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The Three Gorges Project, the greatest dam project of the world and its

advocacies: Background and international voices in the context of the WCD

Nicole Kretschmer

The very controversially discussed Three Gorges Dam (TGD) project in China (first planning

started in 1919) entered its last phase, the 3 rd stage construction, in 2004.

Picture 1: Model of the TGP in the visiting

centre in Yichang; scale: 1:500

Picture 2: Right bank of the reservoir,

construction of the second power house

behind the coffer dam (3rd stage)

The end is scheduled for 2009, ninety years after the first official discussion took place. The

impressions collected at the building site and several kilometres upstream until Fengji City

were taken just before the first filling started in the end of April 2003. This article tries to

combine personnel impressions as well as background information in the context of the

recommendation of the World commission on dams (WCD).

The TGD project has been chosen as an example for different reasons. Mainly because it is

the largest dam construction of the world and reflects furthermore a country which is in a

transition process, but still remains one of the most active dam building countries today. The

review paper of China in the WCD Study (WCD, 2000) states that China has been involved in

the displacement of more people and the alteration of more rivers than any other society.

Nevertheless the amount of people which have to be resettled during the construction of theTGD is higher than ever before. This is one reason why this issue will be critical reviewed in this

article. Additionally during the visit of the region one is permanently confronted with this

topic; either through construction sites, demolishing sites, where people still live or via

comments from guides. The resettlement is the most discussed issue in the media, but

moreover the issues of water quality as well as cultural heritage will be mentioned here.

History of the project

Some critics of the project argue that the project is not much more than a prestige project of

Chinas government, at least of the leaders which suppressed since the early beginning

much of the controversial questions coming up. Looking at the history this can be in one or

the other way confirmed: Already in 1919 Sun Yatsen proposed to build a dam on the


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Yangtze River for power generation purposes. The idea was shelved due to unfavourable

political and economic conditions. The problem of mayor floods brought the idea up again

35 years later and the government adopted it in 1954 for flood control.

Vice minister of Electric power, Li Rui, after initially arguing for a multipurpose dam andproposing to build smaller dams first until China can afford such a costly project, he

suggested construction should proceed in stages to allow time to solve technical problems.

But later he concluded that the dam should not be build at all since it would be too costly.

Furthermore he argued that the dam would flood many cities and fertile farmland and would

not much contribute to shipping.

Nevertheless Lin Yishan, head of the Yangtze Valley Planning Office, favoured the

construction. He was further encouraged in 1958 by the political climate and the support

from the late chairman Mao Zedong, who wanted China to have the largest hydroelectricdam in the world. But depression resulted from a political campaign boasting. Chinas

economic development ended the preparation work in 1960. Three years later the plans

were discussed again in the context of the third front industry in southwest China. But the

cultural revolution (1966) and the fear that the dam would be sabotages by the Soviet Union

(1969) resulted again in a delay. In 1970 work was resumed in Gezhouba (a smaller dam

downstream) which ran in great technical problems.

The economic reform introduced in 1978 underlined the need for more electric power to

supply a growing industrial base with the result of approval of the construction in 1979. A

feasibility study was conducted in 1982/83 to appease the increasing number of critics, who

complained that the project did not adequately address technical, social, nor environmental

issues (China Online, 2000). The former Premier Li Peng (Hydraulic engineer) brought the

project on its way. It was said, that his successor Zhu Rongji never liked the project. Also

before 1989 there was a high resistance against the project (Great China, 2003).

Due to its huge experiences (at least from the engineering point of view), positive as well as

negative, one could think that China should be able to overcome the problems of the three

gorges project. But the different leaders, responsible planners and engineers changed with

the long period of time and so did the visions, the moral, the economics etc.

Location of the dam

The Yanktze flows from the Tibetan Plateau, cuts across central China to the east coast of

Shanghai. Its river basin is located in the humid zone of China.


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Map 1: Agro climatic zones of China

Below the reservoir location has been illustrated. The dam is located in the middle part of

Xiling gorge about 50 km upstream of Yichang and the reservoir will have a length of

approximately 600 km, when it is filled up until 175 m, giving it a storage capacity of 39.3Mrd

cubic metres of water. The surface area of the filled reservoir will be 6900 km. This is almost

half of Schleswig-Holstein. The cost are estimated with US$ 24Mrd. and US$ 42Mrd. for

infrastructure for generation of current and transport (Helvetas-Wasser-Fachsheets).

Map 2: River Basin of the Yangtze, the dam is located in Yichang

In comparison to the worldwide largest river basins (the Yangtze is the worlds third largest

river), the population density of the catchment of the Yangtze is the second highest, after the

Ganges in India, with 224 persons/km (Revengaet al. 1998, in WCD 2000).

Multipurpose dam as described by the advocacies

As already mentioned the dam is been promoted to be a multi purposes facility with the

following beneficial aspects: The main goal is the flood control of the Yangtze River. This was

strengthened by the disastrous flood in 1998, which was the worst flood in nearly half a

century. According to the press releases this flood was battering for months Chinas


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heartland. Although millions of civilians and soldiers had been mobilized to fight against the

ever-swelling Yangtze River, the losses were huge. Officials at China's State Council said that

about 30 million people had to be displaced; 5.6 million homes have been washed away,

and almost 4.8 million ha of crops have been destroyed (Platt 1998). The second purpose of

the dam is the power generation with an annual output capacity of 84.7 TWh. Furthermorenavigation will be improved and result in an increase of annual one-way navigation capacity

from 10 million tons to 50 million tons to the harbours of Chongqing. The South to North water

transfer (from the humid to the arid regions of China) might get reality. Furthermore the

authorities promote the development of fishery in the reservoir, as well as tourism and

recreational activities (Three Gorges Project, CTGPC).

Chinese as well as international legal framework regarding infrastructure

development and resettlement, consequences for the TGD Project

Studying the laws and regulation of China which are designed to settle the regulation of theproject affected people (PAPs) of new infrastructure it is obvious that they are well

developed and theoretically cover all areas of conflict. Reviewed by Zou Youlan it is stated

that the various laws and regulations covering resettlement and compensation, which have

been introduced since 1982 are approaching international standards and comply with the

standards and requirements of the World Bank Group.

The three main regulations are:

1. The Constitution of the Peoples Republic of China, first adopted in 1982 and revised in

1999:land in urban areas belongs to the State and land in rural areas and in city

suburbs belongs to the collectives, as well as house plots

2. The Law on Land Administration, first adopted in 1986, revised in 1998, sets out

compensation criteria for land acquisition, and specifies legal procedures and

standards for resettlement plans;

3. Regulations for the Compensation for Land Acquisition and Resettlement for the

Construction of Water Conservancy and Hydroelectric Projects were adopted in 1991.

These regulations require a "resettlement with development" approach and call for

compensation in the early stages of resettlement and provision of rehabilitation assistance

after displacement. It also stipulates that all displaced persons shall be assisted to improve orat least restore their former living standard in steps. The important policy implications of these

laws and regulations are to restore the original living standards, compensate and provide

employment to PAPs, and extend assistance to them for five to ten years after resettlement

implementation is completed. Grievance redress mechanisms are set up by project

authorities to settle disputes. Project budgets now are required to include all compensation

and resettlement costs.

In general there is an improving trend in the planning and execution of reservoir resettlement,

though some implementation aspects remain controversial and are increasingly covered by

the Chinese media. Resettlement policies and compensation standards are being continuallyimproved and livelihood restoration is a component of all resettlement projects. Special

resettlement offices have been established at provincial, city and county levels. Resettlement


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funds are made available at the local level, and there is extensive consultation with village

chiefs and PAPs. Fortunately, China's rapid economic development also provides more

opportunities for PAPs to move out of the agriculture sector.

The laws and regulations in China relating to land acquisition and resettlement at each

administrative level (national, provincial and county) are accepted by the World Bank.

Furthermore the project authorities generally follow the local regulations during resettlement

implementation. This is true for various projects in China supported by the World Bank.

The objective of the Bank policy is to aim at improving the livelihoods and standards of living

or at least restoring them to pre-displacement levels. To achieve this, their clients have to

develop a resettlement instrument, either a resettlement action plan (RAP) or a resettlement

policy framework (RPF) and ensure the project affected people (PAP) are fully compensated

and restored from the negative impact of involuntary resettlement. However, the Bank

considers the project completion only when the resettlement measures set out in the relevant

resettlement instrument have been implemented. With the careful planning and close

monitoring of the implementation, resettlement in China is generally discussed as successful

(WCD paper). A good RAP or RPF as well as a continuous monitoring during the different

resettlement phases are the most important requirements of the bank to contribute to the

financing of infrastructure projects.

Moreover the World Bank requests participation throughout the whole resettlement and

compensation process. In China a special policy exists, where it is stated that the national

land law of China requests that once a plan for land compensation and resettlement

subsidies is decided on, the local peoples government concerned shall make it known to the

general public and solicit comments and suggestions from the collective economic

organizations and the peasants.

Beside the national policies, China has been signed international conventions, like the

international convent on civil and political rights (1998) and the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNIHCR) guiding principles on internal displacements, as well in

1997 the international convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),

ratification in 2001.

Despite their general commitment to the interests of PAPs, the provincial and county

governments continue to face problems when they implement resettlement plans. Commonproblems are the lack of good quality replacement land. Efforts to resettle people higher up

the slopes above the reservoirs, generally within the same village or county, have seldom

been successful due to poor land and low carrying capacity. There is still a tendency for

resettlement estimates to be kept as low as possible when a project is under consideration.

In China, the central and provincial design institutes have experience in resettlement

planning. However, their resettlement/social staff, numbering about 500, generally lacks

expertise in important areas like anthropology and sociology. Consequently, there is greater

emphasis on the physical aspects of resettlement, areas inundated, cost estimates etc. This

approach to resettlement planning has been largely influenced by Ministry of WaterResources (MWR) directives issued in 1984 and 1985 that stressed impacts on land, houses,


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structures and population. The MWR is aware of this problem and is taking steps to improve its

directives and policies.

This short general view of the existing legal framework as well as possible sources of

implementation problems might give an idea about the complexity of the problem. The TGD

project forces the relocation of about 1.2 Million. Although the legal framework in China has

been developed extensively, the World Bank withheld the financial support to the TGD

project.

Financing

As already mentioned the World Bank Group who has provided the largest multi-lateral

development assistance since 1984 has finally refrained from financing the Three Gorges

Dam. The main reason was the lack on information on environmental and social mitigation.

Until 2000 eight dams in China were assisted by the World Bank with US$ 3.3 billion total

support.

After the NGO International River Network (IRN) and a coalition of US environment,

development and human right groups encouraged the US administration to withhold

financial support for the US companies; eager to bid for the project; the position of the US

government was clearly against the controversial Three Gorges Dam.

In May 1996 the US Export-Import Bank supported this direction with the announcement, not

to guarantee loans to US companies seeking contracts for the dam. The financing support

from outside the country is therefore not that high as usual. According to Wang Jiazhu 50 % of

the capital is from the state. Domestic loans are from the State Development Bank and the

issue of domestic bonds. Furthermore the responsible planners are counting on the revenue

from downstream Gezhouba dam and even more from the first units to come online (2003-

2009), while the last units are being constructed. The satellite image shows the working units

on the left bank of the river.


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Image 1: Quick Bird Satellite image of the completed Hydro Power units of the TGD project,

August 2003

Already now, one year after the starting of the filling it is already published that the

calculationwas based on much higher demand than there is in reality in present. This results in much

lesser revenues than previously expected. For the resettlement 45 % of the total project cost

has been calculated.

Unofficial estimates of the investment figure are as high as US$ 75Mrd. or more. Supporters

reported however, that the plan is within its US$ 25Mrd. budget.

The critics of the project state that the dam will far exceed the official cost estimate, and the

investment will be unrecoverable as cheaper power sources become available and lureaway ratepayers (China Online 2000). Before looking at the resettlement problems of the

project in more detail, Chinas experiences in dam building will quickly reviewed.

Chinas experiences with dams

China has been built almost half of the world estimated 45.000 dams. It remains one of the

most active dams building countries today. One reason for that is the uneven distribution of

water resources over China and the need to transfer the water from the south to the north.

Furthermore China faces the challenge in providing water and energy services for over

1.2Mrd. citizens.

The WCD states that China has build more than three times the number of large dams than

the USA and over five times the number of India. After the definition of the international

commission of large dams (ICOLD) a dam is called a large dam when the height above the

foundation is 15 m or higher or in case the height is between 5 15 m and the volume of the

reservoir is bigger than 3 MCM.

Despite the problems of the TGP, Chinas dam infrastructure is aging, since a considerable

portion of large dams were built in the 1950`s and 1960`s. Furthermore the optimisation of

reservoir operation in the context of an integrated basin development plan is necessary to

discuss and implement (this is one goal of the WCD, see next paragraph).

Already in the past the most difficult challenge in implementation of large dams and other

large public infrastructure in China was resettlement. During the last 50 years, some 45 million

people have been resettled within China for all kind of infrastructure, of which dams are

estimated to account for about 12 million people. Before the land reforms of the early 1980s

reservoir resettlement often lead to economic hardship. In recent years the government has

enacted new policies, as described before that aim, at a minimum, to maintain incomes and

social well being for those who have to be moved.


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Regarding the resettlement issue in large dam projects the WCD report refer to the Chinas

reservoir resettlement act (ADB, 1999) as well as to the recent changes in Chinese policy as

an interesting model for other countries. The ADB refers to Chinese regulations, framed in 1984

and updated in 1991, governing urban development projects, providing measures for

consultation and grievance resolution for persons affected by the construction of large dams.

Comments on the China Review of the WCD from NGOs like International River Network (IRN)

were the absence of critical literature. Obvious corruption as well as comments of the

information reliability werent mentioned. The policies and laws, as well as the given promises

to the relocates are contrary to the reality (SOPHIA WOODMAN, 2000).

Looking at the harbour of Fengji city (Picture 3) this can be agreed upon. Since 20 years this

area hasnt undergo any development.

Picture 3: Harbour of Fengji city

Despite the relative positive review paper of China one of the strongest critics of the WCD

report and its objective has been the government of China. The outcome of the work of the

DDP over the last three years will be presented as a future outlook in the end of the paper.

Regarding the Three Gorges Dam the following part will mainly discuss the resettlement issue.

In the TGP the highest number of persons affected by dam structures has to be relocated.

Since this issue has many factors to be considered and many reasons of problem

occurrences, this paper wont be entitled to be complete. Two issues of the WCD report

regarding People and large Dams, social Performance can be witnessed at the TGP:

a. The delay between the decision to build a dam and the onset of construction and its

important social impact. This can result in communities living for decades starved of

development and welfare investment.

b. The impact of displacement of people and livelihoods are described widely.

Displacement culminates in physical exclusion from a geographic territory and economic

and social exclusion from a set of functioning social networks. Thus, affected people face

a broad range of impoverishment risks that include landlessness, joblessness,


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homelessness, marginalisation, food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of common

resources, and community disarticulation that result in a loss of socio-cultural resilience.

Furthermore WCD states that under-counting of the displaced are well known. Frequently the

number of both directly and indirectly affected people has been underestimated. In all the

WCD Case Studies, the initial assessments of the projects failed to account for all the affected

people (WCD 2000).

Problems concerning resettlement in the TGD - Project

The good practices of resettlement, reported mainly by the WCD and the World Bank reports,

are described of lacking a critical view. International institutions, such as the World Bank and

UNDP allow the PRC to censor their reports and furthermore IRN states, that the World Bank

has not applied their own guidelines in a number of areas of work with China (Woodman

2000).

Since the World Bank refrained from being part of the financing group in the TGD project,

there is none independent institution or organization for monitoring the implementation of the

resettlement plans in this mega project. Looking at the IRN publications and other NGO like

human right watch or critical Chinese authors (e.g. Dai Quing 1998) it gets obvious that the

government faces many problems concerning the resettlement process. Procedures followed

by China in resettling the displaced by the Three Gorges Project fall short of those set by the

World Bank and required by the UN Conventions that China has signed (IRN 2003).

It is obvious that the responsible institutions are not well enough prepared to implement the

policies. One difficulty is the long period of planning and implementation time. The recent

years are a period of changes in China, mainly the shift from the planned towards the market

economy. Working places previously operated by the state and not under market pressure

are getting less; old factories cant comply any more with the standards and have to be

closed. Especially in the reservoir area a lot of factories have been closed or will close during

the next years because of the environmental pollution, mainly the water pollution.

The 2nd main problem is the shift in policy during the construction time. Policy revision from

the original plan led to lesser available farmland for resettlement. This change was initiated by

Premier Zhu Rongji in 1998 after the devastating Yangtze floods, to curb soil erosion. He

required that farming land on slopes steeper than 25 % has to be reforested. The result wasthat 125.000 peasants more had to be relocated out of the reservoir area, since there was no

longer arable land for them. Plans from 1992 in comparison envisaged open up new virgin

land within the reservoir area, to be given to the peasants.

Another main trend is the urbanization in China. At present only 30 % is urban. The prediction

is 60 % by 2050. One indication of this fact is the decrease of agriculture to the overall GDP. In

the mid 1990 agricultural GDP fell to less than 20 % (Country Study, China 2000).

Furthermore the uneven execution of the resettlement process by the different local

authorities is adding to the grievance of the PAPs. Additionally the counties dont have

enough money to employ well educated personal, who are able to deal with the

resettlement problem. High differences can be witnessed in the height of compensation.

Promises that have been made to the people havent been performed. Most of the peasants


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cant afford new flats, since the compensation was much to low and promised werent

available.

Also corruption has to be mentioned. The list is long: from announcing wrong numbers of

PAPs by the provinces to the state, announcing more arable land than they can provide,

misuse of the transferred money by the local officials, including the so called pocket money.

A chapter by its owe could be written about this, here just one citation of IRN:

The resettlement development philosophy is also blamed for the corruption, or the

belief that there is widespread corruption. As two-thirds of the compensation

/resettlement funding is now given directly into the hands of the officials, they can

invest as they choose. Their books (even the fake ones) are never made available for

inspection, so the peasants have no idea whether the money has been well spent or

squandered by the officials.

Fact is, that the state failed to establish a system, as recommended by international lending

agencies, whereby such complains can be openly addressed and investigated. Moreover

China rejects to allow outside inspections of the resettlement process. To be fair it has to be

said that in some provinces, where corruption has been detected the officials got their

punishment, whereas in others nothing happens. The WCD states in its report that in early 2000

the Chinese government released information that corrupt officials had embezzled US$60

million (500 million yuan) from resettlement funds for the Three Gorges dam project. An official

was sentenced to death for embezzling almost US$1.5 million from the project.

The most published concern regarding the resettlement process is the lack of participation

permission of the PAPs by the state. Most of the villagers petitions are ignored and strikes or

similar organized complains against the authorities are being suppressed and responsible

PAPs are even put in jail. Instead of a peaceful resettlement process, the project has

become an instrument of repression with widespread embezzlement of funds as well as

special discrimination of rural relocates in comparison to urban people. Xinhua news agency

reported that ~ 12 % of the total resettlement budget were embezzled, misappropriated or

illegally used in 1998 alone.

Apart from that the construction of the new cities is another serious problem. Most of them

are built by a standard design, which is intended to build on flat land and is not suitable for

the geological conditions of the steep three gorges area. The next picture shows as a positive

example the new city of Wuhan.


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Picture 4: New city of Wuhan, before the filling started

The new town of Fengji in contrast was half way constructed when they discovered that the

sandy soil is too soft to safely support the buildings.

Fengji is quite famous because of its Baidi Temple above the old town, which wont be

submerged, when the reservoir will be filled up. What will change is the marvellous view to the

gorges.

The next picture shows the temple and its surrounding.

Picture 5: Baidi Temple above old Fengji town

To get in touch with the possible impacts of the relocation to the individuals one case will be

illustrated. The following fate of a villager of Fengji is the sad lot of a high number of rural

people:

Hong, a villager of old Fengji stated that everybody living there is certain that they have been

cheated, because the new housing costs two or three times the cost of the old one. He, his

family and 300 villagers were relocated in 2001 to a newly built migrants village in Fujian

Province. For them there was no work to be found because they couldnt speak the local

dialect. He himself decided to return to Fengji and reopened his roadside restaurant (our luck


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during our visit because we had a wonderful Chinese breakfast there: comment of the

author). He personally admitted that it hasnt been an easy choice.

Looking at this case (many others could be enumerated) shows that the people dont really

have a vision for the future (Becker 2002). There are a lot of returners who dont know how

their live will be after the flooding. Actually the government has to find a solution for all this

cases. For sure that wont be an easy task. Additionally relocated urban people face similar

problems. The government established so called Model Cities. Welcoming ceremonies for

the first relocaties organised for the Chinese media were followed by ignorance of local

people, difficulties in understanding, problems in jobs, higher costs than initially promised etc.

The List is long.

The pictures below give an impression of the old town of Fengji, where already relocated

people came back to live in the demolished area until the water is coming, because they

didnt manage to adapt in their new homes.

Picture 6 and 7: Left: Old town, or whats left with newly constructed measures against erosion

of slopes. Right: the upper street of the old town can be seen. Here are still some buildings

used. But latest in 2009 everything will be submerged

Having a look on the review paper of the WCD the resettlement task of the TGP is described

in a more or less emotional way. The only problem announced there is the problem that

people have to leave their homes where their ancestors had lived for decades. Furthermore it

is said that the farmland which is to be inundated is 24.000 ha of mostly low yielded farmland

and accounts for 2.9 % of the total farmland in 19 counties. Reading this numbers theresettlement doesnt occur as a major problem of the project. But looking behind the

numbers and percentages it can be seen that this task occurs as one of the biggest problems

the government has to deal with. The last projects of China where the Wold bank was

involved are described in one sentence as successful. The largest number of PAPs was

140.000 people (in Xiaolangdi). One has to be careful by comparing this to the resettlement

of 1.2 million.

Water Quality and geological issues

Perhaps a more devastating threat to river-dwellers is toxic waste. The land soon to besubmerged contains 178 waste dumps, 40.000 grave sites, and a total of 3 million tons of

refuse. Chinese environment officials warn that this waste threatens to turn the Three Gorges


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reservoir into a cesspit (Becker 2000). Becker states that according to a survey of 1993 (start of

the TGP) the industrial and mining enterprises released more than 1Mrd tons of wastewater

into the river annually; the river bed is a toxic sludge of mercury, cadmium, and arsenic. It is a

miracle that the issue of water quality has never been mentioned by the promoters of the

project, they even promote the fishing in the filled reservoir. Local journalists say they areaware of the illegal pollution, but have been told by their editors not to report the stories.

Government inspectors admitted some time ago that the water quality on one stretch of the

river near Chongqing was no longer fit for human consumption - though it would not reveal

why. The government has announced to build 200 new sewage and waste water treatment

plants by 2010. Nobody knows, if this will be sufficient.

Another problem which was addressed already by the government through the allocation of

US$ 361 million is the so called geological disaster. Experts suppose that the dam structures

and reservoir filling could cause subterranean structures to shift and the land above them tobe unliveable. But the extent of such possible changes cant be predicted in detail.

Cultural Heritage

Last, but not least the cultural heritage should be mentioned. A whole book can be written

about this. Here just some comments: Critical views say that the reservoir will flood many

historical sites and ruin the legendary scenery of the gorges and the local tourism industry.

Picture 8 and 9: Left: View to the famous Gorges of the Yangtze. Right: The three gorges at

the Daning river

The promoters respond that a lot of historical relics are being moved and the scenery will not

change that much. Latter nobody can really imagine. But being there and enjoying the

beauty it is hard to imagine that all of that will be soon gone. Furthermore the WCD states

that the combined problems of time constraints, under-budgeting, and a shortage of

qualified personnel are seriously hampering the salvation and preservation of the impressive

archaeological and cultural sites. The result will be that some relicts are being preserved the

rest will be inundated by the rising water.


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Positive development of the Chinese attitude to the WCD objectives and future

perspective of one of the most dam building countries

The development concerning the WCD objectives is going in a positive direction. Therefore

this article will end also with a positive future prospect. Since the release of the report almost

three years had passed, when the third WCD platform dialogue took place in 2003 in Berlin

and positive changes could be observed. The WCD dialogue took place by an initiative of

the BMZ (Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and development). The results were

most promising: The acceptance to the principles of the WCD is growing worldwide. This is

mostly due to the contribution of the DDP. Even the government of China send a signal of

willingness for co-operation (three years before they have been one of the strongest

opponents). The task of the DDP is to follow up with the WCD, to promote a dialogue on

improving decision-making, planning and management of dams and their alternatives based

on the WCD core values and strategic priorities. In 2002 DDP had successful consultations with

governments of the most important dam building countries. The result was that the ChineseMWR as well as the State Environmental Protection Administration of China are new members

of the DDP (after a meeting in September 2002, Beijing); furthermore India, Turkey and Brazil.

Membership includes the active collaboration. Moreover the Chinese State Power

Cooperation mentioned their interest to be a member. This year (2004) it is planned to

develop and sign concrete co-operation agreements.

After such a success of obtaining more and more willingness to participate one can hope for

the future, that the governments will try to find solution to be conform with the

recommendations of the WCD and national as well as international discussions and

exchange will go on. This hopefully will lead to less problems in new projects with an more

integrative participative process and improved management of existent structures.

Literature:

ADB, 1999: Asian development bank, 1999b, p.20-21, cited in the WCD Report

Becker, Jasper (2002):Peasants dig in as dam water rise, Chinese officials along 375 miles of

the Yngtze must relocate 550.000 residents by the years end:

http://www.irn.org/programs/threeg/index.asp?id=021204.digin.html; release

12.04.2002

China Online, 3.10.2000: Three Gorges Dam Project,

http://www.chinaonline.com/refer/ministry_profiles/threegorgesdam.asp

Country Study China (2000): Executive Summary, WCD:

http://www.dams.org/kbase/studies/cn/cn_exec.htm

Dai Qing (1998): ed. The river Dragon has come! The three gorges dam and the fate of

Chinas Yangtze River and its people, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY

Dams and Development Project (DDP), United Nations Environment Programme, Interim

Report


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Great China Newsletter (30.06.2003): Citation of the Sddeutsche Zeitung, 1.06.03:

http://www.huang-jaumann.de/download/deutsch/2003/newsletter0306.pdf;

19.02.04

Helvetas-Wasser-Fachsheets: Staudmme; www.helvetas.ch

IRN (2003); Human Rights Dammed of at Three Gorges, An investigation of resettlement and

human rights problems in the three gorges dam project, January 2003

IRN and human rights in China, Major Problems found in TGD Resettlement program, March

13, 1998

IRN: Three Gorges Campaign, www.irn.org

Plat, Kevin (1998): As Yangtze Rises, China Must Choose; Christian Science Monitor; 7.August

1998, Website of: The Christian Science Publishing Society

Sophia Woodman (2000):IRN's Three Gorges Campaign: Comments on World Commission on

Dams' China Country Review Paper, of the research director, Human rights in

China, May 25, 2000

Three Gorges Project, China Yangtze Three Gorges Project Development Corporation

(CTGPC)

Wang Jiazhu (2000). Progress at the Three Gorges Project. Hydropower and Dams, Issue4,

2000

WCD (2000): Dams and Development: A new Framework for Decision-Making, A Report for

the World Commission on Dams, November 2000, Earthscan Publications Ltd,

London and Sterling, VA

WCD (2000): WCD Country Review Paper: Experience with Dams in Water and Energy

Resource Development, in the Peoples Republic of China, Final Report

November 2000

WCD Platform Dialog, Berlin 2003: http://www.gtz.de/dokumente/dams/WCD-Plattform-

Gespraech_03.pdf

Xinhua, China Daily (2003-09-08): China ready for the third phase of Three Gorges Project

Zou Youlan, World Bank Resettlement Policies in China, Senior Social Development Specialist,

World Bank Office in Beijing

Images:

Quick Bird Satellite Image: http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-

8/08/content_253235.htm, 19.02.2004

Pictures: Made by the IAHR Student Chapter Stuttgart Group during the China Excursion in

March/April 2003

Documents

china yangtze