CHAPTER II

POST-REVOLUTIONARY ERA : RESPONSE TO THE REVOLUTION IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

The Islamic revolution in Iran, 1978 - 79, swept away the

most powerful monarch and trumpeted 2, 500-old institution of

monarchy. It shook the very roots of Iran's political and

social structures, and changed entirely the political, socio-

economic landscape of the country. It also was to have a spill

over effect which would not be confined to the region alone. 1

Imam Khomeini and his followers strongly believed that the

Islamic revolution of· Iran is the "unique among all the

revolutions in the world". 2 In fact, what happened in Iran was

not a new phenomenon but the latest phase of a process of

politico - constitu·tional evolution which began during the

second half of the nineteenth century. The_process passed

through various stages of struggles such as dissent, protests,

demonstrations, strikes, riots, non-cooperation and civil war.

The mere protest or agitation graduated into a mass movement, and

the opposition assumed the proportions of

revolution.3

a national

A new chapter opened up in the history.of Iran as not only

the 72 year old Constitution was challenged but also an

alternative political system was envisaged. Khomeini favoured

1. A.H.H. Abidi, "The Iranian Revolution: Its Origin and Dimension", International Studies (New Delhi), vol.18, no.2, April - June 1979, p.129.

2. Islamic Republic Party Weekly Bulletin, November 13, 1981.

3. Abidi. n.1, p.129.

59

the adoption of the Constitution of 1906 with necessary

amendments, meaning there by the that provisions regarding

monarchy be dropped and changes be made in order to bring it

in harmony with the contemporary political developments in Iran.

In his book, Islamic Government, Ayatollah Khomeini spelt out his

ideas about the Islamic state. According to him Islam stands for

constitutional government and the rule of divine law, as opposed

to absolutism. "The difference between Islamic government and

constitutional· government whether monarchical . or republican",

says Khomeini, "lies in the fact that, in the latter system, it

is the representatives of the people or those· of the king who

legislate and make laws. But the actual authority to legislate

belongs exclusively to God. No others, no matters whosever

they may be, have the right to legislate nor has any person

the right to govern on any basis other than the authority that

has been conferred by God. Since Islamic Government is a

Government of law, it is the religious expert and no one else who

should occupy himself with the affairs of government. 4

Meanwhile, Khomeini also consistently rejected the

contemporary international· system. The earliest indication of

4. Ayatollah Khomeini, Islamic Government (European Islamic Center, Rome, ·1983), pp. 32-45; Algar Hamid, Islam and Revolution Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini (Translated and Annotated), Nizam Press. Berkeley, 1981, pp. 40-54. Also see International Herald Tribune (Paris), 8 January 1979.

60

this strong view is found in his book Kashf-e-Asrar, in which

he stated categorically as early as in 1944 that modern states

are the products of man's limited ideas, and the world is the

horne of all masses of people under the law of God. 5 Populism,

rnillenarianisrn, Shi'isrn, and revolutionisrn converge in

Khorneini's world outlook. For example, in a statement to

Iranian students abroad, he declared:

n Iran's Islamic; Revolution, with the support of the gracious Almighty, is spreading on a world wide scale and, God willing, with its spread the satanical powers will be dragged into isolation and governments of the meek will be established; the way will be opened for the world government of the Imam Mehdi (12the Imam), may exalted God hasten his noble advent an~ may our lives be sacrificed to the dust of his path~

Another important point is that the perception of foreign

policy also changed drastically. The revolutionary government

in Iran declared that Iran would neither accept pressure from

a mighty power nor would it exert pressure on any state no

matter how weak it might be. 7 From the very outset Khomeini

regarded the purchase of armaments as waste of national wealth.

"These are poisonous to the freedom of Iran". The provisional

5. R.K.Ramazani, "Khorneini's Islam in Iran's Foreign Policy" in Adeed Dawisha, ed., Islam in Foreign Policy (Westview Press, New York, 1983), p.17.

6.. Quoted in Ibid.

7. Dawn (Karachi), 26 February 1979.

61

government abandoned the multi-billion dollar project of

building of a military naval complex at Chahbahar. Instead,

the site was to be ~sed for the construction of a fish harbour

which would provide job opportunities to the local population. 8

The new regime also declared that it had no intention to

"act as policeman of the Gulf waters". 9 Khomeini said, sooner

or later, Iranian forces would be recalled from Dhofar and the

republican Iran will adjust its relations with the

neighbouring states on a footing of equality and mut11al

respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all

the states in the region. Apart from this, the regime seemed

determined to break away from its isolation in international

politics that followed its revolution and concretized in the

wake of the hostage crisis. The country was riveted after the

holding of American hostages for 444 days. This resulted in

the economic, political and even military pressures on Iran by

the West. During this trying period the relationship between

Iran and the Indian Subcontinent was rendering. It was the

situation in which it was hoped that the developing and

Muslim countries, faced with conunon challenges, could come

closer.

8. Shameem Akhtar, "Impact of the Islamic Movement in Iran on the Region", Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), vol.39, no.9, winter 1979, p.90.

9. Ibid.

62

Iran also made it clear that the Islamic revolution was

not after anything "but revival of Islamic norms and values.

And when we say Islam, we mean all the Muslims and the entity of

the Islamic world. We don't want to escalate and add fuel to

the divisions and sects certainly, if our revolution shakes

the Muslim and wakes them the Islamic world as a Third World

power will be able to stand up to· the two dominating and

prevailing superpowers of the world." 10 Article 11 of the

Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran states :

11 In accordance with the Quranic verse, surely this community of yours is one community, and I am your lord, so serve Me, ( 21 92) , all Muslims are one nation and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is responsible that its total political policy be based upon the coalition and solidarity of the Islamic nations and to make continuous efforts to realize the political, economic and cultural unity of the world of Islam~11 ·

Khomeini' s ideology was neither pan- Shi' ism nor pan-

Islamism, it aimed at the establishment of what could be

termed as the 'Islamic world order'. From his perspective, the

existing world order is imperfect, but it will be perfected on

the appearance of the twelfth Imam, . variously called Messiah

(Mehdi) or 'Master of the Age' (Sahib-i -zaman) . The Messiah

will create justice and equity in the world because in Kho-

10. The Hindu (Madras), 17 June 1985.

11. Islamic Revolution Future Paths of the Nations (The Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran, 1982), p . .110.

63

meini's words, he alone will be able to establish a · "world

government of God." He viewed that all legitimate religious

and temporal authority belonged to the supreme jurisprudent,

who should rule until the Messiah appears. The Iranian

Revolution has resulted in the establishment of such a rule in

a country which, "in Khomeini' s words, "wishes to establish

divine justice in the world, first of all in Iran itself, then

"the way will be opened for the world government of Imam

Mehdi" once the governments of the meek are established. 12 In

Khomeini' s words, "Islam is a sacred trust from God to

ourselves and the Iranian nation must grow in power and it has

vouchsafeo Islam to the entire world". In the view of Prime

Minister Mir Hussein Mousavi, Iran is trying to establish a

"new system of values" that stems from the ideology of Islam

and is at the same time aiming

mankind" . 13

at "the liberation of

Throughout the period of turmoil in Iran, Pakistan, India

and Bangladesh tri~d to maintain a balanced attitude and policy

towards the revolutionary developments in that country. Their

delicate concern was to maintain correct relations with Iran

irrespective of the emerging conflict between their two

12. Ramazani, n.S, p.17.

13. Ibid, "Iran's Islamic Revolution and the Persian Gulf~ Current History (Philadelphia), vol.84, no.498, January 1985 p.S.

64

systems and ideologies. Hence, after the Shah's ouster and the

fall of the Bakhtiar government, Pakistan, India, and

Bangladesh promptly recongnised the Provisional Revolutionary

Government headed QY Mehdi Bazargan in February 1979.

Pakistan regarded the arrival of Khomeini and revolution in

Iran as an · event of true revival of Islam and Islamic

solidarity. ·In March 1979 the people of Pakistan expressed

their full support for the victory of the Islamic revolution

in Iran. Resolutions were also passed in all mosques in Pakistan

which assured the Iranian people of support for their struggle

and the move towards the Islamisation of their society under the

leadership of Ayatollah Imam Khomeini. During a visit to

Tehran in February Pakistan's adviser on Foreign Affairs, Agha

Shahi, said: "the Islamic revolution of Iran was an event of

great significance not only for Iran, but for the entire

world. It would have tremendous imppct on the countries of

the regions".14

Pakistan was also the first country to recognize the

establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran like other

subcontinental countries and reiterated its 'fraternal

relations' with Iran.

felicitation to the

In February 1979, in a message of

Iranian religious leader, Ayatollah

14. Times of India (New Delhi), 7 March 1979.

65

Khomeini, and Prime Minister, Dr. Mehdi Bazargan, on the success

of the Islamic revolution in the country, the Pakistan

President General Zia-ul-Haq expressed his deep feelings saying

that:

lt k. . Pa 1stan and Iran are bound by the unbreakable t1es of religion, culture and history.... the simultaneous triumph of the Islamic ideology in both of our countries is the most recent ·expression of our transcendental; spiritual links, which are everlastingly immune to dissolution by adverse external or internal circumstance~ 15

Furthermor~, he assured his Government's ever-deepening·

cooperation with the Iranian Government advanced in concert

towards their cherished goals and their common destiny. In

another message to Dr. Bazargan, Zia-ul-Haq said

"The victory of the forces of Islam in brotherly country of Iran under the inspiring of Hazrat Ayatollah al-Uzma Rouhollah Al-Khomeini will consecrate the bonds that have traditionally existed between the people of our two countries. We give thanks to Allah Almighty that the aspirations of the peoples of Iran and Pakistan for ordering their lives in accordanc.e with the dictates of Islam are realized simultaneously."16 ·

Pakistan viewed the Islamic r.evolution in Iran as one of the

progressive revolutions in the region and in the Islamic

countries as well. During the celebration of the first

anniversary of Islamic revolution in Iran and on the occasion

15. Dawn. 12 March 1979.

66

of the 15th Hijra century in Islamabad on 10 February 1980,

Zia-ul-Haq paid rich tributes to Khomeini and the people of

Iran people for bringing about the Islamic revolution. He

praised the efforts of the Iranian leaders and people for

cementing Iran's unity and solidarity. He said that the

changes that had occurred in Iran were very important and they

would pave the way for the progress of the Iranian people. He

expressed the hope that Iran would be able to further consoli­

date its position. 17

Meanwhile, the .Central Executive of the Islami-Jamiat-e-

Talaba, Pakistan, under the chairmanship of Liaqat Baluch

resolved to support the call of solidarity day on March 16,

given by the leader of Ikhwan-ul-Muslimoon, Abdur Rehman Fejani,

and the chief of the Jama'at-e-Islami, Pakistan, Mian Tufail

Mohammad. In its resolution the executive viewed the cessation

of monarchy and the advent of the Islamic revolution in Iran as a

magnificent event in the world history. 18 The resolution also

said that "on the eve of the solidarity day celebration the whole

Muslim world should announce their support and assistance to all

Islamic movements the world over in general and to the Islamic

movement of Afghanistan in particular." At the same time,

16. Ibid.

17. Khyber Mail, 11 February 1980.

18. Radiance (Delhi), 1 April 1979.

67

Pakistan also withdrew from the CENTO along with the new

government in Iran and decided to join the NAM. 19 In an

editorial the Pakistan and Gulf Economist said that the

revolution, whatever be its rationale, has been able to bring

about a meaningful and qualitative change in the lives of common

men. 20

The Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini, expressed

the desire that two brotherly people of Pakistan and Iran,

who always have been friends and brothers, would henceforth

get closer under the banner of Islam, strengthen their 'unity',

help and support each other like two brothers. In a letter

received in Islamabad on 23 April, in reply to ~resident Zia-

ul-Haq' s congratulatory message on the occasion of the

establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah

Khomeini said:

11 The great Islamic solidarity which transcends all other considerations should untie the Muslim nations so staunchly that no foreign power even dream of dominating them. Unfortunately ever since foreign experts intruded into the eastern and Muslim countries, they have tried to spilt the Muslim nations into different groups. Then, through their own wide-scale propaganda and with the help ·of those associated with their destructive policies, they have created dissensions between the various groups. Some­times they even made them confront each other. During

19. Shirin Tahir- Kheli, "In Search of Iran Identity : Islam and Pakistan's Foreign Policy", in Dawisha, no.S., p.76.

20. "Iran's Initiative", Pakistan & Gulf Economist January 1986, p.1.

68

(Karachi),

our long history and also, during over 50 years of reign of the Pahlavi dynasty we have seen untold criminal acts and innumerable acts of treachery. Our noble Muslim people endured severe repression and captivity during this period. They were deprived of their Islamic and human rights. Our uprising on 15th Khordad (5th June 1963) was a turning point in the history of our oppressed country and people. That uprising bore fruit during the last one or two years. Through the might of our faith, through our unity and with the blessing of God Almighty we managed to get rid of the oppressors and plunderers who were armed to the teeth ..... by the blessing of Gbd Almighty and through the unity of our people we will overcome all difficulties. .With our historic links with Pakistan it is imperative that we m~intain our relations on the basis of mutual respect. 11 1

Besides, Dr. Yazdi stated that because of Islam there will

have to be close and deep relations between Iran and the rest

of the world. In an exclusive interview with the Pakistan

Television at Havana in 1979 where Yazdi had led his

country's delegation to the sixth non-aligned summit

conference he said 11 all necessary elements existed for deeper

and more meaningful.relationship between the brotherly people

of Pakistan and Iran .. 22 Both countries were bound by common

culture and common sentiments and motivations. He

particularly mentioned the migration oE millions of muslims

from their original homes for the establishment of the Islamic

Republic of Pakistan and said the dream of nation of the true

21. Dawn, April 11, 1979.

22. Ibid.

69

Islamic state is one of the many things common between the

Iranians and Pakistanis' for which they can work together. 23

Iran's official magazine Imam paid rich tributt".s to the

leaders of Pakistan and praised them for introducing Islamic

laws in the country and at the district level. It also praised

Pakistan's struggle for a separate homeland which was inspired

by a lofty idea as ideal higher than that of territorial

nationalism. They fought ·for Pakistan to set up ideological

state and made it the bulwark of Islam. 24

The Islamic Republic of Iran also showed a keen interest in

the affairs of the shi' is of Pakistan, expres.sed through its

diplomatic representatives and the branches of Iran's Cultural

Institute (Farhang-e-Iran) in the major cities of the country.

This institution was initially established by the Pahlavi

regime to teach Persian to Pakistani's and to disseminate

information about Iranian culture. Since the Islamic revolution

the aims and objectives of the Iran institute have been

transformed, and it now emphasizes the religio-political

message radiated by ·Islamic Iran to the rest of the Muslim

23. In an interview to Impact International (London),26 October 1979.

24. Business Recorder (Islamabad) ,8 September, 1979.

70

World. 25

Bangladesh was also the first country to recognize when

the Islamic Republic was established in Iran in 1979 under

Khomeini. Ziaur Rahman, the President of Bangladesh, sent a

message of felicitation to the Prime Minister of Iran, Mehdi

Bazargan, and hoped that friendly and fraternal relations

between Bangladesh and Iran would continue to· grow in every

field. 26 In a message he said: "It is our hope that under your

able and wise leadership the people of Iran will enjoy peace,

stability and prosperity. May Almighty Allah grant the

brotherly people of Iran success in all spheres of life. The

people of Iran and Bangladesh are bound by historical, religious

and cultural ties extending over many centuries". 27 He also

sincerely expressed the hope that " the friendly and fraternal

relations between our two countries, resting on these deep-

rooted ties, will continue to grow in every field". 28

Bangladesh also viewed the Islamic revolution in Iran under

Khomeini as a true revival of Islamic principles and those should

be implemented in all Islamic countries. During the visit to

25. Ibid., 18 September 1980.

26. Munir D .Ahmed, "The Shiis of Pakistan;' ed., Shi'ism, Resistance and Revolution London, 1987), p.284.

in Martin Kramer, (West View Press

27. Bangladesh Series 1-5.Pot, vol.IV, part.18, February 1979, pp.243 - 244.

28. Ibid.

71

Iran in 1982, the spiritual leader, Maulana Mohammad Haferi

Huzur, optimistically said:

"They were able to see that the revolution was brought about to establish Islamic principles which should be established in all Muslim countries throughout the world. Because as true Muslims they

-believed that Islam is neither 'Shia' nor 'Sunni' for Prophet Muhammad was a Muslim. He was a messenger of God and preached Islam as a submission to God. Any differences between the Shias and Sunnis were not doctrinal. Both the Shias and the Sunnis believed in God, the Prophethood of Muhamrna~and the Quran, the Shia and Sunnis were all Muslims." 9

In pursuance of the objectives of broadening and deepening

its fraternal relations with Bangladesh, Ayatollah Khomeini sent

a message to President of Bangladesh, Ziaur Rahman, immediately

after the establishment of the Islamic Republic. In his

message the Ayatollah said that: "our Islamic Republic which is

based on the unity and cooperation of the Islamic countries of

the world should play a decisive role in the attainment of great

Islamic goals and prosperity of Muslims throughout the

world. n 30 Apart fr·om this, Khomeini sent Ayatollah Hussein

Noori who was an important spiritual leader to. Bangladesh on a

special mission on the occasion of the third anniversary day of

the victory of the Islamic revolution.

The Bangladesh government sent a delegation to Tehran for

29. Asaf Hussain, Islamic Iran: Revolution and counter Revolution, (London, 1985), p. 22.

30. Ibid.

72

conveying its solidarity with the Islamic government in Iran. In

response to Bangladesh delegation's visit to Tehran, a seven-

member 'good will' delegation arrived in Dhaka on 10 February

1982 which was led by Ayatollah Jannati. According to a

Bangladesh daily, which published a report on the proposed visit

of the Iranian delegation, Jannati was a member of "Maj lish-e-

Shoora" of Iran and close associate of Imam Khomeini". 31

During his visit to Bangladesh, Ayatollah Jannati conveyed the

message of Ayatollah Khomeini to the Bangladesh leaders of the

"need for the Islamic countries to resist the forces that were

trying to divide the Islamic world". 32 Bangladesh government

also subscribed to this vi.ew. Thanking the leader of the

Iranian delegation, the then Foreign Minister, Professor

Mohammad Shamsul Haq, said: "It was important that our

combined efforts are directed towards achieving the goal of

greater unity and solidar~ty among the Islamic countries in

the true spirit of Islamic message of peace unity and

brotherhood~' 33

In case of India, any ideology based on religion, race,

etc. did not constitute a determining factor in its foreign

policy.

31. Bangladesh Observer (Dhaka), 12 March 1979.

32. Ibid., 2 February 1982.

33. Ibid., 11 February 1982.

73

It played a subservient role not only in the Indo-Iran

relationship but also with other Asian - African countries.

Moreover, the relationship between the countries was influenced

by the international situation and the political developments

of contemporary times. In a statement, former member of the

Rajya Sabha (Congress-!), D.P. Singh said 11 Islam is part of

India's heritage. In sheer numbers, citizens of India

professing the Islamic faith now total more than 700 million.

In terms of our historical experiences, we found that the

imperial-ist powers, at first Britain and now the United States

of America, have alwqys raised platform of Pan- Islamism and

Zionism as a means of dividing the anti imperialist and

national forces. Our approach to the international relations,

rela.tions between states and structuring of a new international

order are not motivated by any ideology expressed in rigid

terms. Our thinking and policies are secular.n 34

India made all efforts to keep good relations with the new

regime in Iran. In a message to Ayatollah Khomeini the Prime

Minister, Morarji Desai said, "the peopl~ of India and Iran are

linked by age old friendship rooted in hi~tory and culture and a

prosperous Iran is a guarantee for the peace and stability of

the entire region". 35 In the meantime, A·shoka Mehta (a Janata

34. This is the text of the senior advocate at the Supreme Court and former member of Rajya Sabha (Congress-!) who attended a conference held in Tehran on the subject of the US Crimes against Iran. Published by Mainstream "India stands by Iran", by D.p. Singh, vol.VIII, no.4, 14 June 1980, p.10.

35. Indian Express ( New Delhi), 13 February 1979.

74

Party Leader), was sent to Iran. During his visit, he called

on Ayatollah Khomeini at his residence. 36

Iran's decision to withdraw from the CENTO and its attitude

of anti West, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism sent a wave

of jubilation in- India. India hoped that the new regime in

Iran under Khomeini would join the non-aligned community.

Explaining the government stand during the question hour in

the Lok Sabha Atal Behari Vajpayee, Minister for External

Affairs, said that . India also appreciated Iran's intention

to keep away from military blocs. "We are waiting for th~ day

when we can welcome Iran in the non-aligned movement. These

developments in Iran were.positive." 37 These hopes were realized

as the new government withdrew itself from CENTO on March 1979.

Subsequently it;

Movement (NAM)38.

applied

Apart

for membership in the Non-Aligned

from this, Iran seemed determined to

break away from its is~lation in international politics that

followed the taking of American hostages. Iran also abrogated

the bilateral defense pact with the USA and articles 5 & 6 of the

1921 Treaty with the Soviet Union in November 1979. 39 It

stopped selling of oil to Israel and broke off diplomatic

relation with Egypt. In the meantime, Ayatollah Khomeini

declared that Iran would summon a conference of Islamic

36. Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 16 March 1979.

37. Lok Sabha Debate,1

March 19, 1979. vol.30, p.45.

75

countries to devise ways and means of liberating the holy city

of Jerusalem. Yasser Arafat was given a state reception in

Tehran and received assurances of full support in the

Palestinian struggle. 40 Besides Javeed Mansoori, Deputi

Foreign Minister of Iran, was sent to India with a letter to

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, requesting Indian support for

Iran's move to expel Israel from the United Nations. 41

India considered that the Iranian revolution was popular

and genuine uprising which centered against the Shah's

autocratic and undemocratic system subservient to foreign

control. D.P.Singh (Former member of Rajya Sabha and Congress-

I) said:

"We recognize that the revolution in Iran under the inspiring leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini is motivated by high ideals of freeing this great and ancient country of Iran from the tentacles of American imperialism. We have no doubt that the government of Iran will consistently defend the gains of its revolution and not barter it away. It is therefore normal and natural for us in India to view with sympathy and. support the aspirations of the Iranian people for freedom, for equality and a new economic order at home and abroad."

38. Islamic Revolution: Future Paths of the Nations, n.21,pp.l28

- 129.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41.. The Hindu, 20 September 1984.

76

He also expressed hope that "the government and the people

of Iran will look upon their struggle as part and parcel of the

wide struggle for freedom, independence and not in any narrow

terms. n 42 Nikhil Chakravarthy (Journalist) wrote:

" ... self respect of the nation was hurt by the American suzerainty that had been imposed upon Iran ·in the last three decades. The virtual extra­territorial status that the Americans were enjoying offended the dignity of the Iranian people, reared in the heritage of Shah Abbas proud of the glory that he had left behind."

He futher added :"the dethroned Shah with his worship of the

dollar put up a grand show tracing his descent from the

forgot ten emperors of Perse Polis, a ta, asj a om 1971 which

struck no cord in the mind and heart of any Iranian Patriot,

for whom history begins at the Isfahan of Shah Abbas. Isfahan

was ignored by the shortsighted Shah, whose court wallowed in

the vulgarity of wealth in Tehran a court which was propped up

with unspeakable cruelty by the CIA-trained terror police, the

SAVAK. The Shah's idea of modernizing his people was to go in

whole hog for groveling imitation of the West, and one of its

ghastly achievements was to turn a large section of the youth

into drug addiction due to a well-oiled and prospering drug

racket at the head of which was the Shah's blessed twin

42. Singh, n.34, p.lO.

77

sister. This culture thus rose on no solid foundation in the

history of Iranian people who are reared in the majesty of the

Iranian culture." 4 3

The Communist Party of India described the victory of

the Iranian people as a big blow to the global plans of US

imperialism and said that the victory of the Iranian people

gave strength to the anti~imperialistic and democratic forces in

India. In this regard, a resolution was also issued which hailed

the resounding victory of the heroic people and the patriotic,

democratic forces of· Iran over the Shah's hated autocracy ~nd

the US imperialism.44

The Ameer of Jama'at-e-Islami-e Hind wired congratulations

to Allama Khomeini on Iran becoming the Islamic Republic. In

a message Maul ana Mohammad Yusuf, the chief of the Jama' at,

expressed hope that the divine law would fulfill his Islamic

mission in the light of Ki tab and Sunnah and on 1st Apri·l, the

day the result of referendum was made known, would go down in

the world history as an epoch-making day. In an identical

43. This is the on the spot understanding of Nikhil Chakravarthy on extraordinary development in Iran. He went to Iran in August 1980. He stayed there for four weeks. On his return he wrote a series of articles for different Journals including Times of India I Indian Express I Ananda Bazar Patrika I Mathrabhoomi I Illustrated Weekly of India I See for details special report, Nikhil Chakravarty, "Iris ide ;Iran Today, " Mainstream (New Delhi) , vol.XIX, no.6, October 11, 1980, p.27.

78

message to Dr. Mehdi Bazargan, Dr. Ibrahim Yezdi and Karim

Sanjabi, he hoped relations of Iran with Islamic world in

particular would go from strength to scrength. Meanwhile, the

Uttar Pradesh Minister of State for Home, Mukhtar Anis, urged

che Prime Minister to grant immediate recognition to the gov-

ernment which was proposed to be sec up by Ayatollah Khomeini.

He also urged central government to invite Ayatollah Khomeini

to India. n 4 5 In addition to this, in November 1978, Maulana

Ali Nasir Saeed Abaqati, a young leader from Lucknow, visited

Paris where Ayatollah Khomeini was scill leading the struggle

against the Shah of Iran. 46 ·

In an editorial Radiance, wrote: "In Iran, Islamists have

won a. great battle under the religioas leadership of Maulana

Ayatollah Khomeini. The great movement launched by him

successfully was purely in the name of :tel igion which

enthused millions of young and old, wornen and children to the

extent that they finally overthrew a strong regime which was

backed and supported by powerful Westein allies from without and

by strong and well equipped military form within". It wrote in

another editorial that Allama Khomeini, brought spectacular

political revolution in Iran purely in the name of

44. Indian Express, 13 February 1979.

45. Times of India, 22 January 1979.

46. Kayhan International, 15 March 1979.

79

religion .. u 47

The Shia Council of India expressed full confidence in the

' spiritual and religious leadership' of the Iranian leader,

Ayatollah Khomeini. It assured him full cooperation of the

community of this country. In a resolution adopted in its

annual conference the Council expressed the hope that Iran would

emeTge victorious in the war between "good and evil." 48

Khomeini's rise was widely admired in India. This is

because-he was pre-occupied with the liquidation of the Pahlavi

dynasty. His anti-Shah posture and unusual consistency won

him enormous respect of the various strata of society. For

India, Khomeini was a great revolutionary and strong

religious leader. Ayatollah Khomeini also sent Ayatollah

Hossein Noori a special envoy to India. He was the highest

Iranian dignitary to visit India since the success of the

Iranian revolution in Iran in 1979. In Iran he had held the

highest rank among Iranian clergy and was one of the

architects of the Iranian revolution. He was a teacher of

philosophy and theology in the holy city of Qom. He was reported

to. have told that he had been deputed by. Ayatollah Khomeini "to

study the conditions of Muslims" in India and report back to

him. He also said that the Muslims are not confined to any

----------------~ 47. Radiance (Delhi), 18 February 1979.

48. Times of India (New Delhi), 13 March 1979.

80

geographic unit and that they should be united no matter where

they live". 49

As far as the process of Islamization in the three

countries (Iran, Pakistan and Bangladesh) is concerned it was

entirely different. Iran's triumphant revolution created a

new atmosphere for determining that country's domestic as well

as international posture. In Pakistan and -Bangladesh the

rulers boast to be in favour of an Islamic republic or Islamic

state but their latest aim is to beguile people under the name of

Islam. 50 These regimes call themselves 11 Islamic 11 to show their

purity and to justify their deeds under the title of 'Islamic

government'. They continue their mercenary services to the East

or the West. As compared to Pakistan or Bangladesh the Islamic

Republic of Iran at present is the unique one in the Islamic

world.

Religion is an important social category_. It can play an

influential role in politics. The Khomeini movement in Iran was

against the social and political evils in the Shah' s regime.

The establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran was a

dynamic proclamation of the victory of Islam as a political and

religious power.5 1

49. Hindustan Times {New Delhi), 19 January 1980.

50. Islamic Revolution : Future Path of the Nations. n.21, p.99.

81

With the establishment of the Republic of Iran, domestic as

well as foreign policies changed drastically. The draft

Constitution for the Islamic Republic was published on 18

June 1979. It was submitted to a Council of Experts, elected

by popular vote on August 1979, to debate the various clauses

and to propose amendments. The amended Constitution was

approved by a referendum on 2-3 December 1979.

There was absorption of the old Pahlavi inst~tutions with

some modifications. Like the Pahlavi state, the Islamic Republic

is an insistent on a unified state (against demands for

-decent ral"i"zea-reg-ional-au tonomy )-· -anEl-on-the-use~o.f_P.ers.ian_as_

the national language. All the major ins·titutions of the

pahlavi state have been retained. These include Parliament,

ministries, bureaucracy, secret polic;:e, and army, controlled

press and media, revitalized guild system for taxation and

control .. 52 In addition, there is now a parallel institutional

structure of the party and revolutionary organisations,

revolutionary courts, Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) Basij,

Reconstruction Crusade (Jihad-e-Sazandeqi), Housing Foundation,

Martyrs Foundation, Foundation for the Oppressed, Workers

51. Ibid.

52. Michael M.J.Fischer, "Repetition in the Iranian Revolution," in Martin Kramer, ed., Shi'ism. Resistance. and Revolution (Westview Press, London, 1987), p.l29.

82

Councils, Peasants Councils Guilds. 53 One ·writer observed

that "This has the potential for crystallizing into a stronger

coercive state on the soviet model. But there is also the

potential for added flexibility, or a mixed political system

analogous to the mixed economic system". 54

The Islamic government of · 1979 was propelled by a

powerfulegalitarian thrust or, at the very least, by a powerful

commitment to social, political and economic justice. Within

the framework of the Islamic Republican system existent in

Iran and accepted by the people, everything must be done

a c-curding---t o- -I·s-l·amic-p rec.ept.s-~an.d_l a ws_. No laws or

regulations can be proposed or implemented that are contra~y

to the precepts of the divine religion. Article 4 of the

Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran states

f( All civil, penal, financial, economic administrative, cultural, military political, etc. laws and regulations should be based upon Islamic precepts. This article absolutely and universally governs all other articles of the constitution as well as other rules and regulations to be decided upon at the discret~Qn of the jurisprudent of the guardian council~55

The form of government in the Islamic Republic of Iran

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Islamic Revolution: Future Path of the Nations. n. 21, p.101.

83

is based exclusively on divine precepts which are

available to the people through the teachings

But the Islamic Republican form of governments

of Islam.

have same

similarities and some differences with other republics of

the world, as far as its forms and structures are

concerned. 5 6 The constitution recognizes three organs

of power namely legislature, exeeutive and judiciary. In

this respect it is similar to other governments. It is

different from other governments in- that there are some

organizations in addition to the three organs which

supervise the functioning of these·· three institutions.

These organizations form the major differences between the

Islamic Republic of Iran and other governments of. the world.

These other organizations consists of the· Guardian Council,

the Supreme Judicial

Velayet-e-Faqih. 57

Council and the leadership or

The essential difference existing between republican

form of governments in the world and the Islamic Republic

as exemplified in Iran is in the

i.e. Velayet-e-Faqih. The leader or

type

the

of leadership,

Vali -e-Faqih is

onewho supervises and correlates government's policies with

divine decrees and Islamic precepts. In this way, he

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., also see Khomeini, n.4, pp. 33-45.

84

is responsible for this concord both before God and the

people. In the Constitution it is explained as to how

the leader or the leadership is chosen, what attributes

he should have and what power and jurisdiction he has,

Article 107 of the Constitution, concerning the choosing

of the Leadership Council, states:

II Wherever any theologian meets the conditions set out in Article Five of this Constitution, and according to the majority of the people is recognized and accepted as the marja' and leader, as it was with the distinguished marja' and the leader of the Revolution, the great Ayatollah Imam Khomieni . This leader has the sanc-tity of command and all responsibilities emanating therefrom. Otherwise, experts elected by the people will revive and consult each other about the competency of all candidates for leadership. Wherever one is found to be above the others in all required qualities, that person will be introduced to the, people as the leader. Otherwise three or five competent religious authorities who meet the conditions of leadership will be appointed to the post of Leadersh~a' Council and they will be introduced to the people~

In Pakistan, the issue of Islamization has been on the

nation's agenda in various forms since its inception. Liaquat

Ali Khan said in the Constituent Assembly: "Pakistan was

founded because the Muslims of the subcontinent wanted to build

up their lives in accordance with the teachings and traditions

of Islam, because they wanted to demonstrate to the world that

58. Ibid.

85

Islam provides a panacea to the many disease which have crept

into the humanity today."59

But, military intervention became a regular part of

Pakistan's political process. Till Zia-ul-Haq used Islam

potentially as an ideology to justify the endless martial

law. On three occasions, so far, military intervened overtly

and imposed martial law throughout the country in Octo~er 1958,

March 1969, and July 1977 and justified its extreme action on the

grounds of chaotic conditions prevailing in the country.

Pakistan has essentially been ruled by men in uniform for 23

years during the 40 years of its existence. 60 It is also a

reflection of the inability of the early Pakistani leaders to

create viable political institution which could hold ·together

the infant body politic. The Pakistan Constitution was written

several times. The first .was promulgated in 1'956. The country

was explicitly referred to as an "Islamic Republic" although

this reference was omitted from the Constitution of-1962 after

11 years. The 1973 Constitution ·declared Islam as the state

religion and envisaged that (a) the President

Minister ought to be Muslims, (b) that all laws

and the Prime

should be in

59. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debate, vol. V, 7th March, 1949, p.49.

60. Veena Kukreja, "Military Politics in Pakistan : Ten Years of Zia' s Rule," Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), vol.XII, no.S, August 1988, p.447.

86

conformity with the values of Islam. 61

The efforts of Zia-ul-Haq, the President of Martial Law

Government were somewhat more sucessful. In marked contrast to

the earlier two regimes of Ayub and Yahya, over 11 years Zia

perpetuated his rule "through a combination of repression, the

shameless utilization of Islam and elaborate series

carefully orchestrated political initiatives designed to lull

the rna sse s . " 6 2 0 F b 1 0 n e ruary , 1979, Zia promulgated an

ordinance on the 12th of Rabi-ul-Awwal 1399 A.H ammending

Pakistan penal code relating to certain offenses affecting the

property and moral and social order of the society, so as to

bring it inconformity with the Holy Quran and the Sunnah. By

this ordinance, the existing laws relating to the offences of

theft, robbery and dacoitry, extortion, adultery and drinking of

wine have been replaced by the Islamic provisions of Hudud,

the Almighty Allah's restrictive ordinances, the fixed

punishments prescribed by the Holy Quran, provided or

established by the Sunnah ·of the Prophet on which there is an

61. Tanzil-ur-Rahman, "Introduction of Islamic Legal System in Pakistan," Radiance (New Delhi) March 1, 1979.

62. Tariq Ali., Can Pakistan Survive (Londori, 1983) p.l36. Also see Marvin G.Weibaum and Stephen P.Cohen, "Pakistan in 1982: Holding on, " Asian Survey, (Berkeley) , vol.XXIII, no.2, February 1983, pp.l23-31. Also consult Alvi, "Pakistan and Islam: Its Ethnicity and Ideology", Mainstream (New Delhi), February 21, 1987. pp.lSl-52.

87

'I j ma ' (consensus)

{sahaba) . 63

of the Holy Prophets' revered companions

So far as the compatibility of democracy with Islam is

concerned, Zia used Islam as the very. strategy for survival

and stated on several occasions that Islam had no such things

as political parties, Western-type democracy, division of

power among the exec·utive authority and autonomous legislature

and independent judiciary. He considered democracy as out of

step with the Muslim psyche. Obviously, Zia's intention was

to decide democracy through a self-justifying interpretation of

Islam64 11 Muslims 11, according to him, "believe in one God, one

prophet, and one book, and their tendency is that they should be

ruled by one man".65

Zia's obsession with "puritanical and aggressive

63. Rahman, n.54. The so called Islamisation of political, legal, economic and social institutions undertaken by the regime manifests the Jamai 'at-i -Islami 1 s . blueprint of a coercive and bureaucratic state that perpetuates exploitative and feudal status quo. For an excellent account of Maulane Maudoodi 1 s authoritarian state, see Zafaryab Ahmed, 11 Maudodi' s Concept of Islamic State, " in Asghar Khan, ed., Politics and the State: The Pakistan Experience (London, 1985}, ~.127.

64. For an interesting discussion on Islam and modern democratic institutions see Mo.hammed Munir, From Jinnah to Zia: A Study in Ideological Convulsion (New Delhi, 1980), pp.114-22.

65. Nisar Osmani, "Presidential System More Suitable," Dawn (Karachi}, March 28, 1978. A.R.Changez, "Political Parties Have no Place in an Islamic State", The Pakistan Times (Lahore), September 16, 1977.

88

championing of the. causes of Islam was apparently born out of

his political motives or compulsions for survival in the wake of

changing social and political composition and ethos of the

officer corps in the seventies. Conscious of the need to

broaden its political base on the one hand and the masses'

attachment to Islam on the other, Zia shrewdly exploited

religion to "evoke an emotional response" in support of his

regime. 66 Most controversial step towards Islamization of the

civil law movement was the new law of evidence (Qanoon-i-

Shahadat) promulgated by a presidential·- order on October 27,

1984, which set the testimony of two women as equal to that

of one man. This generated vocal reaction and .sparked off a

women's movement unparalleled in the history of Pakistan, which

met with repression and violence. 67

Thus, Zia used Islam as possible legitimization strategy

for the consolidation of his autocratic military rule in an

unprecedented manner. Unlike Ayub (who conducted a referendum

after about one and a half year of the coup), Zia went· ahead

with a referendum seven years after his seizure of power from

Bhuto. He kept postponing elections several times on one

pretext or the other. With the growing unrest over the suspense

66.

67.

Omar Arghar Khan, "Political and Economic Acpects Islamization," in Asghar Khan, ed., n.65, p.127.

of

Dawn, February 13, 1983; N.A.Khwaja, Slogan and the Motives", Pakistan Times 18, 1983.

89

"Women's Rally: The (Karachi), February

about the promised election for April 1985, Zia made the

announcement on 1st December 1984 for holding a referendum on

19 December in which the electorate would be asked to vote "yes

or no" on whether they approved of the Islamization programme

that he had instituted and whether they supported the "Islamic

ideology of Pakistan".68 Indeed, the highly circumscribed

referendum, sought to be rammed down the people's throat at a

fortnight's notice and which was the typical of Zia's strate-

gies and skullduggery claimed 97.71 "yes" vote based on a 60%

turnout of the electrorate. In sum, President Zia claimed the

vote was a mandate for the continuation of his Islamization

programme, and he assumed the presidency for a five year term

i.e., upto 1990.69

Zia' s major items on parliament's political agenda were

(1) modification of the constitutional structure, ( 2)

·legalization of political parties, {3) the lifting of Martial

Law. Unlike the earlier rulers, Zia did not introduce a new

Constitution but introduced several changes. On March 2,

1985, the President, despite his frequent references to the need

to amend the 1973 Constitution, finally announced the Revival

of the Constitution Order in 1985, printed in the Gazette of

68. Rafique Akhtar, Pakistan Year Book 1985-86 .(Karachi, 1986), p.l86.

69. R.G. {New

Sawhney, "Sultan Zia- ul-Haq," Strategic Analysis Delhi), vol.VII, no.lO, January 1985,pp.927-39.

90

Pakistan Extraordinary. The salient features of Order included

strengthening of the powers of the President vis-a-vis those of

the Prime Minister and the creation of a National Security

Council to give the military a formal role during the time of

-major crisis. 70 . The Constitution Eighth Amendment (Indemnity)

Bill was passed by the National Assembly on October 16, 1985. It

aimed at validating the 1977 coup and absolving Zia and the

military from any legal liability for action taken over the next·

eight subsequent years of Martial Law. 71

In the sphere of Pakistan's foreign policy under Zia, Islam

and Islamic solidarity also played an important role. Since its

inception Pakistani leaders cherished a leading role for their

country in the pan-Islamic movement and claimed Pakistan to be

the "fortress of Islam. 11 According to Ayub Khan "our faith and

cultural heritage incline us towards the Muslim world which

runs in a great belt from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific

situated as Pakistan is, with its two wings touching the Western

and Eastern points of the Islamic world, it can be a strong

link in the chain of the Islamic unity 11•72

70. Kukrej1

n.60, p.462.

71. Ibid.

72. President Ayab Kahn's address to the Pakistan's Institute of International Affairs on 28 January 1967, quoted in Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), vol.XX, no .1, First Quarter 19 6 7 I PP . 13 - 14 . .

91

The initial enthusiasm for strong Islamic ties and cordial

relations with Middle East was often watered down by

Pakistan's preoccupation with securing a regi.onal balance of

power with India. That steadily drove Pakistan to the Western

alliance system in 1950s. Pakistan's perennial search for

security restricted its foreign policy options to such an

extent that it. had to compromise its zealous efforts of

solidarity of the Islamic coinmunity. 73 Pakistan's foreign

policy can be divided. into five periods: 1947 to 1954; 1954 to

1958; 1958 to 1971; 1971 to 1977, and the period since then.

During the first phase, the framers of Pakistan's foreign policy

aimed at seeking friendly relations with the Islamic countries

and followed what. may be called a policy of non-alignment.

During the second period Pakistan followed a policy of total

alignmen·t with the western bloc. 74 In the third phase, after

the military coup, the military rulers sought to follow a policy

of partial alignment with the West. Since the coup in July

1977, General Zia wove in the facade of Islam in his domestic

and foreign policies. He tried to evolve a new equation with

the United States, Soviet Union and the Third World.

73.

Zia' s military regime could not give a radical turn to

M.G.Kabir, "Pakistan's Middle East Passion and Interest 11

, Bliss Journal October 1986. p.455.

Policy:A Dilemma of (Dhaka), vol.7, no.4,

74. Ibid.

92

Pakistani's foreign policy of the Bhutto era, immediately after

he took over in July 1977. Pakistan went on to join the Non-

Aligned Movement (NAM) during its summit at Havana in

September 1979. Apparently there was no change in Pakistan's

foreign policy even.after the military coup in July 1977. The

basic frame work of Pakistan's foreign policy during the Zia

regime remained similar to th!= one followed by the earlier

regimes, i.e., alliance with the United States to counter the

perceived threat from India and the Soviet Union, particularly

after the emergence of the Soviet installed regime in

Afghanistan. During the time of Zia, Pakistan was quite active

in the Islamic arena as we11. 75

In Iran under Khomeini, the perception of foreign

policy changed drastically. The core message of the new

regime's foreign policy was "neither East, nor West, Islam is

the best". 76 "The superpowers" Khomeini told, "are responsible

for all world corruption". For this reason Muslims "should

mobilize the oppressed and chained nations so that the

superpowers can be pushed out of the scene and the governments

can be handed over to the oppressed". 77 But this must be done

75. Kal im Bahadur, "Military Rule and Foreign Policy, " in Surendra Chopra, ed., Perspective on Pakistan Foreign Policy (Amristar, 1983), p.58.

76. Islamic Revolution: Future Path of the Natiohs, n.21. p.101.

77. FBIS, June 20 1983.

93

in a way that teaches the superpowers a lesson. They must be

both humiliated and punished for the wrongs they have done to

the Muslims. They must be "slapped in the face". or "punched

in the mouth." 78 Through violence, the Satanic majority will be

made to submit to the righteous few. 79

The main guiding principles for the conduct of Iranian

foreign policy were:

1) Rejection of 'dependence' on either the West or East.

2) Identification of the United States as .the 'principal

enemy' of the Islamic Revolution;

3) Struggle against superpower and the 'Zionist Power',

4) Close relations with all oppressed peoples, especially those

in Muslin countries;

5) Liberation of Jerusalem and opposition to pro-Israel states;

6) Anti-imperialism; and

7) Support everywhere for oppressed people. 80

The new regime's foreign policy has been clearly outlined in

78. Ibid., August 17, 1983.

79. Mangol Bayat, "Mahmud Taleqani and the Iranian Revolution", in Martin Kramer, ed., Shi'ism, Resistance and Revolution (Westview Press, London, 1987), p.S3.

80. Ramazani, n.S, p.21.

94

Articles 152, 153 and 154 and part ten of the Constitution of

the Islamic Republic of Iran. Article 152 Says

The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on the negation of all ·forms of domination or submission there-to, the preservat~on of the independence and territorial integrity of the country, the defense of the rights of all Muslims, non­alignment before dominating powers and mutual peaceful relations with non-aggressive states. 81

Article l53 states

No contract is to be concluded involving foreign domination over the natural or economic resources, the.cul~~re, the army or other domains of the Iranian nat1on.

Article 154 asserts : -

The Islamic Republic of Iran aspires for the property of man in the whol~ human society and recognizes independenc;:e, liberty and the rule of justice and truth as rights for all people of the world. Hence, while refraining from any kind of intervention in other nation's internal affairs, the Islamic Republic of Iran supports the truth seeking struggles of the opprg~sed against the oppressors in every part of the world.

Apart from this, the export of its revolution also

became the cardinal principle of Iran's foreign policy.

The doctrine of the export of the Islamic Revolution

aims simultaneously. at three interconnected goals in

81. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Islamic Propagation, Tehran}, n. p.70.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid.

95

Iran's foreign policy namely, paving the way for the

eventual establishment of the world government of the

messiah, promoting populist, independent Islamic

governments 1n other states and, above all, protecting the

first and only such state and government in Iran. 84 At the

same time, Iran also made it clear that the 11 export of the

Islamic Revolution 11 must be accomplished by example and

propaganda. For example, Khomeini told a group of

ambassadors and charge' d' affairs who had been recalled

to Teharan for consultation

84.

"It does not take swords to export this ideology. The export of ideas by force is no export. We shall have exported Islam only when we have helped Islam and Islamic ethics grow in those countries. This is your responsibility and it is a task which you must fulfill. You should promote this idea by adopting a · conduct conducive to the propagation of Islam and by publishing · the necessary publications in your countries of assignment. This is a must. You must have publications. You must publish journals. Such journals. should be promotive and their contents and pictures should be consistent with the Islamic Republic, so that by proper publicity campaigns you mg5 pave the way for the spread of Islam in those areas. 11

R. K. Ramazani 11 Iran's Islamic Revolution Gulf, 11 Current History (Philadelphia) , January 1985, p.6.

and the vol. 84,

Persian no.48,

85. Quoted in Ramazani, n.5, p.l9

96

In Bangladesh the process of Islamization and perception

of foreign policy is entirely different from both - Iran and

Pakistan. The main reason for this was political and

economic. Bangladesh emerged as an independent state in 1971

in a complex international political and economic scenario. In

the post-independence era· Bangladesh had to face formidable

challenges both of political and economic nature from inte:~;nal

and external sources. The country was caught . up by severe

economic crisis and the nation

traumatic events. For consolidation

rehabilitation and reconstruction of

to step up the pace of economic and

country needed national cohesion,

undisrupted flow of external aid.

it had developed with the Soviet

passed through a series of

of national independence,

war ravaged economy and

social development the

political. stability ·and

The close relationship that

Union and other communist

countries besides India during and after the war of

independence apparently fell short of meeting Bangladesh's

growing needs of ext€rnal resource inflow. Dhaka had to take

initiatives to broaden her external support base by developing

relations with the other group of countries. Bangladesh pqlicy

planners were convinced that development of relations with the

Arab countries might ease the economic hardships of the new

state. At the same time Bangladesh wanted to enhance her

international prestige and position by getting recognition from

more and more countries and becoming member of various

97

international organizations and bodies, including the

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) for which strong

support was required. On the domestic front, there was a

growing demand on the part of the traditional muslims for

developing fraternal ties with the Arab countries stemming

fromshared religious and cultural values and the government

could not ignore it.86

Bangladesh underwent a different process of Islamization.

The use of ·religion for political purpose began under Muj ib.

Mujib's political use of Islam was demonstrated by the general

amnesty in 1973 to collaborators without trial, use of

Islamic terms in speeches, dropping of the use of valedictory

"Joy Bangla" in speeches; revival of the Islamic Academy

(abolished in 1972) and upgrading it to a Foundation by a

Presidential ordinance

Islamic gathering.87

of 28 March 1975, and attending of

The winning of Pakistani recognition and

OIC membership in February 1974 and securing of the founder

membership of Islamic Development Bank in 1975, provided enough

ground for Muj ib for a head start in this direction. 88 The

86. Golam Mostafa, "Bangladesh Foreign Policy: The Middle East Factor", Bliss Journal (Dhaka) , vol. 7, no .1, January 1986, pp.33-36.

87. Syed Anwar Husain, "Religion and Ethnicity in Bangladesh Politics", Bliss Journal (Dhaka), vol.12, no.4, October 1991, p.227.

88. Ibid.

.98

Lahore summit of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)

was watershed. At this summit Bangladesh was admitted as a full

member of Oic.89

Bangladesh's inclusion into the world Islamic conference

and her participation at the second Islamic summit conference at

Lahore in 1974 was .a triumph of Bangladesh foreign policy. On

the eve of the Islamic summit at Lahore, Bangladesh was

recognized by Pakistan, Iran and, later on by Qatar, United

Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Oman. fact, after the Lahore

conference Bangladesh developed wider connection with the Arab

countries. During the devastating floods in 1974 Saudi Arabia

donated $10 million as disaster relief to Bangladesh, although

she was not yet recognized by the former. 90

Bangladesh tried to put high priority on Islam ~nd Islamic

solidarity ostensibly to satisfy some quarters in the Arab

world and in consonance with the bulk of the Isl?imic

constituency within the country. The August coup in 1975 was

a turning point in Bangladesh's relations with Muslim

countries as basic principle of the state was replaced by

'absolute, trust and faith in Almighty Allah.' Thus the then

President, Ziaur · Rahman, dropped the word 'secularism' and

89. Ibid., "Bangladesh and the Organization of Islamic Conference", Asian Affairs (Dhaka), vol.9, no.2, April-June 1987, p.18.

90. Times of India 20 (New Delhi}, August 1974.

99

substituted_ a paragraph which said the high ideals of absolute

trust and faith would remain in the Almighty Allah. He also

added Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim (in the · name of Allah the

beneficent 1 the merciful) in the constitution • 91 One scholar

observed that II in spite of all his apparent leanings

towards Islamic orientation and demonstrative attempts at

Islamization Zia never seemed to have contemplated to turn

Bangladesh into an Islamic polity. But to him goes the

responsibility for rehabilitating the anti-liberation religious

elements and therebY introducing a strong divi~ive force in

Bangladesh." 92

A new clause was added to Article 25 ·in the Constitution

relevant to external re~ations. It. expressed solidarity with

fraternal Islamic countries. The clause read: " the state

shall endeavour to consoli'date, preserve and strengthen

fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic

solidarity." In May 1976, Ziaur :Rahman declared in a public

meeting in Dhaka· that "we have religious, historical, cultural

relations with all the Muslim countries of the world." 93

91. The Constitution of The People's Republic of Bangladesh 1972. The Proclamations (Amendments), Order no.12 of 23 April 1977, Article no.8, p.154.

92. Husain, n.84, p.430

93. The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, n.88,p.154.

100

Bangladesh repeatedly expressed its solidarity with the

Muslim countries and this willingness became the "basic

philosophy of our (Bangladesh) policy programme." 94 It is true : . .

that in 1977 the changes in Bangladesh's Constitution gave an

impetus to its relations with Muslim countries: But in fact,

this was not an overnight overture towards Islam.

Bangladesh's efforts to emerge as an important Islamic

country in the . world reached its peak. Apart from being a

member of the OIC, also secured membership of the

organization's five major special committees. Those are~

1) 15- member permanent committee on Jerusalem, known as the

Al-Quds committee.

2) 3 - member Al-Quds summit committee, (both committees are

headed by Moroccan Monarch king Hasan II)

3) 9- member OIC Peace Committee (Islamic Peace Committee)

formed to mediate in the protracted and fratricidal war

between Iran and Iraq.

4) 13 - member permanent committee of Islamic Solidarity Fund,

5) 13 member standing committee for information and cultural

94. Akmal Hussain, "Bangladesh and Muslim World 11, in Emajuddin

Ahmad, ed., Foreign Policy of Bangladesh: A Small State's Imperative (University Press, Dhaka, 1984), p.87.

101

affairs headed by the President of Senega1. 95

Bangladesh's desperate move to identify itself with a

genuine Islamic character irritated Bangladesh's opposition. In

1980, in a session of the parliament, they accused the

Bangladesh government of "one way traffic". However, the

Bangladesh government rejected this allegation. Foreign

Minis::er refuted the opposition charge that the Bangladesh's

effort for winning friendship of Islamic countries was one way

traffic. · He termed the allegation totally false and declared

that there was a dearth of reciprocity in matters of promoting

fraternal relations and mutual cooperation~ 96

President Erashad took some steps to make Islam the state

religion. "Bangladesh's progress.towards Islamization especially

after Sheikh Mujibhur Rahman's assassination in 1975 was

steady." 97 The Bangladesh parliament passed a bill that

amended the Constitution so as to make Islam the state

reiigion. "The bill submitted b~ President Hussain Ershad's

Jatiyadal party was approved by a 254 to 0 vote in 300-member

Parliament known as the Eighth Constitutional Amendment bill." 98

95. Syed Anwar Husain, "Bangladesh and the Organization of Islamic Conference", Asian Affairs (Dhaka), vol. 9, no. 2, April-June 1987, pp.ll-19.

96. Bangladesh Times (Dhaka), March 1, 1980.

97. Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 31 June 1988.

98. International Herald Tribune (London), 8 June 1988.

102

In case of India's perception of foreign policy Middle

Eastern countries also played an important role. India's West

Asian policy before 1947 consisted primarily· of emotional

commitments to certain issue like the Khilafat movement,

Pal.estine , .. anti colonialism, anti-imperialism, Arab

nationalism, Arab unity etc. Though there was no conscious

effort to evolve· a joint struggle against imperialism and

co~onialism, the Arabs and the Indians sought to gain strehgth

from each other's struggle against the common enemy. 99

Indian support for the Arabs was expressed in the form of .

reiteration of Indo-Arab · solidarity -·on an emotional level,

against the common enemy . 100 In 1933 Nehru wrote to his

daughter Indira, that in Palestine the British had pitted Jewish

religious nationalism against Arab nationalism, to perpetuate

British rule. He complained that although the Arabs in their

fight for national freedom and democratic government, tried to

ain the support of the Jews, they (i.e.the Jews) rejected

these advances. Instead, he wrote, they preferred to take

sides with the foreign ruling power ... Even Mahatma Gandhi did

not appreciate the Zionist claim to an indissoluble link between

the Jewish people and Holy land. Gandhij i wrote in the Harijan

99. K.R.Singh, 11 India and WANA 11, International Studies (New

Delhi), vol.17, no.3, July-December 1978, p.627.

100. Ibid., p.630.

103

on 12 November 1938

"I have all my sympathy with the Jews. But sympathy does not blind me to the· requirements of justice. The cry for the national home for the Jews does not make much appeal to me. Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the sense that England belongs to the English or France belongs ·to the French. It is wrong to impose the Jews on the Arab. The Palestine of Biblical conception is .not the geographical.tract .. It is in their heart."1U1 .

The shaping of India's West Asia policy was. strongly

influenced by its perception and requirements. The changes

that came about in regional international environments in the

mid -fifties influenced I~dia's ~est Asia policy. The rivalry

between the superpowers for influence in Southern Asia

{comprising mainly South Asia and West Asia) made profound impact'

upon the regional power equation. None could tell whether the

political presence of the Western bloc and its pro·gramme of

military aid in Southern Asia really constituted a threat to

the Soviet Union (and China) . 1 02 What is certain is that ·it

resulted in increased regional tension and -rivalry which occa-

sionally led to war (e.g. Anglo-Iranian Oil company crisis

1951-.531 the Suez war of 1956, Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, and

Arab-Israeli war of 1967) besides several minor crises. A major

101. Quoted in Arun Kumar Benerj i, "India and West Asia: Changing Images Reflects Shift in Regional Balance of Power." Round Table (London), no.305, January 1988, pp.26-27.

102. Singh, n.99, p.629.

104

result of the rivalry between the super powers in Southern

Asia and of Western policy was that the regional powers split

into two camps, one consisting of the states that were pro-

Western and other comprised of the States that were Non­

Aligned.103

Another important thing is that economic aspect also played

important role in India's West Asia policy. For centuries Indian

trading communities have flourished in the region, particularly

in the Persian Gulf. After becoming free from colonial !~_le,_

the countries of the region embarked upon the process of socio-:-.

economic development and industrialization which was further

accelerated after the pouring in of Oil revenues in these

countries in the late sixties and early seventies. As such

they were in need of technical personnel and expertise, thus

providing good market for Indian skilled labour. Most of the

countries of the region have thousands of Indians employed in

lucrative jobs. Thus providing great scope for earning valuable

foreign exchange.104 Besides, the spurt in oil price in 1972-73

and scare about the impending oil scarcity necessitated the

strengthening and broadening of ties with the gulf countries.

Two thirds of India's oil imports came from Iran. The next

103. Ibid.

104. V.P.Dutt, India's Foreign policy (Vikas Pub; Delhi, 1984), p.332.

105

largest supplies was Saudi Arabia. There was a massive hike in

India's oil bill. India was earlier spending only Rs.130 crores

on petroleum oil and lubricants but with the subsequent oil

crisis, the expenditure shot up to astronomical figures for

India, Rs .1413. 4 crores for 1976-77 and Rs. 5189.3 crores in

1881-82. 1-05 - ·-->~ ..

Domestic factor also occupied an important role in its

policy. India today has bigger Muslim population than all the

Muslim countries (including Pakistan) except Indonesia and

Bangladesh. Indian Muslim population always has shown deep

concern in West Asian developments because of religious

affinity. 106 One scholar observed that 11 just as Jews have looked

to Jerusalem and Catholics to Rome for religious inspiration

and pilgrimage, so muslims of the subcontinent as all over

the world, have prayed towards Mecca .. 111 0 7 India is among

the top five countries sending a large number of pilgrims

(Hajis) to Mecca and Madina every year.

105. Economic Survey 1982-83 (Government of India, New Delhi), p.135.

106. Theodore P. Wright. Jr., 11 Indian Muslims and the Middle East 11 , Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. vol.VI, no.1, Fall 1982. p.265.

107. Dutt, n.104, pp.335-38.

106