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8/3/2019 China Defence Paper 2010
1/14
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 269 1
he Peoples Republic o China (PRC) State Council Inormation O-
ce released the seventh edition o its biennial deense white paper,
Chinas National Deense in 2010, on March 31, 2011. Tis docu-
ment aims to communicate the latest inormation on Chinas military devel-
opment, strategy, capabilities, and intentions. China began publishing deense
white papers in 1998, partly as a means o increasing transparency in response to
regional concerns about the growing capabilities and actions o the Peoples Lib-
eration Army (PLA). Despite the systematic release o these documents, many
o Chinas neighbors and other regional powers continue to express concerns
about Chinas lack o military transparency. Te Chinese maintain that they are
becoming more open over time and highlight the importance o transparency
about strategic intentions rather than capabilities.
According to Senior Colonel Chen Zhou, the principal coordinator o
Chinas deense white papers, the document is a government statement that
provides a public explanation on the states national deense policy and national
deense conduct. In his opinion, the 2010 iteration has three new main points:
First, the white paper urther expounds on and openly declares the basis or
and the determination in Chinas pursuit o a national deense policy that isdeensive in nature; second, it systematically introduces new developments in
the building and deployment o the armed orces; and third, it ully presents
the important roles played by the armed orces in such aspects as condence-
building and protecting peace. He concludes that the issuance o Chinas de-
ense white paper serves three distinct unctions: externally, it builds condence
and clears doubts; internally, it raises national deense awareness; and it deters
and warns adversaries.1 Major General Qian Lihua, director o the Ministry
Chinese MilitaryTransparency: Evaluating the2010 Defense White Paper
by Phillip C. Saunders and Ross Rustici
Strategic ForumNational Defense University
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o National Deense Foreign Aairs Oce, states, One
important unction o the national deense white paper
is increasing trust and alleviating the suspicions o the
outside world.2 Tese and other interviews indicate that
the Chinese view the purpose o deense white papers in
a similar ashion to the rest o the world: as documents
intended to increase trust and condence and reduce
suspicion. Tese goals cannot be achieved without a high
level o transparency.
Unortunately, the use o the word transparency is
problematic due to multiple competing denitions. Tis
makes objective analysis about claims o military trans-
parency dicult in general, including in the context o
deense white papers. A number o well-qualied analysts
have discussed limited transparency in the 2010 Chi-nese paper, but the subjective nature o their assessments
makes their conclusions less persuasive to a Chinese audi-
ence.3 o help address this gap, Michael Kiselycznyk and
Phillip C. Saunders published the studyAssessing Chinese
Military Transparency in 2010.4 Te study, which created
a comprehensive rating system or deense white papers,
denes military transparency as providing inormation
about military capabilities and policies that allows other
countries to assess the compatibility o those capabilitieswith a countrys stated security goals. Tis study adapt-
ed a sample deense white paper ormat developed in a
Council or Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacic
working group and created a rating template with 7 sec-
tions and 19 individual categories designed to primarily
assess current military structure, capabilities, and doc-
trine. Te rating template also includes a orward-looking
element by evaluating deense budget trends and planned
acquisitions/procurement.
For each o the 19 categories, the rating system in-
cludes specic denitions and criteria or each o the our
levels o transparency, which are represented using a col-
or-coded system. Red, orange, yellow, and green ratings
indicate, respectively, no transparency, low transparency,
medium transparency, and high transparency. Te rating
system uses consistent language in the rating criteria to
ensure comparability across categories. For example, an
orange (low) transparency rating usually indicates that a
white paper listed or identied some relevant inormation
but did not include the description or analysis required
or a yellow (medium) or green (high) rating. Each white
paper is rated independently by two raters, who reer backto the specic wording o the rating criteria to resolve any
disagreements.5 Te methodology and denitions detailed
in that study were used to assess the transparency o Chi-
nas 2010 Deense White Paper. Tis paper thus serves as
an addendum to the original study. It evaluates the trans-
parency o the most recent Chinese white paper and puts
the ratings into historical and regional context.
rg C 2010 d
W PpTe ollowing table presents the overall transparency
ratings or Chinas deense white papers. In the analysis
below, we provide the rationale or why each o the 19
categories in the 2010 white paper received its specic
transparency rating.
Security Environment. Tis section addresses cur-
rent or developing international, regional, and internal
trends that threaten or have the potential to threaten the
country. Te section consists o international, regional,and internal categories.
Te discussion o Chinas security environment
in the 2010 Deense White Paper generally receives a
medium transparency rating. Te papers rst chapter,
Te Security Situation, is not explicitly divided into
international, regional, and internal categories, but the
delineation among the three levels o analysis is readily
the Chinese view the purpose of
defense white papers in a similarfashion to the rest of the world:
as documents intended toincrease trust and condence
and reduce suspicion
8/3/2019 China Defence Paper 2010
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www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 269 3
apparent. Te section identies but ails to adequately
analyze a number o trends. Internationally, the chapter
highlights that international strategic competition cen-
tering on international order, comprehensive national
strength and geopolitics has intensied. In support o
this claim, the paper elaborates on tensions within the
existing international order and highlights that prog-
ress toward . . . a multi-polar world is irreversible. Tis
section lists a litany o nontraditional security threats
such as terrorism, economic insecurity, climate change,
nuclear prolieration, insecurity o inormation, and
transnational crime. While there is some discussion o
W Pp 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
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4 SFNo. 269 www.ndu.edu/inss
these trends, there is little analysis. Furthermore, what
little analysis there is does not oer any insight into how
these trends aect China. Te result is a medium trans-
parency rating in the international category.
Te regional category also receives a medium
transparency rating. Tis category makes multiple
assertions about growing regionalism and the overall
security environment. In general, the white paper pres-
ents regional economic trends in a positive light, while
acknowledging negative security trends. Despite de-
scribing these trends, a consistent lack o analysis and
a concerted attempt to deemphasize contentious ter-
ritorial disputes prevented a high transparency rating.
Chinas limited discussion o internal security trends
means that this category received a low transpar-
ency rating. (Te internal security rating is adversely
aected by the rating system, which does not accept
the PRC view that aiwan is purely a domestic issue.)
Once the analysis o aiwan is discounted, the discus-
sion o internal security trends is supercial. In a de-
parture rom previous years, there is little discussion o
internal economic progress. Te ocus o this category
is on nontraditional security threats and territorial in-
tegrity. However, there is no explanation o or support
or claims such as Separatist orces working or East
urkistan independence and ibet independencehave inficted serious damage on national security and
social stability. Te inconsistency in identiying and
explaining internal security trends coupled with dis-
counting aiwan equates to a low transparency rating
or this category.
National Security Goals.Tis section addresses the
economic, political, social, and security objectives that
are critical to the country s development and security and
the policy approaches that it pursues to ensure national
security objectives are ullled. Te section consists o
strategic and tactical categories.
Te discussion o Chinas national security goals re-
ceives a medium transparency rating. TeNational Deense
Policychapter identies broad strategic level national se-
curity goals o saeguarding national sovereignty, security
and interests o national development, building inorma-
tionized armed orces and winning inormationized wars,
maintaining social harmony and stability, and maintain-
ing world peace and stability. Te chapter varies widely in
its description o each o these goals, but it outlines three o
the our with sucient detail to garner a medium rating.
Te Arms Control and Disarmament chapter does a armore complete job o not only listing major strategic goals,
but also describing the way in which China is attempting
to attain them. Because o the disparity o inormation in
these two chapters, the rating or national security goals is
considered a low medium. o attain a high rating, the Na-
tional Deense Policy chapter would have to describe all
the strategic goals in depth, and both chapters would have
to conduct an analysis o how these goals are important to
Chinas national security in addition to prioritizing them.
actically, the white paper is ar more descriptive. For
example, when discussing tactics to maintain world peace
and stability, the paper identies strategic coordination and
consultation with major powers and neighboring countries
as one way to achieve this strategic objective. Because this
level o description is consistent throughout the chapter,
this category is rated medium. It ails to achieve a high rat-
ing because there is no analysis o how these actions will
ensure that Chinas national security objectives are secured.
General Defense Policy. Tis section addresses theapproaches, ramework, or principles that guide a coun-
trys deense policy and the primary missions, responsi-
bilities, or roles assigned to the armed orces in pursuit o
this deense policy. Te section consists o doctrine and
mission categories.
Te discussion o Chinas general deense policyre-
ceives a mix o low and medium transparency ratings.
the white paper presents regionaleconomic trends in a positive light,
while acknowledging negative
security trends
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Te National Deense Policy chapter details elements
o Chinas doctrine, which is described as a deensive
doctrine built upon the philosophy o only attacking a-
ter being attacked and a sel-deensive nuclear strategy.
Tis chapter not only discusses specic approaches to
maintaining Chinas deense, but also links that doctrine
to Chinas national strategic goal o supporting this
important period o strategic opportunities or national
development. Tis category received a medium trans-
parency rating (declining rom a high rating in the 2008
white paper) due to an insucient explanation o this
doctrines role in policy. A more detailed discussion o
how a deensive doctrine aids in advancing the identied
policy goals would be necessary or the category to earn
a high transparency rating. Te National Deense Policy and Deployment
o the Armed Forces chapters speciy the missions or
Chinas armed orces. Tis category receives a low trans-
parency rating due to a lack o consistent identication
and description regarding missions. While this section
lists some specic missions such as saeguarding bor-
der, coastal, and territorial air security and maintaining
social stability, there is little discussion o the missions
o the military services and the PLA Second Artillery
Force (PLASAF), which operates Chinas land-based
nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles. Te only spe-
cic reerence to missions or any o the individual ser-
vices or the PLASAF is about the Peoples Liberation
Army Navy (PLAN) enhancing its capabilities in stra-
tegic deterrence and counterattack, and develop[ing] its
capabilities in conducting operations in distant waters.
Despite oering a good description o border security
and maintaining social stability, these chapters would
have to identiy and describe in detail the missions o theservice branches and the PLASAF to warrant a medium
transparency rating. (Te 2008 Deense White Paper
included more inormation about service missions and
received a medium transparency rating.)
Te disparity between the 2008 and 2010 white
paper iterations highlights an important caveat to the
rating methodology: It only considers inormation pre-
sented in the current white paper. Tis technique is at
odds with expressed Chinese views that the white pa-
pers should be viewed as a set. Tis divergence between
how the paper is rated and the Chinese view occasionally
results in a lower transparency rating. For example, the
2008 Deense White Paper has an in-depth discussion o
Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) missions,
while the 2010 version does not mention its missions at
all. We do not believe that these missions have changed
in the intervening period, but the act that the inorma-
tion was not included in the 2010 paper yields a lower
transparency rating.
Major Areas of Concern. Tis section addresses spe-
cic international, regional, or internal situations, issues,
conficts, or problem spots that concern or threaten the
country. Tis section diers rom the Security Environ-
ment category by ocusing on concrete issues and situa-
tions and the policies the country employs to conront
them. Te section consists o international, regional, and
internal categories.
Te discussion o Chinas major areas o concern
receives low to medium transparency ratings in the di-
erent categories. Most o the discussion in this section
overlaps with international security trends. In mostcases, the white paper does not detail specic inter-
national situations or crises that concern China or in-
dicate how it is responding to these concerns. For this
reason, both international and regional areas o concern
receive a low transparency rating. Te 2010 white pa-
per identies prompt global strike, missile deense, and
the new strategic commanding heights (outer space
the disparity between the 2008and 2010 white paper iterations
highlights an important caveat to
the rating methodology: It onlyconsiders information presented in
the current white paper
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and cyber space) as Chinas main international military
concerns. It also identies policy-related concerns re-
garding the prolieration o nuclear weapons and that
deep-seated contradictions and structural problems
behind the international nancial crisis have not been
resolved. Te Korean Peninsula, Aghanistan, political
turbulence, ethnic and territorial disputes, and mari-
time and territorial rights are all listed as regional con-
cerns, although oten with just a ew words devoted to
each topic. For an increased rating in these categories,
the white paper would need to include a detailed de-
scription o the concerns.
Te discussion o internal concerns receives a higher
rating due in large part to the extensive description o
current cross-strait relations. With this as the exception,this section ollows the established pattern o listing a
ew security concerns but oering very little descrip-
tion and no explanation. In addition to issues related to
aiwan, the domestic section also highlights separatist
orces working or East urkistan independence and
ibet independence. While issues such as poverty alle-
viation and natural disasters are reerenced in other sec-
tions, there is no explicit indication that these are major
areas o concern. For a high transparency rating, a greater
discussion o internal issues and a detailed analysis would
be needed.
Current Defense Posture.Tis section addresses the
details and composition o a countrys armed orces. Tis
includestotal number o personnel serving in the deense
orces o the country, organization o the armed orces
and the order o battle, chain o command and the struc-
ture o decisionmaking, and weapons systems and equip-
ment o the armed orces. Te section is broken down
into total personnel, structure o orce, command struc-
ture, and armaments categories.
Total personnel. Like the 2008 version, the 2010
white paper does not include an overall gure or the size
o the PLA. It does provide the total number o lawyers
and legal advisors employed by the armed orces (26,342)
and the number o militia (8 million). Despite mission-
specic breakdowns or the militia, lawyers, and some
international missions, the act that the white paper does
not indicate the number o personnel in the armed orces
mandates a rating o no transparency. o achieve an or-
ange rating, the white paper must include an accurate
number o personnel in the armed services.Structure of force. Te scant space devoted to the
PLA, PLAN, PLAAF, the Second Artillery, the Peoples
Army Police Force, reserves, and militia provides little
inormation on their respective orce structures. Te pa-
per identies the number o army combined corps (18),
number o feets and their names, and the air commands
in each military region.6 While this provides a basic over-
view o how each service is structured, it does not iden-
tiy or provide the number o combat units within this
structure. For example, the paper does not present details
on the number o air wings that comprise the Chengdu
area command or give the number o planes within each
air wing. Tis category receives a low transparency rating.
Command structure. Te only reerence to com-
mand structure can be ound in the National Deense
Mobilization and Reserve Force Building chapter.
While this discussion is detailed and descriptive, it rep-
resents only a small raction o the armed services; as a
result, this category receives a low transparency rating(a decline rom the medium transparency rating in the
2008 white paper). o achieve a medium transparency
rating, the white paper must include the command au-
thority at the highest levels and list specic geographic
and service structures.
Armaments. Te Modernization o the Peoples
Liberation Army chapter contains a general description
the 2010 white paper identies
prompt global strike, missiledefense, and the new strategic
commanding heights (outer space
and cyber space) as Chinas main
international military concerns
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o weapons platorms used by each service but has no
inormation on the Second Artillery. For example, the
air orce operates airborne early warning and control
aircrat, third generation combat aircrat, and air and
missile deense systems, and the navy is incorporat-
ing new types o submarines, rigates, aircrat and large
support vessels. Tis listing o general platorms ullls
the basic requirements or a low transparency rating. o
increase to a medium rating, the white paper must in-
clude a description o particular weapons systems, such
as J10s or DF21s.
Defense Management. Tis section addresses a
countrys deense budget and uture procurement plans.
Tis includes overall spending on the armed orces and
deense, budget gures that provide historical contextor current deense spending or inormation on uture
spending plans, and planned weapons systems or capa-
bilities procurements. Te section consists o overall bud-
get, budget trends, and planned acquisitions or procure-
ments categories.
Te chapter Deense Expenditure includes a gure
or Chinas 2010 deense budget (Renminbi 532, about
$82.3 billion at current exchange rates). Te paper pres-
ents a comparison o Chinas budget as a percentage o
Chinas gross domestic product and state expenditure.
A table in the chapter divides Chinas 2009 deense ex-
penditures into three categories: personnel, training and
maintenance, and equipment. Te paper includes a brie
explanation o what is covered within these three broad
categories, but it does not provide any specic gures or
spending on procurement or research and development,
both o which are important or judging uture capa-
bilities. Tese gures are urther divided by active orce,
reserve orce, and militia. Because the chapter does notdiscuss any deense-related expenditure not included in
the ocial deense budget or provide inormation on the
budgets o individual services, this category receives a
medium transparency rating.
Te budget trends category receives a low trans-
parency rating. A table in the white paper presents the
deense budget as a percentage o Chinas annual state
nancial expenditure rom 1998 to 2009. Tis inorma-
tion places Chinas past deense expenditures into his-
torical context, but the white paper does not provide any
estimated or projected size o the deense budget beyond
2010, inormation that would be needed or a medium
transparency rating.
Similarly, the planned acquisitions and procure-
ments category receives a low transparency rating because
the white paper oers only general reerences to some o
the capabilities China plans to acquire in order to ulll
modernization goals. Te majority o these capabilities
are related to logistics and to command, control, com-
munications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C4ISR). At no point does the white pa-
per discuss any specic weapons platorms, quantities, or
timelines or procurement or purchases (which is needed
or a medium transparency rating).
International Activity. Tis section addresses the
international activities o a countrys armed orces. Tis
includes the countrys deense relationships, military
exchanges, and joint exercises with other nations, par-
ticipation in international deense organizations, and
participation in bilateral or multilateral peacekeeping or
humanitarian missions. Te section consists o relation-ships, exchanges and joint exercises, and peacekeeping
operations (PKO)/humanitarian missions categories.
Te 2010 Deense White Paper receives a high trans-
parency rating regarding international activity. It provides
a description o Chinas international relationships, ex-
changes, and joint exercises in the chapters Deployment
o the Armed Forces and Military Condence Building.
the white paper offers onlygeneral references to some
of the capabilities China plans
to acquire in order to fulllmodernization goals
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with only vague reerences to capabilitiesand has no
mention o any specic weapons systems (or example,
Chinas aircrat carrier program, eorts to develop anti-
ship ballistic missiles, or the development o the J20
stealth ghter).
Despite other countries voicing concern over the
lack o specic inormation regarding PLA capabilities,
the PLA leadership has long insisted that intentions
rather than capabilities are the more important aspect
o military transparency. Furthermore, they oten justiy
Chinas actions and modernization programs as reac-
tions to what other countries are doing or to broader
trends in the development o military technology. In
their narrative, China must modernize its armed orces
to deend itsel. New capabilities or actions that othersmay perceive as threatening are presented as responses
to changes in the international security environment or
reactions to other states.
Tis narrative is laboriously adhered to in the 2010
white paper. Given the precedent o rarely singling out
states, the white paper relies on the international security
environment to provide justication or Chinas military
capabilities and modernization program. Te white paper
was reportedly delayed or several months or revisions
to the assessment o the security environment (ound in
the Security Situation chapter). Tese revisions pro-
duced a more avorable depiction o the international
and regional security environments and may have caused
a reduction o inormation on military modernization
programs, which might now appear unmotivated by the
more benign description o the security environment.
One striking aspect o the 2010 white paper, only
partly captured by the transparency rating system used in
our analysis, is its extremely limited and veiled reerencesto adverse regional security developments in 20092010.
Many security analysts would argue that a more assertive
Chinese diplomatic and military posture in the region
including such actions as the harassment o the USNS
Impeccable, increased Chinese patrolling and naval exer-
cises in the South China Sea, verbal bullying o Asso-
ciation o Southeast Asian Nations and Northeast Asian
countries in regional meetings, and economic retaliation
against Japan ollowing a collision between a Japanese
coast guard vessel and a Chinese shing boatis a ma-
jor actor that heightened regional security concerns and
prompted many countries to improve their security ties
with the United States.10 Tey would point to North
Koreas 2009 nuclear weapons test and 2010 sinking o
the South Korean navy ship Cheonan and shelling o
Yeonpyeong Island as important destabilizing regional
developments (neither is mentioned in the 2010 white
paper). Tey also highlight the Chinese leaderships re-
luctance to condemn these actions, increased support or
the North Korean regime, and the planned succession
o Kim Jong-eun as important regional developments.11
Chinas actions and role in these events are entirely miss-
ing rom the discussion o the regional security envi-
ronment in the 2010 Deense White Paper. Te overall
tone o the paperbased on language, omitted inorma-
tion, and the amount o text dedicated to issuesseeks
to create a message o strategic reassurance to Chinas
neighbors. However, the reduction in transparency about
specic Chinese military capabilities and general deense
policy is likely to have the opposite eect.
When the ndings described above were presentedin a recent international conerence, one Chinese par-
ticipant argued that the lower rating or the 2010 white
paper is an artiact o the assessment methodology rather
than an actual decrease in transparency. He complained
that because the assessment did not consider inorma-
tion about command structure and missions presented
in previous white papers, the 2010 Deense White Paper
the white paper focuses heavily on
discussion of Chinese intentionscoupled with only vague references
to capabilitiesand has no mention
of any specic weapons systems
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received an articially low rating. I inormation rom
previous white papers had been included, two categories
would have received higher ratings and the overall trans-
parency rating would have remained constant.
Tere are sound methodological reasons or a rating
system to ocus on the inormation in a single white pa-
per rather than to rate all available white papers as a set.
Rating only the most recent paper avoids the problem o
subjective determinations about whether inormation in
older white papers has become dated or inaccurate. Tis
approach also acilitates comparisons across countries,
not all o which publish white papers on a regular sched-
ule. It would be possible in principle to construct a mov-
ing average system that considers inormation rom both
old and new white papers, but this would bias transpar-ency ratings in a upward direction (because transparency
ratings in a moving average system would not decline
even i a new white paper contained signicantly less in-
ormation than older ones). Accordingly, we believe the
rating system should produce as accurate a transparency
rating as possible or individual white papers, and then
use detailed content analysis to consider why the ratings
in individual categories changed. We agree that a com-
prehensive assessment o a countrys military transpar-ency should use all available inormation.
As we discussed in the explanation o our ratings
above, we believe that artiacts in the rating system
had limited impact on our conclusion that the 2010
white paper is less transparent than the previous edi-
tion. Most observers would agree that Chinas military
capabilities have improved signicantly over the last
2 years, but the discussion in the white paper pro-
vides ew details on those changes. As we rated the
2010 white paper, we ound that a number o catego-
ries (especially those ocused on military capabilities)
contained less inormation than previous editions. In
a ew cases, this resulted in a lower rating; in other
cases, the rating stayed the same even though less rel-
evant inormation was provided in the 2010 white pa-
per. Te armaments category is a good example. Te
low transparency rating did not change even though
the amount o inormation in the 2010 white paper
decreased signicantly. Furthermore, the discussion
o the services and Second Artillery is drastically re-
duced. Te 2008 white paper devoted approximately
21 percent o its text to the military services and theSecond Artillery, whereas the 2010 white paper de-
voted only 6 percent.
Tis critique o the assessment methodology misses
a broader point about transparency. While we agree that
PLA missions probably have not changed since 2008,
we do not know that or certain. Te draters o Chinas
white paper may want to keep each edition short and
ocused on new developments, but that inherently de-
creases transparency because outside observers are let
to wonder i things are omitted because nothing has
changed or because China does not want to highlight the
changes. Most outside observers would also agree that
omitting relevant inormation about the modernization
o Chinese military capabilities in order to make space
or a discussion o the military legal system is not a good
tradeo i China wants to increase transparency.
Cc
While the 2010 Deense White Paper appears in-tended to assuage the concerns o Chinas neighbors
and the broader international community about PLA
actions and modernization eorts, it does so at the
expense o reduced transparency about Chinese mili-
tary capabilities. Te 2010 version includes little new
inormation and provides less inormation than previ-
ous white papers about military command structure,
most observers would agree thatChinas military capabilities have
improved signicantly over the last
2 years, but the discussion in thewhite paper provides few details on
those changes
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strategic national security goals, PLA missions, and
Chinas military modernization. Specically, the 2010
white paper is less transparent than the 2008 version
in the categories o General Deense PolicyDoctrine,
General Deense PolicyMissions, and Current De-
ense PostureCommand Structure. (Te 2010 edi-
tion did, however, improve its transparency rating in the
category o Major Areas o ConcernInternal.) Tis
edition o the white paper portrays Chinas military
modernization as a means o aiding the international
community and attempts to convey an image o China
as a benign international actor. In crating this message,
there are large sections detailing Chinese involvement
in international cooperation coupled with a noticeable
omission o any Chinese agency in regional incidents.Tis reduction in transparency is at odds with Chinas
own position regarding the evolution o transparency. For
years, Chinese interlocutors have maintained that great-
er transparency benets the strong at the expense o the
weak. Major General Luo Yuan, deputy secretary general
o the Chinese Military Science Association, states:
Military transparency could only . . . progress
gradually in a step by step fashion. . . . Any
comparison on Chinas progress in militarytransparency should be vertical. . . . China has
become more in line with international practice
in the past few years, and it is sincerely trying
to reinforce trust and erase doubt, while hoping
to gain understandings from the international
community on the modernized construction of
Chinas national defense.12
Unortunately, the 2010 iteration o Chinas deense
white paper does not conorm to this ideal. It is unde-niable that China is a growing military power. Publicly
available Chinese assessments o PLA capabilities13 place
China on par with regional powers such as Japan, South
Korea, and Australia; many outside observers would rate
the PLA as the strongest Asian military in the region.
Yet rather than progressing toward the level o transpar-
ency o other Asia-Pacic major powers, the 2010 white
paper constitutes a step backward. Several Chinese mili-
tary ocers have stated that as China grows in compre-
hensive national power, it should become more transpar-
ent. Te many interested observers o the PLA will await
the publication o Chinas 2012 Deense White Paper
to judge whether the 2010 paper is a one-time excep-
tion to the trend o gradually increasing Chinese military
transparency or reveals a cap on Chinas willingness to
be transparent about its expanding military capabilities.
ransparency about both intentions and capabilities is
important i condence-building measures such as pub-
lication o deense white papers are to achieve their ob-
jective o increasing trust and alleviating the suspicions
o the outside world.
ackwgmTe authors would like to acknowledge Michael Kiselycznyk or
his contributions in developing the analytical ramework used in this
study and to thank Christopher Yung, CAP Mark Redden, USN,
William Norris, David Finkelstein, Dean Cheng, ai Ming Cheung,
and the participants in the April 2011 University o Caliornia Institute
on Global Confict and Cooperation conerence on transparency
or helpul comments on earlier drats. Tey also thank Jerey
Smotherman, Lisa Yambrick, and ara Parekh at NDU Press and
Kimberley Berlin in INSS or assistance in preparing the manuscript
and posting the associated les on the Institutes Web site.
n1Tis paragraph draws upon an interview conducted byGuang-
ming Ribao Online, April 15, 2011, available at .
2Yuan Yuan, PLA Major General Expounds on Militar yransparency in PRC Deense White Paper, Beijing Liaowang,no. 40.
3 Dean Cheng, Te Limits o ransparency: China Releases2010 Deense White Paper, Web Memo, Te Heritage Founda-tion, April 7, 2011, available at ; Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, Grading
Chinas Military Plans, The Diplomat, April 9, 2011, availableat ; Michael S. Chase, Chinas2010 National Deense White Paper: An Assessment, ChinaBrief11, no. 7, April 22, 2011, available at .
4 Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders,Assessing ChineseMilitary Transparency , China Strategic Perspectives 1 (Washington, DC:National Deense University Press, June 2010), available at .
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12 SFNo. 269 www.ndu.edu/inss
5 See Ibid., 612, or a more detailed discussion o the methodology.6 All o this inormation was presented in the 2008 white paper,
and in the case o the air orce and Second Artillery, it was presentedin more detail.
7 See the comments o Michael D. Swaine, Dennis J. Blasko, andDavid M. Finkelstein at the Center or Naval AnalysesInstitute orNational Strategic Studies roundtable on the 2010 Deense White Paper,
April 20, 2011, available at ; and Ian Easton, Chinas National Deense in 2010, RoundtableReport, July 2011 (orthcoming), available at .
8 Updated tables comparing Chinas 2010 Deense White Paperwith other Asia-Pacic white papers are available on the INSS Web-site at .
9 Proessor ai Ming Cheung presented key ndings o theIGCC 2010/11 Northeast Asia Deense ransparency Index at aUniversity o Caliornia Institute on Global Confict and Coopera-tion Workshop on Deense ransparency in Northeast Asia, La Jolla,CA, April 2829, 2011.
10 For contemporaneous analysis, see the relevant issues oPacic Forum Center or Strategic and International StudiesComparative Connections, available at .11 For regional perspectives, see Ross Babbage, Australias Stra-
tegic Edge in 2030, Kokoda Paper no. 15, February 2011, 3134, andJapans 2010 Deense White Paper, 35, 6164.
12 Luo Yuan, Beijing Liaowang, no. 15, April 1117, 2011, 64.13 Department o Deense (DOD),Military and Security De-
velopments Involving the Peoples Republic of China (Washington, DC:DOD, 2010); National Institute or Deense Studies (NIDS),NIDSChina Security Report(okyo: NIDS, 2011).
The Center or Strategic Research within the Institute orNational Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secre-tary o Deense, Chairman o the Joint Chies o Sta, andunied combatant commands through studies, reports,briengs, and memoranda. The center conducts directedresearch and analysis in the areas o strategic and region-al studies and engages in independent and leading-edgeresearch and analysis in related areas.
The Strategic Forum series presents original researchby members o NDU as well as other scholars andspecialists in national security aairs rom the UnitedStates and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recom-mendations expressed or implied within are those o thecontributors and do not necessarily refect the views o theDeense Department or any other agency o the FederalGovernment. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.
Nicholas RostowDirector
Center or Strategic Research
Phillip C. SaundersDirector o Studies
Center or Strategic Research
InstItute for natIonal strategIc studIes
Hans BinnendijkDirector
INSS
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White papersChina2010
Brunei2004/07
Cambodia2006
Indonesia2008
Laos2005
Philippines1998
Singapore2000
Tailand2005
Vietnam2009
Security Environment
International
Regional
Internal
National Security Goals
Strategic
Tactical
General Defense Policy
Doctrine
Missions
Major Areas of Concern
International
Regional
Internal
Current Defense Posture
Total Personnel
Structure of Force
Command Structure
Armaments
Defense Management
Overall Budget
Budget Trends
Planned Acquisitions
International Activity
Exchanges
PKO Missions
Comparison o Chinas 2010 Deense White Paper with Those oASEAN Member States
8/3/2019 China Defence Paper 2010
14/14
White papersChina
2010
Australia
2008
India
2008
Japan
2008
South
Korea 2006
aiwan
2008
SecurityEnvironment
International
Regional
Internal
National SecurityGoals
Strategic
Tactical
General DefensePolicy
Doctrine
Missions
Major Areas ofConcern
International
Regional
Internal
Current Defense
Posture
Total Personnel
Structure of Force
Command Structure
Armaments
DefenseManagement
Overall Budget
Budget Trends
PlannedAcquisitions
InternationalActivity
Exchanges
PKO Missions
Comparison o Chinas 2010 Deense White Paper withOther East Asian and Asia-Pacifc White Papers