China’s 13th Party Congress: Explicating the theoretical bases of reform

CHINA'S 13TH PARTY CONGRESS: EXPLICATING THE THEORETICAL BASES OF REFORM

Joseph Fewsmith

The convocation of a series of leadership meetings--the Seventh Plenum of the 12th CPC Central Committee, the 13th Party Congress and the First Plenum of the new Central Committee--in late October and early November 1987 marked a remarkable victory for China's reform program following an extraordinary year of political conflict and maneuver-- arguably the most contentious year in Chinese politics since the downfall of the gang of four a decade ago.

The meetings went much further in both providing ideological justification for wide-ranging reform and electing a younger, more reform-minded leadership to implement these reforms than seemed possible only a short while before. Led by Deng Xiaoping, a number of veteran party leaders-- including Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, and Peng Zhen--retired from the Polit- buro. What seemed even more extraordinary given the campaign against the "bourgeois liberalization," was that both Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun, the party's best-known conservative theoreticians, were removed from the leadership. Although the retirement of such senior leaders may not remove them from the political arena altogether, it does mark the passing of political leadership to a younger generation and appears to pave the way for a new round of reform eflbrts.

Only a few months before the Party Congress, such a meeting seemed impossible.t A number of converging factors--the question of succession, the increasing difficulties in the economic reform program, controversy over the political structural reform, and perhaps personal animosity toward heir apparent Hu Yaobang----converged in the fall and winter of 1986 to bring about a sharp upswing in the influence of conservatives within the party. 2 Apparently angered over the very liberal intellectual atmosphere that had emerged in the spring of 1986 with the commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the hundred flowers movement and Deng's efforts to foster

Joseph Fewsmith is Chief of the China Branch at the Foreign Broadca~st lnlbrmation Service (Washington, D.C.L He is author of Party, State, and l~cal Elites in Republican China: Merchant Organizations and Politics in Shanghai, 1890-1930 and numerous articles on contemporary Chinese economics and polities.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government or any of its agencies.

42 JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES~SUMMER 1988

discussion of political structural reform, conservatives were able to get their concerns heard at the Sixth Plenum, an apparently stormy session over the role of ideology. Then they were able to take advantage of the student movement to force the ouster of Hu Yaobang and launch a campaign against bourgeois liberalization. Three prominent intellectuals--Liu Binyan, Wang Ruowang, and Fang Lizhi--were drummed out of the party in an extensive media campaign and others, including senior intellectual Yu Guangyuan, apparently came under attack. 3

Leadership tension was apparent throughout the year, including at the summer leadership meetings at the summer resort of Beidaihe and later; however, in retrospect, the most striking feature of Chinese politics in 1987 was the way Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang worked steadily and apparently in tandem to progressively limit the struggle against bourgeois liberalization, launch a campaign to criticize "leftism," lay out a theoretical framework for far-reaching reform, and secure a leadership line-up that will apparently support continued reform. The close relationship between Deng and Zhao that was to guide political developments throughout the year was adumbrated by a January Xinhua report that portrayed Deng and Zhao as "two senior Chinese leaders" working together to "dispel unnecessary worry" that fundamental reform policies would change in the wake of Hu Yaobang's ouster. 4

THE CONGRESS SESSION

The central party leadership meetings finally got underway on October 15 in Beijing with the convocation of a five-day preparatory work meeting of the Central Committee. That meeting was followed by the Seventh Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee on October 20, the 13th Party Congress from October 25 to November 1, and the first plenary session of the new Central Committee on November 2.

In accordance with the congress's theme of accelerating reform and opening up, there was a concerted effort to portray an open, democratic atmosphere. For the first time, foreign reporters were invited to attend the opening and closing sessions of the congress, and reporters were given unprecedented access to major party and state leaders. Drawing on the practice of recent sessions of the National People's Congress (NPC), Zhu Muzhi, spokesman for the 13th Party Congress, hosted a series of five press conferences, which were attended by such leaders as the CPC Secretariat's Rural Policy Research Office head Du Runsheng, Vice Minister of the State Commission on Reform of the Economic Structure Gao Shangquan, State Councillor Gu Mu, and Minister of the State Commission on Science and Technology Song Jian. Following the congress, Zhao Ziyang and other newly

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elected members of the Politburo Standing Committee attended a press reception.

A more democratic atmosphere was also apparent in procedures to elect both delegates to the congress and members of leading bodies. The 1,939 delegates to the congress were said to have been elected in a "democratic" fashion, proceeding through a process of preliminary discussions and nominations to deciding on short lists of candidates and the holding of formal elections. All delegates to the congress were reported to have been elected by secret ballot from multiple candidates. 5

More important, the number of candidates for election to central bodies was, for the first time, greater than the number of seats. The number of candidates standing for election to the Central Committee and the Central Discipline Inspection Committee (CDIC) exceeded the number of positions by 5 percent, and the number of candidates for alternate membership on the Central Committee exceeded the number of seats by 12 percent. The number of nominees to the Central Advisory Commission (CAC), however, was the same as the number of seats, apparently out of deference to the feelings of elder leaders.

Also reflecting the more open atmosphere, the content of the Central Committee report to the congress was broadcast the day the congress opened, and it was published in the pro-P.R.C. Hong Kong press the following day, allowing comparison with the final version approved by the congress and carried in Renmin Ribao on November 4. Comparison of these two versions reveal approximately 30 changes. While most do not appear very significant, some appear to address the concerns of more conservative party members. For instance, one of the subheadings in the economic development section of the original report called for maintaining a general (dati) balance between supply and demand. In the final version this was changed to call for a fundamental (jiben) balance between supply and demand--an apparently more restrictive formulation. Similarly, in the section on political reform, the original version says that Deng's 1980 speech was given "on behalf of the CPC Central Committee," but the final version deletes this phrase, replacing it with the factual statement that the speech was given "at an enlarged Politburo meeting in August 1980"--thus denying the speech retroactive status as an authoritative party document, which was apparently sought by reformers.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

The Central Committee report to the Congress, entitled "Advance Along the Road of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics," represents the first time that the party, in an authoritative forum, has tried to elaborate on the theoretical basis and content of Deng Xiaoping's repeated call to "build


socialism with Chinese characteristics"----a phrase that appears repeatedly throughout the text and is incorporated into the report's formal statement of the Party's basic line, something not done at the 1982 Party Congress. 6 Prior to this congress, reformers had avoided defining "building socialism with Chinese characteristics," apparently both to provide flexibility in practice as well as to avoid the political tension inherent in attempting to define in ideological terms the content of the Dengist reform program.

The congress's extensive discussion of the theoretical basis and content of the term, therefore, suggests a major turning point in Chinese politics. By putting down in an authoritative party document a theoretical elaboration both of the practice of the past nine years and of the framework to be followed in future reform, reformers appear to be decisively undercutting the ideological justification of those who continue to oppose reformn and laying out a program for succession to a post-Deng era.

Taken as a whole, the report is a strong statement of the basic Dengist position that economic reform is the most important task in China and that all other concerns, whether for ideological orthodoxy or for democratic reforms beyond those necessary for economic development, must be subordinate to that task. The report delivers its message in strong tones, with few conces- sions to conservative concerns. At some points, the report seems even combative in tone. For instance, at one point when the report defends the reform program as favorable to economic development, it warns, "Comrades throughout the party should better understand this point, acquire unity in their thoughts, and push ahead with reform more resolutely."

Consistent with this emphasis on economic reform, the report devotes very little attention to foreign policy. In a departure from the practice of previous congress reports--in which a tour d'horizon was standard--the report mentions foreign policy concerns in only two brief passages. The first comes at the beginning, where the report affirms China's position of maintaining an "independent foreign policy of opposing hegemony and safeguarding world peace." The second is a brief section at the end of the report, where it states that China welcomes the recent agreement in principle between the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate medium range nuclear missiles. It goes on to note, however, that "not a single 'hot spot' has been removed" and that it will be a "long, arduous process to achieve a genuine relaxation of international tensions."

The Initial Stage of Socialism

The core of the report is an elaboration of the concept of the initial stage of socialism (shehui zhuyi chujifieduan), a concept that was widely discussed in the Chinese press in the months prior to the congress. The concept of the initial stage of socialism was apparently first employed by the economist Sun

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Yefeng in 1958, who attributed the notion to Stalin. Using the term initial stage of socialism in a sense quite opposite to that employed by the congress document, Sun criticized Stalin for the view that two types of ownership (whole people and collective), commodity circulation, and the law of value continue to exist only because society remains in the initial stage of socialism. In contrast to this view, which emphasized the transitory nature of these economic relations, Sun argued that the law of value continues to have validity throughout the entire period of socialism and communism. 7

In the late 1970s, as China faced the question of how to evaluate the history of the P.R.C., theorists took up the question of the periodization of socialism. For instance, Su Shaozhi, until recently head of the Marxism- Leninism Mao Zedong Thought Institute of CASS, and economist Feng Lanrui argued in 1979 that following the socialist transformation of the means of production--this is, in the mid-1950s---China entered the stage of undeveloped socialism (bufada de shehui zhuyi). The period of undeveloped socialism, as they describe it, bears many similarities to the concept of the initial stage of socialism adopted by the congress. Capitalist "remnants," capitalist elements, "feudal remnants," commodity exchange and currency relations were all said to continue to exist. Moreover, Su and Feng make the point that in China, as in the Soviet Union, the revolution took place in a semi-feudal, semi-colonial country in which the economy remained underde- veloped, thereby necessitating a very long period of undeveloped socialism. 8

Similarly, senior economist Xue Muqiao argued in 1979 that "socialism is the low stage of communism; it is immature communism. Therefore, from the perspective of communism, socialism is imperfect. At present, we are still in the initial stage of socialism; from the perspective of socialism, it is still not mature. ''9

Despite such views stressing the immaturity of Chinese socialism, when the concept of the initial stage of socialism was first endorsed by an official party document--the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the P.R.C. adopted in 1981--the emphasis was quite different. The resolution carefully distinguished between the initial stage of socialism and the "period of transition" (quodu shiqi) in order to refute those who implicitly or otherwise were arguing that China remained in the "new democratic period. "1~ Thus, the resolution's declaration that "even though our socialist system is in the initial stage, there is no question that our party has established a socialist system" was intended to emphasize the Socialist nature of the Chinese system rather than to elaborate on the need to tolerate a variety of economic, political, and cultural phenomena not suited for a higher stage of socialism, l 1

In his report to the 12th Party Congress in 1982, then Party Chief Hu Yaobang reaffirmed that China was still in the initial stage of socialism, adding that in that stage "material civilization is not yet well developed. ''12


Then, in September 1986, the Sixth Plenum resolution significantly extended this thesis, hinting at some of the political, economic, and cultural implications of the concept. According to the resolution: "our country is still in the initial stage of socialism. Not only must we implement distribution according to labor and develop the commodity economy and competition, but also for a fairly long historical period develop diverse economic elements under the premise that public ownership is primary and encourage a part of the people to become wealthy under the goal of common prosperity. 'q3

Despite the endorsement by the Sixth Plenum resolution, discussion of the concept of the initial stage of socialism was confined to local media and limited to academic discussion for a number of months. For instance, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) advisor Yu Guangyuan---one of the primary advocates of the concept---discussed some of its implications at a symposium on the Sixth Plenum resolution hosted by the Guangzhou Municipal Propaganda Department, and the economics weekly Jingjixue Zhoubao reported in January that its parent organ, the Federation of Chinese Groups, had convened a symposium on the concept. 14

Widespread discussion of the concept, however, appeared only after Zhao Ziyang endorsed the concept in March. Speaking at a national meeting of directors of propaganda departments, Zhao pointed out that China was still in the initial stage of socialism. "This thesis," he said, "is very important and extremely significant." Adhering to it will prevent both leftist and rightist errors, is Shortly after Zhao's endorsement of the concept of the initial stage of socialism, the central newspaper for intellectuals, Guangming Ribao, started a special column for discussion of the thesis.

Opposition to the concept may have been one reason that P.R_C. media did not take up the theme extensively in the wake of the Sixth Plenum. Although P.R.C. media is not known to have reported views directly countering the notion that China is in the initial stage of socialism, comments by a number of proponents suggest that such opposition exists. For instance, one author noted that "some people have alleged that the initial stage of socialism is something similar to capitalism and developing the commodity economy in the initial stage of socialism discredits the reputation of socialism. ''16 Similarly, an article in the central agricultural paper Nongmin Ribao stated that "a small number of people have begun to doubt and waver in the rural reforIn" and that only by affirming that China is in the initial stage of socialism "'can we promote rural reform to develop healthily and in a thorough-going way. 'q7

Thus, the decision to elaborate on the theory and content of "building socialism with Chinese characteristics" in the congress report in terms of the initial stage of socialism apparently comes after many years of internal debate. In short, the concept of the initial stage of socialism provides theoretical justification for Chinese socialism to be less than pure. Therefore,

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many things that would not be permitted in a more mature Socialist society--such as nonsocialist forms of ownership and distribution--are permissible and should be encouraged. More important, the concept suggests that Chinese society should not attempt to move on to a purer state of socialism any time soon, as the initial stage is to last "at least 100 years" from the 1950s--a notably clearer expression of duration than the "fairly long historical period" called for by the Sixth Plenum resolution.

As defined by the report, the initial stage of socialism is distinguished from other Marxist concepts, particularly the period of transition----during which time capitalist enterprises are transformed into socialist enterprises. It is a stage unique to China, through which the country must pass because of its particularly low level of economic development at the time of the Socialist revolution. Thus, the report argues that Chinese socialism did not develop from a highly developed economy, as predicted by Marx, but rather "emerged from the womb of a semicolonial, semifeudal society."

The report states that because China possessed a weak economic founda- tion, the conditions it faces are neither like those "envisioned by the founders of Marxism," nor like those of any other socialist state. Therefore, "it will not do to mechanically copy what was in the books, nor will it do to copy mechanically from foreign countr ies"- -a formulation that undercuts conservative arguments based on the Marxist classics and the experience of the Soviet Union.

The report also uses the concept of the initial stage of socialism to advance the traditional Dengist "struggle on two fronts," arguing that both leftist and rightist views must be opposed. Thus, it criticizes both the mechanistic view that China cannot pursue socialism without undergoing fully developed capitalism, a view that it labels as the "primary cognitive root of Right deviationist mistakes," and the "utopian" belief that it is possible to pass directly into a more mature phase of socialism without going through the initial stage, a view it calls the "primary cognitive root of 'leftist' deviationist mistakes."

E c o n o m i c s as the C e n t e r

In accordance with this conditions, the congress report reaffirms that the "principle contradiction" faced by China during the initial stage of socialism is that "between the people's increasing material and cultural needs and the backward social productive forces"--a formula first endorsed by the 1981 Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the P.R.C. t8 Echoing this formulation, the 1984 decision on economic reform declared that "the essential task of socialism is to develop the forces of production, create ever more social wealth and meet the people's growing material and cultural needs," and the Sixth Plenum


resolution last year declared that economic work was the center (zhongxin) of party work. 19

Apparently feeling the need to reiterate the centrality of economic work in even stronger terms, the congress report unambiguously states that expanding the "productive forces" that is, economic development--is "the fundamental task (genben renwu) of a socialist society." Echoing the 1981 history resolution's admonition that "all our party work must be subordinated to and serve this central task---economic construction," the report says that during the initial stage of socialism it is "especially necessary" to "put the expansion of productive forces at the center of all our work." Elaborating on this thesis in unambiguous terms, the report states: "Whether or not something is advantageous to the development of productive forces ought to become the point of departure for our consideration of all problems and the fundamental standard for judging all our work."

The centrality of economic work is taken up again in the final section of the report, "Strive for a New Victory of Marxism in China," which states this basic theme of Dengism in the strongest possible terms:

The strength of the nation, the wealth of the people, the flourishing of the educational, scientific, and cultural cause, the consolidation and development of the public ownership system and the people's democratic regime, in short, the full demonstration of the superiority of socialism and the continual strengthening of its attractiveness, in the final analysis, are determined by the development of productive forces. All things that are conducive to the development of productive forces are in accord with the fundamental interests of the people; because of this, they are a demand of socialism or are permitted by socialism.

The report's strong and repeated endorsement of the importance of developing productive forces can be viewed as a belated rejoinder to the 1978 discussions on "practice as the sole criterion of truth." Although those discussions were resolved in favor of Deng, who bested Hua Guofeng's advocacy of the "two whatevers," they did not address the fundamental question of how to distinguish successful and unsuccessful practice. Complaining about this lack, Wang Ruoshui, the former deputy editor-in- chief of Renmin Ribao, who was expelled from the party in August 1987, argued in a 1979 essay that the "people's welfare" should be taken as the criterion of practice. 2~ As Dai Yuanchen of CASS has written, the resolution's call for developing productive forces fills this void--and comes surprisingly close to Wang's suggestion. 21

Critique of Leftism

The report's emphasis on the centrality of economic work is accompanied by repeated and strong criticisms of "leftist" and "ossified" thinking, past and

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present. In particular, the report sharply criticizes the epistemological basis of leftism, which it identifies as historical idealism (lishi weixin zhuyi), distinguishing it from the true Marxist viewpoint of historical materialism (lishi weiwu zhuyi). The former "abstractly expounds socialism without consideration of the development of productive forces," while the latter holds that "the productive forces are the most decisive force of all social development." According to the report, "departing from the standard of productive forces and using abstract principles and utopian models to judge life can only ruin the reputation of Marxism."

Accordingly, the report yields very little to traditional Marxist, and particularly Maoist, beliefs in the importance of "productive relations"--the organization of political and economic institutions. Stating the "we acknowl- edge and value the great counteraction of production relations and the superstructure" on the economic base, the report goes on to state that "only on the basis of acknowledging that productive forces are the fundamental standard" is it possible to resolve conflicts between the superstructure and the economic base. The implications of this line of argument are not only that Maoist voluntarism violates Marxism but also that leftist demands for more socialist forms of organization impede the development of the economy. In other words, the form of economic and political organization must accommo- date the development of the economy, not the other way around.

Consistent with this critique of leftist thought, the report strongly endorses the "extensive development" of Marxist theory. Saying that the "contemporary world is going ahead by leaps and bounds," the report calls on the theoretical workers to "develop new concepts" and "enter new realms." The question of developing Marxism has been particularly controversial since the publication of a series of Renmin Ribao commentator articles on theory and practice in late 1984. During the campaign against bourgeois liberalization in early 1987, many articles criticized the tendency to develop Marxism at the expense of upholding it.

Four Cardinal Principles and Class Struggle

Although the report places heavy emphasis on the centrality of economic work and levels sharp criticism against both the theory and practice of leftism, it also goes on to reaffirm the existence of class struggle and the "four cardinal principles"--upholding socialism, the people's democratic dictatorship, the leadership of the Communist party, and Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong thought--all of which have long been espoused by the Dengists, but even as the report reaffirms these tenets it takes pains to prevent their being used to attack reform policies.

Thus, reaffirming the importance of the four cardinal principles, the report draws heavily on Zhao Ziyang's remarks to the Spring Festival gathering in


January and particularly on his May 13 speech. 22 As those speeches did, the report states that the two basic principles of the Party's line since the 1978 Third Plenum---upholding the four cardinal principles on the one hand and carrying out reform and opening up on the other--"cannot be separated from each other" and neither should be stressed at the expense of the other. If the four cardinal principles are treated with a "rigid" point of view, people would come to doubt, "or even negate," reform and opening to the outside world. Conversely, if reform and opening to the outside world are treated with a "liberalization" point of view, it will cause Chinese development to "deviate from the path of socialism."

Having affirmed that the two basic points are inseparable, however, the report goes on to endorse Deng's view, articulated in May, that the "principle task" for a long time to come remains "overcoming rigid mentality"--an important endorsement of the reformers' position that leftism constitutes the primary danger.

Moreover, the report goes beyond this endorsement of the "two basic points" to include economic work as the "center." Thus, the report sums up the party's line as "one center and two basic points"--that is, economic work, the four cardinal principles, as well as reform and opening up. Commentary on the congress has prominently called attention to this formulation of the party's basic line and has cited Deng Xiaoping as saying in remarks not known to have been previously publicized: "It is good to summarize the line as one center and two basic points. ''23

The report also directly ties upholding the four cardinal principles to economic development. "Why do we want to uphold the four cardinal principles?" the report asks. "It is precisely because in present-day China only by doing this can there be a fundamental guarantee of the development of productive forces" a formulation that appears to interpret the four cardinal principles through their contribution to economic development.

In addition to endorsing the four cardinal principles, the report reaffirms that class struggle continues to exist, a thesis that has been consistently upheld throughout the Dengist period. The 1978 Third Plenum communiqu6 stated that the party "must not relax its class struggle" against a "small handful of counter-revolutionary elements and criminals," but pointed out that class struggle should be carried out by strictly differentiating the two different types of contradiction--antagonistic and nonantagonistic--so as not to disrupt political stability. The party constitution adopted in 1982 affirmed this but added that "under certain conditions" class struggle "'may even sharpen. ''24 The resolution of the Sixth Plenum last year dropped this admonition, stating that "class struggle will continue to exist within certain limits for a long time to come but that it does not constitute the principle contradiction, and that most contradictions in our society do not have the nature of class struggle."

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Using language almost identical to that of the Sixth Plenum resolution, the 13th Congress report states simply, "class struggle will continue to exist to a certain extent for a long time but it is already not the principle contradiction." This affirmation is followed immediately by the statement that to resolve the principle contradiction at the present stage, it is necessary to make "vigorous efforts to develop the commodity economy," to raise labor productivity, to realize the four modernizations, and "to transform the portions of the relations of production and of the superstructure that are not suited to the development of the productive forces." In other words, economic development and the readjustment of administrative, political, and ideological arrangements are the way to resolve the principle contradiction facing society and ameliorate class struggle.

Economic Reform

Consistent with this emphasis on economic reform, the congress report devotes two sections to the economy, one on economic development strategy and the other on reform of the economic structure. The first makes clear that the crux of economic work should be the improvement of "economic efficiency," and outlines three major tasks: placing greater emphasis on science and technology, maintaining a "basic balance" between supply and demand, and further extending the "scope and depth" of opening to the outside world.

The requirement to maintain a basic balance between supply and demand appears to be a bow to economic orthodoxy as well as an acknowledgment of political realities. Implicitly invoking the four great "balances" of senior economic leader Chen Yun, the report calls for "conscientious efforts" to achieve an overall balance in finance, credit, foreign exchange, and materials as well as a basic balance among the four areas. Similarly, acknowledging the inflationary pressures that China has faced since the beginning of the year, it calls for "resolute measures" to control prices.

The report balances this appeal to economic orthodoxy with the admonition that it is possible to achieve good macroeconomic results only on the basis of a "rational economic structure"--a formulation that implicitly subordinates the demand for economic balance (a goal often elusive and difficult to define) to the broader goal of reforming the economic structure in accordance with the dictates of economic reality.

Market Versus Plan. In order to promote economic efficiency, the report makes clear that it is necessary to reform the economic structure of the country, particularly by enlarging the scope of market forces. Noting that some measures--such as issuing too many mandatory targets--taken in the early years of the P.R.C. were products of a unique historical period and not


"hard and fast requirements of the socialist system," the report criticizes them as obstacles to future economic development. Conversely, it states that such phenomena as the capital goods market, the money market, the technological market, the labor services market, and the issuing of stocks and bonds are the "inevitable" results of the development of a commodity economy and therefore are "not unique to capitalism."

In calling for enlarging the role of market forces, the report makes a further--and important--step in a progressive reevaluation of the role of the market vis-a-vis the plan apparent in authoritative party documents over recent years. Hu Yaobang's report to the 12th Party Congress in 1982 explicitly limited the role of markets, stating that it is necessary to "correctly implement the principle of the "leading role of the planned economy and the supplementary role of market regulation," and that the "law of value" (prices) should "spontaneously play a regulatory role within the limits circumscribed by the state's unified plan." Market regulation, it went on, is "subordinate and secondary" to the plan but "essential and useful nonetheless."

Two years later, the economic reform decision adopted by the Third Plenum extended the role of market forces by endorsing a gradual expansion of "guidance" plans at the expense of "mandatory planning." Nevertheless, it went on to state that "ours is on the whole a planned economy, that is, a planned commodity economy, not a market economy that is entirely subject to market regulation" and specified that "production and exchange completely subject to market regulation are confined mainly to certain farm and sideline products, small articles of daily use and labor services in the service and repair trades." These would, it said, "play a supplementary but indispensable role in the national economy."

The proposal of the Seventh Five-Year Plan adopted by the 1985 Confer- ence of Party Delegates went considerably further, deleting for the first time the description of market forces as "supplementary." Reversing the balance between market and state-planned goods, contained in the reform decision the year before, the proposal stated that "except for a few major commodities whose prices should continue to be determined by the state, price controls on everyday consumer goods should be systematically relaxed and replaced by market regulation." While reaffirming that "a certain amount of administrative means will always be indispensable," it said that the "essence of reform should be to reduce the use of administrative means.'25

The report to the 13th Party Congress advances beyond these previous formulations by placing plan and market on an even, or very nearly even, basis. Explicitly referring to the 1984 reform decision, the report states that it is "necessary to clarify" certain points, including that "the functions of planning and the market should be performed by the whole society"--thus implicitly denying that one is primary and the other is supplementary. It goes on to state that the relationship between state and enterprises should be

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indirect, mediated by market forces: "The general pattern of economic operation should be one in which the state regulates the market and the market guides the enterprises." In his press conference, Gao Shangquan emphasized the inclusion of this point in the report, saying that it "shed new light" on the relationship between the state and economy and made the concept of a planned commodity economy "more specific.'26

This "clarification" was obviously the source of some disagreement during the congress. The draft of the report submitted to the congress avoided explicit mention of administrative measures, stating that "the state mainly uses economic and legal means to regulate market supply and demand." This was amended by the congress to read: "The state uses economic and legal means and necessary administrative measures to regulate market supply and demand" (emphasis added).

Despite this bow to economic orthodoxy, the report also clears the way for a continued expansion of market forces by "clarifying" two other aspects of the 1984 reform decision:

�9 The difference between capitalism and socialism, the report declares, lies in the form of ownership on which they are based, not on the presence or absence of a market. Defending economic reform from the charge of practicing capitalism, it states: "Using the regulatory function of the market is completely different than practicing capitalism."

�9 Whereas the 1984 reform decision states that the "planned economy does not necessarily mean the predominance of mandatory planning" and that it is necessary to reduce the scope of mandatory planning and appropriately expand guidance planning, the congress report goes further by emphasizing that the planning process itself should be managed "according to the principle of commodity exchange and the law of value." State management of the economy, it goes on to say, should "move toward a phase of mainly indirect management."

In line with this strong endorsement of a greater role for markets, the report goes on to state that it is necessary to "speed up" the creation of a "socialist market system" by establishing markets for consumer goods, means of production, labor services, technology, information and real estate--an apparent reference to recent efforts to expand the buying and selling of housing as well as to current discussions on allowing the transfer, for compensation, of the "use rights" of land.

Price Reform. In marked contrast to both the 1984 reform decision and the 1985 proposal on the seventh Five-Year Plan, the report to the 13th Party Congress moves decisively away from viewing price reform as central to economic reform. Whereas both of those documents explicitly label price reform as the key to economic reform, the congress report says that the focus of work should now be placed on reform of the "enterprise management


mechanism" a phrase that refers to rationalizing factory management by defining more clearly the rights and obligations of factory managers vis-h-vis both their own work forces and the state. This reform will make use of a contract system to define and evaluate the success of managers in increasing the value of enterprise assets. The report says that implementing such a contract system will enable "a large number of shrewd and boldly enterpris- ing entrepreneurs to come to the fore in the storm of market competition." Thus, the report further underscores the role of enterprise managers, calling for the implementation of the factory manager responsibility system--a controversial reform that was enacted in the fall of 1986.

The endorsement of enterprise management reform over price reform does not mean that price reform is no longer regarded as a necessary part of economic reform, but rather that price reform is now seen as emerging out of reform instead of being the lever by which to implement it. Thus, in discussing the creation of a "socialist market system," the report makes clear that one of the goals is to "actively and steadily promote price reform"--a formulation that indicates that the creation of a market system must precede the rationalization of prices. The decision to focus on enterprise management at this time reflects an important shift away from one school of economic though championed by Wu Jinglian of the State Council's Economic Devel- opment Center, and the endorsement of the approach favored by a number of young economists at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, including Hua Sheng, He Jiacheng, and others. 27

Ownership and Distribution. Relying on the concept of the initial stage of socialism, the report goes further than any previous party document in endorsing a mixed economy. Although it maintains that the socialist principles of public ownership and distribution according to labor should play the "dominant role" during the present stage, it decries efforts to demand "absolute perfection" in these areas.

Whereas the 1984 resolution on reforming the economic structure called for developing "diversified economic forms and various methods of management" and specified that the development of the public ownership system "should not be predicated on the restriction and exclusion of other forms and methods of management," the congress report goes beyond this to endorse a "multiple ownership economy" (duozhong suoyouzhi fingji). According to the report, "it is not the case that other economic components (chengfen) outside the system of whole-people ownership have developed too much, in fact they have not developed enough.'28

Also going beyond the bounds of the 1984 document, the report for the first time calls specifically for the development of a "privately managed economy" (siying fingji)--though it carefully avoids the use of the even more ideologically loaded term "private ownership system" (siyouzhi). Facing

FEWSMITH 55

directly the ideological implications of the existence of private economic activity, the report explicitly admits that under it "relation of hired (guyong) labor exists'--thus implicitly admitting the existence of a sphere of "exploi- tation" in socialist society. However, the report maintains that the implications of private economic activity are mitigated in socialist society because it is "linked to and greatly influenced by" the public ownership economy, which is predominant. The report further calls for elaborating "as soon as possible" policies and laws governing private economic activity.

Along with this recognition of a "multiple ownership economy," the report, for the first time, explicitly recognizes the need for a variety of forms of distribution. Calling the socialist principle of "distribution according to labor" the "mainstay," it says that there must be other forms of distribution as well in the initial stage of socialism. Specifically, it recognizes the legitimacy of income derived from interest on bonds, from dividends on shares, and from "hiring of some laborers in privately owned enterprises"--all of which are incomes not derived from labor.

While calling for guarding against "big gaps between rich and poor" and for regulating "excessively high, individual incomes," the report makes clear it is necessary to allow further increases in income inequality in China. "At present," it says critically, "the main trend in distribution is, as before, eating out of the big pot and practicing equalitarianism."

Agriculture. Reflecting sensitivity to three consecutive years of disappoint- ing grain harvests, the report singles agriculture out for special attention. Calling the development of agriculture "rather unsteady," the report labels that sector of the economy as of "vital importance" to reform and demands a substantial increase in grain production over the next decade or so in order to "achieve our strategic goals by the end of the century." In order to increase grain and other agricultural production, the report calls for increased invest- ment--particularly to strengthen capital construction and irrigation pro- jects--by national and local authorities as well as individual peasants.

At his press conference, CPC Rural Policy Research Center head Du Runsheng underlined the importance of price and land use reform measures. Noting that state price subsidies have led to irrational consumption policies, Du stated that it is necessary to "regulate the level of consumption through price policies and tax policies.'29

Du also noted that, in order to "increase the enthusiasm" of the peasants, Beijing is presently "considering" permitting peasants to transfer the "use rights" of land. Distinguishing use of land from ownership of land---which remains with the collective---Du stated that if a person makes investments to improve the land, then he should be appropriately compensated when he transfers the use of the land. Such transfers could be negotiated among the


peasants, he said, but the results of the negotiations would have to be reported to the villagers' committee.

Political Structural Reform

Political structural reform has long been one of the most sensitive and controversial--though not always publicly discussed--of Deng's proposed reforms. The locus classicus of this reform is Deng Xiaoping's 1980 speech "On Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership," a speech approved at an enlarged meeting of the Politburo but not publicized until three years later in The Selected Works ofDeng Xiaoping. Even then, a sensitive section of the speech dealing with the factory manager responsibility system was deleted. 3~

Although raised by Deng in 1980, the subject of political reform remained basically dormant for nearly six years, when Deng put the question back on the agenda in the spring of 1986. In a June Politburo meeting, Deng declared that whether or not reform "ultimately succeeds" would be determined by political structural reform, and he urged the party to study the question for a year before addressing it at the 13th Party Congress.a1

The public discussion of the issue became very lively during the summer of 1986, and reform no doubt contributed to the tensions that led to the ouster of Hu Yaobang in January 1987. This increasing tension was reflected in the resolution of the Sixth Plenum in the fall of 1986, which endorsed the goal of political reform, but did so only briefly and added the cautionary admonition that it was a "very complex task" that could be carried out only after "exhaustive investigation and study."

With the outbreak of student demonstrations and the launching of the campaign against bourgeois liberalization, public discussion on political structural reform ceased. Mirroring this public silence, efforts to draft a political reform proposal for inclusion in the 13th Party Congress report were put on hold for about two months. 32 Work on political reform apparently picked up again in the spring after Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang again publicly endorsed it, and a new wave of momentum came with the republica- tion of Deng's 1980 speech in Renmin Ribao on the July 1 anniversary of the party's founding.

Despite the ability of reformers to put political reform back on the agenda, there are indications that sharp disagreement continued up until the eve of the congress. For instance, following the summer leadership meetings at the seaside resort of Beidaihe, the P.R.C.-owned Hong Kong press reported that owing to continuing disagreement among leaders at Beidaihe, a "concrete plan" for reform was "still far from ripe. ''33 Even more revealing was the communiqu6 of the party's Seventh Plenum, convened on 20 October, five days before the opening of the congress. The communiqu6 stated that the

FEWSMITH 57

plenum had "approved" the inclusion of the "main points" of the section on political reform in the congress report--thus contrasting the plenum's less than wholehearted endorsement of political reform with its "unanimous approval" of the congress report as a whole and indicating that some sections on political reform would be omitted from the congress report.

Given this background of sensitivity and conflict, reformers were strik- ingly successful in obtaining a strong--if sometimes vaguely worded-----endorsement of political reform. Drawing heavily on Deng's 1980 speech, the congress report calls for eliminating the "major defects" of China's political system, particularly the overconcentration of power in state and party organs, bureaucratism, and "feudal influence." Political structural reform is necessary, it says, because the "deepening" of economic reform has raised new demands on the political system, but "without conducting political structural reform, it is impossible for economic structural reform to achieve final victory." Only by building "socialist democratic politics" will it be possible to "raise the efficiency, increase the vitality, and stimulate the initiative of all sectors of society."

Government Administration. One area of political reform in which Beijing appears ready to move ahead fairly rapidly is that of restructuring government organs. Citing problems of excessive levels, undefined responsibilities, and petty infighting, the report proposes to "merge and cut" specialized administrative departments so that they better fit the needs of economic reform, particularly the separation of government administration and enterprises.

In an apparent reference to the failed attempt to streamline the government in 1982, the report warns against "slipping back into the old rut of streamlining, expanding, restreamlining, and reexpanding" and indicates that it is necessary in the current reform to change not merely the size but also the structure of the bureaucracy. In order to accomplish this, the report calls for the State Council to submit a plan for the reform of central organs to the first session of the Seventh NPC in March 1988.

In addition, the report calls for the enactment of a "Government Function- ary Law." Citing a need for a fundamental reform of the personnel system, the report proposes establishing a "scientific" personnel structure that appears to parallel in important aspects Western civil service systems. In particular, the report recommends creation of a dual system, differentiating between "administrative" (zheng wu) and "professional" (ye wu) personnel. According to a later article, the overall design for this reform has been basically completed and will be implemented gradually in the near future. 34

Consistent with current practice, administrative personnel would continue to be nominated and supervised by the appropriate level of the Party, but would be subject to serving "limited terms" and being constrained by the


"general supervision of society." One article explains that such personnel are to be "mainly responsible for guiding political orientation and principles and making administrative decisions" and therefore "should have good political quality, leading ability, and a strong mass base. ''35

Professional personnel, in contrast, would be subject to a system of recruitment and evaluation governed by legal criteria. Citing the need for young people, especially, to "show their talents," the report outlines a system of personnel recruitment based on public, competitive examinations "pro- vided by law." There would be legal guarantees for training, pay, welfare, and retirement; but "promotion, demotion, rewards and punishments" would be based "mainly" on performance--a formulation that apparently allows purely political criteria to continue to be used.

The report appears to address concerns that such a professional civil service system would diminish the role of the party. According to the report, not only would such a personnel system enhance the efficiency of government but it would also "foster political activists" and "help the party to strengthen and improve its leadership over the personnel system."

Role of the Party. While emphasizing the CPC's preeminent role in originating and implementing all key policy, the report also underscores the need to fundamentally change the relationship between the party and state. Pointing to a clear restriction on the scope of the party's role in the future, the report states that: "the main form of the party's political leadership over state affairs is that the party's propositions become state decisions through a legal procedure and that the party guides the broad masses through party organizations' activities and party members' exemplary role." In other words, like the state's control over economic affairs, the party's role in administration is to be indirect.

Redefining the role of the party in this way, the report says, necessitates both streamlining and democratizing the party and changing the way that it relates to state and social organizations. Internally, the party should open the process of decision making and thus strengthen collective leadership. In order to do this, the report calls for more frequent reports by the Politburo Standing Committee to the Politburo and by the Politburo to the Central Committee, an increase in the number of Central Committee plenary sessions (which have been held annually in recent years), and a strengthening of "democratic life" meetings within party organizations. The report also calls for "reforming and perfecting" the party's election system so as to work out explicit regulations governing and to ensure that there are more candidates than posts.

Externally, the report calls for redefining the relationship between party and state organizations by eliminating party departments that overlap their counterpart government departments, "gradually" abolishing party leading groups in government departments, and placing party organizations in

FEWSMITH 59

enterprises and institutions under the leadership of local party organizations rather than in party organizations in administrative units at a higher level--a move apparently directed at reducing vertical administrative control through party organizations. In addition, the report calls for reducing the role of party discipline inspection commissions, limiting their function to "fostering a fine party style, and enforcing party discipline." Legal and administrative infrac- tions will apparently come under the purview of the Ministry of Supervision, which was established in late 1986 in anticipation of political reform.

This redefinition of the relationship between party and government is also intended to extend to the functions of China's legislative organs---the people's congresses at various levels. Stating that "marked progress" had been made on the reform of the people's congresses since the beginning of the year, the report called for continuing to enhance their representative function. In particular, the report calls for strengthening the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee. Members should be younger and gradually become "full-time members."

The report also calls for changing the relationship between the party and society. In particular, it proposes strengthening the system of Chinese People's Political Consultative Committees (CPPCC)--China's united front organizations--so as to "regularize political consultation and democratic supervision." In addition, it calls for reforming mass organizations (such as the Communist Youth League, labor unions, and women's organizations) to enable them to carry out their work "independently (duli zizhu)." Such changes are apparently intended to foster a system of "social consultation and dialogue" so that social interests can work out conflicts among themselves as well as express their grievances to higher levels. In this regard, the report explicitly recognizes the existence of "diverse interests and contradictions"-- an approach that accepts the diversity of social life rather than trying to force all interests to accept the fiction of a monolithic general interest.

Consistent with these proposed changes in the role of the party, the report, drawing on the resolution of the Sixth Plenum last year, makes a clear distinction between party members and nonparty members.36 Party members must be held to high standards at all times, but nonparty members should not be expected to live up to the demands of the party constitution. Moreover, the report says .that even those who "leave the party ranks" should be supported and "united with" and that "some of them can continue to undertake appropriate leadership work"--a provision that might be invoked to permit Liu Binyan, who was expelled from the party during the campaign against bourgeois liberalization, to continue as deputy head of the Chinese Writers Association.

The reforms redefining the role of the party vis-~t-vis government, economic, and social organizations were supported by changes in the party constitution. 37 In particular, Article 33 now specifies that the party will


provide leadership in "enterprises and institutions where the system of the administrative leader assuming full responsibility is not yet practiced." This formulation stops short of giving administrative leaders full authority in all instances but nevertheless provides support for the factory director responsibility system by removing the injunction for party organizations to provide leadership in all instances. Similarly a change in Article 46 drops the requirement for party leading groups to exist in economic and cultural organizations, and revision of Article 48 provides for the possible elimination of party committees in some government departments by giving the Central Committee the authority to determine whether party committees should exist in those government departments that exercise "centralized and unified leadership" over subordinate units.

Concerns of Conservatives. Reflecting sensitivity to the continuing concerns of party traditionalists, the report argues that the intended reforms will strengthen not weaken the leadership role of the party. Echoing arguments developed in Deng's 1980 speech, it says that the ability of the party to lead was undermined by the party's taking on direct administration of the whole society. This practice meant that the party not only "failed to attend to its own business" but also became "easily involved in contradictions" or even the "center of contradictions." Only by separating party and government functions, the report emphasizes, can the CPC extricate itself from these difficulties and return to its true role as "general coordinator" of policy.

In an apparent effort to reassure skeptics, the report vows emphatically that the party will "never abandon the characteristics and advantages" of the Socialist system. Reflecting lingering sensitivity over slogans about democ- racy and multiparty government raised by student demonstrators last winter, the report states that "China will never indiscriminately copy the Western system of separation of three powers and the system of different parties ruling the country in turn."

The report also tries to address the concerns of conservatives by emphasizing the need to maintain "stability and unity." "Without the stability and solidarity of the whole system," it says, "economic construction would be impossible." Calling the political reform "arduous and complicated," the report vows to implement it "step by step in an orderly way with leadership." The final version approved by the congress emphasized this thought, adding that, "in the period when the new structure is replacing the old, it is especially necessary to pay attention to our work being disjointed and causing friction."

Reflecting widespread doubts over the proper pace and scope of political reform, the report avoids citing any timetable for the proposed changes. "The immediate goal for political structural reform," it says, "is limited." The draft submitted to the congress included a very vague timetable, saying that some items on the reform agenda "might be effective within a year," while other

FEWSMITH 61

items might take "a decade or even longer." Even that timetable, however, was removed during the course of the congress.

C O N C L U S I O N

The 13th Party Congress was not only successful in making major ideological innovations that are likely to give reformers greater flexibility in carrying out economic reforms, but also in securing the leadership changes necessary to put such reforms into effect. Senior party leaders Deng Xiaoping (83 years old), Li Xiannian (78), Chen Yun (82), and Peng Zhen (85) all stepped down from the Politburo, paving the way for a younger generation of leaders to take their place. The composition of the Central Committee was also substantially changed as 60 people (34 percent) were elected to full membership for the first time. Fifty-one others (29 percent) were first elected full members in 1985, making a total of 101 members (58 percent) who attained full membership on the Central Committee in the last two years. Forty-four others (25 percent) first joined the Central Committee in 1982, and only 22 members (13 percent) first joined the Central Committee prior to 1982.

Within the Central Committee, there was a particularly substantial turnover in the ranks of military representatives. With the removal of Yang Dezhi and Yu Qiuli from the Politburo, only Yang Shangkun, permanent vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Qin Jiwei, Commander of the Beijing Military Region, remain on the party's highest decision-making body, and both have long-standing ties to Deng. Although the number of military representatives on the Central Committee is about the same as previously, their composition is substantially different. Altogether, a total of 18 military leaders (19 if the deceased Xiao Hua is included) left the Central Committee, paving the way for almost an entirely new generation of military leaders to take their place. Of the 32 military leaders on the new Central Committee, only two (Yang Shangkun and Qin Jiwei) are Long March veterans. Eleven joined the Central Committee for the first time and five otbe :s were elevated from alternate to full status on the Central Committee. Eleven others joined the Central Committee for the first time in 1985 (two as alternates), and the remaining three joined in 1982 (one, Liu Zhenhua, served as an alternate member in 1969 but first became a full member of the Central Committee in 1982). Thus, a total of 26 of the 32 PLA members (81 percent) on the Central Committee were first elected in either 1985 or this Novem- ber--a turnover rate far exceeding the comparable figure (58 percent) for the Central Committee as a whole.

This rate of personnel turnover---combined with the ouster of such conservative leaders as Deng Liqun and Hu Qiaomu and the retention of former party chief Hu Yaobang on the Politburo---suggests that reformers


were remarkably successful not only in securing the ideological changes needed to continue far-reaching economic reforms but also in effecting the leadership changes needed to ameliorate ideological challenges to the direction of reform. The ability to do that following the political tension evident in

late 1986 and early 1987 is testimony to the remarkable political skills of Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang.

The political opposition that converged in late 1986 and early 1987 to oust Hu Yaobang and bring into question the direction of future reform will not

disappear with the 13th Party Congress. Clearly some ideological and economic disputes remain unresolved, and a new wave of ideological loosening or serious economic difficulties could, and probably will , bring

them to the fore again. But it will be more difficult for conservative elements to question the direction of reform; moreover, there will be no more opportunities to bring about large-scale turnover in personnel for five more years, making it very difficult to challenge effectively the course of reform.

The death of Deng Xiaoping could provide senior leaders with an

opportunity to reassert themselves, either by influencing the choice of a new leader or by seizing power directly. But the abili ty to do so would seem to

depend on division within the current leadership and on the existence of sharp disputes over ideology and economic p o l i c y - - a n d those conditions do not

appear likely to develop. In short, the 13th Party Congress appears to have been a major step forward to securing an important Dengist goal an institutionalized transfer of power to a successor generation.

N O T E S

I. See for instance, Parris H. Chang,"China After Deng: Toward the 13th Party Congress," Problems of Communism, May-June 1987, pp. 30-42.

2. See Joseph Fewsmith, "The P.R.C.'s Internal Political Dynamics," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Spring 1987, pp. 3-23.

3. Suggestive of both the tensions and stakes within the party preceding the 13th Party Congress, was the attack against Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Advisor Yu Guangyuun--one of the chief proponents of the concept of the initial stage of socialism that became the underlying theme of the 13th Party Congress. While there is no evidence that Yu was attacked for his views on the initial stage of socialism, he was criticized for advocating "selfishness" as an essential component of developing a commodity economy. This view may be related to Yu's belief that Socialist morality, among other things, is not appropriate to the initial stage of socialism. In December, Bo Yibo criticized the idea of "holding your head high to look ahead and lowering your head to look for money," a view Yu allegedly was cited as advocating in an interview with Shanghai's Shehui Bao. Shortly thereafter, Hu Qiaomu criticized similar notions at a forum marking the first anniversary of the journal Zhonghua Lieshi (Chinese martyrs). It was probably Hu's remarks to this forum that the Hong Kong paper Ta Kung Pao had in mind when it said that Hu had criticized Yu's views. Yu was able to reply to criticisms against him indirectly in a Jingjixue Zhoubao article, but did not write again publicly until the May issue of Zhongguo Shehui Kexue (Chinese Social Sciences), when he wrote a long article on the initial stage of socialism. See Jingjixue Zhoubao, 30 November 1986, and 25 January 1987, trans. FBIS-CHI, 30 December 1986; Xinhua, 6 January 1987, trans. FBIS-CHI, 7 January 1987, KI6.

FEWSMITH 63

4. Xinhua Commentary by Zhong Shu, "China To Persist in Reform, Open Policy," trans. FBIS-CH1, 15 January 1987, K1-3.

5. Beijing radio, 24 October 1987. 6. "Advance along the Road of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics," Beijing Domestic

Service, 25 October 1987, pp. 10-34. All translations have been checked against the final version of the report, which appears in Renmin Ribao on 4 November 1987. References to the original version of the report as read by Zhao Ziyang to the congress on 25 October have been checked against the text published in Wen Wei Po on 26 October 1987.

7. Sun Yefang, "Yao dongde jingji bixu xue dian zhexue" [In order to understand economics it is necessary to study some philosophy], Sun Yefang xuanji [The Collected Works of Sun Yefang], shanxi renmin chuban she, 1984, p. 172. The attribution of this as the first use of the term "initial stage of socialism" is contained in Zhu Zhongxin, "Shehui zhuyi chuji jieduan bu dengyu gongchan zhuyi di yi jieduan," [The initial stage of socialism is not the same as the first stage of communism], Jingji Ribao, 12 December 1987, p. 3. Zhu, however, does not mention that Sun was using the term negatively, as one that hindered a proper understanding of the role of the law of value in socialist society.

8. Su Shaozhi and Feng Lanrui, "Wuchan jieji qude zhengquan hou de shehui fazhan jieduan wenti" ["The question of social development stages in the period after the proletariat seizes power"], Jingji Yanjiu, May 1979, pp. 14-19.

9. Xue Muqiao, Zhongguo shehui zhuyijingji wentiyanjiu [Studies on the Economic Problems of Chinese Socialism[, Renmin chuban she, 1979, pp. 6-7.

10. Gao Fang, "Shehui zhuyi chuji jieduan de tichu ji qi lishi diwei" ["The Raising of the Initial Stage of Socialism and Its Historical Place"], Tianjin shehui kexue [Tianjin Social Sciences], 1987, no. 6 (December).

11. "Resolution on Certain Questions on the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China," Hongqi, 1 July 1981.

12. "Hu Yaobang's Report to the 12th Party Congress," Xinhua, 7 September 1982, trans. FBIS-CHI, 8 September 1982, KI2.

13. "Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Guiding Principles for Building a Socialist Society With Advanced Culture and Ideology," Xinhua, 28 September 1986, FBIS-CHI, 29 September 1986, K2-13.

14. Guangzhou Ribao, 2 January 1987, trans. JPRS-CAR-007 (16 June 1987):11-19; and Jingjixue Zhoubao, 25 January 1987, p. 1.

15. According to later reports, Zhao presided over a meeting of the drafting committee of the Central Committee report to the 13th Party Congress in February and expressed the view that the theory of the initial stage of socialism could "fully answer all questions." Zhao addressed the meeting of propaganda workers on March 13, and on March 18 addressed a letter to Deng Xiaoping, which Deng later approved, summarizing the discussions of the drafting group and endorsing the thesis of the initial stage of socialism. See Zhongguo Xinwen She, 4 November 1987, trans. FBIS-CHI, 4 November 1987, p. 2.

16. Shu Xiang, "The Initial Stage of Socialism," Gongren Ribao, 26 June 1987, p. 3, trans. FBIS-CHI, 14 July 1987, K16-19.

17. Nongmin Ribao, 15 May 1987, trans. JPRS-CAR-016 (8 July 1987):6-9. 18. The communiqu6 of the Third Plenum that ushered in the Dengist period endorsed "shifting

the emphasis of the party's work" to economic affairs in order to "speed socialist modernization" and improve the living standards of the people. It did not, however, specify a "principal contradiction" facing China. See "Communiqu6 of the Communist Party of China," Xinhua, 23 December 1978, FBIS-CHI, 26 December 1978, E4-13.

19. "Full Text of the C.P.C. Central Committee Decision on Reform of the Economic Structure," Xinhua, 20 October 1984, FBIS-CHI, 22 October 1984, Kl-19.

20. Wang Ruoshui, Wei rendao zhuyi bianhu [In Defense of Humanism[, p. 27. 21. Dai Yuanchen, "'Cong lixiang de lilun hui dao xianshi de lilun" ["From Idealist Theory to

Realist Theory"], Jingji Yanjiu, November 1987, pp. 4-5. 22. See "Speech by Zhao Ziyang at the Spring Festival Gathering," Xinhua, 29 January 1987,

trans. FBIS-CHI, 30 January 1987, K4-8; and "Speech at a Meeting of Propaganda, Theoretical, Press and Party School Cadres," Xinhua, 8 July 1987, trans. FBIS-CHI, 8 July, KI-8.


23. Zhongguo Xinwen She, 4 November 1987, FBIS-CHI, 4 November 1987, p. 8.

24. "Constitution of the Communist Party of China," Xinhua, 8 September 1982, FBIS-CHI, 9 September 1982, K19.

25. Xinhua, 25 September 1985, "Proposal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party for the Seventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development," FBIS-CHI, 26 September 1985, KI-24.

26. Beijing Domestic Service, 26 October 1987, trans. FBIS-CHI, 26 October 1987, p. 37.

27. Wu called for price reform as the centerpiece of a set of "coordinated reforms" in an article called "Some Views on the Choice of a Strategy for Reform" in Jingji Yanjiu, No. 2 (20 February 1987). This article became the focus of economic debate throughout 1987. For the opposing views of Hua and He, see Hua Sheng, He Jiacheng, Zhang Xuejun, Luo Xiaopeng, Yong Bianzhuang, and Du Haiyan, "An Historical Turning Point and Our Hopes," Jingji Yanjiu, No. 3 (20 March 1987). See Joseph Fewsmith, "Approaches to Economic Reform and the Making of Economic Policy in Contemporary China," unpublished manuscript.

28. The Sixth Plenum resolution was the first authoritative party document to use the term "economic components" (chengfen) in reference to nonsocialist economic activities. This term is more explicit than formulations contained in previous party documents, which had used such terms as "diverse economic forms" (duozhong jingji xingshi) and "diverse economic management" (duozhong fingji jingying).

29. Beijing Domestic Service, 26 October 1987, trans. FNIS-CHI, 26 october 1987, pp. 35-41.

30. Deng's speech was photographically reproduced by the Taiwan publication Chung-kung yen-chiu, 15 July 1981, permitting comparison with the version in his selected works. When Deng's speech was published on 1 July 1987, the section on the factory director responsibility system was restored.

31. According to the PRC-owned daily Wen Wei Po, Deng raised the issue of political structural reform at an April meeting of provincial governors held to discuss the factory manager responsibility system. See Cheng Xiang, "Tentative Analysis of Discussions Concerning Reform of the Political Structure" (part one), Wen Wei Po, 21 July 1986, p. 2, trans. FBIS-CHI, 24 July 1986, WI-3. Deng's comments at that meeting are not included in the expanded version of his Building Socialism With Chinese Characteristics, but his call for political structural reform at a June Politburo meeting is. See Deng Xiaoping, Jianshe you Zhongguo tese de shehui zhuyi, revised and expanded edition, p. 123.

32. Cheng Hsiang, "Preview of the 13th Party Congress--Part I," Wen Wei Po, 25 August 1987, trans. FBIS-CHI, 25 August 1987, p. 6.

33. Wen Wei Po, 31 August 1987.

34. Gu Yunchang, "China to Gradually Implement the Civil Service System," Liaowang, Overseas edition, 16 November 1987, trans. FBIS-CHI, 24 November 1987, pp. 25-29.

35. Ibid.

36. The Sixth Plenum resolution distinguished between a "common ideal" that would unite all people and an "ultimate ideal" to which the party faithful must remain committed. It was on the basis of this distinction that the resolution dropped the phrase, included in the 12th Party Congress report, that "Communist ideology" should be the "core" of spiritual civilization, replacing it with the less restrictive phrase that it is necessary to "build spiritual civilization with Marxism as guidance." Stressing the "common ideal," a Guangming Ribao Commenta- tor article later stressed, would facilitate China becoming a "more democratic, prosperous, and civilized country." See Commentator article, "The Common Ideal Is the Base for Uniting All the People," Guangming Ribao, l November 1986, trans. FBIS-CHI, 6 November 1986, K1-2.

37. "Revisions of Some Articles of the CPC Constitution," Beijing Domestic Service, 1 November 1987, trans. FBIS-CHI, 2 November 1987, pp. 27-29.


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Documents

China’s 13th Party Congress: Explicating the theoretical bases of reform