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Chapter Two
SALT I (1972) & SALT I1 (1979) TREATIES
Before one goes into the reasons, causes and effects of why
the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks Treaties (SALT) were
signed, one must also go into the elements that go into the
making of a treaty. One of the important elements in this
regard is that of summit meetings where treaties are usually
signed between the leaders.
THE IMPORTANCE OF SUMMIT MEETINGS:
Summit diplomacy is personal negotiations held
face to face between heads of state or government of the
major powers in the hope of resolving major conflicts, The
origin of summit diplomacy can be traced to the Congress of
Vienna of 1815. After Napoleon Bonaparte's defeat, the
question of settling the surrendered lands and redrawing the
map of Europe had to be resolved. To decide these, there
were monarchs and plenipotentiaries who had gathered there
by agreement. The Treaty of Versailles (Peace Plan),
concluded at the Paris conference, which was held from 18
January 1919, at the conclusion of World War I. It was
represented by the Allied countries and their allies.
President Wilson of the USA, Prime Minister Lloyd George of
Britain and French statesman, Georges Clemenceau, among
others, were there, to decide on the treaty's provisions and
reparations. Teheran, the Iranian capital, was the scene of
the first wartime summit conference from 28 November 1943 to
2 December 1943 and was represented by Winston Churchill of
Britain, Franklin Roosevelt of USA and Josef Stalin of the
USSR. Though it was mainly concerned with military matters,
the conference also saw the exchange of viers on the future
treatment of Germany, the post-colonial settlement, the
post-war frontier of Poland and the organization of
international security. Yalta, a town iq the Crimea, was
the scene of the second wartime summit conference m o n g
Churchill, Roosevelt end Stalin, from the 4 to the 11 of
February 1945.
Winston Churchill, Clement Atlee, Harry S Truman and Josef
Stalin held a meeting at Potsdam, a town in East Germany,
from the 17 of June 1945 to the 2 of July 1945, to determine
certain aspects of post-war control in Germany. The most
immediate apparent decisions were to demilitarize Germany,
put war-criminals on trial, revise German-Polish frontiers
and finally, to place the four zones into which Germany was
divided under the control of the military command of each
occupying power.
In a superpower summit, the superpower countries gather in. a
designated pre-determined place, along with their top and
Closest rides. The purpose of the summit meeting is to
t h r u b out and discuss about problems thrt beset and
confront the Powers and how best these powers can solve
them. It is ale0 to discuss the issues,ideologies and
differences thrt exist between the powers. It gives the
leader of one power a chance to explain to the other the
stand he has taken on Various issues and why he has done so.
Treaties and accords may or may not be concluded at such
summits.
A eummit is very important in the sense that it gives an
opportunity to the COu~trieS to try and understand the
other. In a world that faces and goes through regional
conflicts, terrorism and civil strife in almost all parts of
the globe, it is natural for the weak, small, undeveloped
and underdeveloped countries to give them security - a
security where conditions for peace and stability exist.
According to former US President Dwight Eisenhower, "Since
the days when President Wilson made his European trips to
participate in the formulation of the Treaty of Versailles,
many conflicting opinions have been expressed, most often in
generalities, as to the wisdom of a President of the United
States meeting personally with other heads of government. It
seems to me that conclusions of this kind rarely have value
if they are meant to apply universally and eternally; each
1 set of ~ir~\llr8t4n~eS has to provide the answer." Eisenhower
rightly recognised that the importance of summits could not
be written off completely, and that each summit had to be
looked into through its own set of circumstances which
brought it ( S u ~ i t ) about in the first glace, before it
could be called a success or failure.
The conclusion that follows naturally from the above show
that summits are very important for the treaty making
process. Not Only is a summit a place where treaties are
usually signed as a result of the dialogue processes set in
motion earlier, but it can also be a place where differences
are resolved amicably, at the highest level, when leaders of
various countries meet face-to-face, on a one-to-one level,
at such eummits.
Elements Present in a Super~ower Summit: According to David
D. Newson, the factors that went into the making of a
superpower summit were four primary elements of the process.
These elements which went into the adequate preparations
required for the holding of a summit between the two powers
were: the timing and circumstances of a decision to hold a
1. Dwight D Eisenhower, The White Rouse Years: Mandate for Chanae, 1953-1956, (Garden City, New York, Doubleday 8 CO*), p.503.
summit, setting the date and location, the issue of 2
preconditions (if any) and setting the agenda.
Other isrues which can be identified as among the decisions
that have had to be made in the preparation of at least some
of the meetings were: how to respond to the domestic and
foreign pressures for a summit; the division of
responsibility within the US bureaucracy for the planning,
particularly between the Vhite House and the State
Department; the channels through which advance discussions
with the Soviets were to take place; the degree of
consultation with allies; the preparation of agreements for
symbolic signing at a summit; the problem of record keeping
and interpretation and at what level the communique was to 3
be drafted. Certain observations that have emerged
regarding the preparation of summit meetings and the
relationships of the preparatory steps to the policies and
successes of the summit include: There did not seem to be a
single point at which the question of whether there should
be a summit meeting had been decided. In each
administration, the decision appeared to have been a matter
2. David D Newson, in the forward to Gordon R Weihmiller m d Dusko Doder, US-Soviet Summits, (University Press of America, Lanham, 1986), p.xi.
3. Ibid.
of the evolution of pressures to the point where a summit
became both a diplomatic and a political necessity. With
each succeeding administration, the assumption grew that
each president would need at some point, to meet with his
opposite counterpart. The requirement for a summit became
absolute.
Newson went on to say that the move toward a summit was a
process including both formal diplomatic contacts between L
the two sides and signals. The possibility of a summit
needed to be testedlfloated as an idea/ a speech made here
and there to see what response one got. Answers to such
questions as: What was the reaction domestically? Bow did
the allies like it and so on. All of this emerged rather
than being direct. The preparation of summits had two
effects on the policy process. The planning tended to move
the center of power to the White Rouse because the President
was involved. The fact of the summit created a deadline
that forced decisions on major policy issues - decisions
that otherwise might have been postponed.
Summits were also domestic political events and the
preparation involved as much the development of domestic
support as it did the arrangement with the Soviets. In some
case8, noted by those who had been involved in the process,
politialll, regardless of the the substance of the meeting
itself. Efforts to prepare for a summit meeting could give
an indication Of the true interest of the other power in
having such r meeting. While they might agree in principle,
their obstructionist tactices in the preparation phase may
well have been designed to force the other to withdraw, and
vice versa, 60 the onus of not having a meeting did not fall
on them. Apart from all this, the ceremonial aspects
counted too (to a certain extent) - the toasts, speeches,
wreath layings - were all part of the substance of a summit
meeting and often involved as much advance negotiation and
preparation as the issues of the meetings themselves.
It was symbolic of the course of global politics that, while
summit meetings before 1960 were multilateral discussions
that included the principal US allies, all of those since
had been bilateral meetings emphasizing concrete agreements,
The trend of the summit meetings had also moved from an
initial emphasis on multiple international problems to a
later emphasis on strategic nuclear weapons, Other aspects
that merit further examination if one is to have a complete
picture of the process of preparation would include: the
advance pass arrangements, security arrangements, the
decision on attendance at the meetings and the drafting of
the communique.
A BRIEF I&OS AT US-USSR SUYYIT MEETINGS: ( W I T VORLD WAR I1 TO lW8)
Before we come to why the SALT Treaties were signed, here is
brief look at the superpower summits held so far, between
the USA m d USSR, prior to the signing of these, treaties and
also a brief look at the summits held upto 1980.
m e first US-Soviet bilateral summit, held in 1958 in the
US denoted a thaw after more than a decadeeof chilling Cold
War. The meeting between President Dwight Eisenhower and
uikita Khrushchev from 25 September to 27 September 1959,
gave rise to a new term in the lexicon of world diplomacy,
'Camp David' spirit helped in lowering temperatures in the
chequered history of love-hate relationship between the two
once-mighty powers of the world. However, the whole process
of detente nose-dived in less than half a year and another
summit was planned between the same leaders. On the eve of
tbe summit, a US plane that took-off from Rawalpindi,
Pakistan, was shot down in the heart of Soviet land on 1 May
1960, at a time when Moscow was holding its traditional May
Day Parade. The summit was cancelled due to this incident.
A t the Vienna summit from 3 to 4 June 1961, President
Kennedy and General Secretary Khrushchev met. Though it did
mot lead to any substantial result, the two leaders were
mainlt ~ a l d in meacluring the strength and mood of the
~pposite side. The third superpower summit saw a change of
leadership at both the m i t e House and the Kremlin. Richard
Nixon was the new incumbent and Leonid Brezhnev had
succeeded Khrushchev. The summit took place in Moscow from
22 Yay to 30 1972. This heralded substantial changes in
the rigid approaches by the two powers. They signed the
famous ABY (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty and agreed upon a
number of measures Concerning the SALT I Treaty, Washington
was the venue for the fourth summit where the same two
leaders met and signed ten documents which denoted the
transition forin confrontation and cold war to cooperation
based on mutual benefits. This summit began on 18 June 1973
and successfully concluded on 25 June 1973. The fifth
summit took place at the Soviet capital, Moscow, and it was
the third meeting between Wixon and Brezhnev. The summit
commenced on 27 June and ended on 3 July 1974. A major
agreement signed by the two sides pertained to the limita-
tion of underground nuclear weapon tests.
The sixth summit which was called at a very short notice
took place in the Soviet Far-East city of Vladivostok.
Brezhnev and his counterpart, Gerald Ford, reaffirmed their
desire to sign s long term strategic offensive arms
limitation agreement. The seventh summit took place at
Vienna, frol the 1 to the 18 of June 1979, between Brezhnev
and US President Jimmy Garter. The second Strategic Arms
~imitrtion Talks Treaty mas signed during this summit. 4
gowever, it had not been ratified by the US Senate.
A CLOSER LOOK AT SUMMIT MEETINGS BETWEEN USA AND USSR LEADING TO THE SIGNING OF THE SALT I TREATY (GENEVA, JULY 1955 TO GLISSBOBO, JUNE 1967)
The summits preceding the signing of the historic SALT I
Treaty are important because they give us in idea about the
factors leading to the USA and USSR signing the first
important bilateral strategic arms accord treaty. The onset
of the Cold War, according to Elmer Plischke, gave rise to a
set of four basic requirements by the USA for tangible
evidence of better intentions on the part of Soviet leaders 5
before any summit would receive serious attention. These
preconditions specified the following: abandonment of the
Marxist principle of world revolution; cessation of
aggressive action; adherence to the principles of the United
Nations Charter; and fulfillment of international
agreements. However, some of these requirements were not
followed by the USSR. In the same way, the USA too, did not
4. The Telegraph, (Calcutta), 30 Hay 1988.
5. Elmer Plischke, Summit Diplomacy: Personal Diplomacy of the President of the United States, (College Park, University of Maryland, 1938), g.81.
follw tbe basic requiremento laid out by the USSR as a sign
that their intentions were serious. Inspite of these
eetbaoks, summit did take place between the two countries.
The Geneva Conference of Beads of Government, 18-23 juiy 1955:
The principals to the summit were the USA represented by
president Eisenhower (Conference Chairman) and Secretary of
State Dulles, the UK represented by Prime Minister Eden and
Foreign Secretary Macmillian, France represented by Premier
Faure and Foreign Minister Pinay and the USSR represented by
Premier Bulganin (nominal Head of Delegation), CPSU First
Secretary Khruschev, Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense 6
Minister Marshal Zhukov.
7 There were no formal agreements after the summit. However,
there was a final Communique in the form of a directive to
the foreign ministers to undertake negotiations on issues
discussed at the summit in Geneva, in October, which 8
subsequently failed,
6. . Gordon B leihmiller & Dusko Doder, US-Soviet Summits, (University Press of America, Lanham, 1986) p.124.
7. - Ibid.
Khrwchchev raid about the summit, in his memoirs that, "We
return to YOSCOw from Geneva knowing that we hadn't achieved
any coacrete results. But we were encouraged, realizing now
that our enemies probably feared us as much as we feared
them.. . . The Geneva meeting was an important breakthrough
for us on our diplomatic front. We had established
ourselves as able to hold our own in the international 9
arena." Eisenhower, did in retrospect, evaluate the summit 10
as a "limited success." Due to the Cold War tensions
prevailing at that time, the very fact that the two leaders
were meeting proved that it was a limited success. However,
in terms of substantial results, the summit was not a
success.
Khrushchevte State Visit and Camp David Meeting: 15-27 September 1959:
The principals at the Camp David discussions were the USA
represented by President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon,
Secretary of State Herter, Ambassador Lodge, Fay Kohler
9. Nikita Khruschev, Khruschev Remembers, With Intro- duction, Commentary and Notes by Edward Crankshaw, trans. and ed.. Strobe Talbott (Boston, Little Brown &
10. Dwight D Eisenhower, The White House Years : Mandate for Chanpre. 1953-1056, (Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Co., 1B63), p.530.
(~epoty Assistant Secretary of State of European Affairs)
and by the USSR, rho Were represented by Premier Rhrushchev,
Foreign Minister Gromyko, and Ambassador Menshikov, Soldatov
(Chief American Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
The heads of the two respective countries were helped by
their respective foreign Yinisters. The issues and
discussions focused on the German problem resulting in
agreement to resume talks on Berlin without time constraints
imposed by the Soviet Union. Disarmament (control and
inspection), trade and credit and nuclear tests ban, were 11
the other issues. A joint communique affirming
constructive efforts toward general disarmament, peaceful
resolutions of international problems, renewal of Berlin,
negotiations and invitation for the US President to visit
the Soviet Union. Eisenhower consented to an East-West 12
summit conference. Though Khruschev's visit did not end
in any concrete results by way of treaties being signed, at
least the line of communications between the world's two
most powerful rivals of that era, was still open.
11. Gordon R Weihmiller & Dusko Doder, US-Soviet Summits, (University Press of America, Lanham, 1986), p.128.
12. See White House (Gettysburg, Pa.), press release dated 27 September 1959, in Department of State Bulletin, Vo1.41, No.1049, (12 October, 1959), pp.499-500.
the Parir Haads Of Government Conference, 16-17 May, 1~60:
The Paris Beads of Government Conference from 16-17 Yay 1960
could not take Place as scheduled because of the refusal of
president Eisenhower to apologize to Khruschev on the
downing of the 0-2 espionage plane. A western Communique 13
was released in Paris on 17 May 1960.
The Vienna summit: 3-4 June 1961: The principals were the C
USA represented by President Kennedy and the USSR by Premier
mrushchev and the issues discussed were nuclear tests ban,
disarmament, Germany and Laos. The communique issued on 4
June 1961 affirmed mutual support for a neutral and 14
independent Laos and effective cease-fire.
The Glaosboro Discussions : 23-25 June 1967
The principals were the USA represented by President
Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense
McNamara, Ambassador Thomson, while, for the USSR,
representation was by Premier Kosygin, Foreign Minister
--
13. See White House, (Paris.), release dated 17 May 1960, in De~artment of State Bulletin, Vo1.42, No.1093, (6 June IOBO),
14. See White &use (Vienna) press release dated 4 June 1901 in Department of State Bulletin, Vo1.44, No.1148, (26 June 1961), p.g99.
Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin. The iseues discussed were
the Middle East, (Six-Day War); Soviet insistence on prompt
Israeli withdrawal; Vietnam Var; US withdrawal; Non-
proliferation; general agreement on the importance of this 15
issue. There were no formal agreements signed on the
above issues and also no communiques. There were only 16
statements issued, by the President of the USA and the 17
leader of the USSR delegation, Premier Kosygin. Though
nothing was achieved in the way of agreements or treaties,
at least the two heads of government emphasized the need to
discuss the matters further.
STRATEGIC DOCTRINES FOLLOWED BY USA AND USSR FROM 1945 TO 1968 (US STRATEGIC DOCTRINES FROM PRESIDENTS TRUMAN TO JOHNSON)
STRATEGY
Broadly speaking, strategy refers to the art of formulating
objectives to means or resources. Strategy is developed at
15. Gordon R Weihmiller 8 Dusko Doder, US-Soviet Summits, (University Press of America, Lanham, 1986) p.137.
16. See President's Report to the Nation, Vashington 25 June 1967, White House Press Release dated 25 June 1967 in Department of State Bulletin, Vo1.57, No.1463, (10 ~ u l ~ v
17. Statement by Premier Kosygin at his News Conference at US IiQs, 25 June 1967 - Department of State Bulletin, Vo1.57, ~0.1463, (10 July 1967), p.38, Unofficial translation.
several levels. National strategy relates to overall
national objectivee and measures, For example, at this
level, strategy would deal with the relat,ive priority of
national ~ecurity and other national objectives, such as
improving education or providing social welfare, economic
growth and full employment. It would also deal with
cmbining the various m a n s of promoting national security,
as Leon Sloes has pointed out, as wag of example, promoting
national security including defence, diplomacy, trade aid 18
and arms control.
Defense strategy reconciles defense objectives and
commitments with available and projected defense resources.
~t this level, strategy begins with a definition of
national objectives and an assessment of the role of
military power in meeting those objectives. It also
involves priorities and tradeoffs. As an example, how much
total defense effort should be devoted to the defense of
Europe, Asia or sea lanes? In addition, defense strategy is
concerned with striking a balance between various military
instruments: nuclear and non-nuclear forces; strategic and
non-strategic forces; ground, sea and air forces: Defense
18. Leon Sloss, "The Strategic Perspective," in Ashton B David N Schvartz, ed., Ballistic Missile Defense, (Vaohington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1B84), p.25,
st rate^ must also thke into account decisions about the
relative importance of developing new types of weapons
systems, oodernizing existing forces, and ensuring the
readiness of currently deployed forces. Defense strategy is
also concerned with selecting the best way to achieve a
given military objective. Exsmple: strategists have debated
for years the capabilities required to deter nuclear attack.
TO really understand the need for the reason the SALT
Treaties were eventually signed we must go into the
evolution of strategic nuclear weapons in the nuclear
aresenal of both the USA and USSR.
The Strategic Triad: The USA and the Soviet Union had large
strategic arsenals, known as the strategic triad, i.e.,
three types of systems for delivering nuclear weapons or
warheads to their targets: intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missile
(SLBMs); and strategic bombers. Each survivable force of
this triad had distinct characteritics of nuclear weapons
systems that affect their performance, which, as described
by the Arms Control Association are: controllability, 19
promptness, penetrability, accuracy and yield.
19. Arms Control and National Security : An Introduction, (Washington, D.C., Arms Control Association, 1989), p.98.
~ntercontinental Ballistic Missiles CICBYsl: ICBMS are
landbased multi stage rockets, capable of propelling nuclear
~arheads Over intercontinental distances (i .e., more than
5500 kilometers). An ICBM can deliver several powerful
~arheads with exceptional accuracy to intercontinental
targets in under thirty minutes. The development of
multiple independently targetable entry vehicle (MIRV)
technology in the late 1960s allows each missile to carry a
number of warheads that can be targeted under separate aim
points. These characteristics enable ICBMs to carry out
time urgent, i.e., counterforce (military) targets and make
ICBMS potential first strike weapons. nigh accuracy also
makes ICBMs potentially useful as war fighting weapons in
specialized or limited options attacks. ICBMs are currently
deployed in massive concrete and steel silos just below the
earth's surface. Unlike bombers, ICBMs cannot be recalled.
Thus, launching ICBMa on warning of an attack, which might
be a false alarm would precipitate a general nuclear
exchange. Their potential vulnerability as fixed targets
increases the liklihood that ICBMs may be used prematurely
for fear of losing them to an attacker's weapons. To reduce
their vulnerability, ICBMs can be deployed in a mobile mode.
strategic Bombers: Strategic bombers are long range air-
Craft ckpable of carrying nuclear weapons over
intercontinental distances and then returning to an overseas
recovery base. Bombs were the first means of delivering
nuclear weapons and the United States of America, at one
stage, relied upon strategic bombers as delivery vehicles
for almost 40 per cent of its total strategic nuclear
arsenal while the Soviet Union had about 9 per cent in this
category. Bomber survivability is determined in the
readiness of the force. Bombers on the ground are extremely
vulnerable to attack. Bombers have more flexi-bility than
missiles, because they can be recalled and operate under
fail-safe procedures whereby they automati-cally return to
base unless they receive additional instruc-tions within a
fixed time period. Strategic bombers take many hours to
perform intercontinental missions. Large subsonic bombers
are also vulnerable to air defenses. Bombs can carry a
large number of accurate weapons with high yields. Once
they penetrate air defenses, bombers are, in principle,
capable of seeking out and destroying undamaged hard and
mobile targets, but, at least, in the case of hardened
silos, most of the missiles in them would presumably have
been fired by the time the bomber or their air-launched
Cruise missiles (ALCMs) arrive. .
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles [SLBMs): SLBMs are
Similar to I C a s but are launched from submarines. The US
Q ~ W force wi th 6- 5300 warbeads carried about 40 per cent
the US s t r a t e ~ i c nuclear arsenals while Soviet SLYBS
carried sl ightly more than 30 per cent of their s t ra tegic
nuclear rarheada. SLBMs are inherently the most survivable
and thus the most r t r b i l i z i r leg of the s t r r tegic t r iad .
Deployed on submarines which patrol vast ocean rrearr, SLBYS
are d i f f icul t to locate and destroy, As a consequence, they
are considered e ~ ~ e l l e n t second-strike weapons which add to
both deterrence and s tabi l i ty . For the same reanon that
subaarines and SLBYs a r e relatively invulnerable, national
command authorit ies may have difficulty communicating.
Cruise Missiles: Both superpowers had deployed a new class
of s t ra tegic weapons: long range cruise missiles on a i rcraf t
and a t sea. Cruise missiles are small, pi lotless a i rcraf t ,
powered by miniature jet-engines and capable of f l y i n g long
distances, terrain hugging missions. With modern guidance
systems keyed to the terrain they are overflying, cruise
missiles can s t r i k e targets with great accuracy. Future
cruise missiles r i l l have reduced detectability(stea1th
technology) and increased speeds which w i l l make them even
less vulnerable t o a i r defenm systems. Moreover, the small
s ize , large projected numbers, and relative ease of
Production of cruise missilea make thei r verification more
d i f f i cu l t than other delivery systems. Tbese cruise
,issiler prooed their mettle during the Perrian Gulf war in
1991, when it war used by the US forces to bomb vital Iraqi
forcer.
The Truman AdainiBtration (1945-1952) - US Nuclear ~ o n o ~ o l p - Collective Security:
Immediately after lorld War 11, the lest adopted the p61icy
of 'Collective Security'. The idea was that peace could
best be assured if all countries acted together to Oppose
any threatened or actual aggression. For it to be
effective, the parties to a collective security system had
to have a shared definition of aggression, a common will to
respond to aggression, and finally, the means to implement
that response. In this case, several great powers had to be
willing and able to act in concert against any aggressor.
Given these prerequisites, collective security was unlikely
to work effectively in a world characterized by bipolarity
or by multiple alliance structures.
The United Nations was founded upon the theory of collective
security and was dominated by the countries tbat had won
lorld War 11. Their alliance, forged by the common need to
defeat the Axis powers and now esrential to collective
Security, war quickly undermined by c ~ petition between the
two emerging rupcrporers; the USA and the USSR. AS pointed
10 r ightly by Colt Blacker and Gloria Duffp, the port war
unity f ina l ly collrpsed under the r t r r in of the Cold War.
BY 1947, the USA had, i n e f fec t , abandoned collective
security in favour of what c w t o be known a s
lcontainment.' Prerldent Truman fe l t that Cormunirt idsology
committed the 8Oviet Union t o a continual e f fo r t to erprnd
the revolution, md t h i s aggression had t o be w t and
contained a t every point of attempted expaneion. Bowever,
tbe theory of Collective security envisaged r multipolar
world w i t h common 8ecurity interests . The Truman Doctrine
though, envisaged a bipolar world with d i rec t ly competing
interests . The USA supported the formation of a Western
military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO), comprised by the USA, Canada and most countriec i n
leatern Europe. The Soviet Union responded i n the 19508 by 21
forming tbe Warsaw Pact, an alliance of the Communist
countries of Eastern Europe. Tbe USA and the Soviet Union
~ i n t r i n e d an uneasy a l l i ance during World War 11. At the
end of the Vrr, the USA withdrew i t s forcer from Europ and
dumobilised i t s troops, while the Soviet Union retained an
20. Colt D Blacker and Gloria Duffy, ads., International Arms Control-Irruer and Arrwmentr, (California, Stanford University Presr, 2 edition, 1984), pp.190- 200.
21. Vitb the callapra of Coollunin i n Eartern Europe, tbe Varmam Pact has since been dirbrnded.
117
iucnre military establishment and set about installing
upp pet r e g ins in Eastern Europe. Pro-Soviet Communist
parties emerged as potent forces in Western
Europe, and it was feared that Greece, Turkey, Iran and west
Berlin right be absorbed into the Soviet sphere. Againnt
this background, there war a growing consensus in the USA
that the Soviet Union represented a clear and imrediate
threat to the security of the Vest.
The Truman administration believed that atomic weapons could
play a critical role in the evolving confrontation with the
Soviet Union. The US monopoly on these avesome weapons of
mrss destruction seemed an immediate and direct way to
compensate for Soviet conventional military superiority in
Europe. To deter Soviet aggression and even compel the
Soviet Union to act in a manner acceptable to the lest, the 22
USA began deploying nuclear-armed bombers in Europe. The
Soviet Union detonated its first atomic weapon in August
1949, several years earlier than most US observers brd
expected. Spurred by the Soviet accomplishment, the USA
undertook a crash programme to develop the hydrogen or
therronuclerr bomb. The " A " bomb was successfully tested in
22. Arms Control and National Security : An Introduction, (~ashington, D.C., Arms Control A8Socibtion, N E B ) , P. 19.
1952 with a tiold Which WAS a thousand tiwr greater than
the boob that dertroyed Birosbira. The US monopoly on there
weapons 1aot.d only until the firrt Soviet thermonuclrar
tost in 1953. The US arms COmPetitiOn bad now begun in
earnest. The USA remained far ahead for more than r decade
- in its capability to deliver nuclear weapons againnt the
Soviet Union. The first truly US intercoatinental bomber,
the 8-36, was introduced in 1948, and by the end of the
Truun Administrrtion, the USA had nearly 600 aircraft
capable of delivering atomic bombs ngainrt the Soviet Union
from the US or European bases.
The Eisenborer Administration: 1953-1960 - "Massive Retrliatiod*
The Cold War was at its height when President Dwight
Eisenhower took office in 1953. The USA was embroiled in a
costly land war in Korea against North Korern and Chineee
forces and renred a growing threat from the Soviet Unloa in
Europ and around the world. In 1954, Secrrtary of State,
John Poster Dulles announced that any attack on the United
Stater of America or its Allire would be net "10 r unner 23
and at a place of our orn choosing." The implicatton rrs
23. Quoted in fbid., OP.Clt., p.21.
that ADI CO..uoirt w r e r r i o n , whether direct or through
proxire, could well result in massive retaliation - a large
scale nuclear attack against the Soviet Union. ~t the 81.0
t i w , tbe USA began to integrate nuclear weapons into it8
forcer deployed i n the USA, at sea, and on the territory of
allied aAtiOn8.
~ h s Advent of Intercontinental Ballistic Ylssiler:
In 1957, the Soviet Union shocked the USA by orbiting
Sputnik, the world's first artificial satellite. Rapid
Soviet success in developing nuclear weapons had been widely
dismissed as something of a fluke which was highly dependent
on espionage. The launch of Sputnik suggested that Soviet
technical capabilities had been underestimated and that the
Soviet Union would soon be able to develop land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles(1CBYs) capable of
delivering nuclear weapons against the USA. Fears grew that
the USA would be threatened by a missile gap. In response,
the USA undertook a crash programme to develop and deploy
its orrn ICBMs AS well as SLBYs. As a stop-gap measure, IR
missile8 were deployed in England, Italy and Turkey between
1957 and 1963. By 1959, the USA began to deploy ICBMs at
Vadenberg Air Force Base in California. In 1960, the USA
llunched tho first pol~ris ballistic missile rubmarine.
m e derelopent of ballistic missiles gave a new character
to nuclear mariare. Previously, nuclear weapons bad been
~arried by bomber aircraft which took many hours to reach
their targets. Deployed on ICBMs, nuclear weapons could
travel continent to continent in 30 minutes. , Dsployed on
submarines in mid-ocean, SLBMs, in mid-ocean, SLBus might
strike in even less time. Fears of a surprise Soviet
missile attack, designed to destroy US strategic boebers and
effectively disarm the country, led the Eisenhower
administration to develop and test a plrn to maintain some
bombers on continuous airborne alert.
The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1960 - Mutual Vulnerability:
The Cuban Missile Crisis: When President John F. Kennedy
came to power in January 1961, US-Soviet relations were in a
poor state. The Bay of Pigs disaster and the Soviet
erection of the Berlin Wall dividing East and West Berlin
increased US-Soviet tensions during Kennedy's first year.
US-Soviet relations suffered a severe strrin in the postwar
period when, in October 1982, US aerial reconnaissance
Photographs revealed that the Soviet Union was secretly
building bases to deploy mdium range nuclear missiles in
Cuba. To demonstrate American resolve in the face of a
threat which va8 j w t 90 mile away tram Florida, Kennedy
08 nuclear forces on increared alert. For reven
tense days, the world watched the rtandofi between Kennedy
a d rhnuhchev. US naval forces blockaded Cuba while the
leader6 of the two 6UpcrPOwers negotiated. In exchange for
a Mviet conitnent to withdraw their missiles, the USA
pledged not to invade Cuba and indicated informally that
intermediate range US nuclear missiles in Turkey and Italy
would be withdrawn. This sobering brush with nuclear war
focused the world's attention on the risks of the arms race.
The Missile Gap: President Kennedy had campaigned in 1960
against Eisenhower's strategy of massive retaliation but
also had argued for a substantial build-up in ICBMs, largely
on the grounds of an alleged missile gap between the USA and
Soviet forces. By 1961, however, newly orbited
reconnaissance satellites revealed that the Soviet ICBM
force was in fact much smaller than US forces. But the
United States of America went ahead with plans to deploy a
large force of Minuteman ICBMs. Tbe USA and the Soviet
Union were also starting to deploy submarines capable of
launching long-range nuclear-armed missiles. Submariner
would enrure that both sides would have an invulnerable
retaliatory deterrent.
~ l e r i b l e B ~ B D O ~ J J ~ M d Assured Dertruction: m i l e in the
early 19608 the USA remained far ahead of the Soviet Union
in the number and quality of nuclerr forcer, the
destructive power of nuclear weapon8 ensured
*at even with fewer weapon6 the Soviet Union had the
u p a c i t y to inflict unacceptable levels of damage on the
*st. As the Soviet capability to attack or retaliate
againrt US territory grew, the Eisenhower's administration
policy of 'Ya88iVe Retaliation', which, in' a11 probability,
w u l d have led t o general nuclear war and the wholerale
destruction of both the USA and the Soviet Union, became
less credible. T h e threat to launch an all-out rttack in
response to non-nuclear conflicts did not seem to many
strategic analysts t o provide a credible deterrent to such
actions. The Soviet Union might have been tempted to call
the U S bluff. Moreover, events of the 1950s bad rhown that
nuclear ruperiority could not prevent Communist-supported
uprisings in the Third World. Kennedy believed that the USA
relied too heavily on nuclear weapons and that the
challenge8 of the 1960s would require more sophirticated
resPonse8 with greater emphasis on conventional forcer,
Counter-inrurgency teams, and economic and developmental
~ennodr, thus, Proposed tbe replacement of massive
retaliati~n with a strategy of deterrence through 'Flexible
~~sponse', which would involve "a range of appropriate
responses, conventional and nuclear, to a 11 levels of 24
aggression or throats of aggression." To allow for more
non-nuclear options, the Kennedy administration strengthened
conventional forces. Kennedy also carried out the
deployment, planned by Eisenhower, of s m e 7000 tactical or
battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe. The new strategy
aimed to provide a more credible alternative to a masrive
retaliation against a Soviet conventional or limited nuclear
attack. Some argued that more advanced technology, both in
missile guidance systems and in capabilities for monitoring
deployments and activities in the Soviet Union, would make
precision attack on enemy military targets possible with a
minimal level of civilian causalities or other collateral
damage.
Critics of flexible rerponse, however, did not believe
nuclear warfare could be controlled or its damage
constrained in any meaningful wag. Even the limited use of
nuclear weapon8 on the battlefield in response to r
Conventional attack by tbe Soviet Union would almost
24. Ibid., Op.Cit., pp.23-24.
e8mlrte rapid19 to an exchange of weapons between
the ruprporers and then to uncontrolled #enerr1 nuclear
war and mutual destruction.
NEED TALKS 011 STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIOI:
be rcronyan SALT, which expands to Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks, wrs coined by Robert Martin, who wre in
the Bureau o f Political Military Affairs in the State
bpartmnt of the USA. He was then r member of the
Political Section of the United States North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Mission in Brussels. Though the term war
resisted by some Washington officials for r while, it (the
acrongma SALT) was finally adopted when the CIA was 25
organizing Its filing system rround the tars 'SALT.
The talks were launched because there was r mutual need to
rolemnire the parity principle. To put it differently, SALT
talk8 were atartad to eetablieh an rcceptrnce by each ride
of the othor'a rbility to inflict unrcceptrhle retribution
in rerponro to r nuclear attack - which arsuaee here that
neither ride would initiate a first rtrike if the other'r
retaliatory capability was strong enough to survive it8
25. John Mewhouse, Cold Dawn : The Story of SALT, (Iarbiagton, Pergason-Brareey'r, l980), p.54.
i8p.ct. n o r , 8 u t u l deterrence rerts on the lwlrene88 by
each ride of the other's second rtrike capability.
~rms-control over the years had gained increasing importance
in relatioar between the USA and the Soviet Union and for
very good rerronr. The two powers had been rivals since the
closing days of World War 11, and their rivalry bad reached
almost every region of the world. As a result, profound dis-
trust and a mutual fear, if not hatred, characterized their
relationship. The arms race was an expression of their deep
political differences. The danger was tbat the rrms race,
fueled by continuing conflict would at some time spill over
into a nuclear war. One way each side had tried to avoid
such a cataclysmic end was to build up its nuclear forces as
a defense; the other was to meet and negotiate agreements
tbat reduced the chances of war breaking out. As rightly 26
pointed out by J.W. Spanier, since the basic conflict
bould not be resolved and nuclear weapons were unlikely to
be rbolisbd, the next best tactic, therefore,was to manage
the nuclear rrms balance by instituting arms control,
In the 19708, t h e w negotiations shifted to each side's
strategic iorcer. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks rtood at
26. Jobn 1 Bpmirr, American Poreitn Policy since World War XI, (Irrhington, D.C., C.Q. Prftm, 1988), p.203. -
126
the center of detente. It mainly had the following
objectives, the first of wbicb was to make the arms race
.ore predictable by establishing the numbers of strategic
weapons for each side. It was hoped that rucb knowledge
would reduce the anxietp of the arms race; uncertainty and
the fear that the opponent migbt be gaining superiority in
military strength fueled competition. The Soviet Union had
begun a steady, large-scale military build-up in strategic
and conventional weapons after the Cuban ai8sile crisis. By
tbe time Nixon became Pretident, the Soviet8 had overtaken
the US in number of deployed missiles, and the miraile
production continued. A new arms race, therefore, was
likely, unless mutually acceptable ceilings on missiles
could be negotiated. Indeed, given the anti-military eood
in the USA following the Vietnam War and congressional
hostility to increased defense spending, the pressure on the
Rixon adminirtration to negotiate an agreement was intense.
The alternative would be a missile gap in favour of the
Soviet Union.
SALT'S recond objective was to ensure parity. The
assumption mar that if the two sides had approximately the
same number of warheads and bombs neither ride could launch
1 crippling ride on the other. More specifically, parity
w.8 a condition in which no matter who struck firrt, the
a t t a e d side would atill have the capability to retaliate
and destroy the aggressor. When each power posrersed
mistilet with Single warheads, even with reasonably accurate
warheads, r 2:l superior it^ was needed to launch a
devastating first strike. Short of such a superiority, the
USA and USSR would each have retained a sufficient
retaliatory capability to assure the continuation of
deterrence.
Another objective of SALT was to reduce threats to each
aide's deterrent forces. By the early 1970s, the deterrent
balance wrs threatened not only by the continuing Soviet
quantitative rtrategic growth but also by te~bn010gi~al
innovations that were widely believed in the USA to be
undermining the stability of American-Soviet deterrence.
One matter of concern was the development of r new defensive
weapon. The Soviet Union had deployed ABYs around Yoscov
and were thought to be working on a second generation ABM
for possible nrtionwide deployment. If ABYa could shoot
down enough incoming American ICBMs and reduce the
destruction inflicted on the Soviet Union to what they felt
was an acceptable level of a few million crrualties, the
ABYs would undermine US deterrence, which depended upon it8
capacity to impose aseured destruction. In turn, this
defensive weapon rtimulated the USA to improve its offensive
~cbnolOgY, r w c i f i c a l l ~ the develomnt of the MIRVS. M I R V
is an ICBM w i t h multiple warheads that wn 8eparate i n
f l i gh t , cbrnge trajectory, and f l y independently to assigned
md disperred targets. The advantage of MIRV was that the
large number of warheads would be able to overcome any ABM
b f e n s e , meaning that the USA would s t i l l be able to destroy
Qaviet rociety i n a re ta l ia tory blow.
MIRVs a180 threatened to dertabil ize the deterrent balance.
I t war one thing for the USA and Soviet Union to possess
~ i s s i l e s with single warheads, even i f these warberds were
reasonably accurate. I f s ide A had 1000 missiles and side B
1400, B s t i l l d i d not have the 2 : l superiority i t was
assumed necessary to destroy A'a missiles. But i f both
possessed the same number of missiles - l e t us assume 1000 - but A's missile could carry 10 warberds and B ' a could carry
only 3, the rat io of warheads would be greater than 3 : l .
This mould permit A with only 200 missiles to launch a f i r r t
# t r ike to disarm the l a t t e r . Multiplying the wrrbeads and
providing them w i t h greater accuracy thus undermined the
mtability of the nuclear balance because i t placed a premium
oa attack. lbicbever r ide got i n the f i r s t blow was l ikely
to w i n because i t might have been able t o prevent any major
retaliation. Tbir war a potentially dangerous ri tuation.
men both rider possesred such counterforce weapons, the i r
mutual fear of a preventive war, and especially of I
preemptive strike during a Crisis would have made both
jittery. Each would fear that if the other struck first, it
would be unable to retaliate with sufficient force to
destroy the otber; the very vulnerability of the opponent's
forces, therefore, provided an incentive to attack first.
u c h would then feel that it had to either use the nuclear
weapons or else it would loce them.
Finally, SALT I was necessary for detente. On the one hand,
a failure to arrive at an agreement or at least to continue
the SALT dirlogue was bound to have a deteriorating effect
on their overall political relationship. On the other hand,
only a relaxrtion of tensions could provide the diplomatic
atmosphere that would enable the two nuclear giants to
arrive at an arms agreeaent that would leave them feeling
.ore secure, sanctify the etrategic parity between tbem, and
avoid new costly offensive and defensive arms racer. SALT,
in brief, becrae a symbol of detente. With it, detente
seemed to blossom; without it, detente reeaed to fade.
Succerr or failure to achieve a SALT agreement, therefore,
according to John Spanier, became the barometer of 27
detente.
n. ~bia., 09. cc".
TBE m a B m I T t MAY 22-30 1972: TRE SIGHING OP SALT I TBEATT and the INTERIM AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC O P P ~ S I V E ARMS
According to Kissinger, President Nixon entered the White
~ o u s e convinced like his predecessors, particularly
Eisenhower, that a summit meeting with the soviet Union
could only succeed if it was well-prepared. He said, "Hi8
original intention was to use the prospect of a summit only
when it could be a means to extract 'important Soviet 28
~~ncessions."
In the account given by Gordon leihmiller and Dusko Doder,
the first Soviet feeler about the prospects for a Bummit
meeting was raised by Ambassador Dabrynin in talks with
Kissinger on 20 January 1970, but Kissinger refused, stating
that the timing was not yet right. The two met again in
April and Dobrynin floated the possibility of a meeting when
Premier Kosygin attended the opening session of the United
Rations in New York; but this was again rejected. Other
exchanges continued and on 23 June, Dobrlnin suggested that
the tw leaders might want to discuss developments in the
Middle East, China and Soutbeart Asia, as well re European
Security. Purther exchanges about the poseibilities of a
28. W a r y A fiesinger, White Bouee Years, (Boston, Little B m a 8 Co., 1979), p.552.
meeting later in the year continued until September 25, when
the Soviets suggested postponing further talks on summit
prospects until the following pear. A month later, on
October 22, Dobrynin and Poreiga Minister Gromyko met with
Nixon, Kissinger, and Secretary of State Rogers, who had not 29
previously been invol7ed in the s u m i t discussions.
Gromyko appeared amenable to the idea of a summit but wanted
to see a settlement on the Berlin problem first. Efforts to
resolve tbat lingering problem were undertaken in January
1971, in talks between Kissinger and Dobrynin, in Washington
and were directly linked to the prospects for a summit tbat
year, by the Soviet Ambassador. Also, in Jlnuary, Prerident
Nixon initiated back channel communications with Moscow in
an effort to resolve differences and break deadlocks in the
strategic arms limitation talks.
Throughout the spring of 1971 summit prospects were
alternately connected with progrecs on SALT, the Berlin
situation, and Vietnam. It appeared that both tides were
now trying the carrot-and-stick routine, with the summit in
the balance. Another effort was u d e on June 8 to coos to
an agreemeat on a date for the summit as Kirringer and
29. Cordon R Ieibmiller and Dusko Doder, US-Soviet Summits, (Lanham, University Presr o f America, 1986), pp.55-56.
Dobrpin m t at kvid, but again, the details of timing
were put off. Shortly after, as given in the account of SO
~ a c o b Bean, in earl9 July, Kissinger was off on his secret
trip to Chin. resulting in President Nixon's suboequent
announcement that he would visit China in February 1972.
Moscow's interest in a US-Soviet summit suddenly peaked. On
10 August 1971, the President received a formal invitation
to virit Moscow for talks in Yay or June of 1972. After the
details were arranged, a joint anriouncenent of the trip was
made in Moscow and Washington on October 12.
Though the reception in Moscow mas chilly and
notwithstanding the various tirades against the bombing and
mining of North Vietnam's harbours, the summit was a
success, as exemplified most notably in two agreements: the
'Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems', which limited
each country to the construction of two systems: and the
'Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms,' which mtated that neither country would start
construction of additional land bared ICBY launchers alter 1
July 1072, thus freezing their levels to the numbers
deployed and under construction at the time. The Protocol
30. Jacob Bean, Multiple Exposure: An American Ambarsador's Uniaue Perrpsctire on Eailt-lest Issues, (Mew York, 1.V. norton & Co., 1078), pp.260-63.
to the Inter Agreement further specified, inter alia, that
the USA was limited to 710 SLBY launchers on 44 modern
submarines, and the Soviet Union to 950 launchers on 82
w d e r n submarines, along with 4 provision for trade-offs on
replacement for SLBYs on older type submarines.
This agreement, later dubbed SALT I, was the culmination of
a long Process. Three years earlier, President Nixon bad
decided t o resume the efforts initiated by President Johnson
at the Glassboro summit for formal strategic arms limitation
talks with the Soviets, rnd these commenced in November of
1969 at Helsinki. They continued for the next two-and-a-
half years in Vienna and Geneva under the direction of
Ambassador Gerard C Smith, Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, and his Soviet counterpart, Deputy
Foreign Minister Vladimir Semenov, who was assisted by
Colonel General Ogarkov, first Deputy Chief of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces.
According to Raymond Garthoff, throughout the early stages
of the negotiations, delegations consisting of about ten
psople on each ride, conducted meetings twice weekly,
followed by i n f o r m 1 rerrionr. Subsequently, the 08 rlde
took to preparing YtYCONs (*menoranda of converrations*)
numbering over five hundred in tbe two-and-a-quarter year
pried. The Mencons were dispatched to the SALT community
in Iashington, ~ 0 n S i ~ t i n g of about fifty government experts,
~ s t l y in the Dcplrtments of State and Defense, as well 1 s 3 1
in the A n s Control lad Disarmament Agency. National
Qecurity Advisor Kissinger, kept track of their progress
through meetings of the Verification Panel, tbe rroup he
chaired to review the inspection or policing arrangemeate,
and significant problems were occasionally brought to the
attention Of the National Security Cohncil. Then, in
addition (and as P r e ~ i ~ ~ S l g noted), President Nixon began
tbe back channel correspondence with Kosygin in January
1971, which mas supplemented by the Kissinger - Dobrynin
talks. After the 24th Party Congress in April 1971,
Brezhnev began to replace Kosygin as the Kremlin's chief
8pokesman and by 1972 became the recepient of the 32
backchannel cwmunications.
In sum, then, as pointed out by Raymond L Carthoif, there
were four different levels of arms control discussions going
On at the same time: formal plenary and informal resrions
between the SALT terms: tbe Kissinger-Dobrynin talks; and
31. B.ymond L Garthoff, "Regotiating SALT", The Wilron 9 u r t e r l ~ , (Autumn 1977), p.78.
32. Ibid., p. 80, and Gartboff, "Negotiating mitb the Rueriaas : Some Lessons from SALT," Internationrl Security, Vol.1, 10.4, (Spring 19771, p.6.
33 the hack-channel between Washington and uoscow. Neither
~mbasrrdor Smith nor Secretary Rogers was informd of the
back channel, w a v e r , unt i l the day before President
~ i x o n ' s announcement of Yay 20 that an agreement had been
reached with the Soviet Union to separate the ABY treaty
from related progress on offensive weapons limitations, i n
e f fec t , a major break through i n the deadlocked
negotiations.
The f ac t that the SALT negotiations were proceeding a t a l l ,
l e t alone making significant progress, dates back to
fundaaental agracaent between the two rides i n 1968 on the
common objectives and conceptual framework to be employed 34
during the process. The emphasis of the main objective
was on the need for s t ra tegic s t a b i l i t y , and that required
l imitat ion of offensive weapons i f deterrence was to be
ef fec t ive for eitber side. I t was agreed that neither ride
should be allowed a military advantage, and agreements would
be based on parity i n nuclear weaponry. I t war also agreed
that further measurer were required to reduce the risk of
nuclear war from aiscalculation or accident.
34. For details , see Lyndon Baines Johnson, Tbe Vanta e Point : k r s ~ ~ c t i v e s of the Presidency.- (New York, b l t ,Rinehar t , and Winston, 1871), p.485-90.
joint announCeMnt in Moscow and Vashington on 12
October 1971 of agreement to bold tbe summit meting in nay
1972 put additional pressures on the SALT negotiators to
c w e to t e n 8 with rwaining issues. By the time the rummit
there mere three such outstanding problems: Tbe
distance permitted between tbe two ABY systems that would be
allowed; what increases in size or volume, if any, would be
permitted for ICBM8 and tbeir silos; and what SLBYr to count
( e l tbe SLBMs on new versus older submarines).
Resolution of these matters became the principal tack of
President Niron and Kissinger at tbe summit meeting. The US
President would negotiate directly with General Secretary
Brezhnev on tbese details, a task, as be stated i n bia 35
memoirs, was befitting the leaders of the two countries.
Tbe summit put prersures on the negotiations to finalize
agreements in t i n for rignature by the principals, which
resulted in sore bartily concluded SALT documents. The SLBY
portion of the Interim Agreement, contained in the Protocol
to that agreement, bas been cited m r t often a8 an example;
it apparently had to be done over after rignature and signed
again by the leaderr a day or two later.
35. Picbard M BW Iiron, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, (New Tork, Grorset a d Dunlap, 1978), p.211.
Among the other agreements signed, which covered such
matters as environmental Protection, wdical science rrd
technology, and Prevention of incidents at sea, the ore
entitled 'Basic Principle~ of Relations Between the United
states of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics' was of spacial significance to Yoscow. Soviet
interest in such an agreement was initially raised t y
Ambassador Dobrynin in his talks with Kissinger !n
Washington, and its consummation at the summit was construe$
in Moscow as symbolizing US recognition of the Soviet Unicn
as a coequal superpower. Although this agreement rrs
generally devoid of operative content, Kissinger observed 36
that:
... the fundamental achievement was to sketch the outline on which coexistence between the democracies and the Soviet system must be based. SALT embodied our conviction that a widely spiraling nuclear arms race was in no country's interest and enhanced no one'r security; the "Basic principles" gave at least verbal expression to tbe necessity of responsible political conduct. The two elements reinforced each other; they symbolized our conviction that a relaxation of tensions could not be based exclusively on arms control; the ultimate test would be restrained international behaviour,
36. Benry A Kissinger, White Rouse Years, (Boston, Little, B r w n and Co., 1979), pp.1253-$4.
A joiat cawunique was released on Yay 29. It was all but
c ~ p l e t e before the summit took place, as Kissinger and
mbrynin bad started work on it in Wrshington. There was
only one U j O r rrea of disagreement to be settled rnd that
concerned tbe Yiddle hat. Tbe Soviets wanted a rtrong
statement on joint efforts to &chieve peace in the region;
but, unwilling to open the door to further Soviet
involvement and influence in the Middle East, Kissinger
would agree only to a bland strtement on tbat mrtter. He
lrter attributed President Srdrt's expulsion of Soviet
advisers in July of tbat year to Moscow's inability to 37
achieve more for its Arab client state at the summit.
Upon the President's return to Washington on 1 June, he
immediately reported to Congress tbrt " the foundation has
been laid for r new relationship between the tvo most 38 - -
powerful nations in the world."
7
37. Ibid., Op.Cit., p.1248.
38. President Nixon's Address to Congress on 1 June 1972, "The Moscow Summit : Nev Opportunities in US-Soviet Relations" Reprinted in US OIDartment of State, Bulletin, Vol.66, 10.1722, (26 June 1972), p.855.
39 AS succintly s u u e d up by Kissenger,
The contert 1s well as the contert of the r u r i t made it r mrjor ruccess for Americrn foreign policy. The fact that we bad faced down Brnoi and yet coapleted mrjor negotirtions with Yoscow . . . evoked the prospect of 1 w r e hopeful future and tbus put Vietnrm into perspective. The summits helped us complete the irolrtion of Rrnoi by giving Moscow and Peking r stake in their ties with ur. Vbrt war even more novel, re were freed for the better part of the year from the domestic turmoil on which tbus far U n o i had rlwrps been rble to count. Thir, together with the military defeat of the North Vietnrmere offensive, led to r break through in the perce negotirtions within .onthe. The summit was equally rignificrnt for the evolution of the Middle Erst .... It u r k e d r turning point at which moderate Arab larders begrn to move toward Inshington..,.
The summit was r success for the American lerdership. It
was during tbe summit that concrete strategic nuclear rrme
cuts were signed, for the first time in bilateral superpower
history. It also gave time to the US rdministrrtion to
concentrate more on the ongoing war they were going through
with Vietnam, 1.0, for them to reek honourable wry8 to get
out of r war they were losing on all frontr men, orterirlr
and money. The ABY Yirrlle Systems Treaty wrr approved by
the &nrte Foreign Relrti~ns Committee and endorsed 88-2 by
39. Benry A Kirringer, White Ifouse Y a r s , (Boston, Little, Ems and Co., 1979), p.1253.
the full kaate oa 3 August 1972. The Interim Agreement was
by botb Aoures of Congress in September and oa the 30
o f that m t h , Prerident Uiroa signed the joint resolution
.uthorizin# approval of the Interim Agreement and Protocol
thereto, botb accords then b e c u e effective on 3rd October
witb the excbange of rrtificrtions.
MAIN PROVISIOIIS OF SALT I ACREWENT
Tbe ABY Treaty: The preamble to the treaty stater iuportant -- preaieer for the agreement (and for the whole Strategic Arms
Liaitation Talks): the devastating consequences of nuclear
war, the oeed for measures to decreare the risk of outbreak
of nuclear war, the contribution of limitation of ABY
syrtear to meeting thir need, and the importance of ABY
liaitatiou as a prior condition for limiting rtrategic
offensive arar.
The objective of the treaty ir very clearly embodied in its
provirionr. It is to prohibit all ABY activities and
deployments. The parties undertook (Article I ) pot to
deploy Am rystems for the defense of the territory of their
countries or to provide the bare thereof, and not to deploy
AW ryrtru for regional defense except as rpecif icallg
provided. Article 111 rpecifies in detail the mirsile
launchers m d &BY radars pdrmitttd for defenre of: r the
national Capital, and b: one ICBM field - 100 missiles and
launcberr At eacb. The 1974 Protocol reduced the permitted
deployment to one or the other of there sites.
be probibition8 and limftations are further reinforced
(Articles V and VI, and some rlreed statements and common
understandings). Sea-based, air-based, space-based or
w b i l e land-based components are probibited; this is
essentially because mobility is inconsistent with the basic
prohibitioa of other than limited regional defense.
Verification was to be by national technical means, and
interference with these means and concealment were banned.
Tbe treaty provided for a Standing Consultative Commission
to facilitate working of the treaty, including dealing rith 40
verification and compliance questions.
TRE INTEBIY OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT OF 1972
This agreement was essentially applicable to ICBM8 and SLBYs
but not to bombers, for a five-year duration while a broader
and more detailed agreement could be negotiated. ICBM
bollbars used were frozen at tbe number alraady oper&tional
40. Philip J Parley, "Strategic Arm& Control, 1967-87*, in Alexander L George, Philip J Parley, Alexander Dallin, (dr.) , US-Soviet Security CooWration, (Oxford, NOW York, 1988), p.217.
o r under construction. New fired bombers (silos) could not
b~ started; the dimensions of silos could not be
significantly increased; bombers for light or older ICBMs
could not be converted into bombers for mordern heavy ICBYS.
Bombers for SLBMr could be increased beyond those
operational or under construction, up to an agreed level of
each for each party, but only if a corresponding number of
older ICBM or SLBY bombers were dimantled or destroyed.
Verification provisions corresponded wi th those of the ABY 4 1
Treaty.
The formal SALT negotiations and agreements recorded during
the decade 1969-79, represented only the conspicuous
negotiating phase of the SALT process. Integral to this
process and even more protracted was the two-decade period
-ram 1949 (when the Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear
test explosion) until the opening of formal negotiations in
1969. During tbia period, the two powers in a parallelled
and then interactive process, came to recognise that the
primary goal of national security policy in the nuclear age
had to be avoidance of nuclear war, that strategic arms race
- even with both sides seeking to deter rather than to win a nuclear conflict - was an inadequate and risky rag to pursue 41. See the fnteria Agreement on Strategic Offrnsive leapons
Treaty.
143
security and that negotiations and agreements on strategic
arms might contribute to r@curity in rays tbat rtrrtegic
arms alone could not.
Entering into negotirtions on such premires, a8 Philip 42
Parley noted, mould imply acceptance of the other side as
r worthy negotirtinz partner, a notion with compatible even
if not identical security goals and standards, tbur making
it conceivrble that a fair, balanced and verifiable
agreement aight be arrived at, complied with and found
effective. Thie premiae, implicit, rather than explicit, rt
least initially, during the SALT process, crme to be highly
contentiour -especirlly in the USA -with the the decline of
detente beginning in the lrtter years of the 1970'r.
Soae Problear Internal to the Regime Treaty Provirionr: The Case of the ABM Trertp
According to Gloria Duffy, reverrl of the ccmpliance
disputee in the first half of the lB8Os concerned provisions
of agreement tbat were an imperfect coapromise at the time
they mere negotiated, establishing qualitative conrtrrintr
12. Philip J Parley, *Strategic Armr Control, 1867-87", in Alexander L George, Pbilip J ?arlry, Alexander Dallin, ( e d ) US-kvirt Mcuritt CooMrrtion, (Oxford, Iewyork, 1@88), p. 270.
on weapons or behaviour, but doing so in a way that 43 --
contained rubstrntial ambiguities. Such deficiencies
provided u p l a room for differing US and Soviet
faterpretations of tbeir obligations under the agreementr.
Such ambiguities were involved in each of the central
compliance disputes between the USA and USSR in the 1980s.
Certain provisions of the 1972 ABY Treaty conta ined
ambiguities that contributed to the compiirnce disputes in
the early 1980s. The agreeaent prohibited deployment of
large-phared array radars (LPARs) for tracking incoming
ballistic missiles and relaying tbeir flight prth to ABY
radars and interceptors except at the one permitted AB M site
choren by each country. Tbe intent of the negotiations in
including this provision was to prevent deployment of the
most costly, longest lead time component of an ABU system,
the existence of which could allow one of the parties to
most easily and quickly breakout of the treaty limits to
mount a regional or nationwide ABY defense.
The precire wording of Article VI of the ABY Treaty was
designed to distinguish LPARr that could be used for
43. Gloria Duffy, 'Conditions that Affect Arms Control Compliance,* in Alexander L George, Philip J Farlry, Alexander Dallin,(odr.),US-Soviet Securit~ Cooperation, (Oxford, Hew York, 1@88), p.270.
purporsr of attacking incoming mirrilsr from tbore used for
early warning, since from external observation, LPARs would
appear t o be the same. In 1972, both the USA and USSR were
beginning modernitrtion programer for their early warning
networks involving the deployment of new LPARr. Artciler VI
coamitted the parties not to deploy new early warnlag radars
except at the periphery of their national territories, and
oriented outward. Due to their location and vulnerability,
radars deployed in this fashion would be ill-suited for ABU
battle-management.
However, at Soviet insistence, a further qualification to
the limits on LPARs, war appended to the treaty by Agreed
Statement F. This clause stated that an exception to the
rule would be provided for LPARr used for space-tracking or
verification, much LPARs could be located other than on the
periphery of the country and other than oriented outward.
The Soviet LPAR at Abalrkoro war located inland and was
oriented toward6 the north-eart, giving it coverage over at
least 3000 kmr of Soviet territory which did not qualify at
'0riented outward'. Due to tbir loophole provided by Agreed
S t a t e w n t P, the USSR had been able t o claim tbrt the rrdrr
war for rpace-tracking purporer, although tho overthelming
likelihood was that the radar war for early warning.
&b.lakoro clored tbe la8t cmplete gap in the Soviet early
warning network, mbicb should otbenire have lacked radar
coverage without thir inrtallation. It war rpecifically
oriented to detect tbe launch of US long-range C-4 and D-5
Sl,SWr deployed on the Trident rubmarine 'force in the
northern Pacific Ocean. It was moat likely a technical
violation of the ABW Treaty, even though it may not have
violated the rpirit of the agreement,. which sought to
prevent the deployment of ABY defenrer.
Until the radar operated, the Soviet care could not be
proved or disproved. The differencer between LPARs for
space-tracking and for brllirtic mirrile early warning are
not phgrically obrervable by national technical means of
verification, and relate mostly to the roftware or control
rgttemr, which govern the radar's operation. Once the radar
begin8 to operate, it emits rignals that may be monitored to
determine the function it ir rervinc at that time. But its
functions can be changed at any time, by manipulating there
r a m internal controls. The ABY Treaty contained no
rpecific interior or guidelines lor di8tinguirhing LPARr
from thore that were permitted for $pace-tracking and
rerfication, which hrd allowed varying 08 and 8oviet claimr
about h w the treaty provirionr related to their radar
programer.
The ABY Treaty Provisions governing LPARs had permitted the
USA as well as the USSR, to move toward8 action8 that might
not bavo been constituent with the 8pirit of the agreement.
Article V I of the treaty ClOlrlY prohibited the deployment
of new LPARs except 18 permitted for space-tracking,
verification, use at test ranger, and for early warning, if
on the periphery and oriented outward. It did not, however,
explicitly prohibit the modernization of exirting LPARa,
wherever tbey might have been.
44 In Leslie B Gelb's account, the USSR charged in 1985 that
US upgrading of two LPARs at Thule, Greenland and Flyingdale
Moors in the United Kingdom violated the Article VI
ttrictures that new radar8 for early warning could not be
deployed except on the periphery of US national territory
and oriented outwards.
According to the Soviet Union, modernization of there two
sites actually involved building a new radar and clearly,
neither of them were located on the US periphery and
oriented outward. Soviet Union a180 hinted, ju8t a8 the USA
had chclrged with regard to Abalrkor, that tbey believed the
purpose of upgrading t h e ~ e radar8 was to provide ABY battle-
44. k r l i e B Gelb, " Y o s c w Prop0808 to End r Dirpute on Siberia Radar", Wcr York Timer, 29 October 1085, p.1.
capabilities. T h e USA responded that tbese
radars were not for ballirtic missile defense and tbat their 45
modernization was not probibitad under treaty terms,
be extent of the planned US improvement of tbese facilities
raised tbe question of the dividing line between
Mderoization of OXirting rYSte.8 and the creation of radars
that represented a new level O f technology and thus were
errentially oew systems. Tbe problem8 faced by USA and USSR
while trying to implement, Article VI of the ABY Treaty,
showed tbat tbe treaty was not without its flaws,
contradictions and ambiguities.
ABM Treaty and Strategic Defence: In March 1983, most
strikingly, the Reagan Administrrtion announced that it
intended to mount s national rerearch effort directed
towards a nationwide space-based ballistic mirrile defeare
for tbe USA. The Soviet Union immediately took tbe porition
tbat rucb a programme would violate tbe ABM Treaty, Article
I of wbicb rtrter tbat:
45. Por Reagan Administration, reinterpretation roe, "The Treaty and the SDI PrOgraUIe," Testimony by Ambrsrador Paul B Uitee, Special Advimor on Arms Control Matters and Abraham D Safaer, h @ a l Advisor to the State Ikpartwnt before the Sub Conittee on Arms control, Int. Security and Science o f the Boure P o r e i ~ n Affairs - - . . . - -
Committee,' - 12 October 1985, US De~artment -of State, Bureau o f Public Affairs, Current Policy 10.755.
46 each party undertakes not to deploy ABY rystems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide for such a defense, and not to deploy ABY r y s t m u for defense of an individual weapon except as provided for in Article 111 of this Treaty.
47 Article I11 of the ABY Treaty permitted tv3 ABW systems to
be deployed by each country, around their national capitals
and around a single ICBM field. A 1974 protocol to the
treaty restricted each side to a single rite.
Several key treaty ambiguities surrounded the issue to
whether the US SDI programme would violate the ABM
rgreement. Perhaps the most important of these was
contained in Agreed State~aent D of the Treaty. This
provision stated thrt in the event of the emergence of ABM
systems based on "other physical principles" in which
coaponents not foreseen would be subject to discussion
through the Standing Consultative Co~ittee(SCC) and
possibly serve as the basis for amendment to the treaty.
This provision meant that systems based on "other physical
principles" could be puruued only if legitimized by future
amendments to the treaty; otherwise, they would be
46. See tbe ABY Treaty.
47. Ibid.
prohibited under Article I of tbe Treaty. Proponents of the
SDI brd neglected the lrtter rltnerrtive and rdvrnced r more
penisrive interpretrtion, while opponents preferred the
.ore restrictive reading of the trarty.
Otber ~ b i ~ u i t i e s in treaty prOVirion8 brd led to rimilrrly
dirsrging interpretrtion6. Tbe trerty probibited
*development or testing 02 ABY ryatear oe their components,
mbich are rer-brsed air-based, space-brsed, or mobile lrnd-
based." (Artilce V).
Vrs the US SDI progrrame purely r rererrcb programme even if
its ultimate rim mas to produce rn ABY system? Were rome
te:bnolo~ies under development in the 19801, rucb as lreerm,
permitted becruse they mere not prime factor connected with
an ABU system; or probibited becrure they could be
compcaentr of such r cyrtem? Agrin, the treaty provided
little guidance. There rmbiguitier rlloaed an intense
debate to develop within the USA in 1985 and 19136 end
between the USA m d USSR, rr the Reagan sdmiairtrrtion
sought to jurtify its SDI p r o g r a m by reinterpreting ABY
tnaty provision6 to p n i t rererrcb and developrent on
erotic SDI ryrtrmr.
Critics alleged that such interpretrtionr did not reflect 48
the latent or negotiating history of the trerty. lowever,
the ambiguities in the rcturl text of the trerty, Permitted
the Reagan Admi~i~trrti~n to build tomething of r care for
it8 reinterpretation,
S&T I rad Detente: The SALT procerr began at r time when
expectations for broad improvement in US-Soviet relrtionr
were running high. The Nixon-Kisaiger notion of r security
regime recognized the principle that such recurity regimes
were very difficult to achieve unless they were supported by
r network of common interests rad cooperrtive rrrrngements.
Even in retrospect, the principle reems round. The USA and
the Soviet Union hrd managed to avoid war for 25 yerrr in
1969 and r kind of modus vivendi had emerged for maarging
the intense politicrl rivrlry without resorting to war. The
48. Among many critiquer, ree Testimony of John B Rhinelrnder before the Subcommittee on Arms Control Internrtionrl Security rod Science of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Testiaony 24 April 1985. Christopher Prine, "The ABY Trerty : Looking for Loopboler," Bulletin of the Atomic 8cientist8, (Augurt/September 1983), pp.13-16. Gerard Smith, "How The Adminirtrrtion Anended the ABY Treaty," Letter to the Mew York Timer (23 October 1085), TOD Wicker, *Subverting r Treaty," Mew York Times, (25 October 1085), R Jeffry Smith Star Wrrr' Tests and the ABY Treaty,* Scieace ( 5 July
1985), pp.29-31.
tenet8 o f tbe nuclear p a c e are well-8tated by tewis Dunn 49
who said:
The stakes of the Soviet -Imer!can confrontation remained limited even at the height of the Cold la?. Neither country sought to challenge the territorial integrity or political independence, let alone the physical survival of the other. Despite periodic East-lest crises froa the late 19408 to the early 1 W O s over Western Europe'8 political orientation, neither power believed that recourse to military force and the ri8k of escalation to a nuclear exchange mas justified.
Additionally, the Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe, though
reprehensible froa the American point of view, rent
unchallenged. The risks mere Just too great.
litb this 25-year history in mind, Kirsinger and others
developed policies aimed at codific&tion of the rtrtus quo
and the selrch for explicit rules and norms of behavior to
replace the tacit practire of restrrlnt. Patterned
behaviour could generate convergent expectation6 leading to
conventialized behaviour. This dercription mort certainly
fits postwar Soviet and American behaviour. Therefore,
while the preferences were pretty straightforward in SALT,
49. Lewle, A Duan, COntrOlllOg the Bomb, (New York, heatlstb Century Fund, 1982), See also the more detailed explanation o f Jobn k . 1 ~ Gaddis in 'The Long Peace, ' International security. 104, Spring 1886.
it war w r e Complex when it came to detente. In areas of
the world where in areas like the Third World, competition
was bound to continue, the avoidance of war was only one of
several agenda-items. This made the search for a broader
security regime difficult.
Statur of SALT - 1 Trertr: As SALT-I was of r limited
duration of five years and there was the expectation that it
would be replaced by a permanent Trerty, the SALT-I was an
Interim Agreement rather than a formal treaty. The Interim
Agreement formally expired on 20 October 1977. It had
originally been thought that five years would allow
sufficient time to negotiate a more comprehensive agreement.
A t the SALT-I1 trlkr continued beyond this date, both the
USA and Soviet Union pledged to contiae to observe the
Interim Agreement. In Yay 1986, President Rergrn formally
repudiated this political cosoitment to SALT-I. The USSR,
however, upto the beginning of the Bush Administrrtion,
reuined within the SALT-I Treaty limit8.
Succesr of the ABY.Trertp: The ABY Treaty is one of the
most important and rucce8sful arms control agreements to
date. The baric goal of the treaty bad unequirocally been
achieved. Beither power bad deployed a nationvide defenre
agriast etrrtegic ballistic mirriles. As Rorold Brown, the
former SQcretary of Defense bad rightly pur it in a
nutrhell, "Tbe Anti-Blllistic Yirrile Treaty i s the moat 50
substantial a g m e w a t . b i l e neither the ABY Treaty nor
tbe Interim Agreement succeeded in stopping the build-up in
offensive rtrategic forcer tbrt mas underray ia 1872, the
pace and scale of that build-up would have been creator bad
tbe ABY Treaty not cut the possibility of a miss:le defense
race at its start. In 1985, rs James Schleringer, the
former Secretary of Defense, rightly pointed ou:, *The ABY
Treaty has forestrlled rn explosion of otfenrivo development
on both cides. Back in the 19606, when the E.>viet Union
first started to deploy defenses around Yorcow, the United
States government war examining expanding offrctive forcer
up to 40-50,000 reentry bodies or warhead8 12 order to
penetrate those defenses. The ABY Treaty brr been the 5 1
cornerstone of restraint for the lart 13 pc~rs." By
averting a defensive rod offensive buildup, the ABY Trerty
bad contributed rubstantirlly to the rtrjility and
predictability of the rtrategic balance. In tbt rbrence of
tbe ABM Treaty, tbe rheer economic costs moult bare been
rtaggering. The US A n 8 Control and Dirarmawnt Agency baa
50. Ar quoted in Matthew ~um'r, loundatico for the Future : ?be ABM Treaty rod llationrl k c u i t , (Arar Control Aarociation, Varhington, D.C.. 1881), i . 1 7 .
conservatively estimated that one hundred billion dollars
had been avoided by Preventing an offense-defenre race over
the last two decades. The SALT-I Treaty succeeded a8 the
firrt bilateral arms control agreement between the two
powers.
TRE SIGII#G OF SALT I1 AND ITS MAIN PROVISIONS
The SALT 11 agreement in its completed version was signed by
President J i m y Carter and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev
in Vienna on 18 June 1979, Carter then had it transmitted
to the US Senate on 22 June 1979, for its advice and coneent
to ratification. SALT I1 was an extremely detailed and
technical document which had 19 Articles and nearly 100
explanatory 'Agreed Statements', and 'Common Underrtaadings'
which attempted to leave as few loopholes and ambiguities as
possible.
The SALT I1 Treaty, had it been ratified, would have
provided for: an equal aggregate limit on the number of
strategic number delivery vehicles - ICBM and SLBY
launcherr, beavy bombers, and air-to-air rurface ballirtic
mlrsiles ( A s ) . Tbis ceiling would hare been 2400 as
&(red at the Vladirostok S u a i t of 1974 between the leaders
of tbe two countrier. The ceiling would have been lowered
t o 2250 at the end of 1981; an equal aggregate limit of 1200
on the total number o f launchers of MIRVed ballistic
rnirsiles and heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles;
and an equal aggregate limit of 820 on launchers of MIRVed
ICBMs.
In addition to these numerical limits, the agreement would
have included: a ban on construction of additional fixed
ICBM launcherr, and on increases in the aumher of fixed
heavy ICBM launchers, a ban on heavy mobile ICBM launchers
and on launchers of beavy SLBMs and ASBMs; a ban on flight-
testing or deployment of new types of ICBMs, with an
exception of one new type o f light ICBM for each side, a ban
o a increasing the number of warheads on security types of
ICBMs and a limit of ten warheads on the one new type of
ICBM permitted to each party, a limit of 14 warheads on
SLBMs and 10 warheads on ASBMs. The number of long-range
cruise aissiles for heavy bombers would have been limited to
a n average of 28; and the number of long-range cruise
missiles for beavg bombers of existing types would have been
limited to 20; ceilings on the launch-weight and throw-
weight of strategic ballistic misrile and A ban on the
cooversion of light ICBM launcher-to-launcbrr of heavy ICBM6
- a ban on the Soviet 85-10 1 C W ; a ban on rapid relord ICBM
systems, a ban on certain new types of strateaic offennive
systems which were technologically feasible, but which had
not yet been developed. Such systems included long range
ballistic missiles on surface ships, and ballistic and
cruise missile llunchers on the seabeds; advance
notificatioa of certain ICBM test launcher; and an agreed
data base for systems included in various SALT-limited
crtegories. The Treaty included detailed definitions of
limited systems, provisions to enhance verification, a ban
on CirCUmVentiOn Of provisions of the agreement and a
provision outlining the duties of the SCC in connection with
the SALT I1 Treaty. The duration of the Treaty would have
been upto 1985. SALT 11, like SALT I, provided for the
verfication of compliance by National Technical Means (NTU),
In addition to extending the SALT I provisions prohibiting
interference with and concealment from NTM, SALT I1 included
a specific ban on encryption of missile telemetry when it
impeded verification of treaty compliance. Another
cooperative measure required aircraft with different
aissions (i.e., ALCY carrying bombers versus ordinary
bombers to be distinguishable through NTM by Functionllly
Related Observable Differences (PRODS). In addition to the
basic provisions and explanatory details o f the treaty, SALT
I1 also contained a protocol and a 'Joint Statement of
Principler'. Tbe protocol, which was to bave remained in
force until the end of 1981 would bave temporily banned the
deplopePt of mobile I C B M , SLCUS and GLCYs with ranges over
500 MS. The ultimate disposition of tbese systems was in
dispute during the SALT I1 negotiations and the protocol
delayed their deployment in order to allow some time for
discwrsion o f these systems in follow-on talks., The Joint
statement Committed tbe USA and USSR to seek 'significant
and substantial reductions' in follow-on negotiations on
nuclear arms for a SALT 111 agreement.
Status of SALT I1 Treatl: The US Senate resisted tbe SALT
I1 Treaty much more than it did the SALT I Interim Agreement
and the ABY Treaty. Its critics challenged both treaty's
basic provisions and also the broader relationship of the
Carter Administrations's Arms Control Policy to US foreign
and defense policies. After the Soviet Union's 1979
Afghanistan invasion, President Carter asked the Senate to
postpone consideration, but in March 1980, he pledged that
the USA would abide by the Treaty'r terms, provided the
Soviet UnFon did likewise. During Ronald Reagan's election
camprign, b e opposed the treaty and called it 'fatally
f a In 1981, Reagan formally announced that the USA
did mot intend t o ratify SALT I1 but pledged not to undercut
it i f the USSR showed equal restraint. Thereafter, US
adherence t o the treaty ceared to be a requireaent of
, n t e r n ~ t i ~ n a l law and instead became a question of political
cornmi tment.
The Soviet Union adopted the same no-undercut pblicy but
made it clear that it would not cut its forces to the
aggregate limit of 2500 (to have been reduced to 2250 by the
end of 1981) Strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The
Soviets claimed that this provision, which would have
required sf gnif icant Soviet force reductions was
specifically tied in the treaty to the entry into force of
this treaty. Although not specifically required to do so,
:he Soviet Union also maintained that it had kept it's
internationalforces at or below its June 1979 level of 2504.
The Reagan administration announced in Yay 1986 that in
response to alleged Soviet violations of SALT 11, the USA
was terminating its commitment to the "SALT structure". The
L'SA remained in tecnical compliance with SALT I 1 until
Sovember 1986, when the ongoing conversion of 8-52 aircraft
to carry cruise missiles put tbe USA over the 1320 limit on
the number o f MIRVed missiles and ALCY carrying bombers.
The USSR too, on its part, indicated that it intended to
continue to abide by the SALT I 1 limits, and until 1989, the
evidence indicated that it had remained within the sublimits
of the treaty.
~ f f e c t s of SALT I and SALT 11 on Strategic Nuclear Weapons
00th the SALT accords are historic landmarks in the sphere
,f strategic nuclear weaponry. For the first time, USA and
~ S S R agreed on reductions in both offensive or defensive
strrtegic weapons that were of the state-of-the art
technology, thus, halting to a certain extent, the mad
spiralling nuclear arms race between the two countries.
Both countries had realised that they possessed in their
respective nuclear arsenals enough weapons to wipe each
other out and also the world many times over - they vere on
a MAD mode and had an overkill arsenal, With the
development of eacb new offensive or defensive strategic
weapon, the other country would take counter-measures to
both acquire that technology and also to admit the new
seapons by counter-acting its capabilities. Thus, the arms
race threatened to become a never - ending cycle towards
vertical proliferation unless serious steps were taken to
reduce or halt this process. The USA and USSR recognlred
this need and through the signing of the SALT accords, they
took step8 t o halt the dangerous arms race which was eating
into a major portion of the economy - finance which would
have been better utilired for other a8pectr for the welfare
of the country's citizens. The accordr were ruccerrful in
halting the MAD arms-race to a certrin extent. The
provision o f NTY o f verification were very useful for future
,ccords which would have even more intensive forms of
~crification. Finally, the SALT treaties laid the
fcundation for more comprehensive forms of future strategic
nuclear rccorde.