" '-OIINESE SUPPORT POR REVOLtrrIONARY ~ V E H E N T S by / 1 Howard Il.' 8aUoc:h Muter 0 fArts f: ~ .'J " !!o "'. L .. "#&.J \ \ < '. . , , 1 \ 1,\ CHlISE SUPP'[ POIl UVOLUTIO!WlY IIJ'IBMENT'S IN THE MDl WOIU.D. 1965 ... 1971 by Howard R. Bal10ch A thesls suba1tted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies \1 and Research in p.artial fulfiUtMnt of the requ1reents for the degree of Haater of Arts of Polit1cal Science, , MeC11l University, Montreal, canada " ," .,. ,; l' CO Il., Ja 110ch '1974 1 .-.rct ... January, 1974. il l "' e ra tion struggles, but rather that a self-reliant struggle mJst be waged in order to expect external SUPpoft. Lin Piao dealt easily with this seeming difficulty in his summary of China's stance towards revolutionary movements: fi ' . As for revolutionary vars waged by th oppressed nations and peoples, so far from opposing them, ve invariably give them fine support and active 'alq. lt has been 80 ln the past. it remaina so in the present, and when we grow in Itrength as tilDe' gos on, we wUI sive them still more support and aid in the future Of cours, every revolution in a country stems from the demanda of lta own people. Only when the people in a country are awakened, mobilized, orgnlzed, and anaed can they overthrow tbe reactionary rule of impetialism and lts lackey. struggle; their role cannot be replaced or taken over by Any people from out-s'ide. In thia .ense, cannot be iaported. But this doea not exclde mtitual ayapathy and on the part of revolution-ary,people in their- .truggles againat the Imperialiats and their lackeys. Our and a1d to other revolut10nary people serves precisely to help thelr self-reliant .truggle. '7 for j " / e . .. , lS. Deapite the fact that China bas outlined the characterlstlc8 1 of an Ideal revolptionary moveaent, the Chinese leaders nevet' aaid explicitly that a movement not subscribing to a required minimum of these would be denied support. ln fact, in sade . article by Lin Piao, three other attributes were mentloned: (1) a movement shoula be anti-colonial and ,nti-imperialist; (2) it should be oriented towards socialism and/or communism; and (3) lt should be vigorously pursued vith relatively strong popu1arl support. ln practice, if a movement fulfills the first six attributes it would aiso fulfill the last For China, these last three " tenets can perhaps be seen as the necessary and sufficient condi-tions far a hypothetical member of the ,united front, despite the fact that such a movement might be a long way from .eeting all other conditions. According to the Chinese theory, .by presenting a world-wide front against a common enemy, victory will he easier; , ", .. having overcOlDe the principle eneary. attention can then be turned \ ta puiHying ele.-ents within the united front. In discussing the" past vars of nathmal several of vhich differed radieally from the Chinese model. Lin said: The cl o.e I ding ond' so may the breadth and depth of saobiliza-tian and the extent of victory, bu the vic tories in these people t 8 vars have very" much weakened and pinned down the forces of laperiaUslII, upset the b-.S. iaperiaUst plan ta launch a world war, and becoe lIIighty ,factors defending world peaee. 18 This theory of people's war. its six major and tbree tenets, fanas tbe basis for tbe conatruction of one of the 'rtt f. "' . , 16. independent variables, the ''Revolutionary We .re that this model 18 accepted by the Chinese govern.ent, and the methodology used to test our h,potheaea is based on this premise. E METHOOOLOGY The metbodology used in this thesis ia an outgrowtb of p revioua work used in other atudies of .hinese behaviour and .in more general eventa data researeb. Van Ness, in his study of Chinese support for revolutionary movements in 1965, uses a camparison of two indicators, representing Chinese support and the hostl1ity of a third-world government towards China, to exaine whether China supports IDOvements on the basis intergovernmental hostility. At a time when China elaimed to support a movement on the basis of its ideologieal nature, a study sueh as Van Nesa's is naturally unsatisfactory, for it ignores posaibilities alter-native to its central hypothesis. Second, as bis'study covers only one year his generalizations require further testing. In this thesis we are trying to avoid such pitfalls by using three separate time periods and by setting up a series of variables whieh can be used to test a series of hypotheses. We have attempted to draw fro. that genre of re.eareh that has been called events data researeh or event. research in order to make this study more rigotou8. According to Burgess and 39 Lawson, 1\ the adv.nces made towards building a more rigoroua science by events data research have been due to a careful approacb to data collection and organiz.tion. 5tudies of th!s nature LI 17. generally: (1) exaaine both unilateral and collective action; (2) use direct targets only; (3) break complex actions into discrete .. actions; (4) tbcus on aIL salient foreign policy actions; and (5) have a set time frame. This study fulfills aIL those criteria: (1) Support granted a revo lutionary IIOvesaent by Chin., with tbe co-operation of another.country is treated as an action of support equivalent to Chinese unilateral support; (2} Only direct recip-lents of Chlnese support are classified as targets; (3) An actIon , of support for several movements ls consldered as a separate action of support for each movelDent; (4) lt focuses on both positive verbal and active behaviour, and both are considered salient actions of support; and, (5) A set time frame consisting of three Ume periods hd been estabUsbed. Using consistent and controlled interpretation of data, it is hoped generalizations drawn in conclusion will avoid the pitfall of camparing essentially incom-parable data. This atudy falls short of IlUch events data research in statistical sophistication, but this ia a function of the 7 narrowness of its focus and the concoaaitant problem of too amall 1 a sample size for such'methodology. In any case, the only difficulty this entails is the necessity of interpreting the data intellectually rather than 8tatistically; while the latter i8 useful wen de.Ung with large populations, it i. not clear by any .. ans that it .voids the of le 8 s"'" quantitative techniques of data The IM!thodology iuVolves a qualititive cOliparison of three principle one dependent and two independent. One -, ,{J., -'0' '." ", j'si o l@. secondary inde pendent variable aad one control variable are elao ;- included in the analys18. Tbe principle vat'iables are aU- COll-, posite indices coaposed oi' a series of relevant indicators. The results of the coaparison will be used to test a set of bypotheses presented at the end of this chapter. The dependent variable. the "support index". descr-ibes the pattern of support China to a11 revolutionary movements considered. The tva .. jor independent variables, the "hostility index" and the "revolutionary index", will be used to try to explain the opattern of support described by the dependent variable. These tva independent variables will be assessed for a Umited nu.ber of move_nts as a cOliplete analysis is well beyond the seope of this thesis. the movements chosen represent different types of and receive varying leveh of support from China. Therefore lt 18 not unreasonable to assUDe that the generaltlations drawn fra. the results are in fact. valide Tbougb tbe nUilber g-f .ove.ents eon-s i"dered 18 not large enough to just1fy a quantitative cOliparllon of tbe indices through aultiple correlation and regression ana1y.ia, essentially the .ethodology is a correlation of the .. jor variables, albeit done intellectuslly. 8y relating the tvo pri .. ry independ-ent variables to the dependent variable. their relative c an be assessed. The cOliputlng of the dependent variable relates it autoaaticaUy to the secondary independent variable, the geo-graphieal of a particular state. The control variable, tt.e, e.se8 ehadsea ln Chinese aupport poliey between 1965, 1969, .' -, , " ,t l r ' . ' ,1 '.,. '-.. 19. j "nl' 1911, th", tf'ree ft_ pt!rlodl or thh We ehAU no" prtl( .... d tll thp (on .. trul1t1on of tlw 'ndit .... ,tJ1P)l. I .. out ' thp to b@ tp"lpd, C' {l,,',"l \. 1. " ",Cqn'tn",,11Q!1 QI th! ";tvppott lWtt.a1t (d.plIndent vn, ... b t.) .;" ",,: Gh' tW". ''''pport for l'no l\ldon.ry IIOv ... nt ... l'An tllh ln th .. Il'p'''Ahtl;fl . ..,hon- Il dl .. Unctlcln Il dr""" b.l" n . 40 . ,,01,' lA III y JH,IIt lt'A l '''.pp,,,''t throuMh rrA' Me or A "vQJul tu,,"rv ml"Vp .... nl Chln",,,p J'r","'" Th', ttllPU t .. k .. .. h".."",. Ali or whl"h .. rp MrouppcI h.n 111t .. upport" , 'Nf'(on,l ... U 1t Ary And Pl'onom' (' '''l'Prt'rl 1II\1IIt b. l .. ", .. l.d "" th ' ..... :>: lJI'" of ""pt"'I"I. ((lI' boU1 r .. fe lin l .. port"," t.m"lb Ica l'oc.-, " und.r III d"ltlltUut(,(lW cIIlhd "l"nRlble ,,,.pport". Ftn,,' l" tlMtr. 1 i" Il t tpcs of .upport thAl "ivel ".,.n r.coRnltlon to the r.volu o J ' t lon .. rt-1llQvMMlnt. Th ... type' of Itupport, AcUna a. '" lo"lU.lllna '- , IIIl(fnf; ((lr 'lIklvHifpnt. hl dfplOllalic or "ln"Utution4l1 aupport" '1 whue Chlna ha .. utablhh.d fomAl ti." wHh th. MOv ... nt, . \ , " 1 \ '1&) Pub lle Suppyrt Thertt four type. oC public lupport that "lll b@ .XAnt-t.ned: (A) .tat ... nt. of .upport (or A IIOv_nt ... naUnl froa! Mao or oU .. r a.n'or offtctah oC lM Chine IOVernMnt; (b) .l_Hu " P4 , . 1 l/ "t' ... , {., .. , 8tatements by lesser officiaIs or major pre .. article. backing a IIlOvement; (c) similar by the Chinese Co_unis t P.-tty or statements by the front of, the movements reprinted in the Chinese press; and, (d) general references of support 1n the Chinese press. In computing the support index, each of the f (, , -indicators will be weighted in order to iqdicate iU relative signifieance. Iltithli case of public support for a government '" ' opposed by a revolutionary movement, the indicators will be weighted neg$t:ively, so as ca s,ignify support. The' data for aIL four categories of public support are drawn from the , \. Pekins Review and the translated selections from the Chinese -9.ress by the American Consulate in Hong Kong under the titles: Survey of China Mainland Preu, Suner of China Mainland Hagaz'ine, and Cu'rran t Ba'Cks round. Tangible Support Tangible economic or mil Hary support wi 11 be welghted Along with the four indicators of public !Support.. As econa.ic or mUitary support obviously connotes a strong c01aibDent to a 1 movelDent, it will be weighted heavUy. As with the indicators of putl1c support, when tangible supPOrt 1& granted to a national < \, -government lostead of a revolutlonary IIOvement. it will be welghted " negativet.y. (China has had. at various ti.aes, a policy of giving relativelyJ ... u aalOunte of ..oney to leader. of revolutlonary move.ents for purposea. ln theae Cal the a.ouot J of IIOney 1& .0 ... U tbat auch an Act 'Will, not be a. ----- .' -- - '" " ,-1 .. e ... . tangible support; usually this money is of little help other than l. . providing funds for minor administrative purposes.) The data fot this element are drawn primarily from secondary sources, although the Chinese themselves occasionaHy make certain information ... available. (iii) Institutional Support Some revolutionary movements have front organizations _______ wi th permanent !!lissions in Peking, and send delegates to f --_.- , ------ -- -- -.---. -visit with Chinese officiaIs from time to time. ln cases where either or both 0, these two types of formaI links exist, the movement will be deemed to have "institutional support", another indicator in the support index. Negative support will be ac.corded a movement when active. diplomlrtic relations exist between Peking and the '80vernment of the country in question. The Peking , Review, the Survey of China Hainland Press, and international yearbooks serve as the sources for this data. The weightings of the indicators in the support index 21. are based on the relative importance of each indicaCor in coaaiting China to a position backing the revolutlonary movement. As Peter Van Ness points out: A stateaent by Mao Tse-Tung is the strongest kind of verbal support Pekins can provide. Rach atate-ment Is invariably accompanied by MaSS rallies propaganda campaigna throughout the country and abroad. Public support doea not stop there; o u8)Jally a .tatement of support by Chail'll8D Mao . implies a contlnuing Chinue intereat in and ca.itment to the particular area chosen 'for endorae..ent. 41 ) 22. Thus such a statement is accorded a relatively heavy weigbt. Chou En-lai and Lin Piao also .bave created parallel c01llllitments by " openly endorsing a movement, much IIOre than either junior -officials or tbe CCP. The level of public support receives a lW weighting, for while not as strong a statement as other levels, '. it is still signifieant: "when in official publications certain areas are designated as areas in. whieh armed struggles against imperial1sm are being carried on, there is, at the very least. . 42 a strong implication of official Chinese endorsement." Clearly, tangible economic,or military is as important as any s tatement and thus 1t is accordec:1 th same significance as a s tatement by Mao and other senior officials. Institutional sup-port, while a very positive aet of support, annot be eonsidered ". of quite the same magnitude as actual tangible aid, and thus is accorded a slightly lower weighting. The weightings of the indicators of the support index ar therefore as follows: SUPPORT IND,EX PUBLIC SUPPORT .= 4.1 4.1 ... .. ... k k 0 .... k .. &. 0 U o "0 .J' iS >. CI 4.1 a. ..... CI =' .... 4.1 ...... 0 l1li B ... " 0 .. CI l1li k a &. >->. ...... 4.116.1 IID'W .... .Dk .DU CI CI 0 o a. 0 ..... 116.10 Il U =' ..... .16.1. 0 ..... l1li k l1li Il IID 0 ... g ... 4.1 CloU .... c: Il c: 0 ... 4.1 " CI u !t' 4.1 1 1 k a. .4.1101. .... CI =' 4.1 ; 4.1 CI"'" .. cu .a .. 4.1 ... ., '" 0 ... .... c: :l k ... .... 4.1 .... &. = ..... ....... 0 ... " :t= 4.1 ".e "CI_ Cl.o CloDO" S ... 4.1 u='1 8 Il ... 4.1 Il " CI FI) 0 en ...., k 0 CI ... .... 1-4(1) .... 4 -4 ( ) 2 -2 ( ) 2 -2 ( ) l -1 ( ) 4 -4 ( ) 3(-3 ) , Betveen 16 & -16 ." 23. These values perait the COllstructi0yf an index, applicable to a11 aovellent, vbich will yield a pictu(e of relative levels -of support. 2. Construction of the Index" (independent variable) A country' s voting record in the United Nations General Asse.bly on the tvo'resolutions of the annual China representation --issue will be used as indicators of bostility or friendship towards China. Each yea r, up to and inc lud ing 1971 when China r s sea t in the United Nations was UnaUy given to the Peking government, a resolution, known as the "Albanian resolution", was voted on. This , 1 resolution proposed the replacement of the ,Taiwan representatives by those ,Of Peking, and restoration of China' s lawful seat in the O.N. to the People's RepubUc of China. The United States sponaored, each year, a procedural resolution declaring the Albanian resolution an "important question" involving considerations of the U.N. Charter. "This resolut.ion made the representation issue subject to the rule that two-thirds of the General Assembly aust be in favor of 'a resolut.ion for it to be passed. Clearly, the fina supporters of China voted against the important question resolution and for the Albanian resolution. Adversaries of Peking did the reverse. A vote for the Albanian resolution will be con-sidered an act o.f friendship, as will a vote against the U:!;.-sponsored lIlportant question resolution. Votes opposed to these, or abstentions, will he considered acta of hoatility. Dipla.at.ic relations between the country in question and Peking will be seen a8 an indicator of friendahip; al.tlar relatioa. 1\ (";.'" 1 indiate bostillty. Extensive trade with Peking J a country's total trade or .ore tban U.S. $50 million) will be used as an indicator of friendsh1pi siaUar trade with 1 Taiwan will be used as an indicator of hostility. Finally, a mUitary defence vith China will be considered friendly, whUe one with Taiwan or the United States will be construed as an act of. hostility. Most of the data for this variable can be foond in t e U .N. International Trade Stati.tic8 Yearbook, the Far Eastern Reviev, and/or any national sources available. The weightiags of the indicators of the hostility index unifonD; the index will neverthele8s provide a measure of the relative intenslty of hostility or friendship by govemments towards China. No Is aade to ascribe differing weights to the various indicators as it would be excessively difficult to detenaine relative even through 8uch techniques (which are theDl8elves .ost questionable) as pair-scB,ling. AB opposed to the 8upport index, where different Ieveis of public clearly represent different degrees of co.ait.ent to a aove.ent, we are assuaing that the relative of each indicator is 8igni-ficant as it Adda or subtracts from the final index figure to provide a coaparison of the relative intensity of hostility or friendship of various govern.ents towards China. Probleas created by unifora weighting ahould be less than those created by differential The weighting 18 as follawa: { ._----- '0 , , , 25 .. HOSTILITY INDEX 4.1 1 u c:: c:I .r::: c:: 0 0 4.1 cu.r::: \ .... .... 4.1 .r::: 1:10 1:10:. ..... 4.1 c:: c:: c:: u .r::: '0 .... 4.1 .... 0 .... - .4.1 ... 1 >. 4.1 c:I a uc:l .... 4.1 d 0 >- .... 0 o 0 4.1 o 0 0.4.1 e -j J -= 1:10 c:I .... >4.1..-4 > .... =' .. a J c:: 1 .... c:I ..... c:: 1 c:I 4.1" .. '&,- 0 ......... .'O .... ..-4..-4 .... 4.1 cu -Do ..... .... 4.1 .311 .... .......... .311 .... ..... " .... " .. ... 1 .. ....... fo4dl.9 0- Ip cC ... .Poof-4 -between 1(-1) 1(-1) 1 (-1) 1(-1) 1 (-1>- 5 & -5 (negative values represent Hostility) 1 3. Construction of the Revolutionary Index (independent variable) The indicatora.of thia third variable conaiat of the elements of an ideal people's var as outlined in the last section of this chapter, and an indicator of a aovement's stance on the Sino-Soviet rift. Altbough these vere dlscU8sed previously, the main points will he outlined in order to explain the construction of this index. (i) The six major tenets of an ideal people'. var are tbe first six indicators of this index. The flrst of tbese require.ents is that a revolutionary comawnist party be the princlple front of the organization of the movement. Secood, "In order to vin a people' s , .. var, it is imperative to bulld the broadest possible united front .. consisting of a worker-peasant (and if necessary, an urban petit , 1 bourgeois) alliance. though such an alliance la eaa.ntial, it i8 imperative to rely on the peasantry in order to establiab 26. rural ba.... Fourth, .e.aential to a people'l var is the ezuteoce of an Amy aubordiJulted to the ec-unbt PaTty, and as interested in political wart as venturel. Thil party-Ied ar., sbould l foUow the strategy of .,bUizlng the population and use the tactics of guerrilla warfare. These two attributel eoaprile the fiftb requirement of the Olinele .odel for, revolution. 'The final tenet of Lin Piao's 'people's war' is the adherence of revolution to a poliey of self-relianee. The more ciosely a .ave.ent conIonas to these six principlea, the higher the leore 1t rii receive on the Revolutionary Index. (ii) The three lDinor require.ents, as pointed out eariier, deaand that a moveaent: be anti-colonial, anti-feudal, and ," C) be oriented towards soeialislD and/or co..unisa; and be vigorously pursued with some significant 8IIIOunt of. popular svpport. Theae . three indicators will be considered along with the lirst six ta indicate the degree of between a revolutlonary movement 'and the Chineae .odel. (Ui) Finally, an annotation be .. d to the nerical value of the revolutionary index indieating whetber the in question "'-. supports China, supports the Soviet Union, or 18 in the internationaHzation of tbe Sino-Soviet rift that has dlvided the cOlIDUniat world. This indicator is iocluded to test the ;accuracy of 43 44 sOIae of the findiogs sugsested by Balperin aod Larkln. As this element il of a distinctly different nature fro. the firat oine, it w11l be added to the index in the fOIII of a letter: "ail if the 1Il e IIOve .. nt .upporU the Soviet Union: if the .",elleDt supP'!rts aDel "u" if the .oveIIent 11 or .plit ln lta , 27. 'aUegiance. Thi8 will enable ua to a ess the correlation of this e lellent vith the 8upport index as leparate froa the correlation between the tvo c:o.polite indices. The data for index are sathered prt.arlly fra. aec-ondary &:Ources. a8 priallry research for even the seleeted ndlber of .0ve_nU would present an insuperable obstacle for a proJect of thi8 size,. ln any case, the literature on revol,utionary aove.enta for the .ast part, 80fficient to provide the nece8sary infotlla-tion. The weights of the' first indicators of the revolu-tionary index are The index la 81.ply a aea8ure of the degree of conforalty of a given revolutlonary aoveaent to the Chinese prG"totype. REVournOtwty,:nmEX .... .... .... ... t' .... >- c: u c: .... 401 0 .... 0 C c: .... ....... '0 .... :J .... u &. u .... . ....... =' -_.401 . .-4 .... 1': =' .... u . 't- o C2 > .... .-4 C2 C.a ... o c: 401 0 .... .... >-.-,c .... M '0'" 3:i! 1 1 1 1 C or veen U o and 9 a.e or U , , . .. , 1 " , 28. (For example. if a movement fulfl11ed only the three 1Iin.iIII..- requlre.nts and backed" China in the Sino-Soviet rift, i.t would receive a rating al '3e' on this index.) 4. Analysis and Hypotheses , The analysis of the three pri.nciple variables will coyer , three time periods. provides the poss1bUity of testing for in Chinese poliey across time. Time can, therefore., be r considered 8S a control variable. The literature indicates that there have been four separate phases in Chinese foreign policy 45 since 1963. J Thdugh we shall analyze three of these four time it has not been' established that these 114ve rep-.reaented differing policies of for revolutionary movements. --The inclusion of Ume as a control variable wU'l test thts hypo-thesis. The first of these ended with the introduction of " the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and was marked by an . effort to establish a IDObUized group of third-world atates opposed to both the United States and the Soviet Union, a real "third force". With the breakirig up of the rather tenuous third force, primarUy due to the overthx:ow of the pro-hinese governments in such countr1ea as Ghana, Indonesia, Algeria, came the Cultural Revolution, which marks the aecond historical phase. As it rep- J 46 resented a "turning-in" or a preoccupation with internaI affaira at the expense of relations with the outside world, we are not considering this era in this theaia. The third phase began at the "turning-out" of Chineae attention at the end of the Cultural \ .' " () } 29. and appears to have lasted until the'latter half of 1970. , , At that time China began ta involve'herself more and'.ore in con-, ,ventional diplomacy with western states together with renewed . hostility vith the Soviet Union. Therefore, we have chosen the years.1965, 1969 and 1971 to represent the firat, third, .and four th \ < eras . Of course, the results of this study aaay suggest that vast disparities the periods do not exist and tbat the break-up , of Chine se foreign policy in ta these phases is unjustified. Separate analyses are conducted in this thesis for three geographical regions in order ta test for deviations 'in of support based on physical toChina. The three regions are Latin America, Alrica and the Middle East, and Asia. Renee, geographical proximity an additional inde,pendent variable. "-In sUllllUlry. there is one depencfent; variable, three inde pendent variables and a control variable. Of the independent variables. the hostility index and revolutionary index are , primary varIables vhich are composites of various indicators, while geographieal proximity is essentially a seeondary or eon-textual independent variable. Time servs as a control variable. f If neither. of the primary variables appear to be cor-related vith the support index despite a consistent geographical and/or temporal pattern, the conclusions drawn from the analysis viII be quite different fram those drawn fram a significant eor-relation between the prUDary variables. In the case where sueh a signifieant correlation does exist, region could still be signifie.nt, "11 .. 30. if patterns exist but appear lBited ta geographical region. Temporal variation vithin and acros regions is possible regardles8 of the correlation between primary results of this analysis vill be used ta test a set of hypotheses. The hypotheses to he tested are not .eant ta b lther mutually exclusive or necessarily complementary; their testing should, hovever, illuminate the patterns of " for movements and the explanation for those patterns. The are: 1. The greater the geographical proxaity of a state ta China, the more likely China vill be to take an interest in indigenous movement and offer it support. 2. When directIy confronting the United States or one of its so-calied "{mperialist tools" (e.g., U.N. forces, Israel) a IIIOvement is likely ta receive a high level of support, gre.ter than the nature of the movement alone would dictate, regardle,s of the geographical proxiaity.' (Chineae 3. A IIIOveaent. in Any geographical region, aiaed at the over-throw of a government hostile to Peking is more likely.to receive support than one aiaed at the displace.ent of a friendly regl.e (Van Ness) 4. When a regime is uncomited ln its dealings vith ChIna, vill hesitate to support an indigenous revolutionary -ave.ent, in hppes of broadenlng her international politlal bases, regard-less of (Van Larkln) > . . p 1 ' . " 1 .. ',,-l1. S. ln Mdca. a at the overthrow of a colonial or apartheid regiae will receive greater-support than one merely aimed at a pro-wes tern regilDe. (!.arklra) 6. When a revolutionary .ovement supports the Soviet Union in the international Sino-Soviet dispute. China vUI support either an altemate organlzation within that state, or, if one'does not '1 exiat, no moveaent at aIl, regard les. of the geographicsl of that state to China or the tenor of relations between the governing reg1me and China. (Johnson, Halperin) 7. Tbe greater degree of conforalty of a given revolutidnary move.eot to the Chinese prototype for people'. war, the greater the support the IDOvement will he aeeorded, r,gardlelB of geo-, graphieal proxilllity or govenuMntal bo'stiUty. \ (Ollnese ideology) , l '_---.. . e 1 FOOTNOTES 1. T. R. Gurr. "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A eo.parative Analysis Udng New Indicators." "rican Political Science Review. Volume 62. Decellber-, 1968. p. 1107. 32. 2. R. A. Falk. "Introduction" in Falk (ed.) The International Law of Civil Strife. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1972. 3. John W. Eley. "Events Data and Foreign Pollcy Theory: An of American Foreign Poliey toward InternaI Wars, 1945-1970." Paper presented to the International Studies AS80aiation annual meeting, New York. March, 1973. p. 3. 4. J. N. Rosenau. The Adaptation of National Societies: A Theory of Political System Behaviour and Transfonaation. New York: McCaleb-Seiler. 1971. 5. P. J. McGowan. "A FormaI Theory of poliey as Adaptive Behavior." Paper presented at Alllerican Political Science Association annual meeting. Los Angeles. Septeaber, 1971. 6. C. A. McClelland. "Some Effects on Tbeory fra. the International Event Analysis Movement." Sage Professional Papers in Inter-national Studies. Volume 1. 1972. 7. K. J. Rolsti. International Politics: A Fr..ework for Analysis. Second Edition. Englewood Cliff\: Prentice-Ball, Inc. 1972. 8. C. Hermann. "Policy Classification: Key to the CoIaparative Study of Foreign poUcy." in J. N. Rosenau, V. Davis, and M. East (eds.) The ABalyais of Ipternational Relations. New York: Free Press. 1972. 9. R. J. RUDIIDel. ''The Relationship between National Attributes and Foreign Confllct Behavior." in J. D. Singer. Quantitative International Polities: Insigbt and Evldence. New York: MacMillan. 1969 10. This Is somewhat similar to the definition offered by J. N. Rosenau in "Syetematic Analysie, Sclentific Conseiouaness aod Moral Fervor in Foreign PoUcy Ilesearch." in A. Ranney. PollUcsl Science and Publie Poliey. Olleago; Harkbaa. 1968. , Il. C. R, Mitchell. "External Involve_nt in Civil Strife," Inter-national Studles Quarterly. VOlUM 14. June. 1970. pp. 170-176. v .. J' " .( -. -, \ 12. Ibid. pp. 169-170. 13. Eley. 1 " } 33. " 14. Morton Ar Kaplan. "Intervention in SOII8 (' Sys te.ie Sources _," ifi.J. M. R.osenau (ed.) IntC!rnaUonal DiJDenslons of Civil Strife. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp. 92-121. 15. Young. "Intervention and International 'Syste_. Il Journal 0 of International Affalrs. Volume 22. 1968. pp. 177-187. ) " 16. Ernst Halperin. China quarterly. "China and the Latin AlMdcan v Vo!ume 29". January-Karh,'1961. ' -17. Cecil Johnson. eo.aunist China and LatiJ1>,,"America 1,959-1967. New York: ' Columbia University Press. 1970 " w _1 18. Bruce Larkin. China and Airiea 1919-1970. Berkeley: University of CaUfornia Press. 1971. 19. See, for ex_pIe, T. W. Robinson. ''Peking's R.evolutionary Strategy in the Developing World. Il AImaIs of the Aaerican Aeade of Politic and SoCial Science. Volu.e 386. Boveaber, 1969; and R. A. 'Scala no (ed.) The ec-unist Revolution in Asia. Second Edition." Englewood Cliffs: Inc. 1 %9 ' ./, .: - :: .... -- )-!L,., '" --_ 20. Peter Van Ness. Revolution Md Foreign poliey. Berkeley: University of ealifornia PFass. 1970 21. Mitchell.' gR. ill,- pp. 169-170. 22,. 'See Lyaan P. Van Slyke. Epaies Md fr.Jend.; The Upited 23. 24. 25. 27. Front in Cbioese C(punist Hiat2'fY- St.llford: Stantord "" University Press'. 1967; C. A .Johnson. Peasant Mati'onalis. and ao-uni't Power: The !llers.nce of Revolutiouary Oaina 1937-1945 . -Stanford: Stanford,University Press. 1962; and ,Warner (ed.) Th Chi_se Model. Hong Kong: Bong Kong Udiversity Press. . 1965. Pekig Review. No. 36, 3 Septeaber, 1965. pp,-9-30. " For examp le, . Pekins Review. No. 24. 6 1969. p. 22. c-J Peking Review. "No. 36. 3 Septellbef, 1965. J'. 10. n!!!.. p. 12. Ibid. p. 14. ' 1 -, ,.. "" \ , ,0-, 1 -" 1 . 28. Van S1yke. 22. ill .. pp. 75-209 for an ana1yaia of thla iaportance. '29. Peking Review. No. 36. 3 Se ptellber, 1965. p. 15. 30. Ibid. p. 17. 31. pp. 17,-18. 32. Mao Tse-Tung. Selected Warka. Peking: Poreign Lansuagel Press. 1961 Edition. Volume III. p. 296. (;J 33. Mao Tae-Tung. On Guerrilla Translattrd by Samuel Griffith. New York: Praeger. 1961. pp. 41ft. 34. Peking Review. No. 36. 3 September, 1965. p. 19. 35. Mao Tae-Tung. Selected worka. Pekin' Press. 1961 Edition. Volume II. p. 36. Pekins Review.. No. 36. 3 September, 3 J' lIlli! . p 28. 38. p. 26. Languages 34 39. P. H. Burgess and R. W. Lawaon. "Indicatora of International Behavior: An Asaessment of EVents Data Reaearch." Profeaiional Papers in International Studiea. 1972. pp. 56ft. . -40. See, for examp1e Eley. !' S,ll. p. 14. 41. Van Ness. .2J?. s..!!.. p. 88. 1 42. l!ili!. p. 86. U. Ernat Ra1perin. llt 44. Bruce Larkin. 22 ill 45. For an earl1e.r of the phases in Chinese fore1gn policy see, H. B. Yahuda. Poreign Poliey after 1963: "The Haoht Phases." China Quarterlx. 32. October-Deee.ber, 1967. 46. See Daniel TreUak. "18 China Preparing to 'Turn-Out 1", Aslan Syrvey. Vpluae XI. No. 3. Harch, 1971. J

. :x ... 35. CBAPTER Il CHINES! SUPPORT FOR REVOWTIOHAR.Y !lWEMENTS This chapter will describe the support China offered revolutionary movements during the three Ume periods that we are considering in this project. There will be until later '. chapters ta explain this support--we are simply interested here in 1 compuUng the dependent variable. We shall examine each geographical area separately, assessing the support index for aIl the movements in each area (not just for the case atudies analyzed in subsequent We shall Urst ,look at support offered Latin American , \lovements. then at 'support offere? African and Middle Eastern mave-lIents, and finally at support oftred Asian lIovements. Latin America Chinese support for revolutionary movements in Latin America has been generally low-keyed. 'buring 1965, the tempo of public support for movements increased in reaction ta the very severe hostiUty expressed by Latin America as a whole ta the inter-vention in the Dominican RepubUc by the United States. The American intervention sparked a massive anti-U.S. call1paign in the Chlnese press and a high level of support for the forces ailled at 1:lt the overthrow of the pro-U.S. Dominlcan reg1me. In the middle of 1965 the Chinese published a map of Latin America outllning the a reaa of "anti-U.S. and anti-dictatorship armed' atrugglea and guerrilla activities." Included in the p were twelve countriea: - \. " 36 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Doinican Republic. Guate.ala, 1 Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua; Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela. The Doainican struggle received a very high level of public support, including a statemeftt by Mao himself supporting the DoIIinicans in their struggle "against U.S. imperial1sm". Yet this statement seemed not to focus on the actual events in the Republic as it analyzed the entire situation as an. example of and a demon-stration to the people of Latin America that the American claim to adherence to the principles of non-intervention vas completely bankrupt. The .\merican claim that the troops were there to defend freedom met vith disdain from Mao: What king of tfreedom is this? It 'is the freedom to use airplanes, warships and guns to slaughter the people of other countries. It is the freedom to violate the sovereignty of other countriea at will. the freedom to invade and oeeupy their territory at will. It is the freedom of pirates to loot 'and kn 1. It is the freedom to trample underfoot aIl the countries and peoples of the world.- This is what the U.S. iI.perialista are doing in the Doainican Republic. in Vietnam, in the Congo (LopoldvUle) and in IIUIny other places. 2 Even though subsequent manifestations of Chinese sywapathy for the Doainican insurgents would lend us to believe that the Chinese leaders had "a high priori ty assigned to developments in l the tiny Caribbean republie, Il it aeeu as though this aupport ia 4 high for two reasons. Fira t and mas t iaportantly. it was seen as a .ove_nt that would. given growing Latin A.eriean warinea. of the A.erican behe.oth. apread throughout Central and South '-riea. 37. Second, it vas related to the entire anti-U.S. prop8ganda vhich vas at a relatively high point at this hence the com-pariaon to the Vietaa.ese situation and the civil atrife in the Congo (Zaire) vhich had precipitated the arrivai of U.N. troops in an easentially da.estic confllct. An article in June, 1965, ap-pearing in a Chinese Journal explained the regional signlficance of the Doainican criais: The signifieance of the Doainican people's struggle far exceeda the border of DoIainiea. It has become a signal for a nev tide of national de.aeratlc revolution in Latin Allerica. The people of Latin Alleriean countriea have all been under American u-perialist oppression and exploitation. Any people a struggle in one Latin American country will light the fire of anti-Aaerican struggle in a11 of Latin Alleri,ca. 5 , Tbough this ia IlOt central ,to the ascertaining of relative levels of support, it is included here the Chinese view of the Doainican situation. The Bolivlan co..unist Party the Communist Party of Venezuela'are cited by Van Hess as being given explicit support 6 . during 1965. With this group our model aIso requires that we in-, elude Brazil, Colu.bia, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru. In aU of these cases tbe specifie revolutionary organi-7 zaUon was discussed; not .erely the "people's struggle" as i8 1 usually t"e case in lowest level public support:. Therefore, aIl these seven eountriea, plus Bolivla, Venezuela, and the Doainiean Re pub 1 ic were the loc i of IIOve.ents given second leve 1 support by' Peking. \ IJ" , J 38. At the tbird level, tbough the CCP .. de DO signifieant support statements for parties or organizationa during 1965, the coaauniat parties of Peru, BrazU, and ColUilbia had major statement:a , 8 reprinted in the Pekins Reviev. The delegation fra. the eo-mist Party of Venezuela was the only visit ae.bers of Latin revolutionary move-ments to peking in except for an unpublicized visit from 9 Elias Seman of the Argentine eo..unist Vanguard. There appears to be no evidence of aid granted any Latin American , movements at thls time (or in 1969 for that matter), but on the other band none of the $942 million of aid China granted to non-communist countries 1956 and 1965 (inclusive) vas given to 10 Latin American states. Finally, in 1965, no Latin American country that ve are considering had active dipla.atic relations vith China. Therefore, as ve can see frOli Table II-l, :which 4-J summarlzes the evidence cited Chinese support for revolu-tionary move_nts in Latin Allerica vas; for the IIk)st part, love In 1969 levels of support we,lre generally lover, although in some cases lupport was offered vhere in 1965 there had ben none. AI in 1965. the event8 in Latin provided Peking with a volatile issue. Tbough of auch less signifieance than American in-tervention in the Doainican Republic, Rockefeller's tour of several .J4 ' "countries in Central and South Allerica and his rather le .. than " \, vara wlcoae vas interpreted by the Chine.e pre as a .. jor slap Il in the face for Aaerican t.periali Th struggles of the 1 -: N ... w 0-{ 0 tG N N ... Vt e tG N .... "-W

.' , tG 0 lE N .... W if If N N N .... ... Vt W f ... ... Cl c: N ... W N 0 PI n 0 f N N N .... .... .... Vt n :r 0 Dt N N .... Vt g' N t ... W l ., > ., , " .... c: = Do = " ., '< Statements by Mao or other senior officiaIs Statements by junior officials or .. jor press analyses CCP Itatementl and reprints of front organizatian statements GeZleral pre .. .... referenees of support economic or a111tary support 1 Institut10nal support w TOTAL - Support lnclex \ \ CI) C t'Ct = 0 E ;; .... ! i < .... i ; .... ..c e; - w \Q "'- ... ta , " 40. peoplea of latin A.erica vere prai.ed during the Rockefeller visit: Fra. their experience through long years of struglle in wbicb tbey fougbt, failed and foulbt agaJn the Latin Mierican "ople bave coae to underst.nd that liber.tion and freedo. of the people cannot be Iranted by otben but bave to be won tbrougb a tenacious strulgle. The fact that the people of ColOllbia, Ecuador,' BoUvia and Venezuela drave the "god of plague" Rockefeller out of their countries once again r abows th.t the aurging struBlle of the Latin American people against the Aggreaaors ia irresist.ble. 12 .. Similar geoeral references during June, coupled vith analyses of both the world revolutionary mov __ nt and the LaUn A8erican .ove.ent 10 particular at the the year, coaprlse the .. jor bulk of the low-level support for 1969. Two ele.ents of the struBlles vere stressed; the tactical the .ave.enta and their ubiquity. The major policy stressed vas that of the united front: ln Latin America, the atudent .oveaent and the worker and peasant struggles vere joining forces in Mexico. Brazil, C6ile. Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru, etc., to beco.e a nev powerful storm a/laaiUng Yankee iaperiaUsa and dictator-ial rule. 13 The outbreak of "powerfu1 .. 88 struggle" vhere genetal atrikes and selzure of land vere the mode vere by tbe Chineae in dia-cuaaing the movements of the countrie. mentioned abave aa weIl as 14 Ecuador and El Salvador. 1969 there vere no .. jor press atate_nU by senior officials or leaders in Peking on Latin .Allerican affaira. hlgher than the 1965 level was the frequeney of reprlntina of .. jor article! of the specifie org.niz.tions by the Chineae Preaa. , . , .. [: ) _. .. 41 The Co C 'ui,t of Irazll, the Olilean RevolutioDary o-lDbt Party, the Argentine Cc_ nist Party and tbe 'Marxist-teninlst ec-unist Party of Ecuador ail vere o lS granted the space to reprint .anifestos or state.ents. very noticeable difference press caverage of and 1969 Is the greatly increased frequency of reprinted letters fra. revolutionary front organizationa fra. aIl aver the world to the govern.ent and people of China. USWllly the se are sent on the majdr occasions of the Chinese year: the anniversary '\ of the People's Republic (China Rational Day), the opening of the CCP Congress, etc. Tbough the se letter.s do not ln the.elves taply that Peking supports the IIOve.ent, vben they appear regularly, they can be regarded as endorse.ent. Tbeir reprinting by tbe Chinese does help to legitlmize the organizations and thus is an expression by the Chinese of support. Tbis support, given the high level of frequency of letters, as in Chapter l, should probably be weighted as support equ'ivalent to expl1cit pra.otion of a .ave-.eat by the CCP. The coamunist parties of Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Argentina and Ecuador aIl cooducted this type of correspondence vith China and 16 bad their letters reprinted. As in 1965, tbere is DO concrete evidence that Peking proffered Any sort of tangible aid to either govern.ents orlllOve-.ents, and had still yet to relations with any one of the se potentially revolutionary Latin countries. $44 42. Conaequently there vere no referencea to Latin America other than ln the context of revolutionary movements. The only relations of any sort on a semi-formal level was the visit to China of a delegation led by the former president of the Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch. who was received warmly. This naturally was an endorsement of anti-Government forces in Dominica, although the visit received relatively little fanfare. The articles in the Chinese press stressed the visit, not the struggle and the normal anti-imperialist theme. In summary, Table 11-2 shows us that the Brazilian. Peruvian and Bolivian movements had support quotients for 1969 equaJ to those of 1965., The quotients for the rest of the \ te'llded to have a tdrly high devbtion in 1969 from their pre-Cultural Revolution levels. During 1971, the support the Latin American movements by China was considerably less than in either 1965 or 1969. 17 Perhaps part of China' s so-called "turning out" 'the support pa{- . tern fur 1971 shows a marked tendency towards the development of friendlier govemment to govamment relationa between most Latin American states and China. Perhaps the most significant element in Sino-Latin American relations was the normalizing of relations with Chile following Allende', victory. There was a of diplomat8, sporting delegations, government officiais, journaliats "friends" flowing between the two countriea alter diplomati"ela-18 tions vere establilhed in early January. Thui Chile aust'be " , < C ." ." ." Z f f ;: C'l fII2 fII2r .. a .. .. Il .... n i ., ., D n M D .... IQ c: .. 1 Il .... a. " " en .. .... M ., n c: .... 1 Il a. :2 i Il 0 ., 0 .... '< IQ .. < ., n ... 'oC .. ... .. = .. .. a. 0 ., Ils ID . , -. NI NI , 0/_-1.., NI . N . ?" --... ... ... ... ... . , , w ... ... \II 0 0 0 ... 0 0 0 ... VI 9 CIl CIl > ., 0 ., .... .. 00 , ... toi .... .. .. .... < :2 .... " .... Il .... Il :2 Il ,. '--NI NI NI NI : '-NI NI NI - ... .... . . ... VI VI W \,/'1 -'" ,1 " , by Mao or other lenior Statements by junior official. or .. jor prels analyses CCP ;tatements and reprints of front organhation statementl General pre .. of support Tangible economic or military support Institutional support 10TAL -Support Index \ \ -! ." ." S a 5 M i M ; 1 en M Z ... >&1. $ toi ,t f;; M M 1 N e.; "' 1 \ \ .1 .. ;,-j b " 44. deleted from the 1971 analysla as the aoti-gqverament party that had , been the recipient of support vas now part of the govern-ment coalition. One .ight expect fra. the co.aunist-socialist vict()ry in ChUe that hina would be prone to assl.lllle that events were beginning to faU into the leftw'ard awing of a historical . dialectic in aIl of Latin Aaerica and aller increasins support to communist parties and revolutionary .avement8. Such vas not the case. The main theme of Chinese press attention ta Latin America. throughout the entire year was the eonflict many coastal countries and the United States over the question of sovereign waters. Most countries with either industries or off-shore mineraI interests began a very heated e .. paign in 1971 to extend their lure territorial limit for 200 nautkal miles. A8 the United States very strongly oppoaed sueh a move, the Latin ADlerican eountriea vere plaeed in a situation where '1 the poUties of the united front could justUy Chinese support ,for reactionary govertaenta. Though theae governa.entl were Dot revolu-tionary they oppoaing American imperialis. aod tbus received the bles8ing of Peking, altbpugb not at a very high level. Most Chinese 8tatementa concerning the aovereignty que8tion were general news analyses which, according to the taxonomy of 8upport ean be c l,a.sified as ,the lowest level of public support for tbe goverDlents in power. and th us negative support for revolutionary \ extant in tboae countrie.. Tbe cOUlltriea who ",ere involved in tbi. , / f ---- 45. challenge to U.S. heg8llOny in .Alle-riea and vere .praiaed by the 19 20 21 22 Chinese preA were: Mexico. Braxil. Cbile. 26 Argentina, 27 23 24 25 Uruguay.' . Bolivia, 29 Peru, Bcuador, 30 BI Salvador, Venezuela, , Nicar:agU8 and the Panama. ln statements of support, the " Chinese stressed: Over the past-yeer, new progre .. has been .. de by the Latin Aaerlca and peoples in their struggle to defend natlonal independence and state sovereignty and oppqse iaperiallst power politics. A united front to the doctrine of hegemony is gradually taking p(ace. 31 32 Colombia was also included in this united front although she vas not active in the coastal waters issue. 28 While articles ln pres. were noticeably favourable ln ... t11eir treatment of Latin governments geoerally, there vere ... exceptions. Paraguay, Haiti and Guate.ala vere not once discuesed, vhich is somevhat surprising considering the existence of revolu-donary move.ents in aIl of them. The Doiainican Republic vas the J focus of considerable attention, and support was offered to the . 33 anti-goveraent moveaent that appeared increasingly strong. Both major news analyse. and geoeral references tbat China would still support a revolutionary .avesent ln a country that vas a. entrenched in the A.erican empire as was'Doalnlca .... Apart frOli that offered the Do.inican Republic. the only . support given Any .we.ent vas in the fora of the of congratulatory lettera fra. ca..uDiat parties on the Ccp'a 50th 34 annlver.ary. The Harxllt-Leninht Party of Bcuadot'. 3S 36 the to..unilt Party of Brazll, the ea.Lllllat Party of Peru, e_ 1 1 . '-e . ,. 46. 37 and the CoaIunist Party of Honduras (M-L) vere aIl Iranted this M 1 form of support. In tbe Urst three c.ses th'ts confUc,ta dlrectly, vith the support Peking gave to the govern.ents of tbese states ln ,1 their anti-imperialist over the coastal vaters ia.ue. It 38 ls especUlly 8urprislDI in tbe case of Peru, 'vho Along vith 39 40 Mexico, and CoIOllbia, was developing relations vith China. With Peru, China seemed weIl on the road to eatablisb.ent of , , formaI relations folloving trade alreements and fisberies vhile vith Mexico the talks vere lDOre preU.inary, beiDg concerned only vith trade. Only sporting del,egations vere ,vith /." Colombia, yet th!s is nbnetheless slgnificant the un-likelihood of even thi. sort of friendline.s yeara'earlier. " Table 11-) summarizes the-data for the support China JO;' offered lDOvements in Latin America in 1971, and the vast differences fram 1969 figures. Alain, there 1. no evldence any tangible military or econa.ic aid to Any Latin Allerican .ove.ent and there certa1nlrva., none for govera.ents. Africa and the Middle East Chinese support for revolution ln Africa a. the Middle ........ East is conaiderably .ore confusinl, .ore hldden, and lenerall; .ore d t diacern tban support in Latin Allerican ca.e.. Thia . ' ea.Uy understood wen one reeognize. 'tbet vbUe .,.t of Latin AlMrica ha. alvay. been co".ldered a .ubaldiary of the Il000-1 lithlc United States, Alrica v4. not clearly vithln ODe .pbere of influence. As the Alrican ,peoples .aved fra. colon1aU. to ". -.. ., ... ,0 .. a , ---Ar.""t t" .. .. a,.a tv',-".'tut' .. '\ f" ... ",,,,',,'.-.- .. n tt ... , ,.... tee,u,,'" ,. 'K 1 lia' v.d"" , O\U" ... t. ... tH '-Nond"' .... 4 : ",dco "-Ntoar \N Pan ... ".ru Urul")' .-V ..... vel. --. ..... " i - , ... .. (\ .. iS ..,0 .ft " 1.: t. n " , () , -JAlY ,iJ , . 'm'MT IUCVOwrU*MY MUYICMIM't1 IN ,tU t o ,tA",," Aa@MtCA .... --- ..........1 t t Il - .. -... . ! 1 n ! .. .. '* il 5' 1-1 ., Ji ... .... ! .... 'a -< .. .............. "QO " .. 2 2 .2 . ) , , -1 -1 -1 -1 .... 1 . -1 -1 -1 1 -1 , -1 -1 --1 0 .->-' ) ., , , - \ -4 1 -) , " .. . , .. -1 -1 1-1 _4''1 l . t -1 0 0 2 -, -l ., 0 -2 -1 -1 " . . 41. ";'l'l " '-' \ , 1 48. ... . independence ... ny methods and fot1ll of change vere used a. a tool to help throw off the yoke of subordination. of direct or indirect rule. ln many csas the inltruaaents of power vere pa ed from the European , overseers to the indigenous leaders peacefuHy without reeny up setting anything mu ch beyond the nominal power centres. ln other " ca.es violence forced the tran.fer of Power, resulUng ofttimes in revolutionary states and somet1JDes in miUtary dictato.rships. Still . " others have yet to win their independence. With few exceptions, the " new ,a tatea ha;"e been naarked by un.table regimea, often trying sperately to consolidate a atate trom seemingly eclectic elements. The future has been far from certain'. China thus has been pre.ented 'liiuch more complex set of issues ,than in Latin America. Certain ) countries could very \1111 be extremely ausceptible to revolution and certain groups and organizationa could very well leaders such a new aerles of future govemments. Thua, China has had difficulty in choosing whlch groups to support and hOv, taking into , . . account many difficultis &herent in the African poli.tical order. ... ....