China's Frontier Policy - Xinjiang, Central Asia and the SCO

China's Frontier Policy:

Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Matt Batten-Carew

100771982

PSCI 4803

Professor Jeremy Paltiel

29-03-12

Matt Batten-Carew 29-03-12

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China's Frontier Policy: Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

The "Great Game" narrative does not die easily when discussing Central Asia. Britain and

Russia's rivalry to acquire and exploit the vast resource wealth of the independent areas of Asia in the

1800s continues to be the frame of reference for understanding great power relations when it comes to

this region, due to its easily understandable realist assumptions of large states using their power to

dominate and pillage the weaker ones. However, the present day situation which faces China is so far

removed that drawing parallels is more likely to obscure the true nature of its relationship with its

neighbours in Central Asia than to reveal. This is particularly true when it comes to the re-emergence of

Russian power, indicated most notably by the proposed Eurasian Union (EAU) championed by Russian

President Vladimir Putin, and the implications this has for China's influence in the region. To an adherent

of the great game narrative, this development would be seen as a game-changer in a dynamic rivalry

over the resources of Central Asia, but the question which must be answered to understand how China

might respond is what motivates China's foreign policy in this region?

This paper will seek to answer this question by showing that China's foreign policy in the region

is not the product of geopolitical machinations against Russia, or even the US, but rather the result of

domestic pressures, transnational trends and globalization. This can be seen through the creation of the

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a Chinese initiative which was originally designed to solve

issues of economic interaction and border delineation but which after September 11 has become

increasingly about domestic stability and border security. China's ability to work with these states and

find common ground rather than impose its will or add them to its sphere of influence shows that the

foundations of international relations are shifting. But to fully comprehend the motivations for China's

foreign policy in Central Asia, the level of investigation must go below the state and into the domestic

situation of China's western frontier, and then examine the transnational cultural, political and religious

spheres which do not adhere to political boundaries and are the results of increasing globalization, even


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in the most remote areas. By moving from the domestic politics of China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous

Republic (XUAR) and showing the vertical relationship between the situation there and the international

one, it will then be possible to achieve an understanding of how China will react to Russia's resurgence

in the region and how XUAR and SCO will be affected.

In order to organize the interconnected dynamics at work in determining China's foreign policy,

this paper will be organized into three sections. The first will examine the history of the ethnic tensions

and violence which have come to be associated with China's Uighur population, and look at what

Chinese officials believe to the causes of what has come to be known as the "Xinjiang problem". 1 These

include the underdevelopment of the western regions as opposed to the richer coastal provinces and

the subversive work of foreign dissidents and "cultural and ethnic diehards among the Uyghurs who

pine for a past that never was"2 which link it to transnational pan-Muslim and pan-Turkic movements.

However, multiple authors argue that rather than more than economic or transnational factors are at

work. According to both Uighur leaders3 and scholars who study the problem such as Dru C. Gladney4,

ethnic conflict in XUAR has been caused by discriminatory Chinese policies towards the minority Uighur

population. However, the disconnect between the problems

The second section will focus on China's responses to this problem regarding its foreign policy,

primarily dealing in this instance with its focus on counter-terrorism and the transnational Uighur

movements which it identifies at best as destabilizing influences and at worst as security threats. This

discussion will deal with the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the rapid expansion

of its security role in the late 1990s and especially after 2001 and the beginning of the US's "War on

1 Dru C. Gladney, "China’s 'Uyghur Problem' and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization," Paper prepared for the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission Hearings, Washington, D.C. (August 3, 2006): 3.

<http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/transcripts/aug_3_4/tesimony_dru_gladney.pdf> 2 Ibid, 4. 3 Rebiya Kadeer, "The Real Story of the Uighur Riots," The Wall Street Journal, July 8, 2009. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124701252209109027.html > 4 Gladney, op. cit., 6-7.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124701252209109027.html


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Terror".5 Through the lens of the SCO and building on the context of the "Xinjiang problem" it will

examine China's relations with its Central Asian neighbours as well as Pakistan, Russia and the US, in

order to understand how its interactions with these various states have been influenced by its domestic

situation in XUAR.

The final section will build on the discussion of the "Xinjiang problem", the SCO and China's

Central Asian policies and relationships and argue that the creation of the EAU by Russia will be a

beneficial, rather than threatening, development for China's relationship with Central Asia due to its

emphasis on security while maintaining respect for individual state's sovereignty. Along with the

evidence drawn from the previous discussions, it will also incorporate examples of China's conduct in

other regions, its focus on harmony and respect, and statements from Chinese leaders which all indicate

a desire to work cooperative with Central Asia states and other powers to ensure mutual security and

stability in the region as its highest goal.

The Domestic Context of the "Xinjiang Problem"

The growing ethnic conflict in XUAR since the 1990s between Uighurs and Han Chinese is

important for China as it is one of the most publicized examples of discontent in the country since the

internationalization of the "Tibet problem" in the 1970s and 1980s. Given China's recent popularization

in the West as a new potential global rival to the US, and its concern about its international reputation,

this conflict is a sensitive issue in that it will show how China deals with internal problems, and as such

Chinese leadership has been quick to create a narrative which is simple and controllable, that of battling

the three evils "separatism, extremism and terrorism".6 This has to some extent exacerbated the

problem as focus on labelling even moderate Uighur groups as extremist has radicalized some while

5 Michael Snyder, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization," Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 8.1 (Winter, 2008): 18-19. 6 David Kerr and Swinton Laura C, "China, Xinjiang and the Transnational Security of Central Asia," Critical Asian

Studies 40.1 (2008): 113.


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forcing a siege mentality on others, creating frustration and alienation from the state. 7 At the same

time, a focus on economic development has brought a high standard of living to XUAR, although the

discontent stemming from the lag between XUAR and the east continues. 8 As becomes clear through a

deeper understanding of the conflict, neither the situation nor the solutions are simple. An examination

of the historical roots of the conflict will allow for insight into the current catalysts of the violence.

Historical Context of the "Xinjiang Problem"

The region known as Xinjiang has always existed in a trans-Asian context. Due to the movement

of peoples as consequences of conquest, trade and nomadic movement, various Turkic peoples have

been disbursed across Central Asia, as far as Turkey in the West and Manchuria in the East. These groups

have found themselves on both sides of many political borders, the most relevant example here being

the divide between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and China.9 Turkic peoples are also primarily Muslim, as is

the case for the majority of Uighurs. The region itself was nominally independent until it was brought

under the full control of the Qing Dynasty until 1878 when a Muslim insurrection against Chinese rule

was put down; Xinjiang then became a full province in 1884. The 1911 Revolution led to the collapse of

centralized rule and a time of warlordship in China however, which saw a period of prolonged

instability.10 In this vacuum of power the first East Turkestan Republic was created in 1833 by

Mohammed Amin Bughra, a prominent Muslim scholar, but lasted for only a year until 1934. The second

East Turkestan Republic came about in 1944 after a USSR-backed rebellion in the Ili region of

northwestern, which existed until it was absorbed by the People's Republic of China, with pressure from

7 Joanne Smith Finley, "Chinese Oppression in Xinjiang, Middle Eastern Conflicts and Global Islamic Solidarities

among the Uyghurs," Journal of Contemporary China 16.53 (2007): 632, 649. 8 Kerr and Swinton, op. cit., 120-121. 9 Michael Dillon, "Ethnic, Religious and Political Conflict on China's Northwestern Borders: The Background of Violence in Xinjiang," IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin (Spring, 1997): 80. 10 Ibid., 80-81.


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the USSR a determining factor.11 By 1950, a Han immigration programme had begun and in 1955 the

Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Republic was formed with autonomous regions for the largest minority

groups, such as the Mongol, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Hui. The regional government, the XUAR's People's

Council, was led by an Uighur, but the CCP's Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, which held the

real political and military power, would be continuously chaired by a Han Chinese.

Under the CCP moderate policies were adopted towards the different nations identified in the

XUAR during the 1950s. However, after the 1958 more strident policies were adopted during the Great

Leap Forward, showing a break from the more cautious policies of the 1950s as those with links to the

USSR were criticized and Islamic organizations and bazaars were shut down, foreshadowing the Sino-

Soviet split in 1962 and border closure which would follow. In the lead-up to these events, a mass

exodus of Uighurs and Kazakhs occurred, due to oppression and an intensification of the collectivization

program,12 convincing Weng Enmao, the CCP secretary of Xinjiang, to moderate the state’s policies .13

After the Cultural Revolution was begin in 1966, Wang Enmao was dismissed, and the chaos which

followed necessitated direct military control in 1971.14 The 1980s saw a hard-line, nationalistic approach

being adopted in XUAR, partially due to growing opposition to Chinese rule within the province,15

although the borders were also reopened which allowed Uighurs and other peoples in XUAR to travel for

trade and pilgrimage, and to study in madrassas which brought them in contact with larger

transnational Muslim movements.16

The 1980s saw the beginnings of opposition to Chinese rule in the form of riots which led to

deaths and injuries in Aksu and Kashghar and student demonstrations against ethnic and religious

11 Han Enze, "Boundaries, Discrimination, and Interethnic Conflict in Xinjiang, China," International Journal of Conflict and Violence 4.2 (2010): 247. 12 Dil lon, op. cit., 84. 13 Ibid., 82. 14 Ibid. 15 Han, op. cit., 247. 16 Kerr and Swinton, op. cit., 128.


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discrimination which peaked in 1989 along with the democracy movements in other parts of the

country.17 The first overt violence began in the 1990s with the "Baren Incident", an insurrection which

occurred in the Baren Township, the leadership of which called for a jihad against the Chinese and the

creation of an East Turkestani state, which was quickly suppressed, resulting in numerous deaths,18 but

would be followed by political and ethnic violence in the form of assassinations, bombings, and violent

uprising in several cities.19 The most notable riot of this period occurred in Yining (Ghulja) in 1997 just

after the beginning of the 'Strike Hard' campaign launched by China to generally combat criminal

activity, but was also used to target illegal religious activity and private Quranic schools, leading to

demonstrations and eventually violent clashes. 20

Since the 1997 riot violence and discontent has simmered, revealed by sporadic violence and

protests throughout XUAR. The major development has been the Chinese attempts to redefine the

conflict as one against the “three evils” by labelling the more vocal Uighur groups working for religious

and national expression as terrorists or separatists, which then become enemies of the state. 21 This

narrative was also strengthened by the declaration of the US War on Terror after September 11. In

terms of the conflict itself, the largest incident after the Yining incident was a large-scale riot in Urumqi

in 2009, the capital of XUAR, which occurred after what was believed to be ethnically motivated

murders of two Uighurs, leading to an attempted demonstration that was blocked by police. This led to

a frustration and anger among the Uighur population, which degenerated into violent attacks against

Han Chinese civilians, which resulted in an official death toll of 197, primarily Han Chinese, killed. This in

turn provoked a violent response from the Han Chinese population who armed themselves and marched

17 Dil lon, op. cit., 82. 18 Bovingdon, Gardner. Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent. Washington,

D.C.: East-West Center Washington (2004): 33. <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS011.pdf> 19 Dil lon, op. cit., 83. 20 Han, op. cit., 248. 21 Kerr and Swinton, op. cit., 119.


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as a show of force in Urumqi. Troops were sent to restore order but presently relations between the two

groups continue to be tense.22

Understanding and Responding to the “Xinjiang Problem”

The policy response by the Chinese leadership to the violence and discontent faced in Xinjiang

show that they believe there are two root causes. The first is the relative underdevelopment of the

poorer Western provinces compared to the traditionally richer East Coast. This is partially a result of the

structural imbalances which following the adoption of the “East Coast First Policy” implemented early on

in the reform era ushered in by President Deng Xiaoping.23 The second is the existence of an Islamic and

nationalist revival among Muslims, Uighurs and other minorities in the Xinjiang as a result of the re -

opening of the borders, which allowed new ideas to flow into the country, such as pan-Islamic and pan-

Turkic ideologies, as well as jihadism and political Islam.24 This trend is believed to have been also been

exacerbated by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the creation of independent Central Asian

republics which has allowed transnational Islamic and nationalist organizations to flourish in Central

Asia, 25 which provide support and funding to organizations in China.26

In response to these perceived causes of the “Xinjiang problem”, the Chinese leadership have

implemented two main policy tools. The first is the Great Western Development Strategy (GWDS) which

began in 2000 as part of the 10th Five Year Plan. The GWDS was created to redress the economic

underdevelopment in the West through infrastructure investment, increased migration of skilled

workers to the region (primarily Han Chinese).27 In terms of infrastructure, this includes building new

roads, railways, airports, a West-East natural gas pipeline and upgrading existing infrastructure. There is

also a strong emphasis on improving education, particularly compulsory primary education and

22 Kerr and Swinton, op. cit., 119. 23 Ibid., 121. 24 Finley, op. cit., 642-648. 25 Ker and Swinton, op. cit., 125. 26 Dil lon, op. cit., 85. 27 Ker and Swinton, op. cit., 120.


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vocational training.28 This program is in line with the Chinese leadership’s policy of maintaining stability

and legitimacy through continued economic development, assuming economic disparity is the root

cause of discontent.

The second is China’s use of the “three evils” narrative and a focus on the criminality of the

organizations involved in the protests and violence in Xinjiang. The labels of separatist, extremist or

terrorist have come to be used at different times in order to justify harsh crackdowns without drawing

international condemnation.29 This strategy has been used to brand the East Turkestan Islamic Party and

East Turkestan Independence Movement as terrorist organizations.30 Although some groups, such as the

East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), have links to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, many individual

political dissenters, human rights activists and organizations and other nationalist/religious groups have

found themselves grouped in with the ETIM as terrorists or secessionists.31 The ‘Strike Hard’ campaign

was also implemented beginning in 1996 in response to growing ethno-religious and political tensions in

Xinjiang, being used not only to strike at criminality in general but also to combat ‘political dissenters’

and ‘unlawful religious activities’ which it associates with separatism.32

However, multiple authors who write on the “Xinjiang problem” (Gladney 33, Kerr and Swinton34,

and Finley35) argue that Chinese policies, including oppression of minority cultural and religious

identities, large influxes of relatively wealthy Han migrants and discrimination based on ethnicity and

religion in government and business, are the main culprit for discontent in Xinjiang. The argument is

summed up best by Gladney in his “China’s ‘Uyghur Problem’ and the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization”:

28 Kerr and Swinton, op. cit., 121. 29 Bovingdon, op. cit., 23. 30 Han, op. cit., 253. 31 Bovingdon, op. cit., 11-12. 32 Ibid. 33 Gladney, op. cit., 3-4. 34 Kerr and Swinton, op. cit., 122-126. 35 Finley, op. cit., 628.


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A further error that easily arises from the correct recognition of Xinjiang’s importance to Beijing concerns the sources of the separatist and Islamist currents it seeks to extirpate. Many analysts, including senior

officials in Beijing, assume that these tendencies have arisen either from cultural or ethnic diehards among the local Uyghurs who pine for a past that never was, or from the efforts of subversive forces from abroad, whether from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, or from neighboring states in Central Asia. Such an assumption excludes from consideration what is arguably the main driver, namel y, Chinese

policies themselves.36 Although both the underdevelopment of the region and the existence of transnational groups with

which Uighur’s feel both sympathy and brotherhood may be important factors in making violence

confrontations with Han Chinese and symbols of the Chinese state more likely, the argument is that the

oppressiveness and assimilationist policies of the state are the primary cause of the “Xinjiang problem”.

However, the Chinese leadership disputes this, as their responses have shown, and their foreign policy

towards their Central Asian neighbours and the focus of the SCO have been oriented accordingly . Given

that the SCO is one of China’s most important diplomatic achievements in terms of it being a Chinese

initiative which can boast successes (albeit symbolic in some cases) in the political, economic and

security fields the “Xinjiang problem” can be seen to have had an important influence on Chinese

foreign policy regarding Central Asia, which shall be discussed in the next section.

The Foreign Policy Response to the “Xinjiang Problem”

The SCO has been an important success for China. As well as solving the practical issues the

organization was designed for (such as border disputes), it is also a great diplomatic success as it was

created on China’s initiative without the presence of the United States, it has benefitted the Sino-

Russian relationship, and acts a testament to China’s ability to secure its interests within its sphere of

influence. It is also a deft example of what Pei calls China’s “transactional diplomacy” in reference to the

Chinese leadership’s ability to find shared interests and mutual utility and take advantage of these in its

relationship with other countries.37 In the case of Central Asia and Russia, the shared threat of domestic

instability summed up very comprehensively in the “three evils” narrative has allowed the Chinese

36 Gladney, op. cit., 4. 37 Minxin Pei, “The Loneliest Superpower,” Foreign Policy, posted Mar.20, 2012, accessed Mar.21, 2012.

<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/20/the_loneliest_superpower>

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/20/the_loneliest_superpower


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leadership to hit multiple targets with the creation of one organization: ensure good neighbourly

cooperation, block the US from increasing its influence, promote growing economic interactions and

secure access to resources, but most of all to ensure security, as laid out in the organization’s mandate:

“SCO member states will strengthen cooperation in security fields, with the purpose of increasing

efficiency of struggle against terrorism, separatism and extremism and protecting their common

interests.”38 Following this logic, this section will argue that the main catalyst for the SCO’s creation was

to legitimate repression of transnational separatist groups which could be harmful to China and the

other members and to secure China’s borders with the Central Asian republics. In this way the SCO is

directly connected the domestic instability felt in Xinjiang. To fully establish this, there will first be a

quick overview of the SCO and then a deeper examination of its activities and usefulness to China.

In 1996, the same year the ‘Strike Hard’ campaign began, the members-states of the Shanghai-5

(China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) came together to begin solving boundary

delineation issues and remove restrictions on economic activity, both of which were seen as important

in the eyes of the Chinese leadership to solving the “Xinjiang problem”. 39 In June 2001, the Shanghai-5

group became institutionalized as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, adding Uzbekistan to its

ranks. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the SCO has become the primary international tool

that the Chinese leadership have used in order to combat transnational Uighur and Islamic movements

in Xinjiang.40 Through its increasing emphasis on security cooperation and domestic stability

maintenance, as well as the adoption of “War on Terror” rhetoric, the SCO provides a very useful service

to the Chinese leadership.41 It has also since expanded its membership in terms of observers (India, Iran,

Mongolia and Pakistan) and guest attendants include representatives from Turkmenistan, ASEAN, and

the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Although China is primarily concerned with security

38 Snyder, op. cit., 18. 39 Ibid., 16. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid., 18.


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and stability, its ability to use the SCO to answer the concerns of the Central Asian republics by providing

a forum for them to interact with Russia and China as equals and provide regional and economic

cooperation is of great benefit to all involved as well.42 They are also concerned with the existence of

separatist and Islamic groups within their territory, and have provided China assurances that they will

not support these groups. Working with these states is also important to China as it does not want to be

labelled an anti-Muslim country through its domestic repression of these groups, which also encourages

its insistence that it is dealing with a terrorist threat in a multilateral framework as part of the “War on

Terror”.43 In much the same way as the United States sees Korea and Japan as geopolitical bulwarks

against China, China hopes that by assisting the Central Asian republics they can be used as proxies to

fight rising pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic sentiments which, if they were successful in these relatively weak

states, would have spill-over affects in China’s western regions. Certain groups in these republics, such

as the Islamic Movement of Turkestan or Hizb-ut Tahrir, have stated as their expressed purpose the

overthrew of the governments not just of the states they operate in but also that of the XUAR. China has

also blamed Islamic and terrorist organizations in Afghanistan for providing funding Uighur separatists,

and that ‘East Turkestan’ terrorist organizations were responsible for over 200 terrorist i ncidents

between 1990 to 2001.44 The Chinese leadership sees the SCO bolstering “their territorial integrity,

economic revival, and secular character of the authoritarian, impoverished and ethnically diverse

regimes in Central Asia”.45 The intertwining of economic and security interests can be seen to be a

particularly effective method of securing support as trade between China and the independent Central

Asian states has grown substantially since the creation of the SCO, although it still remains relatively

42 Snyder, op. cit., 18. 43 Chien-Peng Chung, "The Defense of Xianjiang: Politics, Economics and Security in Central Asia," Harvard International Review (May 6, 2006): 58-59. 44 Ramakant Dwivedi, "China's Central Asia Policy in Recent Times," China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4.4 (2006): 142-143. 45 Chung, op. cit., 59.


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modest by international standards.46 Another important aspect of the SCO’s importance to China is both

Central Asia and Xinjiang’s relationship with energy. In 2003 over 71% of Xinjiang’s industrial output was

in the energy sector, and China’s growing economy ensures that this will only increase.47 Xinjiang is also

a major artery for China’s system of pipeline to the East, and the security of these pipelines is

paramount to its energy strategy, as much of its oil supply lines are vulnerable due to the bottleneck of

the Straits of Malacca. The worry that a conflict over Taiwan might lead to a blockade of these Straits

and a stranglehold over the Chinese economy has encouraged China to increase its access to the Central

Asian market. This connection between the security threat posed by the “Xinjiang problem” within

China, transnational organizations in Central Asia and its paramount concern over fuel for its growing

economy makes stability in this region essential to China’s strategy of continued economic growth to

ensure stability and legitimacy for its political structure.48

The interconnectedness of the “Xinjiang problem” with China’s concerns over domestic stability,

its relationship with Muslim countries in general and the Central Asian states and Russia specifically, the

“War on Terror” connection which allows it to appear a victim of transnational terrorism, and its

worries over energy supplies make the SCO, as China’s main foreign policy vehicle in Central Asia, a key

part of its grand strategy for maintaining economic growth and confidence in the government. Without

the domestic threat posed by separatism and terrorism (whether viewed in the extreme light of

terrorism or the more realistic sense of reactions to state oppression) it is unlikely that the SCO would

continue to hold the importance it has managed to attain in Central Asia.49 Presently the threat of

Uighur violence is diminished from its highpoint in the late 1990s, although the relatively recent violence

in Urumqi shows that it is by no means gone. At the same time, the SCO is branching out into a broader

46 Chung, op. cit., 59. 47 Ibid. 48 Dwivedi, op. cit., 146-149. 49 Jing-Dong Yuan, “China's Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),” Journal

of Contemporary China 19.67 (2010): 868-869.


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focus on regional development, the longer term goal of China’s strategy for securing XUAR and its

relationship with Central Asia. The question now is what it will mean for China’s Central Asia policy and

the SCO if the EAU and Russia displace China’s influence in the Central Asian republics, and how will the

SCO evolve if it is no longer the primary vehicle for regional security cooperation. This will be the focus

of the last section of this paper.

The Future of the SCO and the Eurasian Union

Beginning in October 2011, the leaders of Kazakhstan, Belarus and Russia signed an agreement

setting 2015 as the target date for the establishment of the EAU. The project is to build upon the close

ties of the three countries, including the existing customs union which was set up in 2009, with the next

step being the creation of a “United Economic Space” by the end of 2012.50 Other countries in the

Central Asian region have expressed interest, such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The eastern orientation

of the project has become clear as well, with policy analysts positing that this is a move to counter

Chinese influence in the region. Whether this is true or not is important as China’s relationship with

Russia and its interests in Central Asia will be greatly affected by the potential for overt rivalry within

this region. So far the “Great Game” narrative continues to be scorned by both sides, but the minimal

economic cooperation between Russia and China does not bode well for the growth of cooperative

relationships within Central Asia. In terms of trade in oil and gas, which one would expect to be quite

lucrative between Russia, which has one of the largest producers and refiners, and China, which has the

largest market in the world for oil and gas, the two countries relationship is fairly modest. In 2010

Russian exports of oil to China only accounted for 6% of total imports. Similarly, coal and natural gas see

a similar lack of substantial trade. Further cooperation also is seen as unlikely due to price disputes,

declining Russian production in Siberia and barriers to investment by Chinese oil companies.51 In terms

50 Brad Nelson, “Eurasian Union,” Center for World Conflict and Peace, posted Nov.13, 2011, accessed Mar.22, 2012. <http://centerforworldconflictandpeace.blogspot.ca/2011/11/eurasian-union.html> 51 Ibid., 26-33.

http://centerforworldconflictandpeace.blogspot.ca/2011/11/eurasian-union.html


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of nuclear cooperation as well, cooperation with Russia now faces competition from France and the US.

Although China’s interest in Central Asia is primarily predicated on the security and stability of its own

territory, the importance of neutral supplies of resources such as natural gas and oil cannot be

discounted, and in this area of securing supplies through influence and political clout, the deficiencies in

China and Russia’s relationship may bode ill for China’s future in Central Asia. 52 The present cooling of

relations between the two states can be traced most poignantly to Russia’s recognition of the

independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and its subsequent request for China to do likewise. China

did not feel that it could do the same given its own separatist movements in Xinjiang, Tibet and

elsewhere, and even went so far as to make sure the SCO also refrained from recognizing these states,

leading Russia to begin increasing its influence in Central Asia through multilateral organizations of

which China did not have membership, such as the CIS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization

(CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC).53

However, the relationship at the government level continues to be greatly beneficial to both

sides, arguing against the possibility of a new “great game”. In particular military and diplomatic

cooperation have been key aspects of the “strategic partnership” which began between China and

Russia with the signing of the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation as part of

the establishment of the SCO. In particular, the four Peace Missions in 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2010 which

have included both Chinese and Russian forces participating in joint military exercises alongside forces

from the Central Asian states have highlighted the effectiveness of their partnership. This military

cooperation is founded on their common interests in regional and international security and stability,

and their shared principles such as desire to block increasing US influence, promoting multilateralism

52 Nelson, op. cit. 53 Jakobson, Linda, Paul Holtom, Dean Knox and Jingchao Peng. “China’s Energy and Security Relations with Russia:

Hopes, Frustrations and Uncertainties.” SIPRI Policy Paper 29 (October 2011): 10.


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and defending non-interference in states’ domestic affairs, particularly due to the criticism they have

drawn regarding human rights and the undemocratic nature of their regimes. 54

Given the that the Sino-Russian relationship convergences on some of the more important

points, and the fact that divergence in terms of greater economic cooperation to a large degree rests on

China’s desire to be self-sufficient when it comes to great power politics, the present situation in Central

Asia does not have the makings of a geopolitical “Great Game” as some commentators have argued, but

there is room for competition for influence in the Central Asian republics. To explore this, a look at what

Russia and China have to offer and their respective interests in the region is useful.

Russia and Central Asia

As former republics of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian states have important historic ties, as

well as economic and political interdependence with Russia. Although they continue to guard their

independence, especially given their weakness and geopolitical situation between two very powerful

states, they have also been open to overtures from Russia, as can be seen from their participation in the

CIS. Kazakhstan in particularly has continued to have cordial relations with Russia, and their economic

and political policies have been closely tied, much like Russia and Belarus. Other Central Asian republics

have flirted with closer ties to Russia, although their respective opinions are defined by their particular

circumstances. All the republics (excluding Turkmenistan) have joined Russia’s other various multilateral

initiatives, such as the CSTO and EEC.55 In terms of military and economic benefits, Russia has much to

offer these states, many of whom continue to buy their energy and arms from Russia. It is believed that

by offering political support and market access in exchange for some level of economic integration the

EAU will ensure continued Russian influence and relevance in the region despite China’s growing ties

54 Jakobson et al., op. cit., vi. 55 Dwivedi, op. cit., 155-156.


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and what it can offer the Central Asian republics in the way of market for their energy and economic

development opportunities.56

China and Central Asia

Much like Russia, China has a long history of relations with Central Asia, although this has

traditionally been one of patron-client relations. Like Russia, China is adopting an equal partnership

approach to the Central Asian republics, offering cooperation in the economic, military and political

fields primarily through the SCO as discussed before. Its primary interest is in border security and

stability and thus has focused on its direct neighbours, namely Tajikistan, Krygyzstan, Kazakhstan and

Russia, but is also concerned with energy supplies, making the its relationship with all the states of the

region, including Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, important factors.57 The primarily benefits the Central

Asian states gain from dealing with China are its growing economy which has made it the largest and

most easily accessible market for their energy exports, the promise of loans and infrastructural

investment both in and out of the energy sector and the externalities of having a close relationship with

China, such as political protection from a Security Council member.58 The fact that China’s domestic

security issues also align with those of some of the Central Asian republics also ensures mutual reliance

for security and stability as well. In both the cases of Russia and China, there exist different pressures

and desires for their relationship with Central Asia, but this does not necessarily mean the end of the

strategic partnership and the SCO, both of which have been extremely important geopolitically for these

countries over the last decade and a half.

Complicated Cooperation or Geopolitical Rivalry?

Given Russia and China’s different relationships and interests in Central Asia, will this lead to a

critical mass of conflicting policies and overt rivalry, or is there enough convergence for the strategic

56 David Cohen, “China and the Eurasian Union,” The Diplomat Oct.7, 2011. <http://the-diplomat.com/china-power/2011/10/07/china-and-the-eurasian-union/> 57 Yuan, op. cit., 857-860. 58 Cohen, op. cit.


17

partnership to continue despite Russian misgivings about the growth of Chinese influence? In their

article on China and Russia’s security and economic cooperation, Jakobson et al. lays out the main points

of convergence and conflict in China and Russia’s relationship in order to better understand the future

of the SCO and cooperation in Central Asia. Looking at what makes Russia and China strategic partners

to begin with, Jakobson et al. identify their interests in three broad categories. The first is the

maintenance of peace and stability, including peaceful borders, fighting the three evils and ensuring

domestic security for themselves and their Central Asian neighbours. The second is fostering a more

multipolar world order, which includes opposition to growing US influence and the expansion of NATO,

support for multilateralism and non-interference in domestic affairs, including the right for states to

determine their own political system and the treatment and status of ethnic groups. The last is their

views on non-proliferation which are not as “obsessive” as the West, as they see it, but still important to

their security.59

In terms of conflict, China and Russia both pursue pragmatic foreign policies, which can bring

them into conflict, an example being recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

There is also a lack of political trust between the two countries despite the official rhetoric; China

worries that Russia still harbours global ambitions, while Russia does not discount the possibility that

China may use military force to secure its interests in Central Asia. This is also tied closely to the

understanding that both will pursue their own national interest first. The last factor is their conflicting

views on how to combat US global influence while maintaining their own important bilateral

relationships with it.60

Given the convergence and conflict inherent in all relationships, the fact that the largest

problem which exists between Russia and China is their political distrust of one another and their weak

59 Jakobson et al., op. cit., 4-9. 60 Ibid., 9-12.


18

economic ties, this is not nearly the geopolitical rivalry which authors such as Swanström 61 or Nelson62

make it out to be. Although the EAU does signal a more aggressive move by Russia in cementing its

influence in Central Asia, the SCO will continue to be an important vehicle for bilateral and regional

cooperation between the member states of the organization, especially with its enlargement to include

India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan as observers. Despite the questions and concerns which the creation

of the EAU has brought up, the SCO continues to provide unique benefits for many of the countries

which participate in it, such as regional economic integration and secure access for China to Central

Asia’s vast resource wealth and for Central Asia to China’s important markets. China has also made it

clear that is wishes to increase the institutionalization of the SCO in order to disseminate mutually

beneficial norms, many of which are the principles which Russia and China share that provide

convergence for their interests.63 Even if the EAU were widely accepted by all the Central Asian

republics, which is not assured, the security and economic aspects of it as a regional organization would

lag behind the benefits provided by the SCO. Other Russian initiatives such as the CSTO and EEC which

technically provide all the necessary regional integration mechanisms which the EAU would have fallen

short of creating any meaningful regional cooperation where the SCO has real successes to show, 64 such

as the Peace Missions, cooperation on anti-terrorism and insurgency activities, such as mutual

recognition of terrorist threats and extradition of prisoners between the countries for trial 65 and

increasing economic and energy integration for the region.66 The idea that Russia could potentially

implement the EAU project and force China to deal with it directly on issues of energy and development

61 Niklas Swanström, "China and Central Asia: A New Great Game or Traditional Vassal Relations," Journal of Contemporary China 14.45 (November, 2005): 569-571. 62 Nelson, op. cit. 63 Yuan, op. cit., 868-869. 64 Dwivedi, op. cit., 155-156. 65 Bovingdon, op. cit., 23. 66 Jakobson et al., op. cit., 10-11.


19

is unlikely given China’s increasing political and military clout, and attractiveness of a good relationship

with an up-and-coming superpower to the Central Asian republics.

Conclusion: Xinjiang, the SCO and the EAU

Foreign policy is at its heart determined by the domestic pressures a state faces. In China’s case,

the conflicts it faces with Uighur and Islamic groups in Xinjiang have been integral to shaping its policies

regarding Central Asia. Both the GWDS and the SCO are responses to the “three evils” which afflict its

western region. By identifying XUAR’s underdevelopment and the potential transnational nature of the

“Xinjiang problem” as its root causes, rather than their own oppressive policies and unrestricted Han

migration, these moves have not only shaped domestic policy but also foreign policy in the region. The

SCO has thus become China’s primary tool for the mobilization of security and economic cooperation in

Central Asia to combat the “Xinjiang problem”, and has combined with the ‘Strike Hard’ campaign

domestically to combat organizations and individuals it labels as dangerous, whether using terrorism,

separatism or criminality as its justification. The cooperation with Central Asian republics and Russia has

been indispensible in this role, as it would be difficul t to combat the transnationally-organized Uighur

and Islamic movements without the help of the Central Asian republics which are natural launching

points for both violent and peaceful organization against the Chinese state, as well as gaining

international recognition of the “terrorist” nature of these organizations by using the SCO and “War on

Terror” rhetoric to justify its claims against organizations like the ETIM and ETIP. The economic aspects

of cooperation with Central Asia which the SCO seeks to address, such as providing access to Central

Asian resources through stabilizing the China-Central Asia economic relationship and allowing Chinese

troops into the states to protect their infrastructure and investments has also been important for the

development of Xinjiang as well due to its own involvement in the energy sector.

Due to the importance of the SCO, both in dealing with the “Xinjiang problem” and as a

diplomatic tool with which China can generally interact with the Central Asian republics, the moves by


20

Russia to create a Eurasian Union can be seen as threatening China’s interests in the region. However,

the convergence of Sino-Russian interests in building a multipolar world and maintaining peaceful

borders is likely to outweigh their political distrust as the SCO continues to be an important tool for all

parties involved, including the Central Asian republics, and the Eurasian Union will not be a viable

alternative for some time to come, and when it is China’s bargaining position will only be greater as its

economy and the benefits of its partnership grow. Although each Central Asian republic will make its

own decisions based on its national interests, overall it is unlikely Russia will be able to lock China out of

Central Asia.67 China’s influence in the region is only going to grow, not diminish.

67 Cohen, op. cit.


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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/20/the_loneliest_superpower

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124701252209109027.html

http://www.opendemocracy.net/henryk-szadziewski/uyghurs-china-and%20central-asia

http://www.opendemocracy.net/henryk-szadziewski/uyghurs-china-and%20central-asia

Documents

China's Frontier Policy - Xinjiang, Central Asia and the SCO