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CHAPTER V
JINNAH AND THE FORMATION OF PAKISTAN
Cripps Proposals
After the Lahore Resolution, Jinnah tried to win British
sympathy by offering the League's support for the war, provided the
British would not succumb to the Congress pressure. He also
reminded the British that the League would revolt if the Congress was
placated. The League's policy was undoubtedly to ensure that an
independent Pakistan was created at the same time that India should
get her freedom. On this occasion, and in all the subsequent
negotiations with the British Government and the Congress, Jinnah
advanced three basic demands : (1) the League should be regarded as
the sole spokesman of Muslim India; (2) the creation of Pakistan as an
independent state should be accepted in principle; and (3) in any
interim government that was formed, the Muslims, represented by the
League should have equal representation with the Hindus if the
Congress came in, otherwise they should have a majority of seats,
since the main burden and responsibility would be borne by the
Muslims in that case.1 Jinnah's strategy was successful and the
Viceroy stated that "Britain would not contemplate transfer of their
199
responsibilities to any system of government whose authority is
directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national
life."2
The Congress saw in these statements the Britain's intention to
hold India in bondage indefinitely. The Congress ministers` in all the
provinces resigned in October 1939, and Gandhi started the individual
Civil Disobedience Movement on 17 October 1940. Meanwhile the
Japanese attack on Pearl Habour in December 1941, brought the war
to India's door. Soon the British government sent Sir Stafford Cripps,
Lord Privy Seal of the War Cabinet, to make an all - out effort to
enlist the support of India in waging the war. Sir Stafford Cripps
came with the proposals came to be called Cripps Offer. The Offer
provided for Indian independence after the war and conceded the right
of self-determination to the provincial units. This meant that the
provinces were free to remain within India or opt out of the Indian
Union. Thus it also meant that the provinces where Muslims were in a
majority could presumably form their own federation - Pakistan - in
due course. V.P Menon says that "it was really the death - blow to
Indian unity."3 The Offer was rejected by the INC and the Muslim
League for different reasons. The Congress felt that the acceptance
beforehand of the novel principle of non - accession for a province
200
was a severe blow to the conception of Indian unity and it would
create difficulties in the way of the Indian states merging themselves
into an Indian Union.4 On the otherhand, the League was not ready to
compromise on the question of creating an independent Pakistan. It
felt that though the possibility of Pakistan was recognized by
implication, the proposals embodying the fundamentals were not open
to any modification and therefore no alternative proposals were
invited. In view of this rigidity of the attitude, the proposals were
unacceptable to the League. Moreover, the proposal to establish a
single constitution - making body with the primary object of creating
one Indian Union relegated Pakistan to the realm of remote
possibility.5 Thus both the Congress and the League turned down the
proposals.
Jinnah - Churchill: Understanding and Collaboration
With the Japanese threatening to invade India, the Congress
could not remain a passive spectator to such a possibility. At the same
time the British remained highly obstinate, and Jinnah deliberately
obstructive. Gandhi, convinced that the British presence in India
would render communal settlement impossible, realized the urgency
of the two communities coming together when the British power came
201
to an end in India. Gandhi's efforts to win over Jinnah in the past
several times ended in failure. In fact Jinnah had been in constant
touch with Churchill who considered the Hindu - Muslim feud as the
bulwark of British rule in India.6 It was only when the Japanese threat
loomed large on the horizon that Churchill sent Sir Stafford Cripps to
India. The Congress rejection of the Cripp's proposals pleased him so
much so that he told the British public as well as the American
officialdom that Congress had been out to sabotage the war efforts and
they were sympathetic to the Allies.
Jinnah aligned himself with Churchill in the vilification
campaign against the Congress.
The Congress retaliated strongly against this. It passed, on 8
August 1942, the well - known Quit India resolution, demanding
immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal by the British
regardless of the consequences.7 The Muslim League deplored the
decision arrived at by the AICC and opined that the movement was
directed "not only to coerce the British government into handing over
power to a Hindu oligarchy and thus disabling themselves from
carrying out their moral obligations and pledges given to the Muslims
and other sections of people of India from time to time, but also to
202
force Muslims to submit and surrender to the Congress terms and
dictation"8 The League further described it as not only anti - British
but also anti-Muslim, and exhorted the Muslims to abstain from any
participation in the movement and requested the help of the
government to suppress it. This pleased the British so much so that it
brought about an unholy alliance between the British and the League,
and the Viceroy facilitated the installation of League governments in
Assam and Sind.9
In this context it is to be noted that the persons who contributed
in no small measure to the breakdown of relations between the INC
and the British were Winston Churchill and Lord Linlithgow. It was
really wrong on the part of Linlithgow to declare that India was ipso
facto at war against the Axis powers when Congress was ruling
provinces in India. Churchill's overbearing, prejudicial and biased
attitude brought immense hardships to the people of India. He
denounced the INC as a Hindu party dominated by the Hindu
priesthood and caucus. Lord Amery, who was Secretary of State for
India from 1940 to 1945 under Churchill, said that when it came to the
idea of giving anybody self - government, he was unreasonable and
silly.10 It requires to be noted that Churchill and the other members of
the Conservative Party refused to consider efforts made by the British
203
Labour Party and the Indian National Congress (INC) at constitutional
advance.11 When it was pointed out that the dominionhood proposed
by Lord Irwin was in line with the enlightened traditions of the Raj,
Churchill could not control his anger. He was of the opinion that if
self - government or dominion status was granted to India, it would
revert to fierce racial and religious dissension. It was but Britain
which saved India from barbarism, internecine war and tyranny.12
Amery records that during one of his talks with Churchill, the latter
burst out: "I hate Indians. They are a beastly people with a beastly
religion."13 His insensitivity and contempt for the political aspirations
was incredible, when even imperialist conservatives like Leo Amery,
Lord Zetland and Lord Linlithgo were in favour of a constitutional
settlement in India.
Gandhi- Jinnah Talks
Gandhi, Azad, Nehru, Patel and hundreds of their colleagues
were arrested within hours of Congress proclaiming Quit India.
Rajagopalachri, who did not participate in the movement, was spared.
He proposed a formula to end Congress-League deadlock wherein he
suggested that the Congress should accept the League's demand for
self - determination of Muslim - majority areas and reach an amicable
204
settlement with it.14 The All- - India Congress Committee rejected
this resolution, 120 voting against and 15 for it and this resulted in his
resignation from the Committee. Nevertheless, Rajagopalachari, two
years later, again made a move for a Congress - League
understanding, and a correspondence followed between Gandhi and
Jinnah. Gandhi in his correspondence conceded that the claims of the
North-Western and Eastern parts of India in which Muslims were in
an absolute majority to set up two sovereign independent states,
provided it is ascertained through the votes of the adult population of
the areas or through some equivalent method. At the same time the
Treaty should contain provisions for safeguarding the rights of the
minorities in the two states, and also it should provide for the efficient
and satisfactory administration of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal
Communications, Customs, Commerce and the like which should
continue as matters of common interest between the contracting
parties. After reaching an agreement on these aspects, the two parties
would decide upon a common course of action for the attainment of
independence of India.15 Jinnah could not accept these proposals
because of two reasons: 1) He wanted to incorporate the whole of
Bengal and the Punjab in Pakistan, though the Muslims in these
provinces had only a narrow overall majority, and were a minority in
205
many districts. He feared that a plebiscite of all inhabitants would
have gone against the very idea of Pakistan, and so he demanded that
only the Muslims should vote at the plebiscite. 2) He wanted a
completely sovereign Pakistan, with no restrictions whatsoever on its
authority.16 Thanks to the gulf of difference in approach of the two
leaders, the talks turned out to be a failure. However, the fact that
Gandhi had gone to Jinnah's house fourteen times increased the
importance of Jinnah, and it added to his Muslim following too.
The Simla Conference
Gandhi- Jinnah talks were held when Lord Wavell was the
Viceroy. With the change of fortunes of the war in Europe in favour of
Britain and allies, Churchill's labour ministers and more importantly,
the American President Franklin Roosevelt advised Churchill to be
more accommodative. Thus on the expiry of the extended term of
Lord Linlithgow, Lord Wavell was appointed as the Viceroy with the
understanding that the new incumbent would adopt a conciliatory
approach towards the Congress. Lord Wavell had hoped that Gandhi-
Jinnah talks would not end on a note of complete futility.17 The
breakdown of Gandhi-Jinnah talks convinced him of the urgent
necessity of the intervention of the British government for evolving a
206
solution to the Indian problem. The position at the warfront was that
Germany would be beaten by the end of the year and the war with
Japan would end about six months later. In the circumstances, Indian
political question required urgent attention, and the promises made to
India redeemed. The end of the war would result in "general
demobilization, dispersal of labour from war industries, and the
winding up of war establishments, involving large-scale
unemployment and discontent".18 Wavell now set about the task of
inducing the Indian leaders to enter the Central government. In these
matters, all the Governors too nursed the same opinion as that held by
Wavell.
Wavell expressed his opinions in his letter to the Prime
Minister, which was, infact, a dialogue with the War Cabinet about
what he termed as the future of India.19 He reminded Churchill that
"we cannot put back the clock and must deal with existing conditions
and pledges; and am clear that our present attitude is aggravating the
mischief".20 Wavell felt that the failure of Gandhi-Jinnah talks created
a very favourable situation for his Majesty's Government to take the
initiative in the matter. This led to the Viceroy and his team going to
London for discussions which in turn led to the convening of the
Simla Conference in June 1945.
207
To facilitate the participation of the Congress, the members of
its Working Committee were released. The main objective of the
conference was to form a new Executive Council which would
represent the important communities represented by 'caste Hindus' and
Muslims in equal proportion. It would be an entirely Indian Council,
except for the Viceroy and the Commander-in-chief, who would retain
his position as War Member. Even the portfolio of the External affairs
would be placed in charge of an Indian member of the Council, so far
as the interests of the British India are concerned.21 The British
Cabinet had given its consent to conduct the conference of various
leaders representing the broad spectrum of Indian political opinion.
The Working Committee of the Muslim League held from July
6-14, 1945 at Simla, considered the letter from Viceroy's private
secretary to Jinnah, asking him to send him a list of members of the
Muslim League who should be included in the proposed Executive
Council. Jinnah in his letter to the Viceroy dated July 7, 1945 said that
"the Muslim members of the proposed Executive Council should be
chosen from the Muslim League, subject to a confidential discussion
between Your Excellency and the President of the Muslim League,
before they are finally recommended by you to the Crown for
appointment." 22 Wavell could not accept Jinnah's plea and he wrote to
208
Jinnah that he could not give him a guarantee that all the Muslim
members of the proposed new council should necessarily be members
of the Muslim League. 23 Jinnah refused to send a list of names unless
such a guarantee was given and wrote to Wavell that it was impossible
for the League to depart from its fundamental principles. Jinnah stuck
to his stand and pointed out that it was impossible for the Muslim
League to co-operate unless (1) all the Muslim members were from
the League and (2) the Governor-General's power of veto were
reinforced by a special safeguard for the Muslims within the council.
For instance, the provision that decisions objected by the Muslims
should not be taken except by a clear two third majority. 24
The Viceroy, who could not accept either of the conditions,
declared that the conference had failed and he made it clear that "the
responsibility for the failure is mine".25 The conference thus
foundered on the League's claim that it alone represented the Muslims
and that it alone had the right to nominate Muslims to the Executive
Council. Jinnah challenged the national character of the Congress and
described the Congress as a party of the Hindus. On the other hand,
the Congress felt that as a national party it could put forward a panel
of names consisting of Muslims, Hindus, Parsis, Christians and others.
Jinnah then put forward the argument that the League and the
209
Congress had an entirely different angle of vision. "The Wavell
proposals ---- called upon us to make the severest sacrifice. If we
accept this arrangement, the Pakistan issue will be shelved and put in
cold storage indefinitely, whereas the Congress will have secured …
a clear road for then advance towards securing Hindu national
independence of India." 26
Jinnah's demand for 50 percent representation for Muslims and
parity between Muslim and non Muslim members proved to be
another obstacle in the path of a settlement. Jinnah held that all the
other minorities, such as the Scheduled Castes, Sikhs and Christians
had the same goal as the Congress. Their goal was and could not be
different from or otherwise than that of a united India. Moreover they
were, ethnically and culturally, very closely knitted to Hindu society.
27 Jayakar commented on Jinnah's demand of parity between Muslims
and all other interests put together, ie., 50 for Muslims and 50 for the
rest of India when parity between caste Hindus and Muslims had
already been given, as a mathematical monstrosity that 27 equals 73. 28
In fact Jinnah in this case discounted the parity formula which had
been universally recognized as a very big concession to a minority at
the expense of the majority. He justified his position by arguing that
the Muslims would still be in a minority in the Executive Council for
210
the representatives of the other minorities were likely to vote with the
Hindus than with the Muslims on matters on which Hindus and
Muslims might differ. 29 Tribune in its editorial asserted that the
responsibility for the failure of the Simla Conference rested with only
one man, Jinnah. The British newspaper Daily Sketch said that "the
immediate cause of the failure of the negotiations ought to be laid at
the door of Mr. Jinnah". The News Chronicle also expressed the same
view: "The responsibility for the failure of Simla was not Lord
Wavell's. It was Mr. Jinnah's and Mr. Jinnah's alone"30 Hindu also
expressed the same point: "We endorse the well-nigh universal verdict
that the Muslim League's unbending and persistently negative attitude
has been solely responsible for the breakdown of negotiations. 31
Amery suggested to Viceroy that the best course open now
would be to test the representative character of each party by holding
elections to the provincial and Central legislatures. Wavell had
discussion on this matter with Lord Pethick-Lawrence, who replaced
Amery as Secretary of State for India. After that he held discussions
with the Indian Committee of the Cabinet, chaired by the Prime
Minister Wavell, who recognized that procrastination would be
dangerous, and that the loyalty of the Indian soldiers and officers
could no longer be taken for granted, took the immediate step of
211
ordering the elections to the provincial and central legislatures. The
Congress demanded that the election should be on the basis of adult
suffrage. But under presure the Congress gave up that end. Nehru,
Patel and Azad failed to realize that by whipping up the religious
frenzy the Muslim League would sweep the poll in the reserved
constituencies, which would confirm his claim of being the sole
spokesman for his community. The results only confirmed what had
been apparent during the previous few years. In the Central
Assembly, the League captured every seat that was reserved for
Muslims. Congress captured all the remaining elective seats. In the
Provincial Assembles, the Congress obtained an absolute majority in
all the Hindu-majority provinces and in the Muslim-majority
provinces of the NWFP.
The Muslim League captured 428 out of the 492 Muslim seats
in the Provincial Assemblies, as compared with the 109 it had won in
the elections of 1936. The Congress leadership succumbed to hold
fresh elections on restricted franchise which helped Jinnah. Jinnah at
the same time used every communal device to win elections.
The Congress proceeded to form ministries in all the eight
provinces where it was in the majority. Two provinces, such as
Assam and the NWFP, claimed for Pakistan also included in this list.
212
In Bengal, Sind and the Punjab, the Muslim League was the largest
party but it did not have absolute majority. In Bengal, the Muslim
League formed the government with the support of independents and
Europeans. In Sind, though G.M. Syed could muster a non-Muslim
League majority, the Governor asked the Muslim League to form the
government. In Punjab, a coalition was formed with Khizr Hyat Khan
as premier supported by the Congress and the Sikhs. This showed that
though the Muslim League had won almost all Muslim seats in the
provinces, it could not form a government in any Muslim-majority
province. In spite of the fact that the Muslim votes were cast on the
issue of Pakistan, the League could not hope to form the government.
Jinnah had to do something more drastic to gain Pakistan for Muslims.
The Cabinet Mission
Clement Attlee, the new British Prime Minister, was determined
to part with India in friendship and invite it to join the British
Commonwealth of Nations as an equal partner. He declared that the
Britain would hand over power to Indian representatives at the latest
by June 1948. With this end in view, he sent to India a special
Mission of Cabinet Ministers which included Lord Pethick -
Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Cripps, President
of the Board of Trade, and Mr. A.V. Alexander, First Lord of the
213
Admiralty.
The announcement of the Cabinet Mission was welcomed by all
parties in Parliament. It also brought about a sudden improvement in
the atmosphere in India. The Congress advised its followers to trust
the mission, have patience and keep the peace. The Muslim League
was suspicious as the pronouncements did not mention the issue of
Pakistan. The Viceroy, it must be noted, worked with the mission
throughout their stay in India. In effect he was a member of the
mission. The mission in the first three weeks after its arrival,
interviewed a large number of public men and women, including party
leaders - provincial as well as all-India representatives of minorities
and special interests, princes and their ministers. What really
mattered, however, was the issue between the Congress insistence on
the unity of India and the Muslim League demand for Pakistan. So
the Mission had to carry on negotiations almost exclusively with these
two parties.
The League wanted a Pakistan comprising the six provinces of
Assam, Bengal, Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan, although it
would include large areas in which the Muslims were in a minority. It
contented that the areas in which the Muslims in the minority should
be included to make Pakistan administratively and economically
214
workable. The partition on this basis would not solve the question of
communal minorities, as the Pakistan thus formed would include a
very considerable proportion of non-Muslims. The Hindus and Sikhs
of these areas could use every argument which the Muslims were
using against their inclusion in a Hindu - dominated India. The only
alternative thus was to divide Punjab and Bengal and confine Pakistan
to those areas of the provinces in which the Muslims constituted a
majority. This would bring about a Pakistan in which its two parts
would be separated by some seven or eight hundred miles. 32
The Muslim League wanted to accept the principle of Pakistan
unequivocally before its participation either in an interim government
or in constitution making machinery. On the other hand, the Congress
was for taking immediate steps for forming an interim government
and a Constituent Assembly. The Congress was for 'Quit India', while
the League was for 'Divide and Quit'. The Congress believed that a
solution would come about if the British was out of the way. Some of
the League leaders were proclaiming their readiness to shed the last
drop of blood to make Pakistan a reality. Such was the distrust
between the two parties that the possibility of an agreement between
them sank almost to zero.
In this context, the Mission placed before the Presidents of the
215
two organizations, a proposal which might lead to an agreement. It
was as follows: "A Union Government dealing with the following
subjects: Foreign affairs, Defence and Communications. There will be
two groups of provinces, the one of the predominantly Hindu
provinces and the other of the predominantly Muslim provinces,
dealing with all other subjects which the provinces in the respective
groups desire to be dealt with in common. The provincial
governments will deal with all other subjects and will have all the
residurary sovereign rights." 33 Both the Congress and the Muslim
League were invited to send four negotiators to meet the Mission and
the Viceroy together to discuss the possibility of an agreement on this
basis. The Congress thereupon nominated Abdul Kalam Azad,
Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The
League negotiators were Jinnah, Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan,
Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan and Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar.
Two days after the commencement of the Conference, the
Mission submitted the proposed points for agreement between them.
It envisaged a constitutional structure in three-tiers: Union, Groups
and Provinces. The Union would deal with Foreign Affairs, Defence,
Communications, Fundamental Rights and would have the powers to
obtain for itself the finances required for these subjects. The
216
legislatures of the Union would be composed of equal proportions
from the Muslim-majority provinces and from the Hindu-majority
provinces, together with representatives of the States. All the
remaining powers would vest in the provinces, but groups of
provinces might be formed which may set up their own Executives
and Legislatures. And the Groups might determine the provincial
subjects which they desire to take in common. The Constitution of the
Union and the Groups would provide that any province might by a
majority vote of its Legislative Assembly call for a reconsideration of
the terms of the Constitution after an initial period of 10 years and at
10 yearly intervals thereafter. 34
The Mission hoped that if the Muslim-majority provinces were
able to group themselves into organizations, they need not fear that
their separate culture and way of life would be submerged under a
Hindu majority. The scheme would give them advantages of Pakistan
without the disadvantages inherent in the division of India. As for
Congress, the Mission hoped that Congress would consent to the
formation of Groups, as a weak union was far better than the
vivisection of the country.
Though both parties had been prepared to make considerable
concessions, each was careful not to compromise its own fundamental
217
principles. The Congress, which initially opposed the formation of
groups, now was prepared to allow the formation of groups, provided
it would not impair the strong federal union it was bent upon
achieving. Moreover the Congress was inflexibly opposed the
question of parity between the Hindu and Muslim provinces in the
Union Legislature and Executive. The Congress proposed that a single
Constituent Assembly should first draw up the Union Constitution,
and after that the provinces might form groups to decide the
Provincial Constitutions for their group and, if they wished, a Group
Constitution.35 The Muslim League, on the other hand, insisted that
there should be two constitution - making bodies. Then the
constitution - making bodies of the Hindu and Muslim India would sit
together to set up a Union dealing with Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Communications necessary for defence. It would also decide two
points about the Union-whether the Union should have a legislature or
not and the method of providing the Union with finance. The League
refused to contemplate a union with power to impose taxation. It
further demanded that "no decision, legislative, executive or
administrative, shall be taken by the Union in regard to any matter of
controversial nature, except by a majority of three-fourths".36
Since the negotiations with party leaders did not result in an
218
agreed solution, they put forward their own suggested solution, laying
down the principles and procedure for the framing of India's
constitution through a duly elected Constituent Assembly, and a
scheme for the formation of an Interim Government at the Centre. It
was a compromise between the Pakistan and United India ideologies,
and it was as follows:
(1) There should be a union of India, embracing both British India
and the States which should deal with the following subjects : Foreign
Affairs, Defence, and Communications; and should have the powers
necessary to raise the finances required for the above subjects.
(2) The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature constituted
from British Indian and States' representatives. Any question raising a
major communal issue in the Legislature should require for its
decision a majority of the representatives present and voting of each
of the two major communities as well as a majority of all the members
present and voting.
(3) All subjects other than the Union subjects and all residuary powers
should vest in the Provinces.
(4) The States will retain all subjects and powers other than those
ceded to the Union.
(5) Provinces should be free to form groups with Executives and
219
Legislatures, and each group could determine the Provincial subjects
to be taken in common.
(6) The Constitutions of the Union and of the groups should contain a
provision whereby any Province could by a majority vote of its
Legislative Assembly call for a reconsideration of the terms of the
Constitution after an initial period of ten years and at ten-yearly
intervals thereafter. 37
To meet the Muslim aspirations, there would be below the
Union, a sub-federation of three groups: Group A consisting of the
Provinces not claimed for Pakistan, section B of the Punjab, the
NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan, and section C of Bengal and Assam.
Assam was added despite the fact that it did not have a Muslim
majority. The powers of governance and legislation were vested in
these groups with a view to appeasing Jinnah and giving him the
essence of Pakistan. This was a long - term scheme. Integral to it was
the short- term scheme for the formation of an interrim government.
The initial reception of the scheme was favourable.
Gandhi stated that it was the best document the British government
could have produced in the circumstances. The Mission had come all
the way from England to devise the easiest and the quickest method of
ending the British Rule.38 Congress also spoke almost on similar
220
lines. Gandhi had some doubts regarding the grouping of the
provinces but Cripps told him that as the contents of their plan were in
their final form they should be accepted or rejected as a whole. Jinnah,
having realized that the British meant to quit India whether there was
agreement with League and Congress, or not, told Woodrow Wyatt,
Private secretary to Cripps, that the British should remain as the
binding force in the Indian Centre for some 15 years and deal with
defence and foreign affairs for Pakistan and Hindustan consulting the
Prime Ministers of each State."39 The Mission, despite the rumblings
within the Congress and the League, hoped it could bring the two
parties to an agreement.
The Congress and the Muslim League, after analyzing the
various aspects of the Mission's statement, accepted it with
reservations. The Congress insisted on a strong centre, and was not
in favour of the groupings of provinces which were given most of the
powers. On the other hand, the League found in the groupings the
fulfillment of their aspirations. Jinnah, however, was distressed at the
fact that there was no parity for the League with the Congress at the
centre. As far as the interim government was concerned, he was not
ready to compromise on two points: 1) there should be parity between
the Congress and the League, and (2) as far as the nomination of the
221
Muslim members was concerned, he should have the sole right to
nominate them. The Mission was not ready to submit to these two
demands of Jinnah.
Though the Congress accepted the Mission Plan, some of its
followers stood in the way of its acceptance. The inclusion of North
West Frontier Province, a stronghold of the Congress, in group B and
Assam, not a Muslim- majority province, in Group C invited
objections from them. The inclusion of Assam in group C was
opposed by the local leaders of Assam headed by Gopinath Bardolai.
This brought about a change in the attitude not only of Gandhi but
also of Nehru and Patel. Their opposition to the inclusion of Assam in
Group C countermanded the provision of grouping. Jinnah and his
men accepted the Mission Plan just because they could convince their
followers that the grouping of provinces in the north-west and north-
east would give them ample scope for converting these areas into
Pakistan. In fact both the Congress and the Muslim League were not
at all sincere in their acceptance of the plan. Azad alone was positive
and he held that the question of Indian freedom had at last been settled
by negotiation and agreement and not by methods of violence and
conflict.40
No sooner had Nehru taken over as Congress President from
222
Azad, he brought about a change in the hopeful atmosphere his
predecessor Azad had created. Nehru declared that the Congress had
made no commitment to the plan of the Cabinet Mission except to go
into the Constituent Assembly. If the British tried to impose the
treaty, the Congress would tear up the treaty. As regards grouping,
the big probability was that there would be no grouping. Section A
would definitely decide against grouping. There was 4 to 1 chance of
the NWFP deciding against grouping. It was highly likely that Assam
would also decide against grouping with Bengal. "This grouping
business approached from any point of view does not get on at all".41
Nehru's reaction was quite uncalled for. Even Patel felt that he
should have exercised circumspection. Jinnah, having felt betrayed,
told the Mission that he could not consult the Congress anymore.
Jinnah saw Nehru's statement as indicative of the militant Congress
designs. He felt that the Congress by virtue of its majority in the
Constituent Assembly, would modify the plan as it pleased, and thus
jeopardize Muslim interests. Azad felt that all his efforts were
rendered futile by Nehru's statement. In the light of these
developments, Azad felt that a meeting of the Working Committee
must be held immediately to review the situation, and accordingly the
committee met on August 8. In the Working Committee, Azad pointed
223
out that it was wrong to say that Congress was free to modify the plan
as it pleased.42 The Congress Working Committee (CWC) now passed
a resolution assuring the League that Congress was not at all against
grouping. Its objection was confined to the contention that a province
should not be forced into entering a group. Jinnah, thereupon, alleged
that the Congress was always out to hoodwink the Muslims. They
agreed to one thing and went back on it as soon as it did not suit them.
Jinnah called a meeting of the Council of the League which called
upon the Muslim nation to stand to a man behind their sole
representative and authoritative organization, the All-India Muslim
League (AIML), and to be ready for every sacrifice. The Council also
directed the Working Committee "to prepare forthwith a programme
of direct action to carry out the policy enunciated above and to
organize the Muslims for the coming struggle to be launched as and
when necessary".43 The League put the whole blame on the Congress.
It stated that the Muslim India had exhausted without success all
efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Indian problem by
compromise and constitutional means, while the Congress was bent
upon setting up Caste-Hindu Raj in India with the connivance of the
British.44
224
The Interim Government
The Direct Action Day witnessed murder, arson, rape and
looting, especially in Calcutta which witnessed the worst massacres.
By calling 'Direct Action', Jinnah had abandoned the constitutional
methods by which he always swore. The Suhrawardy-led League -
dominated coalition ministry did nothing to prevent the massacre in
which thousands of innocent Hindus and Muslims lost their lives. Its
repercussions were felt in neighbouring Bihar. There the Hindus
resorted to a virtual genocide of Muslims. Statistics revealed that
more Muslims were killed than Hindus.45 Had Gandhi not come to
their rescue, more Muslims would have been killed.
Wavell was appalled at the spectacle of communal violence that
he witnessed when he visited some of the riot-affected areas. He
decided that as long as he was the Viceroy of India, he would do all in
his power to prevent any more massacres of that kind. He would be
abdicating his responsibilities if he did not make a supreme effort to
bring the two communities, Hindu and Muslim, together and persuade
them that working together was the only sure way to freedom.46 He
decided to put into effect the form of the interim government which
was the short-term part of the Cabinet Mission's Plan. The Congress
claimed that it had accepted long-term plan and as such entitled to
225
form the interim government. It insisted that as the League rejected
the long term plan and embarked on the Direct Action, it was
disqualified from entrusting with power. Wavell believed that law
and order could not be brought under control without League's
participation in the interim government.
Jinnah, however, refused to join the interim governments
unless and until two of his conditions were fulfilled. One, parity of the
League with the Congress, and two, League should alone have the
right to nominate Muslim members. Wavell told Jinnah that he could
not accept those demands. Attlee asked Wavell not to lose time and
instal an interim government without delay, though it meant the non-
participation of the League. Wavell asked Nehru to bring a team into
the interim ministry. Early in September an interim government came
into being, with Nehru as Vice-president. Among the Congress
nominees were a Congress Muslim and two independent Muslims.
When the new members of the interim government assumed office,
the Leaguers throughout India hoisted flags on their houses and places
of business.
However the League could not stand aside while the Congress
consolidated its power through the interim government. Jinnah soon
made discussions and correspondence with Wavell and Jawaharlal
226
Nehru on the conditions for the League's entry into the government.
The major points at issue were : the right of Congress to nominate a
'Nationalist Muslim' to one of its quota of seats, the method of settling
communal issues, and the distribution of portfolios. Nehru said that
"the Congress has the right to appoint a Muslim out of its quota ….
The Congress position in regard to the Nationalist Muslims and the
smaller minorities should not be challenged by you".47 Lord Wavell
supported the views of Jawaharlal Nehru to the extent of insisting that
each party must be equally free to nominate its own representatives.48
However, League decided to accept the offer and put forward five
names : Liaquat Ali Khan (Finance), I.I. Chundrigar (Commerce),
Abdur Rab Nishtar (Communication, Post and Air), Ghazanfar Ali
Khan (Health) and Jogendra Nath Mandal (Legislative). The
inclusion of a scheduled caste Hindu belonging to Ambedkar's
organization, Jogendras Nath Mandal, was intended to challenge the
right of the Congress to speak for the untouchables. It was infact a
retaliation for the Congress insistence on keeping one of its Muslims
in the government.
At the time League joined the interim government, Jinnah had
promised to summon the League Council for formal acceptance of
Mission's statement of 16 May and the Muslim League's entry into the
227
interim government was on this condition.49 But after the
reconstitution of the interim government, Jinnah refused to summon
the League Council on the plea that the "the Congress never had, nor
have they even now, accepted the statement of May 16" as it had
chosen to interpret the scheme in its own way.50 There was again a
deadlock. So the British government invited Lord Wavell to come to
London for consultation on the Indian political situation. He was
asked to invite two representatives of the Congress, two of the Muslim
League and one of the Sikh community to accompany him. The
discussion lasted only for four days, but no agreement was reached.
The Cabinet Mission had already made it clear that it was compulsory
for the provinces to enter the sections in the first instance, and only
after the first elections under the new constitution could the right to
opt out be exercised. The Cabinet Mission had throughout maintained
that the decisions of the section should be taken by a simple majority
vote of the representatives in the sections and the Congress view that
"the provinces had the right to decide both as to grouping and as to
their own constitutions" was unwarranted.51 If the Congress still
entertained doubts, the point could be left to the decision by the
Federal Court. The British government further made it clear that
"should the constitution come to be framed by a Constituent Assembly
228
in which a large section of the Indian population had not been
represented, His Majesty's Government could not contemplate forcing
such a constitution upon any unwilling parts of the country".52 The
All-India Congress Committee, meeting on 5 January 1947, decided to
accept the interpretation of the British Government. However, it made
it clear that procedure adopted in the sections must not involve any
compulsion of a province and the right of the Sikhs in the Punjab
should not be jeopardized. In the event of any attempt at such
compulsion, the province or part of a province has the right to take
action as might be deemed necessary inorder to give effect to the
wishes of the people concerned.53 This held out the threat of a
partition of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam, a thing vehemently
opposed by the Muslim League. The working committee of the
Muslim League in its meeting on 31 January 1947, decided that the
above revolution in malafides as the Congress had undermined the
whole basis of the Mission's plan by the conditions it again imposed.
In the circumstances, it demanded that plan should be declared to have
failed and the Constituent Assembly forthwith dissolved.54
Notwithstanding the boycott of the League, the Constituent Assembly
met as scheduled, and proceeded with its deliberations.
229
Meanwhile the Calcutta killings had started a chain of events
resulting in brutal communal violence in different parts of the country.
The Congress and the Muslim League had become like two
irreconcilable horses pulling a chariot in opposite directions. The
Direct Action and its resultant communal violence dashed the hopes of
harmony between the two political elements and communities in
India. The British government felt that such a situation could not be
suffered to continue any longer. A firm decision as to the future of
India should be taken at once, and the period of transformation made
as brief as possible. Accordingly on 21 February 1947 the Labour
government announced in the House of Commons that Britain was no
longer interested in keeping India under its control and that it was the
government's definite intention to grant independence, transforming
power to responsible Indian hands by a date not later than June 1948.
It was also announced that if by that time a constitution was not
framed in accordance with the proposals contained in the Cabinet
Mission's statement of 16 May 1946, it would have to consider "to
whom the powers of the central government in British India should be
handed over, on the due date, whether as a whole to some form of
Central Government for British India, or in some areas to the existing
provincial governments, or in such other way as may seem most
230
reasonable and in the best interests of the Indian people."55 Another
important decision taken was to replace Lord Wavell with Lord
Mountabatten, who would be entrusted with "the task of transferring
to Indian hands responsibility for the government of British India in a
manner that would best ensure the future happiness and prosperity of
India".56
Lord Mountabatten assumed the office of the Governor-General
on 24 March 1947. Attlee had instructed Mountabatten that it was the
definite objective of the government to obtain a unitary government of
both British India and the princely states through the medium of a
Constituent Assembly set up and run in accordance with the Cabinet
Mission's plan of 16 May 1946. It was also instructed that neither the
Indian National Congress nor the All - India Muslim League was to
be compelled to accept the plan. No sooner had he been appointed
than he occupied himself in the study of Indian problems. He held
discussions with the prominent leaders like Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru
and Jinnah to assess the political situation in India in its proper
perspective.
Jawaharlal Nehru welcomed Mountabatten's appointment as
Viceroy of India. On the other hand, Jinnah, who heard of
231
Mountabatten 's friendship with Nehru, was doubtful whether the new
Viceroy would appreciate his stand on partition. Mountabatten found
Nehru "most sincere".57 His first impression of Jinnah was that "he
was in a most frigid, haughty and disdainful frame of mind".58
Mountabatten found Jinnah "a psychopathic case, hell bent on this
Pakistan".59 Mountabatten knew that Gandhi's influence was
enormous and that he could reach nowhere if Gandhi was against him.
In the second meeting with Mountabatten, Gandhi told the former to
"give the Muslims the baby instead of cutting it in half. Place three
hundred million Hindus under Muslim rule by asking his rivals Jinnah
and his Muslim League to form a government." 60 When this was
conveyed to the Congress Party, they refused to consider it.
Mountabatten, it must be noted, tried to make the Mission Plan
acceptable to Jinnah. With regard to Jinnah's demand that the
provinces of Punjab and Bengal should be given to Pakistan
undivided, Mountabatten told Jinnah that the argument that the
country should be divided but Bengal and Punjab provinces should
remain united was illogical. Mountbatten pointed out that the
argument about the two provinces should apply with even greater
force to the country as a whole. He also expressed the view that the
united India could play a great role in the world, but a divided India
232
would not even rank as a second class power.61 Another strategy used
by Mountbatten to dissuade Jinnah from insisting on a separate
Muslim state was that Jinnah would get only a truncated Pakistan
which would be almost unworkable. Muslims would get the whole of
Punjab and Bengal, if the Muslim League would accept the plan, and
it would be a really workable Pakistan. 62
It was thought by wishful thinkers in the Congress that Jinnah,
confronted with the prospect of a truncated Pakistan would throw in
his hand and accept the Mission's plan. There was scarcely any hope
that the Plan could succeed in its object of reconciling the demands of
the two parties. The long wrangle over compulsory grouping and the
growing deterioration in communal relations, made it impossible to
bring about any kind of compromise. As for the British, it failed in
shocking the parties into a settlement. In the interim government, the
two blocks were not on speaking terms and took mutually antagonistic
positions.
Mountbatten fully realised that the Cabinet Mission Plan was
unworkable and partition of India was inevitable. The rapid
deterioration of communal relations convinced him the need of taking
quick decisions. In this context, the question of the fate of minorities
233
of the Punjab and Bengal arose. Jinnah's demand that the Punjab and
the Bengal should be transferred without divided to Pakistan was
bluntly opposed by the Indian National Congress. The Congress took
the firm stand that the non-Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal living in
districts contiguous to India and forming a majority of populations in
these areas, must be given the option to choose between Pakistan and
India. At length Jinnah had to concede to the division of these
provinces. In fact it requires to be noted that in the atmosphere of
mutual district and wrangling, sign of a long-term settlement was
coming with the Congress resigning itself to partition of India. But the
Congress wanted the partition of Bengal and the Punjab also. Nehru
emphasised this point when he said that the Muslim League could
have Pakistan if they wanted, but on the condition that they did not
take away other parts of India which did not wish to join Pakistan.
Though Jinnah and the Muslim League adamantly stood for the
division of India, the Congress, which stood for a united India in the
beginning, gradually came to accept the partition. The Congress
officially referred to partition in March 1947 when the Congress
Working Committee resolution held that Punjab (and by implication
Bengal) must be partitioned, if the country was divided. The final
concession to the League's demands came in June 1947 when the
234
Congress accepted the partition under the 3 June Plan. The acceptance
of Pakistan by the Congress was the result of the failure of the
Congress to draw in the Muslim masses into the national movement
and stem the surging waves of Muslim communalism. The virtual
collapse of the Indian Government made Pakistan inevitable. Patel
stated in the All India Congress Committee meeting on 14 June 1947
that Pakistan was functioning in the Punjab, Bengal and in the Indian
Government. The Indian Government was turned into an arena of
struggle. And Finance Minister Liaquat Ali Khan hamstrung the
functioning of other ministries.
In April 1947 the Congress leaders told Mountbatten that they
came to the conclusion that there was no alternative but to accept
partition. The Congress leaders offered various arguments for
accepting partition. The Congress leadership stressed that partition
was the people's choice. Gandhi said in this context : "They have
taken the course because they realised that it was not possible to get
around the Muslim League any other way... We tried hard....but they
refused to come into the Constituent Assembly."63 Nehru also referred
to the League's, unwillingness to be part of India.64 Another argument
is that the partition of India was agreed to by the Congress leaders in
the hope of averting a civil war between Hindu and Muslims. But the
235
irony was that partition resulted in an acuter form of civil war. Thus it
can be seen that the Congress, later on became the advocate of
partition. Gandhi who said that if the Congress wished to accept
partition, it would be over his dead body, also changed his stand : "He
was still not openly in favour of partition but he no longer spoke so
vehemently against it... For over two hours I pleaded with him, but I
could make no impression on him." 65 As for Jinnah, though he was at
first upset at getting what he called "a moth-eaten Pakistan," he was
happy that he founded a State where his will would prevail. He was
not bothered about its truncated form, and the two wings separated by
hundreds of miles of Hindu territory.
Mountbatten then proceeded to London on 18 May to seek the
advice of the British Cabinet. He came back to New Delhi on 31 May
to announce the British government's acceptance of the principles of
partition, which would be effected probably on 15 August 1947. The
Plan which came to be known as the Mountbatten Plan consisted of
the proposals: 1) Partition of India was inevitable, 2)The
representatives of the Muslim majority districts and those (excluding
the European member) representing the rest of the province, in the
Legislative Assembly of both Bengal and Punjab, would meet
separately and decide by a simple majority vote whether their
236
respective province was to be divided or not. If either part decided in
favour of partition, it would be done. In the event of the partition
being decided upon, each part would the decide whether to join the
existing Constituent Assembly in Delhi or the new Constituent
Assembly to be set up, 3) Sind and Baluchistan would decide which
Constituent Assembly to join 4) The Muslim majority district of
Sylhet would decide by means of referendum as to whether it would
join East Bengal or remain in Assam, 5) Regarding the North-West
Frontier Province, there was to be a referendum to ascertain whether it
would opt for Pakistan or not, 6) The major political parties have
repeatedly emphasised their desire that this should be the earliest
possible transfer of power in India. It became easy for the power to be
transferred much earlier than the date fixed by the statement of
February 20. Accordingly, ... His Majestry's Government proposes to
introduce legislation during the current session for the transfer of
power this year on a Dominion Status basis to one or two successor
authorities according to the decision taken as a result of this
announcement." 66
This was a period of intense political maneuvering between
Jinnah and the British. Throughout the period, Lintethgow encouraged
Jinnah to put forward his demands and supported them at the most
237
crucial stages of the prosecution of war. The Indian National
Congress was sidelined and driven into the wilderness, forcing it to
launch the Quit India Movement. The labour initiatives of 1939-40
were given a neat burial by Linthgow with the blessings of the
conversation led government in Britain.
Many Jinnah’s biographers and supporters opined that Jinnah
did not want Pakistan. Nor was he infavour of partition, Jinnah’s
demand for Pakistan was in fact a bargaining exercise and it was the
adamant attitude of the Congress which forced him to demand
Pakistan. A close scrutiny of his speeches after 1943 reveals that there
was no ambivalence on his part with regard to his demand for
Pakistan. All his speeches were suffused with a single idea: the
acceptance of Pakistan first, discussion later.
Gandhi- Jinnah talks brought out the contradictory and
irrational attitude of Jinnah on such issues as national identity, right
of self- determination and democratic system of governance. Jinnah’s
statements were used by Churchill and his coterie to remind the
English people how ridiculous it was to grant self- government to
Indians. These talks reveal that by that time Jinnah had emerged as the
Defender of the Faith. Not even the great social reformers like Shah
238
Waliullah, Syed Ahmed Brelvi, Jamaluddin Afghani and Sir Syed
Ahmed Khan could galvanise the support of the Muslims as Jinnah
did.
Notes and References
1 Sir Maurice Gwyer and A.Appadorai (ed.), Speeches and
Documents of the Indian Constitution: 1921-47, Vol. I, p.iii.
2 Speeches by the Marquess Linlithgow, Vol. I, pp. 238-42.
a. This was a period of intense political manoevering between
Jinnah and the British. Throughout the period, Linlithgow
encouraged Jinnah to put forward his demands and supported
them at the most crucial stages of the prosecution of war. The
Indian National Congress was sidelined and driven into the
wilderness, forcing it to launch the Quit India Movement. The
labour initiatives of 1939 - 40 were given a neat burial by
Linlithgow with the blessings of the Conservative-led
government in Britain.
3 V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, p.438.
4 The Civil and Military Gazette, 12 April, 1942.
5 Latif Ahmed Sherwani, Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan,
1940-47, p.58-59.
6 R.J.Moore, Churchill, Cripps and India, 1939-1945, p. 28.
239
7 Sir Francis Low (ed.), The Indian Year Book, 1943-44,
pp. 810-811.
8 The Indian Annual Register (1942), Vol. II, p.283.
9 Rafiq Zakaria, The Man who divided India, p.88.
10 Martin Gilbert, Road to Victory, p.5.
11 John Barnes and David Nicholas (ed.), The Empire at Bay: The
Leo Amery Diaries, 1929-45, p.881.
12 Ibid., Introduction, pp. 10-11.
13 Ibid., p. 852.
14 The Indian National Congress Resolutions, 1940-46 (All -
India Congress Committee), p.28.
15 The Hindustan Times (Daily), October, 1944, pp. 26-27.
a. Gandhi- Jinnah talks brought out the contradictory and irrational
attitude of Jinnah on such issues as national identity, right of self-
determination and democratic system of governance. Jinnah's
statements were used by Churchill and his coterie to remind the
English people how ridiculous it was to grant self - government
to Indians. These talks reveal that by that time Jinnah had
emerged as the Defender of the Faith. Not even the great social
reformers like Shah Waliullah, Syed Ahmed Brelvi, Jamaluddin
Afghani and Sir Syed Ahmed Khan could galvanise the support
of the Muslims as Jinnah did.
16 Ibid., p. 29-31.
17 Penderel Moon (ed.), Wavell, The Viceroy's Journal, p. 9.
18 V.P. Menon, op.cit., p.10.
240
19 Wavell, op.cit.., pp. 94-99.
20 Ibid.
21 N. Mansbergh (ed.), The Transfer of Power, Vol. V, p. 1122.
22 S.S. Pirzada (ed.), Foundations, Vol.II, p.502.
23 Ibid.
24 D.N. Panigrahi, India's Partition: The Story of Imperialism in
Retreat, p.264.
25 Government of India, Home Department, Poll (I) Branch, File
No. 97/45-poll(F) 1945, National Archives of India.
a. Jinnah 's biographers and supporters opined that Jinnah did not
want Pakistan. Nor was he in favour of partition. Jinnah's demand
for Pakistan was in fact a bargaining exercise and it was the
adamant attitude of the Congress which forced him to demand
Pakistan. A close scrutiny of his speeches after 1943 reveals that
there was no ambivalence on his part with regard to his demand
for Pakistan. All his speeches were suffused with a single idea:
the acceptance of Pakistan first, discussion later.
26 Ibid.
27 The Indian Annual Register (1945), Vol.II, pp. 137-39.
28 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, Vol. I, p.137.
29 The Hindu (Daily), 15, July, 1945.
30 The Tribune (Daily), 24, July, 1945.
31 The Hindu (Daily), 15, July, 1945.
32 E.W.R. Lumby, The Transfer of power in India 1945-47, p.76.
241
33 Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op.cit., Vo.II, p.572.
34 Ibid., p.572-73.
35 Papers Relating to the Cabinet Mission to India 1946, pp. 21-22.
36 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
37 Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op.cit., pp. 580-81.
38 The Harijan, 20 May, 1946.
39 Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, p.271.
40 S.K. Majumdar, Jinnah and Gandhi : Their Role in India's Quest for Freedom, pp. 225-26.
41 The Indian Annual Register (1946), Vol. II, pp. 145-47.
42 S.K. Majumdar, op.cit., pp. 228-29.
43 Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op.cit., p.621.
44 Ibid.
45 Rafiq Zakaria., The Man Who Divided India, p.120.
46 Jaswant Singh, Jinnah: India-Pakistan-Independence, p.389.
47 The Indian Annual Register (1946), Vol. II, Pp. 267-68.
48 Ibid., pp. 273-74.
49 Ibid., p. 281.
50 Ibid., pp. 277-79.
51 Ibid., p. 301.
52 Ibid.
53 The Indian Annual Register (1947), Vol. I., p.115.
54 Ibid., pp. 147-51.
242
55 Ibid., pp. 142-43.
56 Ibid.
57 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, p. 250.
58 N. Mansergh and Penderel Moon (eds.), The Transfer of Power 1942 -47, Vol.X, p. 137.
59 Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Freedom at Midnight, p.105.
60 Rafiq Zakaria, op.cit., p. 135.
61 Ibid., p.134.
62 Ibid.
63 Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (CWMG), Vol. LXXXVIII, pp. 73-75.
64 Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru, SWJN, Second Series, Vol.III, p.134.
65 Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.203.
66 The Indian Annual Register, Vol. I, pp. 143-146.
243