Character Evidence Revisited

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* Professor of Law, Albany Law School. The aut hor gratefully acknowledgesthe contributions of Maya Hadjiyancheva an d Lori Fowler.

1. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, A S ma ll Con tr ibu t ion to the De bat e Ove r the Prop osed Legi sl at io n Ab ol is hing th e Ch arac t er Ev id en ce Pr ohi bi ti on in S ex Of fense Pr osecu tion s , 44 S YRACUSE L. R E V . 1125, 1129 (1993). For example, the F ederal Rulesof Evidence, the formulation of the ru les of evidence in pl ace in t he su bstan ti almajority of American jurisdictions, i d . at 112 7, p rovide t ha t “[e]vide nce of a pe rson’sch aracter or a trai t of cha ra cter is no t admissible for the pu rpose of p roving act ionin con for mity t her ew it h on a pa rt icula r occa sion , e xcept . . . .” F E D . R. E VI D . 404(a ).

2. S ee, e.g. , Thom as J . Reed, Trial by Propensit y: Adm ission of Ot her Criminal Ac ts Ev id ence d in Fe d er al Cr im inal T ri al s , 50 U. C IN . L. R E V . 713, 7 39 (1981) (“Itfor[bids] th e a dm iss ion of oth er c rimi na l acts of th e accused a t tri al becau se of th esub stan ti al danger of un due pr eju dice to th e accused a risin g from inferent ial proof of the a ccused’s disposition to commit th e crime.”). In this regar d, the Feder al Rulesof Evidence r estate the general cha racter evidence rule in the context in which i t is

of part icular concern: “Evide nce of other cr imes, wrongs, or acts is not admissib le to pro ve th e ch ar act er of a p er son in or der to s how act ion in con form ity t her ewi t h.” F E D .R. E VI D . 404 (b).

3. See F E D . R. E VI D . 413 and 414, which became effective on Ju ly 9, 1995. Rule415 of th e Fe deral Rul es of Evidence, wh ich per mits th e introdu ction of similar eviden ce in civil ca ses concerning sexual assa ult or child molestation, was ena ctedsimulta neously along with Rules 413 and 414 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

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D :\ 1 9 9 8- 4\ F I N A L \ M E L - F IN . W P D J a n . 8 , 2 0 0 1

The Cha ra cter E vidence Rule Revisited

Kenneth J . Me li ll i *

I. I N T R O D U C T I O N

A long -st an ding fun da men ta l ten et of the ru les of eviden cein Ame rican jur isdict ions h as been a gen era l pr ohibition of char acte r evidence for th e pur pose of proving an actor’s confor-mity with a character trait on a particular occasion. 1 Althoughthis character evidence rule is not restricted to thecircum st an ce in wh ich t he pr osecution se eks to in tr oduce nega-tive character evidence concerning a criminal defendant, it isth e desire t o pr otect th e cr im ina l defen da nt from th e im pa ct of such evidence th at accoun ts for th e firm vitality of th e rule. 2

Recently, th e Feder al Rules of Evidence have been am endedso as to per mit t he govern ment , in pr osecutions for sexual as-sa ult or child moles ta tion , to in tr odu ce eviden ce of th e crim ina ldefendan t’s prior offenses of sexua l assa ult or child m olest at ion ,respectively. 3 These new additions to the Federal Rules of Evi-


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1548 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998

4. S ee, e.g. , R eport of th e J ud icia l Con feren ce on t he A dm iss ion of Ch ara cter E v i denc e in Cert ain S exu al M iscon du ct Ca ses , 159 F.R.D. 5 1, 53 (1995) [hereina fter Ju di ci al Con feren ce ]; Myrna S. Rae der, Am erica n B ar A ssoci a t ion C rim in al J us ticeS ection R eport to t he H ous e of Del egat es , 22 F ORDHAM U RB . L.J . 343 (1995).

5. See infra notes 150–163 and a ccompan ying te xt.6. See infra notes 164–177 a nd accompanying te xt.

dence received substantial opposition prior to their enactment,4

as well as a great deal of criticism since that time. 5 Not theleast of these criticisms has been directed at the new rules’unfounded premise t hat s ex offense cases merit ent irely differ-ent evidentiary treatment than do prosecutions for other crimes. 6

But while th ere m ight be n o just ificat ion for a crime-specificad jus tm ent t o the r ul es governin g the adm issibility of cha ra cter evidence, it does not follow tha t the solution is a re tur n to anoffense-neutral proscription against the introduction of char acte r evide nce. I n fact, as will be dem onst ra ted sh ortly, itdoes not a pp ear t hat an y such compr ehensive adh er en ce to thecha ra cte r evidence rule ha s ever r eally existed. Nevertheless,

by their as sa ul t u pon th e char ac te r ev idence ru le , th e newfederal ru les have provoked a ba cklash in defense of this sacredcow of evide nce la w. A close exa mina tion of th e r at ion al esadvanced for the preservation of the character evidence ruleactually lead to the following conclusions.

First, the character evidence rule is more rhetoric thansubst an ce; th e pra ctice in American courts belies any r ealcommitment to excluding character evidence. An uninitiatedobserver of our adjudicatory system would be astounded tolearn of th e cha ra cter eviden ce r ule, for cha ra cter eviden ce isadmitted here, there and everywhere.

Second, when stripped of hyperbole, the standardarguments for the character evidence rule are largelyspeculative and unper sua sive.

Third , th e only t ru ly cogent justifications for the cha ra cter eviden ce ru le are t hose foun ded, to some degree or a nother,upo n judicial econ omy an d cour tr oom efficiency. These concern sdo not support a broad exclusionary rule, but rather can beaccommodated by presumptively limiting relevant character evide nce t o the for m of pr ior convict ion s.

Fourth, when character evidence is admitted under the

cur re nt ru les, it get s in un der one or more of a varie ty of


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1547] CHARACTER EVIDENCE REVISITED 1549

7. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Th e U se of Ev iden ce of an Accu sed’s Unch arged Mi scon du ct to P rov e Mens Rea: Th e Doctrines Which T hreaten t o En gulf t he C haracter E v i d en c e Proh ibit ion , 51 O H I O S T . L.J . 575, 580–81 (1990).

8. In some cases, t he first step in t his pr ocess simply involves cred it ing th etes timon y of the cha racter witness. This occurs when the witne ss testif ies in t he formof opin ion (th e person al opin ion of th e witne ss , base d upon th e witne ss’s pe rsonalkn owledge of the in dividua l in quest ion) or rep ut at ion (a consen sus or collectiveopinion about the individu al in question, a s relayed to the jurors by the char acter wit ness). Examples of character ev idence in thes e forms w ould be testim ony by acharacter witness that the relevant individual is a violent person (opinion) or isreput ed by members of tha t individual’s social circle to be a violen t per son(re puta tion).

In other cas es, the first step in the pr ocess requires an actu al inference to bemade by th e jury. This occurs when t he cha racter witness t estif ies in th e form of oneor more specific insta nces of beha vior by the rele vant in dividual. For exa mple, if th echaracter witness were to testify that the relevant individual had physically beatenhis s pouse on a pa rt icular occasion or occasions, the ju ry might infer the in dividua l’sge neral propen sit y towar d viole nce ba sed upon such spe cific beh avi or.

Essent ially, th e a na lyt ical distin ction bet ween ch aract er evid ence in th e form of

complex theories and exceptions. As a consequence, sucheviden ce is usually accompan ied by jur y instru ctions inten dedto assist t he jur y in it s appropr iat e use. However , because su chin stru ctions ar e often b oth hopelessly confus ing an d contr ar y tocomm on sense, t here is no realist ic hope that they will befollow ed by ju rors.

A simpler, more straightforward approach to theadmis sibilit y of cha ra cter evidence would a lleviat e the above

problem s. Th is ar ti cl e will exam ine t he d eficiencies in t hecurrent approach, and will recommend such a simplifiedsolution.

II. T H E TR A D I T I O N A L S TAT E O F AF FA I R S

The essentia l cha ra cter istic of char acter evidence is th at itrequ ires t wo ste ps of logical in feren ce. First , the jur y mustdraw a conclusion from the evidence about an individual’sgenera l propensity to behave in a certain wa y, and second , the

ju ry must measur e the l ikelihood that th e same individ ual beha ved i n a ccorda nce wi t h t h is genera l p r ope nsit y on the pa r t icu la r occasion in qu es t ion . 7 Thus, the essential feature of character evidence is that its relevance depends upon aconclusion about an individual’s general propensity; if theeviden ce ha s relevan ce without n ecessar ily requ irin g aconclu sion a bout gener al propensity, it is not cha ra cter evidence and is n ot barred by t he chara cter evidence ru le. 8


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opinion or reput ation testim ony an d char acter evidence in th e form of specificinstances is t hat , in th e la t ter circum st ance, the jury mu st take the first step from

beh avi or to ge ne ra l pr op en si ty , wh ile in th e form er si tu a ti on , th e wit ne ss (in th e ca seof opinion t estimony) or even pers ons never h eard from directly in th e court room (inthe case of reputation test imony) have taken this f irst step for the jury. In bothscenari os, it is for t he ju ry to determ ine if, and to what degr ee, the second step(behavior on the occasion in que stion i n conformi ty with th e in dividu al’s gener al

pro pen si ty) s h oul d b e ta k e n .9. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

10 . S ee F E D . R. E VI D . 404(a)(1 ).11. This sequ ence is appar ent from the wording of Rule 404 (a)(1), which permits

“[e]vidence of a pertinen t t ra it of character offered by an accused , or by th e pr osecu tion to r ebu t t he s am e.” Id .

As noted earlier,9

th e prima ry concer ns un der lying t hechar acte r evidence rule ar e t he consequ ences of allowing th e

ju r y to draw con clusions about the general propens ity of acriminal defendant . If t he in tr odu ction of char acter eviden ceagainst the accused in a cri minal prosecution can be defended,then the use of character evidence in all other situations isappropriate as well. Consequently, the balance of this articlewill focus on t he most common a nd m ost d an gerou s scenar io:th e pr ose cut ion’s int rod ucti on of evide nce of th e defen dan t’scharacter.

Pr ior to th e recen t addit ions of Rules 413 an d 414 t o theFede ra l Rules of Evid ence, t her e a lrea dy exist ed a variet y of circumstances in which the government could introduceeviden ce of th e defen dant ’s cha ra cte r. These cir cum st an ces ar eembodied at five different points in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Each of these will be a ddr essed in tu rn .

A. Ru les 404(a) and 405(a)

One of the two exceptions to Rule 404(a)’s general pr oscript ion aga i ns t t he admission of character evide nce is aspecific allowan ce for eviden ce of th e cha ra cter of th e ac cused. 1 0

Th ere ar e, of course, two impor ta nt res tr ictions u pon t hisexception to the character evidence rule.

The first, and most important, of these limitations is thatthe defendant must go first; i .e., the government may notintroduce character evidence regarding the defendant unlessand until the defendant introduces character evidence abouthim self or h erself. 1 1 Wit hout qu estion , the goa l of pr ote cti ng thedefendan t from t he gover nm ent ’s negat ive chara cter eviden ce is


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12 . S ee F E D . R. E VI D . 405(a). The distin ction bet ween opinion an d repu ta tionte st imo ny as cont raste d with t es timony as to specific instan ces of conduct is discussed

su pr a at not e 8. The choice made in Ru le 405(a) might v ery well be regarde d as anodd one. I t requ ires the jury to tr ust the ju dgment of the witness (or those whogossip with t he witn ess) rat her tha n being presented with t he actu al beh avior of thede fen da nt . The prefer ence for opini on a nd repu ta tion eviden ce is cont rary to theconvent iona l wisdom as to t he relat ive p rob ative sup eriority of evidence of specificinstan ces of condu ct. S ee, e.g. , David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to ProveConduc t: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evid ence , 58 U. COL O . L. R E V . 1,16 & n.94 (1986–87). Moreover, reputat ion evidence is thought to be the least reliableand potentially the m ost dangerous form of character eviden ce. See H. RichardUviller, E v i d en ce of Ch ar ac te r to Prove Conduc t: Il lu si on , Il lo gi c, and In just ic e in th eCourtroom , 130 U. P A . L. R E V . 845, 885 (1982). Never th eless , opting to excludech aracter evi dence in the form of specific instan ces of conduct do es avoid pot ent iallytim e-consumin g cour t bat t les over the a ctu al prior conduct of the defendant. I t is ,ther efore, one of several specifics in the law governin g character evidence, suggest ingtha t su ch evidentiar y rules are driven in substan tia l part by concerns for court roomecon omy an d efficiency.

fully ad van ced by providing t he defenda nt with t he only key toth e locked door, behind wh ich lies evidence of the defendan t’scharacter. But the price that the defendant must pay to keepth at door locke d is t he fir st dem onst ra tion of the la w’s lack of total comm it ment to the character evidence rule. In respons e toa false accusa tion , a defenda nt ’s na tu ra l response would be tosta te, “I woul d not do such a th ing, an d t he people who kn owme will tell you t ha t.” A defendant who chooses t o callwitnesses to so t estify essen tia lly wa ives t he pr otection of th echaracter evidence rule.

There is, to be sure, not the slightest unfairness in thisar ra ngement. If there indeed exist s nega tive char acter evidence

be h ind t he now unlocked doors , then perha ps the defend ant ’sown chara cter witn esses a re not t o be believed, a nd su rely the

jur y is ent itle d t o more th an jus t h alf t he st ory . Never th eless , if character evidence, and in particular, negative character evidence, is so prejudicial, why allow it even under thesecircumstan ces? It wou ld seem t ha t eit her su ch char acter evidence has some rea l va lue or the ru le is a less tha n gen uin eatt empt to inhibit defend an ts from in tr oducing positivecharacter evidence concerning themselves.

Th e second lim itat ion on th e int rodu ction of char acte r evidence regard ing th e defen dant is tha t s uch evidence must be

presen te d in the form of opin ion or r epu ta t ion t e st imony on lyan d not a s e vid ence of spe cific in st a nces of con du ct. 1 2 While this


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13 . S ee F E D . R. E VI D . 405 (a).14 . See 2 J ACK B. W EINSTE IN E T AL ., W E I N S TE I N ’S E VIDENCE ¶ 405[04], at 405–50

(199 6).15 . S ee E DWARD W. CLEARY ET AL ., M C CORMICK O N E VIDENCE § 191, at 569 &

n.28 (3d e d. 1 984 ).16 . See 2 W EINSTE IN E T AL ., su pr a note 14, ¶ 405[04], at 405–50 to 405–51.

migh t appear t o be only a m at ter of form r at he r th an substan ce,ther e is one fu rt her a sp ect of the r ule t ha t deserves att ention.

On cross-examin at ion of a chara cte r witn ess , questi ons ar e pe rm it ted a s t o speci fi c i ns t a nces of the defenda n t ’s conduct. 1 3

Thus, for e xam ple, th e cha ra cte r witn ess who testifies tha t t hedefendan t is, or is reput ed to be, a peaceful person m ay becross-exam ined as to specific inst an ces of violent or aggr essive

beh avior of th e defe nda n t . The theor y u nde r lying t he a llowanceof su ch inquir ies in to specific inst an ces of condu ct is not t ha tsuch questions and answers are admitted to prove thedefen dan t’s cha ra cte r, bu t ra ther are admit ted to en able the

jur y t o de ter m in e wha t we igh t , if a ny, s hould be give n to thetestimony of the character witness. 14 If the positive char acter witnes s does not know or ha s not hea rd of the nega tive

beh avior of t he de fen da n t , then the cha racte r wi tness a rgua b lydoes not t ru ly know of th e defen da nt’s ch ar acter or r eputa tion;if the positive cha ra cter witn ess does kn ow or has h eard of t henega tive behavior of the de fendant , th en t he posit ive opin ion or re put at ion test imony of the char acter witness is pr esu ma bly of lesser or no value. 15 Such inquiries on cross-examination aretypically accompa nied by a limit ing in stru ction directing th e ju r y to conside r such questions and a nswers, n ot as nega tiveeviden ce of th e defenda nt ’s cha ra cter, bu t ra th er as evid encewh ich, in th e ju dgmen t of th e jur y, can only be used indetermining what weight, if any, to assign to the character witnes s’s tes tim ony of the defenda nt ’s positive chara cter. 16

Here we have the first of several examples of the law’stheoretical observance of the character evidence rule by thedevice of a likely ineffectual jury instruction. The actualevidence presented to the jury on cross-examination—specificinstances of bad conduct in the context of testimony as to thedefen dant’s g ood cha ra cter—has all th e ear ma rks of character evidence. The defendan t is sa id to be a peaceful, nonviolent

per son, a nd it comes to l igh t tha t he or she ha s physica lly

assaulted several individuals on several prior occasions. That


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17 . See 2 i d . ¶ 405[04], at 405–51.18 . See Abraha m P. Ordover, Ba la nc in g th e Pr esum pt io ns of Gu il t an d

In nocen ce: Ru le s 40 4(b) , 60 8(b) an d 60 9(a) , 38 E MORY L.J . 135 (1989).

th is is affir mat ive eviden ce of a violen t pr open sity ca nn otseriously be doub ted, an d, more to th e point , it is im probableth at th e ju ry will confin e it s consider at ion of th is evidence to itsnominal noncharacter perimeters. 1 7

In fact, one of the two theories on which such cross-examination is permitted—that the value of the character witness’s t estim ony is dimi nished becau se th e cha ra cte r witness is unaware of the negative behavior—dependsnecessarily upon the actual existence of such behavior on the

pa r t of the defend an t . I t is un rem ar ka ble tha t a char ac te r witn ess is un awar e of an event th at did not actua lly take place.Therefore, when the character witness who has testified as toth e defen dant ’s nonviolent cha racte r admits on cr oss-exam inat ion t o ignora nce concer ning th e defen dant ’s p rior assaults, there c an be no diminut ion of the character witness’stestimony unless the jury accepts that there really were suchincidents of prior assaultive behavior on the part of thedefendant. This renders it all the more improbable that theapplicable limiting instruction will accomplish its stated

pur pose . The jur y, having concluded that t he defen dant hasengaged in a ssa ultive conduct , is now inst ru cte d not to consider th is as affirm at ive evidence of th e defendant’s char acter evenas it r esolves the very qu estion of the defen dan t’s cha ra cter for violence or peacefulness.

The unlikelihood that the jury will both comprehend andobey the limiting in st ruction att en da nt to this evidence is not

pr em ised upon a pe jo ra tive as sessm en t of ei ther th eintelligence or the good faith of jurors. The problem lies notwith the jurors, but with t he instruction itself. Lawyers are

p rone to crea t e th eor e t ical d is t in ct ion s t ha t a re e it her illusor yor impos sible to apply pr actically, es pecia lly by ju rors wh o arenot par t icipants in the intellectua l hair-splitting activities thatspawn such distinctions. 18 Children can pretend th at th e familydog is a lion for t he pu rposes of a par ty gam e, but the lat e-

arriving child not involved in the game can hardly be blamedfor g azing at th e ani mal an d pr onouncin g, “It’s just a dog.”Although even a thorough indoctrination in the reasons


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19 . S ee, e.g. , Imwinkelried, su pr a note 1, at 1140–41, 1145–46.20. After restating th e general pr oscript ion embodied in t he cha racter evidence

rule, th e relevan t section of Rule 404(b) provides t ha t “[e]vidence of other c rimes,wrongs , or acts . . . may, however, be admissible for other pur pos es, s uch as pr oof of motive, opportuni ty, intent , preparat ion, plan, knowledg e, ident ity, or a bse nce of mis tak e or accident .” F E D . R. E VI D . 404 (b).

und erlying the lim it ing inst ru ction migh t not advan ce th e goa lof th e instru ction, the ab sen ce of any explan at ion virtua llyinsures failur e.

So why does the law continue to perm it wha t a ppear s to becha ra cte r evidence to reach t he jury, shielding the defendantwith only a feeble ju ry cha rge r estrict ing considera tion to itsnonchara cter use? Sur ely it is not an un wa rr ant ed fai th in suchan instr uction ; th e case for th e cha ra cter eviden ce prohibition islar gely prem ised upon th e claim ed ineffectiveness of in str ucti ons confin ing ju ror consider at ion of su ch eviden ce t o anon-prejudicial scope. 19 Perhaps the explanation is that, whileth e limiting instru ction a llows u s to wor sh ip at t he alta r of thecha ra cte r evidence rule, in r ealit y we are not truly persuaded of the rule’s worth . Perh aps we ar e not terr ibly bother ed by t headmission of wha t ha s all the appea ra nce of what t he chara cter evidence rule categorizes as prejudicial evidence because we

be li eve, or a t le a st susp ect , t ha t such evidence , even used“improperly,” is rea lly quit e r elevant .

B . Ru le 404(b)

Th e circumstan ces governed by Rules 404(a) an d 405(a) ar e by no mea ns t he on ly s it ua t ion in wh ich this phenome nonoccurs. Wit hout a dou bt, th e most sign ifica nt ar ea of th e la w of eviden ce in which t his occur s is th e well-ensconced rule,embodied in the second sen ten ce of F edera l Ru le of E vid ence404(b), 20 allowing t he int roduction of specific insta nces of badconduct, having all the indications of character evidence, for what the law deems a noncharacter purpose. To illustrate,suppose that the defendant is on trial for a bank robbery inwhich th e actor crea ted a d ivers ion by pla cing an explosive inthe automatic teller machine and then, posing as an employeeof an ind ependen tly contr acted clea ning service, used a vacuumcleaner to collect t he cash from th e ab an doned st at ions of t hedistracted tellers. In the likely event that the identity of the


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21 . See id.22 . S ee, e.g. , Hud dle ston v. Uni ted Sta tes, 485 U.S. 681 , 689–90 (19 88).23 . S ee C LEARY ET AL ., su pr a note 15 , § 190, at 558; 2 W EINSTE IN E T AL ., su pr a

note 14, ¶ 404[08], at 404–44 to 404–45.

per p et ra tor i s a contest e d issue a t t r i a l, th e govern men t wou ldalmost surely be permitted to introduce evidence that the

pa r t icu la r de fe nd a n t ha d used th e sam e mod us operandi to roboth er ba nk s on oth er occasions. This evidence would be alloweddespite the fact th at the defen dant i s not cha rged with a ny butthe first-mentioned robbery, and despite the fact that theevidence itself has all the qualities of the supposedly dreadedcharacter evidence, i.e., specific acts (prior bank robberies)indicating a general propensity (defendant robs ba nks) used asevi den ce of beha vior on t he occas ion in ques tion (robbed t his bank).

Th e theory upon wh ich t he a dmissibility of such eviden ce isallowed is that it ha s a legitima te n onchar acter relevance (inth e examp le above, to prove the r obber’s iden tification by th edist inctive met hod used) that is distinct from th e use of suchevidence to demonstrate a general propensity. However, thisdist inction exist s in pr inciple only. On e ca n a na lyt ica llyseparate how the defendant robs banks from the fact that thedefendant robs banks, but in reality one cannot learn how thedefendant robs banks without being informed that thedefendan t robs bank s. The evidence of the de fendant ’scharacter is admitted, and it is only to the extent that we aresu ccessful in persu adin g the jur y to view it oth er wise t ha t suchevidence could be deemed t o be nonchara cter evidence.

1. Th e 404(b) prerequisi tes

To be su re, a dm ission of such evide nce is not au toma tic.Fi rst, th e propone nt m ust give notice t o th e a ccused u ponrequest . 2 1 Second, the tr ial court must be satisfied that arational jury could find that the uncharged misconduct didoccur. 22 Third, th e tria l cour t must be persuaded that there is alegitimate, noncharacter purpose to such evidence. 23 Fourth,the trial court must balance the usefulness of the evidenceagain st th e poten tia l pr ejud ice of the ju ry u sing such e viden ce

to deter mine the gen eral pr open sit y, or cha ra cter , of the


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24 . See 2 W E IN S TE I N E T A L ., su pr a note 14, ¶ 404[08], at 404–45.25 . S ee Imwinkelried, su pr a note 1, at 1126.26. In fact , even in a crimin al case in wh ich th e evidence is offered aga inst the

accused, the government need only sa tis fy the court that the jury could find th at th e pr ior ba d ac ts oc cur r ed by a pr ep on de ra nc e of th e ev id en ce. S ee Hudd leston , 485 U.S.at 689–90. Conseque nt ly, even condu ct which ha s been th e sub ject of a prior acquitta l(r epr esent ing only the failure of the governm ent’s evidence to reach th e higher th reshold of proof beyond a reas onable doubt) may be intr oduced in a subsequen t

pr osecu tion un der Rul e 4 04( b). See Dowling v. U nited S tate s, 4 93 U .S. 342 (1990).27 . S ee Raeder, su pr a note 4, a t 348–4 9; cf. Edward J . Imwinkelrie d, S o m e

Commen ts Abou t Mr. David K arp’s Rem arks on Propensity E vid ence , 70 C H I .-K E N T L.R E V . 37, 39 (1994) (reporting that bot h sides of t he debate feel cour ts a re “undulysolicitous” to the oth er sid e).

28 . S ee 2 D AVID W. L OUISELL & CH R I S TO PH E R B. M U E L L E R , F EDERAL E VIDENCE§ 136, at 132 (1985); Glen We issen berger, Ma ki n g Se ns e of Ex tr ins ic A ct E vid ence:

Fe de ra l Ru le of Ev id ence 404(b) , 70 I OWA L. R E V . 579, 57 9-80 (1985).

accused.24

In mak ing th is final determina tion, the court m ustconsider that such e vidence is, seem ingly wit hout except ion ,accompa nied by a limi ting ins tr uction jux ta posing th e

per mis sible noncha r acter use a nd th e forbidden char ac te r tr eatmen t of the evidence. 2 5

In practic e, these requirements are often sat isfied. The firstis solely procedural and limits only those who are simplyunprep ar ed for tr ial. Th e second requirement is a nomina lre quir eme nt t ha t t here sim ply exist su fficien t evidence to rai sea jury question as to th e occurrence of the prior bad ac ts. 2 6 T heth ird prer equisite to a dmissibility u nder Rule 404(b) mightha ve been a significan t lim ita tion if the per missiblenonchara cter uses of such evidence had been narr owlycircum scribed. But th is h as not been th e case. The d ecisionsre solving Rule 404(b) issues h ave been qu ite liberal insustaining the theories of admissibility advanced by

prosecu tors. 27 Indeed, the frequency with which the exceptionst o Rule 404(b)’s gener al ru le of exclus ion ar e successfullyinvoked has pr ompted some comment at ors t o suggest t ha t it isth e exclusion of such evidence tha t is tr uly the exception r at her than th e ru le. 2 8

Th e pra ctical impact of Rule 404(b) m ust be unde rst ood notonly in th e proportion of cases in which t hese issues a reresolved, but also in the quantity of such cases in which theseissues ma ter ialize. Rule 404(b) accounts for a grea ter nu mb er of

publ ish ed ju dici a l opinions than any othe r pr ovision in the


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29 . See Imwinkelried, su pr a note 7, at 577. Professor Imwinkelried hasch aracter ized “[t]he admissibilit y of un char ged misconduct evidence [as] the singlemost im por tan t is sue in con tem por ary crim in al eviden ce la w.” I d . at 576 (citing toEdward J. Imwinkelried, Un charged Mi scon du ct: One of th e Most Misu nd erst ood

Iss ues in Cri m in al E vid ence , C RI M . J US T ., Su mm er 1986, at 6 , 7).30 . See Ord over, su pr a note 18, at 142.31 . See Weisen berger, su pr a note 28, at 579.32 . See Imwink elrie d, su pr a note 1, at 1136.33 . See supra note s 21–25 and a ccompan ying te xt.34 . S ee 1A J O H N H ENRY W IGMORE , E V I D E N C E I N T RIALS AT C O M M O N L AW § 54.1,

at 1151–52 (1983); Office of Legal Policy, Report t o the Att orney General on the Ad m iss ion of Cr imin al H is to ries at Tr ia l , 22 U. M IC H . J.L. R E F O R M 707, 719 (1989)[hereinafter Ad m iss ion of Cr im in al H ist ories ]; Thomas J . Reed, A d m iss ion of Ot her Criminal Act Evidence After Adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence , 53 U . C IN . L.R E V . 113, 115, 158, 161 (1984).

Federal Rules of Evidence,29

a nd th e in tr odu ction of eviden ce of un cha rged crim ina l conduct under Rule 404(b) ha s appa rentlyincreased subst antially since 1975, when the F eder al Ru les of Evidence were enacted. 3 0 The volume of cases in which courtsar e both asked t o admit evidence u nder Rule 404(b) an d in factgrant such requests has led to the popular conception thatcrea tive prosecut ors will usu ally be successful in gene ra ting ath eory for introdu cing evidence of th e defen dan t’s pr ior,un charged misbeh avior before t he jury. 3 1

Th at pa rt icular piece of plebeian wisdom is und oubt edlyoverst at ed, but th e fact r em ains t ha t, in pra ctice, Ru le 404(b)’sgate sw ings open wid er a nd m ore oft en tha n one migh t exp ect ,given th e const an t and vociferous incant at ion of th e cha ra cter evidence rule. Some have suggested that the problem, if it is a

p r oble m , can be t ra ced t o th e non exclus ive lan gu a ge of R ule404(b)’s second sent ence. S pecifica lly, t he r ule’s pr ovision th a tevidence otherwise inadm issible under the cha ra cter evidencerule “may . . . be admissible for other purposes, s u ch as . . .”followed by a list of noncharac ter th eories of a dmiss ibility,ma kes clea r t ha t t his list is inten ded t o be illust ra tive, an d notexhaustive. 32 Ra th er t ha n viewing th e Ru le 4 04(b) list of th eories of admissibilit y as a closed un iver se of possibilities, t he

p rev a ilin g in terpr e tat ion of Rule 404(b) is t ha t , subject to theothe r requirem ent s specified above, 33 evidence of prior mi scondu ct is adm issible un less its r elevan ce depends solelyupon th e defenda nt ’s gen era l pr open sit y t o comm it the chargedcrime. 34


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35 . S ee Reed, su pr a note 2, at 713.36 . See Thomas J . Reed, The Develop m ent of th e Propensity Rule in Fe deral

Criminal Causes 1840–1975 , 51 U. C IN . L. R E V . 299, 302, 303, 322, 325 (1982).37 . S ee Reed, su pr a note 2, at 717.38 . S ee Reed, su pr a note 34, at 113.39 . S ee Reed, su pr a note 2, at 713–14.40 . S ee Julius Stone, The Rule of E xclus ion of S im ilar A ct Evidence: Am erica ,

51 H AR V . L. R E V . 988, 98 9–91 (1938).41 . S ee Julius Stone, The R ule of Exclu sion of S im ilar A ct E vid ence: England ,

46 H AR V . L. R E V . 954 (1933).42 . S ee Stone, su pr a note 40, at 991; Stone, su pr a note 41, at 954.43 . See id. at 960–65; 1A W IGMORE , su pr a note 34, at 1213 (“In early English

This inclusionary approach stands in contrast to the“traditional,” exclusionary rule that would only admit whatwould oth erwise be char acter e vidence if its logical rele vancefell wit hin a list of well-defin ed exce pt ion s. 3 5 I t h as been ar guedth at th e exclusionary form ulation of the chara cter evidence ru leis the only approach t ha t is faith ful to the origins of the r ule,

bot h in the com m on la w of t he United Sta te s 3 6 and, evenearlier, in the common law of England. 3 7 The arrival of theinclusionary approach of Rule 404(b) in 1975 is supposed toha ve re ver sed t he then-pr eva iling exclusionary a pp roach, 38

re sult ing in a n objection able exp an sion of other crimes eviden ceintroduced against criminal defendants. 3 9 Presumably, then,the large volume of other crimes evidence that makes its wayin to Ame rican court s p ur suan t t o Ru le 404(b) an d its progeny issim ply a r ecent mistake, represen ts n o failur e of the character evidence rule in principle, and can be corrected simply by are tu rn to th e tr aditional, exclusionary character evidence rule.However, neit her history nor rea son allows t he liber al use of Rule 404(b) by pr osecutors t o be expla ined a way so ea sily.

2. Historical absence of an exclusionary rule

Fi rst, an y claim th at the cha ra cte r evidence ru le developedas a gen era l rule of exclusion is sim ply short s igh ted. The

per vas ive be li ef th at th e comm on law ordina ri ly disa llowedeviden ce of sim ila r crimes is a ctua lly r efu ted by t he h istorica lrecord. 40 The character evidence rule in this country hasactua lly und ergone sever al tra nsforma tions du rin g its growth. 4 1

The rule in the United States was originally based upon thethe n-existin g pra ctice in E ngland. 4 2 Neither the ear ly Englishcases 43 nor the ea rly English text wr iters 4 4 specified an y general


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50 . See Stone, su pr a note 41, at 975–76.51 . See id. at 976.52 . See id . Any other result would have been remar kable. Why would, or should,

the law susta in in perp etuity th eor ies of relevance th at ha d arisen in cases up to a p a rt i cul ar mom en t i n t im e, b ut per ma ne nt ly s hu t t he door to t he ide nt ica l ty pe of de velopment of theories of relevan ce in unp rece dented circumstan ces in futur e cases?

53 . See 22 C HAR LES AL A N W RIGHT & K E N N E T H W. G RAHAM , J R ., F EDERALP RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE § 523 9, a t 432 (1978).

54 . See 22 i d . § 5239, at 428. Even Wigmore described th e modern comm on lawcha racter evidence rule in in clusionary term s:

The usual black-letter description of the character evidence rule found inthe l iter atu re and in codes today . . . s im ply a sse rts t hat i t is improper for a tr ier of fact to determine wh at a person did on a pa rticular occasion byask ing an d answering th e qu est ion of whether that per son has t he sort of disposition th at w oul d in cline him toward t he d oing or not -doin g of that a ct.Phr ased in this way, the ru le seems at f irst sight to ha ve a wide am bit.

Moder n an alysis, howev er, give s t he chara cte r evid ence rule a rela tivelyrestricted mea ning. I t is ge nerally said that the pr opensity rule does notforbid any use of evide nce th at re flect s ba dly on th e ch aract er of a person,and ther e is no such pr ohibit ion even when i t ha ppen s tha t th e acts of the

per son sh ow n ar e no t th os e th at ar e ou r ul ti ma te con ce rn in t he la wsu it inquest ion but ser ve only as a basis for ascert aining som e ot her m atter of fa cttha t does ha ppen to be of more im mediate con cer n. The rule againstch aracter evid ence, it is thou ght, prohibits t he use of evidence th at re flect s

inclu siona ry form ulat ion becam e the sta ted exceptions.50

Despite this reversal in formulation, it is doubtful that it hadany practical consequences. 5 1 Cat egor ies for which suchevidence could be relevant (other than to show general

pr open sit y) contin ued to develop; t he on ly dis t inct ion was tha tthese categories were added to a list of exceptions to what wasth eoret ically a g ene ra l rul e of exclu sion, instea d of simply beingincluded among an illustrative list demonstrating a generalru le of adm issibility. Notwithst an ding a chan ge in how the“ru le” was a rt iculate d, th e lis t of sit ua tion s in wh ich eviden ce of uncharged misconduct was found to be relevant continued toexpand and develop. 52

By the t ime of th e adop tion of the Fed era l Ru les of Evidence, most court s wer e art icula tin g the ch ar acter evidencerule using the exclusionary formulation. 5 3 But, semanticdist incti ons a side, the r e-adopt ion of inclusiona ry langu age inRule 404(b), like the nineteenth century switch from theinclusionary to the exclusionary approach, did not give rise toan y significant change in t he ad missibility of such evidence.Even under the prerules common law formulation, theexclusionary rule was avoided easily and often. 5 4 Shifting back


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on the char acter of a person when a nd only when th at evidence is offeredin order to show th at th e per son a cted in a cert ain way on a particular occasion becau se he ha d a propensit y or in clinat ion to a ct t ha t way. If t heevidence th at re flect s ba dly on th e ch aract er of a per son is offer ed for an yoth er purpose, it does n ot offend the prohibit ion against th e use of chara cter evidence.

1A W IGMORE , su pr a note 34, § 54.1, at 1151-52.

to the inclu siona ry a ppr oach in Rule 404(b) me rely sta tes th erule in a manner more faithful to its historical origins, and

perhaps stat es it i n a m anner more in conform ity with actua l pra ct ice.

Regardless of th e tru e his torical deriva tion of the ru le, th eattribution of such extraordinary significance to the semanticdist inct ion between th e inclu siona ry an d exclusionar yapproaches also fails to withstan d reasoned analysis. One mustkeep in mind that, regardless of the form of the rule, thedistinction present in both Rule 404(b) and its predecessor comm on law ru les bet ween inadm issible “propensit y” eviden cean d admis sible “nonchara cter ” eviden ce only ma kes sen se if that distinction is real. There must be an articulable,compr ehens ible bounda ry between th e two; oth erwise the

p le t hor a of motions, ob jections, judici al op inions a nd li te r at ur eon the subject is truly the modern, legal equivalent of theem peror’s new clothes. If t he dist inct ion between wha t isadmissible noncharacter evidence and inadmissible character eviden ce is r eason ably clea r, t hen wha t pos sible differ ence ca nit make which is labeled the rule and which is labeled theexcept ion ? Each cas e sh ould come out correctly regar dless of which half of the dichotomy enjoys the status of “the rule.” Aglass th at is filled half way and a glass tha t is filled completelyand th en emptied b y half both conta in the same q uan tity at theend of the p rocess.

One possible response to this point is that the exclusionaryform of th e ru le, by r estr ict ing the t heories of releva nce t o aspe cified, closed list of possibilit ies, will r esu lt in th e exclusionof other crimes evidence in ca ses wher e admis sibilit y wouldha ve been p rem ised u pon a th eory of releva nce not included inth e tr aditiona l list embodie d in th e second sent ence of Rule404(b). The flaw in th is respon se is empir ica l. An exa min at ionof th e an nota ti ons following Ru le 4 04(b) r eve als t ha t de cision sad mitt in g eviden ce u nder Rule 4 04(b) do so, almost invar iably,


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55. One notable except ion to th is observa t ion i s United S tates v. Procopio , 88F.3d 21, 29–30 (1st Cir . 1996), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct . 620 (1996), and cert. denied,117 S. Ct. 1008 (1997). In Pr ocopio , several defendant s were charged with var iousoffenses, including conspira cy, arising out of the a rmed robber y of an ar mo red tru ck in 1991. Th e governmen t was able to intr oduce evid ence of gun s, ha ndcuffs, a sta te

police u n i for m a nd ba dg e, an d a po li ce sc an ne r se iz ed in 19 93 fr om an ap a rt m en twhich was the r esidence of one defendant a nd th e temporary residence of another defend ant . Over the objection of these defendants that this was impermissiblecha racter eviden ce because i t revealed a p ropen sit y to commit r obberies, the courtsallowed the evidence on the theory that i t demonstrat ed a “crimina l associa tion ”

be tw ee n th ese t wo def end a nt s. Spe ci fic al ly , th e th eor y of a d m iss ibil ity was t h a t t h e

association of th ese two defend an ts in 1 993 was som e evidence of their as socia tiontwo years ea rl ier. The defendants ad mitted th eir association with each oth er in 1991in the m onths following the r obbery, but the courts r ule d tha t t he 1993 associa tioninferred from th e ph ysical eviden ce h ad specia l relevance beca use it, u nl ike t headmitted 1991 associat ion, was a criminal association.

Had the case involved the same c ha rges aga inst a single defenda nt a nd the p h y sica l ev id en ce of other si mi la r cr im es be en foun d in t ha t de fe nd an t’ s ap ar t me nttwo years after th e date of the charged offense, the evidence wou ld pre sum ably h ave

be en excluded a s ina dmis sible cha ra cte r e vi den ce . Th e only dist in cti on b etwe en t hishy poth et ical scen ario an d the actua l fact s of Procopio is t hat t he lat ter si tu ationinvolved mu lt iple actors. Evidence su ggestin g the genera l propen sity of a sin glein dividu al to commit rob beries may be char acter evidence whi ch is inadmissible under the first sen tence of Rule 404(b), but app arent ly t he same evidence s uggesting t hege neral propens ity of two indiv iduals t o commit robberies together is non character eviden ce ad missible u nder th e se cond sen tence of Rule 404(b). What t he cour t labelsas evidence of a criminal a ssociation m ight just a s we ll be designat ed a s gr oupcha racter evidence.

Arguably, another excep tion to the observation i n th e text is the “doctrine of chan ces,” discussed at infra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. As will be seen,ho wever, all or virtu ally all of the “doctrine of chan ces” cases ha ve been, or couldha ve bee n, p laced wit hin one or m ore of the tra dit iona l categor ies of admissibilitycatalogued in Rule 404(b).

56 . See 2 W EINSTE IN E T AL ., su pr a note 14, ¶ 404[08], at 404–44.57 . See David J . Kar p, Ev id en ce of Pr op en si ty an d Pr ob ab il it y in Se x Of fe ns e

Cas es an d Oth er Cases , 70 C H I .-K E N T L. R E V . 15, 35 (1994).

under one of the specified theories of relevance. It seems thatafter several cen tur ies of exp eriment at ion, t he u niver se of

possible “noncha ra cter” theor ies of rele va nce h as b ecom esubst an tially closed, th e inclusionar y formu la tion of th e r ulenotwithstanding. 5 5

The real answer to the objection stated above, and in turnth e explanat ion for t he atte nt ion devote d to what ought to be atrivial distinction as to form, is that the boundary betweenwh at Rule 404(b) an d like rules allow and disa llow could ha rdly

be less clear. The dist in ct ion re qu ir ed by Ru le 404(b) ha s beenchara cterized a s so per plexing 5 6 and vagu e 5 7 t h a t t he re i s li tt l e


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58 . See id. ; Karp, su pr a note 57, at 34-35.59 . S ee 22 W RIGHT & G R A H A M § 5239, su pr a note 53, at 431. This difficulty, in

th e view of some comment ators, has led some cour ts in some cas es to admit eviden cethat properly sh ould h ave be en excluded. S ee, e.g. , Imwinkelried, su pr a note 7, at 578;

see also Pr ocopio , 88 F.3d at 29–30.60 . S ee, e.g. , 1A W IGMORE , su pr a note 34, § 54.1, at 1152, 1155–56; Richard B.

Kuhns, Th e Propensity to M isu nderst and t he Charact er of S pecif ic Acts Evidence , 66IOWA L. R E V . 777 (1981); Lee E . Teitelbau m et al., Eva lua tin g th e Prej ud icia l E ffect of Evidence: Can J udges Identify the Im pact of Improper Evidence on Ju ries? , 1983W IS . L. R E V . 1147 (1983); Uviller, su pr a note 12, at 882.

61 . S ee 1A W IGMORE , su pr a no te 34, § 54.1, at 115 2 n.1; Or dover, su pr a n o t e18, at 147, 157.

6 2. F o r e xa m p le , i n Carson v. P olley , 689 F.2d 562 (5t h Cir. 198 2), a c ivil right sact ion again st law enforceme nt officials for th e use of excessive for ce in th e condu ctof an arrest , th e plain tiff a ppe ale d from a jud gment ent ered on a jury ver dict for theseveral defenda nts. On appeal, th e cour t held tha t it was reversible er ror for thedistr ict court t o have excluded a perform ance eva lua tion rep ort rega rding one of thedefendants, conta ining a comm ent tha t the defen da nt “needed t o ‘work on controll ing[his] temp er an d per son al feelings ,’ because he ‘ten ds to get int o argu men ts wit hinmate s, lets h is t empe r fl are up too quick ly.’” Id . at 571. The court ruled that thisre port “te nd ed t o sh ow [the defend an t’s] intent to do harm to [the plaintiff] when

b ooki n g hi m at t he ja il , an d, th er ef or e, wa s ad mi ss ib le un de r th e ‘int en t’ excep tionto the general rule against character evidence.” I d . at 572. Apparent ly, prior incidentsof angry en counters with inmat es is not evidence of a ge nera l disposition to suchencounters, but is evidence of a specific intent t o har m an individual tha t thedefend ant had not yet met a t th e t ime of the incidents for ming t he basis for t hereport .

In United S tates v. Had away , 681 F.2 d 214 (4th C ir. 1982), a prosecu tion for aiding and abett ing the th eft of televisions from an interst ate sh ipmen t, evidence of the defenda nt’s crimi na l involvement in thr ee subsequent thefts of interstatesh ipme nt s of, respectively, 1,000 cases of tuna fish, Goodyear tires , and a tra iler

cons iste ncy in th e decisions of cour ts at temp ting to apply therule. 5 8 Courts often ha ve difficulty iden tifying an d applyin g thedistinction between t he a dmiss ible and t he inadmissible. 5 9

The confusion is easy to understand. The example chosenea rlier, r ega rdin g proof of iden tifica tion by mean s of a un iquemodus operandi , is actually one of the relat ivelycomprehe ns ible exa mpl es of allow able Ru le 4 04(b) evid ence. F or m ost other exam ples, t he distinct ion requir ed by Rule 404(b) isfar m ore obscur e. 60 The dist inct ion is pa rt icu lar ly elu sive, if notillusive, in cas es in wh ich th e evidence is ad mit ted t o provesome level of scien ter , such a s kn owledge, a bsence of mi st ak e or accident and, in particular, intent. 6 1 There are countlessexamples of th e in tr odu ction of eviden ce of pr ior bad a cts,osten sibly a dm itte d, not t o show a propensity t o enga ge in thespecified conduct, but rather to demonstrate the intent toengage in th e specified con duct; 62 this distinction is, at best,


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cont ai ning pipe tobacco and women’s boots, was ad mitted , not to sh ow a gen eral p rope n si t y t o com m it s u ch c r ime s , b u t t o sh ow t h a t t h e defen d a n t po sse sse d t h ereq uisite “in ten t, knowledge, mot ive, pla n, and p rep arat ion” to a id a nd abet thecomm ission of the e arlier, char ged offense. Id . at 219. In Uni ted St at es v. Mc Collum ,

732 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1984), a prosecution for attem pted bank rob ber y in wh ich th edefend ant claimed to ha ve acted un der hypnosis, the court r uled th at evidence of atwelve-yea r-old armed robb ery would have been admissible, not to establish thecha racter of the accused, bu t r ather to prove the defenda nt’s intent to commit thecharged offense.

In Uni ted S tates v. P ollock , 926 F.2d 1044, 1047–49, (11th Cir . 1991), a pr osecu tion for va ri ous dr ug offens es i nv olvin g a v er y la rg e qu an tit y of cocain e fou ndsecreted in a car dr iven by the defen da nt, th e court , after ackn owledgin g t hat “themar gin between [propen sity a nd in tent] is not a bright l ine,” I d . at 1048, ruled thatth e defendant ’s five-year-old conviction for conspira cy to import ma rijuan a wasadm issible to prove conspiratori al intent. In United S tates v. Parziale , 947 F.2d 123(5th Cir. 1991), a case in which th e defendan t was cha rged with, inter alia , conspirin gto import , and att empting t o import , marijuana, evidence of the defen dant’s prior at tem pt t o import marijuana was admissible on th e issue of the defendant’s intent,an issu e sufficient ly raised solely by the de fendant ’s plea of n ot gui lty . In United

States v. Brown , 34 F.3d 5 69 (7th Cir . 1994), a drug pr osecut ion in which th edefend ant did not dispu te int ent but rath er claimed not to ha ve been involved in theatte m pted purcha se of cocaine from an under cover police officer which was t he subjectof th e cha rged offenses, th e court sustained t he ad mission of test imony a s to th ede fen da nt ’s involvement in four pr ior sales or purch ases of dru gs, pur por tedly for th eest ablishmen t of the defendant’s intent .

In United S tates v. Hernandez , 84 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 1996), the defendantdeparted from a n airplane a nd retr ieved a suitcase la ter found t o contain largequan tities of cocaine an d heroin, leading to charges of possession with int ent t odistribut e both su bst ances. At t r ial , the govern ment was permitted t o intr odu ceevidence that , on a prior occasion , the defen dant was stopped en tering th e count ryin an au tomobile con tainin g a lar ge quan tit y of ma rijua na. The appellate courtaffirmed the d efendant ’s conviction, ruling that t he prior crime evidence wasadmissible, not to show the defenda nt’s g ener al propensity to deal drugs, but rather his intent to do so. The cour t reasoned th at th e large qu an ti ty of marijuana seizedon the pr ior occasion allowed the inference of an in ten t t o distr ibu te tha t m arijuana ,which in turn allowed the inference that the defenda nt w as st i l l of a mind todist ribut e when he was fou nd with d iffer ent d ru gs on a d iffer ent occas ion. See id. a t935. Of course, the in itial in feren ce in th is chain of reasoning wa s available directlyfrom the lar ge quant i ty of cocaine an d heroin found in the suitcase in qu estion. More

per s ua sive is th e court ’s adm issio n of th e ev iden ce on an “abse nce of mis t ak e ” t h e ory,i .e. , to refute any claim that the defendant was an ignorant courier. In any event, thedistin ction between “the defendant is a drug dea ler because h e ha s don e it before,”and “the defendant intended to distr ibute these drugs because he has done i t before,”remains paper th in .

extr emely su btle. E vid ence of pr ior , sim ila r crimes is r outinelyadm itted despite t he a lmost imp erceptible distinction between ,for exam ple, the propensity t o sell dr ugs an d the in tent t o selldrugs.


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63 . See Edward J. Im winke lried, The Disput e Over th e Doctrine of Ch ances ,CRI M . J U ST ., Fall 1992, at 16, 18.

64 . See 2 J O H N H EN RY W IGMORE , E V I DE N C E I N TRIALS AT C O M M O N L AW § 302,at 241 (1979).

3. The doctr ine of chances Perha ps the r eal hint er lan d of Rule 404(b) met aphysics isth e doctri ne of cha nces. Th e doctrine is prem ised on th eimprobability of multiple coincidences. 63 In many cases, thedoctr in e is us ed to int rodu ce evidence r elevant to pr ovescienter; 64 su ch eviden ce would th erefore fall wit hin one or mor e of the spe cified, per mis sible ca tegor i es of Rule 404(b),su ch a s in ten t, kn owledge, or a bsence of mistake or accident.For example, suppose th at an individual char ged with receipt of stolen property defends on the claim that he or she wasunaware of the stolen character of the property. It would be a

most u nl ikely coinciden ce if in fact the d efend an t wa s ininnocent possession of stolen propert y on mu ltiple occasions.Ther efore, eviden ce of su ch oth e r occasions could be admis sibleun der th e doctr ine of cha nces to pr ove th e requ isit e le vel of mens r ea .

In other cases, t he doctr ine can be u sed t o est ablish actusre us element s of th e char ged offense. Suppose, for exam ple, a

prov ider of child ca re s er vice s i s ch a rged wit h ph ysica l a bu se of a child a nd defends on th e ground s tha t t he ch ild’s injuriesresulted from a n a ccident al fal l an d n ot from any as sa ult b y th edefen dan t. Ev idence th at a significant n um ber of other children

had also sustained an unusual rate of similar injuries while inth e defendant ’s car e could be admi ssible u nder th e doctrine of chan ces to pr ove a ssa ultive condu ct by t he defen da nt . Su chevidence wou ld seem to fit squa rely wit hin t he “absen ce of mi st ak e or accident” cat egory of permiss ible evidence un der Rule 404(b). If, in the same circumstances, the defense wasin ste ad premis ed upon t he p ossibility of th e inju ries ha ving

been infl icted by an oth er a ssa ila n t , t he s ame evid en ce of similar injur ies suffered by other childr en in the defendant ’scare could be intr odu ced , cons istent with Ru le 404(b), to proveidentit y.

Th e doctr ine of cha nces , th en, is often simply a d ifferen tway of articulating how evidence might come within one or more of the s pecified per missible theor ies of adm issibility


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65 . See Mar k Camm ack, Using the Doctrine of Chances to Prove Actus Reus inChild Abuse and Acquain tance R ape: People v. Ewoldt R econsid ered , 29 U.C. D AVISL. R E V . 355, 407–08 (1996); Imwin kelried, su pr a note 63, at 19–20; Imwinkelried,

su pr a note 1, at 1136. The use of the doctrin e of chan ces as a t heory of admissibilityunder Rule 404(b) has been endorsed by the Cr iminal J ustice Sect ion of th e Am ericanBa r Associat ion. S ee Raed er, su pr a note 4, at 348.

66 . See, e.g. , Imwinkelried, su pr a note 7, at 588, 602.67 . See id. at 588; Ordover, su pr a note 18, at 168.68 . See Cam mack, su pr a note 65 , at 396. T his proposition does not dep end u pon

th er e being a h igh per cen ta ge of r ape accus at ions wh ich a re well founded. Simply be ca us e mos t p eop le a re not accu se d a t a ll—t ru ly or fals ely—i t fol lows tha t m ost peo ple ar e not acc us ed fal s ely . I d .

69. Suppose, for example, th at th e probabil i ty of a fals e rap e accusati on be ingtar geted against a par ticular individual is one in one hu ndred. Considered

cont ai ned in th e second s ent ence of Rule 404(b). In a ny even t, itis clear t ha t t he doctrin e of cha nces is trea ted as a via ble the oryof admissibility under Rule 404(b). 65 As such, though, it isfraug ht with al l th e difficulties that att end th e im plemen ta tionof Rule 404(b) gener ally. E ven t he d efend ers of the doctrin econcede that, in many cases, the distinction between

per mis sible “doctr ine of cha nces” ev idence an d imp erm issiblecharacter evidence is slim. 6 6 And, of cour se, t here ar e the u sua lcomp lai nts th at cour ts u se th e doctrine of chan ces to let inmu ch of wha t should be kept out. 6 7

But t he problem with th e doctrine of chan ces is a systemicone an d is not limit ed to an occasiona l m isa pplicati on. Tak e the

pr otot ypica l ca se for the doct r ine of chan ces; i .e ., t h e case basedupon mu ltiple accusa tions. A defen dant is charged with r ap e,and defends on the claim that the sexual encounter wascons ensua l. Th e governme nt wishes t o int roduce t he testi monyof other women who will te sti fy that , in separ a te incidents,ea ch of the m was forced t o submit to nonconse nsua l sexualintercourse by the defendant. If offered to prove that thedefendan t is in fact a ra pis t, the evidence will be excluded bythe character evidence rule. There is a fair chance, however,tha t s uch e vidence coul d be adm it ted un der t he doctrine of chances.

Because most people are never accused of rape, the proba bility of an in divid ua l be in g fa lsely accus ed of ra pe islow. 68 Ther e-for e, it wou ld be a n im probable coinciden ce for anindividual to be falsely accused, even once, of rape. The

pr obabilit y of an in dividu al bein g falsely a ccused on mu ltip leoccasions is increasingly improbable. 69 Therefore , th e arg um ent


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independen tly, t he probabil i ty of a second false rape accusation being targeted againsttha t individual would also be one in one hun dred. Consider ed together , the pr obabil i tyof both false accusations being made against the same individual would be the

p r odu ct of th e tw o ra t io s, wh ic h wo ul d be on e in te n th ou sa n d.70 . See Camma ck, su pr a note 65, at 397.71 . See id. at 397–98; Im winkelried, su pr a note 63, at 52; Paul Rothstein,

In te ll ectua l Coh eren ce in a n E vid ence Cod e , 28 L OY . L.A. L. R E V . 1259, 1263 (1995); see al so State v. A llen, 725 P.2d 331 (Or. 1986) (admitting eviden ce in an arson pr osecu tion of a p ri or a rs on, un der th eor y of doct ri ne of cha n c es , a s p r oof t h a t t h efire was n ot s tart ed accident ally, even though there w as only on e prior incident) .

goes, th e mer e existence of multiple accusat ions is r elevan t in ama nner concept ua lly dist inct from t he cha in of rea sonin gord ina rily ba rr ed by t he cha ra cter evidence ru le. 70 Es sen tia lly,the doctrine of chances allows the inference of guilt of rape

base d upon mu l tipl e a ccusa t ion s of r ape , pr ovid ed tha t , a lon gthe way, there is no inference drawn that the defendant is ara pist because he h as r aped before.

Th ere are s everal problems with th is concept. We can st ar t by st epp ing ba ck a nd gazin g a t t he b ig p ict ure. I s t her e n otsomething awry with rules of evidence that permit the trier of fact in a rape case t o infer guilt ba sed mer ely on prior accus at ions of ra pe, but, at lea st in pr inciple, ordina rily will n otallow the trier of fact to infer guilt based on the fact that theaccuse d is a ctua lly guilt y of ra pe on pr ior occasions?

In addition, consider the extent to which the doctrine of chan ces ha s pus hed Rule 404(b)’s sup posed distinction betweeninadmissible character evidence and admissible noncharacter evidence. For exam ple, one of th e issues which mu st be r esolvedin a “doctr in e of cha nces ” scena rio is th e nu mber of pr ior incidents or accusa tions necessa ry t o raise a reasonableinfer ence that they ar e un likely a ccounte d for by inn ocen tcoincidence. 7 1 Suppose that, in our hypothetical rape case, thecourt determines that a minimum of two prior accusations of rape is necessary to qualify the evidence as noncharacter evidence. On the basis of a proffer from the government, thecour t d eterm ines t o allow th e testim ony of tw o witn esses as t otwo independent accusat ions of ra pe comm itted by thedefen dan t. On th e first d ay of trial, th e first of these witnessestestifies as pr omi sed, conclu ding he r t est imony with th e close of the t ri al unti l the next day. Given th e court ’s pretr ialdetermination that two such accounts are necessary to qualifyfor t he doctr in e of cha nces, as th e cas e sta nd s at th at poin t, th e


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72. If, in this scenario, we imagine t hat t he second witness does not mat eria lizeat tr ial on t he second da y, the tr ial cour t would presu mably have to choose a mon g(1) instru cting the jury to disre gard the tes tim ony of t he firs t witness from th e

p re viou s da y, (2) decla rin g a m is tr ia l, or (3) rev isi n g it s pr et r ia l orde r lower ing t heth reshold for t he doct rine of cha nce s to one pr ior a ccusat ion.

73 . See Camma ck, su pr a note 65, at 399.74. Even this h ypothesis assum es that t he defenda nt’s innocence can only be

consistent with a conclusion that the accuse r is lying. But this is not necess ari ly thecase. The a ccuser might be mis taken as t o any n umber of issues, includingiden tificat ion. Moreover, the accuser ’s testimony could b e flawlessly accura te a nd stillnot account for a reasonable mistake or ignorance on the part of the defenda nt t hatwould negate t he requ isite level of scienter .

defendan t has been eno rmous ly preju diced by t he in tr odu ctionof cha ra cter eviden ced bar red by Ru les 404 (a) and 404(b).

Th e next morning, the second witness ap pe ar s in cour t a ndtestifies as a nt icipat ed. Not only is t he t estim ony of t he secondwitness not character evidence, but the testimony of the firstwitness from the previous day has now been magicallyconvert ed to noncha ra cter eviden ce as well. A pr emi se of t hedoctrine of chances specifically, as well as of Rule 404(b)gener ally, is that character evidence and noncharacter evidencear e mut ua lly exclusive cat egories of evidence. Yet here we h av ea t estim oni al account th at jum ps from one category to the other

based solely upon th e te st im ony of anoth er witness whosetestimony relat es to an entirely independent occurrence. 72

Ultim at ely, th e flaw in th e doctrine of chan ces is tha t itcollapses the sl im barrier separating character andnoncharacter evidence as supposedly distinguished in Rule404(b). There a re r eally o nly two possible explana tions thatar guably accoun t for th e persu asive influence of th e mu ltiple-accusers scenario. The first must start with the assumptionthat accusers are probably telling the truth. 73 Arguably, then,multiple accusers corroborate each other and increase the

pr obab il ity th at ea ch is te ll ing t he t ru th . 7 4

This expla na tion is not genera lly inaccurat e; it simply doesnot get us an ywhere. Even if we credit each of the mu lti pleaccuser s, tha t does not explain how th ey cross over an dcorroborate each other. If the only impact of the multiple-accusers scena rio is tha t we credit th e specific t estim ony of ea ch, th en the only thing we learn from mult iple accusations isth at the defendan t committ ed mu ltiple crimes. There would beno reason wh y the se cond accuser’s testi mony increase s the


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75. This corroborative impact would only be true if the multiple accusers wer etes tifyin g as to th e same incident, which of course, is never the case in a Rule 404(b)situation.

76 . S ee Camma ck, su pr a note 65, at 399.77 . S ee i d . at 400. Professor Rothstein has expressed this conclusion most

succinctly:The essen ce of this probable guil t argum ent is t ha t t her e is a dispa rity

be tw ee n t h e cha n c es, or p roba b ilit y , t h a t a n innocent per son would becha rged so many t imes and th e cha nces, or probabil ity, t hat a gu il ty per sonwould be ch arged so many t imes. If there is such a disparity, however, i tis only because a guil ty person would have th e pr open si ty to repea t thecrime. If it wer e not for th e pr open sit y to r epe at, th e ch ances, or t he

pro ba bi li ty , t h a t a n in n o ce n t p ers on a n d a guil ty perso n wo ul d be ch ar ge drepe atedly would be identical . H ence, the argument hinges on pr opensit yan d ru ns afoul of the firs t sen ten ce of Rule 404(b). The effort to reconcilethe permission in the Rule with th e prohibit ion in the Ru le has failed.

Rothstein, su pr a note 71, at 1262–63.

lik elih ood th at the defendan t committ ed th e first crime.7 5

Indee d, if this is all there is to the doctr ine of chan ces in themu ltiple-accusers scenar io, th en accusa tions of unchar gedcrim inal incident s would not even be r elevant .

Th e second, a nd only genuin e, explan at ion of th e per suas iveinflu ence of the mu ltip le-accuser s sit ua tion is t ha t we credit

prec isely th e char ac te r infe renc e th at is supp osed ly ba rr ed bythe character evidence rule. 76 In fact, the explanation for thedoctrin e of cha nces in th e m ultiple-accusers conte xt i s simply aconvoluted expla na tion of th e genera l propensit y inference.Ea ch separ at e accusat ion would have no bear in g upon theaccuracy of another allegation but for the conclusion that themu ltiple accus at ions demons tr at e a cross-situat iona l patt er n of

behavi or , wh ich is bu t a va r ia t ion on t he t aboo in fer en ce of agenera l pr opensity or cha ra cte r tr ai t. We connect oneaccusa tion t o an oth er accusa tion of a simila r crime precise ly

because we cr ed it , at leas t to some ext en t , t he not ion tha t people do beh ave con sist en t ly wit h pe r son a l ch a ract er tra its. 7 7

Th at is th e only reasonable explana tion for why even th edoctrine of chances is limited to multiple accusations of iden tical or simi lar crime s. It is th e rea son why th ere is lit tle or no corroborative effect when the multiple accusations involvesignificantly discrete crimes. The doctrine of chan ces ma y infact be tr uly consistent w ith Rule 404(b), but u nfort unat ely tha tconsiste ncy stems from th e fact th at , at least in some cases, thedoctrine of chances is the latest theory for allowing character


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78 . See supra note 23 and accompanying text.79 . For th is reason , some commen ta tors have advocate d abandoning the

“admissib le categor ies” app roach of R ule 404(b) in favor of a case-by-cas edet ermination based upon the as sessme nt an d balancing of the p robat ive value a nd

p ote n t i a l pre jud ici a l effect of the pri or crim es evi d enc e. See, e.g. , Allan, su pr a n o t e45, at 271–74; St one, su pr a note 41, at 984. This appea rs to be th e curr en t dir ectionof th e cha racter eviden ce ru le in E ngland. See Direct or of Pub. Prosecut ions v.Boardman, [1995] App. Cas. 421; se e al so Allan, su pr a note 45, at 253.

80 . S ee 1A W IGMORE , su pr a note 34, § 54.1, at 1152–56.

eviden ce to rea ch th e jur y while ma inta ining th e pious fictionth at we follow th e char acter evidence rule.

4. Anoth er look at th e su bstantive 404(b) prerequ isites

As has been discussed, 7 8 the th ird prerequis i te to theadmis sibilit y of evidence under Rule 404(b) is that th e tr ialcourt must be persuaded that there is a legitimate,noncharacter purpose to such evidence. The current morassthat this task has engendered has arisen precisely because thedistinctions allowed by t he r ule, a nd t hus r equir ed of thecour ts, ar e eit her bar ely per cept ible or ent irely illus ory. 79 We

admit what essentially is character evidence by labeling itotherwise, engaging sometimes in the most contorted analyticalgym nast ics to preser ve an ent ir ely t heor et ical adheren ce t o thecharacter evidence rule. 80 The schola rly pur suit of suchnoncha ra cter th eor ies a s th e doctr ine of chan ces is not un liketh e individu al wh o, after hours of gazin g up on a n ordinar y

pa int ing, pr onou nces that i f one st ands a t a par t i cu la r angle a ta pa rt icular tim e of day using ver y part icular lighti ng, t he

pa int ing will reve al it self to be s omet hin g quit e ext ra ord ina ry.The problem is t ha t judges m ust, in th e ordinar y light of comm on sense a nd exper ience, att empt to implement t heoriesth at ar e often only opera tive in t he a rt ificia l ligh t of th escholar ’s l abora tory. It s hould not b e surp rising t ha t theapplication of Rule 404(b) has not resulted in a coherent andconsistent body of law.

One rem ainin g question is whether the misadventures tha tatt en d th e case law imp lemen tin g Rule 404(b) ar e entir ely theresults of the difficult subject matter, or whether they are in

pa r t the pr oduct s of w illfu l d is rega r d of t he limit a t ion s u ponad m issibilit y sp ecified in Ru le 4 04(b). S ome in sight into th isquestion m ight be atta ined by exploring th e fourth p rerequisite


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81 . See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. Because th e language in Rule404(b) is permissive (“may . . . be ad missible for other purposes”), even if evi den cefits with in one of th e categories of admissibility, it mu st stil l be exclu ded if the“danger of un fair pr eju di ce” “subst an tially out we igh [s]” “its pr oba tive valu e.” F E D . R.E VI D . 403; S ee also 2 W EINSTEIN ET AL ., su pr a note 14, ¶ 404[18], at 404–108 to404–109.

82 . See Stone, su pr a note 41, at 954.83 . For example , the m ore s imi lar th e modu s operand i in the t wo crimes, the

stronger the inference that the identi ty of the actor in the second crime is the alrea dyidentified actor in the first crime.

84 . See Stone, su pr a note 41, at 983.85. As the similari ty of the multiple crimes in creases, th e dist inction between

the char acter and non char acter uses of the evidence argua bly disappears. See supranotes 79–80 an d accompanying t ext.

to adm issibility under Rule 404(b). S pecifically, the t ria l courtmust balance the probative, noncharacter value of suchevidence aga inst t he potent ial preju dice of t he ju ry using suchevidence to determine the general propensity, or character, of the accused, ta king into consideration that such evidence is,seemingly wit hout except ion , accompan ied by a limit inginstruction juxtaposing the permissible noncharacter use andth e forbidden character tr eatmen t of the evidence. 81

On e of the inh eren t difficulties in st rikin g the r equired ba lance for adm ission of evidence un der Rule 4 04(b) is th atthere is frequently a parallel relationship between what therule designates as relevant and what the rule designates as

pr ejud icial. 82 For ma ny of th e th eories of admissibility un der Rule 404(b), the st ren gth of the claim for adm issibilityincreases in pr oportion to the s imilar ity between the chargedcrime and the prior crime. 83 Unfortunately, the greater thesimilarity between the two crimes, the more compelling theforbidden conclu sion t ha t t he accus ed is p redisposed t o comm itthat very cr ime. It is pa ra doxical, then, bu t n ot su rprising, t ha tthe circumstance in which the danger of prejudice isgreat est—i.e., when such evidence i s offered a gains t thecriminal defendant 8 4 —is a l so the cir cums tance in which suchevid ence is m ost pr oba tive a nd significa nt . 85 Consequently,despite the fact that the character evidence rule is designed

pr ima rily to pr otect t he cr imin al d efend an t, a per us al of thean notati ons to Rule 404(b) reve als th at the va st ma jority of Rule 404(b) cases involve evidence offered by t he pr ose cutionagainst the accused. And because the competing values vary


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86. In any case in which th e evidence is excluded and t he defenda nt isacquitted, no appeal can be heard because double jeopardy would bar a r etria l. In an ycase in which the evidence is excluded and th e defendant is nevertheless convicted,the government has n o reason to appeal at al l , and the defendant ha s no cause toraise th e Rule 404(b) issue on a ppeal.

87 . S ee 2 W E IN S TE I N E T A L ., su pr a note 14, ¶ 404[18], at 404–21.88 . See, e.g ., Unit ed Stat es v. Cun ningh am, 103 F.3d 553, 557 (7t h Cir. 1996),

cert. denied , 117 S. Ct . 1481 (1997); Un ited Sta tes v. Pr ocopio, 88 F.3d 21, 30 (1stCir. 1996), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 620 (1996), and cer t. d enied , 117 S. Ct. 1008(1997); Unit ed States v. Her nan dez, 84 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 1996); United St atesv. Parzial e, 947 F.2d 123, 129 (5th Cir . 1991); Oregon v. Allen, 725 P.2d 331, 336 (Or.1986).

8 9. F o r e xa m p le , i n Uni ted St at es v. Br own , 34 F .3d 569 , 57 4 (7t h Cir . 19 94),th e court stat ed tha t, absent “a categorical rule” requiring exclusion of the Ru le404(b) evidence, “we must defer to the judgmen t of the tr ial cour t.” And in United States v. Hadaway , 681 F.2d 214, 217 (4t h Cir. 1982), the cour t ann oun ced t ha t,“[g]iven the wide d iscretion permitt ed the distri ct judge, it is fruitless to co ntend thatthe evidence was impr operly admit ted.”

pr oport iona lly ra th er t ha n inve r se ly , it is no t me r ely the ca sesat t he mar gin that pr esent difficult issues.

So how do cour ts actua lly res olve th e requir ed ba lancingte st? Th er e a re some lim ita tions u pon th e inform at ion t ha t can

be ga th er ed fr om t he pu bl ished op inions . Be cause th e DoubleJeopa rdy Clause effectively elimina tes governmen t a ppea lsfrom tr ia l cour t ru ling s disa llowing th e intr odu ction of eviden ceunder Rule 404(b), 86 the reported appellate decisions areinvariably cases in which the trial court admitted thechallenged eviden ce under Rule 404(b). Moreover, the b ala ncin gtest requ ired by Rule 403, even in th e Rule 404(b) cont ext, isone a s t o wh ich t he re is a grea t d eal of appella te cou rtdeference to the discretion of the trial courts. 8 7 Consequently,wha t appears a necdotally to be a high percenta ge of ap pella tedecision s affirming th e allowance of evidence under Rule 404(b)might not represent the actual success rate of prosecutorsseeking to introdu ce such evidence.

Never th eles s, some observations can be made. First,ap pellat e court s readily defer to trial court discretion. Perha ps

because th e re quir ed ba lan cing tes t is often s o difficult , th ere isa conspicuous willingness of at least some appellate courts toground their decisions predominantly, if not singularly, uponthe deference accorded to the trial courts. 88 This suggests avirtu al abdica tion of an y m ean ingfu l appellate a ut hority on t hisissue. In some cases, the repudiation of meaningful appellatereview is express, and not merely implied. 89


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90 . S ee, e.g. , United States v. Boyd, 53 F.3d 631, 637 (4th Cir. 1995) (findingthat the evidence of the defendant’s prior drug use was not unduly prejudicial in adr ug prosecution “because th e evidence of [the defendan t’s] personal use of m arijuan aand cocaine did not involve conduct an y more sensationa l or disturb ing tha n t hecrimes with which he was char ged”); United St at es v. Melin g, 47 F.3d 1546, 1557 (9thCir. 1995) (finding that tapes of the defendan t at tempting to hinder a n investigationwe re not unfa irly prejudicial because “the pr ofanity in th e tapes was rela tively m ild

by tod ay ’s st an da rd s”); Ca rs on v. P olle y, 6 89 F .2d 562 , 57 3 (5 th Ci r . 19 82 ) (findin gth at , in a civil rights act ion for the u se of excessive force in effecti ng an a rr es t,admission of the defenda nt ’s per forman ce evalua tion r eport indica tin g t he defend an t’s

pr ior losse s of tem per a nd exp res sions of host il ity towa rd de ta ine e s wa s not u njus tly p r e jud i ci a l beca us e “th er e we re no h orr ifyin g de ta ils t ha t w ou ld pr e di ct a b ly inf lam eth e jury ’s passion”).

This hands-off approach used by appellate courts inreviewing th e se emingl y endle ss pa rade of appea ls by convicteddefen dan ts who suffered the r evelat ion of the ir un cha rgedcrim ina l condu ct before th e juries which convicted t hem ha rd lysuggests a deep and abiding commitment to the character eviden ce ru le, which is su pposed t o protect defend an ts fromsuch exposure. It often seems as though once a so-callednoncharacter use for the prior crimes evidence has beenidentified and adequately defended, the contest is, as a

p ra ctical mat ter, over . It is a s i f char act er e viden ce is ordin ar ilyexcluded , not becau se it is pr eju dicial, bu t rat her becau se it is

just not r ele van t en ough. Bu t if its p roba t ive va lue ca n beenha nced increm enta lly by ad vancing a th eory of relevan ce inaddition to the suggestion of a general propensity, th e bar ha s

been exceeded an d t he bala ncin g te s t is r ar e ly an obst a cle t oadmissibility.

Second, there is a flip side of this phenomenon in cases inwhich the court has been persuaded that there is a realnoncharacter use for the prior crimes evidence. In thesecircum sta nces, to the extent t ha t t he pote ntial prejudice in theequat ion is merely the da nger of the jur y inferring adefendant ’s gener al propen sity to engage in such crim inalcond uct, t he arg um ent s for e xclusion ofte n fai l to car ry th e da y.Many judicial opinions seem to require more than this ever-

p res ent da nge r, s uch as some th ing p ar ticu lar ly in fl a mma toryabout the prior crimes evidence. 9 0 Again, the devotion togua rding agai nst t he da nger of the gen era l pr open sity infer enceis un impressive.


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91. Apparent ly, even some defenders of the chara cter evidence rule would agreewith th is obser vation. See, e.g. , Imwink elried, su pr a note 7, at 577–78.

92 . See supra notes 61–62 and a ccompan ying te xt.93. In M e lin g , 47 F.3d at 1557, a p rosecution in wh ich the defenda nt wa s

ch arged with var iou s offenses ar ising fro m h is a tt empt to kill his wife in order tocollect $700,000 on a l ife insura nce policy, evidence of the defen dant ’s purch ase of anexpensive firearm was deemed to be more probative of the defendant’s motive (greed)than prejudicial (propensity for violence). In Bo yd , 53 F.3d at 636–37, a prosecutionfor conspira cy and possession with intent to distr ibute m arijuana, test imony t hat thedefend ant use d mar iju ana a nd cocaine was foun d to be more pr oba tive of t hede fen da nt ’s motive t o finance a nd supply h is own drug u se than it was prejudicial inlinki ng the defendan t to criminal dr ug activities. Moreover, in Cun nin gham , 103 F.3d553, the defendan t, a nu rse, faced crimin al ch arges based on her alleged the ft of Dem erol from hospita l syringes. The pr osecution was per mitt ed t o intr odu ce evidencetha t, four years ear l ier, the defendant had been addict ed to Demerol, that her nu rsin glicense had been suspended because of her prior theft of Demerol and that she hadsubsequ en tly falsified drug te st results in order t o maint ain the re inst atemen t of tha tnur sing l icense. With barely a passin g reference to th e requisite balan cing tes t , thecourt determined tha t th e value of the evidence to prove a motive for th e th eft ( thede fen da nt ’s addiction) exceeded a ny prejudicial suggestion of a propensity t o stealDemerol. Even assu ming th is t o be tr ue, given th e explicit evidence of th e defe ndan t’sadd iction, i t is u nclea r wha t t he incre ment al value of the evidence of th e pr ior th eftof Demerol was for the st ated pur pose, especially as balanced against i ts ten dency tosuggest a pr opensity t o pilfer t he dru g. See id. at 556–57.

Third , th ere ar e ma ny cas es in which Rule 404(b) evide nceis admit ted, despite a n a ppa rent ly wea k case for t he probativevalue of the evidence in connection with its proffered,“noncharacter” use. 9 1 As noted earlier, this is particularlyapparent in some decisions admitting evidence under Rule404(b) to show intent or other levels of mens r ea. 9 2 Bu t theexamples of this phenomenon are by no means so limited. For example, notwithstanding the fact that it is the exceptional

person wh o cou ld not use som e a dd it ion a l cash, eviden ce of t hedefendan t’s uncha rged, costly cri minal appe tites some time sfinds its wa y to th e jur y on th e imp roba ble theory that itsupp lies a m otive for the defendan t’s char ged crime, wher e thelatter is one having the allure of some pecuniary (andsometimes even nonpecuniary) benefit. 93 In many of thesecases , one is left wit h th e im pres sion t ha t, n ot only is thegenera l ban agai nst char acter eviden ce not a priority, but, t othe contrary, the courts often embrace opportunities to allowcha ra cte r eviden ce in under t he gu ise of treat ing s uch evidenceas someth ing else entir ely.

Four th , there often is no serious att ention to what t hechar acte r eviden ce r ule d eems t o be pr eju dicial be cause of a


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94 . See Par ker v. Ran dolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979); Edward J. Imwink elried,The Ri ght to “Plead Out ” Issues an d Block t he A dm ission of Prejud icial Ev idence: Th e

Di ff eren ti al Tr eatm ent of Civ il L iti gan ts a nd th e Crim in al A ccus ed a s a D eni al of Eq ua l Prot ection , 40 E MORY L.J . 341, 378 (1991).

95 . S ee Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 562 (1967). The authority for such alimit ing inst ru ction is contained in t he Feder al Ru les of Evidence. S ee F E D . R. E VI D .105.

96 . S ee, e.g. , United Sta tes v. Her na ndez, 84 F.3d 931, 93 5 (7th Cir. 1996)(“[T]he distr ict c our t i nstru cted the jury both before an d after t he 404(b) evidence wasadmitt ed tha t it could be considered ‘only on the quest ion of the def endan t’s inte nt ,knowledge, absence of mist ake, or acciden t a s it relates to th e cha rges in th eindictment.’ Absent any substan tial evidence to the contrar y, we presume that the

j u r ors follow ed th eir in st ru cti on s.”).97 . See Kuh ns, su pr a note 60, at 796.98. See, for example, the decisions discussed su pr a at n ote 62.

me cha ni cal , an d a rguab ly disingen uous, fait h in th e efficacy of limit ing in str uction s t o th e jur y. Of course, t he ent ire jur ysystem is predicated on the assumption that jurors can, andwill, follow th e ins tr uctions from th e tr ial judge. 94 Thisassu mption ext ends to limit ing inst ru ctions, i.e., inst ru ctionsre st ricti ng jur ors’ conside r at ion of evide nce t o its cor rect scop ein circumst an ces in which the evidence could be used for bot h a

proper an d an impr oper pu r pose . 9 5 J ud ges wh o adm it evidenceunder Rule 404(b) rou tin ely assu me (or s o the y sa y) that an y

potent ial prejud ic e fr om such eviden ce is cont rolled by aninstr uction directing t he jur y’s consider at ion of such evidence toits specified “nonchar acter ” context an d pr ohibit ingcons idera tion of tha t evidence a s bear ing upon th e cha racter of the accused. 96

But on w ha t possible basis does this a ss um pt ion rest? Anymeaningful consideration of prejudice must focus, not on thetheory constructed by the law and contained in the juryinstructions, but rather on the actual use to be made of sucheviden ce by th e jur y. 97 So th e question one m ust a sk is, “How

pr obable is i t tha t ju ror s will under s ta nd a nd fol lowinstructions?” For example, are juries capable of consideringeviden ce of the defen dan t’s pr ior dru g sa les as bea rin g on th edefendant ’s inte nt to sell dr ugs but n ot on th e defen dant ’s

propensity t o do so? 9 8 Can a jury likewise consider thedefendan t’s prior theft of drugs from h ospital invent ory a s

bea r ing on t he defen da nt ’s m otive for s te alin g dr ug s fromhospita l in ven tory but not on th e defendan t’s pr opensity to


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99. See United S tates v. Cunningham , 103

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