CHILD-SENSITIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION IN … CHILD-SENSITIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION IN RWANDA A C k NOWLED g E m acknowledgements ENTS This study was commissioned by the Ministry of Local Government

1

CHILD -SENS IT IVE SOCIAL PROTECT ION IN RWANDA

How can VUP Public Works more effectively support young children and their caregivers?

AN OPTIONS PAPER

CHild-sensitiVe soCial ProteCtion in rWanda

2


AC

kN

OW

LE

Dg

Em

EN

TS

acknowledgements

This study was commissioned by the Ministry of Local Government and UNICEF Rwanda and is the result of a successful collaboration between a number of organizations and individuals. The study was carried out by Tamsin Ayliffe, independent consultant. Lead technical support was provided by Francine Tumushime of the Ministry of Local Government; Justine Gatsinzi and Vincent Gahamanyi of the Local Administrative Entities Development Agency (LODA); Laura B. Rawlings and James Tumwine of the World Bank; Samantha Yates and Emmeline Skinner of DFID, as well as other members of the Social Protection Sector Working Group; and Rachel Sabates-Wheeler, Oliver Petrovic, Erna Ribar and Gisele Rutayisire of UNICEF Rwanda.

We would like to acknowledge the generosity of all the women and men who devoted their time to this study.

Child-sensitive social protection in Rwanda: How can VUP public works more effectively support young children and their caregivers? An options paper

© United Nations Children’s Fund, Kigali, Rwanda

Cover photograph: © UNICEF/2014/Muellenmeister

This study was prepared in support of the Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC) of Rwanda in 2014. The option on Expansion of Public Works was recommended for implementation by MINALOC, and was elaborated in detail in the Implementation Plan developed in 2015.

3


CO

NT

EN

TS

Contents

acknowledgements _____________________________________________________________________ 2

acronyms and abbreviations _____________________________________________________________ 4

executive summary _____________________________________________________________________ 5

introduction ____________________________________________________________________________ 8

section 1: Global and national evidence _________________________________________________ 10

1.1 Early childhood development 111.1.1 Why is early childhood so important? 111.1.2 The Rwanda context: Are young children thriving? 13

1.2 The role of social protection in promoting early childhood development: Global evidence 13

1.3 Social protection in Rwanda 161.3.1 How child-sensitive is VUP public works? 161.3.2 Government of Rwanda policy and programme responses to

identified challenges 20

1.4 Framework for assessing options 25

section 2: Child-sensitive social protection in rwanda – options __________________________ 26

2.1 Four categories of child-sensitive action 26

2.2 Options within each category 302.2.1 Category 1 – Expanded public works 302.2.2 Category 2 – Guaranteed minimum benefits for vulnerable

households with children 392.2.3 Category 3 – Mitigating measures 432.2.4 Category 4 – Complementary services 46

section 3: Costings _____________________________________________________________________ 48

3.1 Comparative cost estimates of achieving EDPRS2 Social Protection Strategy targets 49

3.2 Costs: Option by option 51

3.3 Key assumptions and estimates 54

section 4: recommendations and road map _____________________________________________ 58

4.1 Recommendations: A comprehensive solution 58

4


AC

RO

Ny

mS

AN

D A

bb

RE

VIA

TIO

NS

acronyms and abbreviations

CHW Community health worker

dHs Demographic and Health Survey

eCd Early childhood development

edPrs Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy

dFid Department for International Development

Frw Rwandan franc

loda Local Administrative Entities Development Agency

MiGeProF Government of Rwanda, Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion

MinaloC Government of Rwanda, Ministry of Local Government

MinedUC Government of Rwanda, Ministry of Education

MineCoFin Government of Rwanda, Ministry of Finance

Minisante Government of Rwanda, Ministry of Health

nGo Non-governmental organization

PsnP Productive Safety Net Programme

rldsF Rwanda Local Development Support Fund

saCCo Savings and Credit Co-operative

UniCeF United Nations Children’s Fund

Us$ United States dollar

VUP Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme

5


Ex

EC

uT

IVE

Su

mm

AR

y

executive summary

Early childhood is a critical period of human development. Malnutrition and other deprivations in the early years can have lifelong negative consequences on intellectual development, health and poverty status.1 In Rwanda, 38 per cent2 of young children are currently stunted, and addressing this problem is a national priority.

It is also during the earliest years of childhood that the economic rates of return from investment in human capital are highest. Protecting households with young children from poverty, hunger, food insecurity and the associated stress has been found to be among the most promising and cost-effective investments that can be made in human development.3

Thus, in pursuing the goal, “to reduce poverty and vulnerability and to promote equitable growth”,4 it is critical that the social protection sector gives attention to early childhood. This

1 Walker, Susan P. et al., ‘Child Development: Risk factors for adverse outcomes in developing countries’, The Lancet, vol. 369, no. 9556, 13 January 2007, pp. 145–157.

2 National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, Rwandan Ministry of Health and ICF International, ‘Rwanda Demographic and Health Survey 2014–15: Key indicators’, NISR, MOH and ICF International, Rockville, Maryland, 2015.

3 Heckman, James J. and Dimitriy V. Masterov, ‘The Productivity Argument for Investing in Young Children’, Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 29, no. 3, 2007, pp. 446–493.

4 EDPRS2 Social Protection Strategy, p. 3.

The Options Paper on Child-Sensitive Social Protection in Rwanda was developed in 2014 in support of the Ministry of Local Government’s (MINALOC) efforts to identify strategies to more effectively support young children and their caregivers who are beneficiaries of the Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP). The study proposed several categories and options for child-sensitive action. The option on Expansion of Public Works was recommended for implementation by MINALOC, and was elaborated in detail in the Implementation Plan developed in 2015.

© U

NIC

EF/

201

4/S

hres

tha

6


Ex

EC

uT

IVE

Su

mm

AR

y

is recognized in the Government of Rwanda’s Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) 2 and the National Social Protection Strategy which has, as one of its six strategic priorities, addressing child poverty and vulnerability in the poorest households.

Global evidence shows that cash transfer programmes can have positive impacts on young child nutrition and development, but that these effects are not automatic or guaranteed, depending instead on context and programme design. Furthermore, the work requirement of public works programmes can sometimes have negative impacts on child nutrition and well-being, due to the impact of hard physical work on the nutritional status of pregnant and lactating women and/or to conflicts with their responsibilities of care (see Section 1.2 below).

The poor households in which young children live tend to be eligible for public works, rather than direct support. This is because there is usually at least one able-bodied adult in households where young children reside and households with any adult labour capacity are classified as eligible for public works.

Public works wages are expected to have positive impact on young children whose caregivers are included in VUP public works in Rwanda (and forthcoming evaluations should provide evidence). On the other hand, it is known that the work required by VUP public works is physically demanding, intensive and often carried out some distance from home. There is evidence from the ‘VUP Gender Equity Assessment’ (2013) and other recent research,5 of negative impacts of this work requirement on the quality of care of children in participating households: young children are often either brought to unsuitable worksites, or left at home with inadequate care (see Section 1.3).

This report proposes that the top priority in improving the child sensitivity of social protection in Rwanda should be to mitigate any such negative impacts. Given its objectives of reducing poverty and vulnerability, it is imperative that the social protection sector avoids doing harm. Mitigation of potentially harmful effects can be achieved by combining a number of the following actions (detailed analysis and costings of which are set out in Sections 2 and 3, respectively):

• Providing paid maternity leave from public works for all pregnant women in VUP-eligible households that have no other labour capacity;

• Formally enabling all pregnant and lactating women to work reduced hours (and to do lighter work) for equal pay (no cash cost);

• Contracting skilled providers (e.g. non-governmental organizations (NGOs)) to provide childcare for the children of public works participants (at the worksite for babies 6–24 months old and home-based for children 24–36 months old);

• Expanding the definition of ‘labour-constrained household’ so that households with only one able-bodied adult and a child younger than 6 years old become eligible for direct support;

• Developing a new range of public works that is more flexible and part-time and can be carried out closer to home (expanded or flexible); and

• Providing a guaranteed child element paid in addition to regular public work payments for all public-works eligible households with a child 0–4 years old.

5 Roelen, Keetie and Helen Shelmerdine, ‘Researching the Link between Social Protection and Children’s Care in Rwanda’, Family for Every Child, London, 2014; and Berglund, Anna, ‘A Local Perspective of the VUP and the Land Regularization Programme’, 2012.

7


Ex

EC

uT

IVE

Su

mm

AR

y

A concern is that, even once negative impacts are mitigated, the benefits of public works to young children can still be limited, due to:

• Generally low coverage of public works;

• Particular challenges of sustained participation faced by some households with small children;

• Barriers to participation of women (highlighted in the ‘VUP Gender Equity Assessment’);6

• Generally low number of workdays;

• Greater inadequacy of fixed benefit levels for larger households with many children; and

• Payments being generally made to heads of households (rather than primary carers).

Thus it is proposed that a further priority should be to promote a general expansion of coverage and adequacy of benefit levels, with particular regard to households with very young children. The development of a new range of flexible public works could play a key role in this. So too could the provision of a guaranteed child element (of 100 Rwandan francs, or FRw) per day for all public-works eligible households with children 0–4 years old, paid to the primary carer.

Cost estimates suggest that, if both expanded public works and a guaranteed child element were implemented, the cost of achieving EDPRS2 targets on coverage and adequacy of public works would be only 2 per cent higher than the cost of achieving them through the current public works approach. Implementation of these two options would also reduce delivery costs as a proportion of total costs. The current approach of classic public works is estimated to have the most expensive delivery costs, and the combination of new-style public works and a guaranteed child element is the least expensive.

On the other hand, effectively taking forward at scale the proposals in this report will demand upgraded capacities. The necessary actions include:

• Modifications to the VUP manuals and/or the issuing of detailed specific guidance to district and sector staff;

• Training of staff in the new provisions;

• Intensive monitoring and supervision in the early stages to ensure that the changes have been well understood and implemented; and

• Review and incorporation of lessons learned.

Some of the necessary actions will require additional measures. For example, the contracting out of childcare provision would require the development of appropriate standards and terms of reference for contractors, legal contracts, and new reporting and supervision arrangements.

Furthermore, it is recognized that some of these proposals require intensified cross-government collaboration. For example, a major expansion of new-style public works would entail ensuring that options to employ public works participants were systematically considered in the design and implementation of government programmes across ministries.

6 FATE Consulting, ‘VUP Gender Equity Assessment’, 2013.

8


INT

RO

Du

CT

ION

introduction

The purpose of this study is to identify options to enhance the positive impacts and mitigate any negative impacts of the flagship VUP social protection programme on the poverty and vulnerabilities of young children in Rwanda.

A growing body of global literature highlights the critical importance of investments in early childhood in enabling people to reach their full intellectual and physical potential, and the potentially devastating impacts of failing to make these investments. Social protection is by no means the only sector responsible for supporting the development of young children: the health, education, water and sanitation, children’s social services and agricultural sectors all have key roles to play, and the proposal here is not for the social protection sector to take over the roles of these other sectors. But, in order to achieve social protection objectives – among them reducing poverty and vulnerability, promoting graduation out of extreme poverty and preventing its intergenerational transmission – it is increasingly clear that investments in early childhood cannot be neglected.

The National Social Protection Strategy (2013–2018) of Rwanda recognizes the linkages between social protection and early childhood development. One of its key outcomes is ‘child poverty and vulnerability in the poorest households is addressed’, and the present study contributes to taking forward this commitment.

The methodology of this study consisted of a literature review; key informant interviews in Kigali and two sector offices (Gitovu and Rubavu); a public works site visit in Rubavu; and beneficiary focus group discussions in both sectors.

The literature used included all relevant policy and strategy documents, and studies and assessments carried out in Rwanda on social protection, nutrition and early childhood development; these are referenced throughout this report. A review was also carried out of the global literature on the linkages between social protection and early childhood development

© U

NIC

EF/

201

1/N

oora

ni

9


INT

RO

Du

CT

ION

outcomes, with particular attention given to publications that systematically reviewed relevant studies.

During four weeks in Kigali in 2014, the consultant met with the Local Administrative Entities Development Agency (LODA), the Government of Rwanda’s Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC) and the Government of Rwanda’s Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) – the early childhood development (ECD) lead – as well as key development partners, including the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), the European Union and the World Bank (by Skype), and civil society organizations active in the ECD sector, including Save the Children, Care International and the Harvard School of Public Health/Partners in Health. The two sector offices visited were purposively selected due to their history of active engagement in an initiative aiming to link VUP public works with ECD.7

Two presentations on options were made to key stakeholders to solicit feedback – at the midpoint and end of the country visit. A draft of this report was subsequently shared and feedback incorporated.

This report is divided into four sections:

The first section, Global and national evidence, briefly reviews global and national studies on the impact of cash transfer programmes (including public works) on young children. It looks closely at evidence on VUP programmes, assessing strengths, risks and challenges with respect to effects on young children. The section also proposes a conceptual framework for assessing options for making public works more child-sensitive, a framework which is grounded in existing Government of Rwanda policy and strategy commitments.

In the second section, Child-sensitive social protection options, four categories of actions to make VUP public works more child-sensitive are set out. They include:

• Enhanced public works;

• Increased benefit levels without additional work requirements;

• Mitigating measures; and

• Complementary children’s services.

Options under each of these are proposed in the section, and the advantages and disadvantages of each option are considered, in line with the framework developed in Section 1.

Section three, Costings, presents detailed cost estimates of all these options, including the costs of achieving EDPRS2 strategy targets with different options.

Section four, Recommendations and road map, makes some proposals on how these options might be combined into a comprehensive package that addresses the three key issues identified with the current programme. In addition, recognizing the need for further discussion within government, the challenges of implementing the proposals at scale and the next steps to take this work forward are proposed.

7 Save the Children worked with sector authorities to support the employment of caregivers in ECD centres through VUP public works in four sectors and reported most success in Gitovu and Rubavu.

10


SE

CT

ION

1:

gLO

bA

L A

ND

NA

TIO

NA

L E

VID

EN

CE

section 1: Global and national evidence

This section summarizes relevant international and national evidence on:

• The importance of a focus on the early stage of childhood – Section 1.1;

• The extent to which social protection programmes can impact ECD – Section 1.2; and

• The child-sensitivity of current VUP social protection programming in Rwanda – Section 1.3.

Based on the key issues that emerge from this discussion, Section 1.4 proposes a framework for assessing options to strengthen the child sensitivity of social protection in Rwanda.

The terms ‘social protection’ and ‘early childhood development’ are used here in line with their definitions in Government of Rwanda policy documents.

The Rwanda Social Protection Policy (2005) and the EDPRS2 Social Protection Strategy (2013–2018) define ‘social protection’ as “a set of public and private initiatives that provide income or consumption transfers to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalized; with the overall objective of reducing the social and economic vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and marginalized groups”.8

Early childhood development is concerned with the holistic development of young children. The Rwanda Integrated ECD White Paper (2009) defines it as “the processes by which children from preconception to six years grow and thrive physically, mentally, emotionally, morally and socially”. A key indicator that children are not growing and thriving is low height-for-age (stunting). Hence, addressing stunting where prevalence is high (as in Rwanda) is a key element of support to ECD.

8 Government of Rwanda, ‘EDPRS2 Social Protection Strategy’, July 2013, p. 3.

© U

NIC

EF/

201

4/M

uelle

nmei

ster

11


SE

CT

ION

1:

gLO

bA

L A

ND

NA

TIO

NA

L E

VID

EN

CE

1.1 early childhood development

1.1.1 Why is early childhood so important?

It is already well known that the first years of life are associated with a heightened risk of mortality; and there is increasing evidence that, for those children who survive this risky period, deprivations in early childhood can have lifelong negative impacts.

In terms of economic efficiency, it is during the earliest years of childhood that the rates of return from investment in human capital are highest. Protecting households with young children from poverty, hunger, food insecurity and the associated stress has been found to be among the most promising and cost-effective investments that can be made in human development.9 It has also been estimated that a country can achieve an economic gain of about US$510 for each infant that is moved out of low birth weight status, largely stemming from increased labour productivity and reduced costs incurred by infant illness and death.10

The architecture of the human brain is laid down very early in life. Risks associated with poverty in childhood such as undernutrition, lack of stimulation or excessive stress negatively affect brain development. In particular, stunting in early childhood due to chronic malnutrition has been found to impact intellectual development, school attainment and employment in adulthood.11 Negative impacts of stunting have been found on school grades attained by teenagers in Zimbabwe,12 and on the likelihood of formal employment at age 20–22 years in

9 Heckman, James J., and Dimitriy V. Masterov, D, ‘The Productivity Argument for Investing in Young Children’, Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 29, no. 3, 2007, pp. 446–493, 2007.

10 Alderman, Harold and Jere J. Behrman, ‘Reducing the Incidence of Low Birth Weight in Low-Income Countries has Substantial Economic Benefits’, World Bank Research Observer, vol. 21, no. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 25–48.

11 Walker, Susan P., et al., ‘Child Development: Risk factors for adverse outcomes in developing countries’, The Lancet vol. 369, no. 9556, 13 January 2007, pp. 145–157.

12 Alderman, Harold, John Hoddinott and Bill Kinsey, ‘Long-Term Consequences of Early Childhood Malnutrition’, Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 58, no. 3, 2006, pp. 450–474.

Not stunted

Stunted – stimulation

Stunted – no stimulation9–48 months 7–8 years 11–12 years 17–18 years

.8

.4

.2

0

-0.2

Dev

elo

pm

ent

Figure 1: lifelong impacts of childhood stunting

Source: Walker, Susan P., et al., ‘Child Development: Risk factors for adverse outcomes in developing countries’, The Lancet vol. 369, no. 9556, 13 January 2007, pp. 145–157.

12


SE

CT

ION

1:

gLO

bA

L A

ND

NA

TIO

NA

L E

VID

EN

CE

the Philippines.13 Figure 1 shows the differences in intellectual development of children in Jamaica who were and were not stunted in early childhood; how these differences persisted into adulthood; and how they were (partially) mitigated by a home-visiting programme providing early childhood stimulation. Stunting thus emerges as a key risk factor for long-term intellectual impairment.

Given its importance, it is useful to briefly consider the key causes of chronic malnutrition and stunting. As can be seen in Figure 2, household food security is only one of the key immediate determinants of child nutritional status, with others being quality of care (including child-feeding practices, health care and stimulation) and the healthiness of the environment.

13 Carba, Delia B., Vivencia L. Tan and Linda S. Adair, ‘Early Childhood Length-for-Age is Associated with the Work Status of Filipino Young Adults’, Economics and Human Biology, vol. 7, no. 1, 2009, pp. 7–17.

Child undernutrition, death and disability

Potential resources: environment,

technology, people

Basic causes

Underlying causes at household/family

level

Immediate causes

Disease

Poor water/sanitation and inadequate health services

Inadequate dietary intake

Insufficient access to food

Inadequate maternal and child

care practices

Quantity and quality of actual resources –

human, economic and organizational, and

the way they are controlled

Inadequate and/or inappropriate knowledge and

discrimatory attitudes limit household access to actual

resources

Political, cultural, religious, economic and social systems,

including women’s status, limit the utilization of potential

resources

Source: UNICEF, Strategy for Improved Nutrition of Children and Women in Developing Countries, UNICEF, New York, 1990.

Figure 2: Causal framework for child undernutrition

13


SE

CT

ION

1:

gLO

bA

L A

ND

NA

TIO

NA

L E

VID

EN

CE

1.1.2 the rwanda context: are young children thriving?

In Rwanda, in 2014–2015, 38 per cent of children 0–5 years old were stunted,14 down from 44 per cent in 2010. As discussed above, stunting (low height-for-age) is a crucial indicator of young child development and is highly correlated with low cognitive development and other negative impacts that persist into adulthood.

The likelihood that a child in Rwanda is stunted is strongly influenced by household income and wealth,15 as well as by the mother’s educational status. Children in Rwanda are far more likely to be stunted if their mother is also stunted, and if they were small at birth (confirming that the process of chronic undernutrition already starts in the mother’s womb).16

In Rwanda most babies 0–6 months old are exclusively breastfed, in line with international recommendations, but in many cases after 6 months of age their changing food needs are not being adequately met. Various surveys have demonstrated that the age period between 6 and 24 months is the period when stunting rates increase significantly.

As discussed above, nutrition is not only about food intake but also about care and the healthiness of the environment. A recent Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices survey17 showed a substantial gap between hygiene knowledge and practice in Rwanda. For example, while 100 per cent of respondents knew that they should wash their hands with soap before preparing food for the baby, only 28 per cent actually did so. Some 97 per cent of carers were observed not to wash their hands after cleaning a baby’s bottom following defecation.

In response to these challenges, the Government of Rwanda has developed a new draft National Food and Nutrition Policy, one of the strategic objectives of which is to “prevent stunting in children under 2 years of age at national scale”.

1.2 the role of social protection in promoting early childhood development: Global evidence

This section briefly reviews the international evidence on whether, how and in what circumstances social protection programmes impact ECD outcomes.

Evidence from around the world demonstrates that cash transfers can positively impact the health, cognitive development and nutrition of young children. On the other hand, these effects are not automatic but depend on programme design and context. While there is strong global evidence that cash transfers affect the quantity and diversity of household food consumption,18 effects on other determinants of child nutrition are less clear. For example, there is a risk that work conditionalities imposed on mothers (through public works programmes) reduce their time and energy to provide quality care, nutrition and a healthy environment.

14 National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, Rwandan Ministry of Health and ICF International, ‘Rwanda Demographic and Health Survey 2014–15: Key indicators’, NISR, MOH and ICF International, Rockville, Maryland, 2015.

15 From both DHS 2010 and Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment 2012, using various measures, including household consumption, asset index and Ubudehe status.

16 ‘Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment’, Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources, National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda and World Food Programme, 2012, p. 43.

17 Rwandan Ministry of Health, ‘Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Assessment on Early Nurturing of Children Report’, 2012.

18 See, for example, Department for International Development, ‘Cash Transfers Literature Review’, 2011.

14


SE

CT

ION

1:

gLO

bA

L A

ND

NA

TIO

NA

L E

VID

EN

CE

Two key systematic reviews are discussed in this section. Firstly, in their review of studies of the role social protection plays in improving human development outcomes in the earliest years of life, Britto et al. (2013)19 examine the ECD impacts of conditional and unconditional cash transfer programmes, as well as microcredit programmes. They consider impacts on a range of dimensions of ECD, including health, cognitive development and nutrition. Secondly, Manley and Gitter (2013)20 review 18 studies of 15 interventions in 10 countries, looking at the nutritional impacts of a range of cash transfer programmes, including unconditional programmes, and programmes with a range of types of conditionalities, including work conditionality (public works programmes). They focus on impacts on child height-for-age, a crucial summary measure of child health and development potential.

Key findings of these reviews are set out on three key dimensions of ECD – health, cognitive development and nutrition.

Health

Of 17 studies reviewed by Britto et al. (2013), seven show positive impacts of cash transfers on child health, eight show mixed (positive and neutral) impacts and one shows negative impacts.

A study of Red de Protección Social, a Nicaraguan conditional cash transfer and services programme, found large increases in vaccination coverage for children.21 Beneficiaries of Nicaragua’s Atención a Crisis programme spent more on critical inputs for child health and nutrition.22 Several studies of PROGRESA/Oportunidades, Mexico’s national conditional cash transfer scheme, show positive health impacts for children, including on birth weight,23 stress24 and infant mortality.25

An evaluation of the Bolsa Alimenação programme in Brazil found negative impacts of a conditional cash transfer programme on child health outcomes,26 possibly due to mothers’ misperceptions that eligibility for participation in the programme depended on a child being underweight and that benefits would be suspended if the child gained weight.

Cognitive development

Regarding the cognitive development of young children, the four studies reviewed by Britto et al. show a range of positive impacts. In Mexico’s Oportunidades programme, an effective doubling of cash transfers was associated with children doing better on motor development, cognitive development and receptive language.27 Studies of Ecuador’s Bono de Dessarrollo Humano programme also found significant impacts on cognitive and language development, though only for certain groups of children.28 The Atención a Crisis programme in Nicaragua led to sustained improvements in early childhood cognitive development, including language and socio-personal skills. These effects were attributed to both increased household consumption

19 Britto, Pia, et al., ‘Social Protection Programs and Early Childhood Development: Unexplored potential’, Plan International Australia, 2013.

20 Manley, James, and Seth Gitter and Vanya Slavchevska, ‘How Effective are Cash Transfers at Improving Nutritional Status?’, World Development, vol. 48, August 2013, pp. 133–155.

21 Berham and Maluccio, 2009, cited in Britto et al., 2013, op cit.22 Macours et al., 2012, cited in Britto et al., 2013, op cit.23 Barber and Gertler, 2008, cited in Britto et al., 2013, op cit.24 Fernald and Gunnar, 2009, cited in Britto et al., 2013, op cit.25 Berham, 2011, cited in Britto et al., 2013, op cit.26 Morris et al., 2004, cited in Britto et al., 2013, op cit.27 Fernald et al., 2008, cited in Britto et al., 2013, op cit.28 Paxson et al., 2010, Fernald et al., 2011, cited in Britto et al., 2013, op cit.

15


SE

CT

ION

1:

gLO

bA

L A

ND

NA

TIO

NA

L E

VID

EN

CE

as a direct result of the cash transfer and changes in parenting behaviours, and were also thought to be a result of other programming elements.29

Nutrition

Britto et al. (2013) find largely positive evidence on the nutritional impacts of social protection programmes. One study of PROGRESA found that a doubling of cash transfers was associated with higher height-for-age and lower prevalence of stunting.30 An examination of Brazil’s conditional cash transfer and services programme, Bolsa Familia, found positive impacts on height-for-age and weight-for-age, though not on weight-for-height.31

Manley et al. (2013) also find evidence from some programmes of positive impacts on child height-for-age, including the South African Child Support Grant32 and the Conditional Cash Subsidy on Child Health and Nutrition in Colombia.33

However, both Manley and Gitter and Britto et al. highlight the fact that these impacts are not automatic, but depend on programme design and context. Furthermore, overall, based on meta-regression analysis, Manley and Gitter do not find a statistically significant impact of the cash transfer programmes reviewed on child height-for-age; though this hides a wide variability between programmes. Marginal impacts of cash transfer programmes on child height-for-age may be higher for more vulnerable groups, including girls, younger children and children living in environments with poor health infrastructure. Little difference in aggregate is detected between unconditional cash transfers and transfers that are conditioned on health/education-related behaviours; and it is suggested that other factors, such as context, programme design and child age and gender are likely to be more important determinants of impact.

A further tentative conclusion from Manley and Gitter’s analysis, of high relevance to the Rwanda context as will be presented below, is that work or savings conditionalities on cash transfers (e.g. public works programmes) can sometimes lead to negative impacts on child growth.

Meanwhile, Manley et al. (2013) looked only at impact on child height-for-age and not at intermediate outcomes that might explain the effects of a work requirement; one of the original studies includes a range of measures that shed some light on this. Ahmed et al. (2009)34 assessed the nutritional impacts of two public works programmes in Bangladesh – the Food for Asset Creation and the Rural Maintenance Programme. Despite a substantial positive impact on household food consumption, these programmes were found to have no significant impact on either women’s body mass index or on the calorific intake of young children. In the case of women, the authors suggest that the calorie-burning manual labour requirement may have offset the programme’s positive cash impact. Similar negative effects on women’s and children’s nutrition have been reported for other public works programme in Bangladesh35 and Ethiopia.36

29 Marcours et al., 2010, cited in Britto et al., 2013, op cit.30 Fernald et al., 2008, cited in Britto et al., 2013, op cit.31 Paes-Sousa et al., 2011, cited in Britto et al., 2013, op cit.32 Aguero et al., 2007, cited in Manley et al., 2012, op cit.33 Attanasio et al., 2005, cited in Manley et al., 2012, op cit.34 Ahmed, Akhter U., et al., ‘Comparing Food and Cash Transfers to the Ultra Poor in Bangladesh’, Research

Monograph 163, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C., 2009, pp. 1–250.35 Helen Keller International, Bangladesh, 2007, reported in McCord, Anna Gabriele, Public Works and Social

Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa: Do public works work for the poor?, United Nations University Press, New York, October 2012.

36 McCord, Anna Gabriele, Public Works and Social Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa: Do public works work for the poor?, United Nations University Press, New York, October 2012.

16


SE

CT

ION

1:

gLO

bA

L A

ND

NA

TIO

NA

L E

VID

EN

CE

1.3 social protection in rwanda

The Government of Rwanda VUP social protection programme consists of four pillars: direct support; public works; micro-finance; and community sensitization. It provides cash transfers through direct support for those poor households with no labour capacity and through public works for those with at least one adult able to work. Eligibility for public works is on a household basis and households are free to choose who participates and to rotate this participation between adult members as they wish.

In 2014, of the 416 sectors of the country, the VUP programme was operational in 240 sectors with direct support and in 150 sectors with public works. The total number of beneficiary households reached by the VUP programme has increased in the past few years. In 2012–2013, public works reached 89,000 households (and 48 per cent of eligible households), with an average of 40 days’ work each; by mid-June 2014, 104,310 households had received public works employment.37

The poor households in which young children live tend to be eligible for public works rather than direct support due to the fact that there is usually an able-bodied adult in households where young children reside – hence the particular interest in assessing the impact of VUP public works on ECD.

1.3.1 How child-sensitive is VUP public works?

Taking account of the principles of child-sensitive social protection as set out in the Joint Statement on Advancing Child-Sensitive Social Protection,38 key dimensions of this question include the following:

1. To what extent are public works transfers reaching poor families with young children?

2. Are transfers received sufficient to make a difference to these families? And are they made in ways that encourage spending on young children’s needs?

3. Are there any unintended negative impacts on the quality of care or nutrition of young children?

The following section considers these issues in turn, based mainly on existing evidence about VUP public works in Rwanda.

Three key sources are used in this section:

• RLDSF (LODA) ‘VUP Gender Equity Assessment’, FATE Consulting, 2013;

• Researching the Link between Social Protection and Children’s Care in Rwanda, Roelen and Shelmerdine, 2014; and

• A Local Perspective of the VUP and the Land Regularisation Programme, Berglund, A., 2012.

Question 1: To what extent are public works transfers reaching poor and vulnerable families with young children?

We know that there is a general challenge of low coverage of public works in Rwanda. In 2012–2013, no more than 48 per cent of households selected as eligible for public works got access

37 Ministry of Local Government, ‘Social Protection Backward-Looking Joint Sector Reviews’ report, 2014.38 Advancing Child-Sensitive Social Protection, DFID, UNICEF, World Bank et al., 2009.

17


SE

CT

ION

1:

gLO

bA

L A

ND

NA

TIO

NA

L E

VID

EN

CE

to any work at all.39 Despite the commitment in the Labour-Intensive Public Works Strategy to use labour-intensive approaches and labour from Ubudehe categories 1 and 2 across government projects, there has been an ongoing challenge in identifying sufficient projects. Furthermore, many of the public works projects that have been identified have been rather capital-intensive: in 2012–2013 only 30 per cent of the VUP public works budget went to wages, though this is understood to have improved somewhat (to around 50 per cent) in 2013–2014,40 and there are indications of even further improvement in 2014–2015.

In addition to the general challenges of coverage of public-works eligible households, there are indications that coverage of households facing a combination of limited labour capacity and caring responsibilities may be even lower, due to the particular challenges of participation they face.

The Gender Equity Assessment illustrates the problem through many quotes from focus group participants, including this one from Kibumbe: “I am in public works but I couldn’t work as a single mother. I have a disabled child and was taking her to the hospital constantly, so during all public works period last year I did not get paid as I had not yet worked.”41

There seem to be several mechanisms that lead to exclusion of such households.

First, when, as is often the case, there is insufficient work for all eligible public works households, the Gender Equity Assessment reports that having strong labour capacity is often used as a criterion for selecting households for work. As a result, people initially categorized as ‘able to work’ but who are perceived to be insufficiently strong to undertake the onerous demands of a particular public works project are at risk of exclusion from the benefits of VUP.42

This finding was corroborated by field visits undertaken as part of the present review. For example, in Rubavu, sector officials reported that for community projects, households are randomly selected from those eligible by pulling names from a hat, whereas on projects that are managed by contractors, the contractors insist on hiring people who are stronger, and refuse to accept women with children or pregnant women at the worksite. In Gitovu Sector, two key criteria are used: (1) being among the poorest/most vulnerable and (2) having strong labour capacity in the household.43

Second, even if initially selected, according to Berglund (2012)44 people with less physical strength tend either to be excluded or to self-exclude from VUP public works after a few days, due to their perceived inability to perform the required work. The finding of self-exclusion of weaker workers, workers living far from the worksite and single-adult households is echoed in the findings from fieldwork conducted in December 2011 by Hartwig, who also finds that late payments present a barrier to participation for some of the most vulnerable households.

The limited quantitative evidence available is more ambiguous as to which households are, and are not, accessing public works. According to Hartwig’s analysis of the third cohort of public works’ households (2010–2011), female-headed public-works eligible households are significantly less likely to actually participate in public works than male-headed ones. On the other hand, public-works participant households tend to have somewhat fewer adult

39 DFID VUP Project Completion Review, 2013.40 DFID Social Protection Support to the Poorest in Rwanda (SPSPR) Business Case and Intervention Summary and

discussions with VUP Technical Assistance.41 Gender Equity Assessment, op cit., p. 22.42 RLDSF (LODA) ‘VUP Gender Equity Assessment’, p. 19.43 From fieldwork conducted as part of this study.44 Berglund, A Local Perspective of The Vision 2020 Umurenge Program and the Land Tenure Regularization

Program, 2012.

18


SE

CT

ION

1:

gLO

bA

L A

ND

NA

TIO

NA

L E

VID

EN

CE

workers, 1.5 on average, compared with an average of two workers in eligible non-participant households.45 There are no data available specifically on households with a combination of limited labour capacity and caring responsibilities for children.46

Question 2: Are received transfers sufficient to make a difference to these families? And are they made in ways that encourage spending on young children?

Size and regularity of benefits

Even for those eligible households fortunate enough to get access to work, workdays and transfer levels47 tend to be very low. In 2012–2013, of those households who actually participated, the average number of days work accessed was just 40 and the average benefit level was 41,400 FRw per year. Given that the average public works household consists of 4.7 members, this equates to just 11 per cent of the extreme poverty line, unlikely to be sufficient to support household graduation out of extreme poverty.48

For larger-than-average households with many children, per capita transfer levels will be even lower. There is evidence from other programmes within the region that when benefit levels are fixed and do not vary with household size (e.g. as in the Kenya Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children, impacts on larger households are less).49

Furthermore, the analysis above of VUP public-works transfer levels simply considers the gross wages, as if they were a net benefit. However, given the work requirement, it is important to consider the costs as well as the benefits of public works in arriving at an assessment of net benefits. The cash costs of participation in VUP public works – including earnings foregone from other work and Savings and Credit Cooperative (SACCO) bank account costs – are estimated to be around 22 per cent of VUP earnings at the current employment level of 40 days per year.50 Late payment of public works wages also leads to substantial costs for beneficiaries who are generally living hand-to-mouth and have few, if any, reserves on which to draw. It is estimated that a 30-day delay costs beneficiaries 15 per cent of the value of the transfer.51 These costs further reduce the already low value of the public works transfer.

How the cash is spent

All VUP payments are made into a household bank account for which the head of the household is the primary signatory. This is the case for public works, regardless of who within the household actually does the work. The Gender Equity Assessment quotes public works participants explaining that at registration at the public works site, the name of the household head is called out and women (and other household members) are required to answer to that name, rather than their own.52

45 Government of Rwanda, ‘Fourth Population and Housing Census, Rwanda’, Thematic Report on Households and Housing, Table 15, 2012, p 37.

46 Hartwig, R., ‘Short-term Welfare Effects of Rwanda’s Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme’, Table 3, 2013, p. 35.47 Amount received from public works during a period, so depending on wage rates and number of days worked.48 Figures from DFID, Business Case, op cit., Annex 3, Table 4, 2013, p. 28.49 Ward, P. et al., ‘Operational and Impact Evaluation of the Cash Transfer Programme for Orphans and Vulnerable

Children, Final Report’, OPM, UK, 2010.50 Wylde, ‘Draft Value for Money Analysis of VUP’ (unpublished), 2013.51 Ibid.52 RLDSF Gender Equity Assessment, p. 30.

19


SE

CT

ION

1:

gLO

bA

L A

ND

NA

TIO

NA

L E

VID

EN

CE

There is strong international evidence that empowering women can benefit young children, as women’s spending patterns tend to favour children and household nutrition.53 A study using Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data from 40 developing countries shows that women’s status within the household is an important determinant of child nutrition.54 Evidence on South Africa’s pension scheme also demonstrates positive impacts on granddaughters’ nutrition due to pensions provided to grandmothers, but there are no impacts from similar payments to grandfathers.55

It does not, of course, follow that because VUP public works monies are paid into an account in the name of the head of household that women have no say at all over how the money is spent. Wives are often secondary signatories on these accounts, and most households report deciding jointly on spending of the cash. It has been argued that this arrangement is appropriate in the Rwandan context because husbands and wives tend to make joint decisions regarding spending. On the other hand, partners will have varying influence over so-called ‘joint’ decisions, and the extent of this influence will depend partly on who is seen to be bringing money into the household. Furthermore, according to the 2010 DHS,56 a sizeable minority of women in Rwanda (18 per cent) report having the main say in the use of their normal (not public works) cash earnings, so these women may actually be disempowered by the current public works payment arrangements.

The extent of women’s influence over spending of VUP monies and what this means for the extent to which different household members benefit has not yet been fully investigated. VUP surveys indicate that, in general, cash transfer beneficiaries spend their cash on food and other necessities. There are also documented cases of men misspending monies on alcohol.57 But there has not yet been any in-depth Rwanda-specific analysis on whether/how expenditure patterns might change to the benefit of young children were payments to be made to women carers.

Question 3: Are there any unintended negative impacts on the quality of care or nutrition of young children?

One set of costs of particular concern to the present assessment is those costs borne by young children whose mothers participate in public works. In considering these, it is important to note that public works is generally perceived by households as more onerous than most other income-generating activities, given the nature of most of the work (physically arduous), its timing (long hours, intensive) and the distance of some of the public works worksites.58 This has implications for ECD in that engagement in public works is likely to lead to greater nutritional depletion and exhaustion in pregnant women and mothers of young children, and longer hours away from home, than the alternative income-generating work they might otherwise be doing. According to World Health Organization guidelines, children 9 months to 2 years old should, in addition to breastfeeding, be eating three to four times per day, which will clearly be difficult to arrange for mothers who find themselves at a distant worksite for most of the day.

53 See, for example, Yoong, J., Rabinovich, L. and L. Diepeveen, S., ‘What is the evidence of the impact on family wellbeing of giving economic resources (e.g. microcredit, cash or asset transfers) to women relative to the impact of giving them to men? A systematic review’, 2012.

54 Smith, Lisa C., et al., The Importance of Women’s Status for Child Nutrition in Developing Countries, Research Report 131, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C., 2003.

55 Duflo, Esther, ‘Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old‐age pensions and intrahousehold allocation in South Africa’, World Bank Economic Review, vol. 17, no. 1, 2003, pp. 1–25.

56 DHS 2010, p. 225.57 Roelen and Shelmerdine, 2014, op cit.58 FATE Consulting, ‘VUP Gender Equity Assessment’, 2013, p. 23.

20


SE

CT

ION

1:

gLO

bA

L A

ND

NA

TIO

NA

L E

VID

EN

CE

Many negative effects on young children of the public works requirement are highlighted in the various recent studies discussed above, including:

• Harmful effects on young child nutrition: “Women work with their small children and, as we start early, they don’t have time to feed them well” (male public works participants in Minazi);59 “We stay home until they come back and that is when we get something to eat” (Kibilizi, female child).60

• Inadequate care and stimulation of young children who are taken to the worksite: At most worksites there are no childcare facilities and so babies and young children often remain on their mothers’ backs for long hours,61 which is both tiring for mothers and inadequately stimulating for children. There are also health and safety risks involved with bringing young children to worksites due to their precarious location and the presence of tools and other hazards.

• Reduced time of public works participants for caring and other domestic responsibilities: “Direct Support benefits more than other [kinds of support] because participants get the time to care for their children, whereas public works participants spend much time in work” (Kibulizi, adult female, Direct Support); “The time available for household activities has become less for those who are alone and don’t have anybody to assist them when they go for public works” (female public works beneficiary in Kibumbe Sector).62

• Inadequate arrangements for care of children left at home: “As I worked very far from home I had to leave the children alone and close the door so that they cannot go outside, and I left food for them” (Kibilizi adult female).63

• Increased child labour and reduced school attendance of older children who care for them: “These children stay home and are refused to go to school, because they’re taking care of their siblings”.64

1.3.2 Government of rwanda policy and programme responses to identified challenges

The challenges of low coverage and limited workdays of public works are well understood by social protection stakeholders in Rwanda. The EDPRS2 Social Protection Strategy sets targets for ongoing improvements: by 2014–2015, 60 per cent of eligible households should access work and should gain an average of 71 work workdays each.65

Based on:

• The Integrated Household Living Survey (EICV) 3 finding that the poorest households tend to be larger than average and to include more children – 65 per cent of households in the poorest quintile include a child under the age of 5, compared with only 42 per cent of households in the richest quintile;66 and

• The understanding that such households tend to be eligible for public works rather than direct support.

59 Ibid. p. 23.60 Roelen and Shelmerdine, 2014, p. 25.61 Reports from sector officials as part of fieldwork.62 FATE Consulting, 2013, p. 39.63 Roelen and Shelmerdine, 2014, p. 25.64 Gender Equity Assessment, p. 25.65 EDPRS2 Social Protection Strategy, Annex 2, p. 53.66 EICV3 Social Protection Thematic Report, 2012.

21


SE

CT

ION

1:

gLO

bA

L A

ND

NA

TIO

NA

L E

VID

EN

CE

The Social Protection Strategy also specifically commits to addressing the issue of child poverty through expanding public works. One of the six key priorities in the strategy is ‘child poverty and vulnerability in the poorest households is addressed’, and specific commitments are laid out (see Box 1).

The Labour-Intensive Public Works Strategy takes forward the commitment of expanding public works to other programmes, by providing for the VUP approach (labour-intensive works and selection of labour from Ubudehe categories 1 and 2) to be extended across government programmes. It provides for the setting up of an Inter-Ministerial National Steering Committee to oversee this, chaired by MINALOC and with representation from a wide range of other ministries, and for corresponding District Steering Committees.

Additionally, in terms of the particular challenges of participation faced by women with young children, there are some provisions in the VUP Public Works Manual. However, these are couched as recommendations rather than central elements of programme design. As a result, not only is implementation patchy, but there are also risks of unintended negative effects of the provisions.

Box 1: national social Protection strategy commitments

• Expand the VUP public works approach to other programmes. The social protection sector will encourage and support the use of the VUP targeting approach (based on Ubudehe categorization) to select workers for other public works and infrastructure programmes. In this way, more of the poorest families will be able to access public works employment.

• Broaden public works to suit a range of household characteristics. Pregnant and breastfeeding mothers could be given lighter work or more flexible hours; for example, through employment as assistants and support staff within ECD centres, schools, crèches and health centres. Households could be given responsibility for maintaining a particular asset in their own time, working flexible hours. Such types of public works would also enable expanded employment of other people able to work but unable to undertake intensive physical labour (such as older people and people living with disabilities).

• Increase the public works benefits received by large households to improve impact on household poverty levels. One way of increasing benefits to larger households with many dependents would be to allow more than one person from such households to participate in public works. An alternative would be to prioritize access to public works for large households with young children. The sector will consider options and pursue the most feasible.

• Review other elements of the design of public works in order to maximize impacts for children. Among other issues, this review will consider the arguments for and against the introduction of an employment guarantee scheme, and will look at whether the impacts for children are affected and who within the household receives the public works payment.

22


SE

CT

ION

1:

gLO

bA

L A

ND

NA

TIO

NA

L E

VID

EN

CE

Provisions in the VUP Public Works Manual

Promoting the participation in public works of women with young children

Annex 2 of the Public Works Manual states:

As a general rule, at least 50 per cent of clients of this programme must be women. Necessary steps may be taken to enable women to participate. For example, women with young children could participate if crèche facilities are provided, and women running such crèches could be paid by the programme.

This provision could help mitigate the adverse effects on children of unsuitable care arrangements while their mothers are engaged in full-time, intensive public works. The recommendation to provide crèches will need to be further explored, as currently there is no systematic provision of childcare at public works sites. There are some informal strategies to support women with children; for example, some sectors report allowing public works participants to bring children to the worksite, along with someone to look after them; and sometimes women who are pregnant or have small children themselves are employed as part of public works to look after the children of others.67 On the one hand, these approaches may provide low-cost solutions to some of the challenges of the participation of women with small children noted above. On the other hand, given the informality of the arrangements and the lack of support or monitoring, there may be risks around the quality of this care, in particular risks of inadequate provision of nutrition, clean water and sanitation for children at worksites.

Protecting pregnant women and unborn children

A further protective measure is included in Annex 1 of the manual: “It is recommended that women participants must not be pregnant beyond the sixth month of pregnancy.”

In some social protection programmes (for example, the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia) this measure is accompanied by a provision for a switch to direct support during pregnancy, thus protecting women and unborn children from the harmful effects of intensive physical labour, without negatively affecting household income. However, in Rwanda, such a provision for a switch to direct support needs to be further explored and clarified. A 2008 document entitled Annex 4: Direct Support Framework and Procedures lists various categories of households that should be prioritized for direct support, including: “Female-headed households with pregnant women in their last trimester or lactating mothers in the first 10 months after birth.” On the other hand, this annex is not included in the 2009 Direct Support Manual and its status is unclear. In practice, such a provision to switch female-headed households from public works to direct support as a result of pregnancy is yet to be implemented.

The impact of implementation of the provision that pregnant women are not allowed to participate in public works will therefore vary depending on household circumstances. Where there is another household member available and willing to replace the pregnant woman, the provision may protect her and her unborn baby from the negative effects of hard physical labour, without compromising the household’s public works income. On the other hand, in households without another able-bodied adult, this exclusion will lead to a reduction in income.

The Gender Equity Assessment reports that in most sectors officials have not considered the issue of pregnant women who do not have able-bodied husbands present, although there are some isolated examples of innovative practice to address this. For example, in one sector

67 Ibid. p. 29.

23


SE

CT

ION

1:

gLO

bA

L A

ND

NA

TIO

NA

L E

VID

EN

CE

(Rangiro), sector officials consider whether there is someone else in the household able to work before insisting that a pregnant woman stops work;68 and in Rubavu Sector, officials took the initiative to enable pregnant women to work half-days and to continue to receive full wages.

Initiatives to link social protection and ECD

In a few sectors, there has been collaboration with NGOs to develop innovative pilots that link VUP public works and ECD. Examples are given in Boxes 2 and 3 below.

Box 2: linkages between VUP public works and eCd centres

Since 2010, Save the Children has been supporting a pilot ECD programme in four VUP sectors, working with sector authorities in support of ECD centres for children 3–6 years old and a range of related services for children 0–6 years old and their caregivers.

One innovation has been the promotion of linkages between VUP and ECD, through the employment of VUP public works beneficiaries as care assistants in the centres. The design envisaged the employment of 15 care assistants per sector through VUP public works in a range of roles, including assisting the primary caregivers in the classroom with cooking and cleaning (Save the Children programme proposal to European Commission, 2009).

However, in practice, these linkages have been more limited. Save the Children found that, in the absence of a formal communication from RLDSF (LODA) supporting the innovation, some local officials were reluctant to deviate from classic public works approaches. Where the approach partially succeeded, success depended a great deal on the existence of proactive local leaders and VUP staff at sector level who were willing to innovate.

In two sectors – Mwendo and Rubaya – no such linkages with VUP public works were established. In the other two sectors – Gitovu and Rubavu – linkages were established, but at lower scale and in somewhat different ways than initially envisaged.

In Rubavu, four public works beneficiaries were employed as primary caregivers in an ECD centre. These women had been carrying out these roles on a voluntary basis previously, and, given their eligibility for VUP public works, an opportunity was identified to motivate them and promote their retention as caregivers. Three of the four have since graduated from VUP, being now categorized in Ubudehe 3, and are still working as caregivers, without VUP support.

In Gitovu Sector, VUP beneficiaries did work as care assistants in ECD centres (as initially envisaged). However, rather than employing public works beneficiaries, the sector placed elderly direct support beneficiaries in these positions. Although from the perspective of the sector these positions were entirely voluntary, there is a risk that beneficiaries might have misunderstood this, as, apparently, some complaints were received. Employing direct support beneficiaries risks undermining the principle of entitlement to direct support; it also underlines an identified risk with the proposed expanded public works approach that beneficiaries previously in receipt of direct support might be reclassified as suitable for light public works.

68 RLDSF, Gender Equity Assessment, p. 28.

24


SE

CT

ION

1:

gLO

bA

L A

ND

NA

TIO

NA

L E

VID

EN

CE

Box 3: linkages between VUP public works and home-based care

In addition to supporting ECD centres for children 3–6 years old, in Kamonyi District CARE International has, since 2010, worked in collaboration with local authorities to pilot home-based care provision for children 18 months old to 3 years old. Groups of mothers care for one another’s children at a centrally agreed site on a rotating basis. Minimum provisions at the site include a latrine, handwashing facilities, a kitchen and basic equipment. CARE provides training to the mothers.

Home-based care is seen as a cost-effective solution and an effective means of reaching younger children. Scale-up can be achieved more rapidly than with ECD centres; and CARE expects to be supporting more than 8,600 children in home-based care in Kamonyi District by the end of this year.

Home-based childcare is reported by CARE to have been highly valued by women participating in public works. An evaluation of this programme will be completed shortly.

Source: CARE International, A Model Beginning: CARE’s early childhood development for Rwanda’s most vulnerable children (undated).

© U

NIC

EF/

201

4

25


SE

CT

ION

1:

gLO

bA

L A

ND

NA

TIO

NA

L E

VID

EN

CE

1.4 Framework for assessing options

Based on the preceding analysis, it is proposed that the following framework be used to assess the extent to which different options promote child-sensitive social protection.

table 1: Framework for assessing options

Social protection missionEnsure that all poor and vulnerable men, women and children are guaranteed a minimum standard of living and access to core public services, those who can work are provided with the opportunities for escaping poverty, and that increasing numbers of people are able to access risk-sharing mechanisms that protect them from crises and shocks.Child-sensitive social protectionKey issue Current situation Existing targets/commitments Source1. Coverage a) Overall, only 48% of public-

works eligible households access any work (VUP data).

b) Mothers of young children face particular challenges of participation in public works (Gender Equity Assessment).

c) Eligible female-headed households are less likely to gain access to work than male-headed households (Hartwig 2013).

a) By 2014–2015, 60% of public-works eligible households access public works.

b) Coverage will be increased to reach a greater number of large households with children.

c) Consider the arguments for and against the introduction of an employment guarantee scheme.

a) EDPRS2 Social Protection Strategy, Annex 2, p. 53

b) EDPRS2 SP Strategy, p. 20

c) EDPRS2 SP Strategy, p. 21

2. Level and regularity of benefits – and spending on children

a) Average number of workdays only 40 and average benefit level 41,400 per year: only around 11% of per capita extreme poverty line for average household.69

b) Fixed benefits mean that benefits are even more inadequate for larger households with many children.

c) Payments made to household head, regardless of who actually works.

d) Ongoing challenges with regularity of payments.70

a) By 2014–2015, public works beneficiary households will get an average of 71 days’ work per year.

b) Increase the public works benefits received by large households to improve impact on household poverty levels.

c) Consider how impacts for children are affected in relation to which member of the household receives the VUP public works payment.

d) By 2013–2014, systems for measuring timeliness will have been developed and approved and will be operational; by 2014–2015, targets will be defined – and achieved.

a) EDPRS2 SP Strategy, Annex 2, p. 53

b) EDPRS2 SP Strategy, p. 21

c) EDPRS2 SP Strategy, p. 21

d) EDPRS2 SP Strategy, Annex 2, p. 54

3. Harmful effects on young children of work requirement of VUP public works

a) Numerous examples of harmful effects on young child feeding practices (Gender Equity Assessment).

b) Numerous examples of inadequate care and stimulation (Gender Equity Assessment) of young children whose mothers work on public works.

a) Reduce chronic child malnutrition from 44% currently to 15% by 2020.

b) All Rwandan children achieve their potential, are healthy, well-nourished and safe, and their mothers, fathers and communities become nurturing caregivers.

a) Vision 2020 target, reiterated in EDPRS2 SP Strategy

b) Early Childhood Development Policy and Strategic Plan, 2011

69 Wylde, E., 2013, op cit.70 Recent analysis of data from five sectors (by LODA Financial Management TA) indicates reasonable programme

performance on timeliness (with the majority of both public works and direct support payments being made within 30 days of the end of the period) but far greater problems with regularity. Somewhat less than half of public works payments covered the correct period of 15 days and the rest covered a longer period. Regularity of direct support was even worse, with two-thirds of direct support payments covering a period of more than 90 days (instead of the correct period of 30 days).

26


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

section 2: Child-sensitive social protection in rwanda – options

This section sets out practical options to improve the child sensitivity of VUP public works programming and, in particular, the extent to which the programme positively impacts the youngest children. In Section 2.1, four categories of programme modifications are proposed, and in Section 2.2 detailed options within each of these are considered.

2.1 Four categories of child-sensitive action

The four proposed categories of action are as follows:

1. Expansion of public works involves creation of new types of labour-intensive public works (later called new or expanded public works) that are more compatible with caring responsibilities, being more flexible, long-term, part-time and closer to home than current public works (later called classic public works);

2. Increased benefit levels for families with young children (for a given level of work);

3. Measures to mitigate potentially harmful impacts of classic (full-time, physically intensive) public works on the care and nutrition of young children; and

4. Complementary services that enhance the impacts of cash transfers on ECD.

These categories are not mutually exclusive, but can be combined for optimal impact on children. Before considering options within these categories in detail, it will be useful to consider the different ways in which these categories of action address the key identified issues.

© U

NIC

EF/

201

4/M

uelle

nmei

ster

27


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

Category 1: Expansion of public works

By expanding VUP public works beyond intensive, group-based infrastructure and agricultural projects to include work that is more flexibly structured, provides social services, and/or is carried out closer to home in safer environments, this category of actions is expected to:

• Promote improved coverage, especially of households with young children, by lifting the constraints to participation and by targeting mothers of young children;

• Due to its highly labour-intensive nature, increase the proportion of the budget dedicated to wages and, thereby, increase transfer levels; and

• Mitigate the negative impacts of the work requirement on young children whose mothers participate (since the work will be less intensive, more flexible and closer to home).

Experience from South Africa suggests that in order to identify a sufficient number of such jobs to make a difference, a major cross-government initiative will be required to prioritize labour-intensive new-style public works wherever and whenever possible across all sectoral programmes.71

Category 2: Increased benefit levels for families with children (for a given level of work)

In the absence of a large-scale, cross-government initiative to identify and fund tens of thousands of new-style public works jobs, a highly cost-effective alternative would be to simply increase benefit levels for certain categories of the most vulnerable public-works eligible households, without requiring any additional work. This approach recognizes the reality that currently most public-works eligible households are accessing little if any work, even if they are willing to work, because the supply of public works jobs is insufficient; and that, as a consequence, their benefit levels are very low (and in many cases zero).

Targeted increases to benefit levels for the most vulnerable households could be achieved in several ways, for example by:

• Providing a guaranteed child element to all public-works eligible households with a child of a certain age (e.g. 0–4 years old), in order to promote young child nutrition and development;

• Expanding the definition of ‘labour-constrained household’ to include those households with only one able-bodied adult and a young child (or person with a severe disability) – such households then become eligible for direct support instead of public works; and

• Providing paid maternity leave from public works for women living in households without another able-bodied adult.

This category of actions would:

• Improve coverage of households with young children;

• Increase transfer levels for households with children and, if the transfers were paid to the primary carer, probably also the extent to which children benefited from these transfers;

• Improve regularity of payments, since a regular monthly payment would be received irrespective of whether there was an active public works project in the sector, or whether the household was selected to participate; and

71 Discussion with Anna McCord, who has worked extensively on the South African Expanded Public Works Programme (May 2014).

28


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

• Mitigate the negative impacts of the work requirement on young children, since the work requirement would be removed for the most vulnerable households with severely constrained labour capacities.

Category 3: Mitigating negative impacts of classic public works

Recognizing that new-style flexible public works will likely be insufficient to cover all eligible households with young children, this category of actions seeks to mitigate the potential negative effects of classic public works on the young children whose mothers participate. Options include support to home-based and worksite childcare, as well as formalizing arrangements for light work and reduced hours of work for women who are pregnant and breastfeeding.

This category of actions will mainly:

• Mitigate the negative impacts of the public works work requirement on young children.

It may also contribute to:

• Improved coverage and increased benefit levels by enabling mothers of young children to participate more in public works.

Category 4: Complementary services – enhancing the impacts of cash transfers on ECD

Evidence suggests that the impact of cash transfers can be enhanced by high-quality complementary children’s services. By definition, this category of actions is complementary: it can enhance the impacts of cash transfers for public works households that are receiving them, but cannot substitute for cash transfers where eligible households are missing out on access. Given that many vulnerable families are not yet receiving cash transfers due to the continued undercoverage of public works, it may be premature in Rwanda to talk about ‘complementary services’.

© U

NIC

EF/

201

4/M

uelle

nmei

ster

29


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

This category of actions may contribute somewhat to:

• Enhanced spending of transfers on children due to an improved understanding by households of children’s priority needs; and

• Mitigation of the negative impact of the public works requirement by increasing carers’ understanding of what constitutes quality childcare and who might best provide it in their absence.

Table 2 below summarizes the expected key benefits of the categories of action under consideration. As can be seen, the options each address the different key challenges with the current system to varying degrees. As such, they can usefully be seen not as alternatives, but as complementary elements of a child-sensitive social protection system. (Of course, exact impacts will depend on the choice of options within each category and on detailed design.)

table 2: How different categories of actions address key issues

Key issues addressed Option 1: Expanded public works

Option 2: Increased benefit levels for vulnerable families with young children

Option 3: Mitigating measures

Option 4: Complementary services

Coverage Medium High LowAdequacy of transfers and spending on children

Medium Medium Low Low

Mitigation of harmful impacts on young children of the work requirement

Medium High High Low

© U

NIC

EF/

201

4/M

uelle

nmei

ster

30


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

2.2 options within each category

This section considers the advantages, disadvantages, feasibility and costs of a range of options in each of the four categories of actions set out in Section 2.1 above.

2.2.1 Category 1 – expanded public works

As set out above, the key purpose of this option is to expand the type of public works available to include jobs that are more compatible with caring roles, and thus enable carers – especially mothers – to earn income from public works, without compromising the quality of care for their young children. This section gives some concrete ideas for new-style public works; summarizes the overall advantages and Challenges/drawbacks of this category of action; and proposes some possible criteria for selecting which eligible households are to benefit from new-style public works.

To date, four new types of public works have been identified that might meet the criteria of alignment with the principles of public works, suitability for the target groups and compatibility with caring responsibilities. It is estimated that the supply of these types of new-style public works could employ at least 180 households72 per sector, or an average of 16 per cent of public-works eligible households.73

It is important to note that this list of types of work is not intended to be exhaustive. Key to taking forward expanded public works will be a cross-ministerial participatory design process that builds on these ideas at both district and national levels, expanding the VUP public works approach across government programmes, in line with commitments in the EDPRS2 Social Protection Strategy and the Labour-Intensive Public Works Strategy.

That said, the four types of new-style public works identified are the following:

1. Support staff in schools, clinics and community ECD centres (especially cleaners, cooks and guards);

2. Flexible road maintenance;

3. Works for the benefit of vulnerable households; and

4. Social/community workers.

The nature of the work proposed and the advantages, challenges, drawbacks and risks of each of these are considered in turn.

1. support staff in schools, clinics and community eCd centres – primarily cleaners, but also cooks and guards where required

• The need for cleaners is year-round (not just for a few months of the year, as is the case with current public works). Each public works participant could work 2–3 days per week all year (or 10 months of the year in the case of schools).

• 8–10 people could be employed in each clinic/school/ECD centre in the sector. Assuming an average of five schools, two clinics and three ECD centres per sector (from a 2011 MINEDUC

72 This is based on the following calculation (approximately 6 schools, 1 clinic and 1 ECD centre in each sector, and 10 public works workers in each) + 100 road maintenance public works workers employed per sector. The number of households that could be found work on projects of type 3 and 4 is to be determined and so is not included here; hence 180 households might be a conservative estimate.

73 The calculation of 16 per cent is based on an average number of 1,143 VUP public-works eligible households per sector, 2012–2013.

31


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

survey), implies that up to 80 public works beneficiary households could be employed in this type of work.

Advantages

• This work would be physically less demanding and potentially closer to home, since there is usually a primary school in every cell (although clinics and ECD centres may tend to be more concentrated near sector headquarters), less intensive and more flexible – thus, more child-sensitive.

• It would also be guaranteed and long-term (for as long as a household was eligible for public works and public works was operational in the sector), thus ensuring regularity of a minimum income.

• There is enthusiasm for this option from school and clinic staff and from sector staff with whom the consultant met (in Gitovu and Rubavu). While schools and clinics have a budget for support staff, this budget is often insufficient for them to employ enough people to maintain the desired levels of hygiene.

• Improving hygiene in schools and clinics is of wider community benefit and could contribute to other Government of Rwanda objectives regarding health and improved nutritional outcomes.

• This work requires minimal skills and could be undertaken by most VUP public-works eligible households with a small amount of training and adequate supervision.

• Cleaning is a marketable skill, so if participants are well trained they may possibly be able to find follow-on work in private-sector institutions/private households.

Challenges, drawbacks and risks

• Some training would be required by public works workers, which should be provided by clinic/school staff. Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health (MINEDUC/MINISANTE) would need to commit to this and it is suggested that a memorandum of understanding be drawn up to clarify responsibilities.

• Supervision should include daily timesheets to be signed by both public works workers and the supervisor (who would also be required to confirm that the work had been carried out to a satisfactory standard) and collated by VUP staff for payment purposes. Such a supervision system would need to be established and also included as a requirement in the memorandum of understanding.

• MINALOC would want to avoid any perception of permanent responsibility for cleaning services, given that public works is intended to phase out from sectors at some point.

• Concern has been expressed that by funding cleaning services from the VUP public works budget, the government budget would effectively be paying for this twice since there is already, in theory, provision for this in schools’/clinics’ budgets even if, in practice, these budgets are tight. This issue could perhaps be addressed by enabling schools in the short-term to use their cleaning budgets to buy cleaning equipment and to train and supervise public works participants, while VUP temporarily took care of public works wages. The memorandums of understanding would need to be very clear that the long-term responsibility for cleaning remained with MINEDUC/MINISANTE.

• Difficulties of targeting might arise, given that demand for these jobs will be greater than supply. There may be challenges in ensuring that women with young children are prioritized for these jobs rather than other households with older, disabled or weaker family members.

32


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

2. Flexible road maintenance. each household would be given responsibility for permanently maintaining a stretch of road

This option concerns the ongoing maintenance of the category of roads that link sectors and cells; main roads that link districts are already covered by a national road maintenance programme, and roads within villages and cells are maintained through Umuganda.

• Households would be expected to work the equivalent of around 9–10 full days on average per month for nine months of the year, with the intensity of work varying according to season. (No road maintenance is required during the dry season from June to August.) To avoid a gap in payments during the hungry season, households could be paid for eight days of work per month every month of the year, as long as the road was adequately maintained.

• Norms regarding length of road per household would need to be worked out by road engineers and might vary for different roads depending on traffic levels. As a rough estimate, based on figures given by a VUP engineer, each household might maintain around 200 m of road.74

• Households would be given responsibility for maintaining a stretch of road as near as possible to their house. But lack of proximity to a road would not be a reason for excluding qualifying households, if they were keen to take on the responsibility.

74 Current work norm is that a strong adult can maintain a 20 m stretch of road in an eight-hour day. Taking account of the fact that this work is aimed at the less strong within the VUP eligible, this norm might be halved to 10 m per day. Working 10 days per month, the household could maintain 200 m per two months. Then they would start again.

© U

NIC

EF/

201

4/M

uelle

nmei

ster

33


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

• The work would consist of repairing potholes, unblocking drainage channels and clearing grass by the side of the road.

• The VUP engineer estimates that this type of work could occupy around 100 VUP-eligible households in each sector, although this estimate will require more detailed sector-by-sector analysis.

• Lessons could be learned from the similar South Africa Zibambele road maintenance public works programme (see Box 4) – and a visit to this programme might be a useful part of the detailed design process.

Box 4: south africa Zibambele programme

The Zibambele programme was initiated in 2000 in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. It contracted rural households to maintain a stretch of road, targeting the poorest and, in particular, female-headed households. Households were responsible for:

• Maintainingtheroaddrainagesystem;

• Ensuringgoodroadsidevisibility;

• Maintainingtheroadsurfaceingoodcondition;and

• Clearingtheroadvergesoflitterandnoxiousweeds.

Work norms were set such that no more than eight days (60 hours) of work per month were required to complete the tasks, and the work could be carried out flexibly, at the convenience of the household. Some 14,000 households were offered regular employment.

Zibambele informed the design of the Expanded Public Works Programme which launched in 2004 and was rolled into this programme.

McCord, A., Public Works and Social Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa: Do public works work for the poor?

Advantages

• While not necessarily less physically demanding in itself than classic public works, the proposed work arrangement would have the benefit of being more flexible, guaranteed, long-term and part-time, and usually taking place closer to home, thus potentially more child-sensitive.

• Households might be expected to feel a responsibility/commitment to maintaining a stretch of road that is close to their own home and that they themselves regularly use, leading to improved work quality (in the view of the VUP engineer).

• There is already some VUP experience with road maintenance projects (though using a group-based fixed hours approach rather than the flexible household approach proposed here).

Challenges/drawbacks

• Quality norms and a supervision system would need to be established, whereby engineers visit all roads regularly to verify work quality (e.g. quarterly). This risks delaying payments, so it is suggested that the default should be to continue regular payments to households unless/until the engineer signals a concern with a particular stretch of road.

• Arrangements would need to be made for the safety of those doing road maintenance who may be more at risk and less visible working individually instead of in a large group.

34


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

Households would need to be issued with appropriate high visibility clothing to signal their presence.

• There is a risk that households would use child labour on the roads. Explanation of the minimum age for participation and spot checks to ensure compliance would be required.

• Mothers might leave small children alone by the roadside while working, putting them at high risk of road traffic accidents. Awareness-raising of the importance of making alternative childcare arrangements, and monitoring of this, would be important.

• Basic tools and equipment (spades, hoes and pangas) would need to be issued to each participating household at a cost of approximately 6,000 FRw per household. One wheelbarrow (approximate cost 50,000 FRw), as well as material to fill potholes, could be issued to each village in the sector to share among participating households.

• The location of homes and roads might mean this is not a closer-to-home option for all households.

• There is a risk that sectors might select households largely on the basis of their proximity to the road, rather than their vulnerability. This would tend to exacerbate inequalities of access to public works, given that the poorest/most vulnerable households often live further from roads.

3. Public works in support of poorest/most vulnerable households

This option involves extending public works to include works on the houses and plots of the poorest households. While the idea has strong support in principle, reflection is ongoing regarding the specific types of work that might be covered and how the work might be organized, as several initially promising ideas were found to be challenging in practice.

For example, latrine construction for the poorest households seemed a key opportunity. However, according to cost estimates provided by LODA, wages of unskilled workers comprise less than 5 per cent of the cost of latrine construction in Rwanda. In order to ensure that VUP public works budget is primarily allocated to public works wages, in line with social protection objectives, it would be necessary either:

• To form cross-ministerial partnerships whereby other ministries cover capital costs and VUP-only labour costs; or

• To adopt a more labour-intensive approach, for example, a more basic model of latrine, local construction of bricks and transport of materials by VUP public works beneficiaries (instead of by truck).

Housing construction for households relocated from disaster-prone areas was another option considered. However, the opportunities here are highly localized: 75 per cent of houses remaining to be built under the government programme are located in a single district – Muhanga.

It has also been suggested that productive work might be undertaken for the poorest households. However, a key consideration here is the need to avoid displacing privately hired labour. Even very poor households may use some of their direct support transfer to pay privately for labour to farm their land.

Advantages

• Housing and latrine construction for vulnerable households within the community is likely to be carried out close to the homes of public works participants. VUP-eligible workers from

35


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

a given village could work together in support of a vulnerable neighbour. The location may make the work more suitable for women with young children.

• This work would bring benefits to the poorest and most vulnerable members of the community. (While sectors try to support these households through other means, e.g. Umuganda – they report that there are outstanding needs that they are unable to meet.)

• Construction of latrines (and other water and sanitation interventions) for those who do not have them could bring health and child-nutrition benefits for the whole community.

• Construction of housing to support relocation might reduce disaster-related losses in affected areas.


• To date it has proven difficult to establish the kind of cross-ministerial partnerships and cost-sharing arrangements that would make this sub-option financially feasible, in terms of the share of wages in total costs to VUP.

• While the location of work might make it more suitable for women with children, the proposed projects still involve construction work which tends to be physically demanding and, as such, unlikely to be suitable for pregnant or weaker workers.

• It will be important not to undermine local labour markets by substituting public works labour for work that would otherwise be contracted privately.

• Also, care should be taken to ensure that public works support to vulnerable households is complementary to voluntary community support and Umuganda and does not displace these.

• There may be a dilemma in terms of which (and how many) households to support through these works. On the one hand, it could be argued that only the most vulnerable households (e.g. direct-support households) should be supported. On the other hand, if many households in a community still lack adequate sanitation, then community-wide benefits from a healthier environment will be limited. In any case, it could be argued that lack of a pit latrine is in itself an indicator of deprivation given that, according to the Census, 88 per cent of rural Rwandan households now have one.75

4. social/community work

The final proposed new type of public works involves a slightly higher level of skill than the others. This work would include roles such as:

• Care assistants in the new pre-primary classes in schools and community ECD centres (assisting qualified ECD teachers);

• Care assistants in clinics;

• Nutrition and parenting educators (working in support of Community Health Workers (CHWs)); and

• Literacy trainers.

Again, these would tend to be part-time positions that lasted for as long as a household was eligible for public works.

75 Fourth Population and Housing Census, 2012, Thematic Report, Characteristics of Households and Housing, p. 79.

36


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

Advantages

• Part-time work, closer to home, less physically demanding. More compatible with childcare responsibilities – can be done without compromising the care and nutrition of young children. Long-term guaranteed work – greater predictability improves ability of the household to plan and invest – may enhance potential for graduation.

• Low or zero capital costs (and often technical simplicity) enables majority of budget to go to wages, and enhances coverage and adequacy of public works.

• Would make a substantial investment to human capital development.

• Develops skills of public works beneficiaries. May enable them to graduate into other social service employment, especially since there are plans to expand the social work system in Rwanda.

• This model has already been successfully implemented (at very small scale) in Rubavu Sector, where several public works beneficiaries have been employed as carers in ECD centres and paid from the VUP public works budget (see Box 2).

• Lessons could be learned from the South Africa Expanded Public Works programme (see Box 5).

Box 5: south africa expanded Public Works Programme

The Expanded Public Works Programme, launched in 2004, provides work opportunities to unemployed, unskilled people in four sectors: infrastructure, non-state actors, environment and social sectors.

Social sector work opportunities include the following:

• ECD: Public works beneficiaries are provided with training and then work in childcare or home-based settings to provide child health, nutrition, education and psychosocial services.

• Home community-based care: Beneficiaries provide basic health service needs to people in their own homes or home-based care that the community can access closer to their homes.

• School nutrition programme: The programme employs beneficiaries as food handlers to provide food to children from needy families and thus address malnutrition.

• Mass literacy campaign: Public works beneficiaries deliver literacy training to adults who missed out on their schooling and who cannot read nor write.

Source: <www.epwp.gov.za>


• These jobs require more investment in training and supervision of public works workers than the other three categories of work. Lack of skills or inadequate supervision could risk the well-being of those being cared for/educated.

• Since VUP public-works eligible households would have to work under the close supervision of a more highly trained and skilled staff member or community volunteer (e.g. pre-primary school teacher, ECD care worker or CHW), this model depends on there being such a cadre of trained workers in place, willing and able to supervise public works volunteers.

37


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

• It might be difficult to find VUP public-works eligible workers with the skills and authority within their community to play these roles. In their experience of home-based childcare, the NGO CARE reports that women chosen by the community as volunteer leaders tend to come from Ubudehe Category 3 and so are not public-works eligible.76

• Given the required investment in training, turnover due to graduation of public works beneficiaries would represent an additional expense, as new beneficiaries would have to be trained up.

• While in theory such jobs are supportive of graduation into social service employment, this requires a well thought out, tailored graduation strategy.

• This sub-option is likely to be more easily implementable in sectors where there is substantial technical support available, e.g. in the form of an NGO project in the health, education or ECD sector – but might not be universally implementable.

summary analysis of expanded public works

In this section, the overall advantages of expanded public works are summarized with respect to the framework set out in Section 1.4, and some cross-cutting challenges and drawbacks are discussed. Costings are presented later (in Section 3).

Key advantages

Coverage

• New-style public works will enable participation of some of the most vulnerable households that have previously been left out, due to the nature of the work on offer.

• Low or zero capital costs (and often technical simplicity) will enable the majority of the public works budget to go to wages, enhancing cost-efficiency and hence opportunities to expand public-works coverage, increase transfer levels, and promote graduation from extreme poverty.

Transfer levels and benefits for children

• By increasing the number of workdays available for a given budget, expanded public works will increase the average transfer level for households.

• Longer-term guaranteed work will improve predictability and thus the ability of beneficiary households to plan and invest, which may have benefits for child development, as well as enhancing the potential for graduation.

Mitigating negative effects on children

• Work is generally part-time, often closer to home and less physically demanding. Thus, it is more compatible with childcare responsibilities: it can be done without compromising the care and nutrition of young children.

• The part-time, flexible nature of the work may mitigate the risk that women’s household work is shifted onto children within the household when women do public works.

Other cross-cutting benefits

• New-style public works would contribute to the whole community by improving hygiene, feeding and security in schools, clinics and ECD centres, thus contributing to reduction of disease, improved nutrition and community safety.

76 Discussions in Kigali with staff of CARE.

38


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

• Many of the new types of public works involve training and the development of new skills, which may be useful in helping participants find similar follow-on work in the private sector, promoting the sustainable graduation of these households out of extreme poverty.77


• In most cases, public works beneficiaries will no longer be working all together at the same time on these new types of work, so it will be less obvious who has worked how many days. New supervision tools and processes will need to be developed (e.g. timesheets, regular inspections of work quality).

• Given existing capacity constraints, the introduction of the new type of public works is likely to require increased staff capacity. It is estimated that one new staff member per district will be required at a cost of 13.5 million FRw per year, plus one-off costs of 350,000 FRw for a laptop.

• Household circumstances change. In particular, if the intention is to accurately target households with a pregnant woman or child younger than 3 years old, frequent selection updates will be necessary. Information on new pregnancies and births could be fed to VUP by CHWs (with the consent of the women concerned), and/or by women in public-works eligible households themselves.

• These new types of work are likely to be very popular with and suitable for a wide range of members of public-works eligible households, including older people and people with disabilities, as well as pregnant women and women with young children. The majority of households include at least one such person and the supply of new types of work will be insufficient to cover all, so key objectives and priority target groups will need to be clearly identified. Once priorities are established, clear selection criteria and processes will need to be developed, and all frontline staff will need to be trained on them. Without this, there is a risk of mis-selection of participants and dilution of intended impacts.

• Given that there is no defined age limit for the criterion ‘able to work’ within VUP selection and that fitness to work is locally determined, there is a real risk that, as the nature of available work changes, more of the elderly start to be defined as ‘able to work’, get switched from direct support to public works, and are offered new types of public works. If this were to happen, the key objective of increasing coverage of women with young children would not be realized. It will be important to ensure that older workers and those not fit to work for other reasons continue to access direct support.

Possible selection criteria

In response to the challenges of selection noted above, some preliminary suggestions on how to select households for new-style public works are presented below.

All selected households must firstly be public-works eligible, i.e. under the current targeting system they must be in Ubudehe categories 1 or 2 and have at least one adult able to work.

In order to decide which public-works eligible households should be selected for new types of public works, it is suggested that there should be a number of criteria that are applied in order of priority until all available posts are filled. The preliminary criteria suggested below give priority to ECD, but also recognize the importance of other vulnerabilities, such as disability.

77 The Manpower Survey 2011 reports that increased demand for workers during the period 2013–2017 is expected to be primarily for workers of a lower educational level (less than A2) and to come from the private sector (National Manpower Survey Report, NISR, 2011).

39


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

Example:

1st priority: Household has only one adult able to work, and:

1. At least one child younger than 6 years old, or estimated 7 per cent eligible households or 80 households in an average sector;78 and

2. At least one dependent who is severely disabled or chronically sick (on the basis that even if this dependent is older than 6 years old, participation of the carer in classic public works will still be constrained), and that while ECD is a key focus, it is not the exclusive focus of social protection. There are no data available yet on the number of households that have a member who is severely disabled, but the new Government of Rwanda disability categorization process should enable these households to be identified. If 5 per cent of VUP-eligible households fell into this category, that would amount to 57 households per sector.

Or

2nd priority: Household has two adults able to work, one of whom is a pregnant woman, or two adults and a child younger than 3 years old (36 months) (estimated 381 households on average per sector).

New public works are unlikely to be sufficient to absorb all the households that fall into these two categories, so some further means of prioritizing will be necessary. For example, within the second priority household with a child younger than 3 years old, the following categories of household could be prioritized:

1. Households with a second child younger than 6 years old (on the basis that this would exacerbate challenges for mother and risks to young children of participation in classic public works); and/or

2. Households that include a child/adult person with a disability (on the basis that this is likely to present increased challenges for the carer and to increase household costs); and/or

3. Households with a high dependency ratio: four or more (child) dependents younger than 16 years old – on the basis that it is known that large households with many children are more likely to be poor.

These are preliminary ideas; precise criteria and their ordering would need to be modelled, debated and agreed.

2.2.2 Category 2 – Guaranteed minimum benefits for vulnerable households with children

A second, complementary or alternative approach would be to increase coverage and benefit levels without increasing work requirements.

Household poverty is a strong determinant of child stunting, yet VUP is not providing adequate transfers to most of those families with young children that have been identified as eligible for public works (only covering on average 11 per cent of the extreme poverty). This secondary category of actions aims to address this issue directly by increasing the size of transfers to some of the most vulnerable families with young children.

There are many ways in which this could be done. Three options are set out below which would all help address child poverty and promote human capital development of the youngest

78 For information on how this and other demographic estimates were arrived at, see tables in Section 3.3.

40


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

children (when returns are highest), as well as long-term sustainable graduation out of extreme poverty. This category offers the strongest technical and cost-efficiency arguments of all four categories, but political acceptability might be an issue and would need to be debated across government.

Options

1. expand the definition of ‘labour-constrained household’

In Rwanda, many small children do not live with both parents: according to the Census,79 nationally 20 per cent of children 0–4 years old living in households (rather than institutions) do not live with both parents. A large proportion of these are living only with their mother.

In Rwanda, a household is only considered ‘labour-constrained’ if no one within it is able to work. However, many households with some labour capacity are nonetheless highly labour constrained; for example, where there is only one adult able to work and dependents require care. Clearly one adult will face challenges in undertaking intensive public works, while simultaneously providing high-quality care for dependents, so young children in these households are particularly at risk of care deficits caused by the work requirement of public works. Case studies of the challenges faced by these kinds of households are highlighted in the Gender Equity Assessment and are quoted in Section 1 above.

Some other African social protection programmes (for example, the Ethiopia pilot Social Cash Transfer and the Zimbabwe Harmonized Cash Transfer Programme) use a more nuanced definition of ‘labour-constrained’ that recognizes these challenges – and Rwanda might do the same. For example, the definition of ‘labour-constrained household’ might be revised to include households that have only one adult able to work and at least one child younger than 6 years old (or a person with a severe disability).

Key advantages

• This option supports the nutrition, care and development of children in the most vulnerable public-works eligible households. The Gender Equity Assessment suggests that it is mothers with no other adult labour capacity in the household who are the most likely to face challenges of participation in public works and/or to leave their children with inadequate care if they do participate.

• Removing the work requirement from these households prevents any negative impacts on young children of this requirement.

• It provides guaranteed, regular transfers to these households, maximizing their chances of eventually graduating out of extreme poverty.


• To effectively reach the youngest children, selection would need to be updated regularly (e.g. at least every six months). As proposed in Category 1 above, information on new pregnancies and births might be provided to VUP by CHWs with women’s consent, or by public-works eligible households themselves.

• There is some concern that this option might incentivize single women to have children in order to access transfers. However, it should be noted that the international evidence does not support the view that child cash transfer programmes increase fertility. Of the major studies on this issue in a range of developing and middle-income countries, only

79 Fourth Population and Housing Census, 2012, Thematic Report, Socio-Economic Status of Children, p. 39.

41


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

one example is found of a positive effect on fertility (in Honduras).80 Even here, the effect is small, possibly only temporary (i.e. affecting birth spacing rather than lifetime fertility) and linked to very specific design and contextual issues.

2. Paid maternity leave: Provide paid leave from public works for pregnant women in households where there is no other adult able to work

As noted above, the VUP Public Works Manual states that women should not work beyond the sixth month of pregnancy. However, there is no provision for paid maternity leave – households are simply told to send someone else to work. In the case of households without another adult able to work, this will lead to a sudden loss of income.

The Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia switches households without other labour capacity to direct support when the sole female worker is four months pregnant and continues this maternity provision until the child is 10 months old. It is suggested that VUP initiate a similar provision.

In the absence of any household income, the unborn child is likely to be at high risk of undernutrition and later stunting. So the provision of direct support to such households can be seen as an important nutrition and ECD intervention. In the interests of fairness, it is proposed that such paid maternity leave be offered to all qualifying households that are eligible for public works (whether or not they are actually offered work in the early stages of their pregnancy).

Staff training and monitoring of implementation should not be neglected. In Ethiopia, it has taken some years and much ongoing capacity building to ensure implementation of this provision; and, while recent evidence suggests that pregnant women are now being switched to direct support in all local authority areas, there are still variations in practice in the timing and duration of the switch.81

Advantages and disadvantages of this option are very similar to those of Option 1 above – the benefits simply start sooner.

3. Guaranteed child element for all public-works eligible households

An alternative (or complementary) option would be for all public-works eligible households to receive a guaranteed child element. The household would still be eligible for public works and would be expected to work if work was available, in order to receive public works wages. But recognizing the current low public-works coverage and benefit levels, and the fact that benefits do not vary with household size, a guaranteed child element would be paid to all public-works eligible households, in order to ensure a minimum income to support young child nutrition and development.

This could be paid, for example, at the rate of 100 FRw per household per child (as in direct support) for up to three children, directly to the child’s primary caregiver. A maternity element could be incorporated, by paying the transfer from six months of pregnancy. A transfer at this level would mean that the maximum guaranteed element for a household with three or more children of the qualifying age would be capped at 108,000 FRw per year (less than half the maximum direct support grant of 252,000 FRw per year).

80 Stecklov, et al., ‘The Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers on Household Composition, Fertility and Migration in Central America’, 2006.

81 Berhane, Guush, et al., ‘The Implementation of the Productive Safety Nets Programme and the Household Asset Building Programme in the Ethiopian Highlands: Program performance report’, 2012.

42


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

This option would serve two main objectives:

• In the current situation of low coverage of households eligible for public works (only 48 per cent of eligible households accessed any work in 2012–2013) and a low number of workdays for those who do (average 40 days’ work), the option would ensure that all public-works eligible households with (young) children or pregnant women received at least a minimum level of benefit, promoting positive child development outcomes.

• Once coverage is improved, implementation of this option will mean that benefits vary according to the number of (young) children in the household.

Key advantages

Coverage/participation

• Paying a guaranteed child element to public-works households with young children would help offset the underparticipation in public works projects of eligible households with children who need care, and of female-headed households.

Adequacy of transfers/spending on children

• The option would ensure that, if the public works budget is insufficient to cover all VUP eligible households, households with children are prioritized, rather than those with the strongest labour capacity. The child element would become an entitlement in a similar way to direct support.

• The focus on child dependents under this option (rather than all dependents, including the elderly), is aligned with EICV3 findings on poverty incidence, namely that the poorest households tend to be larger than average and to include more children.

• Payments directly to the child’s primary caregiver would be likely to increase the proportion of the transfer used to promote child nutrition and development.

Mitigation of negative impacts on children

• Small regular upfront cash payments may enable carers to make improved provision for the care of their children while they work.

Other

• The cap on the number of children for which the grant is paid removes the risk (and appearance of risk) that families might be encouraged to have a large number of children in order to increase their benefit level. (Note: International evidence suggests that in practice this risk is in any case very low.)

• By paying a guaranteed child element of public works to all eligible households, the option is supportive of the right to social protection of all the eligible. By limiting the guarantee to only the child element, the option contains costs.

• This is a variation of an employment guarantee scheme and, as such, takes forward the commitment in the EDPRS2 Social Protection Strategy to consider such a scheme.

• Under this option, there would be no increase in either capital or administrative costs, as increased transfers would be delivered through existing systems. Additional costs would be almost solely driven by increased transfers to households.


• A decision would have to be made as to whether the child element was a separate unconditional transfer (recommended), or whether it was conditional on adult ability and willingness to participate in public works. In the latter case, the conditionality could be

43


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

difficult to manage. Would the child element be stopped or reduced if the adult fell ill and did not turn up for public works? (In any case, the public works wages would of course continue to be dependent on turning up for work, which should provide sufficient incentive for work.)

• As in Option 1, a system would need to be developed for keeping information on household demographics up-to-date, in order to accurately target households with pregnant women and children up to a certain age.

• Global evidence suggests that there are likely to be advantages in paying the child element to the main carer of the child rather than the head of household. But for VUP, this would require changes to some systems – carers opening separate bank accounts and linking head-of-household data to carer data in order to track which households were receiving benefits.

2.2.3 Category 3 – Mitigating measures

A third category of actions can be described as ‘mitigating measures’. The Gender Equity Assessment and Researching the Linkages between Social Protection and Children’s Care in Rwanda both flag some serious concerns with the current operation of public works. Documented negative effects of public works on the care of young children appear to conflict with government priorities to promote young child nutrition and development, and prevent stunting.

Negative effects might be prevented for some households by the creation of new-style, more flexible public works. However, even with a substantial effort, it is unlikely that more than half of eligible public-works households with children younger than 3 years old could be offered new-style, flexible public works. Therefore, there will almost certainly still be households that are offered classic public works and send a woman with a young child to participate.

It is, therefore, important to consider measures to mitigate potentially harmful effects on children of this work requirement.

Three main (complementary) options are presented here:

1. Worksite crèches for children 6–24 months old.

2. Home-based childcare for children 18+ months old.

3. Reduced hours/light works for pregnant and lactating women.

In the case of both worksite crèches and home-based childcare, it is proposed that management and implementation be contracted out to skilled providers (e.g. NGOs with a track record in ECD).

1. Worksite crèches for the youngest children 6–24 months old

To mitigate the potentially harmful effects of women either leaving very young children at home or bringing them to unsafe worksites, one option is the provision of on-site childcare. Small children who are still regularly breastfeeding need to be cared for close to their mothers. Given the short-term nature of public works projects and their distance from the village, shelter would need to be temporary and low-cost, constructed with local materials and/or tarpaulin. To achieve the objective of harm mitigation, the care offered must meet minimum standards. For example, it would need to include provision of age-appropriate regular meals and snacks, clean water and sanitation, and to be provided by trained caregivers.

44


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

2. Home-based childcare for children 18+ months old

In Kamonyi District, CARE, in collaboration with the local authorities, has piloted a home-based childcare model whereby young children of working mothers are cared for in the community by one of the mothers who is trained by the project in childcare. While this model is unsuitable for the youngest children who are still regularly breastfeeding, it may be preferable to worksite provision for children 24+ months old (or even 18+ months old if the worksite is sufficiently close for mothers to return at lunchtime to feed their children). Water, sanitation, cooking facilities and safe play areas are likely to be more easily available in the community than at the worksite.

Key advantages of childcare

Participation

• The provision of quality childcare would reduce some of the constraints on the participation of mothers of young children in public works.


• Quality childcare would mitigate harm caused to young children by them being either brought to the site or left at home without adequate care.

• It could also mitigate the risk that older children will skip school to care for younger siblings.

• The existence of a crèche could be used as an entry point for ECD community education. For example, the trained caregivers could demonstrate to carers the preparation of diverse and nutritious weaning foods and positive childcare practices.


• A crèche only addresses some of the carer’s responsibilities. There is still a risk that the long absence from home required for classic public works leads to an overload of work for the carer and/or a shift of work onto children within the household.

• The existence of a subsidized crèche might encourage more households to choose women with children to participate in public works instead of men – potentially escalating costs and increasing the burdens on women. This should be monitored.

• Even if there is some cost-sharing arrangement between the programme, NGO providers and mothers, it is still likely to be more expensive to allocate a woman to classic public works and provide crèche facilities than to allocate her to new-style public works (Option 1).

• A crèche is not automatically better than current care arrangements: it depends on the quality of care. Without adequate resourcing and supervision of worksite crèches from the programme, quality of care and nutrition in the crèches might suffer, potentially leaving young children worse off/at higher risk than they are currently.

• This option only benefits those households that actually access public works (which in 2012–2013 was less than half the eligible). Using the limited budget to provide crèche facilities rather than to extend access to public works could be seen as exacerbating existing inequalities.

• VUP staff do not possess the skills required to manage workplace crèches – so it is proposed that partners (e.g. NGOs or private providers) would be subcontracted to provide workplace crèches. However, experience from the Niger82 suggests that such contracts would require very clear specification of standards and active supervision to ensure quality care. Therefore, recruitment/training of some ECD specialist staff in VUP is likely to be necessary.

82 From World Bank-supported social safety nets programme in the Niger – presentation and discussion.

45


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

• For worksite crèches, at least some of the materials (e.g. food), as well as the children, would need to be transported to the worksite daily, increasing the burden on carers, especially where worksites are far from home.

• In the case of shifting worksites (e.g. in road construction), temporary shelters would need to be capable of easy removal and re-erection.

3. reduced hours for pregnant and lactating women

In Rubavu Sector, VUP staff have taken the initiative (with permission from Kigali) to enable pregnant women to work reduced hours while continuing to receive full public works wages. This arrangement is not formalized and, to the knowledge of VUP staff in Kigali, is not implemented in any other sector. But formalizing this would be a simple way of mitigating potential harmful effects on young (and unborn) children of the otherwise long hours and physically demanding requirements of classic public works.

Key advantages

Participation

• Reducing working hours could enable the participation of pregnant and lactating women, who would otherwise find the requirements too demanding, while maintaining transfer levels.


• Reduced working hours could enable women to feed their young children regularly throughout the day and to cut down the number of hours they were left without parental care.

• It may enable women to make use of quality home-based care for children 18+ months old, instead of bringing them to the worksite.


• The existence of such a provision might encourage men who would otherwise have participated in public works to send their pregnant and lactating wives instead, increasing the work burden on the latter.

• It also risks creating resentment towards these women who may be seen as being given an easier option.

• Or, in the absence of active promotion of engagement of pregnant and lactating women in public works and of monitoring of their participation, there is a risk that protective provisions could lead to a reduction in their employment (due to perceived lower productivity).

• In the absence of clear guidelines and training, sector VUP staff could interpret ‘reduced hours’ and ‘light work‘ in very different ways (as has happened within the Ethiopia PSNP).83

2.2.4 Category 4 – Complementary services

Evidence suggests there to be strong complementarities between cash transfers and children’s services in enhancing ECD outcomes. Some of the most effective and cost-efficient approaches to service provision are home and community-based; for example, nutrition and positive parenting education. On the other hand, the international literature underlines the

83 Anderson, et al., ‘2013 Review of the PSNP and HABP’, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of Ethiopia, 2014.

46


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

importance of high-quality provision: effects are much reduced for lower-quality interventions and there are challenges in replicating at scale the impacts of successful pilot programmes.84

It is not proposed that VUP staff start direct delivery of children’s services – VUP capacities are already over-stretched and provision of these services requires a different skill set. Nor is it within LODA’s mandate. But there are various ways in which the beneficiaries of VUP cash transfers might be linked to high-quality services where these already exist, in order to enhance outcomes for their young children. This would help ensure that the most vulnerable households receive as complete a package of services as possible, including cash transfers and a range of ECD services.

Practical ways in which connections might be strengthened include:

1. Sharing VUP beneficiary lists with frontline staff providing home-based ECD services, including CHWs, and the proposed MIGEPROF supported social workers once established, with a view to ensuring that those households identified by VUP as the poorest and most vulnerable are prioritized for ECD services.

2. Vice versa, using information from CHW and other ECD service providers to help identify vulnerable households with young children within the VUP caseload so that they can be selected for actions proposed in this paper (including expanded public works, guaranteed child element of public works and childcare support).

3. Supporting CHWs and other ECD community workers to provide full and accurate information to vulnerable families on VUP (as well as a range of other services) during their home visits, so that these families are fully aware of their entitlements, complaints and grievance procedures, and VUP child-sensitive provisions (once developed).

4. Strengthening the ECD focus within the VUP sensitization component. Awareness-raising sessions already involve discussions of infant nutrition, but it might be useful to go beyond talk to include demonstrations and participatory approaches around preparation of nutritious weaning foods and positive parenting practices. VUP gatherings (for direct support and public works payments, and for public-works work) present ideal opportunities for such sessions, which could be carried out in collaboration with CHWs (and NGO ECD specialists, where they exist). This could reinforce the work of CHWs and ensure that the most vulnerable households, which sometimes report struggling to attend awareness-raising sessions,85 are reached.

Key advantages

• These kinds of linkages can help ensure that vulnerable families receive a full package of support and can enhance the ECD impacts of cash transfers.

• This approach is low-cost – it mainly involves active, focused coordination, including further strengthening of the existing linkages with CHWs.

• In some sectors there are community ECD initiatives already under way (e.g. supported by CARE and Save the Children) with which VUP could usefully link, and others are planned, e.g. Partners in Health and UNICEF initiatives.


• The practical benefits that can be realized through linking VUP to ECD services depend on the extent of other home/community-based ECD service providers at local level, and

84 Engle, P. et al., ‘Strategies for Reducing Inequalities and Improving Developmental Outcomes for Young Children in Low-Income and Middle-Income Countries’, The Lancet, vol. 378, no. 9799, 2011, pp. 1325–1338.

85 See Gender Equity Assessment, 2012, p. 32.

47


SE

CTIO

N 2

: C

HIL

D-S

EN

SIT

IVE

SO

CIA

L P

RO

TE

CT

ION

IN

RW

AN

DA

– O

PT

ION

S

on the quality of these services. In many sectors, apart from the services provided by the health sector and CHWs (with which VUP already has links), there are few other ECD service providers.

• Elements of this model – sharing of beneficiary lists with CHWs – could be relevant in all sectors. But others will only currently be implementable in the few sectors where ECD pilots are under way.

• These services can be important complements to regular, adequate cash transfers. However, given that many vulnerable families are not yet receiving cash transfers due to the continued undercoverage of public works, it may be premature to talk about ‘complementary services’.

© U

NIC

EF/

201

4/P

ark

48


SE

CT

ION

3:

CO

ST

INg

S

section 3: Costings

This section provides cost estimates for the key options set out in Section 2.

Section 3.1 – Looks at the costs of expanded public works (Category 1 actions) and of the guaranteed child element (Option 2.3). In the EDPRS2 Social Protection Strategy the sector has set its own targets regarding public works coverage and benefit levels. A useful way of considering the costs of expanded public works and the guaranteed child element is to assess the costs of achieving strategy targets by adopting one or other (or both) of these approaches, as compared with continuing with the current approach.

Section 3.2 – Other options affect a smaller percentage of households or are add-on elements (such as childcare), so the above approach is not suitable. Costings of these other options are presented as discrete estimates.

Section 3.3 – All of the cost estimates are highly dependent on key assumptions and demographic estimates; these are detailed in tables in this section.

© U

NIC

EF/

201

4/M

uelle

nmei

ster

49


SE

CT

ION

3:

CO

ST

INg

S

3.1 Comparative cost estimates of achieving edPrs2 social Protection strategy targets

Costs of the status quo option

The current annual (2013–2014) public works budget for 150 sectors is 11.9 billion FRw, and this enables coverage of 48 per cent of eligible households with an average 40 days’ work each. Once a fair share of VUP administrative costs is allocated to public works, the total annual cost is 14 billion FRw.

Key public works targets for next year (2014–2015) are that at least 60 per cent of public-works eligible households will be reached and that the average number of days’ work per beneficiary household will be at least 71. As shown in Table 3, a substantial budgetary increase will be required to achieve these targets in 2014–2015, while simultaneously scaling up to 180 sectors.

Assuming that identified problems with the capital–labour ratio of public works are rectified and that going forward a capital–labour ratio of 50:50 is achieved, then the projected annual cost of achieving the EDPRS2 targets in 2014–2015 is 19.4 billion FRw (or 21.7 billion including administrative costs).86

Costs of expanded public works

At 16.6 billion FRw (or 19.8 billion including administrative costs), the estimated cost of achieving the targets with expanded public works is somewhat lower. This assumes that one quarter of those accessing public works are offered new-style public works (support staff or road maintenance), with the remaining continuing on classic public works. It includes the costs of one additional staff per district and training in the new approach for all sector staff. The cost reductions are entirely due to the anticipated low capital costs of the proposed new-style public works.

Costs of guaranteed child element

If new-style public works were not pursued, but instead coverage and benefit levels were increased through the provision of a guaranteed child element for all public-works eligible households, then the costs would be a little higher at 22.0 billion FRw (or 24.2 billion including administrative costs). However, the cost comparison here is not entirely fair, since, while average transfer levels for benefiting households are the same, this option provides far higher coverage of eligible households (85 per cent are covered, compared with just 60 per cent under the new-style public works options).

Costs of combining new-style public works and guaranteed child element

Were both new-style public works and a guaranteed child element to be implemented, then the total cost of public works would be broadly similar to the cost of pursuing classic public works (status quo option) at 19.8 billion FRw (or 22.0 billion including administrative costs), just 2 per cent higher than the status quo option. On the other hand, the combination of these two innovations would enable far higher coverage of the public-works eligible to be achieved (85 per cent versus 60 per cent), and for resources to be targeted much more effectively on households with young children.

86 Note: In practice, it is not expected that the proposed measures would be delivered at scale as early as 2014–2015. However, it is more feasible to do hypothetical cost comparisons for 2014–2015 than for later years when there are far more unknowns.

50


SE

CT

ION

3:

CO

ST

INg

S

table 3: the cost of achieving edPrs2 social Protection strategy targets

2014/15 projected costs Status quo: Improved classic public works60% eligible get classic public works.

1. Expanded public works15% of eligible get new public works, 45% eligible get classic public works.

2. Guaranteed child element55% of public-works eligible households receive child element and 69% eligible households receive classic public works (38% both, 14% neither).

1 & 2 Expanded public works and guaranteed child elementSee 2, except that 67% get public works and of these, one quarter gets new-style public works and three quarters get classic public works.

Unit costs – per beneficiary household

180 sectors 180 sectors 180 sectors 180 sectors

Administrative costs 17,268 20,917 12,047 12,189Capital and other project costs

73,485 53,394 46,936 37,690

Average wages 73,485 73,744 73,546 73,051Total unit cost 164,238 148,055 132,530 122,930Total cost to transfer ratio 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.7Coverage of eligible 60% 60% 86% 85%Average number of workdays per beneficiary household

71 71 71 71

Total cost, including administrative costs (current 14.0 billion FRw)

21.7 billion FRw 19.8 billion FRw 24.2 billion FRw 22.0 billion FRw

Total cost as calculated in VUP budget, excluding administrative element (current 11.9 billion FRw)

19.4 billion FRw 16.6 billion FRw 22.0 billion FRw 19.8 billion FRw

Cost efficiency and cost-effectiveness

Cost efficiency considers how well inputs are converted to programme outputs and cost-effectiveness looks at how well outputs are converted to outcomes and impacts.

Two measures of cost efficiency are presented in Table 3 – unit cost per beneficiary household and total cost–transfer ratio.

Unit cost per beneficiary household is simply the total cost of delivering a transfer to a household. This is affected by the actual transfer received by the household, as well as by all the other associated costs. On its own, therefore, it is often not a particularly helpful measure – if it goes up or down, it is uncertain whether this is due to changes in the transfer or other costs. In Table 3, however, the transfer value is held constant at around 73,000 FRw, so the differences in unit costs between the options are due only to variations in the estimated costs of delivering this transfer (capital costs + administrative costs). The current approach of classic public works is estimated to have the most expensive delivery costs, and the combination of new-style public works and a guaranteed child element is estimated to be the least expensive.

The total cost–transfer ratio improves somewhat on the unit cost measure by separating out the actual transfer from other elements (capital costs + administrative costs). It is equal to the total unit cost divided by the value of the transfer received by the household. Generally a lower total cost–transfer ratio is considered good, since it means that a higher proportion of resources is going directly into the hands of poor households. There are limitations to

51


SE

CT

ION

3:

CO

ST

INg

S

this metric, however, since lumping all non-transfer costs together implies that all such costs are equivalent and that reducing them is positive. Clearly, in practice, many so-called administrative costs such as staffing, systems and monitoring and evaluation are essential to the effectiveness of the intervention and reducing them below a certain level is risky to the intended objectives.

As a result, this measure needs to be treated with caution in making comparisons across countries or time. On the other hand, here different options are simply compared at a single point in time. The underlying cost structure of staffing and systems is, more or less, the same for all options. Variations in the total cost–transfer ratio are driven largely by two things: differences in capital costs and economies of scale by delivering to a higher number of households per sector where costs at sector level are more or less fixed. Thus, differences in the total cost–transfer ratio are a useful measure of the extent to which the public works budget is actually benefiting households: the lower the ratio, the more of the budget is going directly to households. It can be seen that, on this measure, the combination of new-style public works and a guaranteed child element is the most cost efficient, and classic public works (the status quo option) the least cost efficient.

These measures are limited to cost efficiency – in this case, how well programme spending is converted into cash in the hands of beneficiaries. They do not capture cost-effectiveness – how well these outputs (transfers) are converted into impacts on poverty and vulnerability. However, the qualitative analysis in Section 2 above suggests that various characteristics of the proposed options are also likely to improve the cost-effectiveness of public works.

For example, the provision of more flexible public works closer to home is expected to mitigate negative impacts of classic public works on the nutrition and care of young children, implying a greater positive impact on overall household poverty/vulnerability for a given transfer level. The guaranteed child element carries no risks with respect to childcare or nutrition, so likewise the positive impacts for the household for a given transfer level can be expected to be higher.

Furthermore, under all the proposed options the coverage of eligible households with young children would be prioritized, increasing the share of resources available to support the nutrition and development of the youngest children. Economic returns to investment are highest for the youngest children, so this can also be expected to improve cost-effectiveness.

3.2 Costs: option by option

This section sets out cost estimates of all the other options discussed in Section 2.

Category 2 – Option 1: Expand the definition of ‘labour-constrained household’

Under this option, the definition of ‘labour-constrained household’ is expanded to include those households with only one adult able to work and at least one child younger than 6 years old – estimated at 7 per cent of all public-works eligible households. The additional cost is estimated at 2 billion FRw. Note that the total number of households covered by public works and direct support combined is expected to increase slightly, as it is assumed that the public works targets of 60 per cent coverage and 71 workdays continue to be met for those households that remain eligible for public works.

52


SE

CT

ION

3:

CO

ST

INg

S

Category 2 – Option 2: Paid maternity leave for women in households where there is no other adult able to work

Analysis suggests that only around 1 per cent of all public-works eligible households would be affected by this provision, which would support some of the most vulnerable babies such as those born to women widowed or abandoned during pregnancy. The estimated cost is only 300 million FRw.

table 4: Costs of cash transfers for single-worker households with young children

2014/15 projected costs Households with only one adult able to work and a child younger than 6 years old switched to direct support

Paid maternity leave for women with no other adult labour in household

Savings on public works budgetAverage unit cost 164,238 164,238Reduction in number of households on public works 8,405 1,201Saving in billion FRw 1.4 0.2

Additional direct support costsAverage unit cost 240,468 240,468Number of households affected 14,008 2,001Cost in billion FRw 3.4 0.5

Net increase in number of households covered by VUP (public works and direct support combined)

5,603 800

Net cost in billion FRw 2 billion FRw 0.3 billion FRw

Category 3 – Options 1 and 2: Childcare provision

Two complementary options are costed here: (1) worksite crèches for children 6–24 months old and (2) home-based care for children 24–36 months old. As discussed in Section 2 above, it may be possible to care for slightly younger children in home-based settings if the worksite is not too far away and/or lactating women are allowed to work reduced hours. However, for the purposes of costings and to avoid double counting for children 18–24 months old, it is assumed that home-based care commences at 24 months.

The total direct cost of providing these two types of childcare is estimated at 0.9 billion FRw per year, which includes the cost of a nutritious meal for the children, a caregiver stipend, caregiver training, and a tarpaulin in the case of a worksite crèche. All other costs, for example, cooking and eating utensils, a cooking stove, locally made toys, mats, water and soap – are assumed to be covered by parents. While cost sharing is seen by the Government of Rwanda as an important principle, it is strongly recommended that VUP cover the essential elements of nutrition and quality caregiving, in order to ensure a minimum standard of provision in support of government nutrition and ECD objectives.

It is important to note that this costing is limited to the direct costs of provision. Even if provision is outsourced (which is recommended), ensuring quality is likely to entail substantial overhead costs: development of standards and terms of reference for contractors, supervision of implementation, and management costs of implementing

53


SE

CT

ION

3:

CO

ST

INg

S

agencies. If these are estimated at 20 per cent of total costs,87 then this would bring total costs to around 1.1 billion FRw per year.

Note: There are no cash costs associated with Category 3: Option 3 (reduced hours/light public works for pregnant women). Similarly the actions in Category 4 concern strengthening linkages and while there will be some costs with regard to staff time and logistics, it is not suggested that VUP should incur substantial cash costs with regard to these actions.

table 5: Childcare costs

2014–2015 projected costs Worksite crècheBabies 6–24 months old

Home-based careChildren 24–36 months old

Unit cost/per child/per day (FRw)Food 50 75Carer stipend 104 104Carer training 28 28Tarpaulin for shelter 14Total unit cost 196 207% households with a qualifying child 30% 23%Total cost (billion FRw) 0.5 billion FRw 0.4 billion FRw

87 This is a rough estimate of management/oversight costs informed by the experience of the World Bank-supported cash transfer and child services programme in the Niger; detailed local costings will need to be developed if this option is taken forward.

© U

NIC

EF/

201

4/M

uelle

nmei

ster

54


SE

CT

ION

3:

CO

ST

INg

S

3.3 Key assumptions and estimates

Clearly, the estimates set out in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 above are strongly affected by key assumptions, for example, on transfer sizes and the demographics of public-works eligible households. These assumptions and their rationale are spelled out in Tables 6 and 7 below.

table 6: demographic estimates

Key estimate Estimate used and rationale

Census EICV3 Social Protection Thematic Report

Other sources

Percentage of public-works eligible households that include a child 0–4 years old.

55%Census data are mostly up to date and accurate, but the poorer households tend to be larger and to include more children, hence slight inflation of Census figure.

Census: % of all rural households including a child 0–4 years old.49%

% public-works participant households, including a child 0–4 years old: 56%And % households in poorest consumption quintile including a child 0–4 years old: 65%

Percentage of public-works eligible households with respectively 0, 1, 2 and 3 children who are 0–4 years old.

0 – 45%1 – 30%2 – 20%3 – 5%Estimate based on data on the mean number of children 0–4 years old per household. (Mean number of children per household according to this estimate is 0.85.)

Mean number of children 0–4 years old per household: in poorest consumption quintile = 0.9 and in all rural households = 0.7.

VUP data (Hartwig, et al., 2013).Mean children 0–5 years old per VUP-eligible household: 0.8 (non-participants) and 0.94 (participants).

© U

NIC

EF/

201

4/M

ugab

e

55


SE

CT

ION

3:

CO

ST

INg

S

Key estimate Estimate used and rationale

Census EICV3 Social Protection Thematic Report

Other sources

Percentage of public-works eligible households with a child 6–24 months old.

23%Estimate based on Census data and the finding from EICV3 that poor households include more infants than other households.

13% of rural households include a child younger than 1 year old.

65% of households in the poorest quintile include a child 0–4 years old, compared with 54% of households overall.

Percentage of public-works eligible households with a child 24–36 months old.

30%Estimate based on Census data and the finding from EICV3 that poor households include more infants than other households.

13% of rural households include a child younger than 1 year old.

Estimates of size of households with only one able-bodied adult and a child younger than 6 years old.

2 persons – 5%3 persons – 20%4 persons – 25%5 persons+ – 50%

Average household size nationally is 4.3, but many single able-bodied adult households are female-headed households which are smaller; average household size for a female-headed household in Rwanda = 3.6.On the other hand, these are national averages and poorer households tend be larger than average.

Primary analysis of Ubudehe database for Ngoma Sector.Note: this is consistent with an average household size of 5.1.

Percentage of VUP public-works eligible households that include only one able-bodied adult plus at least one child younger than 6 years old.

7% Primary analysis of Ubudehe data for VUP sectors in Ngoma District; households with only one member categorized as able to work and a member born in or after 2006.

Percentage of VUP-eligible households that include only one able-bodied adult who is more than 6 months pregnant or has a baby less than 10 months old.

1%Period of last trimester of pregnancy to baby 10 months old = 13 months, so estimated 13/24 * 44 = 24 households fall in this category.

Primary analysis of Ubudehe data: in Ngoma District there are 2,510 public-works eligible households – 44 of these have only one able-bodied adult and a baby 0–24 months old.

56


SE

CT

ION

3:

CO

ST

INg

S

table 7: other cost assumptions

Key assumptions RationaleGeneralUnit cost data (on average administration, capital and wage costs per beneficiary household) from the DFID Business Case are an appropriate starting point for analysis.

These data are recent and were calculated through rigorous budgetary analysis.

Unit costs will increase in proportion to the number of sectors in which the programme operates, but are fixed at sector level, regardless of the number of beneficiary households in that sector.

Administrative costs are driven primarily by staff costs. Increasing the number of operational sectors requires more staff, but increasing the number of beneficiaries per sector will have minimum impact on staff time required.

In order to reach 71% of eligible households, a higher total number of households needs to be reached to allow for public-works inclusion error (of households in U3).There is minimal inclusion error in child grant element.

Administrative inclusion errors are currently rather high and so should be factored into cost estimates, since the EDPRS2 targets are about the percentage of eligible households reached.Inclusion error inflator for classic public works is calculated at 10%, based on a comparison of total households reached versus number of eligible households reached in 2012–2013. It is assumed that inclusion errors of new-style public works are lower due to new selection process, so the inclusion error of Option 1 is 9%. In Option 2, only the public works element is inflated – the inclusion error inflators are estimated at 6% (classic public works + guaranteed child element) and 5% (classic + new-style public works + guaranteed child element).Note: In 2010–2011, inclusion errors were found to be 34%88 (i.e. 34% of public works participating households were not in Ubudehe categories 1 or 2), so the above estimates are rather optimistic and based on the assumption that VUP has reduced inclusion errors since 2010/11.Also, in these costings only administrative inclusion error were addressed, i.e. the extent to which households in U3 receive transfers – not wider issues of targeting error to do with whether households in U1 and U2 are really the poorest.

Category 1:Additional administrative costs associated with new-style public works are 3,649 FRw per beneficiary household.

This is comprised of one additional VUP staff member per district at salary cost of 13.5 m FRw per year + computer set-up cost of 350 k FRw + five days training for six staff per district at a cost of 30 k FRw per staff member per day.

For the purposes of costings, it is assumed that of those doing new-style public works, half do road maintenance and half do cleaning/other work in schools/clinics or ECD centres.

No reliable costings are available for work in support of private households; and it is unlikely that the fourth category of work (social/community work) will be able to be launched at scale in the short term.

The capital costs of cleaning and other support work are assumed to be zero.

Cleaning equipment will be provided by schools/clinics.

The capital costs of road maintenance are assumed to be 23,500 FRw per beneficiary household per year.

This is made up of spades, hoes and pangas for each beneficiary household – 6,000 FRw per beneficiary household; high visibility clothing and other safety equipment – 5,000 FRw per beneficiary household; and a wheelbarrow shared between four beneficiary households – 50,000 FRw.

The wage rate is assumed to be 1,035 FRw for all types of public works.

This is the current average wage rate. Note: In practice, it may need to be varied for different types of work, which would slightly reduce the unit cost (but also cost-efficiency) of new-style public works. Since this would require a policy decision, no assumption has been made about this.

88 Hartwig, 2013, op cit.

57


SE

CT

ION

3:

CO

ST

INg

S

Key assumptions RationaleThe capital–wage cost ratio of public works in 2014–2015 is 50:50.

This is an improvement from the 70:30 ratio documented in 2012–2013 but is considered reasonable given that improvements in the labour intensity of public works have already been realized.

Category 2:Child grant is paid only for children 0–4 years old (0–60 months old) up to a maximum of three qualifying children per household.

The early years are most critical for nutrition and development. Though further reducing the qualifying age range would tend to increase management challenges, as households would have to be frequently moved on and off the grant.

Child grant is paid at the rate of 100 FRw. Same as the direct support rate for third and subsequent household members.

All eligible public works households with children 0–4 years old (estimated at 55% of all eligible households) receive the guaranteed child element.

This is a guaranteed element so all eligible households should receive it.

Households receiving child grant are no more/no less likely than other public-works eligible households to actually access workdays.

The guaranteed child element and public works are independent.

Category 3:At worksite crèche and in home-based care there is at least one caregiver for every 10 children.

Worksite crèches are in potentially unsafe environments and the care here is for the very youngest babies and children. Home-based environments are likely to be unsuitable for a very large number of children, and the CARE home-based model proposes a maximum of seven children per carer.

The caregiver receives the same reimbursement as those doing public works – 1,035 FRw per day.

The carer is doing equivalent work.

In all care settings an age-appropriate meal is provided for children. The cost of this is estimated to be 75 FRw per child per day for children 18–36 months old and 50 FRw per child per day for children 6–18 months old.

Both the draft School Feeding Policy and the Save the Children ECD centre budget estimate the cost of a school meal for a child 3–6 years old as 100 FRw per child per day. Costs for younger children are likely to be somewhat lower, though there may be diseconomies of scale since, especially in home-based care, children will be cared for in smaller groups.

Apart from the tarpaulin cover, the shelter at the worksite crèche is constructed using local labour and materials. Each tarpaulin will be used on three consecutive projects.

It seems appropriate that there should be a local in-kind contribution to the setting up of the crèche.

Carers received 10 days training at a cost of 5000 FRw per day.

This is the cost estimated by Save the Children for training of caregivers if carried out in the sector.

Public works project lasts for 60 days. On average, a caregiver will work on three projects.

This estimate is required in order to calculate the per day and per child cost of caregiver training.

58


SE

CT

ION

4:

RE

CO

mm

EN

DA

TIO

NS

AN

D R

OA

D m

AP

section 4: recommendations and road map

4.1 recommendations: a comprehensive solution

Looking again at Table 2 (reproduced below for ease of reference), it is clear that the different categories of actions proposed address different key issues to varying extents and that they can, therefore, best be seen as complementary rather than alternative actions. It is recommended that a comprehensive solution to the issues identified would involve a combination of actions from each of the four categories.

It is equally clear that there are some trade-offs. For example, the combination of a guaranteed child element (Category 2) and comprehensive childcare provision would do much to address mitigation, coverage and adequacy issues, somewhat obviating the need for the delivery at scale of new-style public works. On the other hand, if it was decided not to implement actions in Category 2 (guaranteed child element, paid maternity leave, switching of some households to direct support), then a rapid, major expansion of new-style public works would be required to address issues of coverage and adequacy of benefits, as well as comprehensive implementation of childcare and other mitigating measures in order to address potentially harmful effects of the public works requirement on young children.

Complementary services are, as the name suggests, complementary and cannot be expected to substitute for actions in other areas.

© U

NIC

EF/

201

4/S

hres

tha

59


SE

CT

ION

4:

RE

CO

mm

EN

DA

TIO

NS

AN

D R

OA

D m

AP

Key issues addressed Option 1:Expanded public works

Option 2:Increased benefit levels for vulnerable families with young children

Option 3:Mitigating measures

Option 4:Complementary services

Coverage Medium High LowAdequacy of transfers and spending on children

Medium Medium Low Low

Mitigation of harmful impacts on young children of the work requirement

Medium High High Low

In effect, the recommendation is to implement as many of the proposed actions as possible, taking account of capacity constraints, with proposed prioritization as follows:

Priority one: Mitigate potentially harmful impacts on young children of current public works arrangements

This could be achieved through various combinations of the following options:

Category 1 actions:

• Develop a new range of public works that are more flexible and part-time and can be carried out closer to home (cost savings of 1.7 billion over current approach).

Category 2 actions:

• Provide paid maternity leave from public works for all pregnant women in VUP-eligible households that have no other labour capacity (estimated cost 300 million FRw per year).

• Formally enable all pregnant and lactating women to work reduced hours (and to carry out lighter works) for equal pay (no cash cost).

• Provide a guaranteed child element for all public-works eligible households with a child 0–4 years old (estimated cost 2.6 billion FRw per year).

Category 3 actions:

• Contract skilled providers (e.g. NGOs) to provide childcare for the children of public works participants at the worksite for babies 6–24 months old and home-based for children 24–36 months old (estimated cost 1.25 billion FRw per year).

• Expand the definition of ‘labour-constrained household’, such that households with only one able-bodied adult and a child younger than 6 years old become eligible for public works (estimated cost 2 billion FRw per year).

Priority two: increase both the percentage of public-works eligible households with young children that access wages/transfers and the adequacy of transfers

The main actions that would contribute to this are:

• Develop a new range of public works that are more flexible and part-time and can be carried out closer to home (cost savings of 1.7 billion over current approach); and

• Provide a guaranteed child element for all public-works eligible households with a child 0–4 years old (estimated cost 2.6 billion FRw per year), paid to the child’s primary carer.

If both were implemented, synergies mean the additional cost of achieving EPRS2 targets for 2014–2015 would be only 400 million FRw per year as compared with the status quo option.

Documents

CHILD-SENSITIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION IN … CHILD-SENSITIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION IN RWANDA A C k NOWLED g E m acknowledgements ENTS This study was commissioned by the Ministry of Local Government