractors in other conflicts.Fijian security forces thus had ample exposure totrauma, although it was never addressedinstitutionally. As in many other cultures, stateinstitutions do not address stress and trauma. Thiswork is left to religious authorities or the individual’sprivate realm. For the most part, superiors simplytaughttheforcesundertheircommand“betough”andencouraged them not to let stress or trauma affectthem. But given the stressful nature of internationalmilitary deployments and the tense situations withlocal communities, institutional leaders recognisedtheyneededbetterunderstandingoftraumaandstress,

ThechallengeTraumaandstressimpactthewellbeingofmanypeopleinsocietyandinthesecurityforces.Theoryofchange:Buildthecapacityofthesecuritysectortounderstandtheimpactoftraumaandstressontheirsociety.


andwaysofhandlingit.

The Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) first requested training from civil societyorganisationstobroadentheirunderstandingofconflictanalysis,restorativejusticeandtraumaawarenessfortheOfficersTrainingSchoolin2003,followingthecoupin2000.TheFijiancivilsocietyorganisationcalledECREA(EcumenicalCentreforResearch,Education,andAdvocacy)wastaskedwithdevelopingacourse.

Thenafterthe2006coup,theyalsocommissionedtrainingoncommunityengagements.Afterthe coup, a lotmoremilitary officers began takingupposts in government. Themilitarywasextending their role intopolicingandoftenconducting jointmilitary-policeoperationswithinFiji. But relationships between the military and civil society were hostile. NGOs had largelyopposedthemilitarycoup.SomeNGOshadaffiliationswithpoliticalparties.Forthesereasons,the military largely distrusted NGOs and questioned their funding and motivations. TheexperienceofFijianforcesabroad,primarilyinIraq,andtheexperienceinthecoupcontributedto a growing concern that on themilitary and police use of force on Fijian citizens at home.Despite these mixed feelings and perceptions about NGOs, the military again turned to civilsociety – this time thePacific Centre forPeacebuilding (PCP), a local peacebuildingNGO thatworkstotransform,reduceandpreventconflict inthePacific-toconductdebriefingsessionswith the military, Fiji Police and Fiji Correction Services about their relationships withcommunities.Theirworkbeganin2007.

Photo9:Jointtrainingintrauma.PhotoCredit:PacificCentreforPeacebuilding

Both organisations developed an interactive training approach that emphasised relationshipbuilding,peacebuildingskillsandprocesses,andwhole-of-communityparticipation.

Whiletraumaandstressarenotoftentopicsincludedinpeacebuildingtrainingforeithercivilsociety or security forces, understanding these concepts and how to develop resilience isnecessaryforallstakeholdersinanycontextwhereviolenceispresent.Itisimportantforcivilsociety and security sector personnel to recognise how trauma at work or in the public cantranslate into violence in the home aswell. Trauma can contribute to gender-based violence.Training in trauma awareness can help people understand the cycles of violence and whytraumatised people often go on to traumatise others. Training on how tomanage stress andtrauma can reduce the likelihood of violence, especially between security forces and civilsociety.


PCPhelddiscussionswithmilitary leaders to assess theneeds and typesof participantswhoshould be invited for a training on trauma awareness and to conduct a context analysis toensureworkshopstookintoaccounttheneedsandinterestsofallstakeholders.Togethertheydecidedtoincludeallbranchesofsecurityforces,asallgroupsneededtolearnhowtointeractwithciviliansbyusingcommunicationskillslikedialogueandnegotiationinsteadofusingforce.Workshops covereda rangeof topics,beginningwith conflict analysis, tohelp security forcesrecognise that therearedifferentwaysofperceivingevents and thatpeople’sbehaviours aremotivatedby their diverseperceptions and experiences.Workshops also included lessons onstress and trauma, as well as conflict transformation skills in dialogue, negotiation andmediation.

Often military and police personnel were directed to come and had no choice in attendingand/orhadnoideawhattheywereattending.Theywereveryexperiencedofficerswhoworkedin both peacekeeping operations, and logistics. They were mostly Indigenous Fijians or“iTaukei”militarypersonnel.Themilitary’susualmodeof instructionwas55-minute lectures,withverylittletimegivenforquestionandanswer.GivenPCP’srecognitionthat lecturesonlymakealimitedimpact,PCP’steachingstylewaselicitiveandparticipatoryusingacombinationof visual and interactive methods thatreinforcedkeyideas.

Growing out of the relationships made intheseinitialtrainings,otherjointworkwiththepolicebecamepossible.PCPstaffworkswiththeFijiPoliceForcetoteachsecondaryschool students and leaders the value ofrestorative justice. Restorative justice is aprocessthatholdsoffendersaccountablebydirectlyengagingwith thevictimsor thosethey have harmed. A dialogue betweenvictimandoffenderallowsforbothofthemto make amends to each other. Unlikepunishmentsthatfocusonthemotivesandsentences for perpetrators, restorativejustice focuses on how to recompensevictims for the suffering they haveexperienced.SinceFijianteacherscanlosetheirjobsforimproperusesofpunishment,teachersand school administrators were eager to learn about restorative justice and come up withalternativeoptionsforcorrectingstudentbehaviours.

When45FijianpeacekeeperswerekidnappedandheldintheGolanHeightsbyaSyrianrebelgroup in September 2014, there was concern that anti-Muslim feelings from the kidnappingwouldincreasethepossibilityofviolencetowardIndo-Fijians,someofwhomareMuslim,intherun up to theNational Elections. PCP provided advice to assist the Fijianmilitary on how tohandle this situation with the affected families in Fiji until the Fijian peacekeepers wereeventuallyfreed.

Photo10:Conflictanalysistools.PhotoCredit:PacificCentreforPeacebuilding


US:TrainingonTraumaAwarenessandResilience(STAR)Experiencing violence causes trauma for individuals, organisations, communities and wholesocieties, including the security sector. Both victims and perpetrators of violence experiencetrauma.Traumaaffectsthebody,brainandbehaviour,aswellastheabilitytomakemeaningormakesenseoftheworld.

Security forces who participate in violence mayexperience“participation-inducedtraumasyndrome”andmaysufferfrom“moralinjuries”forparticipatingin violence. Psychosocial healing and resilience helppeople to recover, and are important elements inassisting organisations and societies to function intheaftermathofviolence.

In the US, trauma is widespread amongst bothmilitary and police personnel. Military personnelreturning fromwars in IraqandAfghanistanaswellas those in other regions of theworld are sufferingfrom high levels of post-traumatic stress disorder(PTSD). This affects the communities and familieswheretheyreturntoliveascivilians.

Strategies for TraumaAwareness and Resilience (STAR) is an educational program, based atEasternMennoniteUniversity’sCenterforJusticeandPeacebuilding,tostrengthenthecapacityof leadersandorganisations toaddress trauma,breakcyclesofviolence,andbuild resilience.Theprogrammebegan for religiousandcommunity leaders inNewYorkandWashingtonDCafter the 11 September 2001 tragedy. The weeklong programme now runs for communityleaders all over theworld and includesworkwith the USmilitary. A 2.5-day seminar called“JourneyHomefromWar”wasdesignedtohelpveterans,primarilyfromIraqandAfghanistan,and veteran’s families and communities understand the impact of trauma and how to fosterrecovery, resilience, and reintegration for veterans returning to their community. Militarychaplainsalsoattend.

All trainings include information on the physical, emotional, cognitive, behavioural, andspiritual impact of trauma, awareness on different types of trauma, insights on the brain’sresponsetotrauma,andstrategiesforcopingwithtraumaandstress.

STARwanted tohelpmilitaryveteransand their familiesandcommunities.But theyalsohadreservations about helping to reduce PTSD symptoms that would allow soldiers to beredeployed,wheretheywouldbothexperienceandparticipateinmoretraumaforthemselvesandothers.STARalsofeltitwouldbenecessarytobeasindependentaspossible,andnotworkdirectly under contract with the military. This independence was deemed as important forprotectingtherelationshipsSTARtrainershavewithcommunitiesinotherpartsoftheworld,who may oppose US military interventions in their countries. (Learn more about traumaawarenessandrecoveryinTheHandbookonHumanSecurity:ACivil-Military-PoliceCurriculum,thecompaniontothisreport.)

Mali:TrainingMilitarystaffonIHLandHumanRightsWrittenwithCynthiaPetrigh

Historic patterns of distrust between the Malian army and the tribally diverse populationfollowingtheendingofcolonialrulein1960contributetoon-goingcyclesofviolencebetweennorthern Mali’s Tuareg tribal group, Islamist groups, and the Malian military, which led a

Thechallenge:Warcreates“moralinjuries”forthosewhoparticipateinit.Theoryofchange:Increasingawarenessoftraumaandwaysofbuildingresilienceareimportant,particularlyforveteransreturningtotheircommunities.


militarycoupinApril2012.InternationalassistancetotheMalianmilitaryfocusesprimarilyonprovidingweaponsandtacticaltraining.Civiliansareoftencaughtinthemiddleoffighting.

When the European Union Training Mission in Mali’s(EUTM) requested a civilian trainer on InternationalHumanitarianLaw(IHL)andHumanRights, theParis-based civil society organisation Beyond Peace wastaskedtocarryoutinitialresearchonmilitarypatternsof abuse. Beyond Peace worked with local andinternational NGOs, human rights groups, and theMalian Ministry of Defence to identify patterns ofmilitary forces abuse. Documented accounts ofarbitrary arrests, enforced disappearance, use oftorture, sexual violence, attacks on civilians, looting,and attacks on schools indicated a systemic lack ofattention to protection of civilians and internationallaw.

The Beyond Peace training on IHL and human rightsfacedavarietyofchallenges.MostoftheMalianforceswereilliterate.Soldiersreceivingtrainingdidnotsharea common language, thoughmanyknewsomeFrench.The design of the military training that they werereceiving in parallel to Beyond Peace’s course was

cumulative,moving fromsimple tomoredifficultmanoeuvres.TheBeyondPeace trainingonIHLandhumanrightswasonseparatetopics(suchasdistinction,proportionality,ortreatmentofprisoners)making itdifficult tobuildon topics alongside themilitary training.And finally,there was only one IHL trainer, compared to 185 military trainers. The IHL trainer had tonegotiatewithmilitarytrainersfortimeallotmentandinclusionofkeythemesintointeractivescenario.

Toaddressthesechallenges,BeyondPeacedevelopedanddelivereda10weekcoursefor700Malian military personnel, all men and mostly illiterate, who were preparing for immediatedeployment to conductpolicing, area control and counterinsurgency.The training focusedonIHLandhumanrightstoaddressthesemajorincidentsandpreparethemwith“rightreflexes”whenfacingfear,hatredandviolence, particularly withcivilians. The training wasnot academic or highlytechnical.Themain ideasofkey international legaldocuments were translatedinto simpler and moreaccessible concepts thatwere then practiced ininteractive scenarios.Training on IHL andhumanrights is about sharingvalues and changing mind-sets. Itcanonlybeachievedifthemissionitselfbelievesinthesevaluesandisreadytochallengeitsownmind-set.”39

Toevaluatethistrainingprogram,BeyondPeacemeasuredtheacquisitionofknowledgeaswellaschangestobehaviourafterdeployment.Apreandpost-trainingquestionnairewasgivenonWeek1andWeek10.Comparative results illustrated improvementonknowledgeof IHLandhuman rights. In addition, trainers met weekly to reflect on group learning objectives and

Thechallenge:Illiteratemilitaryforcesthatspeakdifferentlanguagearefightingnon-statearmedgroupsinacontextwheresecurityforceshadpreviouslyneglectedprotectionofcivilians.Theoryofchange:Createabasictrainingonprotectionofciviliansaccessibletoilliteratesoldierswhospeakdifferentlanguagesandthenintegratetrainingthemesintoapractice-basedscenario.

Photo11:BeyondPeaceinMali.PhotoCredit:CynthiaPetrigh


subjectiveprogress inmeeting these.Trainingexerciseswereadapted to reflect challenges inmeeting learning objectives. In addition, the trainer gathered feedback from partners andobserversaboutviolationsofIHLandhumanrights.Nomajorviolationswerereportedafterthetraining,incontrasttothefrequentreportsofviolationsbeforethetraining.Duringarefreshercourseforoneofthebattalions,soldiers’anecdotalreportsindicatedthattheyhadusedtheIHLandhumanrights trainingand that itdidchange theirbehaviour inmilitaryoperations.Theyindicatedtheirrelationshipwiththelocalpopulationhadimproved.

BurundiLeadershipTrainingProgrammeWrittenwithElizabethMcClintock

Burundi’scomplexhistoryandthechallengesandflawsintheArushapeaceprocessmotivatedconflict management experts to challenge common assumptions about post-agreementpeacebuildingprocesses.Couldadversarialpoliticsreplacewarandviolence ina transitiontodemocracy? Could building new institutions lead to stability? Would donor efforts to applymoral and political pressure, combined with legal sanctions, deter further violence orcorruption?Localleaders’attitudesandbehavioursneededtoshift,especiallythoseleadersinchargeofimplementingtheArushaAccord.Arationalortechnicalsolutionwasunlikelytoworkinsuchacomplexconflictwheredeeplytraumatisedpeopleheldontodeepantagonismtowardeach other. Capacity building created an opportunity for addressing these challenges in newways.

TheWoodrowWilsonInternationalCenterforScholars(WWICS), a Washington think tank and a US-basedconsulting firm, Conflict Management Partners(CMPartners), collaborated to create the BurundiLeadership Training Program (BLTP). The aim of theBLTPwastobuildaconsensusonthenewrulesofthegame,basedonaunderstandingthattheinterestsofallstakeholders are interdependent and thus, they mustworktogetherratherthancompetewitheachother inadversarial politics based on a “winner take all”mentality.TheBLTP’s skills-based trainingcurriculumused interactiveexercises, simulations, and role-plays,designed to strengthen communication, negotiation,and conflict management skills of Burundi’s leadersand to rebuild the trust necessary to solve problemstogether.Thetrainingsincludedbothmixedandhomogenousgroups:thesecuritysector(bothArmy and Police); political party leaders and government officials; and community-basedleaders,includingyouth.

Participating in a BLTP training was a first step toward building relationships and trustbetween former enemies. In the first trainings, the facilitators used negotiation case studiesfromothercontexts,whichcreatedenoughdistancefromtheconflicttoenabletheparticipantstoexplorenewwaysofthinkingandbehaving.Overthecourseoftheprogram,therole-playsbegantomorecloselyreflectthereallifechallengesfacedbystakeholders.Forexample,ahighlevelmilitaryofficialaskedthetrainerstousearoleplayrelatedtoaceasefirewheninreallifehe was having a difficult time getting key stakeholders to negotiate a ceasefire. The BLTPimplemented a two-year programmewithmilitary officers and police. In all, the programmetrainedover350officersinthehighcommandofthemilitaryandpolice;15policetrainersand30armytrainers.ThreesuccessivecommandersofBurundi’smilitaryacademyparticipatedinthetrainingoftrainersprogram.

ThechallengeLeadersneednewrelationships,ideas,andskillstonavigateimplementationofapeaceaccord.

Theoryofchange:Rebuildingrelationshipsandreinforcingcapacitiesfornewwaysofcommunicatingandnegotiatingamongcivilianandsecuritysectorleaderswillimprovejointproblemsolving.


US:AllianceforPeacebuildingTrainingHowdoestheUSmilitaryworkwithNGOsandrelatetocivilians?Howdoesitparticipateinorcontribute to conflictprevention, governance, andhumanitarianassistance?TheUSmilitary’sexperience in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as involvement in humanitarianassistance inPakistan,Haitiand thePhilippinesandelsewherepromptUSmilitary leaders toask thesequestionsand invite civil society toprovide trainingona rangeof topics related tothesequestions.

The Alliance for Peacebuilding is a network ofpeacebuilding organisations with the shared goal ofimproving human security. After 9/11, the USpeacebuildingcommunitybeganexploringhowtoimpactUS foreign policy, concerned about the reliance onmilitary force rather than skills and processes from thefieldofconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.Whilefirstemphasizing outreach efforts to Congress, AfP learnedthat it was challenging to make an impact influencingCongress without speaking the language of security.Experimenting with translating conflict prevention andpeacebuilding language into security discourse, AfPeventuallyemphasisedtheconceptofhumansecurity.

AfP engaged directly with US military leaders to helpshiftUSpolicytowardhumansecurity.Throughoutthiswork,AfPlearnedtobuilda“narrativebridge”toexplainhowconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingapproachescouldaddresssomeofthesamesecuritythreatsfacingtheUSmilitary.AfPstressedthatcivilsocietyhadanimportantroleinconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding,andimprovingcoordinationbetweencivilsociety,militaryandpolice–aswellaspolicymakers–wasessentialtopeaceandsecurity.AfPsoughtto both highlight common ground between the US military and civil society organisationsworkinginconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingwhilealsohighlightingthedifferencesintheapproaches.

AfPhighlightscivilsociety’scontributiontopeacebuildingandhumansecuritybyenablinglocalcivil society leaders from countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to share theirperspectivesonhumansecurity, the impactof currentUSpolicy,andalternativestrategies tobettersupportconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding leaders inthesescontexts.AfPpublishespolicy briefs and conducts research to improve US government and military support topeacebuildingandhumansecurity.

AfPprovides training to a variety ofUSmilitary training centres formilitarypersonnel at alllevels. This includes teaching new cadets, such as at West Point Military Academy, in theircourse on “Winning thePeace”, training seniormilitary leaderswho are preparing for futuredeployments, such as Special Operation Command University or Quantico Marine Center, or

trainingspecificmilitaryunitswhoareabouttodeploy, such as the 101st Airborne Division orthe 12 PRT commanders and their teamspreparing to go to Afghanistan. AFP alsoprovided training at the US Foreign ServiceInstitute several times amonth for over 1,000US Foreign Service officers and embeddedmilitarypersonnelwhowerepreparingtoworkin theUSEmbassy inAfghanistan. (Learnmoreabout this training inTheHandbookonHumanSecurity: A Civil-Military-Police Curriculum, thecompaniontothisreport.)

ThechallengeTheUSmilitaryrecognisedthattherewerenotmilitarysolutionstomanysecuritychallenges.Theoryofchange:Trainingofferedabroaderperspectiveonconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingoptionsforaddressingsecuritychallenges.

.

Photo12:AfPtrainingforUSmilitaryPhotoCredit:JohnFilson


USandGlobal:TrainingonCivilianHarmMitigationWrittenwithMarlaKeenanThe number of civilians killed in today’s armed conflicts continues to increase despite theGeneva Convention and the protections it affords to civilians in themidst of armed conflict.From Afghanistan to Yemen, Syria, the DRC, and South Sudan, civilians are caught betweenarmedgroups.Whilehumanrightsgroupshavetraditionallybasedtheirstrategyon“naming,blaming and shaming” human rights violators, new approaches in civilian protection arefocused on engaging directlywith state and non-state armed groupswho have the power topreventcivilianharm.Whilesomegroupsintentionallytargetcivilians,manyarmedgroupsdonot try toharmcivilians.Thecauseofcivilianharm isoftena lackofknowledgeofwhatpatternsofmilitaryaction cause harm and failure to prepare and to takeproactivestepstoavoidharm.The Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) worksdirectly with civilians, international organisations,governments and their militaries and other armedforcesinconflictzones.CIVIClistenstoanddocumentsthe stories of civilians including their harm,perceptions, wants, and needs. CIVIC then uses thisresearch to develop specific recommendations forpolicy and practice on better civilian protection andadvises parties to a conflict onways to better protectcivilians from their operations and to appropriatelyrespondtoharmwhencaused.CIVICbelievesallharmtociviliansshouldbepreventedtothegreatestextentpossible.Changeshouldberootedinthewantsandneedsofcivilianscaughtinconflict.CIVICbringstheirvoicestothosemakingdecisionsaboutconductinconflict.Liketheotherorganisationsfeaturedinthisreport,CIVICbelieveschangesinthebehaviourofpartiestoaconflictwillresultfromworkingdirectly with decision-makers, helping them understand the effects of their actions andprovidingthemwithpracticalpolicysolutionstolimitandaddresscivilianharm.Byadoptingapragmatic approachbasedonpolicy andpractice rather than law,CIVIC is able to secure thecooperationofkeyactorsandmotivatethemtoadoptadditionalmeasurestoensurethesafetyof civilians. CIVIC believes working in partnership to protect civilians is more effective thanworking alone. The organisation works with civilians themselves as well as civil society,governments, military actors, international organisations, thought leaders, and the media aspassionateadvocatesandpragmaticadvisors.Likeotherhuman rightsorganisations,CIVICpressesmilitaries todowhat’s right andwhat’ssmartwhen it comes to civilians on the battlefield. Governments,militaries and other armedgroups, and international organisations listen to CIVIC because their civilian harmmitigationrecommendations are based on solid research and tested expertise. CIVIC develops concretesteps and recommendations that militaries can take to make smarter choices in theiroperations, by advising on prevention of civilian harm and response to harm caused. CIVIC’sapproach has been proven effective. The US military, NATO and its national militaries, theDepartment of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN, African Union forces, Afghan forces, andothershavechangedpolicies,training,doctrine,tactics,andmind-setswiththehelpofCIVIC’suniquework.CIVICprovidestrainingtobothtroopsonthegroundandtheirleadershiponhowtotakeamodern,strategic,andethicalviewofciviliansinthebattlespace.

Thechallenge:MilitaryforcesdonothaveadequatemechanismsforaddressingharmtociviliansTheoryofchange:Workwithlocalcommunitiestodevelopamethodformitigatingcivilianharmandthentrainmilitaryforceshowtheycanmakeamends


As much as possible,training involves“showing” throughscenarios and role playsmore than “telling” theinformation throughlectures. This includesadvice, training, andguidance on keeping “thecivilian” front and centrewhen planningoperations,avoidingharmduring operations, andresponding to harmcaused including bytracking casualties,learning lessonsthrough analysis, and

dignifyinglosses.CIVICdocumentsbestpracticesandaimstoinstitutionaliselessonslearnedoncivilianprotection,trackingandanalysis,andmakingamendsforcivilianharm.In Somalia, CIVIC advised on an African Union civilian protection policy and are supportingAfrican Union forces to build a cell to track, analyse, and respond to civilian harm. InAfghanistan, CIVIC developed a seven-step process for responding to civilian harm forinternationalandAfghanforces.WiththeUSmilitary,CIVIChelpeddraftthefirstcivilianharmmitigationdoctrine.CIVICconductstrainingexercisesthatexplorecivilianharmpreventionandresponseatUSbasesandforthousandsofofficersintheAfghanNationalSecurityForces.Like other civil society organisations, CIVIC will not take money from warring partiesthemselves, preferring to remain independent. CIVIC functions in a neutral advisory role, asadvocatesforcivilianscaughtinarmedconflict.Armedgroupshavelegal,strategic,andethicalreasonstoensuretheyreducethepotentialforandmitigatecivilianharm.Ratherthansimplyadvocatingfromahumanrightspointofview,itisimportanttoalsolookattheinterestsofarmedgroupstofigureouthowbesttocommunicateandmotivateattentiontocivilianharmmitigation.Armedgroupsoftenrecognisethatharmingcivilians can result in further attacks on their soldiers and increased support for oppositiongroups.Making the case for prevention and appropriate responses to civilian harm from thepoint of view of armed groupsmakes it easier to build relationships, dialogue, and problemsolvewitharmedgroupstoaddresstheproblem.Thedecisiontoengageornotengagewithanarmedgroupisimportant.CIVIChasaninternalguidelines document that aids in decision-making aboutwhether to engage an armed group.Oneoftheseprinciplesistheneedforthearmedgrouptohavesometypeofresponsiblechainof command structure. Without this, there is no way to implement civilian harm mitigationpoliciesand theorganisationrisks theadvice theyhavegivenbeingusedasa ‘fig leaf’by thearmedactor.AmplifyinglocalcivilsocietyvoiceshasbeenanimportanttovalidatingCIVIC’sapproach.Someof the work on the impact of drones on civilians, for example, is politically sensitive.Documenting local civilian voices in reports, and/or actually providing an opportunity forcivilianstomeetwithmilitaryleaderstodiscusstheimpactseemstohaveanimpactonmilitaryleader’sunderstandingoftheimportanceofcivilianharmmitigation.(Learnmoreaboutcivilianharm mitigation in The Handbook on Human Security: A Civil-Military-Police Curriculum, thecompaniontothisreport.)

Photo13:CIVICstaffworkingwithlocalcommunitiesPhotoCredit:CIVIC


Global:Trainingon“DoNoHarm”WrittenwithMarshallWallace

Any intervention into a conflict can cause harm, particularly if groups attempt to intervenewithout first understanding the local context. The “Do No Harm” approach includes two keyideas. First, analysing the local context to identify “connectors” and “dividers” will help anygroup–civilsociety,military,orpolice–understandmoreabouthowtheirinterventionmighthelporhurtthelocalcontext.Connectorsareinstitutions,values,people,orprocessesthathelppeople connect with each other across the lines of conflict. Dividers are institutions, values,peopleorprocessesthatincreasedivisionsbetweengroups.Aswiththemedicalprofession,theconceptof“donoharm”impliesthatthefirstresponsibilityofanyintervenerisnottomaketheconflictworsethroughtheir intervention.Second,theDoNoHarmapproachprovidesasetoftoolsforplannerstoensuretheirplanningis“conflictaccountable.”ThediagrambelowillustratestheDoNoHarmassessmentandplanningtool.Anyinterventionshouldattempttoreducethepossibilitythatitcouldcreateunintendednegativeconsequencesorsecondordereffectsthatwouldincreasedivisionsbetweengroups,increasethelikelihoodofviolence,orfuelcorruption.

Civil society peacebuilding efforts as well as police and military operations should all be“conflict accountable.” All groups should ensure that they anticipate potential impacts of theefforts, identifyinghow theymight inadvertently increasedivisionswithina contextandhowtheycouldmaximiseconnectionsbetweengroupssoastofosterbetterrelationshipsacrossthelinesofconflict.TheDoNoHarmapproachistheproductofacollaborativelearningprojectinvolvingthousandsofpeoplefrom1993-2014,organisedbyCDACollaborativeLearningProjects.40Becauseofthecollaborativenatureofthelearningprocess,trainingisavailablefromseveralorganisationsandindividuals.Many NGOs operating internationally have receivedtraining in theDoNoHarmapproach, recognizing thatin thepastNGOhumanitariananddevelopmenteffortshave inadvertently increased conflict and violence,fuelledcorruption,disempoweredlocalvolunteerismorleadership, and led to a variety of other unintendedimpacts. As military forces engage in morehumanitarian crisis, and become involved in a widerrangeofciviliantasks, there isagreaterneedfor themto recognise the potential for causing harm whenbuilding a school, setting up a humanitarian camp fordisplacedpeoplesordeliveringmedicalaid.InKosovo,intheearly2000s,aconsultanttrainedtheUSmilitaryintheDoNoHarmapproachin a brief workshop. A checklist was developed out of the training to help the US militaryidentifytheconnectorsanddividersinthecontextsoastoavoidpotentialunintendedimpactsandmaximiseopportunitiesforsupportinglocalconnectors.

Connectors DividersListofConnectorsthatlinkspeopleacrossconflictlines,particularlythoseforcesthatmeethumanneeds

Designprogrammesthatdecreasethedividersandincreasetheconnectorsbetweengroups

ListofDividersorthetensionsorfaultlinesthatdividepeopleorinterrupttheirhumanneeds

Figure13:ConnectorsandDividersAnalysisTool

ThechallengeAnytypeofassistancecanunintentionallycauseharm.Theoryofchange:Trainingcanhelpgroupsanticipatepotentialnegativeimpactsandplantominimiseharmwhilemaximizingconnections.


InAfghanistan, theAustraliangovernment’saidagencyAUSAIDmovedintoforwardpositionswiththeAustralianmilitaryduringtheperiod2010-2012.AUSAIDdevelopedatrainingmodulefor deploying soldiers on relating to NGOs that included a section on Do No Harm to helpexplainwhatNGOsdo,howtheydoit,andwhyitmatterstotheAustralianmilitaryoperatinginAfghanistan.ThepositivefeedbackontheDoNoHarmapproachwassostrongthatwhileitwasonly given a one hour block in the first round of training, it was given an entire day in thesecond training course.OneAustralianmajor reported itwas themost important part of thetraining. The operational reports were not as positive. Despite preparation to analyse theconnectorsanddividersinAfghanistancommunitieswheretheAustralianmilitaryandAUSAIDwere serving, they endedup inadvertently supportingprojectswith awarlord that increasedconflict between Australian forces and Afghan communities. However, a US-based NGO, theCenter for Civilians in Conflict, found that the Australians were far ahead of other countriesinterveninginAfghanistanwhenitcametoaddressingcivilianharm.In thePhilippines, localcivil society initiatives to train themilitaryandpolice(seeothercasestudiesinthisreport)emphasisedtheDoNoHarmapproachthroughshortworkshopsfortheOfficeofthePresidentialAdvisoronthePeaceProcess(OPAPP).TheFilipinomilitaryreportedthat the Do No Harm training has been very useful for helping them interact with civilians.Trainingsthatinvolvebothpoliceandcommunitytogetherareon-goingasof2015.Anorganisationworkingon security sector reform inZimbabweandHonduras, amongothercountries,hasusedtheDoNoHarmapproachaspartofthetoolkittheyteachtostakeholders.AnevaluationofthenowcompletedworkinZimbabwesaidtheircontributionwas“invaluable.”TheworkinHondurasison-going(2015).

(Learn more about “Do No Harm” and other conflict assessment and planning tools in TheHandbookonHumanSecurity:ACivil-Military-PoliceCurriculum,thecompaniontothisreport.)

Documents

Chapter 2 Capacity Building for Human Security 2.pdf · 2019. 2. 7. · Mindanaw had no intention to work with the military when they began their peacebuilding work in 1996. The director