China's Foreign Policy-jul-aug2010

|24| India-China Chronicle July-August 2010

INFOCUS | FOREIGN POLICY

Going soft for hard gains

CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY

Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preference of others. It is leading by example and attracting others to do what you want. China is doing exactly that.

July-August 2010 India-China Chronicle |25|

Parama Sinha Palit

SOFT POWER’ HAS emerged as an important in-strument of foreign policy dur-

ing the last decade. It is being consid-ered the ‘linchpin of public diplomacy’ by many who discount wars and the use of force. Predominantly considered a Western concept, Beijing’s cultivation of soft power seems inclined towards constructing “its ideal of international order in the age of China’s rise.”

Posing as the engine of economic growth, China is the new regional leader. Its expanding diplomatic and economic involvement with Asia is commensurate with its rise on the global arena. China’s growing influence is not limited to Asia alone. Its ‘soft’ power has penetrated into Africa as well. As the largest investor, trader, buyer and trade donor in a number of African countries, it has replaced Euro-pean, American and Japanese diplo-matic ‘soft’ power in many nations of sub-Sahara.

China’s gradual rise and its global activism are being watched by the other powers with great interest. In fact Bei-jing’s heavy reliance on ‘soft’ power during the recent years is constantly de-bated so much so that a lot of western literature perceives its growth of ‘soft’ power as a challenge. Its foray specifi-cally into Southeast Asia is a cause of grave concern to the United States and its other Asian neighbours including India. China’s attempt to expand its ‘soft’ power is in contrast to its policy direction during the Cold War. Bei-jing’s support for the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia during the 1970s is well-known. Beijing had sent the Khmer Rouge over 15,000 military advisers and provided the bulk of its external aid. Its military response to Vietnam’s incursion into Cambodia in 1979, and its forceful claims to disputed islands in the South China Sea during the1990s also contributed in tarnishing Beijing’s image worldwide.

Interestingly, China soon trans-formed its strategy towards Cambodia and became the most important for-eign influence, providing foreign aid and even pardoning Cambodia’s entire

more coercive economic and diplomat-ic levers like aid and investment and participation in multilateral organiza-tions.” The Wikipedia suggests that “soft power is the ability to obtain what you want through co-option and at-traction. It is in contradistinction to ‘hard power’, which is the use of coer-cion and payment.”

All definitions indicate the wide gamut of soft power ranging from co-option, attraction to humanitarian as-sistance, trade, aid and investment.

China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’China’s rise is a matter of great

debate in the 21st century. The international community is not only uncertain about this new emerging power, but is suspicious of its moves as well. Its military might and mounting defence budget made the Bush admin-istration declare the ‘China threat’ and the need to ‘contain’ the giant. This drove Beijing to propose a ‘peaceful rise’ in 2003 to assuage international fear and mistrust. Soon ‘peaceful development’ was adopted at the 2004 Boao Forum. Since then ‘peaceful development’ or heping fazhan became the new thinking in Chinese foreign policy under the Fourth Generation Leadership. Many argue that this new foreign policy statement was a deliber-ate attempt by the Beijing leadership to secure a favourable international envi-ronment for its rise while accepting to operate within a unipolar model dominated by the US.

Titled “China’s Peaceful Develop-ment Road,” the Information Office of China’s State Council published a White paper in 2005, explaining Beijing’s pursuit of “peaceful develop-ment.” It outlined the major policies the Chinese government had under-taken to demonstrate its determination to stick to the road of “peaceful devel-opment.” The new foreign policy strat-egy is defensive in nature. It aims to decrease the fear of a “China Threat,” by promoting good neighbourly and multilateral relations in the region and around the globe, and creating a peace-ful and stable external environment for its economic development.

The policy statement is an indica-tion that China is not inclined to be a

debt to China. Cambodia is not just one example. China also provides con-siderable assistance to Vietnam along with other Southeast Asian nations. Beijing’s constructive role during the financial crisis of 1997 has been much appreciated. It was around this time that the international community was introduced to this new benign image of the Asian giant.

Concept of ‘Soft’ Power ‘Soft’ power dates back to the 7th

century and is a contribution of an an-cient Chinese philosopher Lao Tsu. However, it was Harvard professor Jo-

seph Nye who is credited with coining the term during the late 1980s. Accord-ing to Nye, ‘soft’ power rests ‘on the ability to shape the preference of oth-ers…It is leading by example and at-tracting others to do what you want.”

Journalist and author Joshua Kur-lantzick, provides an elaborate defini-tion of ‘soft’ power. He explores the concept and has discovered that “soft power has changed” over time. A dy-namic concept, soft power “means any-thing outside of the military and secu-rity realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also

POSING AS THE ENGINE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH,

CHINA IS THE NEW REGIONAL LEADER. ITS

EXPANDING DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC

INVOLVEMENT WITH ASIA IS COMMENSURATE WITH ITS RISE ON THE GLOBAL

ARENA. CHINA’S GROWING INFLUENCE IS NOT LIMITED TO ASIA ALONE. ITS ‘SOFT’ POWER HAS PENETRATED

INTO AFRICA AS WELL.

|26| India-China Chronicle June-July 2010

hegemon. Historically proved, the Chinese have always followed ‘love, peace and harmony’. Its strategic cul-ture discounted wars and the use of force while promoting ‘universal har-mony and order’. However, history is also replete with Chinese use of hard power during the Cold War years. Dur-ing the 1950s to 1970s Beijing sought to destabilize Southeast Asian govern-ments both by supporting armed insur-gencies and by mobilizing “fifth col-umns” among overseas Chinese, trying to export Maoist ideology. It also had border disputes and conflicts with ev-ery adjacent country. But with new dy-namics at play, Beijing began to realize the futility of hard power and the im-portance of developing a ‘soft’ image in spreading its influence. China began to believe that its peaceful development “will help Beijing execute its foreign policy more successfully” in an en-abling environment.

In accordance with its new foreign policy, ‘peaceful development’ is more flexible emphasising cooperation while focusing on ‘the economic develop-ment first.’ China realizes that its “soft power” – “1.3 billion population + 1

purchase order,” international trade and cooperation, economy, and culture – are tools to be used to improve Chi-na’s role as a rising power and to facili-tate China’s economic development and modernization.

China Woos Southeast Asia, Africa

China has been employing its ‘soft’ power instruments to reach out to its neighbours in Asia. While engaging the Southeast Asian countries, it has also made inroads into Africa. As far as Southeast Asia is concerned, Prof Wanfa Zhang points out that China is tapping the “third dimension of pow-er” for assuming its new role in the world, particularly Southeast Asia. Joshua Kurlantzick goes to the extent of referring to the Chinese version of the Monroe Doctrine as a policy which has helped Beijing to charm the region and in the process reduce Washington’s alliances in Southeast Asia. Whatever be the take on the issue, there is no de-nying that China is increasingly in-volved with the region.

Southeast Asia is strategically and economically a vital region. The Chi-

nese ambition is to build a “ring of po-litical friendship” on China’s periphery to secure its borders. Given the past misunderstandings and interference by Beijing in Southeast Asia, China has been trying hard to improve its rela-tions with the region. However, the tools it has been employing for engag-ing the region is essentially economic. By virtue of its foreign aid and other economic assistance programmes or the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and similar other agreements that it has signed with the countries in Southeast Asia, China is moving closer to it. It has made a conscious decision to ig-nore outstanding border disputes with its neighbours while resorting to posi-tive rhetoric in advancing its relations with Southeast Asia.

China’s soft power initiatives in this regard are many. The Early Harvest programme has allowed neighbours like Thailand to negotiate mutual re-ductions in trading barriers in some agricultural goods ahead of the ASE-AN China Free Trade Area (ACFTA). The extension of aid to the least devel-oped Indo-china countries for infra-structural projects and a wider range of economic assistance that Beijing offers including non-development aid and low-interest loans, as well as trade and investment agreements has enhanced its position in the region. It offers aid to the more developed Southeast Asian countries of Indonesia and Philippines as well. Apart from offering aid to the Southeast Asian countries, its trade re-lations with the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) are also noteworthy. China’s trade with the countries has grown sharply over the last couple of years in terms of trade volume, percentage increase and size. China is also a major source of ASE-AN’s foreign direct investment (FDI).

Africa has also been witnessing growing Chinese involvement with the region. The reasons are clear. It holds a

Foreign Minister of China Yang Jiechi shakes hands with Revolutionary Socialist Party MP Abani Roy after his lecture on China-India Strategic Partnership, or-ganised by Indian Council of World Affairs and Institute of Chinese Studies

INFOCUS | FOREIGN POLICY


fraction of the world’s proven oil re-serves—9 per cent compared to the Middle East’s nearly 62 per cent—but industry analysts believe it could hold significant undiscovered reserves as well. This has prompted the oil-hungry Asian giant to get a foothold in the re-gion. China is using its direct invest-ment tool in Africa in a bid to enhance its ‘soft’ power image in the country. However, Chinese presence in Africa has evoked some concern. It is increas-ingly believed that China’s offer of comprehensive and exploitative trade deals combined with aid to the poor countries in Africa is a definitive Chi-nese strategy to exploit the region for its own interests. Thus, while China seems to be trying to win over the Afri-can countries by projecting its ‘soft’ im-age, analysts are weary of this strategy. Nonetheless, despite the apprehension, China has become the principal inves-tor in Sudan’s oil industry and related transport and infrastructure projects. The recent promise of $10 billion in cheap loans to Africa, and a pledge to cut customs duties is yet another ex-ample of Chinese continuing involve-ment with the region.

Not only does Beijing economically engage the countries in the Southeast Asia and Africa but their engagement has other facets as well. China’s estab-lishment of Confucius Institutes as in-struments for spreading Chinese lan-guage and culture abroad are examples of the other ‘soft’ power tools employed by China to spread its influence across the globe. In an effort to promote fa-miliarity with Chinese culture, Beijing offers scholarships for spreading the growth of Chinese language. Promo-tion of Chinese culture, Chinese-lan-guage schools along with networks of informal summits to bring together opinion leaders and the creation of a Chinese version of the Peace Corps for sending idealistic Chinese youth to de-veloping countries for voluntary ser-vice projects are considered “vital to Beijing’s global charm offensive.”

Beijing’s hosting of the Olympics in 2008 is the most recent example of Chinese ‘soft’ power projection. By hosting the Beijing Olympics, China has made a strong pitch to advance its prestige and attraction across the world and not the region alone. With the Olympics, the ‘China element’ has

been injected into the world. Beijing’s new proactive regional

posture is earning China a lot of appre-ciation in the world including South-east Asia. This is striking given China’s past domineering role in the region. Its transformation has led the countries in its periphery to readjust their relations with China while looking at it as a reliable partner and a constructive neighbour. Its export of goodwill not only in Southeast Asia but even far-flung countries such as in Africa has prompted the international communi-ty to take note of China’s emphasis on ‘soft’ power, which is emerging as a strong and visible component of Chinese foreign policy. This change in China’s image is encouraging and high-lights the changes that have occurred in China’s foreign policy directions in the 21st century.

Foreign Minister of China Yang Jiechi [L] shakes hand with Pakistan High Commissioner for India Shahid Malik [C], after his lecture on China-India Strategic Partnership organised by Indian Council of World Affairs and Institute of Chinese Studies


BRIC nations voice concerns over global issues and reaffirm belief in the unity among four friends.

A Harmonious Quartet


ond BRIC summit in Brasilia on April 15, “our four countries have become good friends and good partners.”

This is scarcely a small feat from a diplomatic point of view. Moreover, the four countries’ willingness to transcend their differences to seek a common voice—as shown at the increasingly in-stitutionalized BRIC summits—will help speed changes in international eco-nomic and political dynamics, Chinese international studies experts said.

A bigger sayGiven the declining role of the Unit-

ed States in the wake of the global finan-cial crisis, the other major world powers have since vied to secure themselves in favorable positions in in-ternational economic and financial ne-gotiations, said Jin Canrong, Associate Dean of the School of International Studies at Renmin University of China. With this in mind, he added, they have formed a variety of groups based on common interests.

At their second summit in Pitts-burgh in the United States in Septem-ber 2009, leaders of the Group of 20 (G20) major economies designated the G20 as the “premier forum” for interna-tional economic cooperation. This year, the G20 leaders are scheduled to meet in Canada in June and South Korea in November for two more summits.

The BRIC summit in Brasilia was meant for the BRIC nations to prepare for the coming G20 summits by coordi-nating their positions.

The four powers, meanwhile, held their first summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in June 2009—three months ahead of the G20 Pittsburgh summit. The BRIC countries, not surprisingly, are home to 42.9 per cent of the world’s population, and make up 15.5 per cent of global GDP.

The BRIC countries are also large countries with global aspirations and have, in the past, been relatively margin-alized in the currently US-dominated international system. These commonali-ties have enabled them to work in concert to seek a greater say in the international community.

The reform of international financial institutions offers a good example. Reforming the international financial

Yan Wei

When Goldman Sachs first coined the BRIC concept a decade ago, the international

investment and securities firm by no means expected that Brazil, Russia, India and China would later unite into a formal alliance. Indeed, if anything, the four fast-growing economies have since proven that BRIC represents far more than just an eye-catching acronym.

“Despite the differences in political systems, development modes, religious beliefs and cultural traditions,” said Chinese President Hu Jintao at the sec-

system, including adjusting voting pow-er in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was among the major agreements reached at the summit. The IMF and the World Bank urgently need to “address their legitimacy deficits,” BRIC leaders said in a joint communiqué.

Restructuring the governance of these institutions requires a substantial shift in voting power in favor of emerg-ing market economies and developing countries, thus bringing their participa-tion in decision making in line with their weight in the world economy, said the communiqué.

Apart from economic issues, BRIC leaders also addressed diverse topics at their second summit. These range from poverty reduction to antiterrorism—evidence that the summit has become more institutionalized. But the expand-ed agenda may pose risks because of the countries’ inherent differences.

The BRIC countries, for instance, hold vastly different views on some international issues such as the Iranian nuclear issue and the reform of the UN Security Council. Moreover, China and India tend to compete over market shares and resources. Brazil and Russia, meanwhile, are both major exporters of raw materials to China, so frictions be-tween suppliers and buyers are practi-cally unavoidable.

Future plansIn the face of both “rare opportuni-

ties” and “severe challenges,” the BRIC countries need to chart a future course for their cooperation, Hu said at the summit. In this respect, he noted, political trust, practical

THE BRIC COUNTRIES, NOT SURPRISINGLY,

ARE HOME TO 42.9 PER CENT OF THE WORLD’S

POPULATION, AND MAKE UP 15.5 PER CENT OF

GLOBAL GDP.


cooperation in diverse fields, institu-tional development, win-win results, openness and transparency are of pivotal importance.

At the summit, Hu called on the BRIC nations to take the lead in laying a more solid foundation for global eco-nomic recovery by enhancing coordina-tion in macro-economic policies. The BRIC countries, he added, should also encourage other parties to address im-balances in the global economic governance structure, while increasing the representation of emerging markets and developing countries in interna-tional financial institutions.

At the same time, said Hu, they should promote trade liberalization, properly handle trade disputes, oppose protectionism and promote the estab-lishment of an open and a mutually ben-eficial multilateral trading system. The alliance, he added, should work to im-prove the international financial regulatory system by expanding the scope of regulation while identifying regulatory responsibilities.

The BRIC countries should also call on the international community to redouble its efforts to pursue develop-ment while respecting different models of development that countries have practised, based upon their actual conditions. Industrialized countries in particular, Hu said, must honor their commitments to assisting developing nations, debt relief, market access and technology transfers to help developing countries achieve economic growth.

Hu also said that China will host the third BRIC summit next year.

Hu’s words, said Wang Yizhou, Associate Dean of the School of Inter-national Studies at Peking University, demonstrated hopes for deepened co-operation between the BRIC nations.

Despite the dramatic rise in their economic clout in recent years, emerg-ing countries have yet to play a leading role in many international forums, he said. Against this backdrop, there is a driving need for BRIC nations to work together on international issues.

Wang also voiced his belief that BRIC cooperation remains at an early stage, and thus the four countries will need decades to realize their long-term objectives.

A growing partnershipDuring their talks on April 15, Hu

and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva agreed to further advance bilat-eral ties. Hu had planned on paying state visits to Brazil, Chile and Venezuela af-ter attending the second BRIC summit. But when a devastating earthquake struck China’s Qinghai Province on April 14, he decided to cancel his visit

to Chile and Venezuela and return home to direct disaster relief efforts.

Before his departure, Hu told Lula that both the Chinese and Brazilian governments should encourage their businesses to invest more in each other’s countries in areas such as energy, mining, agriculture, industry and infra-structure development.

China is also willing to cooperate


with Brazil in oil exploration and in developing new energy resources such as bio-fuels.

In terms of cooperation with regards to science and technology, Hu recommended that both sides collabo-rate closely in the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite programme, under which the two jointly develop and operate earth observation satellites.

In addition, China will launch a “Month of Chinese Culture in Brazil” later this year, while Brazil will stage a “Month of Brazilian Culture in China” in 2011 to promote cultural and people-to-people exchanges.

During Hu’s visit, China and Brazil also signed the 2010-14 Joint Action Plan, as well as 15 other documents con-cerning areas such as trade, culture and

product quality inspection.China is Brazil’s biggest trading

partner, second biggest export market and second biggest source of imports. Two-way trade, according to China’s official statistics, reached $42.4 billion in 2009.

(This article appeared in the April 29, 2010 edition of the Beijing Review)

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China's Foreign Policy-jul-aug2010