CHAPTER―IVshodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/207121... · respective countries i.e. the Jama„at–e-Islami Hind (JIH) and the Jama„at-e-Islami of Pakistan (JIP).2 What

CHAPTER―IV

THE RISE OF THE JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND

THE RESURGENCE OF THE MUSLIM POLITICAL IDENTITY IN

KASHMIR

99

THE RISE OF THE JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND

THE RESURGENCE OF THE MUSLIM POLITICAL IDENTITY IN

KASHMIR

4.0 Introduction

Historically, religion has played a key role in the identity formation of Kashmir.

In the post-1988, it resurfaced with the emergence of Islamist forces. The most vocal

among these Islamist groups has been the Jamaat-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir (JIJK)1,

which continue to play a central role in sharpening the Muslim identity in the State. By

tracing the history and politics of JIJK, the objective here is to portray the Islamist

interpretation of the self-determination in Kashmir and also to see how Islamist force led

the ascendency of Muslim-ness (Muslim identity) over Kashmiri-ness (secular identity).

Accordingly this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section of the chapter

discusses about the historical background of JIJK, its ideology and its social base in the

Valley. Section second, looks at the Islamist discourse of JIJK, its opposition to Kashmiri

Nationalism and also discusses its Road-Map for the future state of Kashmir. The third

section focus on JIJK‟s involvement in the political arena and its responses to socio-

political issues. The fourth and final the section of the chapter discusses about JIJK‟s

involvement in the post self-determination Movement and its role in 2008 Amarnath land

issue.

4.1 Section―I

4.1.1 Origin, Ideology, Social base and Organizational Structure of JIJK

For analyzing the JIJK as a key identity maker in Kashmir, it is important to know

its origin. The origin of the JIJK dates back to 1941 when a great Islamic scholar of India,

Mawlana Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979) founded the political-Islamic

1 Though many religious organizations are active in movement for self-determination in Kashmir, while

looki g at the Isla ist voice i Kash ir, I have take Ja a ‘at-i-Islami Jammu Kashmir. It has been most

vocal champion of Islamism in Kashmir and has associated with the movement for self-determination

since long. It fits for the definition of the Islamists for its ideology that Islam is not only religion but also a

political system and it desires pan-Islamic political unity.

100

organization called the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) in Lahore now in Pakistan on August 26,

1941. With the partition of the subcontinent into two independent countries of India and

Pakistan on August15, 1947, JI also split into two independent organizations in these two

respective countries i.e. the Jama„at–e-Islami Hind (JIH) and the Jama„at-e-Islami of

Pakistan (JIP).2 What is more, the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, as

discussed earlier, to the Union of India was rejected by Pakistan and still consider it as

the unfinished business of the partition. While most of the Kashmiri Muslims rallied

behind Sheikh Abdullah, an influential and numerically significant section continued

their hope of Joining Pakistan. Subsequently, this pro-Pakistani section later became the

strong base of support for the JIJK.3

JIJK is the most influential Islamic Movements in South Asia.4 It continued to

work with the JIH till 1952, due to certain political reasons particularly regarding the

final status of Kashmir, it organized itself as a separate entity in the state. It is noteworthy

to mention here that JIJK worked as a movement and not as organization up to 1951.

JIJK was started as a puritan and reformative movement to teach the Kashmiri Muslims

true principles of Islam. According to the founders of JIJK, Islam in Kashmir had

assimilated a number of Buddhist and Hindu practices and traditions. For most of the

Kashmiris, Islam seems to have been nothing more than the observance of certain set of

rituals. It has played an important role in transforming the society and politics of Muslims

from traditional indigenous religious life like tomb and saint worship to puritan religious

and political order based on the principles of Shariah.5 Thus the Islam in Kashmir as such

was an expression of certain rituals and customs but not a single unifying religious

2 Danish Khan, “The different Trajectories of Jamaat-e-Islami in India and Pakistan: Ideological

Compromises Shaping the Politics and Violence of their Student Bodies,” Muslim South Asia Research

Conference, SOAS, University of London (October 28, 2013). See also Aashique Kashmiri, The Islamic

Movement in Kashmir (Srinagar: Muslim Welfare Society, n.d.), 199.

3 Yoginder Sikand, “The Emergence and Development of the Jamaat-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir 1940s-

1990,” Modern Asian Studies 36, no. 3 (July, 2002): 723.

4 Kulbhushan Warikoo, “Islamist Extremism in Kashmir,” in Religion and Security in South and Central

Asia, ed. Kulbhushan Warikoo (Oxon/USA/Canada: Routledge, 2010), 70.

5 Sikand, “The Emergence and Development,” 714.

101

philosophy.6 Dissatisfied with such rituals and un-Islamic beliefs JIJK thought to invite

the people of the state towards Islam as an all embracing system in order to establish a

society in which establishment of Din was pre-requisite.7

The JIJK, shares a common ideological framework with the Jamaat-e-Islami in

Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. It is the writings of Maulana Sayyed Ala Maududi

(1903-1979) that are taken by it as guiding principle both the organizations of Islam as

well as its practical efforts and activities.8 According to Maududi Islam is a complete

ideology and code of life (nizam-i-hayat) that governs all aspects of human existence.

JIJK, therefore believes that Islam must, then, be enforced in its entirety and the central to

this project is the establishment of Islamic State based on the Quran and the example

(Sunnah) of the prophet. In its view it is the duty of every Muslim male as well as female

to play an important role in the „establishment of the din‟, and for that a special Islamic

party (Jamaat) has to be established to lead the struggle. According to them that party is

the JI, with which every Muslim should be associated with. This party is the JI which

every conscious (ba-sha„ur) Muslim should be associated. Finally, when the Islamic state

is set up under the leadership of this Jamaat, Islamic justice must prevail, for it is

pointless if in the process of struggling against an un-Islamic system, a newest of

oppressors (zalim) take the place of old the Islamic state and oppression (zulm) is not

wiped out.9 JIJK has always opposed the western type of democracy and secularism, as

these are based on the concept of sovereignty of Man, opposed to the sovereignty of God.

It criticizes the idea of Kashmiri nationalism, and instead demands that Jammu and

Kashmir should join with Pakistan on the basis of two nation theory. 10

The JIJK‟s social base was largely concentrated in rural areas in the initial years.

It did not get enthusiastic support from the common Kashmiris who were reaping benefits

6 Wasim, “The Study of Religio-Cultural”, 46.


8 Yoginder Sikand, “For Islam and Kashmir: The Prison Diaries of Sayyed Ali Gilani of Jamaat-e-Islami of

Jammu and Kashmir,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 18, no.2 (1998): 242.

9 Ibid.

10 Warikoo, “Islamist Extremism,” 70.

102

from the agrarian reforms introduced by Sheikh Abdullah. Traditionally rural areas in

Kashmir formed the strong social base for National Conference (NC) due to Shaikh‟s

charismatic leadership and his initiative of land reforms. The non-beneficiaries of land

reforms (people who were left out in land reforms or engaged in other services) and new

educated middle class in villages were alienated by what was perceived by then as

compromising politics and corruption of NC. The land reforms which earlier consolidated

the peasantry base of National Conference led to its erosion, which in turn strengthened

the social base of JI, as substantial segment of peasantry came under its ideological

influence. 11

The JIJK has its own constitution (Dastoor) which was framed in 1952 and

enforced in November 1953. The constitution consists of 100 (one Hundred) Articles

which define the organizational structure of the party. The organizational structure of the

JIJK is hierarchical in nature. It consists of central (markazi), the provincial (sobaye),

District (Zhil,le), Tehsil (tehsile), and local (maqami) units. The central level consists of

Amar-i-Jamaat (president), Majlis-e-Shora (Central Advisory Council) is the apex body

which consists of 24 members who are elected by the council of representative, Majlis-e-

Namaidgam(Council of representative) is of 90 member body and is supervised by

Majlis-e Shora, and Qayyim-i-Jamaat (Secretary General). They elect and remove the

president and the members of the central advisory committee.12

4.1.2 Amar-i-Jamaat (President)

The head of the Jama‟at is known as Amir-i-jamaat, whose status shall not be that

of Amirul Mu‟mineen13 in the recognized sense of the term but only that of leader of this

particular organization. The Amir shall call people towards its creed and Mission rather

11 Ibid.

12 Ved Prakash, Terrorism in Northern India: Jammu and Kashmir and the Punjab (Delhi: Kalpaz

Publications, 2008), 108.

13 This literally means „the Amir of the faithful‟, i.e., the Chief of the Muslims.

103

than towards the personality or the office of the Amir.14

Amir must be a man of high

learning, possessing the knowledge of the Qur‟an and Sunnah. He must be the

embodiment of extremely high virtues, God fearing, a man of wisdom, foresight,

integrity, decisiveness and determination. He must have a good understanding of Islamic

movement and devotion to it. He should be neither an aspirant for, nor desirous of the

office of the Amir or any other office with the Jama‟at.15 The Amir is elected for a period

of three years. He may if the council so agrees be reelected to the office. He is elected by

an electoral college known as Mujlis-i-Numayandgan on the basis of majority vote. If the

office of the Amir suddenly falls vacant due to his dismissal or some other reason, the

central advisory can appoint a new Amir for the maximum period of six months.16

Amir is empowered to exercise full control over the assets of JIJK. But he is

answerable to Majlis-i-Shura, which can put limit to his powers in case of particular

issue. He can sanction enrolment of (new) basic members of Jama‟at and can terminate

the members if situation arises. He could appoint or dismiss any sub-unit of Jama‟at and

appoint the Qayyim (Secretary General) and heads of the other departments under him.

He is managing the Bait al –Mal (Central Treasury). He has the power to summon all the

members or part of them, for consultation over a particular issue, and set up regional

units of the Jama‟at and can rectify the decision of the provincial and district levels.17

4.1.3 Markaz-i-Majlis-e-Shoura (Central Advisory Council)

Majlis-e-Shoura is an apex body to assist and advise the Amar-i-Jamaat. Its

members consist of the distinguished cadre of the party. The shoura is elected for a period

of three years, under special circumstances Amir can extend it term. It a powerful body

and without its prior consultation, Amir cannot take any important decision regarding

organizational issue. Shoura has the power to pass a vote of no confidence against the

14 The Constitution of the Jamaat-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir, Department of Publications and Publicity,

Jamaat-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir, Srinagar, 17. See Appendix IV

15 Ibid., 18.

16 Ibid., 19.

17 Ibid., 21-22.

104

Amir if found violating the commands of Quran and Sunnah and are free to be critical

during the proceedings of Majlis Shoura.18

4.1.4 Majlis-e-Namaidgan (Representative Council)

Majlis-e-Namaidgan is a ten member body elected by the rukuns or basic

members of party for a period of three years. It is supervised by the Majlis-e-Shoura and

its main function is to arbitrate in any dispute between the Amir and Majlis-e-Shoura.

Qaim-e-Jamaat (General Sectary) is appointed by the Amir in consultation Majlis-e-

Shoura. His main functions include the supervision and ensure successful working of all

departments at the central and sub-ordinate wings of the organization. 19

The organizational structure at the central level of the JIJK is replicated at the

lower levels. The provincial structure comprises of an Amir, a Majlis-i-Shoura and a

Qaim. Amir-i-Soaba (province) is appointed by Amir-i-Jamaat for a period of three years.

It performs the same functions for the province, what Amir-i-Jamaat performs for the

party. Every province has Majlis-i-Shoura, which consists of ten members and is elected

for three years. It performs same functions in its jurisdiction as that of Markazi Majlis

Shoura. There is Qaim-i-Soaba, who is appointed by Amir-i-Soaba. His functions are

same as that of Qaim-i-Jamaat for all party. The chain of command and authority is then

further carried down to the district, tehsil and local levels.20

To conclude the section, a brief sum up: the origin of the JIJK dates back to 1941

when a great Islamic scholar of India, Moulana Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi founded the

political–Islamic Organization the Jamaat-e-Islami Lahore now in Pakistan on 26 August

1941. With the partition of the subcontinent into two independent countries of India and

Pakistan on August15, 1947, JI also appeared into two independent organizations in these

two respective countries i.e. the Jama„at–i-Islami Hind (JIH) and the Jama„at-e-Islami of

Pakistan (JIP). JIJK continued to work with the JIH till 1952. It was due to certain

18 Article 16, 17 and 20, Dastoor (in Urdu), Jamaat-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir.

19 Wasim, “The Study of Religio-Cultural,” 150.


105

political reasons particularly regarding the final status of Kashmir that JIJK organized

itself as a separate entity in the state. JIJK started as a puritan and reformative movement,

in initial years its social base was largely concentrated in rural areas. Traditionally rural

areas in Kashmir formed the strong social base for NC due to Sheikh‟s radical land

reforms. The reforms which earlier consolidated the peasantry base of NC also led to its

erosion, as the non beneficiaries strengthen the social base of JIJK, and thus substantial

segment of peasantry later came under its ideological influence.

4.2 Section-II

4.2.1 Self-determination Movement: Islamic Movement or Kashmiri Nationalism

The JIJK considers the self-determination movement in the State as religious one.

It places more emphasis on Muslim identity of the Kashmiris and seeks alliance with the

Muslims across the world. The JIJK maintains that Islam has always played an important

role in Kashmiris struggle against the Dogra rule up to 1947 and after the partition of the

subcontinent in 1947 against India. It believes that the Muslims worldwide constitutes the

Ummat: one monolithic ideological community, cemented together on the basis of

common belief (aquida) and faith (iman) which sees no difference of colour, race,

language, caste, tribe or family.21

Syed Ali Shah Gilani, who spearheads the separatist

movement in the state, argues that that Hinduism, with its capacity to absorb extraneous

elements poses a threat to other communities, including Muslims. For Muslims it is

difficult to live with Hindus as is for fish to live in the desert.22

Thus, for JIJK Islam

became the basis of identity for the Kashmiri people‟s right to self-determination. It

became the war cry of JIJK that the Muslim culture in Kashmir is in danger from Hindu

nationalism of India.

21 Navnita Chadha Behra, “The Rhetorics of the Kashmiri Militant Movement: Azadi or Jihad,” in The

Valley of Kashmir: The Making and Unmaking of a Composite Culture? ed. Aprana Rao (New Delhi:

Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2008), 630.

22 Yoginder Sikand, “The Changing Course of Kashmiri Struggle,” The Muslim World 91 (Spring, 2001):

237.

106

Gilani‟s opposition to India is limited to liberate Kashmir from former‟s rule. He

makes it clear that armed struggle in Kashmir is against Indian state and its agents not

against Hindus or Indians per se. After freeing Kashmir from Indian rule, the JIJK would

like to see India as free, prosperous and peaceful.23

JIJK, while emphasizing the Muslim identity of Kashmiris has also stressed

monolithic puritan form of Islam. The opposition to popular form of Sufi Islam launched

by the Ahl-i-Hadith,24

was further carried by the JIJK, which according to them is

influenced by idolatrous practices of other religions.25

To them it sometimes became very

difficult to distinguish between a Muslim and a Hindu (Pandit) in the observance of

certain sets of rituals. Commenting on the common practices that Islamic reformers were

to castigate, Walter Lawrence, Settlement Commissioner of Jammu and Kashmir wrote:

The indifference shown in the matter of Mosques and Mullahs may be

accounted for by the fact that the Kashmiri Sunnis are only Musalmans

[Muslims] in name. In their hearts they are Hindus, and the religion of

Islam is too abstract to satisfy their superstitious cravings, and they turn

from the mean priest and the mean mosque to the pretty shrines of carved

wood and roof bright with the iris flowers where the saints of past time lie

buried.26

JIJK, was opposed by many Kashmiri Muslims who are associated with the

popular Sufi tradition, they saw it opposed to those Sufi saints whom they held with great

respect. It was felt to be a threat to the authority of the custodians of shrines, who

commanded great respect among the common Kashmiri folk. Sufism is still dominant

23 Ibid., 236.

24 The Ahl-i-Hadith drew principally on the reformist programme of the Arabian Wahhabis, founded by

the eighteenth century Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab. There is little to distinguish the two except that,

unlike the Alh-i-Hadith, the Wahhabis stress a modified adherence to the Hanbali school of Jurisprudence.

Both groups sternly oppose Sufism, in both its popular as well as its orthodox varieties.

25 Yoginder Sikand, “Popular Kashmiri Sufism and the Challenge of Scripturalist Islam (1900-1989),” in

The Valley of Kashmir: The Making and Unmaking of a Composite Culture? ed. Aprana Rao (New Delhi:

Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2008), 508.

26 Walter R. Lawrence, Valley of Kashmir (New Delhi: Asian Educational Service, 2005), 286.

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form of Islamic expression in Kashmir; this was seen by many as hostility towards Islam

itself.27

Though from the very beginning, JIJK was critical to the Sufi form of Islam in

Kashmir. Pro-self-determination groups like JKLF came under their attack for their belief

in Sufi shrines and Saints and also for their ideology of Kashmiri Nationalism.

According to JIJK, armed struggle in Kashmir against the Indian state revolves

around the Muslim identity of Kashmiris. It has always criticized the distinct cultural

identity of Kashmiris based on Kashmiri nationalism. To them territorial nationalism has

proved to be the bane of Muslims. Syed Ali Shah Gilani argues that:

Nationalism is poisonous philosophy which the enemies of Islam foremost

being various Western philosophies have deliberately sought to infect

Muslims with so as to divide and weaken them so that they can be kept

under their control. 28

Gilani says, Islam, makes a clear distinction between „love for their country

(Watan dosti), which it allows, and territorial nationalism or „nation worship‟ (watan

parasti), which clearly forbids. He says „Nation worship‟, based on the principle of “my

nation, right or wrong” leads to group prejudice, a quality of the period of the pre–Islamic

period of jahiliya, an age of utter darkness. It is because of territorial nationalism that

Gilani, says world is witnessing strife, war and bloodshed, while Kashmiri nationalists

base their argument for self-determination on distinct Kashmiri identity based on shared

composed culture. Therefore, for JIJK, it is the Muslim identity of Kashmiris which is an

important constituent of its discourse.29

4.2.2 JIJK, its Roadmap for Future State of Kashmir

JIJK like other religious and political organizations questions the legality of

Kashmir‟s accession to India and has consistently demanded that the future status of

27 Sikand, “Popular Kashmiri Sufism,” 512-513.

28 Sikand, “The Changing Course,” 236.

29 Behra, “The Rhetorics,” 631.

108

Kashmir be decided through plebiscite.30

According to JIJK Kashmir‟s right to self-

determination is based on the „Two Nation Theory‟ (do qaumi nazarya) on which the pre-

partition Muslim League had based its claims for a separate Muslim state – Pakistan for

the Muslims of the sub-continent.31

The Ameer of the JIJK, Shaikh Hassan argues:

Right to self-determination of Kashmiri people is political but the roots of

the Kashmir conflict is itself religious in nature. The two nation theory in

which religion became the basis of the partition is the starting point of the

Kashmir conflict.32

Basing two nation theory of their argument, JIJK, argues that the Hindus and

Muslims despite living together in the same territory form two completely different

nations (millat, quam). Not only in matters of faith, beliefs and customs that the two

communities stand diametrically opposed to each other, but their life-style, faith, food

and clothing are different. In the pre-partition India, leaders of both the parties Congress

and Muslim league had accepted the two nation theory which later became the basis for

the creation of Muslim state of Pakistan in 1947.33

Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime

Minister of India, asserted that, in keeping with its pledge, India would allow the people

of Jammu and Kashmir to decide their own future, thus suggesting, says Ayaz Akbar- a

senior leader of JIJK, an implicit acceptance and endorsement of two nation theory.34

Following the two nation theory, JIJK claims that Jammu and Kashmir being a Muslim

majority state must join with Muslim Majority Pakistan. Arguing that United Nations

(UN) had passed various resolutions for the peaceful settlement of Kashmir dispute,

through plebiscite which gives the people of the state this right to join either of the two

countries India or Pakistan, JIJK claims that the will of the majority in plebiscite will be

30 Mumtaz Ahmed, “Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia,” in Fundamentalisms Observed, vol. I, ed.

Martin. E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (London: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 506.

31 Yoginder Sikand, “The Jamaat-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir” in Competing nationalisms in South Asia:

Essays for Asgar Ali Engineer, ed., Paul Brass and Achin Vanaik (Orient Blackswan, 2002), 281.

32 Interview with Ameer of the JIJK, Srinagar on May 30, 2008, quoted in Wasim, “The Study of Religio-

Cultural,” 160. 33

Ibid., 281.

34 Interview with Ayaz Akbar on September 2008, quoted in Wasim “The Study of Religio-Cultural,” 161.

109

respected and in case majority of the population wants to be with India, JIJK will agree to

the decision of the majority. Over the last few years JIJK has shown flexibility in its

stand of resolving Kashmir problem. It argues that the longstanding Kashmir dispute

cannot be decided by India and Pakistan alone, but Kashmiris should be the part of any

negotiation. Syed Ali Shah Gilani, while arguing the inclusion of Kashmiri leadership in

deciding the future road-map for Kashmir said:

[Jammu and Kashmir] is not simply a border dispute between India and

Pakistan but a matter of life and death and a question of basic human

rights to political self-determination of some twelve million people living

in the province.35

Therefore, it is evident that though JIJK has shown flexibility in its stand of

solving Kashmir issue, it sees the future state of Kashmir to be either as part of Islamic

Republic of Pakistan or as an independent Islamic state. It further maintains that it is

under this system that the followers of all religions live in peace and the minorities can

enjoy cultural and religious autonomy.

4.2.3 JIJK and Other Pan- Islamic Groups-a Contrast

The ideology and the world view make JIJK identical to other Islamist

movements‟ world over. The pan- Islamic concepts like Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen (Universal

Muslim Brotherhood), Ummah and its response to the events happening in the Muslim

world form part of its ideology. But the politics of JIJK in last two decades reflects its

difference with the radical Islamist groups with Pan Islamic agenda that have been active

in Kashmir over the last two decades.36

In the 1970s and 1980s, the role of Islam became more important in making

distinctive Kashmiri Identity by the induction of radical Islamist groups into Kashmir. It

was during this time that Islamism came to be regarded as primarily a movement for

35 Sikand, “The Jamaat-e-Islami,” 281.


110

establishing and preserving the religio-cultural identity of Muslims wherever they live in

minority.37

The International Seerat Conference organized by the JI in May-June 1980

attended by the Imam of the Kaaba, was one such ambitious attempt to expose them to

Pan-Islamic Ideology.38

By the late 1990s a growing effort was being made to give

formal architecture to the alliance between the Jihad in Jammu and Kashmir39

and its

global counterparts. Pakistani authorities began sponsoring militant Islamist outfits, to

undertake what is called a Jihad in Kashmir. The most active of these Islamist groups in

Jammu and Kashmir were Harkat-ul-Jihad-Islam, the Harkat-ul-Mujaideen, the Lashker-

e-Taiba, albdr and probably the most influential of them, the Lashkar-i-Taiba. All these

groups share a common Islamist ideology and advocate the merger of Jammu and

Kashmir with Pakistan.40

Lashkar-i-Taiba (LIT) is the military wing of an organization called the Markaz

Dawat-ul Irshad (the Centre for Preaching and Guidance), set up in Pakistan by Hafiz

Muhammad Saeed and Zafar Iqbal in 1986. The Markaz is affiliated with the Alh-Hadith

School of thought,41

a socio-religious reform movement which insists that Muslims must

go back to the original source of inspiration- the Quran and the hadith, the sayings of the

Prophet.42

Like other Islamist groups, Markaz sees Islam as a perfect, all embracing

system. For establishing an Islamic system, an Islamic state is pre-requisite. Since Islam

is seen as the very antithesis of nationalism, it demands the establishment of one

37 Abu Taher Salahuddin, “The Early-1990 Kashmiri Muslims‟ Uprising‟s Endogenous Basis: Exploring

the Ethno-Cultural and Religious Roots,” BIISS Journal 30, no. 4 (October 2009): 371.


39 According to Gilani, India has proved by its actions, extreme hostility towards the religious and moral

sensibilities of the Muslims and the tenets of Islam. When Islam is under threat he says, it is the collective

duty of Muslims to spearhead jihad against enemies of the faith. According to JIJK, such a situation

prevails in Kashmir today. Jihad can have various forms physical as well as through the pen and the tongue.

Journalists and writes also have important part in the jihad. See Yoginder Sikand, “The Changing Course of the Kashmiri Struggle,” 234. 40

Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004,

(London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 182.


42 Ibid., 246.

111

universal Islamic state, ruled by a single Khilafah.43

As the system of Khilafah does not

believe in geographical boundaries or independence of one Muslim country from another,

the present division of Muslims into many nation-states must be overcome.44

LIT sees Kashmir conflict not as territorial dispute between India and Pakistan,

but the war between two different and mutually opposed ideologies: Islam on one hand

and disbelief on the other. It sees the roots of Kashmir problem as having been replaced

first by the Sikhs and then by the Dogras with the assistance of British. After 1947 the

Indian rule is referred to as the Hindu rule over Kashmir.45

LIT does not recognize any

movement for self-determination or a nationalist movement just for Independent Kashmir

but sees it as a part of larger struggle for the formation of Khilafah world over. Although

JIJK like LIT, sees the Kashmir problem through Islamic prism, but at the same time it

recognizes the right to self-determination, nation-states- India and Pakistan, and has even

participated in the parliamentary elections. While JIJK argued by Yoginder Sikand,

sought to place armed struggle in Kashmir within an Islamist discursive framework, of a

war between disbelief and Islam, it was not explicitly communal in character:

Three features are of particular importance in Gilani‟s description of the

jihad. Firstly, the jihad is seen as directed against the Indian state and its

agents, not against Hindus or Indians as such. Secondly, the jihad has the

limited goal of freeing Kashmir from Indian control. Thirdly, the

mujihadin have no intention of intervening in Indian internal affairs after

the liberation of Kashmir. Once the Kashmir issue is solved by freeing the

territory from Indian control and merging it with Pakistan, the two

countries Gilani writes, will be able to establish peace and cordial

43 The title of the leader of Muslim community following the death of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) was

Khilafah and the general political system is called Khilafat, with the term Khilafah having literal meaning

of „successor‟ of Prophet. 44

Sikand, “The Changing Course,” 246.

45 Ibid., 248.

112

relations with each other, for the root cause of the tensions between the

two countries is the dispute over the issue of Kashmir.46

LIT case strikingly illustrates global agenda, a marked contrast with local or

national scope and ambitions of other Islamist as well as secular nationalist groups in

Kashmir. While criticizing certain un-named Kashmiri militant groups Gilani says that:

Emotional slogans like crush India are neither realistic nor do they reflect

the spirit of Islam. At root Islam is based on invitation to prosperity,

witness to truth, salvation in the Hereafter, protection of the truth, the

ending of every form of oppression and creating understanding between

all children of Adam…This is why I believe our struggle should be geared

to gaining our rights… The slogan of Islam is not one of destruction of

invitation, prosperity, peace and truth.47

Unlike Lashker which goes beyond even Geelani‟s relatively less radical project,

by converting the Kashmir struggle into war between Islam and disbelief, JIJK makes it

clear that armed struggle is against the Indian state and not against the Hindus or Indian

per se. The fact that LIT refuses to recognize the possibility of independent Kashmir,

means that it has very limited support base among those Kashmiris who support

independent sovereign State. The ongoing ethnic and sectarian violence and political

instability in Pakistan have convinced many Kashmiris of the futility of jihadist

rhetoric.48

4.2.4 Politics of JIJK: From Revivalist Organization to Separatist Party

The Islamist ideology and discourse of JIJK is manifested through its politics and

responses to various socio-religious events in Kashmir. Right from the beginning JIJK

was not a political Party. For many years after its emergence it worked as a revivalist

46 Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad, 182.



113

movement. It was only after 1950s that JIJK started involving in socio- political issues.

JIJK, has undergone many stages in Kashmir politics from a purely revivalist

organization to political party and from political party to a separatist organization.

Though JIJK argued for the self-determination in Kashmir, it was only after 1988 that it

became the part of armed struggle against India.

4.2.5 Evolutionary Phase: Madarssas and Network of Schools

JIJK in its evolutionary phase concentrated in activities in strengthening its roots,

in shaping new units, preparing new membership and propagating their ideology through

writings. It started its activities in Srinagar by organizing weekly meetings, at central

Jamia Masjid. Secondly, it started the network of schools. From the very beginning JIJK,

embarked upon a vigorous educational policy carrying its ideas and programmes. This

policy was meant, in the first place to inculcate Islamic sprit among the students, and to

highlight the benefits of Islamic education. Secondly, the policy was meant to counter the

existing educational system that had been raised on the foundations of imperial outlook.

They were of the opinion that the then education system was the legacy of the British rule

and strengthened only colonial designs. Therefore, JIJK opines that the British have left

India and their education system should also be discarded.49

JIJK, put forth, the idea of an educational system before the people that had an

ideological basis-a system with the objective of salvation for all human beings based on

the concept of Tawhid (Oneness of Allah).50

They did not advocate compartmentalization

of knowledge as religious and non-religious. While criticizing the then educational policy

of the government of Jammu and Kashmir, Peer Sa„ad al Din, one of the senior members

of JIJK, says that the aim of education in Islam is to develop man‟s potential as to make

him capable of promoting values approved by Allah and eradicating evils denounced by

Him. He at the same time accepts the universality of sciences like Physics, Chemistry,

49 Monthly Azan 4, Urdu, no.6 (July, 1955): Srinagar.

50 Monthly Azan 5, Urdu, no. 3 (November, 1955): Srinagar.

114

Mathematics, Biology etc.51

With these ideas JIJK, started to establish schools in

different parts of the Valley and in the Muslim dominated areas of Jammu province. The

syllabus adopted by them was in accordance with the JIH. Subjects like Arabic, Urdu,

English and Mathematics were made compulsory in the curriculum. Most of these

schools were opened in rural areas and that seems one of the important factors for

Jamaat‟s less influence in Srinagar, in initial years.52

Sayyed Ali Shah Gilani, chief of the

JIJK, acknowledged that initially children of the JIJK‟s members were inducted into 200

to 350 schools. JIJK‟s teachers were absorbed into government schools which offered

them a new and wider platform to propagate their ideology. Afterwards JIJK, started

distributing Islamic literature to other schools and colleges, establishing reading rooms

and discussions groups and began to publish monthly newspaper which afterward became

daily. The systems of schools were instrumental in providing the JIJK a social base in the

Valley.53

It was in 1975, under the government of Indira Gandhi that emergency was

imposed in the country and Jammu and Kashmir was also brought under its sway. As P.

S. Verma writes, the very first act Sheikh Abdullah made of emergency power was to ban

JIJK “Darsagaha‟s”. Its offices were sealed, more than 150 JIJK run schools were closed

and about 22 thousand students deprived of their education, number of its activists were

put behind the bars and its property was damaged.54

Sheikh‟s order for closure of these

schools in 1975 had failed to stall the growth of the JIJK, mainly for two reasons.

Sheikh‟s arrest in 1953, witnessed the political turmoil in the state. To quell political

turmoil and to overcome people‟s displeasure over Abdullah‟s arrest, Bakshi used the

political and religious groups to gain his popularity. This provided an opportunity for

JIJK, to build its cadre through madaras and schools. Its leaders used Mosques for the

expansion of its cadre.55

It was during this evolutionary phase that JIJK was able to

51 Hamari Talimi Policy, Monthly Azan, Urdu (October, 1955): Srinagar.

52 Ashiq Kashmiri, Tarikh Tarik-i-Isalmi Jammu and Kashmir 1947-1990, Urdu, vol. 2 (Srinagar: Markazi-

Maktaba Jamaat-i-Islami, 1984), 101.


54 Kashmiri, Tarikh Tarik-i-Isalmi, 106, also see P. S. Verma, Jammu and Kashmir at the Political

Crossroads (New Delhi: Viking Publishing House, 1994), 59.


115

prepare a dedicated, trained and trustworthy cadre besides consolidating its social base. It

worked to bring more and more people to its fold particularly the youth.

To sum up, JIJK emphasises more on Muslim identity of the Kashmiris and

considers the self-determination movement in Kashmir as religious. It believes Muslims

worldwide constitute one monolith community and Islam is the basis of identity for

Kashmiri people‟s right to self-determination. Gilani makes it clear that armed struggle in

Kashmir is against India and not against Hindus. After freeing Kashmir from India JIJK

would like to see India as free, prosperous and peaceful. According JIJK, armed struggle

in Kashmir revolves around the Muslim identity and thereby criticizes distinct cultural

identity of Kashmiris based on Kashmiri nationalism. To them territorial nationalism has

proved to be the bane of Muslims. Gilani says Islam makes a clear distinction between

love for their country (Watan dosti), which it allows, and territorial nationalism or „nation

worship‟ (watan parasti), which it clearly forbids. It is because of territorial nationalism

that world is witnessing strife, war and bloodshed. JIJK questions the legality of

Kashmiris accession to India and has consistently demanded that the future status of

Kashmir be decided through plebiscite. According to them Kashmiris right to self-deter

mination is based on the „Two Nation Theory‟. Basing two nation theory of their

argument, JIJK, argues that the Hindus and Muslims despite living together in the same

territory form two completely different nations. The Islamist ideology and discourse of

JIJK is manifested through its politics and responses to various socio-religious events in

Kashmir. JIJK has undergone many stages in Kashmir politics from a purely revivalist

organization to political party and from political party to a separatist organization. From

the very beginning JIJK, embarked upon a vigorous educational policy to inculcate

Islamic spirit among the students. The systems of schools were instrumental in providing

the JIJK a social base in the Valley. It started to establish schools in different parts of the

Valley and in the Muslim dominated areas of Jammu province. JIJK in its evolutionary

phase focused to prepare dedicated, trained and trustworthy cadres besides consolidating

its social base. It worked to bring more and more people to its fold particularly the youth.

116

4.3 Section-III

4.3.1 The JIJK’s Involvement in Politics: Interaction with National Conference

Gradually, the JIJK started its direct involvement in the Kashmir situation. It

started this by its interaction with the state institutions at various levels. Its response to

immediate socio-political issues and its interaction with the state institutions were guided

not only by its ideology but also by existing socio, religio-cultural environment and

politics in state to a large extent as well. It criticized Shaikh Abdullah for backing

Maharaja Hari Singh while signing the Instrument of Accession to India in the late

October 1947.56

JIJK, therefore questioned the legality of the Accession of Kashmir to

India, insisting that the matter be resolved through a plebiscite and thereby challenging

the legality of the rule of Kashmir.57

The relations between JIJK and NC were satisfactory if not cordial before JIJK‟s

participation in the State Assembly elections. Shaikh Abdullah had fair opinion about

JIJK and praised the role of the schools run by the party.58

On June 10, 1967, the Majlis-

i-Shura of the JIJK in its memorandum demanded the release of Shaikh Abdullah who

was jailed for his demand of self-determination through plebiscite.59

The relations later

soured and long period of confrontation started. The first major confrontation between

JIJK and Shaikh Abdullah occurred, when the latter convened a Kashmiri people‟s

convention in Srinagar on October 10, 1968 to discuss what he called, long standing

Kashmir issue. Political leaders of various ideologies and commitments attended this

convention, and JIJK was represented by Saif al- Din. Sheikh Abdullah wanted the

convention to adopt a resolution that the future set-up of Kashmir should be on secular

and democratic basis. All except Saif al-Din accepted the resolution. Saif al- Din objected

56 Kashmiri, Tarikh Tarik-i-Isalmi, 79.


58 Interview with Saif ul-Din Qari, quoted in Afroz Ahmed Bisati, “Religio-Political Role of the Jamaat-i-

Islami in Jammu and Kashmir,” (M.Phil. diss., University of Kashmir: Shah-i-Hamandan Institute of

Islamic Studies, 1997), 68.

59 Interview with Syed Ali Shah Galeelani, quoted in Bisati, “Religio-Political,” 89.

117

the use of the word secular in the resolution. This led to the break-down of relationship

between Sheikh and JIJK in the state. This later became the reason of Saif al-Din‟s arrest.

According to Ashiq Kashmiri, the senior member of JIJK, the participation of JIJK in the

1972 elections, amidst the ban on Plebiscite Front, further added to their confrontation.60

The 1975 Indra-Shaikh Accord, according to which Article 370 that gives special status

to Jammu and Kashmir was retained, the state was termed as constituent unit of the

Union of India.61

JIJK, like other religious and political groups regarded this Accord as

compromise for Shaikh‟s 22 years of long stand of plebiscite. In the aftermath of the

1975 accord, JIJK was not only critical of the politics of NC but also pointed out how

Article 370 rendered hollow and almost of no significance through various constitutional

orders.62

JIJK therefore warned the people of Kashmir not to be carried away by the

propaganda about the Article 370 by NC. Sheikh in turn criticized the JIJK by calling it

as fundamentalist organization and enemy to the Kashmiri culture and traditions. JIJK‟s

call to puritan Islam has been projected by NC as quite contrast to Kashmiri orientation

of Islam. Shaikh Abdullah often roused the indignation against the JIJK for its attitude

viz-a-viz local shrines, saints, customs and beliefs.63

The allegations and accusations by

the JIJK and NC against each other continued. The NC alleged the JIJK for having

foreign links and blamed them for inciting trouble in the state.64

The JIJK considered

both NC and its secular policy and the government of India as a real threat to Islam in

Kashmir.65

The ideological difference between JIJK and NC has been the main factor for

their confrontation. So the ideological and political rivalry between JIJK and Sheikh

Abdullah continued unabated. Shaikh Abdullah‟s final remarks about the JIJK, was that

60 My Interview with Ashiq Kashmiri on November 15, 2014.

61 Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in conflict: India, Pakistan and Unending War (New York: I. B Tauris & Co

Ltd, 2003), 123.

62 Weekly Azan, Urdu, March 1977.

63 Balraj Puri, Jammu and Kashmir: Triumphs and Tragedy of Indian Federalism (New Delhi: Sterling


64 Mir Asadullah, Mukadama-e-Ilhaq, Shoaba Parliament, Urdu, Jama„at-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir,

38-39.

65 Basti, “Religio-Political, 70.

118

“JIJK has to be resisted politically and fought back socially.”66 In 1975 Shaikh Abdullah

ordered the closure of the JIJK schools which remained closed till emergency was lifted.

It was in 1988, following the ban on JIJK schools that the Falah-e-Aam trust was created

to run its schools which continued to work till 1990 when Government of India banned it

again along with Jamaat.67

Therefore Sheikh Abdullah proved to be a great hindrance in

the growth and activities of JIJK, which was carried by his successor and son Farooq

Abdullah. He adopted the same approach towards JIJK and accused them as anti-national

and anti-secular.

4.3.2 JIJK’s Participation in elections

Until the late 1960s, the JIJK sought to cultivate a constituency by publishing and

distributing literature, establishing reading rooms and discussion groups, setting up a

network of schools all over the state, and through public lectures. It was only in 1969,

that the JIJK for the first time decided to enter electoral fray by fielding its candidates for

the local level (Panchayati) elections. JIJK argued that remaining outside the sphere of

the electoral politics was increasingly ineffective. By contesting elections it was thought

that elections will provide the best platform to popular the message of JIJK.

Subsequently, JIJK participated in the Parliamentary as well as provincial elections in

1971 and 1972 respectively.68

Sheikh Abdullah after his dismissal from power in 1953,

decided to take part in 1972 state assembly elections. But his entry to the state along with

his colleague Mirza Afzal Beg was banned and the Plebiscite Front was declared

unlawful. Syed Mir Qasim, the then Chief Minister of the state admited that to frustrate

further attempts by any group with support from Abdullah to contest the Congress, they

enlisted the service of the JIJK to fill the vacant political space and guaranteed its success

in five constituencies. It was first time that JIJK received its constitutional recognition

and political legitimacy in Kashmir. The leaders of the State Pradesh Congress in

66 Ibid.

67 Official website of Jamaat-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir (JIJK), accessed November 20, 2014,

http://www.jamaateislamijk.org/about-us/81-jama-at-e-islami-jammu-kashmir.html


http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/jamaat-e-islami-jammu-and-kashmir-jei

119

Kashmir opposed the idea of giving recognition to an organization like JIJK, which had

not accepted Kashmirs accession to India.69

In the 1972 assembly elections JIJK won 5

of the 20 seats it contested, it picked up 23.53% of the popular vote in those seats, all of

it in the Kashmir Valley.70

Then in 1975 By-elections JIJK‟s performance was so poor

that it could not even save the securities of its members. In 1977, Lok Sabha elections

JIJK fielded its two candidates one each from Baramulla and Anatnag and one candidate

in Udhampur, Jammu region. Its candidates secured 38% and 27% of the valid votes in

Baramulla and Anatnag respectively, whereas in Udhampur it secured only 6.1% of the

votes. In the subsequent 1977 State Assembly elections, JIJK contested 19 seats, 17 in the

Valley, and 2 from Jammu, but could secure only one seat from Sopore receiving 3.59%

of the votes. During these elections the issues highlighted by the JIJK, in its manifesto

were identical to those raised by other parties in their respective manifesto. These

included the demand for development of friendly relations with Indian and Pakistan,

ensuring independence of Judiciary, bringing agricultural reforms, and revision of pay

scale of government employees. In 1983 State Assembly elections JIJK, fielded 26

candidates all of them were defeated, including the one from Sopore constituency where

it used to have stronghold.71

For the last time JIJK, participated in 1987 elections as part

of a Muslim United Front (MUF). In 1987 elections, Kashmiri Muslim Identity was

mobilized by an alliance of several Islamists called the MUF, mainly comprising the JI,

Ummat-e-Islami led by Qazi Nisar and the Anjuman-e-Itthadhad-ul-Muslimeen led Abas

Ansari. The NC-Congress alliance won the election by getting 62 seats while the MUF

got only 4 seats. Alarmed by the clear upsurge in the support for the Muslim United

Front, elections were rigged by the NC-Congress alliance and resorted strong-arm tactics

of beating up the MUF‟s electoral candidates and polling agents, which subsequently led

to the rise of Jihadist violence. The administration openly worked in favour of the NC-

Congress alliance.72

A prominent example being Syed Salahuddin, supreme commander

69 Balraj Puri, Kashmir Insurgency and After (New Delhi: Orient Longman Private Limited, 1993), 54.


71 Ibid., 72.

72 Navnita Chadha Behra, State, Identity and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, (New Delhi:

Manohar Publishers, 2000), 159.

120

of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, who had contested from Amirakadal Srinagar.73

Although the

exact extent of rigging remains difficult to assess, but an anonymous source at the Indian

Intelligence Bureau claims that around 13 seats may have been lost by the MUF because

of the electoral.74

The JIJK‟s participation in elections was not applauded by different quarters in

the Valley. It was criticized by the non-Jamaat people; to them it was an ideological

compromise and became a tool to malign the image of the JIJK. According to Saad al-

Din, JIJK perceived that there was no way out of the dictatorial government of Bakshi

and hurdles were created in way of joining politics and towards assembly. Keeping in

view JIJK, started to think in terms of participating in elections. They argued that there

were more advantages than disadvantages in its participation of election and they were

confident that the day was not far-off when the state would be transformed into an

Islamic State, if JIJK continued in this direction. JIJK was criticized for its taking oath of

the allegiance by the elected members to maintain the sovereignty and integrity of India

in the assembly. It defended itself that they took the oath under the state of compulsion.75

Since 1988 JIJK, has not participated in any elections, and instead involved itself in anti-

elections campaigns.

To conclude the section in sum, JIJK gradually started involving in Kashmir

politics by its interaction with the state institutions at various levels. The relations

between JIJK and National Conference were satisfactory if not cordial before JIJK‟s

participation in the State Assembly elections. Sheikh Abdullah had positive opinion

about JIJK and had praised the role of schools run by it. JIJK in its memorandum

demanded the immediate release of Sheikh Abdullah, who was jailed for his demand for

73 Navita Chadha Behra, Demystifying Kashmir (Washington D.C.: The Brooking Institution Press, 2006),

47. See Sumantra Bose, The Challenge in Kashmir: Democracy, Self-Determination (New Delhi: Sage


74 Sten Widmam, “The Rise and Fall of Democracy in Jammu and Kashmir,” Asian Survey 37, no. 11,

(November, 1997): 1021.

75 Bisati, “Religio-Political,” 63.

121

self-determination through plebiscite. The confrontation between NC and JIJK began

when Sheikh Abdullah wanted the people‟s convention to adopt a resolution that the

future setup of Kashmir should be on secular and democratic basis. This was rejected by

the JIJK. JIJK‟s participation in 1972 assembly elections, amidst the ban on Plebiscite

Front further added to their confrontation. It was for the first time that JIJK received

constitutional recognition and political legitimacy. In the aftermath of the 1975 accord,

JIJK was not only critical to the politics of National Conference but also pointed out how

Article 370 rendered hollow and almost of no significance through various constitutional

orders. Sheikh in turn criticized the JIJK by calling it as fundamentalist organization and

enemy to the Kashmiri culture and traditions. So the ideological and political rivalry

between JIJK and Sheikh Abdullah continued unabated. The last election that JIJK

contested was in 1987. It was during this election that Kashmiri Muslim identity was

mobilized by an alliance of an Islamist groups like JI, Ummat-e-Islami and Anjuman-e-

Itthadh-ul-Muslimeen. JIJK was criticized for its participation in elections, as non JIJK

members perceived it as ideological compromise, secondly taking oath under Indian

constitution to maintain its sovereignty. JIJK therefore defended itself by saying that they

took oath under the state of compulsion.

4.4 Section-IV

4.4.1 Involvement of JIJK in post- 1988 Self-Determination Movement

Since1988, the self-determination movement in Kashmir saw a new phase, as it

was based on the armed struggle. The struggle was led by the secular nationalists JKLF.

JIJK as a part of MUF had fought 1987 state Assembly elections.76

The elected members

of JIJK, were the part of the assembly at a time when different militant groups started

armed resistance, challenging Indian sovereignty over Kashmir. However, the JIJK did

not take part in the struggle in its opening years. While justifying its stand vis-à-vis the

armed struggle, JIJK maintained that it was always in favour of self-determination, and

76 For detailed information about MUF see Chapter-III.

122

had been engaged in building cadres, establishing educational institutions and inculcating

right Islamic consciousness among the Muslims in the state. The JIJK also believed that

dialogue was the only way to solve the Kashmir problem. Nevertheless, JIJK, after few a

years started direct involvement in the armed struggle. It was encouraged by Pakistan to

involve in the armed resistance to counter the popularity of the nationalist groups

including JKLF.77

Therefore, JIJK, supported the pro-Pakistani militant organizations like

Hizb-ul-Mujuhideen (HM). The HM was formed in 1989, with Master Ashan Dar, a

school teacher, as its first Commander-in Chief. Later in 1991, Dar declared HM as the

military wing of JIJK. The JIJK‟s association with Islamist militant groups like HM led

to its ban in early 1991 and its offices were closed in major towns of Kashmir.78

Migration of Kashmiri Pandits

As discussed above in the post-1988, situation Kashmir saw the rise of armed

struggle in which JKLF took the lead. In the late 1989, the selective killings of prominent

personalities including Kashmiri Pandits, followed by mass rallies chatting anti-India and

Islamic slogans, had created an atmosphere of fear and insecurity in the Pandit

community. During this period State apparatus also failed to control militancy and

provide security to minority groups. It was in the backdrop of these circumstances that

Pandits migrated from their homeland-the Kashmir Valley-to other parts of India.79

There are multiple narratives on the causes of Pandit migration which vary from

source to source. Majority of the migrated Pandits who settled in other parts of India

shared their view that the „displacement‟ of their community took place in an atmosphere

of fear created by the Muslim Separatists. It is noteworthy here, that Pandits used the

term „forced displacement‟ instead of migration. According to a Kashmiri Pandit living in

Delhi, he has always been sympathetic towards the cause of Kashmiri Muslims but the

statements of militant groups in Urdu dailies telling us to leave and the slogans like Ae


78 Ibid.

79 Alexander Evans, “A Departure from History: Kashmiri Pandits, 1990–2001,” Contemporary South Asia

11, no. 1 (2002): 20.

123

Kafiroo Ae Zalmoo, Kashmir Hamara Chhod Do (You Infidels, Leave Our Kashmir)

disturbed him.80

Monohar Nath Tickoo, a Kashmiri Panidit who had migrated to Jammu

in early 1990s Says:

Me and my neighbours never wanted my family to leave Kashmir but there

was definitely a massive psychological fear created by unknown agencies

against Kashmiri Pandits which forced us to leave. Although the fact

remains that not a single Muslim forced us to leave.81

Shouting slogans of Nizam-i-Mustfa and a systematic campaign telling Pandits to

leave the Valley created an atmosphere of fear and insecurity in the community. It was in

April 1990, that two Srinagar based news papers, Alsafa and the Srinagar Times carried

direct threats issued by the HM, ordering Kashmiri Pandits to leave the Valley.82

JKLF and other militant groups, who were the part of armed struggle in early

1990s, claimed that there were some killings at the beginning but that was not on the

basis of religion. Whosoever worked for Indian agencies or against the movement, was

killed irrespective of religious identity, which is why Muslims killed by militants

outnumbered Pandits, is the claim made by most of the pro-self-determination groups.

Some high profile Pandit victims may well have contributed to the spread of fear in the

Pandit community.83

JKLF and majority of the Kashmiri Mulsims, blamed Governor

Jagmohan, for his role in facilitating the migration of Pandits to stigmise armed struggle

as communal. According to Shakeel Bakshi, the member of the core group of JKLF in

early 1990:

The state Government machinenary which facilitated the leadership of

then Governor Jagmohan which facilitated the migration, first by creating

80 Khalid Wasim, “Migration of Kashmiri Pandits: Kashmiriyat Challenged?” Working paper 237

(Bangalore: The Institute for Social and Economic Change, 2010): 6.

81 Monohar Nath Tickoo, “Two Decade of Exile,” Interview on Kashmir Watch, posted on February 18,

2009.

82 Behra, State, Identity and Violence, 173.

83 Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (New Delhi: Vistar Publications, 2003), 120.

124

a communal fear among minorities our political movement as communal

as fundamentalist and then providing transport facilities and promises of

salaries in Jammu.84

However, considering merely as allegation, Jagmohan strongly refuted:

What can you say of a committee which comes out with a proposition that

it is not a fearsome environment, it is not a brutalized landscape, it is not

the ruthless Kalashnikov of the marauders, it is the bomb explosions and

fires, it is not the threatening telephonic calls, it is the hysterical

exhortations for “Jihad” from hundreds of loudspeakers fitted on the

mosques…but the inducements of the trucks that have impelled the

Kashmiris to abandon their homes and hearths in the cool and crisp

Valley and to move to the hot and inhospitable camps of Jammu?85

While Jagmohan‟s contribution in organizing the migration of Pandits continues

to be hotly debated, it is certain that after his arrival, they left en mass and it appeared

that logistically he assisted in the exodus86

The narratives of those Pandits who had not left Valley, were different from those

who migrated. Though they did not agree that the exodus of Pandits was the conspiracy

hatched by Governor Jagmohan, they blamed the state government‟s inability to provide

security to minorities. Instead of blaming the entire Muslim population of the valley, they

acknowledge the support and protection provided by the Muslim neighbours.87

JIJK like

other religio-political groups blamed Jagmohan, for his role in facilitating the migration

of Pandits, to stigmise armed struggle as communal. Defending armed struggle from

charges of being anti-Hindu, Geelani, asserts that migration of Pandits in the early 1990s

was instigated by Indian authorities, to brand armed struggle in Kashmir as an „Islamic

84 Interview with Shakeel Bakshi, quoted in Wasim, “The Study of Religio-Cultural,” 24.

85 Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, 152.

86 Behra, State, Identity and Violence, 173.

87 Wasim, “Migration of Kashmiri Pandits,” 7.

125

terrorist‟ movement, so as to discredit it in the eyes of the West. He appealed to the

migrated Pandits to return their home. It is the fundamental duty of every Muslim to

ensure the safety of all innocent people, men as well as Women, Muslims as well as non-

Muslims. Protection of life, property, self-respect, religion and belief must be ensured to

all without discrimination. Gilani condemns acts of threats and killings of innocent

Kashmiri Pandits, seeing them as the violation of the rules of Islam.88

JIJK has been

critical of organizations like Panun Kashmir,89

whose ambition is to create separate

homeland for Kashmiri Pandits within the Kashmir Valley (see map-3).

Map-3: Panun Kashmir (own Kashmir): A Homeland for Kashmiri Pandits

Courtesy: Google Maps


89 Panun Kashmir is an organization founded by migrant Pandits in 1991. It means our own Kashmir.

http://www.panunkashmir.org

http://www.panunkashmir.org/

126

Formation of Hurriyat Conference

While supporting armed struggle through HM, JIJK continued its programme of

Ijtimass, Seerat Conference and other related programmes. It was in 1993, that the

amalgam of over 30 political, religious and social groups united which came to be known

as the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC).90

It comprised of Syed Ali Shah Geelani,

of JI, Abdul Gani Lone of the People‟s Conference, Moulvi Abas Ansari of the

Liberation Council and Professor Abdul Gani Bhat of the Muslim Conference. APHC

was headed by the then teenaged religious leader of the Awami Action Committee

(AAC). The central ideology of APHC revolved around the “Core Issue” of Kashmir, and

its constitution laid emphasis on tripartite talks (India, Pakistan and representatives of

Kashmiris) to solve the issue. It emerged as a unified voice to realize the dream of the

right to self-determination of the people of Kashmir. However, the Hurriyat‟s line of

action was deeply influenced by Pakistan and it failed to earn that credibility as forum for

independent thinking.91

There was strong disagreement among the various components of

APHC, about whether independence of Kashmir or unification with Pakistan was the

better alternative. 92

While most of the groups of APHC lean towards unification with

Pakistan, Yasin Malik, adheres to JKLF‟s ideology of Independence for the formerly

90 Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Chairman of Jammu and Kashmir Awami Action Action committee, on

December 27, 1992, called a meeting of the representative of various religious, social and political

organizations at Mirwaiz Manzil, Srinagar to consider ways and means to meet the growing oppression by

the security forces. A meeting was conducted which was presided over by Mirwaiz. The suggestions made

in the meeting were referred for examination to Screening Committee. After considering the report of

Screening Committee, the Assembly of Representative on March 8 took the decision to have common

platform under the name of „All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC). It reprensts Awami Action

Committee,* Jamaat-e-Islami,* Jammu and Kashmir Muslims Conference,* Muslim Conference,* Jammu

and Kashmir Liberation Front (Malik),* People‟s League,* Ittihad-ul Muslimeen, *All Jammu and Kashmir

Employee‟s Federation, Employees and Workers Confederation, Anjaman-e-Tablig-ul-Islam, Liberation

Council, Jamaat-e-Ahle Hadith, Kashmir Bazmeh Twaheed, Jamiat-e-Hamdania, Kashmir Bar Association,

Political Conference, Tehreekh Huriayati Kashmiri, Jamiate Ulama-e-Islam, Anjamani Auqafi Jamia

Masjid, Ummat-e-Islami, Shahedd-i-Millat Youth Forum, Muslim Khawateen Markaz, Jammu and

Kashmir Human Rights Committee, Jammu and Kashmir People‟s Basic Rights (Protection) Committee,

Employees and Workers Confederation (Arsawi Group), Students Islamic League, Islamic Study Circle,

Auqaf Jama Masjid. * Indicates the membership in the executive council, the highest decision making body.

See Appendix

91 Shujaat Bukhari, “Split, Yet Again,” Frontline, February 7, 2014.

92 Hameeda Naeem, “The Politics of Exclusion” in The Parchment of Kashmir: History, Society and Polity,

ed. Nyla Ali Khan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 227.

127

princely state. It was in 1997 that Hurriyat was undergoing a period of internal change in

its hierarchy, when Umar Farooq, after four years as head of the APHC, was replaced by

Syed Ali Shah Gilani leader of the JIJK. Although Farooq‟s resignation as chairman of

APHC was treated as normal shift of power from one office holder to another, there were

reports that internal differences started once Umar Farooq offered unconditional talks to

the government of India.93

JIJK often clashed with the pro-Independence groups like

JKLF within the APHC. When Gilani, the then executive member of JIJK, became

chairman of APHC in 1998, it started dominating the political space within APHC, which

subsequently led to the breakaway of pro-nationalist groups like JKLF and Democratic

Freedom Party (DFP) of Shabir Shah from it.94

The ideological difference between the

constituents of APHC surfaced over 2002 Assembly elections. When Sajad Lone‟s

People‟s Conference was accused of the participation of a few proxy candidates in 2002

elections which Gilani, saw the violation of the APHC constitution. This created fissures

among the leaders of the conglomerate, and serious charges were leveled against each

other which subsequently led to the expulsion of People‟s Conference from the APHC.95

Accusing APHC of having lost the track of its goal of right to self-determination to the

people of Kashmir, hard-liner Islamist Syed Ali Shah Gilani96

broke away from APHC in

2004, and formed its own Tehreek-e-Hurriyat Jammu and Kashmir and took charge of it.

APHC maintains that the Muslim character of the state needs to be preserved, but at the

same time interests of the non-Muslims should be safe guarded.

The members of the JIJK, had to pay price for their close association with the HM

and its support of other Islamist armed groups active in Kashmir. They had to face state

repression, arrests, torture and killings during insurgency operations and those working in

offices were dismissed from their jobs. In some cases passports were denied to their

93 Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, 202.

94 Nyla Ali Khan, Islam, Women and Violence in Kashmir: Between India and Pakistan (Palgrave

Macmillan, 2010), 106.

95 Behra, Demystifying Kashmir, 54.

96 Gilani has long been considered as hard-liner in Kashmiri politics and has never shifted from his

demands for a referendum to decide the future status of Kashmir.

128

children to study abroad.97

It was in early 1995, that the Indian Military created a cadre of

counter-militants, or also called Ikwan. Most of these people were surrendered militants

and were willing to work with security forces. These Ikwanis were bitterly hated by the

Kashmiri people. Armed by the security forces, they became law unto themselves,

arbitrarily looking and killing like brigands became order of the day. This counter

insurgency groups of surrendered militants targeted the JIJK workers, their family

members as well as their sympathizers.98

On November 14, 1998, Ghulam Mohmmad

Bhat, Amir of JIJK proclaimed his party‟s decision to sunder all links with armed

struggle, especially with HM. According to him,

JIJK suffered heavy loss due to its support in the armed struggle. Many of

its leaders and members were killed by security forces and renegades. The

decision to stop supporting armed resistance was strategic. It does not

mean [that] we will stop our support for the self-determination.99

Ghulam Mohmmad, in his press conference claimed that the members of his party

were being targeted by security personnel and pro-India militia groups. He said over

2000, JIJK workers had been murdered as part of a systematic campaign to finish this

party. The leaders of the JIJK explained their departure from supporting armed struggle

through reference to its constitution and thereby committed their organization to work for

the spread of Islam and universal brotherhood through peaceful means. He had argued

that although he believed that armed struggle was itself legitimate, it was response to a

specific phase of the secessionist movement and had now served its purpose. His

announcement has enraged Syed Ali Shah Gilani, Chairman of the APHC, who also

heads the political wing of JIJK, claimed that Amir of JIJK did not have the support of

his party cadres and reiterated his full support for the armed struggle. It was clear that the

97 Kashyani‟s (Amir JIJK) interview quoted in Khalid, “The Study of Religio-Cultural,” 176.

98 Harsh Mander, „The Threads of Life: Story from the Valley‟, The Hindu, (November 16, 2008), accessed

December 07, 2014, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-features/tp-sundaymagazine/the-threads-of-

life-story-from-the-valley/artic; see also Sumit Ganguly, “Slow Learning: Lessons from India‟s counterinsurgency Operation in Kashmir,” in India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, ed. Sumit

Ganguly and David P. Fielder (New York: Routledge, 2009), 84.

99 Interview with Ghulam Nabi Bhat quoted in Khalid, “The Study of Religio-Cultural,” 176.

129

confrontation had been brewing when Ghulam Mohmmad announced his decision of not

supporting armed struggle. It appeared that if JIJK was heading towards its split but the

intervention of the leaders of Majli-i-Shura it was saved from any split.100

After

distancing itself from the radical faction, today the leadership of the JIJK is relatively

moderate. Since last few years it, has been seeking to return to its original agendas of

strengthening educational institutions, organizing seminars and rallies against the spread

of social evils.101

Though officially it was declared that JIJK had no links with the HM, it

continues to be the part of hard line Islamist Gilan‟s Tehreek-i-Hurriyat which in turn

supports armed struggle.

Since 2000 onwards JIJK again started to concentrate on its reformative religious

programmers to get back to its constituency. For its election boycott in 2002 State

Assembly elections, JIJK had faced severe criticism from the other pro-self determination

groups as it had fought elections under Indian constitution. The party reasoned the contest

of 1987 elections as a constituent of Muslim United Front to impress the government of

India on the importance of Kashmir issue through electoral process. Syed Ali shah Gilani,

who had been elected more than once in the State Assembly, has stood against elections

in recent times. Even during 2008 assembly elections he campaigned for election boycott

throughout the Valley. Defending his participation in earlier elections he said:

I participated in elections for the sake of movement only. Even in assembly

I never missed a chance to raise the issue for self-determination of

Kashmirs, I always confronted Shaikh Abdullah for his policies and

compromises with Indian Government.102

100 Praveen Swami, “A Break With The Past,” Frontline 15, no. 25 (December 1998), accessed December

10, 2014, http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1525/15250380.htm

101 Ayesha Khanyari, “Jamaat-e-Islami: Limiting its Ambitions and Learning from the Past?” Institute of

Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), (April, 30 2014), accessed December 09, 2014,

http://www.ipcs.org/article/jammu-kashmir/jk-jamaat-e-islami-limiting-its-ambitions-or-learning-from-

4419.html

102 Interview with Geelani quoted in Khalid, “The Study of Religio-Cultural,” 177-178.

130

Apart from participating in anti-election campaigns, JIJK was responding to the

various political events and shared the common platform with other pro-self-

determination groups. It was in 2008 that JIJK as part of the Kashmir Action Committee

which was formed to protest against the transfer of 99 acres of land to Shri Amarnath

Shrine Board (SASB).103

The Amarnath cave revered by Hindus was discovered by Buta Malik, a Muslim

shepherd more than a century ago. The trek to the cave was made by foot or ponies

through a steep winding path of 46 kilometers from Pahalgam or 16 Kilometers from

Balatal. The duration of the pilgrimage was limited from fifteen to thirty days in

July/August, the period in which the ice formation was the best.104

It was in fact in 18th

century that the cave was discovered but until 1980s, this pilgrimage was known little

and in 1989, only 12000 pilgrims visited the cave. It is only after 1996, that the Amarnath

cave acquired its prominence when the militancy was at its peak in Kashmir.105

The

Amrnath cave has now become prominent pilgrimage destination for the devout Hindus

and over the years the number of pilgrimage have increased manifold. The idea of

establishing a shrine Board had taken its shape following the recommendations of the

Nitish Sengupta committee in 1996, which was set up by the state government to identity

the causes that led to the death of 200 yatris who were caught in bad weather. The act of

setting up of SASB as an independent body to facilitate the pilgrimage was passed by the

NC government in 2001.106

The Board has eight members and is headed by the state

Governor. The Governor‟s principal secretary is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of

the Board.107

103 Ibid.

104 Muzamil Jaleel, “The Yatra‟s Wrong Turn,” The Indian Express (June, 28, 2008), accessed December

04, 2014, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/the-yatras-wrong-turn/328693/

105 Gautam Navlakha, “State Cultivation of the Amarnath Yatra,” Economic and Political Weekly 43, no.

30 (July 26, 2008): 17-18.

106 Jaleel, “The Yatra‟s.”

107 Shakti Kak, “Hindutva, the Crisis of the State and Political Mobilisation in Jammu and Kashmir,”

History and Sociology of South Asia 3, no. 1 (June, 2009): 16.

http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/the-yatras-wrong-turn/328693/

131

The Amarnath pilgrimage erupted into a major controversy in 2008 on account of

the actions of the state when Governor S. K. Sinha presided over as the chairman of the

SASB. The CEO as principal secretary of the forest department, granted permission to

the SASB on May 2005 to use forest land for the pilgrimage. However, as this order in

violation of the J&K Forest conversation Act of 1977, the state government withdrew the

order. This withdrawal of permission was stayed by a division bench of the J&K High

Court. It was in 12 July 2007 that the proposal of giving 800 kanals of land was cleared

by the Forest Advisory committee headed by the Chief Secretary. Subsequently, on 26

May 2008, the state cabinet approved for the transfer of the forest land to SASB. The

announcement regarding transfer of forest land being permanent was made by CEO of

SASB in a press conference on 17 June, 2008. The transfer of forest land for yatra

erupted into widespread public protests throughout the Valley.108

In Kashmir Valley,

Geelani was instrumental in mobilizing general public and charged S. K. Sinha, with

working to “alter the demographic character of our state”. The scholar Yoginder Sikand,

tells us, JI leaders believe that “a carefully planned Indian conspiracy was at work the

Islamic identity of the Kashmiris”. The conflict over the land transfer brought the two

Hurriyat Conference and their leaders, the hardliner Gilani, and the moderate Mirwaiz

Omar Farooq, together on a shared platform.109

In Jammu, the call for restoration of

forest land was used as a slogan to mobilize the Hindu masses. It was only after the exit

of the governor S. K. Sinha that the new governor N. N. Vohra took the decision of

revoking the sale order of the forest land.110

Though JIJK as part of Kashmir Action

committee participated in the protest rallies, the ideological difference between the

secular nationalists and Islamists continued.

In sum, the post 1988 Kashmir witnessed the armed struggle in which secular

nationalist groups took the lead. Initially JIJK did not show any interest in the armed

struggle. While justifying its stand vis-à-vis the armed struggle, JIJK maintained that it

108 Ibid., 17.

109 Nils Ole Bubandt and Martijn Van Beek, ed. Varieties of Secularism in Asia: Anthropological

Exploration of Religion, Politics and the Spiritual (USA/Canada: Routledge, 2011), 114.

110 Kak, “Hindutva,” 18.

132

was always in favour of self-determination and believed that dialogue was the only way

to solve Kashmir problem. Nevertheless, JIJK, after few a year‟s started direct

involvement in the armed struggle. Subsequent encouragement by Pakistan to Islamist

groups like JIJK led to the displacement of secular nationalist groups and latter JIJK

became the part of Hizbul-ul- Mujahideen (HM). Immediately after armed struggle there

was the migration of Kashmiri Pandits from Kashmir Valley to other parts of India. It is

noteworthy that Pandits use the term displacement instead of migration. Majority of the

migrated Pandits shared their views that displacement of their community took place in

an atmosphere of fear created by Muslim separatists. The views shared by those Pandits,

who have not left Valley are different, instead of blaming Muslim community they are

blaming the government‟s inability to provide security to the minorities. There are

different narratives for their migration which vary from source to source. Therefore a

through independent enquiry can alone show whether this exodus of Pandits was entirely

unavoidable. Therefore a through independent enquiry can alone show whether this

exodus of Pandits was entirely unavoidable. It was in 1993 that All Parties Hurriyat

Conference (APHC), a political, religious and social groups came together to fight for

Kashmiri‟s right to self-determination. However disagreement among the secular and

Islamist leaders led to the split in APHC. Subsequently hard line Islamist Geelani

established his own Tehreek-e-Hurriyat in 2004. On June 17 2008, Amarnath pilgrimage

erupted into major controversy when the announcement regarding transfer of land being

permanent was made by CEO of SASB in a press conference. JIJK believes that „a

carefully planned Indian conspiracy [is] at work to change the Muslim identity of the

Kashmiris‟. It therefore maintains that the Muslim character of the state need to be

preserved at the same time interests of the non-Muslims be safeguarded.

4.5 Conclusion

The origin of the JIJK dates back to 1941 when a great Islamic scholar of India,

Moulana Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi founded the political–Islamic Organization the

Jamaat-e-Islami Lahore now in Pakistan on 26 August 1941. With the partition of the

subcontinent into two independent countries of India and Pakistan on August15, 1947, JI

133

also appeared into two independent organizations in these two respective countries i.e.

the Jama„at–i-Islami Hind (JIH) and the Jama„at-e-Islami of Pakistan (JIP). JIJK

continued to work with the JIH till 1952. It was due to certain political reasons

particularly regarding the final status of Kashmir that JIJK organized itself as a separate

entity in the state. JIJK started as a puritan and reformative movement. Its social base was

largely concentrated in rural areas in initial years. Traditionally rural areas in Kashmir

formed the strong social base for NC due to Sheikh‟s bold and pro-poor radical land

reforms. The land reforms which earlier consolidated the peasantry base of NC quite

paradoxically led to its erosion, which in turn strengthen the social base of JIJK, as

substantial segment of peasantry later came under its ideological influence.

JIJK emphasises more on Muslim identity of Kashmiris and considers the self-

determination movement in Kashmir as religious. It believes Muslims worldwide

constitute one monolith community and Islam is the basis of identity for Kashmiri

people‟s right to self-determination. Gilani makes it clear that armed struggle in Kashmir

is against India and not against Hindus. After freeing Kashmir from India JIJK would like

to see India as free, prosperous and peaceful. According to JIJK armed struggle in

Kashmir revolves around the Muslim identity, it criticizes the Kashmiri nationalism

based distinct cultural identity of Kashmiris. To them territorial nationalism has proved to

be the bane of Muslims. Gilani says Islam, makes a clear distinction between love for

their country (Watan dosti), which it allows, and territorial nationalism or „nation

worship‟ (watan parasti), which it clearly forbids. It is because of territorial nationalism

that world is witnessing strife, war and bloodshed. JIJK questions the legality of

Kashmiris accession to India and has consistently demanded that the future status of

Kashmir be decided through plebiscite. According to them Kashmiris right to self-deter

mination is based on the „Two Nation Theory‟. Basing two nation theory of their

argument, JIJK, argues that the Hindus and Muslims despite living together in the same

territory form two completely different nations. The Islamist ideology and discourse of

JIJK is manifested through its politics and responses to various socio-religious events in

Kashmir. JIJK has undergone many stages in Kashmir politics from a purely revivalist

organization to political party and from political party to a separatist organization. From

134

the very beginning JIJK, embarked upon a vigorous educational policy to inculcate

Islamic spirit among the students. The systems of schools were instrumental in providing

the JIJK a social base in the Valley. It started to establish schools in different parts of the

Valley and in the Muslim dominated areas of Jammu province. JIJK in its evolutionary

phase focused to prepare dedicated, trained and trustworthy cadres besides consolidating

its social base. It worked to bring more and more people in its fold particularly the youth.

Over a period of time JIJK gradually started involving in Kashmir politics by its

interaction with the state institutions at various levels. The relations between JIJK and

National Conference were satisfactory if not cordial before JIJK‟s participation in the

State Assembly elections. Sheikh Abdullah had positive opinion about JIJK and had

praised the role of schools run by it. JIJK in its memorandum demanded the immediate

release of Sheikh Abdullah, who was jailed for his demand for self-determination through

plebiscite. The confrontation between NC and JIJK began when Sheikh Abdullah wanted

the people‟s convention to adopt a resolution that the future setup of Kashmir should be

on secular and democratic basis. This was rejected by the JIJK. JIJK‟s participation in

1972 assembly elections, amidst the ban on Plebiscite Front further added to their

confrontation. It was for the first time that JIJK received constitutional recognition and

political legitimacy. In the aftermath of the 1975 accord, JIJK was not only critical to the

politics of National Conference but also pointed out how Article 370 rendered hollow and

almost of no significance through various constitutional orders. Sheikh in turn criticized

the JIJK by calling it as fundamentalist organization and enemy to the Kashmiri culture

and traditions. So the ideological and political rivalry between JIJK and Sheikh Abdullah

continued unabated. The last election that JIJK contested was in 1987. It was during this

election that Kashmiri Muslim identity was mobilized by an alliance of an Islamist

groups like JI, Ummat-e-Islami and Anjuman-e-Itthadh-ul-Muslimeen. JIJK was

criticized for its participation in elections, as non JIJK members perceived its ideological

compromise, secondly taking oath under Indian constitution to maintain its sovereignty.

JIJK therefore defended itself by saying that they took oath under the state of

compulsion.

135

The post 1988 Kashmir witnessed the armed struggle in which secular nationalist

groups took the lead. Initially JIJK did not show any interest in the armed struggle. While

justifying its stand vis-à-vis the armed struggle, JIJK maintained that it was always in

favour of self-determination and believed that dialogue was the only way to solve

Kashmir problem. Nevertheless, JIJK, after few a year‟s started direct involvement in the

armed struggle. Subsequent encouragement by Pakistan to Islamist groups like JIJK led

to the displacement of secular nationalist groups and latter JIJK became the part of

Hizbul-ul- Mujahideen (HM). Immediately after armed struggle there was the migration

of Kashmiri Pandits from Kashmir Valley to other parts of India. It is noteworthy that

Pandits use the term displacement instead of migration. Majority of the migrated Pandits

shared their views that displacement of their community took place in an atmosphere of

fear created by Muslim separatists. The views shared by those Pandits, who have not left

Valley are different, instead of blaming Muslim community they are blaming the

government‟s inability to provide security to the minorities. There are different narratives

for their migration which vary from source to source. Therefore a through independent

enquiry can alone show whether this exodus of Pandits was entirely unavoidable.

Therefore a through independent enquiry can alone show whether this exodus of Pandits

was entirely unavoidable. It was in 1993 that All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), a

political, religious and social groups came together to fight for Kashmiri‟s right to self-

determination. However disagreement among the secular and Islamist leaders led to the

split in APHC. Subsequently hard line Islamist Gilani established his own Tehreek-e-

Hurriyat in 2004. On June 17 2008, Amarnath pilgrimage erupted into major controversy

when the announcement regarding transfer of land being permanent was made by CEO of

SASB in a press conference. JIJK believes that „a carefully planned Indian conspiracy [is]

at work to change the Muslim identity of the Kashmiris. It therefore maintains that the

Muslim character of the state need to be preserved at the same time interests of the non-

Muslims be safeguarded.

Documents

CHAPTER―IVshodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/207121... · respective countries i.e. the Jama„at–e-Islami Hind (JIH) and the Jama„at-e-Islami of Pakistan (JIP).2 What