CHAPTER 3: Archetypes and Symbols

CHAPTER THREE: ARCHETYPES AND COMMUNICATION

“Before the visible universe was formed its mold was cast. This mold was called the Archetype, and this

Archetype was in the Supreme Mind long before the process of creation began.… [t]he Supreme

Mind…gouged out caverns in primordial space and cast the form of the spheres in the Archetypal

mold...The Supreme Being - the Mind - male and female, brought forth the Word; and the Word,

suspended between Light and darkness, was delivered of another Mind called the Workman, the Master-

Builder, or the Maker of Things”.

The Vision - The Divine Poimandres of Hermes (Mercurius) Trismegistus

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The exploration of literature from a selected yet diverse collection of disciplines and

cosmologies in the preceding chapter points towards inclusive assumptions concerning

the notion of a unitary and an ‘objective’ reality. The scope of such notions ranges from

the ancient Egyptian ‘primeval ocean’, Nun, to the collective unconscious in depth

psychology, a ‘unified force field’ posited in quantum physics, and the ‘ideosphere’ of

memetics, a branch of evolutionary biology. Consequently, the postulation of both

universal and archetypal theories is intimately related to notions of a unitary reality

apparent in various scientific, philosophical and cosmological accounts along a

continuum ranging from the ancient to current views of the psyche and human

existence. It is also discernible that reality constructs occupy a quintessential and pivotal

position in the pursuit of an integrated worldview and cosmology, and the universality

of the symbolic and mythological, specifically the creation myth.

Additionally, the human psyche appears to be extensively described as a three-tiered

configuration with an innate, archaic predisposition to strive towards a transpersonal

unity and integration (Walsh & Vaughan, 1993; Haeri, 1989). The Self, an archetypal

sense of being and inherent self-image or archaic identity, furthermore acts as the

archetype of order and meaning, and as the organising principle, which propels the

psyche’s striving towards said unity and integration (Haeri, 1989:1, 155; Jung, 1933,

1968a). The probable connection between the Self and a unitary reality is alluded to by

Jung (1933, 1965) when he termed the foundation from which the Self emerges the unus Archetypes & communication

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mundus or collective unconscious. Moreover, the Self-archetype generates symbolic

representations, mythico-religious or spiritual images and symbols from its personal

unconscious and complexes, which are rooted in and derived from an archaic, collective

and unconscious blueprint. Seemingly, images, myths and symbolic representations are

the manifestations of the archetypes that are interpreted through self-talk in the

conscious modality of the psyche (Jung, 1965).

In order to portray the role of an underlying unitary reality in the representation and

interpretation of symbols of the Self and hence intrapsychic communication, a

comprehensive understanding of the unifying and innate structures, namely archetypes

of the collective unconscious is necessary. Said exploration of the nature and

characteristics of archetypes and universal archetypal symbols will facilitate the

integration of universal archetypal symbols with current notions of symbols in the

semiotic approach to communication studies.

This chapter will accordingly aim to explore the nature of archetypes, archetypal

images, myths and symbols and their relation to and application in communication

studies. It will specifically explore the implication of deep behavioural drives implied

by the notion of innate mental patterns in the collective unconscious and their possible

coercive influence on communication patterns and symbols of the Self in intrapsychic

communication.

3.2 ARCHETYPES OF THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS

The notions of archetypes and the collective unconscious, in which they are rooted, are

veiled in multiple interpretations and skepticism due to their apparent numinous and

intangible nature, and their experimental “untestability” (Huston, Rosen & Smith,

1999:140). Nonetheless, they have been explored by various theorists from diverse

disciplines and subsequently have either been embraced for their intuitive yet daring

appeal or rejected as preposterous metaphysical nonsense. The following quotation from

Jung’s (1950) Travistock lectures gives a clear indication of his response to such

criticism: “Our unconscious mind, like our body, is a storehouse of relics and memories

of the past. A study of the structure of the unconscious collective mind would reveal the

same discoveries as you make in comparative anatomy. We do not need to think that

Archetypes & communication

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there is anything mystical about it. But because I speak of a collective unconscious, I

have been accused of obscurantism. There is nothing mystical about the collective

unconscious” (Jung 1950 in Huber, Edwards, & Heining-Boynton, 2000:272).

Interestingly, 54 years after Jung made this statement, including years of criticism and

marginalisation in certain branches of psychology, Stevens (2003:xii) states that the

proof of the existence of archetypal structures in the collective unconscious could be

based on evolutionary psychiatry and evolutionary psychology. These two new

disciplines corroborate and amplify both the collective unconscious and its archetypes

since they confirm that human experience and behaviour are complex products of

environmental, and mental and hereditary forces. “Archetypes are intermediates

between genes and experience; they are the organizing schemata by which the innate

becomes personal” (Stevens, 2003:xii).

Constructs which appear similar to Jung’s explanation of archetypes include Chomsky’s

(1968) notion of an inborn ‘language acquisition device’; ‘primitives’ or basic

phonemic building blocks by which language may be constructed proposed by Marslen-

Wilson (1980); and Bierderman’s (1987) postulation of the concept of ‘geons’. ‘Geons’

are types of simple visual primitives from which more complex objects such as symbols

can be visually constructed (Huston et al, 1999:139). Additionally, Levi-Strauss (1967)

developed the concept of ‘infrastructures’ or processes that give rise to ‘cultural

universals’, and Schuster and Carpenter (1986) identified similar symbolic and artistic

patterns worldwide (Huston et al, 1999:139).

Despite various supporting views, the existence of innate unifying and deep structures is

an ongoing debate amongst theorists and scientists. Jung (1968:24) explains that the

mystical nature that scientists and theorists ascribe to the collective unconscious is due

to humankind’s estrangement from its natural roots. Consequently, the myths, “gods

and symbols” of ancient times have been expelled from current reality constructs.

“Heaven has become the cosmic space of the physicists, and the divine empyrean a fair

memory of things that once were” (Jung, 1968:24). He asserts that the result of myth

and the symbolic being ousted from scientific investigation and spiritual exploration is a

growing secret unrest at the root of human experience. Moreover, the exploration of the

unconscious and its archetypal images relates to the vital question of humankind’s


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spiritual being or non-being, and most things spiritual are considered unscientific and

metaphysical (Jung, 1968). Consequently, any study of the spiritual, which is contrasted

with the dominance of a socially and observable reality, is labeled as meta-physical and

viewed with suspicion.

The cynicism regarding the collective unconscious and its archetypes, according to Jung

(1950 in Huber et al, 2000:274), is also typical because unconscious processes cannot

be observed directly which make their delineation and measurement problematic. “They

appear only in their products, and we postulate from the peculiar quality of those

products that there must be something behind them from which they originate. We call

this dark sphere of the mind the unconscious psyche” (Jung 1950 in Huber et al,

2000:275).

Jung (1950 in Huber et al, 2000:275) furthermore postulates that the contents of the

conscious mind of an individual consist of three sources. These sources include the

ectopsychic contents of consciousness which are derived from the environment through

the data of the senses; the endopsychic sphere consisting of contents derived from

memory and processes of judgment; and a third source which is “the dark sphere of the

mind”, the unconscious. The endopsychic sphere contains those functions that are not

under the control of the will and are the vehicle by which unconscious contents reach

the surface of consciousness. According to Jung (1950 in Huber et al, 2000:275), the

contents of “the dark sphere of the mind” have a mythological character and universal

nature. “It is as if they belong to a pattern not peculiar to any particular mind or

person, but rather to a pattern peculiar to mankind in general and therefore they are of

a collective nature”.

Hall et al (1998:85) elucidate; “the collective unconscious is the psychic residue of

human evolutionary development, a residue that accumulates as a consequence of

repeated experiences over many generations”. This psychic residue of collective

patterns and traces of an archaic history were called archetypes by Jung (1950 in Huber

et al, 2000:274). The products of the unconscious psyche seemingly relate to meanings

and interpretations derived from the symbolic representations in, for example,

mythological motifs, dreams, fairytales, legends, folklore and archaic formulae. The

link between archetypes, images, myths and symbols will be explored comprehensively


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in later sections of this chapter.

3.3 THE NATURE OF ARCHETYPES DELINEATED

The abstract and rather ineffable nature of an archetype contributes to the difficulty in

determining the precise meaning of the construct. Jung (1950 in Huber et al, 2000:274)

describes an archetype, derived from ‘arche’ (first) and ‘typos’ (mould or pattern), as a

“typos (imprint), a definite grouping of archaic character containing, in form as well as

in meaning, mythological motifs”. The use of the term ‘archetype’ seemingly has a

historical and epistemological history. Jung (1972:4; 1968:4) explains that it was used

as early as 200 AD in the Corpus Hermeticum in ‘The Vision - The Divine Poimandres

of Hermes Mercurious Trismegistus’, reportedly written by an ancient Egyptian sage,

where God is called the “Archetypal Light” and reference is made to the “Archetypal

mold”. Additionally, other ancient texts refer to the “immaterial archetypes”, “the

archetypal stone” and “the archetypal reality” (Whiteman, 1986). Jung (1972:9;

1968:4) also describes the term as an “exploratory paraphrase” of the Platonic ‘ideas’.

The construct of an archetype hence appears to be archetypal in itself.

Moreover, the term “représentations collectives” used by Lévy-Bruhl (1935 cited in

Jung, 1972:4; 1968:5) which denotes the symbolic figures in the primitive view of the

world, could be applied to unconscious contents, “since it means practically the same”

(Jung, 1972:4). However, Jung (1972:4) states that these “collective representations”

are only indirectly related to archetypes since they have already been modified and

interpreted consciously. Von Franz (1998:128) explains that the archetypes themselves

are the “unconscious dynamisms” behind such conscious collective representations;

“they produce them but are not identical to them”. Consequently, they are no longer

contents of the unconscious and have been changed into conscious formulae taught

according to cultural tradition, generally in the form of esoteric teaching and primitive

tribal lore. Esoteric teaching is a typical means of the historical expression for the

transmission of collective and archetypal contents originally derived from the

unconscious (Jung, 1972:3).

It is evident from the above discussion and an exploration of volumes in his ‘Collected

Works’ that Jung (1972:5) identifies various terms and constructs in association with


110

archetypes which need further elucidation. For example, the terms archetype as-such,

archetype per se, archetypal ideas and images, mythological images, primordial images,

historical formulae (représentations collectives), instincts, and behaviour patterns are all

seemingly used by Jung and various authors to explain aspects of both the construct

“archetype” and its representation.

3.3.1 ARCHETYPES

An archetype, also referred to as the archetype as-such, archetype per se, dominant or

the primordial image, is a hypothetical and ‘non-represented’ model which denotes

mental forms and elements (Jung, Von Franz, Henderson, Jacobi & Jaffé, 1978:57).

Jung (1972:5) explains it as that “which seems to be aboriginal, innate, and inherited

shapes of the human mind”. It appears that he considered the primordial image,

archetype as-such, and the archetype per se as the original, pure moulds and blueprints

which “form the basis for human thought and are the world treasure-house of

mythological motifs” (Jung, 1960:3l0). The terms primordial image, archetype as-such

and archetype per se seemingly denote identical universal constructs of innate

quintessential patterns that predispose humankind to behave in specific ways.

These aboriginal, innate and inherited shapes or moulds of the human mind or “archaic

remnants and primordial images”, could also be called “instinctive trends” or

subconscious and universal psychic urges or impulses to interpret images symbolically

(Jung, 1960:310). Archetypes as-such hence have no material existence but

simultaneously cloak and reveal themselves as images, which are humankind’s mode of

perception of primordial ideas (Hyde & McGuinness, 1992:61).

Meyer et al (1997:105) state that although Jung uses instinct and archetype as

interchangeable concepts, it appears that instinct refers more to physiologically

inherited impulses which determine behaviour without conscious motivation and

intrapsychic interpretation; the archetype as-such. Hyde and McGuinness (1992:59)

state that where instinct determines spontaneous biological actions, archetypes as-such

are innate, unconscious modes of understanding which regulate perception itself. Hence,

as the instincts determine actions, archetypes as-such determine modes of understanding

and meaning.


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McDowell (2001:637) also refers to the archetype as-such as an underlying constant that

functions to organise the psyche, and serves as an adaptive principle of the psyche that,

in turn, could be viewed as a dynamic system. Jung (1972:9) indicates that archetypes

are comparable to Plato’s conception of the ‘idea’ as a supra-ordinate and pre-existent

prototype to all phenomena. These innate ideas represent inherited “possibilities” of

ideas, which through repetition became engraved impulses and expectations (Jung cited

in Robertson, 1995:166-167).

Consequently, archetypes, in their quiescent, unexpressed or unmodified state, have no

exact determinable content. They are indefinite structures, which can assume distinct

forms only in projection or expression. Humans are hence not born as tabula rasa

(blank slates), but have aptitudes which are inherited instincts and preformed patterns,

the latter being the a priori and formal conditions of apperception. Archetypes as-such,

instinctive trends and primordial images are hence regarded as innate psychic

predispositions or “intuitions” influencing the person to perceive in a certain way, to

experience and form images. The term archetype as-such moreover “designates only

those psychic contents which have not yet been submitted to conscious elaboration and

are therefore an immediate datum of psychic experience” (Jung, 1972:4).

Stevens (2003:18) provides an evolutionary psychological explanation of the archetype

as-such as the inherent neuropsychic system – “the innate releasing mechanism” for

patterns of behaviour and experience when stimuli are present in an environment. For

example, it is responsible for patterns of behaviour as the “zigzag dance or patterns of

experience as falling in love” (Stevens, 2003:18).

Archetypes may thus be defined as innate and universal patterns of behaviour without

content and expressed in, for example images, myths and symbols. One may assume

that since communication is a form of behaviour, archetypes will consequently also

influence communication patterns.

Jung (1968a:48-49) states that the main sources and hence the proof of the existence of

archetypes are dreams, visions and active imagination. They are considered as the most

rudimentary forms of an archetype since they are more individual, less understandable,


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and more naïve than myths and symbol. He (Jung, 1968:48) considers dreams to be

spontaneous and involuntary products of the psyche and hence not falsified by any

conscious purpose. Usually, an archetype as-such is accompanied by dream symbols

that are related to the “représentations collectives, which in the form of mythological

motifs have portrayed psychic processes of transformation since the earliest times”

(Jung, 1972:5). Once the archetypes as-such are identified as mythological motifs and

reflect conscious deliberation, they are referred to as archetypes expressed in myth and

symbol. According to Jung (1960:309), an archetype exists for each universal human

experience, including birth, death, sun, darkness, power, women, men, sex, water,

mother and pain. Active imagination is described as a series or sequence of fantasies

produced by deliberate concentration that are rich in archetypal images and associations

(Jung, 1968:49).

The archetype is therefore essentially an unconscious content that is altered by being

perceived through conscious awareness, and “it takes its colour from the individual

consciousness in which it happens to appear (Jung, 1972:5). Moreover, archetypes,

“like all numinous contents, are relatively autonomous, and cannot be integrated simply

by rational means”. This is evident in Jung’s (1972:5) assertions that the interpretation

of an archetype requires an inner dialectical procedure, which “puts into effect the

alchemical definition of the meditatio: an inner colloquy with one’s good angel”. The

term ‘angel’ in this sense refers to “inner messengers or phenomena, derived from the

Greek word angelos, meaning messenger” (Jung cited in Gellert, 1994:29).

The integration of archetypes into the individual psyche occurs not through rational

thought alone, but is mediated through intuitive interpretation of symbols and an ‘inner

colloquy’ or inner discussion, hence self-talk in intrapsychic communication. The

existence of archetypes on the unconscious level is thus universal and collective, but

their manifestation or expression and interpretation in consciousness is intrapsychic and

symbolic.

It is through the analysis and interpretation of symbols that are evident in, for example,

dreams, fantasies, visions, myths and art that the collective unconscious and the

archetypes can be analysed and understood (Jung, 1964:83-90; 1972:4). Other forms of

expression of archetypes include visions, rituals, neurotic and psychotic symptoms. The


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image, myth and symbol as manifestations of archetypes will be discussed in detail in

subsequent sections of the chapter.

3.3.2 ARCHETYPAL IDEAS

Archetypal ideas supposedly are historical formulas based on archetypes, which have

been passed on over long periods. Jung (1972:5) explains that there is a difference

between the archetype and the archetypal ideas or historical formula that has evolved

based on it. “Especially on the higher levels of esoteric teaching, the archetypes appear

in a form that reveals quite unmistakably the critical and evaluating influence of

conscious elaboration” (Jung, 1972:3). For example, archetypal ideas of transcendence

of the Self are reflected in creation myths and the description of the Christ, Buddha and

Osiris (an Egyptian god). “The drama of the archetypal life of Christ describes in

symbolic images the events in the conscious life – as well as in the life that transcends

consciousness – of a man transformed by his higher destiny” (Jung quoted in Edinger,

1987:15).

Presumably, archetypes that become archetypal ideas and historical formulae are

permanent deposits of an experience that has been persistently repeated, for example, in

mythical form for many generations. For example, the experience of countless

generations of the daily cycle of the rising and setting sun became fixed in the collective

unconscious as an archetype of the sun-god, “the powerful, dominating, light-giving,

heavenly body that humans deified and worshipped” (Hall et al, 1998:87).

Hall et al (1998:86) moreover assert that archetypal formulae are not necessarily

isolated from one another in the collective unconscious since they tend to interpenetrate

and “interfuse”. For example, the archetype of the hero and the archetype of the wise

old man may blend to produce the conception of the “philosopher king”, a person who

is responded to and revered because he is both a hero leader and a wise seer (Hall et al,

1998:86).

Archetypal ideas and historical formulae are closely related to archetypal myths that

will be more extensively explored under a subsequent heading.


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3.3.3 ARCHETYPAL COMPLEXES

The contents of the personal unconscious are feeling-toned complexes and constitute the

personal and private side of psychic life, hence the personal unconscious. A complex or

also referred to as the living units of the psyche is an organised group or constellation of

feelings, thoughts, perceptions, and memories that exist in the personal unconscious. It

has a nucleus or central core - an archetype - that acts as a kind of magnet attracting to it

or “constellating” various experiences and archetypal images (Jung 1934 cited in Hall et

al, 1998:85).

According to Shalit (2002:22), the complex was so important to Jung that he considered

calling his approach to the psyche “complex psychology”. The interrelatedness of

archetypes and complexes concomitantly illustrate the relationship between the

collective and personal unconscious, and also transpersonal and intrapersonal

communication. Shalit (2002:8) writes that the complexes give visible and

comprehensive shape to underlying blueprints, hence archetypes. It is through the

complex that we approach the archetypes; however, it is also through the complex that

the unconscious approaches us.

As “possibilities of representation”, the archetypes and complexes manifest only when

some level of consciousness comes into play. Hall et al (1998:86) explain that the

nucleus of a complex may be an archetype that draws experiences to it. The archetype

can then penetrate into consciousness by way of these associated experiences. However,

it is important to note that the archetype does not determine and shape the actual

experience. According to Shalit (2002:22), to this end individuals need complexes, for

they are “the path and the vessel that give human shape and structure to archetypal

patterns as they unfold in personal experience”. Complexes hence provide the link

between archetype and ego, enabling the transformation of the collective and universal

archetypal image into the personal symbol.

3.3.4 ARCHETYPAL IMAGES, MYTHS AND SYMBOLS

Universally, according to Chetwynd, (1993:207) symbols embody the dynamics and

functions of all myths, dreams, images and the imagination. He (Chetwynd, 1993:xi)


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t symbols of the Self and concomitantly the

dynamics of intrapsychic communication.

3.3.4.1 Archetypal images

agic, extending from the conscious understandable into the

eld of the unconscious”.

, a

ersonal guide and an inner dynamic that gives the feeling of purpose and a destiny.

isual patterns consisting of grids, dots, spirals, zigzags, circles and curved lines.

asserts that life, interpreted in terms of dreams, images and myths, constitute the

symbolic language of the unconscious and the soul. Consequently, symbols function in

determining the meaning of dreams, images and myths and are seemingly the

quintessential component of all unconscious data. An exploration of the nature and

functions of images, symbols, and myths in the activation of archetypes will ostensibly

aid in the understanding of the transcenden

Archetypal images are reportedly the moulds, vessels or containers that lend temporary

shape to the energy and powers that flow through the universe (Chetwynd, 1993:93).

Jung (1968a:39) proposed that the soul’s mode of experience is in images – image is

thus always of the psyche, specifically of the collective unconscious. Moreover, he

(Jung, 1968a:39) states, “the symbolic process is an experience in images of images”.

Frutiger (1989:235) is of the opinion that the symbolic element in images is an implied

value, “a mediator between recognizable reality and the mystical, invisible realm of

religion, philosophy, and m

fi

An aspect of innate archetypal images is highlighted by Hillman (1996:11) which he

describes as part of his ‘acorn theory’ as the defining image or innate destiny of every

individual. “We each embody our own idea, in the language of Plato and Plotinus”

(Hillman, 1996:12). Innate images are thus not only visual images as proposed by Jung,

according to Hillman (1996:203) they also refer to an innate individual calling

p

Evidently, archetypal images are comparable to entopic images found universally in

artwork by modern children, contemporary hunter-gatherers, Paleolithic humans, great

apes and humans (Aiken cited in Palmer & Palmer, 2002:235). Aiken (cited in Palmer

& Palmer, 2002: 234) defines entopic (meaning inner vision) phenomena as emergent

v

Additionally, people who have entered an altered state of consciousness, regardless of

116


es to be almost identical in nature to the collective unconscious as described by

ung.

derived from the collective unconscious, the domain of altered states

f consciousness.

similar to Lewis-Williams and

owson’s (1989, 2000) postulations of entopic images.

whether it was induced by drugs, sleep deprivation or a migraine headache, universally

report these particular images. Palmer and Palmer (2002:234) assert that the universality

of these entopic images is due to the shared neural architecture of the higher primate

brain. They (Palmer & Palmer, 2002:234) claim that these entopic images are evoked by

an innate aesthetic releaser response, which is part of the human brain. The higher

primate brain is also referred to as the ancestral mind by Jacobs (2003:29) which he

describ

J

The previous assertions relate to Lewis-Williams and Dowson (cited in Palmer &

Palmer, 2002:234; Lewis-Williams & Dowson, 1989:61; 2000:61) who report that the

shamanic San of the Kalahari Desert recreated similar entopic phenomena or images in

their art during periods of self-induced altered states of consciousness in shamanic

ceremonies and ritual (refer to Figure 3.1 and 3.2 below). Lewis-Williams (2002:156)

furthermore asserts that in San rock images, “The San fused the ‘abstract’ experiences

of altered states of mind with the materiality of the world in which they lived”. An

important correspondence exists between shamanic San expression of entopic images

and Jung’s (1972) assertion that esoteric teaching is a typical means of expression

(through visions, rituals and art) and for the transmission of collective and archetypal

contents originally

o

Moreover, these symbolic expressions and entopic phenomena seemingly relate to

Jung’s archaic images and historical formulae which appear not only in San art, but also

recurrently in various other ancient images and symbolic representations. Van Auken

and Little (2000) report on pre-Mayan pertroglyphs (rock carvings) dated 1500 BC

found at Piedras Negras in the Western Gulf of Mexico illustrating spiral and circular

designs (Figure 3.20 refers). These designs appear to be

D

Additionally, based on this researcher’s examination of the basic Egyptian hieroglyphic

alphabet, it appears that most of the entopic images mentioned are present not only in

the Egyptian alphabet but also in Egyptian art (Fig. 3.3–3.19 refer). Prominent

Egyptologists and anthropologists posit that the sacred Egyptian hieroglyphics are

117


g is “clearly the same as

rawing, engraving and painting, the so-called graphic arts”.

thought was a two-track

evelopment of the spoken sound and descriptive gesture.

ith a common innate structure, or merely associations based on personal

amongst the first recorded complex written language (Goody, 1981; Robinson, 2001;

Hagen & Hagen, 1999). The link between art and writing is established by Goody (in

Williams, 1981:106) who states that the physical basis of writin

d

Furthermore, the Schmandt-Beserat (cited in Frutiger, 1989:119) theory posits that the

first forms of stylised writing evolved from Middle Eastern clay tokens dating back to

the eighth millennium BC. Frutiger (1989:120) argues that this theory provides the

answer to the simplification of images, which had become stylised before the first

pictograms were drawn. He (Frutiger, 1989:116) refers to Chinese, Mesopotamian and

Egyptian pictograms to illustrate the stylisation and development from pictogram to

ideogram. According to Frutiger (1989:112), the development of symbolic

representation, and the pictorial recording of expressed

d

Moreover, Frutiger (1989:125) indicates that the Egyptian script culture is viewed as the

most important basis of the Western alphabet. Through their myth, image and geometric

proportion, Schwaller de Lubicz (1978) believed that the Egyptians were able to

encapsulate in their writing and architecture the basic pattern of structure of the natural

universe. It is through the rich and exacting array of ancient hieroglyphic writing that

consciousness is lifted from subjective, poetic or personal insight to a precise,

communicable, universal knowledge-activity upon which a future science of nature

could have been founded (Schwaller de Lubicz, 1978). Schwaller de Lubicz, (1978)

indicates that Egypt and other cultures that were grounded in the symbolic method used

symbols to maintain an active, conscious connection with the impulses and subliminal

information received from the ancient and deeper limbic and reptilian centres of the

brain, hence archaic information nested in the collective unconscious. This proposition

by Schwaller de Lubicz (1978) relates to Frutiger’s (1989:115) fundamental question of

whether a pictorial notion is inborn, or the result of experiences entering the

consciousness as a memory. Although Frutiger (1989:115) claims that the search for a

common origin of sign formation has been mostly in vain, there are nevertheless

analogies between elementary signs in picture representation of common objects across

various cultures. Hence, the crucial question relates to the existence of inherited

‘archetypes’ w

118


xperiences.

yths, spiritual visions, and the deeper human realities that seem universal

nd eternal”.

om generation to generation. (Compare

ith Section 2.8, ‘Memetics’ in Chapter Two).

n Kluger, 2004:52) consequently claimed to have

und the genetic root of spirituality.

e

Jacobs (2003:140-141) states that visual imagery is a form of symbolic mental

processing that does not depend on the use of language. Visual imagery includes

dreams, daydreaming, goals, activities, desires, and wishes in the mind’s eye. This

visual imagery is part of the ancestral mind’s (referred to as the collective unconscious

by Jung) utilisation of preverbal imagery to convey emotions, feelings, and intuitions.

He (Jacobs, 2003:140-141) also indicates that these visual images are comparable to

stored information in the ancestral mind as a form of genetic memory. Moreover, Jacobs

(2003:141) indicates that preverbal imagery is also the basis for the Jungian archetypes,

“the stuff of m

a

Additionally, Wilson (cited in Jacobs, 2003:141), a Harvard evolutionary biologist,

argues that preferences for certain patterns or colours, for example, have been conveyed

genetically. He (Wilson, 2003) refers to them as “memes” or fundamental human

images that have been held in common throughout our evolutionary development and

that are a form of “species knowledge”, passed fr

w

Dawkins’s and Wilson’s claims of memes as genetically conveyed memories

correspond closely to a very controversial and contested assertion by Hamer (cited in

Kluger, 2004:50), a molecular biologist, of having discovered a “God gene”. Kluger

(2004:51) reports that Hamer arrived at his conclusions while conducting a survey on

more than 1,000 men and women who took a standardised, 240-question personality test

called the Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI). Among the traits the TCI

measures is one known as self-transcendence, which consists of three other traits: self-

forgetfulness or the ability to get entirely lost in an experience; transpersonal

identification, or a feeling of connectedness to a larger universe; and mysticism, or

openness to things not literally provable. Hamer (cited in Kluger, 2004:52) then isolated

a positive correlation between the VMAT2 gene and the scores on the self-

transcendence test. He (Hamer cited i

fo

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reported by individuals who had near death experiences (Zohar

Marshall, 2000:95).

ncient civilizations in forms

f art and earliest forms of writing (figures 3.3-3.23 refer).

haviour, referred to as attractor research, is also used by indicated by

awkins (2002).

Zohar and Marshall (2000:95) make a similar claim and describe a connection between

spiritual intelligence and an area in the temporal lobes of the brain, which they refer to

as the “God Spot”. This “spot”, ostensibly, relates to the altered states of consciousness

and visions of entopic images as elucidated by Aiken (cited in Palmer & Palmer, 2002:

234) and Lewis-Williams (2002:156). Reportedly, this spot, when stimulated, produces

visions similar to those

&

Seemingly, images similar in design to entopic phenomena occur and recur in all forms

of representations regardless of whether their source is humankind’s mind or computer

generated illustrations of atomic behaviour in quantum physics. This researcher finds

that computer generated illustrations of the behaviour of subatomic particles in quantum

physics as well as the images of fractals and strange attractors, as constructs of chaos

theory, are outwardly similar patterns to those depicted by a

o

This is seemingly corroborated by Van Eenwyk (1997:116) who equates archetypes

with strange attractors, which Mandelbrot (cited in Van Eenwyk, 1997:58) considers to

be fractal, and also alludes to a similarity in geometric designs of entopic images,

fractals, attractors and holograms. “Like equations that are graphed on a computer

screen [fractals], the activity of the psyche also leaves its traces. From cave drawings to

religious images to folk tales and myths, we humans have been moved to represent

graphically what we believe to be the essence of the world we inhabit” (Van Eenwyk,

1997:116). The correspondence between attractors, consciousness and innate hidden

determinants of be

H

The observation of innate and inherited shapes (entopic images) during an altered state

of consciousness (the collective unconscious) which is subsequently recreated and

represented in symbolic form may thus mark the existence of archetypal moulds and

rudimentary patterns of meaning. Through repeated experiences these shapes and

images became archaic and historical formulae (Jung) and collective representations

(Lévy-Bruhl) expressed not only in art, but also in earliest forms of writing as in, for

example San and Egyptian hieroglyphs and petroglyphs. These assumptions, including

120


121

h these constructs

erive, will be explored in the final contributory chapter of the study.

possible explanations for the relationship between archetypes, holograms, strange

attractors and fractals and the systems and chaos theories from whic

d

Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2

San rock art depicting Examples of entopic images

a rain animal, and showing

the zigzag – an entopic image

Fig. 3.3

Entopic images evident in ancient Egyptian art, including zigzags, circles, stars, and spirals

Fig. 3.4 Fig. 3.5 Fig. 3.6 Fig. 3.7 Fig. 3.8 Fig. 3.9

Fig. 3.10 Fig. 3.11 Fig. 3.12 Fig. 3.13 Fig. 3.14 Fig. 3.15 Fig. 3.16 Fig. 3.17

Fig. 3.19

Fig. 3.18

Figures 3.4 – 3.19


images evident in ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs, including zigzags, grids, circles, stars, and

pirals

Entopic

s

1500 BC found at Piedras Negras in the Western Gulf of

Fig. 3.20

Pre-Mayan pertroglyphs (rock carvings) dated

Mexico illustrating spiral and circular designs

Mandelbrot’s fractals

Fig. 3.21 Fig. 3.22

The Mandelbrot Set The Mandelbrot Set

Mandelbrot’s fractals

The Lorenz attractor

3.3.4.2 Archetypal myths

Fig. 3.23

Jung (1963:118) stated, “Comparative religion and mythology are rich mines of

archetypes” Spiegelman (1989:iv) follows Jung by stating that it is through myth,

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retranslate these stories

o as to speak into the language of metaphors and symbols”.

g and everyone is implicated in

verything and everyone else” (Houston, 1993:111).

ture and to the whole personality (Schorer quoted in Cooper, 1995:iv; Ions,

997:6).

cultural stories and religion that the workings and passions (archetypes and complexes)

of the soul are revealed. However, in order to grasp the significance of these stories of

the soul and “echoes from a distant past” (Hawkins, 2004) an approach or key is needed

to unlock their meaning. Spiegelman (1989:v) says, “the way is the symbol, as depth

psychology has shown us, and the mode is interpretation. We

s

It is apparent from the previously mentioned that closely related to the symbol and the

symbolic are the myth and the mythical which appear to embody sequences or series of

symbolic representations describing so-called imaginary events or fantasy. Myth may

hence be described as patterns representing archetypal expressions of the psyche. For

example, “Myths depict the typical sequences, the archetypal patterns, in the drama of

the psyche (or soul)” (Chetwynd, 1993:vii). Mythical patterns are moreover likened to

the natural working of biology and cosmology by (Houston, 1993:111). “We are

patterned in a field of resonance where everythin

e

Myth was, according to Cooper (1995:iv), for the early anthropologists, untrue, a

figment of the imagination, and that which was dreamed up by elementary, and

uncultured minds. However, this century has seen a full appreciation and interest in its

value. Consequently, it is now recognised as a serious expression of both some sacred

truth and aspects of the mundane. Schorer (quoted in Cooper, 1995:iv) says, “myths are

the instruments by which we continually struggle to make our experiences intelligible to

ourselves”. Furthermore, Feinstein and Knipper (1989:2) maintain that myths are not

falsehoods or legends, they are the models by which human beings code and organise

their perceptions, feelings, thoughts and actions. A myth may thus be defined as an

image or pattern of symbols that gives meaning to the facts of ordinary life and sacred

principles. Without such representations, experience is chaotic, fragmentary and merely

phenomenal. Consequently, myths unify experience in a way that is satisfactory to the

whole cul

1

Myth is expressed through series of symbols and “readily merge into one another,

making patterns of bewildering complexity”. Accordingly, Eliade (cited in Cooper,

123


corresponds with Hillman’s imaginal

apacities of the soul stated in Chapter Two.

ion and Deluge myths, which seem to be narrated in most cultures (Todeschi,

000b).

ggests, “In a very real way,

at humankind comprises a demonstrably unified family”.

1995:v) argues that current language confuses myth with fable, whereas, traditional

societies see myth as the only valid revelation of reality, dealing with the sacred. In

contrast, Rundle Clark (1978:218) considers symbols to be acting as focal points for

emotions or imaginative speculations described in myths. Rundle Clark’s (1978)

association of myth with the imagination

c

Cooper (1995:v) explains that many myths are universal and are fundamental responses

to the environment, existential situations, and personal social and cultural longings.

“They have been handed down by word of mouth, in rituals, festivals, religious drama

and in literature, becoming a creative force, perpetuating the powers of which they are

an expression” (Cooper, 1995:v). Examples of universal and hence archetypal myths are

the Creat

2

In accord with and expanding on these statements, Roberts, Roberts and Katz (1997:9)

are intrigued by the similarities expressed by diverse cultures in mythical expression.

“Cultures as separated as the Norse and Chinese or the Greek and Japanese, for

example, share a surprising number of mythological parallels” (Roberts et al, 1997:9).

They (Roberts et al, 1997:9) furthermore note that the myths of the world seem to come

from a few common sources, and a study of these myths su

th

A surprising simile between myth and the symbolic explanation of quantum theory is

suggested by Finkelstein (cited in Zukav, 1991:277) who states that the true language of

physics is ‘mythos’. It alludes to experience yet does not replace it or moulds

perception. This is because both ordinary languages used to communicate daily

experience and mathematics follows a certain set of rules, or classical logic that are not

sufficient to explain the contemporary ineffable nature of quantum phenomena.

Moreover, according to Finkelstein (cited in Zukav, 1991:277), experience is not bound

by these rules because it follows a more permissive set of rules which fall within the

ambit of quantum logic. “Quantum logic is not only more exciting than classical logic,

it is more real. It is based not upon the way that we think of things, but upon the way

that we experience them” (Zukav, 1991:277). The implication is that language and

124


o

logos, the new sciences herald a return to mythos when confronted with the ineffable.

3.3.4.3 Archetypal symbols

ay mark-out their destiny, the highest evolution of his or her psyche

illman, 1996).

wider meaning and expresses a

sychic fact which cannot be formulated more exactly.

structures or blueprints situated in the

personal, collective unconscious.

as a wider and unconscious aspect that is never precisely defined (Jung et al, 1964:4).

classical logic do not correspond to certain aspects of experience. Finkelstein’s assertion

is also an indication that where the Enlightenment marked the move from mythos t

Symbols have been created and used in every conceivable aspect of human experience.

Todeschi (1995:1) asserts, “The world of myth and symbolism has always been an

extremely powerful vehicle for human understanding”. The essence of Jung’s theory of

archetypal symbolism is found in this quotation: “…a symbol is the best possible

expression for an unconscious content whose nature can only be guessed, because it is

still unknown” (Jung, 1968a:6n). This statement relates to the fact that symbols are

representations of the psyche, which contain knowledge that is not directly known to all

individuals and m

(H

Fordham (1966:19) points out that Jung uses the word ‘symbol’ in a definite way,

making a distinction between ‘symbol’ and ‘sign’: a sign is a substitute for, or

representation of the real thing, while a symbol carries a

p

According to Wehr (1987:55), symbols portray universal human experiences. Symbolic

images are hence discernable personal and cultural signs that are embedded in

unconscious archetypal forms and

im

To discern and comprehend the meaning of the symbol, an intrapsychic analysis (an

inner colloquy) is required, and in so doing, the archetypal root of the symbol is

exposed. Jacobi (quoted in Singer, 2000:183) states; “…the deeper the analysis

penetrates the more clearly the effects of archetypes appear; the symbol becomes

increasingly dominant, for it encloses the archetype, a nucleus of meaning…” Hence,

as the mind explores the symbol, it is lead to ideas that lie beyond the grasp of reason. It

h

125


in Jung’s (in Sabini, 2002:14)

xplanation that nature encompasses all the archetypes.

annot be other than inferred from the archetypal image and the instinctual behaviour.

favour of the view that a

ymbol is solely a product of frustrated impulses and society.

An archetypal symbol therefore connotes meaning in addition to the conventional,

obvious and cognitive, and represents something vague, unknown or even hidden from

conscious awareness. Jacobi (quoted in Singer, 2000:184) provides an example which

elucidates the emergence of the universal meaning of an archetype: “A dream symbol of

a real mother gives a detailed image of her limited diurnal role but gradually the

meaning becomes wider and deeper until the image is transformed into a symbol of

Woman in all her variations as contrasexual partner; then rising up from a still deeper

strata, the image discloses mythological features, becomes a fairy or a dragon; in the

deepest stratum, the storehouse of collective, universal human experience, it takes on

the form of a cave, the underworld, the ocean, and finally it swells into the one-half of

creation, chaos, the darkness that receives and conceives”. The apparent link between

nature, anthropomorphism and archetypes is indicated

e

According to Hall et al (1998:92), a symbol in Jungian psychology has two major

functions: 1) it symbolises or represents an attempt to satisfy an instinctive impulse that

has been frustrated; and 2) it is an embodiment of archetypal material. Archetypal

material or experience takes either visual or muscular form; the former could be called

the archetypal image, the latter instinct. Both are parts of the archetype itself, which

c

The two sides or aspects of a symbol, one retrospective and instinctive and the other

prospective and guided by the ultimate goals of humankind and hence every individual,

are two sides of the same coin. A symbol may be analysed from either side; the

retrospective type of analysis exposes the instinctive basis of a symbol, whereas the

prospective type reveals the yearnings of humankind for completion, rebirth, harmony

and purification. The former is a causal, reductive type of analysis; the latter is a

teleological, finalistic type of analysis. Both are necessary for a complete elucidation of

the symbol (Hall et al, 1998:108). According to Hall et al (1998:108), Jung believed that

the prospective character of a symbol has been neglected in

s

Hall (1957:xx) indicates that symbolism is an ingenious and ideal method of preserving

transcendental knowledge which is both revealed and concealed in symbols. The secrets

126


anity has once again learned to

ad the universal language – symbols (Hall, 1957:xx).

meaning of the symbol is communicated at a level deeper

an that of the intellect”.

g to Tillich (quoted in Van Eenwyk, 1997:84), “real

etaphors are not translatable”.

ake them aware of a knowledge contained in their soul (Schwaller de Lubicz, 1978).

an experiential representation that is included in

of transcendental knowledge are veiled and “engraved upon the face of mountains and

concealed within the measurements of colossal images, each of which was a geometric

marvel”. According to Hall (1957:xx), knowledge of chemistry and mathematics are

hidden within mythologies, or “in the spans and arches of temples which time has not

entirely obliterated”. These lost inner mysteries of life, arts and sciences; and concealed

wisdom of antiquity will remain hidden until this hum

re

In all probability, according to various authors, symbols, and specifically universal

symbols, through their nature or appearance, reflect or represent something profound

(Bruce-Mitford, 2000:8). Particularly universal symbols of the Self are viewed as means

of communicating profound insights to the individual. For example, Shelley (quoted in

Prata, 1997:xi) states, “The universal symbol has been the reciprocity of truth about the

reality of the Self. The true

th

Van Eenwyk (1997:83) explains that symbols may be viewed as star-gates that give

access to other universes. Well-known proponents of this view are Tillich, Heidegger,

Merton and Ricoeur (cited in Van Eenwyk, 1997:43) who maintain that symbols

transcend categories; and point to those areas of life that are difficult to define and

explain. Moreover, they function as agents of change and allow contact with essential

dimensions of our being. Accordin

m

Van Eenwyk (1997:84) also explains that symbols are essentially interfaces mediating

between the conscious mind and the unconscious by participating in both. “Generated

by the psyche to serve its own needs, symbols facilitate communication among its

various dimensions”. Thus, the symbol is a material representation of immaterial

qualities and functions. It is an objectification of things subjective in the human mind

and subliminal in nature, awakening individuals to a perception of the world which may

m

Bruce-Mitford (2000:98-119) provides a list and categorisation of symbols which is

indicative of the vast expanse of hum

127


e explorations by various authors.

th

128

Certain of the categories that relate to the symbols of the Self will be explored in more

detail in a subsequent section of the chapter. It includes the following:

Picture writing: Clay tokens, ideograms, pictograms, and hieroglyphs;

Numbers; specifically the numbers three, four, seven and nine are seen as

symbolic of sacred and transcendent knowledge;

Shapes and patterns; geometric and sacred shapes such as the Yantra or mandala

representing the circle;

Colour;

Alchemical symbols;

Masonic symbols;

Divinatory or mantic symbols including, for example, the I Ching, tarot cards, and

rune stones;

Astrological symbols;

Heraldic emblems, for example, the Coat of Arms;

International signs and symbols, for example, the red cross; and

Symbolic gestures, for example nonverbal and physical cues.

Todeschi (2000b:21) proposes in his categorisation that there are essentially only three

different types of symbols. The first type is that of archetypes, which have meaning for

individuals across time and cultures. Archetypes encapsulate symbols or prototypes of

human behaviour and experience. Mythic tales and legends also illustrate archetypes

independent of the narration’s historical validity. Examples include the Creation Myth,

which is at the root of all civilizations and societies, as well as the Flood Myth, which is

told in a variety of ways in more than two hundred different cultures. Todeschi

(2000b:29) states that whether or not the story of a Great Flood has any basis in fact, it

is so widespread a myth that it has an archetypal meaning at a subconscious level.

“Simply stated, the meaning is one of transformation and change. As an archetype, the

Great Flood Myth symbolizes the pattern of being overwhelmed by personal

transformation and change, yet somehow becoming a better person because of it”

(Todeschi, 2000b:29).

Another popular mythic archetype proposed by Todeschi (2000b:30) is the legend of the

Soul’s Journey. “The Soul’s Journey archetype is exemplified by Dorothy’s experience

in The Wizard of Oz, Christian’s journey in Pilgrim‘s Progress, Pinocchio’s challenges


129

in The Adventures of Pinocchio, Bilbo’s adventures in The Hobbit, and The Parable of

the Prodigal Son in the book of Luke (Luke 15:11-24)”. The basic theme is that the

individual went off on a journey of self-discovery, and eventually returns to the same

place it started but with an expanded level of awareness. Todeschi (2000b:30) moreover

posits that whenever a story, a legend, a myth, or a film encapsulates an archetype of

human behaviour, it has the potential to resonate to an enormous audience.

Secondly, there are cultural symbols, which are appropriate for a given nation or

society. Cultural symbols exist because groups of individuals have often given meaning

to specific images and symbols based upon their history and experience, which has been

passed down to people sharing a similar culture and background (Todeschi, 2000b:21).

Finally, there are symbols that are personal and specific to an individual where the

underlying meaning of a specific symbol is closely associated with whatever the

dreamer equates with that particular image. The interpretation of these symbols is

primarily dependent upon whatever the individual associates with that image or his or

her personal experience with it. When these associations differ from the thoughts and

feelings of others, the personal association generally takes precedence (Todeschi,

2000b:21).

3.3.5 ARCHETYPES AND SYNCHRONICITY

Jung (1950, 1985) proposed and developed a principle that was neither causal nor

teleological, the ‘principle of synchronicity’. To Jung (1985) synchronicity is a

meaningful coincidence in time, and a psychic factor, which is independent of time and

space. This principle applies to events that occur together in time but are not caused by

one another, for example, when a thought corresponds with an objective and external

event. Jung (1985:26) believed that many of these experiences could not be explained as

chance coincidences: instead, they suggest that there is another kind of order in the

universe in addition to that described by causality. He (Jung, 1985:27) asserts, “It

cannot be a question of cause and effect, but a falling together in time, a kind of

simultaneity”. Synchronicity is evident when one is thinking of a person and the person

appears or one dreams about the illness or death of a friend or relative and later hears

that the event took place at the exact time of the dream (Hall et al, 1998:102).


130

Jung (1985:29-30; cited in Hall et al, 1998:102) states that synchronistic phenomena are

attributed to the nature of archetypes. An archetype is said to be psychoid in character:

that is, it is both psychological and physical. Consequently, an archetype can bring into

consciousness a mental image of a physical event even though there is no direct

perception of the physical event. An archetype does not cause both events: rather it

possesses a quality that permits synchronicity to occur. Synchronicity will be explored

in detail in Chapter Four.

3.4 COMMUNICATION THEORY AND THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS

The following section will explore to what extent the constructs and concepts explored

in the previous section have been incorporated into communication theory. Specifically,

this will allow the subsequent incorporation of unearthed constructs into the existing

frame and body of knowledge in communication studies. The exploration will focus on

those theories related to the Self and intrapsychic communication and commence from

selected and relevant theories, such as the most contemporary theories of symbolic

interactionsm and social constructivism.

The social construction of reality, with Berger and Luckmann (1967) as the major

proponents, is seemingly inherently related to symbolic interactionism. Both genres

have been engendered from the discipline of sociology, hence the emphasis on

meanings and understanding derived from communication with others. Where symbolic

interactionism focuses on how an individual develops an identity through

communication with others, social constructivism focuses on how an individual needs

society to create or construct reality and concurrently uses the creation as an objective

sounding board (Littlejohn, 1996:179-180).

Social constructivism is concerned with an inquiry into the construction of reality.

Berger and Luckmann (1967:15) state: “We contend that the sociology of knowledge is

concerned with the analysis of the social construction of reality”. They (Berger &

Luckmann, 1967:16) add that the sociology of knowledge constitutes the sociological

focus of existential determination of thought. The intellectual antecedents of the

sociology of knowledge developed from three streams of thought in nineteenth century


131

Germany, i. e. the Marxian, the Nietzschean and the historicist models. The root

proposition of the sociology of knowledge is said to be derived from Marxian thought:

“Man’s consciousness is determined by his social being”. Specific agglomerations of

‘reality’ and ‘knowledge’ hence pertain to specific social contexts, societies or cultures

(Berger & Luckmann, 1967:15). This notion is reflected and crystallised in an

awareness of the social foundations of values in modern Western thought (Berger &

Luckmann, 1967:17).

It is evident from the assumptions and opinions in the previous paragraphs that symbols

and the symbolic interpretations of reality occupy a central position in communication

theory. The most noted argument is that of the social nature of symbols in which both

notions of self and reality are embedded. Conversely, minimal reference is made to the

intrapsychic processes in the construction of meaning.

The construction of the self is hence attributed to symbols in communication theory.

However, this construction of the self occurs only within a social context. Griffen

(1994:116) states that the interactionists view the self as a function of language and

symbols used within a social context, creates the self. This ‘self-portrait’, ‘self-picture’

or mental image of the self is termed ‘the looking-glass self’ and develops solely

through role-taking or symbolic interaction with significant others (Griffen, 1994:115;

Littlejohn, 1996:162).

Mead’s (1934) humanistic symbolic interactionism emphasises the social dimension of

symbols and states that meaning is a product of social life using significant symbols in a

society that is a cluster of cooperative behaviours by a group of societal members

(Fisher, 1978:165-170; Littlejohn, 1996:161; Neuliep, 1996:47). “Society, then, consists

of a network of social interactions in which participants assign meaning to their own

and other’s reactions by the use of symbols” (Littlejohn, 1996:162).

Fisher (1978:168) adds that the Meadian concept of the ‘I’ and ‘me’ should not be

confused with the Freudian structural tripartite division of the id, ego, and superego.

Rather, the Meadian I-me duality should be viewed as a social process of self-indication

where the construction of reality within the self represents a microcosm of the

construction of a social reality in interaction. This construction of reality in


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interactionism requires the internal social process of self-indication and interpretation.

However, Fisher (1978:168) is of the opinion that Mead’s concept of the self represents

a reflexive process. Interactionism does not view the individual as a unique and

integrated entity with internalised cognitions and beliefs, but as a social being. Fisher

(1978:168) hence posits that this social human being does not exist merely in a stimulus

field, but acts creatively and reflexively.

Littlejohn (1996:162) states that the distinguishing feature of the interactionist view of

meaning is conscious interpretation. Conscious interpretation differentiates non-

symbolic interaction (a reflex) from symbolic interaction where significant symbols are

utilised. In using these significant symbols and role taking or ‘behaving as others

behave’, a person develops a self-concept.

Neuliep (1996:47) is of the opinion that symbolic interactionists believe that an

understanding of human behaviour requires the study of covert behaviour. This

understanding of the internal functioning is not a process of introspection (Griffen,

1994:115), but rather the self must go outside the self to do the interpreting. “The

individual can assume the interpretative process (called standpoints) of others in order

to define the self” (Fisher, 1978:171). Note the difference in interpretation between

Fisher (1978:167) and Griffen (1994:115).

3.4.1 COMMUNICATION THEORY AND ARCHETYPAL SYMBOLS

O’Sullivan, Hartley, Saunders, Montgomery & Fiske (1994:15) state that the problem

with the application of the concept of archetype in communication, cultural studies and

semiotics is that it is too general and varied to allow close definition and scientific

scrutiny. They (O’Sullivan et al, 1994:249) also ascribe the lack of acceptance of Jung’s

collective unconscious archetypal structures and synchronicity to speculative

psychodynamics and metaphysics.

However, they assert that Jung’s search for underlying patterns within symbolic worlds

and the identification of large-scale paradigms for cultural imagery complements a

science of signs, hence semiotics or semiology (O’Sullivan et al, 1994:15).

Consequently, O’Sullivan et al (1994:15) say, “It is therefore somewhat ironic that so


133

little reference is made to Saussure or semiology in Jung’s writing - or that later

structuralist and semiotic theorists have not recognized Jung’s interpretations”.

However, they (O’Sullivan et al, 1994:15) maintain that a (Jungian) project, which

examines signifier /signified relations in so many cultures and eras, may be viewed with

suspicion. The same sentiment is expressed by Rupprecht (1997) who says, “Issues of

genre, period, and language were ignored or subjected to gross generalization as Jung

searched for universals in disparate texts”. It is this researcher’s estimation that clearly

no in-depth study of Jung’ assertions and postulations were made and that their criticism

is based on secondary assumptions. This is evident in the fact that despite their

concerns, they (O’Sullivan et al, 1994:15) indicate that the analysis of ‘clustered’

images in semiotics has been aided by the archetype concept. Moreover, such an

analysis “emphasizes a world of symbolism that goes way beyond the popular imagery

of television screens or newspaper advertisements, and that extends to dream worlds

and memories” (O’Sullivan et al, 1994:15).

Paradoxically, they (O’Sullivan et al, 1994:249) view Jung’s postulations and constructs

with skepticism whilst concurrently favourably appraising Freud’s and Lacan’s

psychoanalytical theoretical perspective concerning internal psychic structures as

important. The importance is attributed to the fact that the “communication system

arising out of such a psychic matrix is of especial importance for the analysis of

intrapersonal communication, motivation, socialization and development” (O’Sullivan

et al, 1994:249).

Contrary to the assertions by O’Sullivan et al (1994:15) regarding archetypal images,

Littlejohn (2002:72) comments, “Visual images do not quite fit the semiotic norm of

representation. Surely, images can be understood as representing things, but they are

not arbitrary or separate from what is represented. Images resonate with deep levels of

actual experience in a way that arbitrary signs do not”. Hence, visual signs and images,

which are pivotal and increasingly important to Western culture due to the new media

technology, create special problems with regard the current semiotic assumptions that

signs are separate from their referents. Visual codes are more open in their potential

meanings; consequently, their interpretation is more subjective and more related to the

internal perceptual and cognitive processes of the viewer than to conventional restricted

representations (Littlejohn, 2002:72).


134

Notwithstanding the above-mentioned statements by Littlejohn (2002) that visual

images do not perfectly fit the semiotic mould, and the assertions by O’Sullivan et al

(1994) and Rupprecht (1997), it is necessary to explore certain theoretical assumptions

of the semiotic approach and analyses that possibly allude to innate structures. This

will allow the juxtaposition of constructs posited by the semiotic approach and those

extrapolated on a unitary reality and archetypal symbols by the exploration in this study.

The German philosopher, Kant’s (cited in Fourie, 2001a:328) assertion that no raw

material is attainable from the Umwelt (reality) other than through humankind’s mind

(gemüt), highlights the possible relationship between semiotics and an inner reality and

symbols since the interpretation and meaning of experiences are mediated through a

“soup of signs” (Sebeok cited in Fourie, 2001a:328). Subsequently, the study will hone-

in on the junction or interface between deep innate mental and psychic structures and

the interpretation of archetypal symbols.

3.4.1.1 Semiotics

The two dominant models of contemporary semiotics emerged from the theories of the

linguist de Saussure (1857-1913), shortened to Saussure, and the philosopher Peirce

(1931-1958) (Du Plooy, 2001:9; Littlejohn, 2002:58). The term, ‘semiology’ (from the

Greek semeîon, ‘sign’) refers to the Saussurean tradition, whilst ‘semiotics’ sometimes

refers to the Peircean tradition, however, nowadays the term ‘semiotics’ is more likely

to be used as an umbrella term to embrace both traditions (Chandler, 2001a).

According to Chandler (2001a), semiotics is not widely institutionalised as an academic

discipline, and is a field of study involving many different theoretical stances and

methodological tools. One of the broadest definitions is that of Eco (quoted in Chandler,

2001a), who states, “semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken as a

sign”, whereas Fourie (1995:2) defines it as “the science of signs, codes and meaning”.

Deacon, Pickering, Golding and Murdock (1999:135) assert that semiotics as a tradition

has merged with a number of forms in the methodological range of cultural studies and

critical approaches.

Semiotics involves the study of what is referred to as ‘signs’ or arbitrary associations


135

between signs and their references as used in everyday speech, and anything which

‘stands for’ something else and may take the form of words, images, sounds, gestures

and objects, and is generally referred to as text (Chandler, 2001a; Deacon et al,

1999:137). Moreover, Chandler (2001a) states that contemporary semioticians study

signs not in isolation but as part of semiotic ‘sign systems’, such as a medium or genre.

“They study how meanings are made: as such, being concerned not only with

communication but also with the construction and maintenance of reality” (Chandler,

2001a). The implication is that current semiotic analysis is focused on the construction

of socially derived meanings found primarily in forms of the mass media (Deacon et al,

1999:135). Fourie (1995:2) incorporates semiotics into a more general semiotic theory

of communication that designates it as the study of the processes by which meaning is

created, transferred and circulated, and includes three principle areas of study: signs,

sign systems and codes. This process of creating meaning is also referred to as

signification. Additionally, Fourie (1995:3) indicates that semiotics aims to provide the

concepts and instruments in the analysis and description of the various ways in which

meaning is created.

Littlejohn (2002:63) explains that there is a reciprocal influence between the study of

the structural tradition of language and semiotics. Accordingly, it is difficult to

disentangle European semiotics from its structuralist origin. The following section is an

exploration of the major contributors to, developments and key points in semiotics.

3.4.1.2 Structuralism

Fourie (2001a:329) indicates that structuralism was one of the main and most dominant

paradigms in the social and human sciences for the most part of this century. O’Sullivan

et al (1994:225) define structuralism as “an intellectual enterprise characterized by

attention to the systems, relations and forms - the structures – that make meaning

possible in any cultural activity or artifact”. Major structuralists include Saussure, Lévi-

Strauss (1908-1990), a cultural anthropologist (who saw his subject as a branch of

semiotics), and Lacan (1901-1981), a psychoanalyst (Chandler, 2001a).

Fourie (2001a:329) groups the purpose of structural analysis of archetypes and the

collective unconscious with anthropology and hence separates it from psychoanalysis,


136

which is said to uncover the underlying structure of behaviour. He (Fourie, 2001a:330)

explains that according to structuralism the surface structures of, for example, myths,

the human psyche and society are based on a deep structure. Moreover, according to

structural philosophy, reality and thought, amongst others, are no more than the result of

the collective unconscious or deep structure of society (Fourie, 2001a:330).

Linguistic structuralism is an analytical method that has been employed by many

semioticians and is based on Saussure's linguistic model. Kellner and Durham

(2001:13), however, attribute the development of structuralism to Lévi-Strauss (1908-

1990) who articulated the basic structures of culture and society. Structuralists seek to

describe the overall organisation of sign systems as ‘languages’ with underlying

universal rules and structures (Fourie, 2001a:329). For example, Lévi-Strauss related

these rules and structures to myth, “mythemes”, kinship rules and totemism; Lacan

related them to the Freud’s explanation of the unconscious, and Barthes equated them

with the ‘grammar’ of narrative (Chandler 2001a; Cavallaro, 2001:23; Mattelart &

Mattelart, 1998:70). Structuralist semioticians hence engage in a search for ‘deep

structures’ underlying the ‘surface features’ of signs and phenomena.

i Saussure (1857-1913)

According to Chandler (2001a), Saussure was influenced by the pragmatic

philosophers of the 19th century, including Wittgenstein and James. Saussure

(quoted in Chandler, 2001a) defined ‘semiology’ as ‘a science which studies the role

of signs as part of social life’. He (Saussure cited in Littlejohn, 2002:63) explained

that signs, including language, are arbitrary and that there is generally no physical

connection between a word and its referent. Signs and the use of language are

therefore conventions governed by rules, which implies that language, as a structure,

and reality are separate.

Saussure (cited in Littlejohn, 2002:63) asserted that reality and an individual’s

knowledge of that reality and the world at large are determined by language. Unlike

other semioticians, Saussure (cited in Littlejohn, 2002:63) stated that signs constitute

rather than designate objects and thus have no referential function. Littlejohn

(2002:63) is of the opinion that “in this regard, Saussure’s work set the stage for

much twentieth-century thought not only in structural linguistics but also


137

interactionist theory”.

Saussure (cited in Littlejohn, 2002:64; Chandler, 2001a; Deacon et al, 1999:136)

distinguished between formal language (langue) and the use of language in

communication or speech (parole). He (Saussure cited in Littlejohn, 2002:64)

referred to language (langue) as a synchrony (it changes little over time) and a formal

structural system that can be analysed (linguistically) separately from its everyday

usage in speech (parole). Speech (parole) is referred to as diachrony since it changes

constantly from situation to situation. “Taken as a whole, speech [parole] is many-

sided and heterogeneous; straddling several areas simultaneously ... we cannot put it

into any category of human facts, for we cannot discover its unity. Language

[langue], on the contrary, is a self-contained whole and a principle of classification”

(Saussure quoted in Littlejohn, 2002:64). According to Littlejohn (2002:64), the

distinction that Saussure made between language and speech, and that between

synchrony and diachrony, have been sharply criticised by theorists from other

traditions.

Additionally, Saussure (cited in Cavallaro, 2001:17; Fourie, 2001a:334; Deacon et al,

1999:136-137) stated that a sign is made of three parts: a signifier - the sound-image

or the physical quality of a sign; the referent or object which the signifier represents;

and the signified – the meaning attached to the signifier by the recipient.

ii Peirce (1931-1958)

Peirce described the basic notion of a sign and semiosis (the process of signification

and meaning production) as a relationship among a sign, an object and a meaning

where the sign represents the object, or referent, in the mind of an interpreter

(Littlejohn, 2002:59). He identified the three components of a sign as being a

denotatum or representatum (what the sign represents), an object (the literal meaning

of the denotatum) and the representation or association of an object by a sign as the

interpretant (Fourie, 1995:38). All three elements are required in an irreducible triad

in order for signs to operate (Littlejohn, 2002:59). According to Littlejohn (2002:59),

many semiotic theorists have elaborated and expanded on this basic idea, and that

further studies of semiotics have since been undertaken by, for example, Morris and

Sebeok (1991), Eco (1982) and Barthes (1972, 1977; 1999).


138

In terms of the above mentioned triadic relationship, meaning thus depends on the

image or thought of the person in relation to the sign and the object being signified.

This relationship between meaning and images alluded to by Peirce could possibly

imply a junction or link between Jung’s postulation on inherent archetypal structures

and meaning. In accord with this observation Semetsky (2002) states that archetypal

images are semiotic by virtue of their being carriers of information.

Peirce (cited in Cavalarro, 2001:18) identified three types of signs: The icon; a sign

based on the resemblance between signifier and signified (a portrait); the index, a

sign in which the signifier and signified are causally related (e.g. smoke means fire);

and the sign proper or the sign in which the relationship between the signified and

signifier is arbitrary. The sign proper is also referred to as the arbitrary sign. An

additional type of signs described by Fourie (2001a:335) is the symbolic sign where

there is no outward correspondence or correlation between the sign and its referent,

for example, a cross symbolising Christianity.

Additionally, Peirce proposed that a concept such as a ‘sign’ makes humankind more

aware of beliefs and consequently behaviour and thought (Fourie, 2001a:332). A

three-level approach to the comprehension of the world is also suggested by Pierce

which includes ‘Firstness’, a concept of what is without reference to anything else;

‘Secondness’ or the conception of what exists in terms of another or a Second; and

‘Thirdness’ is the conception of the generally valid. Thirdness is the conception

arrived at by relating what is being brought about by a Second to a Third (Fourie,

2001a:333).

According to Semetsky (2002), the affective influence of archetypes is compatible

with Peirce’s triadic semiotics, and enables signs to function at the level of Firstness,

that is outside one’s individual cognition, yet inside the collective unconscious

posited by Jung.

The ‘Thirdness’ of mediation during analysis and interpretation of symbols

contributes to signs becoming present to an individual’s conscious awareness as

objects of action and reaction, that is, ‘Secondness’. The explication of the implicit


139

meanings, in accord with Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, has profound implications for

the individual not only contributing to healing the psyche but also by virtue of

enabling the individual to reflect on her/himself when, for example, a person is

situated within conflicting experiences (Semetsky, 2002).

Further similarities between Jung and Peirce as identified by Semetsky (2002)

include Jung’s rejection of dualistic logic since Jung stated “psyche and matter are

two different aspects of one and the same thing" (Jung quoted in Semetsky, 2002).

Semetsky (2002) asserts, “As if anticipating the post-Cartesian philosophies, Jung

did not draw a line of great divide between the products of imagination and those of

intellect: all thinking aims to the creation of meanings”.

The purpose of Jungian analysis in individuation, according to (Semetsky, 2002), is a

process of integration of conscious and unconscious symbolic aspects of the self for

the “achievement of a greater personality”. Integration, as the production of

meanings, leads to potential change in habitual ways of thinking, feeling and

behaving as eventual effects of archetypal imagery embedded in the collective

unconscious. Thus Jungian analytical psychology, both theoretically and practically,

may be considered a pragmatic method in accord with Peirce’s maxim (Semetsky,

2002).

iii Lévi-Strauss (1908-1990)

Fourie (1995:160) indicates that Lévi-Strauss, a cultural anthropologist, is regarded

as one of the pioneers in the field of structural analysis and contributed to the study

of semiotics by drawing attention to the notions of ‘binary oppositions’ in media

texts and the role of myth in human comprehension of reality, a notion that Barthes

elaborated on. Binary opposition is described as the meaning of something that

depends on its opposite, for example ‘good’ and the meaning of ‘good’ depend on

‘evil’ and the meaning of ‘evil’ (Fourie, 1995:160). Additionally, Lévi-Strauss

proposed the notion of myth as a narrative without foundation, which is handed

down from generation to generation, implying that although the content of myth may

differ between generations, the structure and intended meaning remain the same

(Fourie, 1995:161).


140

According to Guerin et al (1992), to Lévi-Strauss, the structures of the human mind

were common to all people and thus underscored the universality of myth. Myth

consequently is a universal narrative that transcends cultural or temporal barriers and

“speaks to all people, in the process tapping deep reservoirs of feeling and

experience and often invested with divine origins”. Guerin et al (1992) indicate that

in his study of the Oedipus myth, Lévi-Strauss described ‘mythemes’ or units of

myth based in binary oppositions, whose structural patterns invest the myth with

meaning. Fourie (1995:161) asserts that Lévi-Strauss’s analysis of myth and binary

oppositions was intended to illustrate that a ‘universal logic’ underlies human

thought. These descriptions of the nature of myths seemingly relate to Jung’s theories

of archetypal myths and the collective unconscious.

Lévi-Strauss also referred to bricolage, the process of creating something not as a

matter of calculated choice and use of whatever materials are technically best-

adapted to a clearly predetermined purpose, but rather involving a ‘dialogue with the

materials and means of execution’. In such a dialogue, the materials, which are

ready-at-hand, may ‘suggest’ an adaptive course of action, and the initial aim may be

modified. Consequently, such acts of creation are not purely instrumental: “the

bricoleur speaks not only with things... but also through the medium of things

[hence] the use of the medium can be expressive” (Lévi-Strauss quoted in Chandler,

2001a).

Although the context of Lévi-Strauss's point was a discussion of ‘mythical thought’,

Chandler (2001a) argues that bricolage may be involved in the use of any medium

and for any purpose. The act of writing, for instance, may be shaped not only by the

writer’s conscious purposes but also by features of the media involved - such as the

kind of language and writing tools used - as well as by the social and psychological

processes of mediation involved. However, not every writer acts or feels like a

bricoleur. Individuals differ strikingly in their responses to the notion of media

transformation. They range from those who insist that they are in total control of the

media, which they ‘use’, to those who experience a profound sense of being shaped

by the media, which ‘use’ them.


141

iv Morris (1901-1979)

Where Peirce described the basic notion of a sign, Morris’ most enduring

contribution, according to Littlejohn (2002:60), is the division of the field into three

branches. These include semantics; the study of how signs relate to things;

syntactics, the study of how signs relate to other signs; and pragmatics the actual use

of codes in everyday life, including the effects of signs on human behaviour and how

people mould signs and meanings in their actual interaction.

Morris (cited in Littlejohn, 2002:60) proposed that the act of interpretation of a sign

consists of three stages, perception (awareness of the sign), manipulation

(interpretation and choice of response), and consummation (actual response). Signs

perform different functions during the three stages, for example, during the

perception stage signs designate and refer to some object or condition. In the

manipulation stage signs tend to prescribe, advise or tell what actions need to be

performed. Finally, in the consummation stage signs allow appraisal and evaluation

(Littlejohn, 2002:60).

Moreover, Morris (cited in Littlejohn, 2002:60).describes the interdependence

between the sign and the individual by stating that perception is often associated with

detachment, when the situation is viewed objectively. During the manipulation stage,

the signs appear to dominate and assume some authority which leads to the

consummation stage when there is often a feeling of dependence and reliance on the

sign as a way of structuring a response.

Littlejohn (2002:61) parallels this incremental development towards signification and

meaning with the system theory: a system influences and is influenced by other

systems and is said to be dependent on and subsequently dominant over that other

system. A state of detachment exists when a system is more or less autonomous.

“Detachment, then, corresponds to perception and the designative mode of

signification. Dominance corresponds to the manipulation and prescriptive factors,

and dependence corresponds to consummation and appraisive values” (Littlejohn,

2002:61).


142

v Barthes (1915-1980)

Semiotics, according to Chandler (2001a), became a major approach to cultural

studies in the late 1960s. This is partly as a result of the work of Barthes (1964

quoted in Chandler, 2001a) who declared that “semiology aims to take in any system

of signs, whatever their substance and limits”. These systems include images,

gestures, musical sounds, objects, and the complex associations of all of these, which

form the content of ritual, convention or public entertainment.

Cavallaro (2001:59) too indicates that the expansion of the concept of text and

textuality may be attributed to Barthes who described everything from billboards to

statues as text. Barthes postulated the concepts of connotation and denotation, and

applied Saussure’s concepts of the signifier and signified to semiotic analysis

specifically relating to forms of mass communication (Mattelart & Mattelart,

1998:69). According to Fourie (1995:162), Barthes concluded that the meaning of a

signifier is both open and layered in terms of first, second and third orders of

meaning. The first order of meaning is the denotative, the second the connotative and

the third the ideological. Additionally, he outlined a semiotic theory of

“contemporary myths” found in forms of mass communication, which he defined as

‘connotated languages’ and hence as second order meaning (Mattelart & Mattelart,

1998:70; Fourie, 1995:162).

Barthes stated that these myths serve an ideological function to naturalize culture and

to maintain the status quo (Chandler, 2001a; Kellner & Durham, 2001:13; Deacon et

al, 1999:131-138; Fourie, 1995:162). This means making “dominant cultural and

historical values, attitudes and beliefs seem entirely 'natural’, 'normal’, self-evident,

timeless, obvious 'common-sense' - and thus objective and 'true’ reflections of 'the

way things are” (Chandler, 2001a). Mattelart and Mattelart (1998:70) explain that

Barthes described the use of myth “appears to make use of ordinary language in

order to make secondary parasitic values natural”. Consequently, for Barthes, myth

is a socially constructed ‘truth’ with an underlying ideological meaning that societies

create for their own survival (Fourie, 1995:162). Barthes (cited in Fourie, 1995:163)

asserted that the universality of the life cycles of people from all cultures or the

“universality of being” is a myth which conceals the cultural and social diversity of


143


negative

eneralisation and simplification conceptions of reality (Fourie, 1995:164).

hereas archetypes are innate,

universal and unconscious patterns of comprehension.

vi Langer

ed in terms of meeting the symbolic need”

Langer quoted in Littlejohn, 2002:62).

ogical sense

humankind. It is because of this second-order and mythical meaning of text

highlighted by Barthes that Fourie (1995:163-164) asserts that the social scientist

should attempt to uncover the hidden social and conventional meanings of text (the

myths of meaning) which are mainly communicated through stereotypes. Stereotypes

are defined as a scheme or prejudice which allows the positive or

g

Pieterse (cited in Fourie, 1995:165) indicates that the view of stereotypes as

reflecting universal truths as the social and cultural equivalents of Jungian archetypes

as ancient mental primordial images seated in the collective unconscious is faulty.

This is primarily because stereotypes are primarily used to portray and emphasize

negative divergent characteristics, whereas archetypes reflect and portray both

negative and positive universal characteristics. Moreover, stereotypes are fluid,

variable and comprehensible social constructions, w

A theory of language and symbolism of specific importance and related to the scope

of this study is that of Langer “who considers symbolism to be the central concern of

philosophy, a topic that underlies all human knowing and understanding”

(Littlejohn, 2002:62). According to Langer (cited in Littlejohn, 2002:62), human

feeling is affected by conception, symbols, and language. The term sign is a stimulus

that signals the presence of a signified object, and a symbol, a more complex

construct, is a vehicle for the conception of objects in their absence. Additionally, the

use of symbols as “instruments of thought”, and symbol making are basic human

needs. “Symbol-making is a continuous process tantamount to eating and sleeping.

Much human behaviour can be explain

(

Langer (quoted in Littlejohn, 2002:62) views meaning as the complex relation

among the symbol, the object, and the person. “If there is not at least one thing

meant and one mind for which it is meant, then there is not a complete meaning”.

Consequently, meaning could be interpreted from two dimensions, logical and

rational interpretations between the symbol and referent, and a psychol

144


f meaning referring to the relation between the symbol and the person.

s rooted in feeling-toned personal

omplexes and universal, collective archetypes.

ception, which includes personal feelings and

ssociations attached to a symbol.

s ostensibly relate to

conceptions of presentational symbols as identified by Langer.

vii Chomsky

o

To Langer (cited in Littlejohn, 2002:62), a symbol communicates a concept, a

general idea, pattern or form that denotes a shared meaning among communicators.

However, each communicator has a private image or meaning, referred to as a

conception that completes the details of the common picture. Meaning therefore

consists of the individual’s private conception and the common concept shared with

others. These assumptions made by Langer appear to relate to Jung’s interpretations

that archetypal symbols should be interpreted a

c

Langer (cited in Littlejohn, 2002:62) furthermore expanded upon the terms

signification, denotation, and connotation. Signification is the awareness of the

presence of a sign; denotation is the relation of the symbol to its object, and hence

the concept of an object and connotation of a symbol is the direct relationship

between the symbol and the con

a

Langer (cited in Littlejohn, 2002:62) additionally noted that humans have a tendency

to abstract which involves a process of forming a general idea from a variety of

concrete experiences. During the process of abstraction, details in the conception of

objects, events, or situations are generalised and filtered out, consequently the more

abstract the symbol, the sketchier the conception. Langer (cited in Littlejohn,

2002:62) describes her conceptions about language as discursive symbolism and her

ideas about symbols such as worship, art, and music as non-discursive or

presentational symbols through which forms some of the most important emotional

human experiences are best communicated. Jung’s archetype

A theory of generative grammar that may possibly have a bearing on this study is

that which Chomsky posited. Littlejohn (2002:66) is of the opinion that although

Chomsky’s generative grammar now has several positions within it, the tradition as a

whole is built on a cluster of essential ideas. This cluster of ideas involve three

145


ntial feature is a transformation process which generative

rammar seeks to explain.

d,

Jung postulated that symbols and myths reflect unconscious patterns (archetypes).

viii Lacan (1901-1981)

an consciousness is incapable of perceiving itself

essential ideas: 1) Generative grammar rests on the assumption that sentence

generation is central to sentence structure and that the form of a sentence cannot be

separated from the process by which it is generated; 2) The objective of generative

grammar is to isolate a set of rules that explains how any sentence could be

generated; and 3) The esse

g

Of direct relevance to this study is Chomsky’s (1968) postulation that principles of

language and mind are universal. Moreover, he was seeking, through an analytical

and rational approach, inherent mechanisms of mind since he believed that

knowledge arises from a projection of innate categories onto the world of actual

experience (Littlejohn, 2002:63). Chomsky (cited in Palmer & Palmer, 2002:89)

posited that the acquisition of the deep structures of language is not only the result of

learning, but also rooted in an innate biological basis. This assumption made by

Chomsky has a direct bearing on Jung’s postulation of innate structures used for

apperception, hence archetypes. Chomsky (1968) asserts that language follows an

evolutionary development from simpler systems of communication inherent to the

structure of the mind. Expressly, human language is associated with a specific type

of mental organisation and, according to Chomsky (1968) “the structure of language

can truly serve as a ‘mirror of the mind’ in both its particular and universal

aspects”. Consequently, where Chomsky asserted that language reflects the min

Lacan’s psychoanalytical theories endeavoured to review Freud through the lens of

structural linguistics and show how “subjectivities” are constituted in discourse

(Moores, 2000:10). According to Lacan (quoted in Chandler, 2001a), the opposition

of “self/other or subject/object” is psychologically fundamental and “the unconscious

is structured like a language”. Hence, in Lacanian terms, the unconscious is the site

of both meaningful representation and signification (Barker & Galasiński, 2001:30).

Moreover, “the mind imposes some degree of constancy on the dynamic flux of

experience by defining 'the Self' in relation to 'the Other'”. It is important to note that

the concept of the “Other” was also used by Hegel (1770-1831 cited in Cavallaro,

2001:120) to argue that hum

146


ithout recognition by others.

terms of the Other.

elf and Other are inextricably connected (Cavallaro, 2001:122).

ubjectivity is hence dynamically constructed

rough discourse (Chandler, 2001a).

w

The development of language is described by Lacan (cited in Chandler, 2001a) as the

infant moving from a “Real” to an “Imaginary” realm. For Lacan, there is a primal

private psychic realm of the “Real” where the child understands itself as a series of

disconnected atomised parts (Chandler, 2001a). Initially, in the primal realm of ‘the

Real’, where there is no absence, loss or lack, the infant has no centre of identity and

experiences no clear boundaries between itself and the external world. The child then

emerges from the Real at the age of between six to eighteen months and enters “the

Imaginary in which the Self is constructed” before the acquisition of speech (Lacan

quoted in Chandler, 2001a). The Imaginary is a realm of visual images where an

individual builds an identity and a sense of Self. This occurs during “a mirror phase”

where the Self is reflected in the Other (Schirato & Yell, 2000:90). The Other is

hence the Self and the Self, paradoxically, is always defined in

S

Lacan proposes that, as the child gains mastery within the pre-existing ‘Symbolic

order’ (the public domain of verbal language), language (which can be mentally

manipulated) helps to foster the individual's sense of a conscious Self, residing in an

‘internal world’, which is distinct from ‘the world outside’. However, a degree of

individuality and autonomy is surrendered to the constraints of linguistic

conventions, and the Self becomes a more fluid and ambiguous relational signifier

rather than a relatively fixed entity. S

th

Post-structuralist theorists such as Derrida also favoured the recurring themes of

absence/presence, posited by Freud and reviewed by Lacan (Lucy, 2001). It can

stand for anything lost or the fear of loss, and for the pleasure or hope of its recovery.

It is thus symbolic of the loss of, amongst other things, the imagined oneness of

being in the Imaginary and the desire and hope of regaining unity without the

mediation of language. Childhood or primal experience, according to Chandler

(2001a) is portrayed by Romantics as virtually ‘unmediated’. However, all but the

most naive epistemology suggests that individual experiences of the world is

unavoidably mediated. This is so since “without the separation of Self from Other

147


can’s description of the Self and the unconscious as the

metaphorical interior”.

help humankind to make sense of

experiences within a culture (Chandler, 2001a).

ix Nonverbal signs

specifically relate to emotional displays, which may be biologically

etermined.

indicate no is culture-specific” (Ekman & Friesen quoted in Littlejohn, 2002:69).

there would be no 'me’ who could hark back to a myth of oneness” (Chandler,

2001a). Moreover, according to Lucy (2001), Lacan and Derrida tend to echo the

poet Shelley (1815) in a vision of primal experience as a mystical sense of oneness,

of being within a universal continuum. Barker and Galasińsk (2001:31) echo these

assertions and refer to La

“

Chandler (2001a) states that signs and codes are generated by myths and in turn

serve to maintain them. Popular usage of the term ‘myth’ suggests that it refers to

beliefs which are demonstrably false. However, in the semiotic use of the term,

myths can be seen as extended metaphors, which

Littlejohn (2002:67) states that the signs used in communication are not limited to

the linguistic and that much of the nuance of meaning is communicated nonverbally.

However, the study of nonverbal communication in semiotics represents a maze-like

experience. Harrison (cited in Littlejohn, 2002:67) states that activities ranging from

inner, but inexpressible feelings to the rhetoric of topless dancers have been

associated with nonverbal communication. Hence, there is little agreement on what

constitutes nonverbal communication. Structural approaches to nonverbal coding

identify several properties, including the feature, according to Burgoon (cited in

Littlejohn, 2002:67), that certain nonverbal codes seem to elicit universal meaning.

These codes

d

Ekman and Friesen’s (cited in Littlejohn, 2002:69) research and model on kinesics

categorises nonverbal activity in three ways: by origin, by coding, and by usage.

Origin is the source of a nonverbal act which indicates that nonverbal behaviour may

be innate (built into the nervous system), species-constant (universal behaviour

required for survival), or variant across cultures, groups, and individuals. For

example, “one could speculate that eyebrow raising as a sign of surprise is innate,

that marking territory is species-constant, and that shaking the head back and forth

to

148


usage.

These include the emblem, illustrator, adaptor, regulator, and affect display.

3.4.1.3 Post-structuralism

a self-contained system,

eeking to explore the use of signs in specific social situations.

uage will ultimately be found at the heart of any literary work

(Cavallaro, 2001:26).

3.4.1.4 Methodology of semiotics

Coding is the relationship of the act to its meaning. An act may be arbitrary (with no

meaning inherent in the sign itself), iconic (resembling the thing being signified), and

intrinsic (coded cues contain their meaning within them and are themselves part of

what is being signified). For example, laughter is an example of intrinsic coding

since it is an emotion, but it is also part of the expressing of the emotion itself

(Littlejohn, 2002:69). According to Ekman and Friesen (cited in Littlejohn, 2002:69),

all nonverbal behaviour is one of five types, depending on origin, coding, and

According to Chandler (2001a), contemporary social semiotics has moved beyond the

structuralism concern with the internal relations of parts within

s

Post-structuralism is a radical offshoot of structuralism that questions the certainty of

meaning portrayed in the media because of the symbolic nature of signs in language.

The French post-structuralist Derrida (cited in Chandler, 2001a; Cavallaro, 2001:25)

argues that recovering meaning from a text is impossible, because interpretation of a

text never points to the real world but only to more language. The purpose of post-

structuralism is to expose the meaninglessness of a text through the method of

deconstruction (Cavallaro, 2001:25). Any meaning imparted to the reader by the author

using signs in the text is all a clever manipulation and the meaning derived is illusory.

The ambiguity of lang

Chandler (2001a) states that semiotics seeks to analyse media texts as structured wholes

and investigate latent and hence connotative meanings. Where content analysis focuses

on explicit content and suggests that this represents a single, fixed meaning, semiotic

studies focus on a system of rules governing the ‘discourse’ involved in media texts,

stressing the role of semiotic context in shaping meaning. The structuralist semiotician

is hence concerned with the relation of elements to each other, whereas the social

149


asize the importance of the significance that readers attach to

e signs within a text.

re,

and no alternative methodologies have yet been widely adopted” (Chandler, 2001a).

i Semiotic textual analysis

hilst others are suppressed

within a selected text (Du Plooy in Fourie, 2001b:5).

ii Syntagmatic and paradigmatic/genre analysis

e

hoices and selection of expression of signs out of a paradigm (Fourie, 1995:58).

semiotician would emph

th

Currently semiotics involves no widely agreed upon theoretical assumptions, models or

empirical methodologies and tends to be largely theoretical with many of its theorists

seeking to establish its scope and general principles Chandler (2001a). As for

methodologies, according to Chandler (2001a), Saussure's theories constituted a starting

point for the development of various structuralist methodologies for analysing texts,

social practices and cultural phenomena. “However, such methods are not universally

accepted: socially oriented theorists have criticized their exclusive focus on structu

A semiotic textual analysis involves an attempt to determine and deconstruct the

ways in which signs and codes operate within particular popular texts or genres

(Chandler, 2001a). The goal of semiotic textual analysis is hence to reveal how

certain values, attitudes and beliefs are supported w

Fourie (1995:58) defines a paradigm in semiotics as “a model consisting of small

signs (or different signs) of the same kind (same sign system)” and a syntagm as

“the formulated message”, hence the text. For example, words are paradigms and

sentences are syntagms. Syntagmatic analysis studies the ‘surface structure’ of a

text that can be applied not only to verbal texts but also to audio-visual ones. In

film and television, for example, a syntagmatic analysis would involve an analysis

of how each frame, shot, scene or sequence relates to the others which represents

the standard levels of analysis in film theory (Chandler, 2001a). Syntagmatic and

paradigmatic analysis also involve the identification of the articulation of meaning

involving three levels ranging from first to third level of articulation related to th

c

According to Chandler (2001a), a paradigmatic or genre analysis involves a

consideration of the positive or negative connotations of each signifier revealed by

150


e, is

sometimes referred to by semioticians as 'the bar', a term employed by Lacan.

tion in his description of, for example, the ego/shadow,

and anima/animus (soul).

iii Archetypal semiotic textual analysis

or patterns in which the universal forces of our nature

there find objectification”.

one signifier rather than another. Furthermore, the existence of ‘underlying’

thematic paradigms, for example, binary oppositions such as public/private and

Self/Other are exposed. Paradigmatic analysis hence seeks to identify the various

paradigms or pre-existing sets of signifiers that underlie the manifest content of

texts. According to Du Plooy (in Fourie, 2001b:60), genre analysis in mass

communication allows the identification of, for example, how media serve to

maintain the status quo. Chandler (2001a) points out that the slanting line linking

and separating the two terms in such pairings, for example public/privat

Chandler (2001a) also states that structuralists emphasise the importance of

relations of paradigmatic opposition. The primary analytical method employed by

many semioticians involves the identification of binary or polar semantic

oppositions (e.g. us/them, public/private) in texts or signifying practices. Such a

quest is based on a form of ‘dualism’, which seems to be deeply rooted in the

development of human categorisation. Chandler (2001a) comments “For more than

two thousand years oppositional patterns were based on these elements and were

widely accepted as the fundamental structure underlying surface reality”. Jung also

assumes this binary opposi

Archetypal semiotic textual analysis also referred to as archetypal analysis or

criticism is an application of the psychological principles of Jung in the semiotic

tradition. The first systematic application of Jung's ideas to literature was made in

1934 by Bodkin in Archetypal Patterns in Poetry, who established the priority of

interest in the archetypal over the mythological. Bodkin (quoted in Rupprecht,

1997) states “An attempt is here made to bring psychological analysis and

reflection to bear upon the imaginative experience communicated by great poetry,

and to examine those forms

Subsequent to Bodkin, various archetypal analyses have been conducted. The

validity of this type of analysis is reflected in, for example an Iranian psychiatrist,

151


any international brands’

advertising and promotional material” (Jonkheid, [sa]).

iv Mythological semiotic textual analysis

lary

now widespread in the discourse of those who might be called myth critics”.

e found in more complex

ombinations reflected as genres or types of literature.

Javanbakht’s (2003) statements that the popularity and powerful attraction of

movies such as ‘Star Wars’ and ‘Lord of the Rings’ relate to archetypes. In addition

to the systematic analysis of books and films (social artefacts), it may also be

applied to the central themes of advertisements. Jonkheid [sa] indicates that

advertising messages invoke archetypes to link products with underlying messages.

“Archetypal symbolism can therefore be identified in m

A major influence on mythological semiotic textual analysis also referred to as

mythological analysis or myth criticism is the work of Jung by way of his theory of

archetypes (Guerin et al, 1992). According to Guerin et al (1992), Jung’s theories

have expanded the horizons of literary interpretation for those critics concerned to

use the tools of the mythological approach. Reeves (1997) indicates that essentially,

myths, as a means by which archetypes and ritual patterns are manifested and

articulated in literature, form the basis of mythological analysis. Moreover, since

the distinction between archetype and myth has often been blurred, Jung's theories

have been used by myth critics and archetypal critics alike (Reeves, 1997). Reeves

(1997) moreover suggests that although Piaget and others have expressed

skepticism about the universality of Jung's archetypes, “the archetypal vocabu

is

The mythological approach to literature seeks to identify archetypal and universal

patterns that inform certain literary works and that elicit dramatic and universal

human reactions. Moreover, “the myth critic wishes to discover how certain works

of literature, usually those that have become, or promise to become classics” are

reflecting archetypal patterns (Guerin et al, 1992). The myth critic is interested in

“prehistory and the biographies of the gods” and probes for the ‘inner spirit’ that

gives literary work vitality and its enduring appeal. Moreover, myth criticism

approaches literary work holistically and hence as elements manifesting from the

depths of humankind’s collective psyche. Guerin et al (1992) assert that in addition

to appearing as images and motifs, archetypes may b

c

152


llaborator Carl Kerényi

ame to call ‘mythologems’)” .

th criticism may

ultimately connect with a larger theory of culture (Reeves, 1997).

3.4.2 SYMBOLS AND COMMUNICATION STUDIES

image or a myth did

A pioneer in using mythological analysis is Frye (quoted in Guerin et al, 1992) who

identifies myth with literature, asserting that myth is a “structural organizing

principle of literary form”, and that an archetype is essentially an “element of one’s

literary experience”. Frye [sa] indicates that myths or “myhtoi” initially perform a

social ideological function and, when this function disappears, they, “being left with

their literary structure, become purely literary”. Frye [sa] bases his assertions on

the societies where the narrative of the myth initially played the role of inculcating

social customs, behaviour and instructions, but as society develops, it becomes

more pluralistic and these narrative are replaced with different types of code

systems (Frye, [sa]). Guerin et al (1992) assert that Frye’s contributions lead

directly to the mythological approach to literary analysis. Reeves (1997) indicates

that Frye and myth critics are attracted to Jung’s theories “because of the richness

of imagery and narrative elements (what Jung and his co

c

Reeves (1997) indicates that Frye identified the ‘quest-myth’ in its various forms as

the central myth (mono-myth) of literature and postulated four ‘mythoi’ or ‘generic

narratives’ reflected in literature including; spring: comedy; summer: romance;

autumn: tragedy; and winter: irony and satire. He also postulated the “total

mythopoeic structure of concern” that extends beyond literature to religion,

philosophy, political theory, and history, which suggests how my

Generally, in communication studies, symbols are very broadly defined as “something

used for or regarded as representing something else” (Tubbs & Moss, 2000:8). They

are also described as pivotal in the process of creating “the sharing of experience”, a

superior and uniquely human ability (Tubbs & Moss, 2000:8). Despite their obvious

importance in human communication, symbols are mentioned twice in an entire

communication studies book of 530 pages by Tubbs and Moss (2002), and once by

Gamble and Gamble (1999). Moreover, they are not mentioned even once either by

Steinberg (2002) or DeVito (1991) in introductory reference material for

communication studies students. A definition or description of an

153


ot feature in any of the communication studies sources consulted.

(2002:57) explains that the basic idea of a sign are generally studied in

emiotics.

Gamble, 1999:103). Hence, the symbols are not related to what they

present.

e, and philosophical) theories of communication (Fourie, 2001a; Neuliep,

996:45).

n

Littlejohn (2002:147) mentions symbols in reference to Mead’s theory of symbolic

interactionism, Burke’s theory of symbolic identification, and the symbolic convergence

theory. However, no exacting and discipline specific definition of a symbol is provided.

Ostensibly, the more mechanistic terms of signal, sign and message in describing

interpersonal communication processes are favoured over that of the symbol. Littlejohn

(2002:57) defines a sign as designating something other than itself that is very similar to

the definition of a symbol provided by Tubbs and Moss (2000:8). Furthermore,

Littlejohn

s

According to Littlejohn (2002:57), many communication theorists and laypersons

believe that signs, as components of messages, are the basis of thought, language and

nonverbal behaviour. Additionally, symbols are viewed as representational signs which

convey abstract, arbitrary and ambiguous meanings (Tubbs & Moss, 2000:8, 65;

Gamble &

re

Green and Green (1971:39) indicate that symbols seem to be the elements of

communication between the different levels of being both within an individual and

between individuals, hence in transpersonal, intrapersonal and interpersonal

communication. The inquiry into the role and functions of symbols, symbolic

representation and meaning in communication theory is primarily found in theories

relating to topical (theories describing the underlying structure of different types of

communication) and critical/humanistic (rhetorical, aesthetic, critical, historical,

interpretativ

1

The exploration of symbols and symbolism, according to Biedermann (1994:preface),

usually reveals one of two very different attitudes toward them. To some the subject is

antiquated and outdated, and to others it is the key to understanding the realm of the

incomprehensible and indescribable. However, symbols and metaphors extend into the

realm of everyday language and figures of speech. Moreover, they permeate images

154


ag,

for example, are linked to complex ideas and traditions (Biedermann, 1994:preface).

3.4.2.1 A semiotic delineation

ings themselves; and it is

e conceptions, not the things, that symbols directly mean”.

within the Saussurean model which

clude

ude a portrait, a cartoon, a scale-model, metaphors, and imitative

from the world of advertising, political slogans and emblems, the parables of our

religions, the icons and writing of foreign and prehistoric cultures, legal customs and

artworks, poetry and historical figures; wherever a ‘signifier’ communicates anything

beyond its own superficial exterior. The wedding ring, the cross and the national fl

According to Chandler (2001a), Peirce defined a symbol as “a sign which refers to the

object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which

operates to cause the symbol to be interpreted as referring to that object”. Moreover, he

posed that all words, sentences, books and other conventional signs are symbols. Since a

symbol refers to a referent, the object or idea represented; they have representational

meaning (Chandler, 2001a). In addition to Peirce’s suggestion of the representational

relationship between sign and object, Langer (quoted in Chandler, 2001a) defined a

symbol as, “not proxy for their objects but vehicles for the conception of objects... In

talking about things we have conceptions of them, not the th

th

Chandler (2001a) points out that the Saussurean terms signifier and signified are most

often used in semiotics, whereas Peirce’s distinctions between the ‘sign’ and the

‘object’, are most commonly employed within a broadly Saussurean framework. There

are three potential referential modes of the signified

Chandler (2001a) defines and explains as follows:

Symbol/symbolic: a mode in which the signifier does not resemble the signified

and its meaning is fundamentally arbitrary or purely conventional. The

relationship between the signifier and signified must be learnt. These in

language in general, numbers, Morse code, traffic lights, and national flags;

Icon/iconic: a mode in which the signifier is perceived as resembling or imitating

the signified. The signifier has recognisable traits, which resemble the signified.

Examples incl

gestures; and

155


Index/indexical: a mode in which the signifier-signified relationship is not

onic signs always involve some degree of

onventionality; and indexical signs “direct the attention to their objects by blind

relation to Peirce's differential framing of the referential status of signs and hence

mb

e regarded as directly

ary symbolism and

hence the symbolic phase, is mathematics. “Mathematics does not need to refer to

bly was a

rge element of ‘mimicry’’”. Peirce (quoted in Chandler, 2001a) explains that, “over

arbitrary, but observably physically or causally connected. Examples include

'natural signs' such as smoke, footprints, echoes, 'signals', and pointers.

These three forms are viewed as decreasing in order of conventionality. Symbolic signs

such as languages are highly conventional; ic

c

compulsion”. Consequently, the more conventional, the more learning is required to

understand their meaning (Chandler, 2001a).

Chandler (2001a) posits three key historical shifts in representational paradigms in

sy ols:

An indexical phase - the signifier and the referent ar

connected;

An iconic phase - the signifier is not regarded as part of the referent but as

depicting it transparently; and

A symbolic phase - the signifier is regarded as arbitrary and as referring only to

other signs. Langer posits that an obvious example of arbitr

an external world at all: its signifieds are indisputably concepts and mathematics

is a system of relations” (Langer quoted in Chandler, 2001a).

Peirce posited that iconicity is the original default mode of signification, declaring the

icon to be “an original sign”, defining it as “the most primitive, simple and original of

the categories”. He (Peirce quoted in Chandler, 2001a) adds, “In all primitive writing,

such as the Egyptian hieroglyphics, there are icons of a non-logical kind, the

ideographs”, and he speculates that “in the earliest form of speech there proba

la

time, linguistic signs developed a more symbolic and conventional character. Symbols

come into being by development out of other signs, particularly from icons”.

Historical evidence, according to Chandler (2001a), does point towards a trend of

linguistic signs to evolve from indexical and iconic forms towards symbolic forms.

156


ests... that

e origins of alphabetical writing lie in symbols previously made out of elemental

primarily symbolic and very

imilar to those of other cultures. Similar cultural symbols include, for example, the

ccording to Peirce’s classification, icons apparently are very similar to Jung’s

terpreter's class, age, gender, and ethnicity. Signs are ‘polysemic’ or more open to

a sign is derived from the signifier of a

Danesi (quoted in Chandler, 2001a) notes that “archaeological research sugg

th

shapes that were used as image-making objects - much like the molds that figurine and

coin-makers use today. Only later did they take on more abstract qualities”.

Chandler (2001a) notes that some of the letters in the Greek and Latin alphabets derive

from iconic signs in Egyptian and Mediterranean pictographs, ideographs and

hieroglyphs. These early scripts used iconic signs resembling the objects and actions to

which they referred either directly or metaphorically. Hence, according to Gelb (cited in

Chandler, 2001a), over time, picture writing became more symbolic and less iconic.

Danesi (quoted in Chandler, 2001a) asserts that the basic number of symbols in Ancient

Egypt were limited and that most hieroglyphs were iconic. However, Rundle Clark

(1978:218) proposes that Egyptian hieroglyphs were

s

Tree of Life and the Phoenix Bird, whereas the scarab, Divine Eye (wedjat) and Djed

column are peculiar to Egypt (Rundle Clark, 1978:219).

A

explanation of archetypal images. However, archetypal images and symbols do not have

a direct representational relevance and signification to the signifiers.

Related concepts of representational and deferred meanings of symbols that relate to

semiotics are those of denotation and connotation, or the primary and secondary

meanings associated with symbols. Denotation is described as the definitional, literal,

obvious or commonsense meaning of a sign or symbol (Chandler, 2001a; Deacon et al,

1999:138). The term ‘connotation’ is used to refer to the socio-cultural and personal

ideological and emotional associations of the sign. These are typically related to the

in

interpretation in terms of their connotations. “Denotation is sometimes regarded as a

digital code and connotation as an analogue code” (Wilden cited in Chandler, 2001a).

Barthes referred to connotation is a second-order signification which uses the denotative

sign (signifier and signified) as its signifier and attaches to it an additional signified. In

this framework, the connotative meaning of

157


enotative sign, and consequently, denotation leads to a chain of connotations. This

cal fables about the exploits of gods and heroes are

related to the concept of connotations. For Barthes, myths were only reflecting the

gies of the time which has been described as a third order of

signification (Chandler, 2001a).

3.5

and

oined the term ‘différance’ to allude to the way in which meaning is endlessly

on, hence constructed events have no objective existence. Consequently, the

otion of reality found in, for example, the Romantic mythology as degenerative of a

d

suggests that denotation is an underlying and primary meaning - a notion which many

authors have challenged (Chandler, 2001a).

Myths or associations with classi

dominant ideolo

COMMENTS

The current trend in social semiotics is to question the eventual symbolic relation

between the image of an object and the inseparable arbitrary verbal label attached to it.

“Even an image is not what it represents - the presence of an image marks the absence

of its referent” (Chandler, 2001a). Specifically, poststructuralists have rejected the

stable and predictable relationship embedded in the traditional semiotic model. Lacan

argued that there could be no anchoring of definite signifiers to specific signifieds and

Derrida referred to the “freeplay” of signifiers: they are not fixed to their signifieds, but

point beyond themselves to other signifiers in an “indefinite referral of signifier to

signified” (Chandler, 2001a). Derrida refers to the “deconstruction” of Western

semiotic systems, denying that there were any ultimate determinable meanings,

c

deferred. Moreover, Derrida proposes that there is no “transcendent signified”, hence

there is nothing, including an ultimate reality, outside the text (Chandler, 2001a).

Lovell (quoted in Chandler, 2001a) explains that, “For materialist Marxists and

realists, postmodernist idealism is intolerable: 'signs cannot be permitted to swallow up

their referents in a never-ending chain of signification, in which one sign always points

on to another, and the circle is never broken by the intrusion of that to which the sign

refers”. According to Galtung and Ruge (cited in Chandler, 2001a), any event is a social

constructi

n

primal state of ‘unmediatedness’ is not plausible in current socio-cultural semiotic

analysis.

158


that he calls ‘simulacra’ (or copies without originals).

a) sees a degenerative evolution as modes of

ingly empty of meaning. These would be the

It masks and perverts a basic reality;

m (Chandler, 2001a). Lewis (quoted in

handler, 2001a) notes that “we are part of a prearranged semiological world. From

Baudrillard (cited in Chandler, 2001a) interprets most representations as a means of

concealing the absence of reality

He (Baudrillard cited in Chandler, 2001

representation in which signs are increas

successive phases of the image:

It is the reflection of a basic reality;

It masks the absence of a basic reality; and

It bears no relation to any reality whatever: it is its own pure simulacrum.

Evidently, in considering the previous statements, the romantic and idealistic

‘mythology’ of individual creativity has been undermined and downplayed by various

strands in semiotics. This is mirrored in Chandler’s (2001a) assertion that the

postmodernist notion of fragmented and shifting identities may provide a useful

corrective to the myth of the unified self (Chandler, 2001a). Additionally, the

structuralists emphasise the primacy of the semiotic system and of individuals as

produced by language. Social semiotics emphasises the role of the interpreters of a text,

as well as the post-structuralist semiotic notion of intertextuality. As a consequence,

individuals are viewed as subjects of a sign system rather than being simply

instrumental users who are fully in control of the

C

the cradle to the grave, we are encouraged by the shape of our environment to engage

with the world of signifiers in particular ways”.

In view of the above statements, concepts of the self and symbols are merely social

constructs with no inherent signification pointing to a deeper or transcendent reality.

Derrida (cited in Chandler, 2001a) argues that dominant ideological discourse relies on

the metaphysical illusion of a transcendental signified - an ultimate referent at the heart

of an independent signifying system which is portrayed as 'absolute and irreducible',

stable, timeless and transparent. Moreover, all other signifieds within such a signifying

system are subordinate to this dominant and privileged central signified which is the

final meaning to which they point. Derrida’s (cited in Chandler, 2001a) main argument

is that there can be no transcendental signified since it is subject to historical change.

159


the

attern and theme of reference in terms of signification remain universally

owever, these universal structural patterns as posited by the aforementioned theorists

the meaning construction of symbols from the foundation

of an internal and universal reality. Thus, the point of departure for the rest of the study

d in an exploration and re-interpretation of symbols from Jungian and

transpersonal perspectives.

For example, “Neo-Platonism focused on 'the Monad’, Christianity focused on God,

Romanticism focused on consciousness and so on" (Derrida quoted in Chandler, 2001a).

Consequently, according to Derrida’s view, there can be no ultimate and transcendent

reality, and the individual is enmeshed in a paradoxical, illusionary and ever-changing

social reality only. It is important to note that despite Derrida’s valid remarks of

historical change in terms of the actual signified, it is obvious from his example that

p

transcendental. For example, the Monad, God or consciousness are all ‘higher’ aspects

of the Self, which in terms of a Jungian explanation, relate to an archetypal pattern.

Although post-modern semiotics denounces any transcendent reality and meaning, Lévi-

Strauss argued that there is a universal mental structure based on certain fundamental

binary oppositions. This structure is transformed into universal structural patterns in

human culture through universal linguistics categories. Moreover, Lévi-Strauss’s,

Barthes’s and Chomsky’s postulations appear to be very similar to Jung’s assertions of

the collective unconscious and archetypes acting as moulds of universal symbols.

H

relate to language and culture, both social constructions, and do not suggest the

individual and universal, hence transcendent, interpretation of symbols and myths.

It is exactly at this juncture that Jung’s concept of archetypal symbols could be used to

expand the semiotic model of symbols and meaning. Ensuing from constructs explored

in the previous paragraphs it is evident that semiotics provides the structural framework

for comprehending meaning of socially and culturally constructed symbols, hence an

external and socio-cultural reality. Social semiotics, however, fails to provide a

comprehensive transcendental and universal ‘inner’ view and framework of symbols as

representations of an innate archetypal pattern of the Self. Consequently, this study will

follow a viewpoint regarding

will be founde

160


3.6

ychic

ommunication. This is assumed since the products of the unconscious psyche

epresented in personal and cultural discernible signs,

quire an intrapsychic analysis or an inner colloquy or discussion. In so doing, the

divergent vantage points within these

isciplines seem to converge in the notions of innate mental structures and dynamics

nscious and their

creation in works of art and earliest forms of writing. The connection between entopic

SUMMARY

An exploration of the symbolic representations of the intrinsic collective and

unconscious strata of the human mind is crucial in the epistemological and ontological

discernment of meaning, and subsequently the processes of intraps

c

outwardly relate to meanings and interpretations derived from symbolic representations

in, for example dreams, fantasies, visions, myths, archaic formulae, common symbols,

images, motifs and themes portraying universal human experiences. Possibly, symbols

reflect unconscious content that represent aspects or levels of the Self-archetype.

Additionally, the unscrambling and interpretation of universal and archetypal images,

myths and symbols, which are r

re

symbol leads to intuitive and feeling-toned ideas and meanings that lie beyond reason in

the collective unconscious. A symbol, which may range from personally constructed

thought forms and complexes to archetypes, hence serves to expand consciousness and

transcendence of the individual.

Moreover, a selection of disciplines and

d

represented in archetypal images, myths and symbols. Although named in another way

by each theoretical advocate, specific streams of thought and arguments can be

identified. Based on these extrapolations certain inherent assumptions will form the

imminent causeway and scope of this study.

In this study, it will be argued that archetypes, as universal and rudimentary intrinsic

patterns of the human mind, are fundamental to the unfolding of understanding of

images, myths and symbols. Archetypes are manifested in and find expression in, for

example images, myths and symbols, and through their repeated symbolic expression,

possibly through a process of self-similarity inherent in the nature of archetypes,

become archetypal ideas and historical formula recurring in human experience. This is

evident in universal entopic images generated in the collective unco

re

161


ore towards intrapsychic processing. This includes the role of archetypal

images, myths and symbols in the process of individuation and the transcendent

function as posited by Jung. For example, the human psyche seems to represent a

complex system and the integration of image, myth and symbol appears to represent the

process of individuation and the transcendent function that will be explored in the next

chapter.

images and archetypes is reflected in the following sentence taken from this chapter:

These mental forms and elements, mythological motifs or “archaic remnants and

primordial images”, could also be called “instinctive trends” or subconscious and

universal psychic urges or impulses to interpret images symbolically.

Although innate structures are alluded to in the semiotic approach, semiotic analysis is

generally aimed at exemplifying the connection between symbol and the social

construction of meaning and not a transpersonal and unitary reality. This is reflected in

the following sentence taken from the chapter: “There is no “transcendent signified”,

hence there is nothing, including an ultimate reality, outside the text”. The slant in this

study is m

162

Documents

CHAPTER 3: Archetypes and Symbols