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Chapter IV
US-SAUDI RELATIONS : 1945-1950
FDR Meets Ibn Saud
United States-Saudi Arabian relations assumed historic
significance with the meeting of President Roosevelt and King
Ibn Saud in February 1945. Roosevelt's desire to meet Ibn
Saud could be deemed as an important indication that the
United States had realised the need for maintaining and
strengthening its relations with saudi Arabia in view of the
developing world situation and the particular situation in the
region where Saudi Arabia was becoming a nation of growing
importance. Prompt acceptance of the invitation by Ibn Saud,
who until the~ had not travelled beyond his kingdom, was
equal~ an acknowledgement of the hope and confidence which
the King had placed on the United States. Van Der Meulen, a
Dutch diplomatist and a longtime traveller in Saudi Arabia, who
saw the King on his w~ to meet President Roosevelt, later
wrote that Ibn Saud was "more than ready to accept the
invitation." (1) However, behind their apparent enthusiasm
for meeting each other were certain important and immediate
issues confronting the two countries, questions involving the
place of West Asia in the war effort, the explosive Palestine
problem, the organisation of the United Nations, and, above all,
(1) D Van Der Meulen, The k/ells .Q.f Ibn Sa 'ud (London, 1957), P• 152.
LVol.
the oil resources of Saudi Arabia in which American companies
exclusively held concessions.
It was announced by the State Department that the meet
ing was arranged in accordance with the President's desire to
meet heads of governments "to talk as friends and exchange
views in order to understand better the problems of one
another.'' (2) Roosevelt had even on an earlier occasion
evinced interest in King Ibn Saud. He had invited Ibn Saud
in 1943 to visit him in Washington to talk over, among other
issues, the Palestine problem. FUlly aware of Ibn Saud's
implacable opposition to the Jewish stand on the Palestine
question, the President apparently believed that in a personal
contact his persuasiveness would prevail upon the Arab chief
tain. (3) ~~en such a meeting was not possible, President
Roosevelt, on sumner Welles' suggestion, had instructed the
State Department in July 1943 to dispatch Colonel Halford L.
Hoskins to Riyadh to explore whether the King would be pre
pared to meet any representative of Jewish Agency for holding
discussions on the Palestine problem.
The idea of arranging a meeting between King Ibn saud
(2) State DePartment Bulletin (25 February 1945), p. 290.
(3) As early as 29 November 1938, King Ibn Saud despatched to the President a letter in which he took an extremely hard line on the Palestine issue. He had vigorously reiterated this stand of his in a subsequent letter dated 30 April 1943. Text of letter, Foreign Relations, Vol. 2- (1938) 994;[ ~ (1943)' pp. 773-75.
79
and a representative of the Jewish Agency arose as a result
of a plan which H. st. John Philby claimed he had devised.
As related by Philby later, the plan envisaged that Palestine
was to be left to the Jews with all displaced Arabs settled
elsewhere, and in return the Jews would contribute £20
million to Ibn Saud. This settlement was to be proposed to
the King by Britain and the United States who were jointlY to
guarantee its implementation. Philby was sure that it was
possible to obtain King Ibn Saud's support for this scheme.
It was in this connection Col. Hoskins was sent to Riyadh to
consult with the King.
Describing Ibn Saud's stand as "consistent with his
character and with his policies" Hoskins wrote in a memorandum
to Cordell Hull:
They are based on his own religious and patriotic principles and reflect his sound political sense in recognizing clearlY his limitations, both spiritual and physical, in this matter •. He realizes that, despite his position of leadership in the Arab world, he cannot, without prior consultation, speak for Palestine much less "deliver" Palestine to the Jews, even if he were willing for even an instant to consider such a proposal •••• The King did not saY so, but he clearly has the political acumen to realize that, even if he had no religious convictions on the subject, he still could not afford to support any Jewish claims to Palestine. (4)
It does not appear as though Roosevelt's meeting with
Ibn Saud in February 1945 was part of any plan evolved in
Washington following the failure of the Hoskins mission.
(4) Foreign Relations (1943), Vol. 4, pp. 808-809; See also H. St. John Philby, Arabian Jubilee (London, 1952), pp. 211-213.
BO
A memorandum prepared by Harry L. Hopkins indicates that the
meeting was an improvised venture. According to Hopkins it
was only on the last night before the Yalta Conference con
cluded that Roosevelt mentioned to Churchill that he had
arranged for a .meeting with King Ibn Saud. According to
Hopkins, Churchill viewed the matter with grave suspicion
and thought that the United States had "some deep-laid plot"
to undermine the British Empire. Hopkins thought that the
meeting was "in the main a lot of horse play ••• and the Presi
dent did not realize what kind of a man he was going to be
entertaining." (5)
Secretary of State James F. ayrnes, who accompanied the
President to the Yalta Conference gives a different account of
this encounter. Later while !fi route to Malta, Roosevelt,
according to ayrnes, "confided to Churchill his plan to visit
King Ibn saud on his return trip to discuss the Palestine
question ••• he wanted to bring about peace between the Arabs
and the Jews. Churchill merely wished him good luck but did
not seem very hopeful that the President would meet with
success." (6)
(5)
(6)
. The US Minister in Saudi Arabia, Colonel William A. EddY,
Robert E. Sherwood, Roo,evelt ~Hopkins: AU Intimate History (New York, 1948 , p. 871.
James F. ~rnes, Speaking Frankly (New York, 1947), p. 22.
carried the invitation to the King and the idea of the meeting
was pursued with such secrecy that nobody in Saudi Arabia knew
anything about it except Eddy, his wife and his coding clerk,
and Ibn Saud and his closest advisers. ActuallY when the
King's party was planning to leave Jidda by the American
destroyer Murpny that had been speciallY sent to pick up the
royal retinue, the people in Jidda reacted with "hysterical
commotion" believing that the King was either fleeing or was
being "kidnapped" by the Americans.
Col. Eddy, who served as interpreter at the encounter
gives a detailed report based on notes taken down at the time
in his book, FDR Meets Ibn Saud. According to Eddy, Chur-
chill was "thoroughly nettled" on hearing from Roosevelt of
the latter's proposed meeting with Ibn Saud and decided to see
the King following Roosevelt's meeting. Eddy further writes
that Ibn Saud did not answer Churchill's invitation until he
received Roosevelt's approval "since he was making the trip to
see Roosevelt and did not want to show any discourtesy to his
principal host" LRooseveltJ. (7)
The meeting was arranged on board the cruiser, USS
Quincy, which-was anchored in the Great Bitter Lake of the
Suez Canal. The President received the King with all the
honours due to a royal dignitary. Commenting on Ibn Saud's
appearance at this meeting, the New York Time§ wrote:
(7) William A. Eddy, E·~·B· Meet§ Ibn ~ (New York, 1954), p. 14.
If Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and King Farouk of Egypt disappointed some of us by appearing in conventional European uniforms, King Ibn Saud made up the difference. He wore the costume of his people. Behind the robes and beneath the draped headgear was a very practical man. (8)
Indeed be was, for even though his conversation with
Roosevelt was pleasant, it was also firm and forthright.
Roosevelt took every care to be deferential to his visitor and
talked on equal terms with Ibn Saud. According to Col. Eddy,
Roosevelt was "in top form as a charming host, witty conver-
sationaliat with the spark of light in his eyes and that
gracious smile which alwaYs won people over to him whenever
he talked with them as a friend". (9)
Roosevelt and Ibn Saud talked mainly on the explosive
issue of the Jewish admission into Palestine. The discussion
was very short and to the point. With a view to repairing
the wrongs done to the Jews by Germany, Roosevelt asked if the
King would continue any further limited immigration into
Palestine, to which, "Ibn Saud, without a smile said 'No •." (10)
Commenting on Ibn Saud's firmness in a memorandum, Harry
Hopkins, who was also present at this meeting, saYs:
The President seemed not to fully comprehend what Ibn Saud was saYing to him for, he brought up the question two or three times more and each time Ibn Saud was more determined than before. (11)
(8) New York Times, 22 February 1945.
(9) EddY, pp. 31-32.
(10) Ibid., p. 34.
(11) Sherwood, PP• 871-872.
FinallY when the King launched on an extended explana
tion setting forth the Arab position and their determination
to resist immigration to the point that the Arabs would
choose to die rather than yield their lands to the Jews,
Roosevelt for the first time realized the extent of Arab
determination on the Palestine problem.
If the President had any illusions about tempting the
King to modify his views on the Palestine problem, they were
soon shattered. The King remained unmoved despite enthusias
tic hints from Roosevelt of American assistance to various
internal projects in Saudi Arabia. The President finalLY gave
the King an unequivocal assurance of his continued and
unfailing friendship and promised that no decision would be
taken with respect to the basic situation in Palestine without
first holding full consultations with both the Arabs and the
Jews. (12)
The meeting ended with the customary exchange of gifts:
the King's gift was a jewel encrusted Arab sword and the
President in turn, offered to send a wheel-chair such as his
own and a luxurious C-47 plane for the King's use. (13)
Despite the uncompromising attitude of King Ibn Saud on
the Palestine issue, the meeting cannot be dismissed as one
(12) Petroleum Arrangements with Saudi Arabia, p. 24991.
(13) Ed~, p. 35.
without positive results. Roosevelt needed Ibn Saud's support
and friendship on certain other matters. In his effort to
organise the United Nations, Roosevelt urged the King to join
the grand alliance to defeat the Axis. Accordingly, the King
declared war on the .Axis powers. In a letter dated 28 Feb
ruary, addressed to President Roosevelt he said, "We have
already taken our stand against the Axis Governments in several
events, chiefly in their aggression •••• I have decided to
adhere to the .Allies in this War." A formal declaration by
Ibn Saud's Government was subsequently made on 1 March in
. which it said, "Saudi Arabia ••• has declared this day March 1,
1945 that it is in a state of war with Germany and Japanu. (14)
The main result of the meeting was that it enabled
Roosevelt and his close advisers to become aware of the depth
of the Arab feelings on the Palestine issue. Harry Hopkins
reported:
There is no doubt that Ibn Sa'ud made a great impression on the President that the Arabs meant business.... I know that the conference' in relation to Palestine never came to grips with the real issues, ••• and I gained the impression that the President was overly impressed by what Ibn saud said. (15)
To Frances Perkins, the interview with Ibn Saud made
Roosevelt realize that the King was not particularly interested
(14)
(15)
Statement Depg)tment Bulletin (4 March 1945), p. 375; (11 March 1945 , p. 408; New York Times, 2 March 1945; 7 March 1945.
Sherwood, p. 872.
in the social and economic benefits the President was prepared
to offer because the resulting benefits would be "inherited by
Jews". (16) Elliot Roosevelt in her account of the encounter
saYs that the President had remarked later to Bernard Baruch
that "of all the men he had talked to in his life, he had least
satisfaction from this iron-willed Arab monarch". (17) On the
other hand Roosevelt wrote to EdOY that his meeting with Ibn
saud was an "outstanding success" as well as "a most interest
ing and stimulating experience". (18) On his return to
Washington, the President himself, in a message to the Congress
on 1 March 1945 on the Yalta Conference admitted:
Of the problems of Arabia I learned more about that whole problem, the Moslem problem, the Jewish problem, by talking with Ibn Sa'ud for five minutes than I could have learned in an exchange of two or three dozen letters. (19)
King Ibn Saud too returned to his country with satisfaction.
Speaking of the meeting he said:
President Roosevelt was the most important man at the meeting. I think a great deal of the United States and I have
(16) Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Know (New York, 1946), pp. 87-89.
(17) Elliot Roosevelt, Ja H& ~I! (New York, 1945), P• 245.
(18) EddY, p. 36.
(19) New York Times, 2 March 1945; Judge Samuel Irving Rosenman, Special Counsel and an intimate friend of the President in his book Working with Roosevelt ~(New York, 1952), pp. 527-528_7 writes that as one who was listening to Roosevelt deliver the speech, he was "dismayed at the halting, ineffective manner of delivery •••• He adlibbed a great deal, as frequent~ as I had ever heard him". The references to Ibn Saud, Rosenman describes as
(Contd. on next page)
faith in it. If I did not, I would not entrust the future destiny of country which was united by the might of the sword, in the hands of the United States. (20)
The cordiality that developed between Kin~ Ibn Saud and
President Roosevelt was, however, soon marred and remained un
satisfactory thereafter for some time. Soon after Roosevelt's
return to Washington, a small but vociferous pro-Zionist seg
ment of American public opinion became aroused over the
reported "secret commitments" made at the Bitter Lake con
ference. (21) With a view to putting such opinion at ease,
President Roosevelt allowed it to be stated on his behalf in
an initialled note to Dr. Stephen s. Wise, Chairman of American
Zionist Emergency Council, that he had not altered his pre
election position on Zionism and would ttcon tinue to seek to
bring about its earliest realizationu. (22) Shortly thereafter,
"almost bordering on the ridiculous". Senator Edwin Johnson (Democrat, Colorado) was even more critical of the President for this statement. He said:
With all due respect to the President and King Ibn Sa'ud, I must saY that the choice of the desert King as expert on the Jewish question is nothing short of amazing.... I imagine that even Fala (Roosevelt's pet dog) would be more of an expert •••• This unfortunate remark dramatizes the spirit in which the whole subject of Palestine has been approached by those who would shape the world of tomorrow.
(20) Historical Report for the Period 1 January to 28 February 1945, US Military Mission to saudi Arabia USAFIME, p. 2.
(21) Congressional Record, Vol. 91, pp. A 4475-4477.
(22) New York Times, 20 August 1945.
Roosevelt received a stronglY worded letter from Ibn Saud in
which the latter asserted that the creation of a Jewish State
in Palestine would be "deadly blow to the Arabs and a constant
threat to peace". A week before his death Roosevelt replied
to Ibn Saud reaffirming his earlier assurances. He also drew
Ibn saud's attention to their conversations in February when
Roosevelt had promised that he "would take no action, in Icy'
capacity as the Chairman of the Executive Branch of this
Government which might prove hostile to the Arabs people". (23)
The problem that Roosevelt faced of pacifying in turn
the vociferous Zionists at home and worried Arabs abroad was
to continue to haunt his successors as well. His technique of
promises and assurances to both parties was also often emulated
by his successors as a result of which the Arabs began to
distrust American motives in so far as the Palestine issue
was concerned. (24)
Dhahran Airfield Agreement
The loss of goodwill on account of the contrary stands
taken by the United States and saudi Arabia on the Palestine
issue did not, however, jeopardise their other inter-related
interests. Mention has been made in the previous chapter about
the War Department's interest in acquiring flyover and landing
(23) Edward Stettinius, Roosevelt ~ the Russians (New York, 1949)' p. 290.
(24) J.C. Hurewitz, ~ Struggle !Qt Palestine (New York, 1950), p. 214.
facilities in Saudi .Arabia in the beginning of 1942. This
interest of the War Department so increased in the subsequent
years with the progress of the war that the State Department
vigorously pursued the matter even when the war emergency
had declined.
In fact, in the middle of 1944 (July 29) the State
Department's interest in acquiring rights for construction of
an airfield in Dhahran was pursued with a view to facilitate
heavy air traffic movements to India and the Far East for the
prosecution of the war in the Pacific front. It was argued
that even though the United States had facilities to fly from
Cairo to Karachi through Habbaniyab, Abadan and Bahrein, a
flight through Dhahran, would save 212 statute miles for every
flight of each plane. In a letter to the Saudi Arabian Acting
Minister for Foreign Affairs, US Minister in Saudi Arabia
James Moose wrote:
In addition to the saving in distance, flight along the direct alignment from Cairo to Dhahran would mean that the entire route from Morocco to India would be divided into approximately equal stages, and that in loading of a plane need not be changed because of necessity of taking on greater or smaller quantities of gasoline proportionate to the length of variable stages. (25)
Behind this seemingly convincing argument for acquiring base
rights in Dhahran, it is possible that the United States had
other reasons too. For, around this time, the War Department
had received reports from the u.s. Military Attache in Iran
(25) Foreign Relations 1944, Vol. 5, p. 662.
89
to the effect that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in which the
British Government had control, had applied to the Iranian
Government to buY the land at Abadan, on which the u.s. had
alreaqy built its airfield. Placing this evidence before the
Counselor of the British Embassy in Washington, Assistant
Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle Jr., argued that "this gave
us the reason to believe that eventually the field would be
taken over by the British interests. We then had undertaken
to get a concession for a field at Dhahran in Saudi Arabia,
across the Gulf, which would serve our purposes as well." (26)
The fear that eventually the United States will have to
surrender Abadan seems to be one other reason for acquiring
Dhahran airfield rights.
An informal statement prepared in the Division of Near
Eastern Affairs of the State Department in November 1944
brought out the other factors that weighed in the US decision
to acquire Dhahran airfield rights. In this statement, no
reference was made about Abadan airfield. But the other stop
over in the Cairo-Karachi route, viz., Bahrein was mentioned.
The statement said:
The field at Bahrein, because of the soft character of the soil on the island, is not suitable for heav,y planes. It will be necessary, therefore, to find a suitable field in another locality nearby •••• The Air Corps has found the terrain in the vicinity of Dhahran, Saudi Arabia suitable for an airfield. (27)
(26) Ibid., pp. 486-497, 664.
(27) Ibid., p. 667.
90
Even in 1945, immediatelY after the meeting of Roosevelt
and Ibn Saud, when it was obvious that the Allies would soon
be victorious in EUrope, it was considered that an airfield in
Saudi Arabia would be a linchpin in order to turn massivelY
and speedilY the forces from EUrope to the Pacific. So in the
negotiations which had commenced in March 1945 and in two
subsequent meetings between Ibn Saud and Col. snyder, Col.
EddY and V.H. Connor, Saudi Arabia granted to the United
States permission to construct and use an airport. The United
States agreed to provide training in aviation and airport
operations to Saudi Arabians and to transfer the facility to
the saudi government within three years after its completion.
It was also agreed that the field would be opened to commercial
services of all countries on equal terms.
Even while the negotiations were taking place, equipment
and personnel for construction began to arrive and on 15
August 1945, US Ar~ engineers took occupancy of the land
granted for construction purposes. (28) a¥ this time the war
had ended and the War Department was not sure whether work on
the construction of the airfield should be carried on. The
State Department, however, stronglY supported the case for the
completion of the field. The State Department maintained that
(28) 80th Cong. 2nd Sese., Senate Report 440, Additional Report of the Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Programme:~ Purchase of Middle East Oil (Washington, 1948), p. 17. Hereafter Cited~---Purchase Qf Middle ~ Q!1.
while the airfield was primarilY useful to Aramco and Saudi
Arabia, it could nevertheless prove extremelY valuable to the
US in times of crisis or of actual hostilities in the Middle
East. (29) The President, in a memorandum to the Acting
Secretary of State, approved the completion of the airfield
by the War Department at its expense provided a new contract
with Saudi Arabia was signed giving the US control over the
field for an interim period and post-war air traffic rights
and provided the Congress approved the use of War Department's
funds alreadY appropriated. Construction of the airfield
began in January 1946 and was completed in about two months
period. (30)
The press speculated on the State Department's objectives
in urging the completion of the airfield even though the war
was over. In a lighter vein the ~ ~ Mirror wrote that
the airfield had to do "with a plane we gave the King of Saudi
Arabia". (31) New York Times pointed out, however, that the
airfield had certain ·strategic importance to the United States
even after the defeat of Japan, in view of the "current un
settled conditions in the Middle East and the immense American
oil interest in Saudi Arabia 11 • (32) A few days later, the same
(29) H. Feis, ~From J·A·' Three International Episodes (New York, 194~p. 186.
(30) ~ Purchase 2f Middle East Oil, p. 17.
( 31 ) New XQI! Mirror , 9 February 1946.
(32) New York Times, 8 February 1946.
newspaper added that since some countries such as Egypt would
possibly raise objections for continued uses of their air
fields by American military transport~ route to India, the
United States would need new air bases in safe and friendly
areas. (33)
Certain members of Congress who were suspicious of the
dealings of the executive branch with Saudi Arabia criticized
the construction of the air base. Representative P.I. Phibin
(Democrat, Massachusetts) and Senator Owen Brewster (Republican,
Maine) voiced their surprise over what they called a government
investment in quasi-private airfield and the use of military
labour in the venture. (34) Basing its views on the testimony
given, the Senate Special Committee investigating the National
Defense Programme concluded that Aramco was the "principal
beneficiary of this field". (35) In his book ~ fi:2.!!1 E·A·
published in 1947 Herbert Feis warned that maintenance of any
American military base in Saudi .Arabia would be provocative
and contrary to the current bent of American efforts to find
the terms of permanent peace between the great powers. neer
tainly no step of this type should be taken merely to assure
continued American control of or access to,the oil of the
Middle East". (36) The question of whether the airfield was
(33) Ibid.
(34) Ibid., 9 November 1945.
(35) Nav.v Purchase .Ql Middle ~ Q!l, p. 17.
(36) Feis, p. 186.
constructed at the instance of the State Department to help
the oil companies or for furthering official American interests
in Saudi Arabia had little difference in effect. In fact, even
from the beginning, the two objectives viz., the development
of an airbase and the strategic importance of Arabian oil were
intertwined. For the oil was used during the war to serve
the Far Eastern campaign forces while airbase had potential
military capabilities.
Available evidence indicates that the u.s. military
authorities were rather slow in realizing the importance of
the Dhahran base. In his unpublished memoirs entitled
"Thirty Years in the Near East", the then US Ambassador to
Saudi Arabia, J. Rives Childs says he "was appalledtt because
not only had no training programme been instituted in accordance
with the provisions of the agreement, or any steps taken for
its fulfilment that American personnel working in Dhahran had
been cut until it comprised a skeleton staff. "This staff
had been so reduced that it was obviouslY quite insufficient
to maintain and operate the base efficiently," he added. (37)
So much was he concerned about the apathy on the part of
his government, Childs even interrogated the Commanding
officer of the base about it and was told that "it was even
possible that the base might have to be closed and abandoned
owing to the economy program". (38)
.(37) J. Rives Childs, Thirty Years 1!! the 1!u!: Fast, Unpublished Memoirs (Hoover Library, Stanford University, n.d.), p. 226.
(38) Ibid.
Childs was also distressed over the failure of his govern
ment to institute a training programme for Saudi Arabians as
had been promised in the agreement. He noted that with a
meagre skeleton staff of Americans the "possibility of ••• under
taking a training programme as we had obligated ourselves to
institute was entirely out of question "• Emphasizing the
strategic importance of Saudi Arabia being at the cross-roads
of the three continents, flanked as it is by the Persian Gulf
and the Red Sea, Childs asserts that "the idea of ••• abandoning
such a base was to me inconceivable.... Yet with our non
fulfilment of the training program, we ran the risk of being
denied our rightsn. (39)
It is not clear from Childs' memoirs the exact reason
for not implementing the training programme except one
reference where he says: "Of course at that time we were in a
floodtide of the most stringent economies in our defence
establishmentsrr. (40) With a vie-w to enthuse the State Depart
ment, which Childs thought had also become apathetic to the
idea of Dhahran base at this juncture, he approached the
Department officials. After considerable delaY the Department
had authorised the commanding officer of the PaYne airfield,
Cairo, Brigadier General Richard J. Okeefe to draw up a training
course for the Saudi Arabians. His report prepared in consulta
tion with Saudi officials had been sent to Washington, where
(39) Ibid., p. 227.
(40) Ibid.
according to Childs, "the report gathered dust for many
months". (41) There was no response to the recommendation
of Ralph Curren, US Civil Air Attache in the Near East that
a dozen English speaking Saudi Arabians should be sent to
the United States for specialised training who might later
serve as nucleus of instructors.
Childs claims that his persistent efforts were even
tualLY successful and a training programme along lines origi
nallY laid down was put into operation in June 1947 when
thirty one Saudi Arabians were selected as trainees from a
list of fifty candidates submitted by the Saudi Government.
Twenty eight US Air Force instructors were sent to Dhahran to
implement the training course. In the following year again
forty eight were enrolled for the training programme. Childs
believed that the implementation of the training programme
came "in the nick of time" and had stemmed a deterioration of
US relations with Saudi Arabia. He says:
I have alwaYs felt that the presence of the airbase and the successful development of the training program there for the Saudi Arabians may have been crucial factors in preventing an out and out break in our relations with the King when sentiments ran so deep against us for what was interpreted as our partisan espousal of the cause of Israel at the expense of the Arabs. (42)
The three year agreement which gave the United states
Air Force full control over the airfield expired on 15.March
1949. :ay that time the Cold War was on and American military
(41) Ibid., p. 228.
(42) Ibid., p. 229.
and civilian leaders were fully alive to the strategic signi
ficance of the Dhahran base. Negotiations for an extension of
the agreement, therefore, began in the spring of 1949 when
Ambassador Childs went to Riyadh with a draft agreement, which
was "practically an extension of the old". But he found that
it was "entirely unacceptable" to the Saudi Government. Des
cribing that the reasons for the negative Saudi attitude were
the delay on the part of the US Administration in implementing
the training programme and the US "lead in sponsorship of
Israel" which the Arabs felt were unfavourable to them,
Childs says:
If in the light of our attitude, Saudi Arabia had agreed to extend the airbase agreement on its old terms, it would have rendered itself liable to the greatest possible criticism from other Arab States.... Saudi Arabia could not tolerate any longer the control of one of its commercial airports by foreigners. (43)
On the other hand, the Saudi Government, Childs found,
was prepared to permit the continuance of the US presence in
Dhahran provided the base could be controlled by Saudi
authority. As Childs says:
There was only one basis on which a new agreement would be considered and that was one which recognized complete Saudi Arabian control and the working out of other conditions on a basis of entire reciprocity. (44)
The US Government was unwilling to accept the control of
operations of a vital military base installation by a foreign
power.
(43) Ibid., p. 231.
(44) Ibid.
The seemingly insuperable deadlock was eventualLY resolved
by a settlement under which the Ameri_can commanding officer was
to assume two offices--one under USAF authori~ and the other
under Saudi Arabian Government to supervise the American airbase
and its installations and also control commercial and other
flying activities from the Dhahran airport. Even with this
provision, the Saudi Government consented to give only a six
months lease to the use of the facilities in Dhahran.
US Financial and Technical Assistance to Saudi AI'abia
Towards the end of World War II, despite appreciable
financial and material assistance from Britain and the United
States through lend-lease assistance, Saudi Arabia was in a
parlous economic condition. In fact, the country almost faced
a crisis because the war had halved the number of Moslems who
each year had made pilgrimage to Mecca. The King saw no chance
of speeqy revival of this profitable traffic. The outbreak of
war also had interrupted the oil development which otherwise
would have very greatly compensated for the loss of revenue
from pilgrimage. The $17 million worth of lease-lend aid he
had received from the United States and roughly similar amount
from Britain had also not made any appreciable impact on
Saudi econo.ey.
Although the oil revenues were beginning to increase
consequent upon Aramco's expanded produc~ion, the Saudi Govern
ment found itself in chronic shortage of capital for development
programmes envisaged for its country. Mention has been made
earlier that President Roosevelt, keeping in view the strate
gic importance of Saudi Arabia and preponder~1ce of American
commercial interest in that country, gave enthusiastic hints
of assistance that might be expected for various internal
development projects. (45) Following the meeting of Roosevelt
and King Ibn Saud, the American Minister in Jidda, Col.
William Eddy, raised the question with the State Department
of the continuation of assistance to Saudi Arabia in 1945. He
pointed out with the termination of lend lease assistance, it
was likely that Britain would reduce its subsidy to Saudi
Arabia. It would be advisable, he argued, to set up some new
machinery and authority to continue .American assistance to
saudi ·Arabia. (46) The State Department, responding favourably
to the suggestion, tried to convince some influential members
of Congress that American security made it advisable to
provide assistance to the tune of $50 million to Saudi Arabia.
The State Department was told that the Congress would only
provide the funds if the United States received some evident
reciprocal advantage or some reliable guarantor of parment. (47)
In the meanwhile, Feisal, Minister for Foreign Affairs who
paid a visit to the United States, held conversations for two
(45) Feis, p. 186.
(46) EddY, p. 48.
(47) Feis, p. 186.
99
daYs with Department officials on economic and political prob
lems covering many points of mutual interest between Saudi
Arabia and the United States. (48)
In spite of these developments the State Department could
secure only $54,700 in August 1945 to establish and maintain
for two years a medical clinic at Jidda. The amount was subse
quently increased to $74,700. The much-needed medical assis
tance to the saudi people, the pilgrims and the American +ega
tion and other foreign personnel was provided by this clinic.
Staffed by medical personnel furnished by the American Uni
versity in Beirut, it proved to be of invaluable assistance
both to the Americans and the Saudi Arabians.
Another instance of assistance by the State Department
during this period was the sending of an agricultural mission
through an arrangement with Foreign Economic Administration.
This ?Mssion under the leadership of David Rodgers of Arizona
arrived in November 1944 and staYed for eighteen months,
bringing some new land under cultivation and introducing new
crops. With its assignment ending in June 1946, technical
assistance to Saudi agriculture came to an end. (49)
Soon discussions were initiated looking toward a possible
loan to Saudi Arabia from Export Import Bank (Exim Bank). A
(48) New ~ Times, 22 November 1946.
(49) J.D. Tompkins, "Saudi .Arabia's Reclamation Plan Turns Desert into Fertile Farm", New X2.!:,! Herald Tribune, 16 '-'aY 1948.
1oo
loan of $25 million was pledged in the autumn of 1945 by the Exim
Bank. The King objected to this loan proposal citing the Kora
nic prescription about charging interest. In the following
July, the King sent his trusted Minister, Sheikh Abdullah
sulaiman, to Washington to try raise a new loan. His dis
cussions with the American officials culminated on 9 August with
the granting to saudi Arabia of an Exim Bank loan of $10 mil
lion. Thi3 credit was made available to Saudi .Arabia until the
end of 15 June 1948. The loan was to be guaranteed by the oil
revenues paid to the Government by Aramco and the repayment
spread over a ten year period. Though interest charges were
not specified it was agreed that when repaying the loan saudi
Arabia will pay 3 percent more than the loan she received.
Thereqy the loan was made a discount loan, and technically, a
loan without interest. The loan was to enable Saudi Arabia
purchase certain commodities not available during the war years
such as cereals, grains, sugar, medicines, automotive and
office equipment and agricultural machinery. The date for
repayment was set as 31 December 1948. An additional credit of
$15 million was earmarked for Saudi Arabia by the E:xim Bank but
was not immediately used by Saudi Arabia. An agreement signed
in July 1950 revived this pledge of the Bank, of which only a
portion was utilized by the saudi Government. (50)
As early as 25 May 1946, an agreement was signed by the
(50) ~ Purchase .Q! Middle ~ Oil, p. 18.
101
officials of the Saudi Government and Central Field Commission
for Middle East for a credit of $2 million to purchase American
surplus material. Payment under this arrangement was to be
made in five instalments beginning from June 1947. Repayment
was to be made either in local currency or instead permit the
u.s. Government to buY land or buildings for official use in
Jidda or Dhahran. Of this credit Saudi government borrowed
a sum of $1.6 million and bought aircraft machinery and
apparatus, construction machinery, aircraft and spare parts,
motor vehicles, textiles, rubber products, tools and utensils.
The largest single item was the sale of surplus equipment at
Dhahran airport where materials which had originally cost
nearly $2.6 million were sold to the Saudi government for
,taoo,ooo. (51)
The Truman Administration, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestine Question
Five months after his re-election for the fourth time,
President Roosevelt suddenly passed awaY and Vice-President
Harry s. Truman succeeded him. From Roosevelt the new Presi
dent inherited no well-defined Palestine policy. He was con
fronted on the one hand by a powerful pro-Zionist lobby,
responsive to the plight of the EUropean Jews and active in
creating favourable public opinion and on the other by elements
in the Departments of State and War which were concerned about
(51) Ibid., p. 19.
102
the strategic and military interests of the United States in
West Asia and, which, therefore, stressed the importance of
dispeling the suspicions in the minds of Arab leaders like
Ibn Saud over American motives. Even earlier, in 1944 when
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discussed the vlagner
Taft resolution favouring the establishment in Palestine of a
Jewish Commonwealth, Truman, then a Senator from Missouri had
taken a rather hesitant stand. He said:
~sympathy, of course, is with the Jewish people •••• I don't want to throw any bricks to upset the apple cart, although when the right time comes, I am willing to help make the fight for a Jewish Home-land in Palestine. (52)
Five days after Truman was sworn in as President, the
State Department sent a special communication to him in which
it said that the question of Palestine "is, ••• a highly complex
one and involves questions which go far beyond the plight of
the Jews in Europe." (53) Commenting on this Truman says in
his Memoir§ that as he read the document he was "skeptical"
about the views assumed by the "striped-pants boys of the
State Department." He added that it was his feeling that "it
would be possible ••• to watch for the long-range interests of
our country while at the same time helping these unfortunate
victims of persecution to find a home." (54) On his return
(52) Reuben Fink, America and Palestine (New York, 1945), p. 153. ---
(53) Harry s. Truman, Memoir§, Years Q! Deci§ion, Vol. 1 (New York, 1955), p. 69.
(54) Ibid.
103
from the Potsdam Conference he ~as more articulate when he
said at a press conference held on 10 August:
The American people as a whole firmlY believe that immigration into Palestine should not be closed ••• the matter will have to be worked out diplomatical~ with the British and the Arabs ••• ~and_7 it would have to be on a peaceful basis. (55)
It was only on 31 August 1945 that President Truman took
what proved to be his first positive step with regard to the
Palestine question. On the basis of a report submitted by
Earl G. Harrison, Dean of the Law School at the University of
Pennsylvania, whom the President had requested in June to
investigate the living conditions and needs of the displaced
persons in EUrope, especiallY the Jewish refugees, Truman
requested British Prime Minister Attlee to admit 100,000
Jewish refugees into Palestine. (56) Again during this period
while the President had received and discussed the Palestine
question with the Zionist leaders such as Dr. Stephen s. Wise
and Abba Hillel Silver and in spite of the State Department's
request he postponed meeting the chiefs of the u.s. Missions
in the Near East because some of his advisors persuaded the
President that it would be impolitic to see them before the
November Congressional elections. (57)
When subsequently he met the ambassadors and discussed
with them the Palestine question Truman made a candid
(55) New York Times, 10 August 1945.
(56) Truman, Memoirs, Vol •. 2, p. 137.
(57) EddY, p. 36.
10~
acknowledgement:
I'm sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among ~ constituents. (58)
Simultaneously, in response to Britain's proposal for
the creation of a joint Anglo-American inquiry committee, the
United States Government announced its agreement to the estab
lishment of such a committee. Among its several recommenda
tions submitted in April 1946, including the setting up of a bi
national independent government based on equal representation,
the committee suggested the admission of 100,000 Jews imme
diately into Palestine. President Truman singled out for
praise this suggestion of the Committee.
Continuing to press for the implementation of the Anglo
American Inquiry Committee recommendations which he approved,
President Truman announced on 11 June 1946 that he had selected
a committee composed of the Secretaries of State, War and the
Treasury, to advise him on "such policy with regard to Palestine
and related problems as may be adopted by this government." (59)
The Secretaries in turn appointed a working body under the
Chairmanship of Ambassador Henry F. Grady. On 21 July the
three Americans of the working body met in London with their
British counterparts headed by Herbert Morrison. The out-
come of the London parleys which came to be known as the
(58) Ibid., Childs, p. 296.
(59) New Xill Time§, 9 July 1946.
105
Morrison-Graay Plan was the acceptance of a federal system
of two autonomous states with a strong central government
under British direction. The admission of 100,000 Jews was
made conditional upon the acceptance of the report as a
whole. (60)
The Zionists leaders found the Morrison-GradY recommen
dations unfavourable from their point of view. It was also
reported that party leaders in New York had warned the possible
consequences of approval on Democratic chances in the November
Presidential elections. (61) The President hesitated to accept
or reject the Morrison-GradY plan. That political considera
tions had played a major role in his reservations regarding
the Morrison-Grady plan, was indicated when Truman, on the eve
of the Presidential elections issued a public statement favour
ing admission at once of 100,000 Jewish refugees in Pale
stine. (62) Not to be out done in this bid for Zionist votes,
the Republican candidate, Governor Thomas E. Dewey, asked why
the number should be limited to 100,000. (63)
President Truman's stand provoked angry protests in the
Arab countries. sYria and Iraq had declined to discuss certain
air agreements which the State Department was then negotiating.
(60) Ibid., 26, 30 July 1946.
(61) Jewish Telegraphic Agency Bulletin, 2 August 1946.
(62) Truman, Memoirs II, pp. 152-153; Hurewitz, p. 264; Forrestal Diaries (The Viking Press, New York, 1951), p. 346.
(63) New Palestine, Vol. 37, p. 3.
106
Syria refused to grant transit rights to Aramco whose pipeline
was to terminate in Lebanon by-passing Palestine. There was
talk that Ibn Saud possibly would terminate the American oil
concessions in Saudi Arabia.
Saudi reactions to American moves regarding Palestine,
however, were marked by moderation and caution and an awareness
of the advantages of a special, close relationship with the
United States. In fact, no drastic action such as termination
of American oil concessions was even contemplated by King Ibn
saud. On the other hand, he merely wrote a letter that the
recent pronouncements of President Truman had altered "the
basic situation in Palestine in contradiction to previous
promises. n He wrote that he had always kept Roosevelt and
Truman informed of the true position in Palestine, and had
never ceased to point out that the Jews were the aggressors
whose ambi tiona had no limits. Expressing surprise at "certain
declarations" supporting the Jews and demanding the immediate
admission of their emigrants into Palestine, he said that his
surprise was all the great in view of the earlier statement
from the White House that the US Government hoped that the
negotiations between the British Government, the Arabs and the
Jews would result in a solution, and that the United States was
readY to facilitate the admission of the refugees, including
Jews in its own territory. He also said that he was quite
certain that the Americans would not permit Zionist aggression
against a friendly Arab country, and had no doubt that this
107
would strengthen the existing ties of friendship between the
Arab countries and the United states by stopping Zionist
aggression. (64)
In his reply dated 26 October 1946, Truman claimed that
support of the Jewish National House had been a consistent
American policy. The latter was couched in cordial terms.
Truman asserted that there was no inconsistency in the Ameri-
can policy on Palestine. tti do not consider that .my urging
the admittance of a considerable number of displaced Jews
into Palestine or my statements with regard to the solution
of the problem of Palestine in any sense represent an action
hostile to the Arab people. n wrote Truman. He assured the
King that his Government was "opposed to aggression of any
kind or to the employment of terrorism 11 and added that he was
"convinced that responsible Jewish leaders do not con template
a policy of aggression against the Arab countries adjacent to
Palestine." He also said that the United States would make
no decision regarding the basic situation without previous
consultations with Arabs and Jews. (65)
The President's letter did not serve to mitigate Ibn
Saud's misgivings. The King sent for US Ambassador Childs
and expressed "greatest concern" over the American policy
(64) Text of King Ibn Saud's letter, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 15, pp. 848-851.
(65) Text of President Truman's letter, Ibid.
108
which would "lead ••• to disaster." The King added that he was
unable to understand how President Harry Truman could reconcile
the assurances that he (Ibn Saud) had received from Roosevelt
with the unilateral support given by Truman to the immigration
of 100,000 Jews into Palestine.n (66) The Ambassador felt
that the King was "deeply alarmed" by the development. "The
King, of course, was anything but reassured despite all my
efforts exerted to that end. Events were to prove how right
he was," he wrote in his memoirs. (67)
In view of the urgency of the question arising from the
unrest and disturbances which had been created in Palestine
and the whole of the Arab world, the first special session of
the General Assembly of the United Nations was convoked in
New York from 28 April to 15 MaY 1947, at the request of
Britain for the purpose of constituting and instructing a
special committee to undertake a preliminary stu~ of the
Palestine question. As a result of this stuqy two reports - a
majority report recommending a plan of partition and the
creation of Jewish and Arab states and a minority report
proposing federal state for Palestine were submitted. On 11
October 1947 the United States announced in the General
Assembly its support of the majority report subject to such
modifications as the inclusion of Jaffa city in the Arab
territory. On 29 October 1947 by a vote of 33 to 13 with ten
(66) Childs, p; 298.
(67) Ibid., p. 299.
109
abstentions, thereby providing the bare 2/3 majority required,
the General Assembly adopted the resolution recommending a
plan of partition for Palestine which included the creation
of independent Arab and Jewish states and a special interna
tional regime for Jerusalem to be administered by the Trustee
ship Council on behalf of the United Nations. James Forreatal,
Secretary of Defence, has recounted in his Diaries the
pressures exerted by American politicians on the UN delegation
of Haiti, Liberia, and Phillipines. (68)
The State Department, soon after the voting however,
sent a circular to its diplomatic mission in the Middle East
instructing them to inform the governments to which they were
accredited that neither the State Department nor the White
House had interfered in the voting of the foreign delegations
at the United Nations. (69) When Childs sought to convey this
view, the Saudi Foreign Minister Feisal replied: "I can only
say in answer to your statement that if neither the \~ite
House nor the State Department interfered in any way with the
voting in the U.N., then the President must be sadlY lacking
in information regarding the activities of the Secretar-
iat." (70) According to Childs, the Saudi Arabians were
predicting that the outcome of all these would be an open
(68) Forrestal Diaries, n. 6{, pp. 348, 358.
(69) Childs, p. 306.
(70) Ibid., p. 308.
110
warfare between the Arabs and Jews. Also, they expected that
the American prestige and goodwill would gradually diminish
in the region.
However, a reconsideration of American policy came about
in the beginning of the following year as a result of the
reports sent by the Middle East American Missions reflecting
Arab official and non-official reactions and sentiments. This
was when the US Ambassador Warren Austin announced in the
Security Council that in view of the impossibility of obtaining
peaceful acceptance of the previous resolution of the General
AssemblY, the United States had decided to support a temporary
trusteeship for Palestine. At the same time a statement made
by Secretary of State George c. Marshall said: "The United
States had repeatedly stated that we are seeking a solution
for Palestine within the framework of the United Nations and
that we are not going to act unilaterally in the matter. 11 (71)
An earnest assurance to the same effect was conveyed to King
Ibn Saud personally by special representative from Truman,
Edwin A. Locke Jr., a Presidential Assistant, who had been
deputed to visit several West Asian countries as a special
representative of the President. Locke informed both the King
as well as Ambassador Childs that the President was completelY
impartial and would allow the Palestine question to be settled
by the United Nations without bringing the weight of US
influence to bear on either side. (72) Further, in a telegram
(71) Ibid., p. 310.
(72) Ibid., p. 311.
111
to Childs the State Department categorically asserted that
the position of the United States was that of allowing the
issue to be settled on its merits and that the United States
Government would not be swayed either "by external pressure
or by the pressure of domestic policies." (73)
Hardly ten days had passed when Ambassador AUstin
introduced a resolution in the Security Council calling for
a special session of the General Assembly to consider again
the question of the future government of Palestine. Saudi
leaders were profoundly disappointed over the development,
but they knew that Ambassador Childs, at any rate, could not
be blamed for it. Childs recalled that "there were no
reproaches, but only evidence of warm sympathy for me in mlf
embarrassment ••• if there was any suggestion of bitterness it
was directed at the politicians of the United States who were
responsible for this abasement of the good name of the
United States." (74)
1 On 14 May 1948, the State of Israel was proclaimed. The
announcement was followed almost immediately by a statement
from President Truman recognising Israel. (75)
Though it has been claimed that the relationship between
(73) Ibid.
(74) Ibid., p. 313.
(75) At \~ite House meeting of 14 May, with the Presidential advisors present, Truman reportedly stated that recogf nition would be granted. See Forrestal Diaries, n. 6 , p. 441.
112
the United States and saudi Arabia had been sorelY taxed with
the pressure constantlY exerted by the United States for the
establishment of the State of Israel and the consequent
displacement of a million Arabs from their homes, curiouslY,
this did not result in deep or prolonged impairment of the
close ties between the two countries. OfficiallY, the United
States Government, in fact, could do very little to assuage
even the apparent tension between the two countries on the
question of Palestine. Mention has alreadY been made about
the two successive loans from Export-Import Bank, for which
the State Department was greatlY responsible. Even as early
as 1946·, the State Department wanted to arrange a visit of
King Ibn Saud to the United States. The King, however,
desired instead that his son and Crown Prince Saud would go
to the United states. PromptlY an invitation was extended
to the Crown Prince on 27 November 1946 for a visit in early
January. A formal welcome was accorded to the Crown Prince
in Washington when he was received by the Under Secretary of
State Dean Acheson and a dazzling array of dignitaries. In
a formal investiture ceremony, the Legion Merit, in the degree
of Chief Commander was conferred by President Truman on King
Ibn Saud and was handed to the visiting Crown Prince. In the
citation special mention was made about the King's attitude
of whole-hearted cooperation which "enabled American forces
to accomplish a program of construction and resource develop
ment in the country that derived benefits of major proportions
for the prosecution of the war." Such gestures on the part of
.113
the United States Government along with periodic clarification
through diplomatic channels about the United States Government
stand on Palestine, could not have appeased or convinced the
monarch of Saudi Arabia. In fact, he not only declined to
visit the United States when invitation was extended, he also
turned down the $15 million of Exim Bank. (76)
King Ibn Saud exhibited his displeasure by rejecting
the Exim Bank loan. It is clear that he was not in favour
of any drastic measures. Ambassador Childs, was deeply
touched by the King's patience and understanding. The King,
"in his infinite wisdom" had correctly recognised that
American policy on the Palestine issue had been dictated "by
internal political considerations in the United States and
that it did not reflect any basic unfriendliness for the
Arabs, u Childs thought. (77)
Wise the King was, but his wisdom lay not in perceiving
that such actions on the part of the US Government were merely
reflections of the exigencies of party politics, but in realiz
ing the economic stakes of any drastic action that he might
have envisaged. SUch fears as were expressed from time to
time that the King might take the extreme step of cancelling
the concession agreement of Aramco, or calling of the con
struction of Tapline, both of which were the gigantic ventures
(76) Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 16, p. 167; New York Times, 8 December 1946.
(77) Childs, p. 263.
of American oil companies were, belied because the Arab monarch
was eminentlY practical and an astute judge of his nation's
limitations. (78) He not onlY was soon to permit two other
American oil companies to join Aramco but he even assured
Aramco from time to time that he had no intention to cancel
the concession. He realized fullY that with his failing
health and traditional and ~rowing ·rivalry among the Arab
countries, the future of Saudi Arabia depended on its principal
economic resource, namely oil and its security in strong links
with the greatest military power in the world, the United
States of America. These links he was by no means willing to
surrender in any dramatic or adventurist bid to demonstrate
his solidarity with the dispossessed Arabs of Palestine.
Beyond offering a token army to fight against Israel, he con
centrated all his efforts towards protecting 'the goose that
laid the golden egg.'
(78) Van Der Meulen, p. 166; Middle East Journal, Vol. 2, p. 466.
