China macroeconomics

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    Figure 1: Growth in China is noticeably

    higher than in the G7

    Source: Datastream

    Figure 2: Investment component drives the

    extremely powerful growth rate

    Source : Datastream

    ContactDr. Alessandro Bee

    Economist

    +41 58 317 9283

    [email protected]

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    China GDP growth y oyG7 GDP growth y oyKorea GDP growth y oy

    Japan GDP growth y oy

    2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012-4

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    China consumption contribution of GDP growthChina investm ents contribution of GDP growthChina net exports contribution of GDP growth

    1 | Macro Focus Economic & Strategy Research

    Challenges facing the MiddleKingdom Chinas economic model proved successful in the past, but it is now reaching its limits China announces the right reforms, but implementation poses the biggest risk The untapped potential of urbanisation and capital stock will help to advance this pro-

    cess

    The need for reform in China

    The Chinese economy has been chiefly as-

    sociated with unbridled growth in recent

    years. But nowadays, the Middle Kingdom is

    mostly associated with the reform concept.

    Given the marked cooling in Chinas eco-

    nomic momentum recently (see Figure 1),

    the need to reform its economy has become

    progressively more important. Chinas eco-

    nomic policies over the last 30 years have

    scored big successes in this respect. The

    economy has expanded by about 10% p.a.

    since 1980. Growth in China has far out-

    stripped economic growth in the G7 coun-

    tries.

    Investments drive growth

    Chinas breakneck economic growth was

    mainly fuelled by a massive increase in in-

    vestment activity (shown in Figure 2).

    Whereas investments in the USA currently

    contribute less than 20% to growth, in China

    the figure is close to 50%. There are good

    reasons for this: 1) China has an extremely

    high savings rate. On the one hand, this is

    explained by its rapidly aging population, to-

    gether with the lack of a social safety net.

    On the other hand, Chinas underdeveloped

    capital markets offer savers few alterna-

    tives. The high savings rate also means that

    the investment ratio is above 40%. 2) Regu-

    lations are used to keep interest rates arti-

    ficially low. Figure 3 shows that in recent

    years, real interest rates were on average

    negative. By keeping capital costs artificially

    low, both the banking system and invest-

    ments profited from this regime of financial

    repression. 3) Despite Chinas one-child pol-

    icy, its working age population has in-

    creased from 59% to 73% of the total popu-

    lation over the last 30 years. 4) But Chinas

    progressive urbanisation is far more im-

    portant. Whereas in 1980, more than 80%

    of the population were employed in the (not

    very productive) agricultural sector, this per-

    centage has since declined to 50%.

    5) Cheap and abundant resources meantthat China was able to expand its manufac-

    turing industry and boost its exports. China

    benefited from the fact that the last 20

    years were characterised by the rapid global-

    isation of product markets and that a boom

    in US consumption until Lehman Brothers

    collapsed created strong demand for Chi-

    nas products.

    Unsustainable growth model

    Chinas growth model has proved very suc-

    cessful to date, but it has also created ex-

    ternal and internal imbalances, which pose

    a threat to its economic stability in the long

    term. 1) In terms of foreign trade, the future

    Macro FocusEconomic & Strategy Research21 November 2013

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    Figure 3: Financial repression in China

    negative real interest rates

    Source: Datastream

    Figure 4: Investments as % of GDP in Chi-

    na, Korea and Japan

    Source: Datastream

    Figure 5: Urbanisation in China, Korea and

    Japan

    Source: Datastream

    2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013-5

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    China deposit rate 1 year nominalChina deposit rate 1 year real

    1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

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    China investment/GDP ratioKorea investment/GDP ratioJapan investment/GDP ratio

    1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 200510

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    China urban population in % of totalKorea urban population in % of tot alJapan urban population in % of t otal

    2 | Macro Focus Economic & Strategy Research

    potential of Chinas export markets in the

    West has greatly diminished because the

    industrialised world continues to suffer the

    consequences of the Great Recession.

    2) Regarding the domestic economy, China

    faces a decline in its working age population

    in the coming years, which could potentially

    accelerate wage growth. 3) In terms of in-

    vestments, there are increasing signs that

    the artificial stimulation of investments hasresulted in a misallocation of resources. The

    corporate debt bubble and real estate bub-

    ble are evidence of this. There is a risk that

    investments in future will no longer be able

    to boost production to the desired extent.

    Chinas reform plans

    Chinas leadership recently announced wide-

    ranging reforms at the third plenary session

    of the 18thCentral Committee of the Com-

    munist Party of China. They are designed to

    reduce the economys external and internal

    imbalances (rebalancing). The central focus

    of this rebalancing process is to strengthen

    consumption. Setting up a social safety net

    is an important aspect of this endeavour.

    Strengthening consumption goes hand in

    hand with changing the structure of the

    economy from the current model of an ex-

    port-based manufacturing industry to that of

    a domestic-oriented services sector. Since a

    large part of Chinas manufacturing industry

    is in the hands of quasi-government organi-sations, whereas the services sector is

    dominated by privately owned companies,

    this also entails the privatisation of the

    economy. Also of central importance is fi-

    nancial liberalisation, which should spell the

    end of financial repression in China. On the

    one hand, consumers will have access to

    new resources, while on the other hand, the

    introduction of market-based capital costs

    reduces the risk of bad investments. The re-

    form plans recently outlined by the Chineseauthorities address all these key issues;

    however, it is the implementation phase

    that usually determines whether reforms are

    successful. Nonetheless, it must be said

    that Chinas leadership has successfully

    executed its reform policies over the last 30

    years, which gives rise to the hope that this

    time will be no different.

    Two transition scenarios

    There are two potential scenarios for Chi-

    nas impending rebalancing. In the optimis-

    tic scenario, China manages to maintain the

    current economic model for several years

    and, as a result, generates high growth

    rates. Supported by strong growth rates, the

    Chinese government manages to gradually

    introduce the pending reforms and the coun-

    try makes a smooth transition to the new

    economic model. In the pessimistic scenar-

    io, the current economic model very quickly

    loses traction and momentum rapidly sub-

    sides. But as it will almost certainly take a

    decade for the reforms to kick in, China will

    face a very difficult rebalancing process andrun the risk of a hard landing, i.e. a very se-

    vere downturn resulting in a stagnation or

    even in a recession.

    Intact growth driver

    It is therefore of paramount importance

    whether the current economic model can de-

    liver high growth rates in the coming years

    as well. The deteriorating demographics and

    dwindling demand from the West are bound

    to slow growth. However, one should not

    overlook the fact that the level of Chinas

    economic development even after the

    powerful growth rates recorded in recent

    years is still relatively low. Chinas per

    capita capital stock is now at the same level

    with that of Japan in the early 1970s and

    Koreas capital stock in the 1980s. Yet both

    countries still managed to record very high

    rates of investment in the subsequent peri-

    od (Figure 4). The urbanisation picture looks

    similar. Chinas urban population is current-

    ly at a similar level with that of Korea in the1970s (shown in Figure 5). Koreas urbani-

    sation increased to 80% in 2000, which

    suggests China still has potential. The un-

    tapped potential of urbanisation and capital

    stock gives rise to the hope that Chinas

    old economic model is still in a position to

    generate high growth rates. This suggests

    China should manage to rebalance its

    economy without encountering serious fric-

    tions or a hard landing.

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